ML20133C657

Provides Results of Initial Review of Survey of Licensee Responses to Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Sys.Issue Addressed in IE Info Notices & INPO Significant Event Repts & Significant Operating Experience Repts

ML20133C657
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, Davis Besse, Salem, Oconee, Palisades, Indian Point, Byron, Three Mile Island, Turkey Point, Crystal River, Waterford, Yankee Rowe, 05000000, Trojan
Issue date:	07/30/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
NUDOCS 8508070103
Download: ML20133C657 (9)

Text

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jul 30 W

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• MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

STEAM BINDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues: steam binding in auxiliary feedwater systems and mispositioned control rods. These issues were addressed more than a year ago by IE Information Notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) significant event reports (SERs) and INP0 significant operating experience reports (SOERs). The SOERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.

The primary purpose of our survey is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues. The secondary purpose is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the recommendations in INP0's SOERs.

Regarding the first issue, steam binding in auxiliary feedwater systems, the responses have been received and an initial review has been performed. The results are provided in the enclosure. Responses for the second issue, mispositioned control rods, have been received. We will inform you of the results when a preliminary review has been completed. ,  ;

original sigud Er. WW C

Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

Summary of the Responses to TI 2515/67 Related to Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater

Contact:

Mary S. Wegner, IE 492-4511 DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer SASchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DAllison MSWegner t_DGr PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F BKGrimes GHolahan, NRR JWermill, NRR WLanning, AE00 KSeyfrit, AE0D WMilstead, NRR GZech VHodge JHSniezek, ED0

• See previous concurrences

• DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE MSWegner DAllison RLBaer SASchwartz ELJordan 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85 8508070103 850730 PDR ADOCK 05000029 G PDR ,

i- .'

• MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

STEAM BINDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues: steam binding in auxiliary feedwatcr systems and mispositioned control rods. These issues were addressed more than a year ago by IE Information Notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) significant event reports (SERs) and INP0 significant operating experience reports (50ERs). The SOERs contained-specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.

The primary purpose of our survey is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues. The secondary I

purpose is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to f the recommendations in INP0's SOERs.

Regarding the first issue, steam binding in auxiliary feedwater systems, the responses have been received and an initial review has been performed. The results are provided in the enclosure. Responses for the second issue, mispositioned control rods, have been received. We will inform you of the results when a preliminary review has been completed.

l

Edward L. Jordan, Director L

Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i

Enclosure:

Summary of the Responses to TI 2515/67 Related to Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater

Contact:

Mary S. Wegner, IE 492-4511 DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer SASchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DA111 son MSWegner DCS PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F

• See previous concurrences 7/23/

D:IE DD:IE PSB JE JTaylor RHVollmer D le 7/ /85 7/ 28 ' 7 8

• DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE D,P%[Elg D. e /

MSWegner DAllison RLBaer h artz an 7/ /85' 7/ /85 7/ /85 // 85 7/p 85

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MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

STEAM BINDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Temporary Instruction 2F15/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues: Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems and Mispositioned Control Rods. These issues were addressed more than a year ago by IE Information Notices (IN) and by Institute of Nuclear Power (INPO) Significant Event Reports (SERs) and INP0 Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs). The SOERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.

The primary purpose of our survey is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues. The secondary purpose is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the recomendations in INP0's SOERs.

For the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the respons-es have been received and an initial review has been performed. The results are provided in the enclosure. Responses for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received. We will inform you of the results when a preliminary review has been completed.

Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

Summary of the Responses to TI 2515/67 Related to Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater l

l

Contact:

Mary S. Wegner, IE 492-4511 DISTRIBUTION J"!6 m RHVollmer SASchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DAllison MSWegner DCS PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F

• See previous concurrences D:IE DD:IE PSB:IE JTaylor RHVollmer DGable 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85

• DEPER:IE *DEPER:IE DEPER:IE DEPER:IE DEPER:IE MSWegner DAllison RLBaer/D SASchwartz ELJordan 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85

' MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

STEAM BINDING IN AUXILIARY FEECWATER SYSTEMS Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues: Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems and Mispositioned Control Rods. These issues were addressed more than a year ago by IE Information Notices (IN) and by Institute of Nuclear Power (INP0) Significant Event Reports (SERs) and INP0 Significant Operating Experience Reports (S0ERs). The SOERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.

The primary purpose of our survey is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues. The secondary purpose is to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the recommendations in INP0's SOERs.

For the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the respons-es have been received and an initial review has been performed. The results are provided in the enclosure.

Responses for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received.

We will inform you of the results when a preliminary review has been completed.

Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

{

Enclosure:

Summary of the Responses to TI 2515/67 Related to Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater

\

Contact:

Mary S. Wegner, IE 492-4511 DISTRIBUTION

' JMTaylor RHVollmer SASchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow " ' -

• cc7ecM DAllison MSWegner DCS PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F D:IE DD:IE PSB:IE

) 3fi DEPER:I!

DE ER:lE JTaylor 7/ /85 DEPER:IE RHVollmer 7/ /85 DEPER:IE DGable 7/ /85 DEPER:IE MSWegner DAllison RLBaer SAScht.artz ELJordan 7/g85 7/n/85 7/ /85 7/ /85 7/ /85

Summary of the Responses to TI 2515/67 Related to Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Te.corcry :nstruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys cf licensee responses to two identified safety issues, steam binding in auxiliary feedwater systems and mispositioned control rods. For the first issue, steam binding in auxiliary feedwater systems, the responses have been received and an initial review has been performed. Tabulation of those responses are given in the attachments.

No immediate safety problems were found that is, no hot' pipes or disabled pumps were found by the inspectors.

Of the 58 units surveyed, 39 units monitor AFW piping temperature at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (INP0 recommendation 1). The principal method used to r.onitor tne AFW piping temperature is touch. Only four units have control room readcut.

Of the remainder, 17 units had some degree of justification. These units are listed below and their justifications are summarized.

Calvert , Cliffs 1 & 2 - monitoring is accomplished weekly. No recent history of steam binding. Appropriate check valve

. . design.

Indian Point 3 - closed MOV in discharge line.

Millstone 2 - normally closed regulating (globe) valve.

Salem 1 & 2 - closed isolation valve.

Yankee Rowe - complete separation of AFW trains makes multiple failures unlikely. Licensee also claims credit for watch-standers' ability to detect but resident disagrees.

Crystal River 3 - has ultrE3cnic flow detectors that also detect back-leakage. (Monitoring has begun since the survey.)

Ocenee 1, 2, & 3 - a closed gate valve, no history of steam binding, and a long uninsulated discharge line.

Turkey Point 3 & 4 - closed globe valves and self-venting pumps.

Palisades - closed flow control (globe) valves.

Davis-Besse 1 - normally closed MOVs.

Byron 1 pump casing vented daily. Licensee also claims credit for water hammer prevention instrumentation but resident disagrees.

Waterford 3 - closed isolation valves. -

?

9 T..o units tnat cid not monitor had little justification. They are:

TMI 1 no previous problems. Check for leakage during plant startup.

The licensee planned to provide general cwareness training.

(Since the survey, the licensee has agreed to monitor once per shift.)

Tro'jan consi.dering monitoring. (Monitoring has begun since the survey.)

Seventeen units monitor the temperature of AFW piping after each operation in addition to the routine checks (INPO recommendation 2). Note that for p' ants ciready monitoring once a shift, this does not carry a great deal cf _ safety significance.

Twenty-five units had procedural guidance and training on identifying and c:rrecting backleakage (INPO recommendation 4),13 had neither, and the ret.aining 20 had less than full implementation of the recommendation.

Le: ails are provided in Table ,1.

Frnredural corrective act. ions include: vent and flush, close isolation salves and slowly reopen, use AFW booster pump to cool, and stroke MOV to ressat check valve.

Nine units leak test the valves or verify that they shut (INP0 recommendstion 5). In-service testing (IST) required by ASME Section XI Part IWV depencs upon the licensee's classification of the valve. It usually entails oper-aoility testing only, when any testing is required. The answers to questior, 7o left coubt about the respondent's definition of " inspection," but the 13 "yes" answers probably refer to the ASME in-service inspection.

We did not determine how many units had reviewed their check valve design fer suitability that is, ability to seat with low AP (INP0 recommendation 3).

~

Pt cid note that 13 units determined that prccedural changes were needed to assure check valve seating and implemented them.

i.s did nct cetermine whether or not unnecessary thermal insulation had been removed (INFO recommendation 6).

Attachments:

1. Table 1 - Tabular Summary

2. Table 2 - Follow Up Commitments Mentioned in Response to TI 2515/67

e .:

. TABLE 1 TABULAR

SUMMARY

PLAT:T ACTION PROCEDURES FOR TRAINING FOR (JUSTIFY / IDENTIFICATION / IDENTIF: CATION /

MONITOR) CORRECTION CORRECTION

-+ JUSTIFY EALEM 1 JUSTIFY BOTH BOTH E ALEM 2 -

JUSTIFY BOTH BOTH CCONEE 1 JUSTIFY BOTH BOTH CCONEE 2 JUSTIFY BOTH BOTH OCONEE 3 JUSTIFY BOTH BOTH CALVERT CLIFFS 1 JUSTIFY BOTH NEITHER CALVERT CLIFFS 2 JUSTIFY BOTH NEITHER YAN!:EE-RDWE JUSTIFY CORRECT CORRECT BYRON 1 JUSTIFY CORRECT NEITHER CRYSTAL RIVER 3 JUSTIFY '

NEITHER

• BOTH INDIAN POINT 3 JUSTIF NEITHER NEITHER MILLETONE 2 JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER TURNEY PJINT 3 JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER TURI:EY POINT 4 JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER

-?ALISADES JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER CAVIS-BEESE JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER LATERFORD 3 JUSTIFY NEITHER NEITHER

+ MONITOR EEAVER VALLEY 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH

D: AN POINT 2 MONITOR BOTH 'BOTH CATAW5A 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH CARLEY 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH FARLEY 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH MCGUIRE 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH MCGUIRE 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH ROBINSON 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH EEOUDYAH 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH EECUDYAH 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH EURRY 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH EURRY 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH ZION 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH ZION 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH FT CALHOUN MONITOR BOTH BOTH AND 1 MONITOR BOTH BOTH AND 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH SAN ONOFRE 2 MONITOR BOTH BOTH EAN ONO RE 3 MONITOR BOTH BOTH FALO VERDE 1 MONITOR BOTH . BOTH e-

? .

. TABLE 1 TABULAR

SUMMARY

LANT ACTION PROCEDURES FOR TRAININ3 FOR (JUSTIFY / IDENTIFICATION / IDENTIFICATION /

MONITOR) CORRECTION CORRECTION HADDAM NECK MONITOR BOTH NEITHER D C COOK 1 MONITOR BOTH NEITHER D C COOK ~2 MONITOR BOTH NEITHER

!CRTH ANNA 1 MONITOR IDENTIFY IDENTIFY NORTH ANNA 2 MONITOR IDENTIFY IDENTIFY EAN ONOFRE 1 MONITOR IDENTIFY IDENTIFY ET LUCIE 1 MONITOR NEITHER BOTH ET LUCIE 2 MONITOR NEITHER BOTH SUMMER MONITOR NEITHER BOTH DIABLO CANYON 1 MONITOR NEITHER '

BOTH PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 MONITOR, NEITHER IDENTIFY

RAIRIE ISLAND 2 MONITOR NEITHER IDENTIFY 1:EWAUNEE MONITOR NEITHER IDENTIFY

.CINT BEACH 1 MONITOR NEITHER IDENTIFY PCINT BEACH 2 MONITOT: NEITHER IDENTIFY DINNA MONITOR NEITHER NEITHER

AINE YANKEE MONITOR NEITHER NEITHER rlOLF CREEK 1 MONITOR NEITHER NEITHER RANCHO SECO MONITOR eNEITHER NEITHER

• + NEITHER Tt:I 1 NEITHER NEITHER NEITHER TROJAN NEITHER NEITHER NEITHER e

IADLE 2 FOLLLlH tlP CUNill'It!EN TS MEN I tillIL D IN likulUNGE ~10 TI 2515/67

• Items t.liat Itesident has reported complete fullowing survoy CALVERT CLIFFS 1 E S T A ltL I Sil L E Ai; CllE C K S IN FtJilfliE.

CALVERT CLIFFS 2 ESTADLISil LEAK CliECKS IN Fln tillE.

DYl(UN 1 ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF APPROPRIA~lENESS OF NATER llAMMER INSTRUMENTS FOR STil DINDING CRYSTAL _ RIVER 3 ITEI' LACE IILTRAGUNIC FLON DET. DEGIN MONITURING.* INSTALL ALARMS.

1tlRI:EY POINT 3 DEGIN MUNITORING DY 6/1/05. TRAINING AND PRLICEDURAL GilIDANCE DY 6/1/05.

Tllill;EY POINT 4 DEGIN NONiltlRING DY 6/1/05. TRAINING AND PROCEI) URAL GUIDANCE DY 6/1/05.

PALISADES ACTIllN ON LEAK CllECK DY 9/1/05.

DEAVER VALLEY 1 CONSIDERING INSTALLING TEMPERAll1RE INDICATORS.

MCGUIRE 1 CONfftOL ROOM COMPUTER PT FOR TENP READOUT.

Silill1Y 1 DESIGN CllANGE CONCERNING TEMP READOUT IN CONTROL ROOM. ,

GURRY 2 DESIGN CllANGE CONCERNING TEMP READOlli IN CONTROL ROOM.

FT CAlllOUN PERMANENT TEMP MONITORS TO DE INSTALLED FALL 05.

SUMMER INSTALL CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR. ,

DIADLO CANYON 1 DESIGN CilANGE TO INSTALL CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR.

FRAIRIE ISLAND 1 EVALUATE LEAK TEST, INSPECTION.

PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 EVALUATE LEAK TEST, INSPECTION.

POINT DEACil 1 REPLACE LEAKING CllECK VALVE.*

GINNA INSTALL TEMP DETECTORS IN AFNP DISCil LINE N/ REMOTE COMPUTER MONITORING AND ALARM TMI 1 CllECK FOR LEAKAGE AFTER EACil OPERATION. TRAIN NATCil-STANI)ER. CONSIDER INS'IRUMENV TROJAN MONITOR, INSTALL PYROMETERS, PROVIDE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING, INSPECT.

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