ML20132G374
| ML20132G374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109022 |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1985 |
| From: | Gerrald L SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER |
| To: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| 25572, NUDOCS 8508050004 | |
| Download: ML20132G374 (8) | |
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E(ON NUCLEAR COMPANYINC.
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July 10, 1 5 4.5%s3
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Mr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief geg/g ' ' '
Transporation Certification Branch g
Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety, NMSS g g,y i
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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License No. SNM-1227 Docket No. 70-1257
Dear Mr. MacDonald:
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE NO. 9022.
We (Exxon Nuclear Co., Inc.) request revisions to the subject Certifi-cate of Compliance:
Section 5(b)(1)
Picase change the enrichment limit from 4.1 wt% to 5.0 wt%.
d ion 5(b)(2) gt0 g
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ussC Posed limits: " Net weight of containment vessel not to exceed
-4 170 kgs total and 120 KgU.
All uranium to be 3 g 2,6 g g F 2
within the 11-1/2" ID x 57-1/4" long boundary of 2
the containment vessel."
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-4 Picase change minimum transport index to 0.5.
The attached application demonstrates conformance to all requirements of 10 CFR 71 and the 1973 IAEA regulations.
A check for the $150 application fee is enclosed.
We request your timely consideration of this application. We plan to use the revised Certificate of Compliance in obtaining a revised Certificate of Competent authority and transportation licenses in foreign countries before the September 30, 1985 expiration date of the current Certificate of Compe-tent authority.
8509050004 850710 POR ADOCK 07109022 C
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Mr. Charles E. MacDonald 2
July 10, 1985 If the proposed Certificate of Compliance could be issued by August 15, 1985, then we would not be forced to use Revision 10, which does not meet 1973 IAEA regulations.
I am available to discuss questions that may arise during the reviev of this application ((509) 375-8656).
Sincerely, l
L. D. (Lonnie) Gerrald Corporate Licensing LDGtjrs Enclosure As Stated N
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SHIPPING CONTAINER APPLICATION 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Introduction This amended application is submitted for approval for delivery to a carrier for transport of Combustion Engineering's CE-250-2 shipping container.
The CE-250-2 shipping container will be used for the transport of uranium oxide with an H/U atomic ratio < 2.26 and an U-235 enrichment < 5 wt%.
This shipping container meets the criteria of 10 CFR Part 71.59 3or shipping as Fissile Class II, with a maximum of 100 packages per shipment and a transport index of 0.5.
1.2 Package Description 1.2.1 Packaging The CE-250-2 package consists of a 16-gauge steel inner container 11-5/8" outer diameter by 57-1/4" long, with a bolted and gasketed top flange closure and steel welded bottom plate. The inner container is centered within a 22-1/2" 1.D. by 68-3/8" long 16 gauge outer steel drum. The inner container is supported by twelve 1/4" diameter steel springs welded to the inner container at the top flange and the bottom of the container. The void space between the inner and outer container is filled with vermiculite.
The CE-250-2 package design incorporates two containment boundaries.
The primary containment consists of the outer 16-gauge steel drum, and the secondary containment consists of the bolted and gasketed inner container.
Closure of the inner container is maintained by a heat resistant gasket and six 1/2" hex head bolts and nuts. These bolts and nuts secure the 1/2" steel inner lid to the package. The outer container is then sealed with a standard 1711 12-gauge bolt ring over the 16 gauge outer tid.
The weight of the package is approximately 575 lbs when loaded, and con-structed in accordance with Combustion Engineering's Drawing No. NFM-E-22175 Rev. 2, attached as Appendix 1.4.
It should be noted that the CE-250-2 package does not contain any valves, sampling ports or protrusions.
- 1.2.2 Operational Features Not Applicable - The CE-250-2 package is a simple design with no operational features.
1.2.3 Contents of Packaging Each package will be limited to a maximum of 300 pounds (136 kilograms) of 2 or U 0 ), in either powder or pellet form, enriched to a uranium oxide (UO 38 maximum of five weight percent (wt%) and having H/U < 2.26.
Each powder or pellet container will have a gasketed, tight fitting lid. The containers may be either round powder cans or rectangular pellet boxes.
At a maximum of 5 wt% U235, the package would contain a maximum of 6.0 kg of U235 The maximum radioactivity for each package is 0.324 curies, and with 100 packages per shipment, yielding 32.4 curies of radioactivity per Fissile Class II Shipment (Specific Activity from Table A-4, 10 CFR 71).
1.2.4 Other Data The inner container will be sealed at room temperature and pressure. Since the decay heat from 5 we% uranium oxide is minimal, no coolants are neces-sary.
1.3 Quality Assurance A Quality Assurance program for the CE-250-2 has been approved by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1.4 Appendix Dimensional details of the CE-250-2 shipping container are described in CE Drawing NFM-E-Z2175, Rev. 2, attached.
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. 2.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 2.1 Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion The secondary containment of the package is the 11-1/2" I.D. x 57-1/4" long 16 gauge steel inner container.
The inner container closure is achieved by securing a 1/2" steel lid to the inner flange with six 1/2" hex head bolts and nuts, tack welded to the flange.
The p'rimary containment vessel consists of two 55-gallon drums which have been welded together to the following dimensions:
22-1/2" I.D.
x 68-3/8" long.
The closure of the outer container is assured by a standard 17H 12 gauge ring with 5/8" bolt and nut.
See View B on Drawing NFM-E-Z2175.
2.1.2 Design Criteria The test results described in Appendix 2.9 support the structural require-ments specified in 10 CFR Parts 71.71 and 71.73.
2.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity The OE-250-2 container weighs approximately 575 lbs when loaded.
The containers of uranium oxide weigh about 300 lbs, with the CE-250-2 container weighing about 275 lbs. The container is approximately symmetrical; the center of gravity is at the center of the container.
When the cans are loaded inside the inner container, the center of gravity shifts vertically to a slightly lower point because of the spacer used to make up the remaining volume within the inner package.
2.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials Materials of all structural components used in the manufacture of the container have physical and mechanical properties equivalent to or better than 16 gauge steel.
2.4 General Standards for All Packaging 2.4.1 Chemical and Calvanic Reactions There are no significant chemical, galvanic or other reactions among the packaging components and the package contents.
The CE-250-2 shippit.g container is fabricated of carbon steel. The contents are: vermiculite for insulation between the outer and inner containers,and steel cans containing uranium oxide in either the powder or pellet form.
. -2.4.2 Positive Closure Positive closure of the CE-250-2 containers is assured by:
- 1) The inner container being gasketed and sealed with six hex head bolts and nuts and 2) the outer container being sealed by a standard 17H 12 gauge bolt locking ring with drop forged lugs, one of which is threaded, having a 5/8-inch diameter bolt and lock nut.
Both of these closure systems insure that the container cannot.be inadvertently opened. Each package incorporates provisions for a tamper proof seal.
2.4.3 Lifting Devices No lifting devices are incorporated as a structural part of this container.
2.4.4 Tie Down Devices No tie down devices are incorporated as a structural part of this container.
l 2.5 Normal Conditions of Transport The CE Model 250-2 package is identical to the Westinghouse BB-250-2 package, except that the overall length is 68-3/8 inches and the inner container length is 57-1/4 inches (compared to 74 and 63-1/2 inches, respectively).
These packages both utilize design concepts which are similar to those used in the design of the NUMEC LA-36 and Pu 10-I packages. These packages were tested in accordance with the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 71.71 for normal conditions of transport, to assure compliance with the standards outlined in Section 71.59.
(See Appendix 2.9 for tests performed on the NUMEC Pu 10-I and LA-36 containers.)
I 2.6 Hypothetical Accident Conditions This section describes the hypothetical accident conditions as specified in 10 CFR 71.73, and meets the standards in 71.59.
The inner container o f the l
when fully loaded, weighs approximately 340 lbs, over a base area CE-250-2,2, resulting in a vertical loading of 3.2 lbs/in.
of 106 in 2
The inner container of the NUMEC Pu 10-I package, when fully loaded,2 including the neutron moderator, weighs 279 lbs over a base area of 78.54 in, resulting in 2
a vertical loading of 3.55 lbs/in. Thus, the tests performed on the latter container are valid for the CE-250-2 package.
As a result, it is concluded that:
1)
The integrity of the package is not affected by the test.
Separation of the lid from the drum does not occur.
In this connection, tes t experi-ence with the BB-250-1 shows that, as a result of a top corner drop, the lid and the body are folded together into a tighter closure.
t
. 2)
The incorporation of five inches of vermiculite is equal to that provided in the NUMEC package, and is suf ficient to assure that after the drop and thermal tests, the temperature of the inner container of the CE-250-2 package would not exceed the observed maximum of 5000F.
Since'the gasket is service-rated to 8000F, the closure of the inner container is not compromised.
3)
The test series does not result in the addition of moderation to the contained fissile material.
4)
The dimensions of a damaged package are conservatively taken to be 20 inches O.D. x 64-3/8 inches long.
This assumes a reduction of 2-1/2 inches in diameter.as the result of a drop test with the package in a horizontal position, plus a reduction of 4 inches in height as a result of a drop test with the package in a vertical position. No deformations in excess of these values were experienced during the testing of the Pu 10-I package.. See Appendix 2.9 for BB-250-2 and Pu 10-I test results.
2.7-Special Form N/A; all radioactive material in the packages is in normal form.
2.8 Fuel Rods N/A; ~ the CE-250-2 package is not used for the shipment of fuel rods.
2.9 Appendix 1)
BB-250-2 Test Results - Westinghouse SNM-338.
2)-
NUMEC Pu 10-1 Test Results SNM-414.
3)
NUMEC IA-36 Test Results SNM-145.
1
6-3.0 THERMAL EVALUATION Materials of all structural components used in the manufacture of the container have physical and mechanical properties equivalent to or better than mild steel throughout a temperature range of -400F to 15000F.
See Appendix 2.9, Page VI-7, of NUMEC Pu 10-I tests "No damage was suf fered by any of the components or materials of construction due to exposure to the thermal test".
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. 4.0 CONTAINMENT 4.1 Containment Boundary The primary containment of the CE-250-2 package is the outer 16 gauge 55-gallon drums which have been welded together (22-1/2 inches I.D. x 68-3/8 inches long). The secondary containment boundary is the 16-gauge steel inner container, 11-5/8 inches outer diameter x 57-1/4 inches long. As a result of the tests performed on the Westinghouse BB-250-2 and the NUMEC Pu 10-I containers, it was determined that the integrity of the CE-250-2 package would not be af fected by the test conditions.
4.1.1 Containment Vessel The outer 'shell of the CE-250-2 package is composed of two 55 gallon drums made of 16 gauge steel welded together.
4.1.2 Containment Penetrations There are no penetrations into the primary containment.
4.1.3 Seals and Welds All seals and welds are specified in Drawing NFM-E-Z2175, Rev. 2.
4.1.4 Closure Closure of the outer container is achieved by using a standard 17 H 12-gauge nut and bolt ring securing the 16-gauge outer lid. The closure of the inner container is maintained by a gasket and six hex head bolts (1/2 inch 13 UNC-2A x 1-3/4 inches long) and nuts (1/2 inch 13 UNC-2B).
These two closure devices provide positive sealing of the container.
4.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport It is concluded that under normal conditions of transport, as specified in 10 CFR Part 71.71, the test results described in Section 2.6 of this application indicate the following:
1)
There will be no release of radioactive material from the containment vessel; 2)
The effectiveness of the packaging will not be reduced; 3)
There will be no mixture of gases or vapors in the container which could, through any credible increase of pressure or an explosion, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the package; and
. ~4)
The package is so designed and constructed, and its contents so limited, that under the normal conditions of transport specified in 10 CFR Part 71.71:
(a) The package will be subcritical; (b) The geometric form of the package contents will 'not be substan-tially altered; and (c) There will be no substantial reduction in the effectiveness of the packaging, including:
(i)'
Reduction by more than 5 percent in the total effective volume of-the packaging on which nuclear safety is-assessed; (ii)-
Reduction by more than 5 percent in the effective spacing on which nuclear safety is assessed, between the center of the containment vessel and the outer surface of the packaging; or (iii)
Occurrence of any aperture in the outer surface of the packaging large enough to permit the entry of a 4-inch cube.
'4.3
' Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Conditions The e f fect on the loaded CE-250-2 container of conditions hypothesized to occur in an accident was assessed during the testing of a loaded NUMEC Pu 10-I container. Two 30-foot free drop tests and puncture tests, as specified.
in 10 CFR Part 71.73, were conducted.
-These tests demonstrated that no radioactive material would be released.
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. The thermal tests performed on the NUMEC Pu 10-I container demonstrated that
'no damage was suffered by any of the components or materials of construction t
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.during the thermal test.
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, Examination of the containers, subsequent to their removal from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of i
l inumersion under three feet of water, revealed that no water leaked into the I
containment vessel.
l It was evident from the above tests that the package would remain sub' critical because the material remains confined _ to a suberitical geometry and the
. geometric form of the contained material is not altered.
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a 5.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION N/A; the packages are used for the shipment of uranium oxide in pellet or powder form in steel cans, which are then placed in the container.
The dose rate at one meter from the CE-250-2 containing low-enriched uranium is estimated to be equal to or less than that for a transport index o f 0.5 due to the Fissile II classification. Thus, shielding is not a part of the construction of the package.
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- . 6.0
. CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATION 6.1 Introduction l
, This criticality safety analysis demonstrates conformance to the requirements
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.of 10 CFR 71.59. for Fissile Class II shipments. The proposed transport index lis 0.5 which. corresponds to 100 (max) containers per shipment.
6.2 Analysis Criteria 6.2.1 Assumed Array Size o
The models analysed for normal and accident conditions were arrays of 500 (minimum) and 200 (minimum) containers, respectively.
The containers were stacked edge-to-edge in all directions in all models.
Containers are normally shipped on wooden pallets which provide about 8" i
edge-to-edge spacing between tiers of containers. This spacing and the wood of the pallet were conservatively neglected.
The containers (500 or 200 minimum) were stacked in three dimensions in the l
optimum arrangement, taken here as that cuboidal arrangement with the minimum geometric buckling for the given number of containers.
(In-this optimum arrangement, the overall array shape would be cubical. )
The cylindrical container has a. length-to-diameter ratio of about 3/1 at both normal and accident conditions. Assuming that N containers are placed end-to-end -(end.
[
faces of cylinders touching), the optimum stacking pattern would be 3N by 3N
.by N. Therefore, the product 3Nx3NxN must' be at least 500 (normal) or 200 (accident).
The normal condition array is 12x12x4 or 576 containers. The accident condition array is 9x9x3 or 243 containers. Thus, the 500 and 200 I
. minimum requirements are conservatively met.
'6.2.2 Reflection All models employed full water reflection (12" thick,1.0 gm/cc density) at l
,all faces of the array.-
l 6.2.3 Moderation 6.2.3.1 Internal Moderation The moderation inside the inner vessel was fixed at an H/U ratio of 2.26 for all cases analysed. For the UO2 Powder cases, this was modeled at 7% water in the-UO -Water mixture.
For the UO2 Pellet cases, this was modeled-as a 2
cell-weighted mixture (homogeneous cross sections) representing 0.5" diameter x 57.25" long pellets (95% TD) on a 1.2228" square pitch with water (0.1185 gm/cc) between the pellets.
In practice, the H/U ratio determination for a shipment will include all
. materials within the inner vessel.
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The sealed (gasketed) inner vessel provides resistance to water (or other hydrogenous material) entry for all credible accident conditions. Additional.
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resistance to increasing the H/U of the U oxide is provided by the required sealed steel container within the inner vessel.
If water entered the gasketed inner vessel, but not the U oxide container, the H/U of the inner vessel would be increased although the resulting effect on the k-eff would be similar to that of increasing the density of the inter-spersed moderator; a safe condition.
There fore, internal moderation control is provided at maximum credible acci-dent conditions and the fissile material need not be analysed at optimum moderation.
l 6.2.3.2 External Moderation The optimum moderation conditions were determined for each array.
The moderator was water uniformly interspersed between containers and in the container annulus.
The annulus normally contains vermiculite. Cases with vermiculite in the annulus and water between containers were also analysed.
All tabulated results referring to a variable water density or moderator density refer to this external moderator rather than the internal moderation.
4 6.2.4 Neutron Absorbers The models did include 'some of the steel of the containers.
The steel of the inner vessel was explicitly modeled as carbon steel.
This includes a 16-gauge wall, a 0.125" thick bottom, and a 0.5" thick lid.
All surfaces of the outer container (drum) were explicitly modeled as 16 gauge carbon steel.
The actual container has considerably more steel than in the model. There-fore, the model is conservative.
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6.2.5 Fissile Materials The proposed constraints on fissile materials in the container are:
1)
Maximum Enrichment - 5.0 wt% U-235.
2)
Maximum Mass - 300 pounds uranium oxide.
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. 3)
H/U (atom ratio) - 2.26 (maximum).
4)
Geometry Restrictions (within inner vessel) - None.
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5)
U-235 Mass Restrictions - No explicit limit.
Implicit limit is 6 kg U-235 based on 120 kg uranium at 5 wt% U-235.
6)
Form - Uranium oxide as powder or pellets.
For comparison, the constraints of the current Certificate of Compliance are:
1)
Maximum Enrichment - 4.1 wt% U-235.
2)
Maximum Mass - 300 pounds total.
3)
H/U (atom ratio) - 2.26 (maximum).
4)
Geometry Restrictions - 73.2 in2 (max.) fissile cross sectional area.
5)
U-235 Mass Restrictions - 4.5 kg (max.).
6)
Form - Uranium oxide as powder or pellets.
The models employed to justify the proposed constraints had the following characteristics:
1)
Enrichment - 5 wt% U-235.
2)
Fissile Mass - 120 kg uranium (about 300 pounds UO )-
2 3)
H/U - 2.26 (represented as 22.6 lbs water in about 323 lbs UO -water).
2 4)'
Geometry - The most reactive geometry for the 323 lbs of UO -water in 2
the inner vessel is to fill this vessel with UO -water with a density 2
near 1.2 gm U/ce. Higher uranium densities are less re' active because the fissile volume must be reduced to maintain the fixed mass (.323 lbs UO -water).
Lower uranium densities would result in less than 120 kgU 2
and lower array k-effectives. Evidence supporting these statements is presented in this analysis.
5)
U-235 Mass - The U-235 mass is controlled by the total fissile mass and the enrichment specifications. A separate specification is not needed.
6)
Form - UO2 was employed in all models. UO2 is more reactive than other forms such as U 03 8 or UO -
3 Cases with powder and pellets were analysed to assure acceptability of both homogeneous (powder) and heterogenous (pellets) uranium oxides.
6.3 Analysis Methods k gg for the arrays were calculated using KENO-IV and the Hansen-Roach cross esection library. The KENO code was obtained from the Radiation Shielding Information Center (RSIC) as part of the SCALE-2 system. All code revisions l
. provided by the RSIC. newsletter and by personal conununications with code experts at ORNL have been implemented.
Evidence of validation of these methods will be presented in a later section of this analysis.
' 6. 3.1 -
Geometry Models Typical KENO input listings are attached for reference.
The ~ basic unit is composed of five regions:
UO -water in inner vessel.
1) 2 2)'
Carbon steel wall, bottom and lid for this vessel.
'3)
= Annulus between inner vessel and outer container (drum).
4)
~ Carbon steel. wall, bottom andIlid for the drum.
S' )
Interspersed moderator in the volume between the-drum and a cuboid
-tangent to the drum surfaces and to the drum end faces.
The basic unit-(Box Type 1) is stacked into the array being analysed (12x12x4 or 9x9x3) and then full water reflection is applied at the six. faces of the array.
A dif ferential albedo (#1012 in thel KENO library - 30.48 cm water) was used to simulate'the reflector.
This albedo was validated at Exxon Nuclear Company using critical experiment data (Section 6.5.2).
6.'3.2 Cross Sections The Hansen-Roach library contains several cross section sets for U-235 and U-238.
The 16-group sets differ from each other in the cross section data for groups 8-12 (resonance region). The appropriate sets were selected by matching the-sigma-m (effective) (hereafter, sig-m) of the - fis sile material being analysed to the-sigma p (sig p) identity of the cross section set.
If the desired sig p was between that of two available sets, a weighted average of the two sets was typically used to simulate the needed nuclide.
The sig-m for each mixture being analysed was calculated using a subroutine added to the s tandard KENO code. Neutron collision data are stored in KENO subroutine BEGIN and then processed in the added subroutine to calculate the sig-escape, sig p and sig-m for each fissile mixture using the collision data, the macroscopic cross sections for the mixture, and the atom density-for the nuclide.
These data are weighted averages for groups 8-12. 'The output from each KENO run includes these data in addition to standard KENO output data.
. Thus, each KENO run provides feedback on the accuracy of the parameters used to select cross sections.
The KENO-derived parameters should be more accurate because the actual system model is used rather than the cruder approximations of ten employed. These methods have been extensively checked for validity.
As stated above, the calculated sig-m's are compared to the sig p's of the input nuclides for each KENO run.
If the calculated sig-m is greater than the sig p of the set used, the calculated k-eff will tend to be biased high (conservative) and the run is not repeated with a more appropriate set (sig p) unless a more accurate k-eff is needed.
If the calculated sig-m is lower than the sig p of the set used, the k-eff will be biased low (non-con-servative) and the run will be repeated with the appropriate cross seccion sets, unless the sig-m:sig p difference is small or a course search yields an obviously poor result.
The sig p of the cross section sets used and the KENO-calculated sig-m data are provided for reference.
The Hansen-Roach library (Knight-modified) was used because:
1)
The cross sections yield amazingly good results.
For most cases analysed with 16 group and 123 group cross sections, the resulting k-eff's are not significantly different.
2)
If reasonable care is taken in accounting for resonance effects, the t
k-eff results tend to be conservative.
3)
Group data from KENO such as flux, leakage, and absorptions are easier to check for anomalies and to interpret with 16 groups compared to ( for example) 123 groups).
6.4 KENO Results 6.4.1 Normal Conditions Undamaged containers were stacked into a 12x12x4 array. The array faces were reflected by 12" of full density water.
The optimum moderation search results are in Table 1.
All of these cases had the tabulated interspersed moderator between containers.
Unless otherwise noted, this moderator was also assumed in the annulus be tween the inner vessel and the drum.
The Table 1 data indicate that:
1)
The peak k-eff is 0.922 + 0.007.
2)
Although the above k-eff occurred in a vermiculite-in-annulus case, the water-in-annulus peak k-eff is not significantly different.
1
se 3)
The array is suberitical by a considerable margin even if a reasonable allowance is made for the possibility of a higher k-e f f at a moderator density between two tabulated values.
4)
The optimum interspersed water density is about 0.04-0.08 gm/cc.
5)
There is no evidence that pellets are more reactive than powders given the limits on geometry, mass and internal moderation.
The Table I search data were generated using 83 generations of 100 neutrons each. All of the results appear reasonably converged; there was no signifi-cant trend as generations were omitted from the final average.
To verify the adequacy of these approximate 8,000 neutron results, a case was run again with 83 generations of 250 neutrons. The third case in Table 1 (6%
interspersed water, powder, no vermiculite) was selected.
The second run result was 0.911 2 0.004 for approximately 20,000 neutron histories. This result is slightly lower than the approximate 8,000 neutron results (0.918 1
- 0.007) but the difference is not significant.
Since all results are considerably subcritical and given the replication results with more histories, these data are adequate to demonstrate suberiti-cality.
Table 2 contains additional data for cases of UO -water powder mixtures at 2
3.0 gm U/cc instead of the 1.2 gm U/cc density of Table 1.
Although the inner vessel did contain 323 lbs of UO -water, the fissile volume was reduced 2
from 100 liters to 40 liters.
The effect of decreased diameter of vessel at constant length and decreased length at constant diameter were examined.
In each case, the fissile volume was placed symmetrically within the inner vessel.
In each case, the 60 liters not occupied by fissile material was void.
The Table 2 data indicate that the full inner container at a lower powder bulk density is more reactive than higher powder densities with reduced volumes.
All results, except those of Table 2, used the full container model.
6.4.2 Accident Conditions The contents and the dimensions of the inner vessel are not changed in the accident case. The diameter of the drum is decreased from 22.5 inches to 20 inches and the drum length is reduced from about 69 inches to about 65 inches. The only other change from normal conditions is the array size:
9x9x3 here versus 12x12x4 at normal conditions.
The calculated results are in Table 3.
The peak k-eff is 0.918 + 0.007.
=
. Interspersed moderator densities greater than 0.10 gm/ce, the maximum tabulated value, will result in decreased interaction among the containers in the array and a corresponding lower value for k-eff.
For example, k-inf for damaged containers (infinite array) with 0.12 gm/cc interspersed water is 0.994 + 0.005.
Thus, any number of containers would be suberitical at moderator densities greater than 0.12 gm/cc.
6.5 Methods Verification The KENO-IV code, the Hansen-Roach cross sections, and all modeling methods have been extensively benchmarked by many investigators (including Exxon Nuclear) against data from many critical experiments.
Additional verifications were performed by us for this analysis:
1)
Critical experiments on U 03 8 Powders with a H/U = 2.03 were analysed.
2)
A critical experiment with flooded and re flected fuel assemblies was analysed using the same differential albedo employed in the CE-250 cases.
6.5.1 Benchmarks With H/U = 2.03 These critical experiments are documented in NUREG/CR-2500 (RFP-3277).
Some details of the experiments and the models are given below.
The experiments employed _15 cm cubes of damp U 038 in aluminum cans.
The cans
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were stacked into arrays on a split table.
Plastic sheets served as the moderator between the cans and as the reflector.
Only two experiments are available with the subject H/U.
Others at lower H/U's are available but were not analysed for this verification. The two cases used here are denoted "F" and "G".
Two types of plastic were used in the re flec tor: one with fire-retardant additive and one without this additive.
The " Tris" additive composition l
included two nuclides not in the Hansen-Roach (or AMPX) library: bromine and phosporous.
The fire-retardant plastic was modeled without these two nuclides; there were no substitutions.
The two types were placed into the reflector as recommended in the source report.
All in-core (between cans) plastic was without additive.
.The thickness of the plastic sheets between cans in the core was 0.93 cm (exp. "F") and 2.43 cm (exp.
"G").
The core of experiment "F" was under-moderated and the experiment "G" core was near optimum moderation.
The experiments were explicitly modeled using the documented average dimen-sions and compositions.
I Calculated results:
Experiment "F" k-eff - 1.009 1 0.005 Sig p for input U-235/U-238 - 1600/78 Sig-m(eff) calculated - 1659 1 4.4 / 78.9 1 0.21 Experiment "G" k-e f f - 1.012 1 0.005 Sig-p for input U-235/U-238 - 1700/82.0 Sig-m(eff) calculated - 1721/81.9
' The calculated k-eff's are conservative by about.1.2% relative to the assumed actual k-eff of 1.000.
6.5.2 Dif ferential Albedo Validation The critical experiments of the previous section employed a plastic reflec-tor.
The CE-250 array models were water reflected.
A critical experiment documented in BAW-1487-7 was analysed to verify the differential albedo employed in the CE-250 calculations.
Several of the experiments in this reference have been previously analysed for methods verification. The single experiment selected for the albedo overcheck was Case #2321. For comparison, the. case was also analysed using the water weighting function for 10 reflec-tor regions of 3 cm each. The albedo and the weighting function are part of the standard KENO system.
Albedo Results k-eff - 1.012 1 0.004 Sig-p for input U-235/U-238 - 2460/62.5 Sig-m(eff) calculated - 2540 1 70 / 64.9 1 1.8 Weighted Reflector Results k-e f f - 1.00610.005 Sig p for input U-235/U-238 - 2460/62.5 Sig-m(eff) calculated - 2587 1 85 / 66.0 1 2.2
I i
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Both results are conservative relative to the observed k-e f f of 1.003.
Although.the albedo result is _ higher than the weighted value, the dif ference is not significant.
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Table 1 12x12x4 Array of Undamaged Containers Inner Vessel Full of 5% Enriched UO -Water (7 wt% water) 2 Bulk Density of Homogeneous UO -Water - 1.2 gm U/cc 2
i Micro Sig p Micro Sig-m Interspersed.
(input)
(calculated)
Water Density U-235/U-238 U-235/U-238 gm/cc (barns)
(barns) k-eff 0.02 1600/87 1622/88.4 0.859 1 0.008 WW 0.04 1600/87 1640/89.5 0.900 + 0.009 WW 0.06 1600/87 1653/90.3 0.918 + 0.007 WW 0.08 1600/87 1642/89.6 0.881 1 0.009 WW 0.02-1600/87 1626/86.7 0.866 + 0.008 VW 0.04 1600/87 1625/86.6 0.901 + 0.007 VW 0.06 1600/87 1626/86.7 0.913 + 0.006 VW 0.08 1600/87 1640/87.4 0.922 + 0.007 VW 0.10 1600/87 1635/87.1 0.915 + 0.008 VW f
0 0.782 + 0.008 PWW 0.02 0.882 + 0.008 PWW 0.04 0.902 + 0.008 PWW 0.06 0.896 + 0.007 PWW Notes:
WW - Powder case, water in annulus, water between containers.
VW - Powder case, vermiculite in annulus, water between containers.
PWW - Pellet case, water in annulus, water between containers.
. Table 2
'12x12x4' Array of Undamaged Containers Inner Vessel With 323 Pounds of 5% Enriched UO -Water (7 wt% water) 2 Bulk Density of Homogeneous UO -Water - 3.0 gm U/cc 2
Micro Sig p Micro Sig-m Interspersed (input)
(calculated)
Water Density.-
-U-235/U-238 U-235/U-238 ge/cc (barns)
(barns) k-eff 0.04 1500/80 1517/80.9 0.837 1 0.007 L-0.06-1500/80 1521/81.1 0.842 1 0.008 L 0.08 1500/80 1520/81.0 0.813 + 0.008 L 0.02~
1500/80 1461/77.9 0.819 + 0.007 D 0.04 1500/80 1472/78.5 0.793- + 0.007 D 0.06 1500/80 1463/78.0 0.748 + 0.011 D
. Notes:
L denotes cases with reduced diameter and full. length.
D denotes cases with reduced length and full diameter..
m
F
. Table 3 9x9x3 Array of Damaged Containers Inner Vessel Pull of 5% Enriched UO -Water (7 wt% water) 2 Bulk Density of Homogeneous UO -Water - 1.2 gm U/cc 2
Micro Sig p Micro Sig-m Inters persed (input)
(calculated)
Water Density U-235/U-238 U-235/U-238 gm/cc (barns)
(barns) k-eff 0.02 1600/87 1605/87.4 0.827 1 0.007 0.04 1600/87 1639/87.3 0.886 1 0.009 0.06 1600/87 1642/89.6 0.918 1 0.007 0.08 1600/87 1642/89.7 0.909 1 0.008 0.10 1600/87 1663/90.9 0.894 + 0.008 l
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6.6.0 Typical KENO Input / Output Listings
TYPICAL KENO INPUT LISTING, NORMAL CONDITIONS CE-250, NORMAL SIZE, FULL INNER, 6% WATER,12X12X4 ARRAY 25.0 83 100 3 16 6 7 3 8 5 1 12 12 4 7 2 0 2010 00 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 6*1012 NOTE UDEN,WT.FRACT WATER = 1.2000E 00 7.0000E-02 NOTE UDEN,U235,U238,0X,WV0L=
NOTE 1.2000E 00 1.5375E -04 2.8844E-03 6.0762E-03 1.0247E -01 NOTE SIG-P: 1600/87 1 -92508 6.15E -05 1 92509 9.225E-05 1 92816 1.7306E -03 1 92817 1.153BE-03 1 8100 6.0762E-03 1 502 1.0247E-01 2 100 1.0 3 502 0.06 BOX 1 NOTE NOMINAL INSIDE DIMS OF-INNER VESSEL: 11.5" DIAM X 57.125" LONG NOTE INNER VESSEL MODEL: 11.625" ID X 57.25" LONG NOTE FILLED WITH UO2-WATER (7 WT.% WATER)
CYLI 1 14.76375 72.7075 -72.7075 NOTE CARBON STEEL WALL.
NOTE
& 0.5" LID & 0.125" BOTTOM CYLI 2 14.91564 73.9775 -73.025 NOTE ANNULUS (NORMALLY VERMICULITE, MIST HERE)
NOTE NORMAL DRUM SIZE: 22.5"D X 68.6875"L (INSIDE)
NOTE VESSEL-DRUM END SPACE: BOTTOM:4.4375", TOP: 6.375" CYLI 3 28.575 90.17 -84.29625 NOTE DRUM WALL, LID, BOTTOM: 16 GAGE = 0.0598" THICK CYLI 2 28.7269 90.3219 -84.4481 NOTE FILL OUT BOX WITH INTERSPERSED MODERATOR CUB 0 3 28.7269 -28.7269 28.7269 -28.7269 90.3219 -84.4481 END KEN 0
TYPICAL KENO INPUT LISTING, ACCIDENT CONDITION CE-250, ACCIDENT SIZE, K-EFF, FULL INNER, 6% WATER, 9X9X3 ARRAY 25.0 83 100 3 16 6 7 3 8 5 1 9 9 3 7 2 0 2010 00 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 6*1012 NOTE UDEN,WT.FRACT WATER = 1.2000E 00 7.0000E-02 NOTE UDEN,U235,U238,0X,WVOL=
NOTE 1.2000E 00 1.5375E-04 2.8844E-03 6.0762E-03 1.0247E-01 NOTE SIG-P: 1600/87 1 -92508 6.15E -05 1 92509 9.225E-05 1 92816 1.7306E-03 1 92817 1.1538E-03 1 8100 6.0762E-03 1 502 1.0247E-01 2 100 1.0 3 502 0.06 BOX 1 NOTE NG41NAL INSIDE DIMS OF INNER VESSEL: 11.5" DIAM X 57.125" LONG NOTE INNER VESSEL MODEL:
11.625" ID X 57.25" LONG NOTE FILLED WITH UO2-WATER (7 WT.% WATER)
CYLI 1 14.76375 72.7075 -72.7075 NOTE CARBON STEEL WALL NOTE
& 0.5" LID & 0.125" BOTTOM CYLI 2 14.91564 73.9775 -73.025 NOTE ANNULUS (NORMALLY VERMICULITE, MIST HERE)
NOTE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS: REDUCE DIAM.BY 2.5", LEN BY 4.0" NOTE DRUM IS NOW 20.0" ID X 64.6875" LONG NOTE VESSEL-DRUM END SPACE: BOTTOM:2.4375", TOP: 4.375" CYLI 3 25.4 85.09 -79.21625 NOTE DRUM WALL, LID, BOTTOM: 16 GAGE = 0.0598" THICK CYLI 2 25.5519 85.2419 -79.3681 NOTE FILL OUT BOX WITH INTERSPERSED MODERATOR i
CUB 0 3 25.5519 -25.5519 25.5519 -25.5519 85.2419 -79.3681 END KENO r
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i TYPICAL KENO INPUT LISTING, VERMICULITE-IN-ANNULUS CE-250, NORMAL SIZE, FULL INNER, 6% WATER, 12X12X4 ARRAY 25.0 83 100 3 16 6 13 4 15 5 1 12 12 4 13 2 0 1010 00 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 6*1012 NOTE UDEN,WT.FRACT WATEPr 1.2000E 00 7.0000E -02 NOTE UDEN,U235,U238,0X,WY0L=
NOTE 1.2000E 00 1.5375E-04 2.8844E-03 6.0762E -03 1.0247E -01 NOTE SIG-P:
1600/87 1 -92508 6.15E-05 1 92509 9.225E-05 1 92816 1.7306E-03 1 92817 1.1538E-03 1 8100 6.0762E-03 1 502 1.0247E-01 2 100 1.0 3 502 0.s6 NOTE VERMICULITE PER ARH-600 4 13100 2.3E-4 4 26100 9.0E-5 4 1102 8.1E-4 4 19100 1.2E-4 4 12100 4.2E-4 4 8100 2.42E-3 4 14100 5.2E-4 BOX 1 NOTE NOMINAL INSIDE DIMS OF INNER VESSEL: 11.5" DIAM X 57.125" LONG NOTE INNER VESSEL MODEL:
11.625" ID X 57.25" LONG NOTE FILLED WITH UO2-WATER (7 WT.% WATER)
CYLI 1 14.76375 72.7075 -72.7075 NOTE CARBON STEEL WALL NOTE & 0.5" LID & 0.125" BOTTOM CYLI 2 14.91564 73.9775 -73.025 NOTE ANNULUS FILLED WITH VERMICULITE NOTE NORMAL DRUM SIZE: 22.5"D X 68.6875"L (INSIDE)
NOTE VESSEL-DRUM END SPACE: 80TTOM:4.4375", TOP: 6.375" CYLI 4 28.575 90.17 -84.29625 NOTE DRUM WALL, LID, BOTTOM: 16 GAGE = 0.0598" THICK CYLI 2 28.7269 90.3219 -84.4481 NOTE FILL OUT BOX WITH INTERSPERSED MODERATOR CUB 0 3 28.7269 -28.7269 28.7269 -28.7263 90.3219 -84.4481 END KENO
TYPICAL KENO OUTPUT, K-EFF EDIT TABLE CE-250, NORMAL SIZE, FULL INNER, 6% WATER,12X12X4 ARRAY GENS.
K-EFF 95% CONFIDENCE TOTAL SKIPPED LIMITS HISTORIES 3
0.91603 +/- 0.00749 0.90106 TO 0.93100 8000 4
0.91559 +/- 0.00757 0.90046 TO 0.93073 7900 5
0.91585 +/- 0.00766 0.90052 TO 0.93117 7800 6
0.91439 +/- 0.00762 0.89915 TO 0.92964 7700 7
0.91681 +/- 0.00732 0.90216 TO 0.93146 7600 8
0.91751 +/- 0.00739 0.90273 TO 0.93228 7500 9
0.91759 +/- 0.00749 0.90261 TO 0.93256 7400 10 0.91879 +/- 0.00749 0.90380 TO 0.93378 7300 11 0.91869 +/- 0.00760 0.90350 TO 0.93389 7200 12 0.91667 +/- 0.00743 0.90182 TO 0.93152 7100 13 0.91555 +/- 0.00745 0.90065 TO 0.93044 7000 14 0.91546 +/- 0.00755 0.90035 TO 0.93057 6900 15 0.91659 +/- 0.00758 0.90143 TO 0.93175 6800 16 0.91627 +/- 0.00769 0.90090 TO 0.93165 6700 17 0.91715 +/- 0.00775 0.90164 TO 0.93265 6600 18 0.91622 +/- 0.00782 0.90058 TO 0.93185 6500 19 0.91539 +/- 0.00790 0.89960 TO 0.93118 6400 20 0.91698 +/- 0.00786 0.90127 TO 0.93269 6300 21 0.91684 +/- 0.00798 0.90088 TO 0.93281 6200 22 0.91496 +/- 0.00788 0.89919 TO 0.93073 6100 24 0.91841 +/- 0.00768 0.90305 TO 0.93377 5900 26 0.91987 +/- 0.00772 0.90442 TO 0.93532 5700 28 0.91876 +/- 0.00796 0.90283 TO 0.93469 5500 30 0.91847 +/- 0.00824 0.90199 TO 0.93496 5300 32 0.91986 +/- 0.00820 0.90346 TO 0.93626 5100 34 0.92231 +/- 0.00835 0.90562 TO 0.93901 4900 36 0.92284 +/- 0.00870 0.90544 TO 0.94023 4700 38 0.92581 +/- 0.00875 0.90831 TO 0.94330 4500 40 0.92564 +/- 0.00915 0.90734 TO 0.94393 4300 42 0.92703 +/- 0.00945 0.90814 TO 0.94592 4100 44 0.92653 +/- 0.00992 0.90668 TO 0.94638 3900 46 0.92771 +/- 0.01015 0.90740 TO 0.94802 3700 48 0.93024 +/- 0.01057 0.90910 TO 0.95137 3500 50 0.93041 +/- 0.01104 0.90832 TO 0.95250 3300 NOTE: Reported k-eff: 0.918+/-0.Opf
l
- 7.0 OPERATING PROCEDURES 7.1 Procedures for Loading the Package A specific operating procedure for loading the CE-250-2 is used by Logis tic s Personnel. This procedure outlines personal and criticality safety, loading methods, installation of a seal, and application of DOT radioactive labels.
7.2 Procedures for Unioading the Package A specific operating procedure for unloading the CE-250-2 package outlines the proper order and method s to be used, including a radiation survey by Health Physics.
7.3 Procedure for Inspection
-A specific inspection of the CE-250-2 is performed prior to the loading of the package. This inspection looks for package damage, gasket condition, paint,' bolt and nut condition, and stenciling.
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. 8.0 MAINTENANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 8.1 Acceptance Tests All containers to be f abricated will be constructed in accordance with CE Drawing NFM-E-22175, Rev.
2, and shall be inspected prior to placing the containers in use.
Changes to the design of the container, which fall outside'of the safety envelope specified in this application, will be submitted to NRC for approval. This may include re-testing of the container if analytical results are not capable of demonstrating enat the test sequence previously performed would be applicable to the changes made.
8.2 Maintenance Program Logistics personnel determine during pre-loading inspections when any repair or replacement of material is required.
8.3 Quality Assurance The fabrication of new containers or maintenance of old containers is accomplished under the purview of the Quality Assurance Program.
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NUMEC LICENSE SNM-414 l
Pu 10-1 TEST RESULTS f
I
VI)1 !;U:WC Pu 10-I Cont.niner
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,/
VI.1.1, container !b::erinti,on Cross Weicht 400 lbs. (max.)
a.
~
b.
Ifodel Number Pu 10-I Materials of construction, weights, dimensions, and methods o.
of fabrication.
19" or 24" diancter Outside drum:
Pres-ure vcssol: Solid stain 1 css steel, with flanced, 4
gaskoted bol.ted closure lrcosure vocaci casket: 1/8" tarcet or blue asbestos l
compressed asbcstos sheet Moderator: Polyethylonc granules with polyester resin filling interstices Primary containcr: 11 liter polyethylene bottic contai.v in two scaled polyvinyl bags Noro detailed desi6n infor:::stion is provided in the enclosed drawings, and in the following sections.
Identification and maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents de 1.
Pu 239 154 Curies (Transport Group I) 1 71 Curies (Transport Group II) 2.
U 233 5 24 x 10-3 (Transport Group III) 4
- 3. U-235 E
Classification of material to be shipped:
e.
Large source and fissile material f.
Identifica' tion, chectical and physicai font, and==v4= t quantities of fissile constituents:
Uranyl nitrate solui.icns having a concentration of U 23'5 not to 1.
exceed 350 grams per liter, provided that (a) the cc:-bined U 23:
and plutoniu content is not more than is of the U-235 content, and (b) the minimum free acid is 2 molar.
Uranyl nitrate colutions having a concentration of U 233 cnd 2.
U-235 not to exceed 250 grar.s per liter, provided that (a) the U 233 content is not greater than 10% of the conbined U-233 and
~
U 235 content, and (b) the plutoniun content is not nore than 1% of the combined U 233 anel U-235 content, and (c) the mini: um free acid is 2 molar.
plutoniutt nitrate solutions having a concentration not to ex::ce J.
250 granu.Pu 23') per liter, provided that (a) the Pu-2% cen,cn is al lea:iL 3,' of,the total plutonium, and (b) the mininu. fece acid is 2 colar.
VI-1 11-22 66
t Ten (10) liters' Maximum quantity of material per package:
of solution, con aining not more then 2 5 kilocrans of 4.
t
,/-
fissile isotope.
Extent of rcticetion, amosnt and identity of non-fissile neutron absorbers in the fissile constituents, and the atomic ratio of g.
modcration to fissilo constituents.
The fissile material is contained in a polyethylens bottic (0.16" wall thickncas) which is contained in a cadmius wrapped 3/16" thick A 2 inch thick polyethylene-stainicas stecI pressure vessel.
polyester resin composite surrounds the 'catilus wrapped pr vessel.
moderation to. fissile constituents.
42 pounds including the polyethylene h.
Maximum weig t of contents:
bottic.
For plutonium containing less than FM = = amount of decay heat:
i w/o Pu 238, wo estimato a 30 F temperature differential between 4
Stat.1.
the solution and the outsido of the container, yielding an internal temperature of 160 F under condition 1 of Appendix A,10 CFR 71.
0 D
4 S
9 9
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e VI 2 11 22.66
)
VI.1.2 contalme Evaluation VI.1.2.1 Comra.1 St.,nd.,rds j
a.
Internal Reactions All fissile material is contained within a polyethylene bottle (0.16" wall thickncss) which is doubic bagged in 0.012 inch PVC, and contained in a pressure vossal fabri-f cated fro:s stainicas stec1, precluding the pos.sibility of internal chemical reactions with the packaging material.
b.
Closurc Closure.of drums con =ists of a 12 gauge bolted ring with drop forged lucs, one of which is thrceded, using a 5/8" bolt.
c.
Lifting Devici:s No lifting devicen are incorporated as a structural part of the container or its lid..
Tie-downkhvices d.
No tic down devices are incorporated as a structural part of this container.
Structural Standards for Large quantity Packaging e.
Because the packago may contain in excess of 20 curies of
~
transport Group I materials, as defined in 10 CFR 71.4(J ),
, it is evaluated as a large quantity package as well as a fissile material package.
1.
Load Resistance Calculations demonst$ ate that the yield strength'of the packaging material is not exceeded under the conditions set forth in 10 CFR 7132(a).
2.
T'xternal Pressure The containment vessel is equivalent to an ICg 2R container, and is thereforo capable of withstanding an external pressure of 25 psig.
=
VI.1.2.2 Criticalit.v Huard for Fissiie Material Packaces Optimun Unter Modcration is a Normal Condition of Ship..cnt.
WEM
- a.
Under. his condition, 2 5 ks U 235 is suberitical in a REFcetAM t
5 625" I.D. cylir.dcr with full water reficction (ricare vo P*.
K-1.2(a),' Y-1272), :nd up to 250 g-s Pu/ liter is cuberitics1 in an infini.tc 5 625" I.D. water reficcted infinite cylir. der (Figurc J 2.7, Y-1272).
VI-3 11 22 66
a All fissile mterial is enntained uttnin.a p
>&..,-..-h.a been tested to b.
[yhichi= provir!rIuithavente.3canwhic8op:n at u ounc:s to E
The bottle is p
encloce:1 in tuo 12. nil polyvinni 'scamle:::
T!w enclora I has be.:n v. ale.1 to pn v-nt kt>'t.i::r of 31.ptiel.
' battle in pinued withirs the containnent vecuel which is provided i
f-
' c, with a ganhet.ed flanced clocure.
Because this system provides doubic containment of the fissile f
material in a suberitical geometry, and precludes the leakage o litluids into an un: arc ccametry in spite of any singic packaging error, the fiscile content of any single packaging execcds the minim'.s critical r.aca under conditions of optimum configuration (sphero) and reficction.
Adninistrative procedurca detailed in VI.l.2 5 below are used to verify thc" leak tightness of each contain=:nt vcascl.
l r a Gi.,pf e Packnac-l VI.1.L 3, Evnlyftion o Normal Corrlitions of Transport a.
l Exp*osure to direct sunlight at an ambient temperature 1.
130 F in still air.
The external container is'a stoc1 drum inside of which is vermiculite insulated steci structure containing a maderator, a stainless steal pressure vessel, and the product solution.
All are expoced without damage to more enverc ther=al con-As dition: during the required thermal test with no danage.
previously indicated, the solution may achieve a
("S ethylux bottle.
8 Expecure to an ambient temperature of 40 F.
2.
Ioss of properties of the steel and insulating material at that temperaturo will not occur, at:1 possible crystalli:stion of
~
the moderator vill not change its modcrating proporties.
The po]ycthylene bottic is composed of " ultra To allow embrittle until the ter.perature is reduced to -55 F.f space is provided in the bottic.
d d atmocpheric
. 3'.
Exposure to atmospheric pressure of 0,.5 times stan cr l
pressure.
The drum lida havo no gaskets, allowing the equilization of pressure.
4.
Vibration Each pachace is vibrated for 5 ainutes as a pa
.r insulation.
VI 4
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11 22 66 i
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. /s
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- 5. Vater Spray j
. Expe rie m o with pae:mne:n using nirellar strum decir,ns (LA ~M.
. 'l S.::*-lh'i) demorwLrate t. hat exposure to heavy HA-10, !!ef:
rain for calended periods of tino does not result in water inlcakage.
- 6. Frco Drop-This test was not performed because the Pu-10-I container does not depend on spacing for nucicar safety.
- 7. Corner Drop Because the package is fabricated from steel, this test does not apply.'
8.
Penetration The druns are fabricated from 16 Ga. steel, and are similar Therefore, the to those used for the !W:EC LA-36 containers.
test results reported in Section Xof S! L 145 apply.
9 Compression A 2,000 pound load was placed on top of a sampic package for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with no measurabic deficction of the drun.
Based on the above,(we conclude that requirements s 1), (2), (3); (b) (1) and (4) 111 are d
in 10 CFR 7135(a) 10 CFR 71 35(a) (4) and (3) do not apply as there satisticd.
10 CFR 7135(b) 1 and 3 a're are no coolants in this package.
discussed in VI.1.2.2 above, and 10 CFR 7135(b) (4),
(1) and (II) does not apply as the spacing provided by the package "does not effect nucicar safety.
With regard to 10 CFR 71 35(c), the vent valve is closed prior to all ~shipstents.
b.
Accident Test Conditions Five sample containers identified in Drawings ASK 1058 D-1, 2, and 3 were subjected to the accident test conditicas required by These drawings show direction of impact for cach
.contairier, and indicate maximun internal temperatures recorded.
Drop tests were conducted in a manner to assure that the lowest point of the container was at least 30 feet above the point cf The:--al impact on an unyiciding surfacc at the ti=c of release.
tests were performed in a furnacc which provided the required
!!osever, containers numbered 1 and 2 were exposed to high temperat@cs for 36 minutes to compensate for a tenperature conditions.
~
VI-5 11-22.60 1
~ ~ ~
drop in'the furnacc observed im=cdiately cubacquen
,f for the required period. Here, the temperature drop was p
minimized by additional pre heating of the furnace to 1600'F.
An 11 liter polyethylene bottic containing cand for ballast was placed within cach container.
Container number 5 suffered impact on the top corner causing the drum lid to sprin'g open and release sor.e vermiculite.
Resulting from this failure, further testing was held in abeyance pending cvaluation of the damage, and the determination As finally determined, these maasures of corrective measures.
consisted of the use of drum lids with a sufficicnt lip to completely encloco the upper half of the roned lip on the drum body, and tlic omission of the lid gasket to assure better seating.
That these neasures were sufficient to assure closur was also corner dropped. The lid remained proparly seated on the drum, and no vermiculite was lost.
Container number 4 was impacted on both its top and bottom surfacc.
The impact onto its top surface caused a scem in~ the upper driet body to separate slightly, yiciding an opening measurin 1/8"xil".
this opening, and subsequent to the above tests, the drtpt was' impacted from a height of 40 inches onto a 6 inch diameter by"8 Impact
/3 inch long bar, as specified by 10 CFR 71 Although a 1 1/2"
'k'
' occurred on the wolded scan joining the drums.
to 2" decp depression resulted, the integrity of the drun and weld was'not violated.
As previously indicated, other tests were performed as illustrated in Figurca 1, 2 and 3 of this application.
~
Examination of the containers subsequent to their rc= oval from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of immersion under three feet of water revealed three principal f5 cts; (1) no water 1 caked into the containment vessel, i
(2) no modcratnr was lost, and (3T the maxinun temperature 5
experienced within the containnent vessel was in excess of 10007, Additionally, the cadmium wrapping of the but Icss than 150 F.
containctent vessel was in no way effected by the test sequence.
{
From these findings, we conclude that:
No radioactive material will be relcIsed from the package
~
1.
under the stated accident conditions.
The package will remain suberitical as the caterial ren.-lns confined to a suberitien1 geometry, and the geo.stric form 2.
of the contained natorial is not altered (10 CFR 7135 (b)(2 4
e VI 6
/
11-22 66
Doubic cantnin.cnt is maintained in that ths internal
').
tenpriratures noted during the tests arc insufficient to compremine the integrity of the polynthylene bottic a.
b.
thn PVC bacging T
the prc: cure, ve::cl c.
It is recognised, however, the precsure bui34up within the polyet.hylene bottic may displace gran quantitics of solution However, such material remains doubly from the bottic.
contained within the doubic PVC bag and the pressure vessel.
No damage was suffered by any of the conponents or materials 4.
. of construction due to exposure to the thermal test.
VI.1.2.4 Evaluation of an' array of Pu-10-I containcrc t
In vic:t of the fact that the test conrlitions did not effect the con-tainment or moderation of the material within the container, we ovalusto an array of Pu-10 I container.3 in both the da=nged and undamaged condition on the basis of,the fo11otting conditions:
Solution Diameter -
- 5 56" 44 H/XRatio Cadnium Thicknees 0.016" 2.0" Modcrator Thickness Equivalent Water Thickness - 1 91" Two methods are concidered herein to demonstrate that the cad =ium wrapped 5 625" diameter cylinders arc isolated when surrounded by the equivalent of 1.9 inches of water.,
We consider first an analysis based on neutron penetration data, and correlated to interacting subcrits, as reported in K-1478.
% this method, a just critical array is described when K=1.0 ke 1-V wherc kc = reactivity of suberit Y =.fLF (1 UF)(ab) p CL F = fractional solid angle
~
(1-UF) = fact Ic:kage probability neutron pcnctration. The weighting factor p is (ab)p
=
set equal to 1.0.
j To obtain values og geenetric buckling BC, an appropriate value of f 2
is required. Using the critical hcicht of a c:dniun ure.pped water VI-7 11-22-66
~
-w.--.
- = -
9 9
9 O
APPENDIX 2.9 WESTINGHOUSE LICENSE SNM-338 BB-250-2 TEST RESULTS
SNM-338 Shipping - NFD k.~
- 16.4 Limits and Controls r~
The Fissile Class II limit, Fissile Class III limit, and the Procedural Controls presented in Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, respectively, will apply directly to this package, if " Equipment Specification E-676498" is sub-stituted for " Equipment Specification E-676200".
I 17.
NUMEC LA-36 Shipoing Package The construction, limits on contents, and loading procedures will be in strict compliance with those giv'en in Amendment 71-1 of License SNM-145, Docket 70-135.
18.
BB 250-2 Shipping Package 18.1 Packaging Description Designation - BB 250-2
.J. >.
Gross height - 575 pounds, uaximum Fabrication - The design and fabrication details for this container are given in Westinghouse sketch
- SKA-252 which is attached as Appendix L to this application.
Coolants - Not applicable 18.2 Contents Description Radioactivity - Not applicable Identification and enrichment of SNM - The SNM will be unirradiated uranium enriched to a maximum of 4 w/o in the isotope U-235.
t O
s... '
Docket 70-337 Date: 11/10/66 Revision No.13 Dale. 3/1/68 face 43 c
O SNM-338 Shipping - NFD C', %.
18.2 (continued *- BB 250-2) f-Form of SNM - The SNM will be in the form of bulk uranium okide (UO
- U0 w
a ens y
2 2
38 grams / cubic centimeter.
The moisture content of the SEM will not exceed 0.5 w/o and 'the total H/U
. ratio, including all packaging materials, will not exceed 1.13.
Neutron Absorbers, etc. - None Maximum Weight of Fissile Content - 4.0 kilograms U-235 Maximum Net Weight of Contents - 250 pounds of oxides enriched I 4 w/o contained in 9.5 inch diameter Fiberpak drums or other containers having equiv-alent strength.
These are contained in an 11.5 inch diameter (maximum) cylindrical inner container.
4 Maximum Decay Heat - Not applicable 18.3 Compliance with.Subpart C of 10 CFR 71 General Standards - The materials which have been*
specified for this package will not result in significant chemical or galvanic reactions.
There will be no specific lifting or tie down devices.
General Criticality Standards - Tests demonscrate that immersion in water, alone, is not sufficient to affect the structural integrity of the 9.5 inch di-ameter Fiberpak drums.
Calculations using LEOPARD procedures show that a fully reflected, 11 5 inch diameter, infinitely long cylinder is nuclearly
([)
'~~~safo for homogeneous uranium enriched I 4 w/o in U-235 under any conditions of moderation.
d Docliet 70-337 Dofu 11/18/66 Revision No.13 Date: 3/1/G8 Pace
,41
~
Shipping - NFD 18.3 (continued - BB 250-2) r Normal and Accident Conditions Evaluation - This package utilizes design concepts which are similar to those e
used in the design of the NUMEC LA-36 and Pu-10-1 packages, described in SNM-145 and SNM-414, respectively.
The outer she'll consists of two 16 ga,,22.5" diameter (nominal) steel drums welded end-to-end to form a package approximately 74" long.
The inner container is an 11.5" diameter (maximum), 16 gauge (nominal) steel cylinder with
A min-imum of six 1/2"-13 NC bolts are used to seat a 1/8 inch thick Anchor Packing Company " Target" or "425" gasket which is provided to assure a leak-
{;
{j tight closure.
Six tightly closed Fiberpak drums contain the uranium oxide.
These drums have a nominal 9.5 inch diameter.
Vermiculite is used to provide thermal and mechanical insulation for the gasketed inner container which is positioned with a minimum of 12 steel spring spacers, as shown in the sketch #SKA-252.
The top insulation plug may be fabricated of unibestos.
At least 5 inches of f
vermiculite insulates the inner container from the drum, except at the bottom where its thickness may be 4 inches.
The effects of the hypothebical accident conditionn specified in Appendix C of 10 CFR 71 are considered on the basis of the results described by NUMCC.
Dockof 70-337 Data: 11/10/66 Revision No.16 Date: 4/8/68 Fena 45 l -~
L
~
[~
+
18.3 (continued - BB 250-2)
Normal Conditions of Transport --All conditions dcccribed
~
in the referenced licenses apply to this package.
Because the package array is based on the consid-eration that each vertical projection of packages is replaced by a continuous cylinder having an identical length, the loss of spacing incurred in a vertical four foot drop test is not of concern.
It is considered that the low horizoncal loading will result in minimal displacement of the inner container in a horizontal drop test.
%pcident Test Conditions - The inner container of the BB 250-2, when fully loaded, weighs 329.4# result-2 ing in a vertical loading of 3.17 lbs/in over a g
,( '
2 base area of 103.87 in.
The inner container of 4
e/
the NUMEC Pu-10-1 container, when fully leaded, and including the neutron moderator weighs 279#,
2 i
resulting in a vertical ' leading of 3.55 lbs/in 2
over a base area of 78.54 in.
When placed in a horizontal position, the loadings are 0.456 lb/in for the BB 250-2, and 0.442 lb/in for the NUIiEC Pu-10-1 container.
Thus the tests perfcrmed en i
l the latter container are valid for the BB 250-2 package.
As a result, it is concluded that:
l 1.
The integrity of the package is not affected l
by the tests.
Because the lid is bolted in a minimum of six places around the top
- of the drum body, separation of the lid from
(]'
the drum body doca not occur.
In this connce-Docket 70-337 Date: 11/10/6e Revision No.16 Date: 4/8/68 Pane 46
- I 4
G
&B e es e absuuD $
9 enet ense 9
sp M eoe W-Q W me *# 8
- e g
y r-,,---
,e-e,en,
-n--n
---g r-y e---
--,~---,- --
w-mv.
mw.
.~
Shipping - NFD 4
['
18.3 (continued - BB 250-2)
~ p tion, test experience. with. the BB 250b1 shows
- ~
that as a result of a top corner drop the lid and the body are folded together into a tighter closure.
2.
The incorporation of five inches of vermic-ulite is equal to that provided in the NUMEC package, and is sufficient to assure that after the drop and fire tests the temperature of the inner container would not exceed the observed maximum of 500 F.
Since the' gasket is service rated to,800 F, the closure of the inner container is not compromised.
9
.3.
The test series does not result in the addi-
,()
(
tion of moderation to the contained fissile
?f material.
4.
The dimensions of a damaged package are con-servativ'ly taken to be 20" O.D. X 70" Lg.
e This assumes a reduction of 2 1/2" in* diam-eter as the result of a drop test with the package in a horizontal position, plus a re-duction of 4" in height as the result of a drop test with the package in a vertical posi-tion.
No deformations in. excess of these values were experienced during the testing of the Pu-10-1 package, i
Single Package Evaluation - The safet'y considerations which pertain to a single package will assure nuclear d
safety even assuming that the failure of the inner 1
i l
Docket 70-337 Deter 11/18/66 Revision No.18 Date: 5/21/68 Pace 4i
.~
I
- 3n : :,:.. i 6.
23.-
PcQc.Shignin7 Pach qq
'r' 23.1 Packnaine Descriotica
~....,-
- ) > ; i..
2, :..? g.. e ) :...
doccriLad in Part 10.
23.2 Contents Descriotion Radioactivity - Not applienblo Identifiention and enrichment of SNM -
The SNM vill be univradiated urcnium geriched to a maximum of 5 w/o in the isotopo
""U.
Form of SMM -
The C::M will be sclid uranium compounda that will not react chemically or decompose at temperaturas below 750' F.
The material will be encicssd with-in a container constructed of steel having a 24-gage specified minimum thickness.
The container will have a maximum ID of 8.5" and a ncminal height of 15.375", and will utilize.a gaskoted lid with bolted 1cching ring.
The container will he constructed in accordance with US Military Standard MS 24347.
As an innor container within the 30-250-2 packaging's inner cylinder, it is considered completely adequate to retain the SEM u.4 der the hypothetical accident conditions.
A co.ng:risc.7 between the structural features of this centainc:
and a DOT Spec. 17-H container is shown in Tabla 23.2.1.
A maximum of four of these centtinces will be insertad in cach package.
The maximum allevable H/U ratio, considering all sources of hyd:cgencus material within the innar cylinder of the packcging will no t a::cced 1. 5.
A typical arrangement for shipping material in the form of pellets is shein dn tiestinghcunc Drawing C7103D10, which is enclocad as part of App.sndi:: R.
Military Standard MS 2.iJ47 also is encioned as part of Appendix R.
Noutron Absorber =, etc. -
None Maximu:.17cight of Fica Lle Content. -
-n i-l S.0 ki109r,i.
- .4.to in ed '"' "U C r. :' : '; J-n':
- ,.' ~: L'./1n/G.
- P.. A..a, la. 2 C C.:..; 1/22/71 L _',. o., _, _
r,
, - - =
-.--r--
a.
Ghipait. - - !: 'O Oc.cl ntion (continued) i 23.2 Content.1
=
r Maximum Not Weight of ConP.ents -
25 U 1:en '.u;.
t : ura: it.
- ce.r..v..c.
c Ita::i::.us. D.:c.q iicat - I'ct.;;gl icabic Table 23.2.1 Structural MS24347 Spec. 17-11 Feature Cr.intainer ConNiner capacity (gal.)
35 5
Type Straight Side Straight Sidc Diameter (in.)
8.5 11.25 Height (in.)
15.375 12.75 Metal Gauga g.7.,
s, i,-
Body 24 24 Cover 24 20 Bottom 24 24 Closure Bolted Lo'ching Multiple Lugs Ring Construction Welded Seam Welded Seam e
e D:1!al 70-337 C d.:
11," 7 / 6 '; a.f 1.d w.a.'o 2 G C.; :: 7/23/71
,E.- ' 'T.1
.~
APPENDIX is
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a
e-,
e APPENDIX 2.9 NUMEC LA-36 TEST RESULTS
- (' )... *,* : 3.,:.:j'G... :.l...f..,;..,'.:y. -n.. : j.::... v-c.J.y.. 6
- (
- ....;..
Q.;; :....
.i; 4
.t
...,.D>.......
. '...[
. ' * *.. $. t[ '..a ;,...... s..
F#-
..~:.'.., '
. ( **$ ' b.
.I..
.N.. E...
- '.'***.1 NU E bd *Id COMt3iner.
~
.... ~.. : :
.s',.
s
.......... ~ ; M.
.y..:.'..,.y.
.. r. n.., :..
- . +
..,.v.,c....'...
Packa*c Descrintion e- -
.. 1.1
... c ~. c.a.....; U.: :..,.......:-..c:.
t.. s:9.+
.t::e '.:..e
..s...
....i.
.::.....s..
...s... :
ep:.'. :.:.,. -
- .y3
.:a.. Gross Voight:
2500 :
-s
.T.Q. S.ir?'.I b. Model Number: LA-36... :.. 1::.. -.a..
.m ;;.
. ~,.c..
c.: : e a v...-:,..
. (;.h,-N d..t.
..a. r.
..... 'l j $* * *: l y.C E. Ig;'. '-(.1 'K-L. ' U.
! 'O'
..;.he{l*l.'.'Ny* Details o.f Construction:
. s.
the enclosed drawings (10 D-1167,
..; 5. 'c.n c.' *. ~ This infors.:ation is provided ir)5.).
'.10-D-1168,10 A 214 and 10 A 21
~
d.
Identification and maxiau..t radioactivity of radioactive constituents:
. s... x o r... ;.- r.
.., l...
4 0 4 +.U-U S 11.1 x 152 curies
~...
s
/
L OS - 1 3 x 10 2 curies
~
m Classification of material'to be shipped:
e.-
..., ?.g,
- Fissile,maf.orial only.
r J. 3 f.
- Identification,, ch-M an$ physical form, and maximum quantities
,3..,
i of fissile constituonts:
,1.' Dry non-decomposable ' forms of uranium having a maximum U 235 assay
~
1;)*
.of.$.0$s..
.i
.Ha'imua loading: 36 kg of material containing no more ihan
~
x 1 58 kg U 235
.... '.< !.. /, Maxim m Uranium Density: Any
+
. Maximut Wat.er content: 05w/o'
- 2. '36 kg M* hydr'ous decomposablo compounds containing a maximum of 1.0 kg U 235 The maximum weight of the uranium bearing' material shall be 36 kg.
s Extent of reflection, amount and identity of non-fissile neutron V
g,.. absorbers in the fissile constituents, and the atomic ratio of
- l*,.. mo'deration to fissile constituents:
. The fissile' bearing material is contained in: tuo sca168 5 mallon ICC-17K
' pails. The above enss limits assure.that no sing 1.c pac:cqo 'concalsw.
. l' critical mass undo *r any credible conditions of modcration and reficction.
(
.
- Non-fissile neutron absorbers, if present, are negiccted for the purposo of evaluation.
Actual modcration ratios are as fo11cus:.
- g..,
- 1., Non dccomposable, forms of uranium:
v,.
T
.... V...
l (50 5 u{o H O) lc 2
,*i s
. gjx.
y-gy$ i.:ca;,
1-2,
14.8 2-3 7.h1 e,.~. 3-4
.,,. h.95
.;.;3,7,.
4-3
.s
, ;..., c,
\\..:.x,.. ;
.o.
M. :.
.,y.C. :, K:.::4..t..( }..
'.. 'c * >
p.
2- :...
i
. 'f.,,'. h '....
?.'..
.....c,
-f1 _NUM?.C LA-16 Container,
- 5..
' ~~
i
. J l,.
.T
~
- .,' 1.1 Pa'ckaee Descriotion
.~
~.
e.~
O~
f.e.'.... 'i > -
Gross Weight: 2507,. [
' *j, *.4 :'A. :,s i.* :
f
'l -.'-
r.. -
.. a.
4 " 4. ~._*r :.. :', ' ': ".... 9. i..
- b.,,
. c..:.' :.'. ' b.
)iode1 5 umber: LA-36.
.U"
~
l*
- c.
Details 'of Construction:
,'4"-
~
'.*. This information is provided in the enclosed drawings (10 D-1167,
, 10-D 1168,' 10 A 214 and 10 A-215).
~
Identilication and maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents:
d.
2 curies
~
U-234.+ U 235 11.1 x 10 U-238 - 2 3 x 10 2 curies
. Classification of material to be shipped:.
a.
..s
.. ~..,
Fissile, material only.
- f.
- Identification, chemical ard physical fom, and max 5. mum quantities of fissile constitucats:
1.
Dry non decomposable forms of 'raniun liaving a maximuk U-235 assay
.of,$.0$
- W.
m2
.Maki=== Loading: 36 kg of material containing no r. ore.than 1 58 kg U 235
, Maximum Uranium Density: Any Fav4=nm Wat.er Content: 05w/o' 36 kg of hydrbus decomposablo compounds containing a baxinun of 2.
1.0 kg U 235 The maximum weight of the uranium bearing material shall be 36 kg.
Extent of reflection, amount and identity of non-fissile neutron s
g,.
absorbers in the fissile constituents, and the atonic ratio of mo'deration to fissile constituents:
The fissile bearing material is contained in Ltro scaled 5 calien Icc-17H The abovo mass limits assure.that no singic package 'contains a pails.
critical mass under any credible conditions of mcderation and raficction.
Non-fissilo neutron absorbers, if present, are negiccted for the purpose of evaluation. Actual modcration ratios arc as folicits:
i 1.
Non decomposable forms of uranium:
(505w/ OHO) 2 r
U 235 An.c_..r N/X
[
12 14.8 2-3 7.h1
.~
4 95 3-4 4-5
,.37
L.ht.. s.w s
- t
. s
. g..
v
., i ;.,,;, 2.
D2co..poc'able forms of uranium:'
'c.
- '5.f *..;.*l,'.
Optinum hydfogen moderation is cicumed.-.
s.-
..,.; lf,".,f'.*].,
f---
t'.
.s....
3.
,.;,. ~ y',;,, jl r
- ff,k%p
[,..*. "
.,5,*.'j;:.. -;I.[.,", h., Maximum weight
- of. contents: *M kg '.
. S.1.
.,.,... ? g.,y.
. r.,,.,
..e..
..s f.4~/.d. =.....=......s,'$$. '.*', i. Maximum amount of de' cay heat:; Negligib1(,,*,,.
J
.."..s..';h.A #'^ W 'W.u. % >~****n*?
'.'l M
- ~
7.'
.s.,'".
-.* w.La2.Containsr Draluntion
. '.. n.:, g.i
- f b'. n.
- rg..';...:.... "......
........... 1.241 Ceneral Standards
.i,.
.:~-
a.
Internal Reactions
~
,.;..,.,.. ::. g.,y
....~y-:.Q:l.inc.i:t;rij.1*e. Nan-deco'aposable forms of uranim,,
No internal chemical reactions are considered credible.
~
- { '... G '..- h x. 2.*.-. Decomposable forms of uranium:
..;............,.r.
All' decomposable forms of uranium are packaged uithin an inart
..., *.,,', 5..,. i material, such as polyethylene in the form of sheet or a 4
... M,.:.?(. f;,,'.,,,.,.,.
bottisi in order to preclude chemical reactions between the.
material, and the $ gallon pails which provide primary conta.inment.
V..
- b Closure s
, Closure of the diss consists of'a 12 gauge bolted r ng uith drop i
forged, lugs, one of which is threaded,. using a 5/,Sa bolt.
..... l...,. c. Lif. ting Dsvices'
~...
/
J l,1(o lifting devices are incorporated as a structural part of the
- '.. i,.,..., /..d. f.... package or its lid..
_ Tie Down Dev. ices.
.d.
l..' No tie down devices are incorporated,as a. structural part of the
- package..
packaging.
Structural Standards for Large quantity
. e.
' Not applicable.
.;L.2.2, Criticalitv St.md..rds for Jicsile 'faterial Packages
- a..Each container is limited to assure that its' contents would re:-ain-l
.. '.i ' *g/
' suberitical under any condition of water moderation and reflection.
b.
Each container is 'further limited' to assure that its contents uould
. '. renain' suberitical 'in an o.ptimum configuration, uith opt.immt yator e
.... . r. e
.s., : " moddration.and reflec.ti.on.
. /...
e.....
,f, %.
...c r
- e..:.
X.1 2...
.... : t.y..,..
....s.,...:.,.,:.....~.-
.k
+
v
?
g
. r..
,,-.n.--
..:. > g. t;3( _ ',.:.. ;.;; :. ;.... eg....g.. :.. y p...,
~
-.:f's: ;.
u e.
... T. :. ":Y'..*-
.a.c :..
.: +.....
" '. $~' f
- d~';5. 2. ~ Decompos'able forms of uranium:
., ' ~
~
.~-
i
/-,.S. ' *. -.
/ '*,.: Optimum hydiogen r.'odcration is as'sumed.-
?.
w.
...1.......
.. Q., --'. :....
-,.....M._,..
.e e.C. - P.-
h.. M=v--= = weight' of. conf.ents: 3 kg '.
..s..
~..y...i. '.f. :... : N 7.
~
J
.,1.
Maximum.amoun.t..of decay. heat: Negligible.
- 5..<. 3..,.:.,..-
':.. *h2 ' Container Evaluntion
- .... k *,.'.' M. >. %.. Y '.- ': n -:...:.
r.
- 1.:
- s..
.=
1;241 Ceneral Standards
.s.
Internal Reactions' a.
1.
Non-decomposable foras of uranium:
No internal chemical reactions are co.nsidered credible.
o
... '..2.
Decomposable forms of uranium:
.~
All' decomposable forms of uraniuct are packaged trithin an inert material, such as polyethylene in the form of sheet or a
[
bottlei in order to preclude chemical reactions between the material, and the 5 gallon pails which provide primary containment.
- ~
b.
Closure
,b c.,.
Closure of the drums consists of a 12 gauge bolted ring with drop forged, lugs, one of which is threaded, using a 5/8" bolt.
c., Lifting Davices i
N,o lifting devices are incorporated as a structural part of the packag's or its lid.
d.
[ieDownDevices
,., No tie down devices are incorporated as a. structural part of the -
package.
I Structural Standards for Large quantity Packaging.
I
.e.
7
' Not applicable.
.1.2.2 Critten11t'r St.tndy-ds for Fiestle ?taterial Pnekase,s,
- Each' container is linited to assure that its contents would rc..ain.
s.
subcritical under any condition o;* unter r.oderation and reflection.,
b.
Each contniner is further linited to assure that its contents trou1d
. re:nin subcritical 'in an o.ntinurt configuration, with optinu t vater modcra. tion.a:d reficc. tion.
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.. 1.2 3 Evalu-tion of n Sinele Pschih
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No.rmal.Gondition of Transport
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Exposure to direct s'unlight at an ambient, tempor"ature of
.. 1.
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...130'0F la still air.
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The external container is a steel _drts inside' of which is a
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e.' ~. : verniculito insulated steel sleeve which contains two ICC-17H
,....u......g.p. en. :.. pagg,,
All are exposed without dartage to more severe thermal U *. :.* '/
conditions during the required thermal test..
l 0
..l 2.
Exposure to an ambient temperature of 40 F
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Exposure, to 40'T wili not aff.ect the structural materials,'
which are steel, or the' insulating material, which is
~
verniculite.
- }.
Exposure to atmospheric pressure of 0'.5 tir.es standard e
atmospheric pressure,.
~
,.; The' drum lids have no gasket, allowing 'equilization of pressure.
.4.
Vibrat' ion Each package.is vibrated foi 5 minutes as a'part of the fabri-cation procedure in onfer to pro =ote settling of the vermiculite
, insulation.
,9,.
.5.*, Water Spray
., A number of containers have been exposed to heavy rain stems Such I ! for extended periods of time, with no water,inleakage.
- exposure exceeds the requirements of the water spray test.
- 6. Free Drop'
. Two sample packages were dropped from a height of 4 feet onto-
. One package was dropped botten end doun,
, an unyielding surface.
and experienced a less than 5$ loss of spacing and reduction of The other was dropped in'a hoiizontal position, and volume.
also experienced a less than 57. loss of spacing and reduction
' of volume.
,Both sa-tple packages' vere subjected to a ponctration test as
.specified in Appendix A of 10 CTR 71.
- The resulting dents did not,excced a. depth of 3/16 inch.
8.'Compecasion i A 1275 pound laid was placca on top.of a sanple psence for a
- priod of '24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> uit no measurabic deficct,lon of the dru-..
Baced on the above, un conclude that, tlic requirements c.:t fo/th in 10.CFR 7135 arc entisti.cd to the c:.:t.cnt' that they are portinc nt... x13 11/22/66 ?*
r .,,v '.., s,_ .q, J.4 ' *. - ~ b. Accident Tcst Creditions t .... r.,, {. .,.y...v Two sa5ple packages, each containing at leas'. 36 kg of dry brick ~ r' '.? ~ ^ ~ ~ ' '...', *nortar, and designated as Drums #1 and 92, were subjected to the 'y. *. : *. . g ;*, -
- accident t.est conditions, as set forth in Appendix A,10 CFR 71.
r *. - a s' 1. Impact . t..'Dru:s number 1 was dro'pped at a 43 angle from a height of 30.. 8 -~ : . s.. ~ s,...r - The drum caved intrard several inches at feet on its cover. ,e ..es.W.. :.'.
- e...,.
the p'oint of impact. The ring and cover were not dislodged. Drum number'2 was dropped fron ateight of 30 feet so as to strike flat on its side. Impact occurred approximately half This drum was then dropped 30 vay between the spacer rods. feet in a vertical position,, suffering impact on its botton surface.'
- 2.
Puncture
- * ' Drum ntsmber 1 was dropped through a distance of 40' inches onto A dent approximately fa 6 inch diar.eter cylindrical target. '
21/8inchesdeepresulted.
- 3. Thermal Both drums were placed within a furnace heated in excess of 1500 F prior to insortion of the drums, and maintained at 0
147.5'.F for 1/2 hour subsequent to' the. insertion of the drums. sg 4. Innersion o . Both drums were. immersed under three feet *of water for a ' poiiod of 24 hours. s-5 , Container, Dismantling and Inscaction ~. The two sample drums were dismantled, inspected and measured. ,to detemine the loss of spacing suffered during the. impact tests, and the extent of water inleakage into the 5 gallen pails. 5 1 Weight Chedks, All pails were weighed before the tests co=.anecd, and again, on the sar.e scale, on completion of the tests. , Theso. weights are tabulated belo.r, and de.on::tra.te that no r.ansurabic inlechago of water into the pails had occurred. e O g X.1 4 11/22*/f4
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.# *. WEIdHb OF PAIT.S'.. 7*. I ~ * * . ! '?
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. w. . a < 1. * - .i.. r .~=...w-J CitGDP . ORGDP' ,..m...e .. * * *f I,.: l[.* '.. * 'l l. NUIEC e '- ' ),, /.,...,', - (before testsl * (before tests),, (after tests.). . p.,, :- : * ~~.*..;.;.;,. ;,.....
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.g;. 7 *:.. ,,,( Number i ? .-.ei...- .t .. :n.;.. :* : z;.%,.: '. :~..:y :.- r.*- n. - ~ ;.;- . Top Pail
- 22,470-22,470 22,4*/0'
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6 g g p,g3 . s 20,470 20, % 0 20,.440 ~ r Number' 2 -~ 20,490 20,490 Top Pail 20,51'O Bottom Pail: 20,450 20, 4 0 20,440 '5 2 Inspectior. Checks 5 2.1 Dru:t number.1 experienced a maximum temperature of 500 F. on the cover plate. Removal of the cover and the pails ' :' revealed that water had entered, but only half filled the
- inner' container.' The inner container had shifted approximately 1/4 inch as *a result of the impact.
Bath pails expsrienced haximum temperatures.of from 200 to *)00 F, and appeared to have suffered little damage. 0 When opened, dryness of the contents was confirmed. 4U 5 2.2 Drun number 2 also exeerienced a maxinum.ta=perature of 5000F on tha cover plate,. As with drun nunber 1, water had entered, but only half filled the inner e,ontainer. 'The e inner container had shifted approximately 7/8 inch as 'a In addition, the drun had caved in result of the impact. at the* point of impact, yield'ing a total loss of.2.1/2 inches spacing between the center of the inner container, and the nearest point on the outer container. The upper pail experienced a maximum tempe/ature of 325 F. . Pieces of the, gasket, pulled loose when the lid was removed as a result of'the adherence to the side of the pail. The botton pail experienced deformation' on its rolling hoop, sufferingalossof1to1-1/2inchesinoverallheight. Howcycr, the gasket had not deteriorated appraciably, ar.d maintained its seal.* A strip of sec=ingly. caked ponder 3/8 inches.uideby3/4incheslongby1/64inchthichunsfound ,ncar t,ho top *of the pail. No.other indications of caked material uns noted. Attempts to brush this c:atcrial from .the pail with light pecesure uero unsuccessful, but simiD.c . atte= pts ui.th-finger nail pressure indicatcd that it may not ' have bacn coepictoly reacted. No othar at.te.pt had been made to identify the nr.ture of this caking. Ho::cyce, in vic:t of the f.an:ral tenden:y of. hygroscopic po::dcred nat.crir.1 to foin locslir.ed :! hen!ces on ns.nf ap'ptrent1~ dry cu. f. : c, f, the nature of the niUisran qu nt.lt. loc,of ed:cd p1:ahr observed cc.nnot be acc:.d.aln:d with eny de rce of ci.ri **.. ^ m!.s It is', therefora, on the.buis of recortled ucicht, n:c n're ~ that ha:!cratica control is cis.ir.cd. v /n t(A
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.9 . :. ;. ~ ..... g. A series of additional tests has been carried out wherein .I * ;' *--.. f'..,.,. ' ;;.:.... pairs of pails have been dropped together without benefit w.,,,,.. ;.* # 'r.J.'.g"... -l:/.. of the surrounding, drum structure, exposed to te. pcraturcs f.- '. :*.d.
- .::~!..-.r typical of those recorded above, and im.ersed under three The results confir='those
"* ** l,..L ~.','{~,,'.Q.' t...' il,^ fact of water for 24 hours. Included in these tests.were pails uhich .y , i.., reported above.
- 4'*,*.
'. '.'.*.,w*. G,i,.if.,.bf,y.2, were equipped with lids identical to the standard 17-H lids, except that the closure device is a' lever-lock ring formed e_:9;.q n..~.. ' r..... of. 032 steci shect, 'in pla' e of the standard lid closure .c. c lugs. The lids are identical in all other respects. ...... g..
- Based on the above tests, we concitide that:
.~".' 1. The individual package-rennins suberitical under all conditions by virtue of,the r. ass linit. 2. The ability to exclude watei from the material being shipped provides the basis for evaluating an array of . s. - packages on the basis of dryness of the material. , 3,.2.4 Evaluation of an Arrav of LA *36 containers . 1.2.4.1 DevComcounds s In view af the proven ability to. exclude water modcration, we consider that all material being shipped contains'a maxinun of 0 5 w/o water.
- 3. :
a. ITndamaged Becausethismaterialisessentiallyunmoderated(H/US05), l criticality c'annot be achieved wigs any finite mass. Accordingly, an infinit.e number of con. tainers is safe.
- b.. Damaged The ninimum voluca occupied by the IA-36 container in a close packed hexagonal array is 3 46 R H = 3.M (.835)2 (316) = 7.6 f t3.
2 Mcb = Critical mass.of an unreflected sphere of UO (93f, U-235) 2 l Because the nederation ratio moy be as high as 14.8 for 1.0;i l . enriched uranium, us deternine.the value of.Mcb frot Figurc 10 of LA-3366. hhile the value of !!cb thus obtained represents a carbon-:: ster-uraniun system, it yields slightly conservative results, as seen in Figurc 9 of LA-3366. Thus,, Tho dansI.ty/ 6 = 17 gm/ce. McB = 25 kg U 235 The a' erage uranium density [for tho.systen is f v fmM3keU-23.1le0074gm/cc 215 liter t X;1 6 11/22/G ---n-.- a .}}