ML20133E129
| ML20133E129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1997 |
| From: | Cotton K NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | William Cahill POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M97448, NUDOCS 9701100210 | |
| Download: ML20133E129 (5) | |
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t UNITED STATES l
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I #
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2naan anni k*s.,<,/
January 9, 1997
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l Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer l
Power Authority of the State of I
New York 123 Main Street l
White Plains, NY 10601
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO BULLETIN 96-02,
" MOVEMENT OF DRY STORAGE CASKS OVER SPENT FUEL, FUEL IN THE REACTOR CORE, OR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT" (TAC NO. M97448)
Dear Mr. Cahill:
l The NRC staff has evaluated the responses to Bulletin 96-02, " Movement of Dry Storage Casks over Spent Fuel, Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Safety-Related Equipment," and found that some licensees without single-failure-proof cranes i
have analyzed or are planning to analyze postulated spent fuel storage cask and transportation cask drop accidents to establish design basis accidents for l
l their facilities.
Typical cask drop analyses for in-plant cask movement have addressed the effects of a drop on plant equipment and/or cask integrity.
Those analyses have assumed that the cask was in its final condition with its structural lids bolted or welded in place and that the fuel remained in the cask at all times though the integrity of the cask might be breached during the cask drop.
However, since most cask lids are not secured until after the casks are removed from the pool, it is conceivable that a cask could drop in a tipped-over orientation.
The cask could be also dropped back into the spent fuel pool or adjacent area,- possibly dislodging the cask lid or dislodging the cask lid and ejecting some or all the spent fuel elements onto the top of the spent fuel racks, the floor of the pool, or adjacent areas.
i l
This accident scenario involves the potential for dropping the cask during movement from the spent fuel pool to the area within the plant building where activities such as drying, inerting, and final securing of the cask lid are completed. Offsite dose effects are not expected from a cask drop and tip-over event in which there is a loss of both the cask lid and fuel confinement.
l However, the effect of such an event on the operation of the facility needs to l
be assessed.
For example, evaluations may need to determine if any vital l
plant areas are rendered inaccessible and if operations or maintenance activities would be significantly hampered.
Such evaluations would involve, but are not limited to, the cask and crane designs, the load paths, and the extent to which the licensee can demonstrate its capability of performing actions necessary for safe shutdown with resulting plant damage and in the l
g presence of radiological source term.
p 1
NRC FBI CENTER COPY 100089 9701100210 970109 PDR ADOCK 05000333 0
W. Cahill January 9, 1997 To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), please provide the following:
1.
An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario described above is not credible at your facility, or 2.
If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:
(a)
An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the cask lid and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool.
This load drop / consequence analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the cask movement for the time immediately following the accident. Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.
(b)
An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.
(c)
An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.
(d)
An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other. parts.of the facility (e.g., the spent fuel pool) is bounded by. previous load drop analyses.
Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of thisiequest for information.
If you need clarification of the staff's request, please contact Karen Cotton at (301) 415_1438.
4 l
Sincerely,
" /s/
'K'aren R. Cotton,' Acting Project' Manager Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Of fice. of Nuclear Reactor Regulatini, Docket No. 50-333 I
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ encl:
See next page DISTRIBUTION:
See next page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\FITZ\\BUL96-02.RAI
- See previous concurrence To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:
"C" - Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" - Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" - No copy 0FFICE PM:PDI-1
,,lE LA P01 1" l
D PDI 1 // /
l l
l NAME KCotton/rst {gj/
SLittle SBajwa A / Q_
DATE 01/ $ /97 01/08/97 01/4 /97 01/ /97 01/ /97 Offici al Record Copy
i W. Cahill To support further NRC staff evaluation of this potential cask drop scenario while the reactor is at power (in all modos other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), please provide the following:
1.
An evaluation of your crane design, load path, and cask loading and unloading processes that supports a determination that the scenario described above is not credible at your facility, or 2.
If you determine that the event is credible, please provide the following:
(a)
An analysis of a possible drop of a spent fuel storage or transportation cask involving a drop that results in the tipping over of the spent fuel cask, loss of the cask lid, or loss of the cask lid!and ejection of the spent fuel from the cask into the spent fuel pool or areas adjacent to the pool. This load drop / consequence analysis should include a dose analysis to personnel involved in the cask movement for the time immediately following the accident. Also, the analysis should address personnel exposure resulting from required entry into plant areas affected by the event and the impact of elevated dose fields on the ability to reach safe shutdown or continue normal plant operation.
(b)
An evaluation addressing the potential for criticality resulting from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.
(c)
An evaluation that addresses possible means of recovering from the postulated cask drop accident scenario described above.
(d)
An evaluation that addresses whether the potential impact of the scenario described above on other parts of the facility (e.g., the spent fuel pool) is bounded by previous load drop analyses.
Please provide your response within 60 days of your receipt of this request for information.
If you need clarification of the staff's request, please contact me at (301) 415-1438.
Sincerely, 4AM Karen R. Cotton, Acting Project Manager Project Directorace I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-333 cc: See next page
William J. Cahill, Jr.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Authority of the State Power Plant of New York cc:
Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein Regional Administrator, Region I Assistant General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Power Authority of the State 475 Allendale Road of New York King of Prussia, PA 19406 1633 Broadway New York, NY 10019 Mr. F. William Valentino, President New York State Energy, Research, Resident Inspector's Office and Development Authority U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Corporate Plaza West P.O. Box 136 286 Washington Avenue Extension i
Lycoming, NY 13093 Albany, NY 12203-6399 Mr. Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Mr. Richard L. Patch, Director Resident Manager Quality Assurance James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Authority of the State Power Plant of New York P.O. Box 41 123 Main Street Lycoming, NY 13093 White Plains, NY 10601 Ms. Charlene D. Faison Mr. Gerard Goering Director Nuclear Licensing 28112 Bayview Drive Power Authority of the State Red Wing, MN 55066 of New York 123 Main Street Mr. James Gagliardo White Plains, NY 10601 Safety Review Committee 708 Castlewood Avenue Supervisor Arlington, TX 76012 j
Town of Scriba Route 8, Box 382 Mr. Arthur Zaremba, Licensing Oswego, NY 13126 Manager James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Mr. Robert G. Schoenberger, Power Plant Vice President P.O. Box 41 and Chiaf Operating Officer Lycoming, NY 13093 Power Authority of the State of New York Mr. Paul Eddy 123 Main Street New York State Dept. of White Plains, NY 10601 Public Service 3 Empire State Plaza,10th Floor Charles Donaldson, Esquire Albany, NY 12223 Assistant Attorney General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271
DETRIBUTION:
Docket File
'PUBLIC PDI-l R/F S. varga J. Zwolinski S. Bajwa S. Little K. Cotton 0GC ACRS C. Cowgill, Region I i
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