ML20134H086
| ML20134H086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1985 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEB-79-27, NUDOCS 8508280267 | |
| Download: ML20134H086 (4) | |
Text
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c C PS Public Serwce Ekx: toc and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation August 26, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bathesda, MD 20814 Attention:
Mr. Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT CONFIRMATORY ISSUE 22 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 Pursuant to discussions held with J.
Mauck and D. Wagner on August 19, 1985, Public Service Electric and Gas Company has revised the response to FSAR Question 421.42 to reflect the re-review of IC Circular No. 79-02 as required by lE Bulletin 79-27.
This item closes out SER Confirmatory Issue 22 and is attached for your review.
This information will be included in Amendment 12 of the HCGS FSAR.
Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact us.
e very truly yours, lIl }
l B508280267 Q 80 S4 NG 5 1 PDR ADOCK PDR k
Y e
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I The Energy People 95 4912 (4V) 7 83
- g.
4-t Dir.~of Nuc. Reactor' Reg._.
2 8/26/85
-C
'D. H. Wagner
> - USNRC' Licensing Project Manager-
. A.- R. = Blough
^
USNRC; Senior Resident Inspector
~NG 5 1/2
()
OUESTION 421.42 (SECTION 7.5)
If reactor controls and vital instruments derive power form common electrical distribution systems, the failure of such electrical distribution systems may result in an event requiring operator action concurrent with failure of important instrumentation upon which these operator actions should be based.
IE Bulletin 79-27 addresses several concerns related to the above subject.
You are requested to provide information and a discussion based on each IE Bulletin 79-27 concern.
Also, you are to:
1)
Confirm that all a.c. and d.c. instrument buses that could affect the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition were reviewed.
Identify these buses.
I' 2)
Confirm that all instrumentation and controls required by emergency shutdown procedures were considered in review.
Identify these instruments and controls at the system level i,
of detail.
J 3)
Confirm that clear, simple unambiguous annunciation of loss of power is provided in the control room for each bus addressed in item 1 above.
Identify any exceptions.
'i 4)
Confirm that the effect of loss of power to each load on f
each bus identified in item 1 above including ability to reach cold shutdown, was considered in the review.
l 5)
Confirm that the re-review of IE Circular No. 79-02 which is a
required by Action Item 3 of Bulletin 79-27 was extended to 4
include both Class IE and non-Class IE inverter supplied (7-instrument or control buses.
Identify these buses or confirm that they are included in the listing required by Item 1 above.
RESPONSE
An analysis (see Reference 1) was conducted based on the Limerick Generating Station (LGS-1) approach for answering the concerns raised in IE Bulletin 79-27.
This methodology has been reviewed and approved by the NRC via a report written for the LGS-1 project.
The analysis showed there is'no situation where a single bus power failure would prevent plant personnel from achieving a safe shutdown condition.
The results established that no single bus supplies power to all existing shutdown paths.
The assignment of the instrument loads identified in this analysis is such that the l
loss of one bus would not prevent the minimum safety function
- }
from being performed.
421.42-1 Amendment 8 l
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. _., _,.,., -. ~,,.,. _ _ _,. -,,,,, -.
ThefailurecIfeachofthebusesareannun'iatedandare c
displayed by the computer in the control room, thereby giving the operator the knowledge of which power bus is lost.
The analysis showed that control room personnel will have knowledge of individual bus and/or circuit failures, and that the operator has alternative instruments and' shutdown paths available to achieve a cold' shutdown condition.
MF REFERENCE l
1.
" Cold Shutdown / Power Bus Failure Analysis Report," Hope Creek Generating Station, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, August 1984.
' 'T~h e anal sis was extendeol
-+e> in c lude both c. lass y
lie d ins-fram ens
!E and non - Class i e in verter. sapp id en tdied on MI' R b u s e s. Th es e.
buses a.re mw e r
- o. n n u.n e. i cet or-o f Reference I
c.oryesponding u se C-c' M n des ig n o.+i o n o S.
t;to V ac. M P S T eb l ". A/D or a clmin; siv a;H de C.Oni Poj 3 ujerc
)
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,.e - r egs g e e
- c. \\ v e.w\\ o.r N o.
79**A-s O
421.42-2 Amendment 8 l