ML20133E661
| ML20133E661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/02/1985 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Proxmire W SENATE, BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133E664 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510090476 | |
| Download: ML20133E661 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h
v f k WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
/ October 2, 1985 CHAIRMAN The Honorable William Proxmire Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Proxmire:
In response to your letter of August 30, 1985, enclosed are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) answers to the four questions you raised concerning NRC's views on the proposed U.S./ People's Republic of China (PRC) Agreement for Cooperation.
As you know, on July 19 the NRC forwarded to the President a classified letter which set forth the Commission's views on the overall U.S./PRC arrangement. Some of the issues raised in your letter are addressed in detail in our letter to the President.
However, since you have requested an unclassified reply, the extent of the enclosed responses must be limited, particularly with regard to the answers to Questions 1 and 2.
Should you have additional questions, please advise us.
Sincerely, d [ M Nunzio J. P lladino
Enclosure:
Questions & Answers I
P 8510090476 PDR 851002 COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
RESPONSE TO SENATOR PR0XMIRE REGARDING NRC'S VIEWS ON THE PROPOSED U.S./PRC AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION QUESTION 1: In discussions with the PRC a month before the President approved the nuclear cooperation agreement, the United States Government received assurances from the PRC, which, according to the July 19, 1985 public Memorandum For The President by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, were "needed to clarify certain matters related to implementation of China's nuclear policies." Is the Commission completely satisfied with these private assurances? Are these assurances as firm as the Commission would like them to be so there is no possibility for misunderstanding between the two nations in the future?
ANSWER:
! The Commission is concerned with the assurances provided by the PRC. As presently constituted, they could lead to future misunderstandings. Because these concerns involve classified information, we are unable to discuss them in detail in this response.
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QUESTION 2: There have been a number of press reports that the PRC has aided Pakistan in the development of nuclear weapons. In light of these reports, has the Commission reached a firm conclusion that the PRC in the future will do no damage to U.S.
nonproliferation objectives? There have also been press reports of questionable or unsafe-guarded nuclear exports by the PRC to other nations, such as Argentina and South Africa. Is the commission fully satisfied that all future nuclear exports by the PRC to South Africa, Argentina or any other nation will be made with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and other appropriate nonproliferation conditions?
ANSWER:
The Commission cannot comment on this question in an unclassified fashion.
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QUESTION 3: Is the Commission fully satisfied that Article 5 (2) of the U.S./PRC Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
, represents a clear and unambiguous statement of
, U.S. consent rights for the subsequent reprocessing or enrichment by the PRC of U.S.
nuclear material transferred pursuant to the agreement?
ANSWER:
Although we believe the requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act are satisfied, the Commission would have preferred that the agreement contain a clear statement of U.S.
- consent rights for the subsequent reprocessing or enrichment of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel or fuel used in U.S.-supplied reactors. Such a statement could eliminate the potential for future misunderstanding.
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QUESTION 4: Article 2 (1) of the Agreement contains a provision not found in previous nuclear coopera-tion agreements that the U.S. has signed. The provision states: "The parties recognize, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." What is the Commission's view on the effect of this provision on the authority of Congress to enact future legislation that might affect activities covered under the U.S.-PRC Agreement? How might this provision affect the flexibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy in the future, particularly as it relates to the FRC?
ANSWER:
The Department of State takes the view that the provision you have cited reflects a principle of international law contained in Articles 26 and 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified customary law relating to treaties.
The U.S. has signed but not yet ratified that Convention. The Commission is concerned that this new provision could be read as reducing the flexibility of the U.S., including that of Congress, in enacting and implementing future legislation affecting U.S./PRC nuclear relations. However, we believe that subsequently enacted domestic legislation that was inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement would have priority.
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