ML20134K216
| ML20134K216 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/11/1997 |
| From: | Spraul J NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134K219 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-32 NUDOCS 9702130189 | |
| Download: ML20134K216 (2) | |
Text
ye focec%4 UNITED STATES g g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'f WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055H001
%, p' February 11, 1997 MEMORANDUM TO: Robert C. Pierson, Chief Special Projects Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards THROUGH: Michael Tokar, Chief .,
Tank Waste Remediation Syste Special Projects Branch /
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and'$afeguards l
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards FROM: John G. Spraul i Tank Waste R ediation System Section Special Projects Branch !
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards i Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards ,
l
SUBJECT:
OBSERVATION AUDIT OF THE WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION I PROJECT I During January 27-30,1997,I performed an observation audit of the U.S. Department r4 Energy (DOE), Environmental Management, Office of Waste Management, Office of Technical Services (EM-37) compliance audit of the quality assurance (OA) program of the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP). This audit was conducted at the WVDP.
facilities in West Valley, New York. The audit evaluated the adequacy and effectiveness of !
the WVDP QA program as applied to the WVDP activities related to high-level radioactive waste form production. The audit took place while WVDP personnel were completing the fill of the 69th of some planned 300 canisters with the high-level radioactive waste slurry at the West Valley site. The report of my observation audit is Attachment 1.
The objectives of my trip were: (1) to become familiar with the WVDP processes and procedures for vitrification of high-level radioactive waste and its associated QA program and (2) to gain confidence that the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), EM 37, WVDP, and their contractor / subcontractor personnel are properly / /
implementing the requirements of their organizations' QA programs in accordance with the OCRWM Quality Assurance Requirements and Description Document (QARD - DOE /RW-0333P) and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 70 - Subpart @
70.22(f), and Part 60 - Subpart G. (Both subparts reference Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.)
130044 CONTACT: Jack Spraul, FCSS/SPB/TWRS NRC HLE CSIS WY 415-6715 /;
9702130189 970211 PDR PRDJ M-32 PDR
R. C. Pierson, SPB/FCSS 2-At the pre-sudit meeting on January 27, the audit team leader described the purpose of the suoit ..d introduced the audit team members and observers. WVDP personnel then described tha WVDP organization and ongoing activities. Handouts from their presentations are Attachments 2-4. A tour of the vitrification facility followed.
During the course of the audit, I observed the tungsten-inert gas closure weld of a canister as well as the movement of a welded canister from the weld station into the '
decontamination station. I also toured the chemistry laboratory where samples from each melt are tested.
On Tuesday afternoon (January 28), I attended a WVDP briefing concerning the December ,
1996 incident at Fernald, Ohio, where the melter at Fernald's vitrification pilot plant f developed a leak that deposited about a ton of molten glass on the floor. The individual who presented the briefing had recently returned from Fernald where he had been a '
member of a team investigating the incident. Attachment 5, a copy of the " overhead" used at the briefing, shows the major differences between the melters and their operation at West Valley and at Fernald. The presenter described how,in his opinion, these differences caused the incident at Femald. He expressed his belief that Fernald's higher :
operating temperature, higher lead content, and lesser REDOX control were the principal I causes of the problem. Based on his experience, he opined that WVDP would not have a similar experience. 4 e
My observation of this DOE audit greatly increased my familiarization with the vitrification ,
work that is ongoing at West Valley and planned for Hanford. I plan to observe a similar ,
DOE audit at Savannah River later this year.
Docket M-32 Attachments: (5), as stated !
DISTRIBUTION (w/ attachments):
c File Center # PUBLIC ACNW LSS CNWRA j NMSS r/f SPB r/f DMartin ABryce RShewmaker RWescott MWeber GComfort JAustin JThoma WBelke SWastler BMabrito JJankovich EEaston !
(w/o attachments): l ETen Eyck WBrach MFederline PSobel l DOCUMENT NAME: S:\JGS1\WVDP-OA.Rpt we nn. ne c , ..c.eviwrwiua=.u.. in iin sarei :u s .n,uisu.w.
OFC TWRS E Tw$tS h \TWRS / 5 NAME JGSpraul/ij* Mkoadley okar DATE 02/07/97 H 02/10/97 d 0[/ k7
' See previous concurrence OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
l l
I R. C. Pierson, SPB/FCSS l l
At the pre-audit meeting on January 27, the audit team leader described the purpose of the audit and introduced the audit team members and observers. WVDP personnel then described the WVDP organization and ongoing activities. Handouts from their presentations are Attachments 2-4. A tour of the vitrification facility followed.
During the course of the audit, I observed the tungsten-inert gas closure weld of a canister as well as the movement of a welded canister from the weld station into the decontamination station. I also toured the chemistry laboratory where samples from each melt are tested. l On Tuesday afternoon (January 28),I attended a WVDP briefing concerning the December 1996 incident at Fernald, Ohio, where the metter at Fernald's vitrification pilot plant developed a leak that deposited about a ton of molten glass on the floor. The individual who presented the briefing had recently retumed from Fernald where he had been a member of a team investigating the incident. Attachment 5, a copy of the " overhead" used at the briefing, shows the major differences between the metters and their operation !
at West Valley and at Fernald. The presenter described how,in his opinion, these differences caused the incident at Fernald. He expressed his belief that Fernald's higher operating temperature, higher lead content, and lesser REDOX control were the principal causes of the problem. Based on his experience, he opined that WVDP would not have a similar experience.
My observation of this DOE audit greatly incressed rty familiarization with the vitrification i
work that is ongoing at West Valley and planned for Manford. I plan to observe a similar DOE audit at Savannah River later this year.
t Docket Number: 70-3019 Attachments: (5)
DISTRIBUTION (w/ attachments):
File Center PUBLIC ACNW LSS CNWRA NMSS r/f SPB r/f DMartin ABryce RShewmaker RWescott MWeber GComfort JAustin JThoma WBelke SWastler BMabrito JJankovich EEaston i
(w/o attachments):
ETen Eyck WBrach MFederline PSobel DOCUMENT NAME: S:\JGS1\WVDP-OA.Rpt in ernell bem en *0PC* hne enter: C - Cover ervy, E = (VERYTHING N = No copy in ernell bem en "DATE" hne enser: M = Egnail distributiert H = Hard copy OFC n TWRS E TWRS TWRS NAME hJGSpraul/ij N DHoadley MTokar DATE b 02/07/97 H 02/ /97 02/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY