ML20133D365
| ML20133D365 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1997 |
| From: | James Knubel GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 6710-96-2412, NUDOCS 9701090157 | |
| Download: ML20133D365 (23) | |
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GPU Nuclear,Inc.
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Route 441 South NUCLEAR Post Off'ce Box '80 Middletown, PA 17057 0480 Tel 717-944-7621 January 03, 1997 6710-96-2412 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Thermo-Lag Response to Request for Additional Information NRC letter dated November 20,1996 (6710-96-3408) requested additional information regarding the TMI-l request for exemption from 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, previously submitted by letters dated August 16, 1996 (6710-96-2229) and August 28, 1996 (6710-96-2301). The attachment provides an itemized response to each of the NRC questions.
i If any additional information is required, please contact Mr. David J. Distel, GPU Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (201) 316-7955, i
1 Sincerely, d
I 9701090157 970103 J.Knubel I
ADOCK 0500 9
j yDR Vice President & Director, TMI k
DJD/jr Attachment l
cc: Administrator, Region I NRC TMI Senior Resident Inspector q c gt3 NRC Senior Project Manager, TMl g
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Page1of10 ATTACHMENT NRC Ouestion:
1.
Topical Report #094, Rev 1, page 7 states:
i To establish the barrier rating (ACTUAL RATING) of a test assembly, GPU Nuclear reviewed the temperature data for the test and identified the point in time when the first individual temperature reading.... exceeded 325 degrees F above the initial temperature. Note that this method establishes a rating for all the elements of a particular raceway size based upon the weakest link in the raceway...it is conservative to establish a common rating for all elements of a raceway based upon a single high reading for the entire raceway.
This implies that the average temperature of the raceway (or cable tray) is not taken into j
account when making the determination of the fire rating of the assembly. Provide technicaljustification for this deviation from Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1.
2.
For each fire barrier element, describe how consideration of the average temperatures will affect the fire rating analysis.
Response to Ouestions (1) and (2):
The responses to Questions 1 & 2 are combined as follow::
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The average temperature of the raceway or cable tray was taken into account in the process of setting the criteria for establishing fire barrier ratings. Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, states that:
"The averages of any thermocouple group during the fire test should not exceed 139 C (250 F) above the unexposed side temperature within the fire barrier test specimen at the onset of the fire endurance test. In addition, the temperature of each individual thermocouple will be evaluated. Individual thermocouple conditions should not exceed the 139 C (250 F) temperature rise by more than 30 percent." (325 F above initial ambient)
In establishing fire barrier ratings, the use of the maximum individual thermocouple reading on the exterior surface of the raceway was adequate to establish fire barrier ratings. In the case of conduits, the maximum reading alone yields results consistent with the requirements of Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, for 6-and 3-inch conduits
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because the maximum allowed was reached prior to the average allowable being reached.
For %-inch conduit, the maximum reading alone yields higher rating results. For
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consistency, GPU Nuclear used the same data review methodology for all raceways rather than use the maximum temperature alone on 3-and 6-inch conduits and average temperature on %-inch conduit. It should be noted that GPU Nuclear used the weakest link in a particular tested configuration to establish a single barrier rating for all barrier types in that configuration. This is described in more detail later in this response.
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Page 2 of 10 ATTACHMENT A review of the test data for conduits (data is from Omega Lab Report 13890-96143 (NEI Test 2-3)) shows the following:
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St %XI%It'NI NIAXINIl'NI AVERAGE EXTERIOR I D Lt MAXI %ft'%l 11Mf AVERAGE li)E Al.I,0WED JIME II.,,E l
TR NI'RFACE AI I,0WED 6"
383 F 388 F 102 min.
309 F 310 F 102 min.
3" 383 F 385 F 91 min.
309 F 310 F 99 min.
385 F 387 F 69 min.
309 F 310 F 63 min.
As stated previously, the method for selecting a fire barrier rating as described in Topical Report #094 results in fire barrier ratings for 6-inch and 3-inch conduit consistent with Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1. For %-inch conduit, use of the maximum single point reading results in a higher fire barrier rating than the method endorsed by Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1; however, this is justified by the fact that use of external conduit surface temperature does not take into account the time delay for heat transfer from the outside to the inside surface. This is supported by the bare #8 conductor readings. Although these readings do not positively demonstrate inside surface temperature because the conductor may not be in contact with the inside surface, they conclusively demonstrate the delay from the outside to the inside surface. For example, at 69 minutes for the %-inch conduit, the maximum bare #8 conductor reading was 356 F vs.
387 F maximum recorded exterior surface temperature. At 69 minutes the average bare
- 8 conductor temperature was 310 F, the same as the exterior surface average temperature at 63 minutes. Also no structural failure or burn-through is evident at 69 minutes. The criteria of no structural failure or burn-through applies to all evaluations for all size conduits.
For cable tray, the maximum bare copper conductor temperature on the right rail of the 24 j
x 4 tray (325 F over initial ambient) was used to establish the barrier rating. This is i
consistent with Generic Letter, Supplement 1, because at 85 minutes into the test the average temperatures and all other single point readings were still acceptable. Therefore, 1
85 minutes is considered a conservative and acceptable fire barrier rating. For the 6 x4 tray, all average and single point readings were acceptable at 86 minutes into the test at which point the test was terminated.
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The use of the single high reading to establish a fire barrier rating for all types of f
configurations on a raceway is considered conservative because both localized average j
and maximum temperatures at different locations on the tested raceway could result in I
higher fire barrier ratings for configurations such as condulets. Reviewing the thermocouple data for the %-inch conduit in NEI Test 2-3 suggests that condulets in that configuration could be rated at 96 minutes based upon the single maximum temperature vs. 69 minutes for straight conduit.
i In summary, a review and comparison of the methodology used by GPU Nuclear and l
Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, does not yield substantial differences in establishing fire barrier ratings for the tests avaluated. The only identified difference is 63 minutes 6710-96-2412 i
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age 3 f10 ATTACHMENT (GL 86-10) vs. 69 minutes (GPU Nuclear) for the %-inch conduit which is not considered to be significant as discussed above. Both methods result in ratings which exceed 60 minutes which is considered adequate for the areas where the exemption from automatic suppression is requested.
6710-96-2412
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"3 F-Page 4 of 10 ATTACHMENT NRC Ouestion:
- 3. to Topical Report #094 describes 2.5-inch straight and radial bend conduits and condulets which are qualified by the test of a %-inch conduit /condulet. Provide a bounding analysis of the 2.5-inch conduits and condulets with respect to the test results of both the 3-inch conduits and condulets and the %-inch conduit and condulets.
Response
Evaluations for Elements Numbers 284 (2.5-inch straight conduit),285 (2.5-inch radial bend conduit), and 30 (2.5-inch condulet), as described in Attachment I to Topical Report
- 094, state that the comparable test configuration to the installed configuration is % inches vs. 2.5 inches respectively. Using the results of the smaller test configuration as a comparison is necessary since no baseline 2.5-inch conduit 3-hour barrier envelope was tested. Use of the smaller configuration as a comparison is considered conservative since the results of testing of multiple size raceways in Test Assembly 2-3 show that the smaller the raceway, the faster acceptable internal or maximum allowed internal temperatures are reached.
The following is from Omega Point Lab Report No. 13890-94143, dated April 11,1994,
" Fire Endurance Test to Qualify a Protective Envelope for Class IE Electrical Circuits."
Page 11 presents the test data that serves as the basis for the evaluation as discussed above. After 102 minutes of exposure, the maximum and average conduit surface I
temperatures for the various size conduits were as follows (maximum temperatures are the highest individual thermocouple reading for the entire raceway assembly which includes straight, radial bends, and condulets) l stAxiut'M AVERAGE TEMPERATt'RE en TEMPERATt'RE en j
6-inch conduit 388 310 3-inch conduit 470 322
%-inch conduit 1205 580 Results of the testing confirms that under the same test conditions after 102 minutes, the conduit surface temperature for a 2.5-inch conduit assembly would not be higher than that i
of the % inch conduit which means it is reasonable and conservative to apply bounding conduit surface temperature data for the %-inch conduit to a 2.5-inch conduit in establishing a fire barrier rating. In the case of the 2.5-inch conduit, the TMI-1 evaluation establishes a 69-minute rating for 2.5-inch conduit which is the same as that established for a %-inch conduit. It is evident from the test data trend that the 2.5-inch conduit would likely have a rating higher than 69 minutes. However,69 minutes is used for conservatism since no specific test data is available for 2.5-inch conduit barriers constructed per this test assembly. Since the TMI-l 3-hour conduit barriers are constructed per this assembly, there is reasonable assurance that the TMI-l 2.5-inch conduit assembly has a fire barrier rating of at least 69 minutes.
6710 96-2412
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1 Page 5 of 10 ATTACHMENT NRC Ouestion:
4.
The analysis of Elements Numbers 159 and 160, states that ".. depth of the cable tray does not efTect the out come of the test as the width does. This statement is made without any supporting rationale. Justify this statement.
Response
The following discussion provides the basis for the above conclusion:
Structural weaknesses of panels have led to failure of barriers installed on the underside of larger cable trays such as the 24" x 4" trays. These failures do not appear to be caused by the side or depth dimension of the fire barrier but by the dimension of the unsupported span on the underside of the tray as stated above. The stresses imposed at joint locations as the underside panel sofiens during fire exposure leads to structural failure. Structural failure as a result of this softening does not occur on the sides of the barrier enclosure.
GPU Nuclear therefore considers it reasonable to apply the test results for 24" x 4" trays to 24" x 6" trays and for 6" x 4" trays to 6" x 6" trays since the tested 4" side dimension vs. the installed 6" side dimension does not factor into the structural failure of the barrier.
Note that this description has been added to the evaluations for these two elements.
i 6710-96-2412
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ATTACHMENT
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i NRC Ouestion:
5.
Describe the relationship between the fire barrier elements that are evaluated in Attachment I to Topical Report #094 and the corresponding fire barrier configurations installed in the various fire envelopes in individual plant fire areas as described in Enclosure A to your letter dated August 16,1996.
Response
Attachment I to Topical Report #094 provides the detailed evaluations of typical 3-hour fire barrier configurations to demonstrate how specific elements are bounded with accepted test configurations and how fire endurance ratings are established. Enclosure A to GPU Nuclear letter dated August 16,1996 lists the results of all barrier evaluations, both bounded by accepted test configurations and those which could not be bounded.
Those which could not be bounded will be upgraded to a fire barrier rating of 60 minutes.
All barriers with a fire barrier rating less than three hours and equal to or greater than 60 minutes are the subject of the exemption request from automatic suppression and supporting analysis in the exemption request which is documented in Enclosure A.
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ATTACHMENT NRC Ouestion:
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6.
Some Thermo-Lag assemblies mentioned in Enclosure A of your August 16,1996, i
submittal, are not reviewed in Attachment I to Topical Report #094. For example, there are evaluations for 31 elements, yet there are over 40 elements listed in the exemption.
I Please resolve this discrepancy, i
4
Response
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As discussed in the response to Question 5, Attachment I to Topical Report #094
. provides the detailed evaluations of typical 3-hour barrier configurations to demonstrate i
i how specific elements are bounded with accepted test configurations and how fire endurance ratings are established and provides examples which are representative of each of the 3-hour installed barrier configurations discussed in the exemption request p
(Enclosure A). Enclosure A does not list the total number of elements but identifies the type of element for which an exemption is requested to each fire area. For example, page 37 of Enclosure A identifies fire barrier envelope No.lCCE-FB07 as the one envelope in i
fire area CB-FA-2G for which the exemption is requested. There are 6 types of elements associated with this envelope. The number of elements per type is identified in Section 3.6 1
of Topical Report #094, page 12 of 16. The Topical Report identifies that there are three j
2-inch conduit elements and a total of 8 elements that make up fire barrier envelope ICCE-FB07. Attachment 1 included an evaluation for a 2-inch conduit (Element 334) j which is typical of the evaluation for all 2-inch conduits.
The total number of elements for which an exemption is requested is 176 (Reference j
Section 3.0 of Topical Report #094). These 176 elements make up a total of 20 fire barrier envelopes in the fire areas / zones where exemptions have been requested. The j'
following Table i provides a complete list of all 176 elements as discussed in our conference call of December 4,1996. This list identifies for each fire area / fire zone: the l
associated fire barrier envelopes, the element numbers that comprise that envelope, and the type of barrier for that element. Note where size of the element is blank that the element is to be upgraded as GPUN Nuclear is unable to establish a legitimate fire j
endurance rating for these elements.
i To summarize, Attachment I to Topical Report #094 includes typical evaluations which j
i are representative of all configurations discussed in the exemption request. Section 3 of topical report identifiev'.esults of all evaluations and Enclosure A extracts information from this section but excluu.O total number of elements associated with a particular type of configuration to avoid repetidon because the evaluation of a particular type of configuration is the same.
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6710-96-2412 i
THI BARRIER REFERENCE REPORT - 3 CR c.
ENVELOFE NO.
ELEMENT NO BARRIER COMPONENT SIEE FIRE 50NE CB-FA-023 1CCE-FB02 159 Cable Tray-24" X 6" 1CCE-FB02 160 Radial bend tray 24" x 6" 1CCE-FB02 299 Cable Tray 24" x 6" 1CCE-FB02 535 Penetration ICCE-FB02 563 Penetration 12" x 37" 1CCE-FB03 31 Penetration Interface 1.25" ICCE-FB03 300 condulet
.1.25" 1CCE-FB03 301 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 302 Radial bend conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 303 Conduit 1.25"
-1CCE-FB03 304 Radial bend conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 305 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 306 Radial bend conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 307 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 309 condulet 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 536 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 537 Radial bend conduit 1.25*
1CCE-FB03 538 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 539 Radial bend conduit 1.25" Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 607 1CCE-FB09 36 Penetration 17.5"x 15"x 6" 1CCE-FB09 352 condulet 1"
1CCE-FB09 353 Radial bend conduit l'
ICCE-FB09 354 Conduit 1"
ICCE-FB10 38 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 359 Radial bend conduit l'
ICCE-FB10 360 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 362 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 363 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 364 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 365 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 366 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 541 Penetration FIREEONE CB-FA-02C 1CCE-FB03 175 condulet 1.25 1CCE-FB03 565 Conduit 1.25" 1CCE-FB03 573 Penetration Interface 1.25 1CCE-FB03 608 condulet 1.25 1CCE-FB09 37 condulet 1"
1CCE-FB09 356 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB09 567 Penetration 1CCE-TB09 568 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB09 569 Penetration 8" x 12" 1CCE-FB09 582 Penetration Interface ICCE-FB09 609 condulet l'
ICCE-FB10 39 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 367 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 368 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 369
. Conduit l'
1CCE-FB10 370 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 371 Conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 372 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 373 Conduit 1"
12/13/96 Page 1
TABLEI THI BARRIER REFERE::CE REP RT - 3 ER ENVE14P5 NO.
ELEMENT NO BARRIER COMPONENT glJE FIREZCNE CB-FA-02C ICCE-FB10 374 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 375 conduit 1"
1CCE-FB10 574 Penetration Interface 1"
EJPSZONE CB-FA-02D 1CCE-FB04 161 Conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 310 Radisl bend conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 311 Conduit 0.75 1CCE-TB04 312 Radial bend conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 313 Conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 542 condulet 0.75 1CCE-FB04 543 Radial bend conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 544 conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB04 576 Penetration 0.75 1CCE-FB04 597 condulet 0.75 1CCE-FB04 598 conduit 0.75 1CCE-FB05 32 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 314 condulet 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 315 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 316 condulet 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 317 Radial bend cond.dit 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 318 Conduit 1.5" ICCE-FB05 319 condulet 1.5" ICCE-FB05 320 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB05 577 Penetration Interface 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 33 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 321 condulet 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 322 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 323 Radial bend conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 324 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 325 Radial bend conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 326 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 327 Radial bend conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 328 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 329 Radial bend conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 330 Conduit 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 331 condulet 1.5" 1CCE-FB06 578 Penetration Interface 1.5" FIREZONE CB-FA-02E 1CCE-FB07 34 condulet 2"
1CCE-FB07 332 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 333 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 334 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 335 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 336 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 337 Redial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 338 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 339 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 340 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 341 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 342 Conduit 2"
l 1CCE-FB07 343 Penetration ICCE-FB07 581 Penetration 12/13/96 Page 2
1 ABil l THI BARRIER REFERENCE REPIRT - 3 BR ENVELOPE NO, FLEMENT NQ BARRIER COMPONENT SIZE FIREZONE CB-FA-02E_
ICCE-FB08 35 Cable Tray 24" X 6" 1CCE-FB08 118 Box 30" X 36" X 12" 1CCE-FB08 350 radial bend tray 6" x 6" FIREZONE CB-FA-02G ICCE-FB07 176 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 344 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 346 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 348 Penetration 1CCE-FB07 349 Conduit 2"
1CCE-FB07 579 Penetration Interface 2"
FIREZONE CB-FA-03A 1CCG-FB01 40 Penetration ICCG-FB01 376 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB01 377 Box 12"x 15"x 13.5" 1CCG-FB01 378 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB01 379 Radial bend condpit 2"
1CCG-FB01 380 Conduit 2"
ICCG-FB05 389 condulet 2"
ICCG-FB05 390 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 391 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 392 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 394 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 395 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 396 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 397 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 398 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 580 Penetration Interface 2"
1CCG-FB05 602 Conduit 2"
FIREZONE CB-FA-03B ICCG-FB02 41 Penetration 23"x 17"x 5" 1CCG-FB02 381 Conduit 3"
1CCG-FB02 382 Radial bend conduit 3"
1CCG-FB02 383 Conduit 3"
1CCG-FB03 42 Penetration 16"x 11.5" x 3" 1CCG-FB03 384 condulet 1"
1CCG-TB03 385 Conduit 1"
1CCG-FB03 386 Radial bend conduit 1"
1CCG-FB03 388 Penetration 13"x 16" x 5" 1CCG-FB04 43 Conduit 0.75" 1CCG-FB05 45 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 399 Box 35"x 10.5"x 16" 1CCG-FB05 400 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 401 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 402 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 403 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 404 Box 15"x 7"x 7" 1CCG-FB05 405 Conduit 2"
1CCG-FB05 545 Penetration Interface 2 inch 12/13/96 Page 3
.i TABLEl l
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'TMI BARRIER REFERENC3 REPIRT - 3 BR ENVELOPE NO.
ELEMENT NO BARRIER COMPONENT SIZE l
FIREIONE CB-FA-03B ICCG-FB05 599 Radial bend conduit 2"
1CCG-TB05 600 Conduit 2"
FIREIONE FE-FE-05 1
ICCE-FB01 30 condulet 2.5" 1
1CCE-FB01 281 Radial bend conduit 2.5" 1
1CCE-TB01 282 Conduit 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 283 Radial bend conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 284 Conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 285 Radial bend conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 286 Conduit 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 288 Radial bend conduit 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 289 Conduit 2.5" i
ICCE-FB01 290 Radial bend conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 291 Conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 292 Radial bend conduit 2.5" ICCE-FB01 293 Conduit 2.5" l
ICCE-FB01 294 Radial bend conduit 2.5" l
1CCE-FB01 296 Conduit 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 297 condulet 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 298 Conduit 2.5" 1CCE-FB01 605 Penetration Interface ICCE-FB01 606 Penetration Interface 12/13/96 Page 4
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Page 8 of 10 ATTACilMENT NRC Ouestion:
7.
The following elements are listed as penetrations in Attachment 1 to Topical Report #094:
31, 573, 574, 582, 577, 578, 545, 605, and 606.
The NEI program did not test penetrations, and it is not clear from the evaluation of these elements how they are bounded by the fire tests that were discussed. Please clearly describe the configurations of these individual elements, as they are installed in the plant.
Detailed drawings should be provided for further clarification. In addition, describe how these elements are bounded by the fire tests discussed in the evaluation.
Response
The elements in question constitute elements which GPU Nuclear believes are adequately supported by NEl testing with respect to similarities in the construction of the interface point of Thermo-Lag fire barrier envelopes and the walls. Photographs of these elements are attached for information. Note that a photograph of Element 573 is not available; however, its configuration is as described below. We have modified how we designate these configurations in our electronic data base based upon our conference call of December 4,1996. These configurations are now referred to as penetration interfaces in lieu of penetrations.
Element 31 is similar to the interface of all three conduits (6",3", %")in NEI Test 2-3 with the test deck. The NEl configuration extended the test item with 1"-thick preformed Thermo-Lag through the test deck and sealed around the outside of the barrier with silicone foam at the opening through the test deck. The only difference between the tested configuration and Element 31 is that in the test, ceramic insulation was installed on the underside of the test deck instead of bare concrete which is the case for Element 31. The construction of Element 31 is the same inside the penetration as inside the test deck, and silicone foam is commonly used as a penetration seal and has been tested successfully as a one-hour seal. This provides confidence that the GPU Nuclear configuration is a one-hour fire barrier. The NEI test, although not identicalin configuration, provides additional level of confidence that this configuration is acceptable.
Elements 573,574,582,577,578,545,605 and 606 consist ofinterfacejoints at concrete walls where Thermo-Lag terminates at the wall and is joined to the wall by pre-buttering the end of preformed Thermo-Lag with trowel grade and attaching to the wall or installing a " picture frame" on the wall and abutting the end of a preformed panel to the picture frame'as in Element 545. NEI Tests 3-1 and 3-2 used similar interfacejoints which were not the cause of the test failures. Therefore, it is concluded that a pre-buttered Thermo-Lag to concrete interface joint is not a potential weak link and has been shown to provide protection for at least 60 minutes for 1"-thick Thermo-Lag based upon the results of the aforementioned NEl tests.
6710-96-2412
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Page 9 of 10
+*
)
ATTACilMENT i
NRC Ouestion:
8.
For Elements 542 and 34, specific condulet dimensions are not given. Elements 352,300, 314 and 30 are described as condulets with specific dimensions of height, length and width provided. Please clarify this inconsistency.
Resnonse:
Reporting of condulet dimensions is corrected to specify the size of condulet protected rather than specifying the dimensions in terms of height, length and width. For example, Element 352 is a condulet installed on a 1-inch conduit raceway and is identified as 1 inch j
in size instead of 11.5" x 5.5" x 12."
All condulet element sizes are now identified consistent with Elements 542 and 34. This is consistent with condulet dimensions reported in the NEl Application Guide for comparison purposes.. The test reports document the actual barrier dimensions.
Based upon a clarification of this question in our conference call of December 4,1996, the following discussion provides additional basis for the conclusion that the TMI-l installed condulets are bounded by NEI Test 2-3. Specific condulet fire barrier dimensions were not obtained in all cases.
NEI Test 2-3 documents barrier dimensions for test assemblies as follows:
6-inch 11%" x 11%" x 45%"h (side 12%") ref. Fig. 2-3, Sh. 6 3-inch 9%" x 10" x 18%"h (side 10%")
ref. Fig. 2-3, Sh. 5
%-inch 3%" x 4%" x 7%"h (side 4%")
ref. Fig. 2-3, Sh. 4 As is the case in response to Question 3 for conduits, the larger the condulet enclosure, the higher the fire barrier rating. Condulet fire barriers could be rated higher than other barrier types within the same raceway, i.e., temperature data for a %-inch condulet in NEI Test 2-3 suggests that the condulet could be rated at 96 minutes based upon a single maximum reading on the condulet vs. 69 minutes. Where specific condulet fire barrier dimensions have been recorded, they are larger than the NEI test configuration to which they have been compared. The dimensions for same size condulet barriers are not identical; however, the dimensions are always larger than what has been tested thereby providing reasonable assurance that the barrier is bounded by the test to which they are compared.
6710- % 2412
r j
Page 10 of 10 j
ATTACllMENT NRC Ouestion:
i 9.
Elements 578 and 350 do not have band spacing specified and the evaluations state that, i
" Additional inspection is required to determine the band spacing requirement." Provide results of these inspections and justify how these elements are bounded by the NEI tests to 1
which these assemblies are being compared.
i
Response
l GPU Nuclear plans on installing additional bands, if necessary, on these particular elements if the requested exemption is granted. if the requested exemption is granted, then these configurations would not require an upgrade to a 3-hour fire rating and the additional bands would be necessary in order for these configurations to fully conform to the NEI tests to which they have been compared. Element 578 has been compared to NEl Test 3-2 because this element is the interface between the fire barrier envelope and the l
I wall, A band would be installed within 2 inches of the wall interface if the exemption is
{
granted. With the additional band, the element configuration would then fully conform to j
NEl Test 3-2 and would be rated at 60 minutes. If the element is required to be rated at 3 1
hours, the need for an additional band becomes unnecessary since an entirely different configuration from the one that is currently installed would be necessary. The same applies to Element 350 which is a radial bend tray. Additional bands would be installed to
)
' assure consistency (2 bands per mitered section) with those tested in NEl Test 2-10 if the j
exemption is granted. If not, a 3-hour rated configuration would require a substantial l
change or a complete rebuild to the existing bamer.
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9 6710- % 2412
-