ML20132G177
| ML20132G177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1985 |
| From: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A701 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507190184 | |
| Download: ML20132G177 (2) | |
Text
.
immeTvammim concuss sTANLgy scovttLa STAFF DIRECTOM MORRIS K. UDALL. arf 20NA CHAJRMAN AND COUNSEL ASf ATE STAFF DIRECTO s
vs I
mus tua.m. new waxco
= ':"a = ~^
='r4 =,$s - ^
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR ANo CouNsn
' j Q 'f,y,'ff ' L
- { -
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
g,'Al^;"ou,,a f
j g g go gu y
g U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES a.
RgAR,OgGN g,v,cos,y g a g J _oam *c a g,,,,
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
" ".=#c745.lf#ch
=c"mL"*"^
0,"mll#L*^c'j"J""'"^"'^
L",o",,. r^o".,
Apri1 26, 1985 L'='"J,= M E E 0 !""'
a"?;"P.l"L""c=o.
E==7oi m. "*
=tAA'=',l". "*
The Honorable Nunzio Palladino Chairman United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I would like to call your attention to a TVA report:
NSRS INVESTIGATION OF CONCERNS RELATED TO FAILURES OF THE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANTINJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM AT BROWNS PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT.
(NSRS Report No. I-84-16-BFN.)
I-84-16-BFN is based on an investigation initiated in March 1984 after TVA employees expressed to the TVA Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) concerns about the workability of the Browns Ferry High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system.
NSRS concluded overall that the employee concerns were valid and " plant safety, in the event of a LOCA at Browns Ferry (BFN), was in jeopardy."
NSRS stated:
From interviews with people from the various TVA organizations, it is obvious that the HPCI system has incurred many f ailures and has been very unreliable from startup of Unit 1 in 1973.
The failures have not been limited to one specific area.
The failures have occurred in the components, the control mechanisms, and in structural supports.
For a system that is essential for high-pressure cooling of the core in the event of a LOCA, 11 years is too long to repair-as-broken instead of providimg a permanent fix.
This system must be raised on the priority list and be recognized for its importance to public safety.
The system has been operated in such a manner as to cause fear of testing by the operations group, since they know something will break when testing.
The control system in the EGM boxes has malfunctioned continuously due to poor environment.
The hanger group along with EN DES personnel agree the piping is inadequately supported to take the loads induced by the fluid flow.
Of all the people interviewed no one stated that the system as-designed and as-built is adequate to meet its safety functions.
h 95$7JR$.Lt4)(29P
O,
Due to the importance to safety of this system, a complete fix to the system so that it will perform its required safety functions must be pursued immediately.
Eleven years is too long to rely on not needing a system rather than having it ready if and when it is needed.
I-84-16-BFN was issued on June 27, 1984.
During the period October 10-12, 1984, NRC Region II conducted a "special, unannounced inspection (that] entailed 57 inspector-hours on site in the areas of High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability." The inspection report (50-259/84-41) is attached.
While the inspectors had access to I-84-16-BFN and although they found what would seem to be significant defects, 50-259 84-41 stated that "No violations or deviations were identified."
The fact that for an eleven-year period plant safety would have been in jeopardy in the event of a Loss-of-Coolant accident is a significant matter which raises the following questions:
-- When was I-84-16-BFN submitted to the NRC?
Were NRC staff aware of the I-84-16-BFN conclusions prior to submission. of the report itself?
If so, on what date were such conclusions provided to the NRC?
-- Did TVA provide NRC I-84-16-BFN in the manner required by applicable NRC regulations?
Did TVA TVA fulfill its reporting obligations pursuant to applicable NRC regulations to report HPCI deficiencies in the 1983-1984 time period?
-- Does NRC headquarters staf f agree with Region II conclusions stated in Inspection Report 59-259/84-41 that the conditions found by NRC inspectors and described in I-84-16-BFN did not represent regulatory violations or deviations?
In the event that NRC staf f believe TVA did fulfill its obligations with respect to reporting and-correcting HPCI deficiencies, does the Commission believe there exists a need to strengthen the regulatory requirements vis-a-vis reporting and correcting significant safety defects in reactor systems?
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely, t
V cORRIS K. UDALL Chairman
l Novernber 6.10P4 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. H. G. Parr.Ls l
Manager of Power and Engineeriro 500A Chestnut Street Tower 11 Chattanooga, TN 37401 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
REPORT N05. 50-259/84-41, 50-260/84-41 AND 50-296/8a-41 On October 10 - 12, 1984 NRC inspected activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-33 DPR-52 and DPR-68 for your Browns Ferry facility.
At the l
conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.
t Areas esamined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and
~ reprisentatTve Feco~rds, interviews with pers6nnel, and obserstTon of activitTei in progress.
Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.
la accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room unless you notify this office by telephone within 10 days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within 30 days of the date of this letter.
Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
Should you have any getions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, (Original signed by DMVerrelli)
David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Meactor Projects
Enclosure:
l Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/84-41 50-260/84-41, and 50-296/84-41 cc w/ enc 1:
J. A. Coffey, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Site Director G. T. Jones Plant Manager J. W. Anderson, Manager Office of Quality Assurance H. M. Culver, Chief Nuclear Safety Staff l
D. L. Williams, Jr., Supervisor Licensing Section R. E. Rogers, Project Engineer f.ck k
bec w/ enc 1: (See page 3)
- r - -.. -
TRan
Tennessee Yelley Authority 2
Nove%er 6,1984 bec w/ encl:
MRC Resident Inspector R. J. Clark. Licens-tng Project Manager, MRR Document Control Desk State of Alabama Rt!
R1 R11 e
R11 Rl!
rtner:1b ulian Gibson her FC 11 st4er 1J84 5/\\/84 s/84 1
/84 1p/f/84
'8/ s,.
1
'g NtA':Ltr.Q CtCut ATORY COAANsSION
/
?
CEte0ee ne I
tot esAAttTTA ETftEST.es W ATL AneTA.OEDetCIA 38383 Report Mos.:
50-259/84-41,50-260/84-41,and50-296/84-41 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 5004 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Occhet Nos.: 50-259, 50-260 and 50-2%
License Nos.:
DPR-33, DFk-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted: October 10-12, 1984 h L. _ _.
si Inspectors: ww W. K. Poortner Da".e 5igned
g fb k, m
. _ _?!!s F P. D. Magpr Date Signed h. A d w
~j aMn L. P. Nocenos
[ ate 51gned C-g/$ /w
- 8 Approved by:
C. A. Justan, Section Chivf Unte Signec Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This special, unannounced inspection entailed 57 inspector-hours on site in the areas of High Pressure Coolant Injection Systee Operability.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9
I, REPORT DETAILS 1.
l.icensee EmpTo'yaes Cor.tacted G. T. Jones Plant Manager
- J. E. Swindel. Assistant Plant Manager
- B. C. Morris, Compitance Engineer
- M. G. Ray, Site Services
- R. K. Widick, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- E. Cornelius, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- T. Cosby, Electrical Maintenance Engineer
- H. Walls, Plant Engineering
- G. Dillard, Modifications Engineer J. Traglia, Modifications Engineer l
S. Carter Electrical Maintenance l
W. Roberts Compliance Engineer J. Souto. Instrument Engineer l
--J.-itincaid,- Engineering Design R. Hunkapiller, Operations Supervisor NRC Resident Inspectors
- F. S. Cantrell, hoclear Regulatory Cosmission, Section Chief l
- C. A. Patterson l
- C. R. Brooks
- 4ttended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 12, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 aoove.
A subsequent telephone conversation of October 19, 1964, between the Plant Manager and F. S. Centre 11. Project Section Chief, Region 11, was held to discuss the findings of this inspection.
The Plant Manager cosmitted to take action to resolve inspector follow-up items 1, 2, and 3 as described in paragraph 5, l
prior to the restart of Unit 2 from its current refueling outage.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This sub.iect was not adoressed in the inspection.
4 Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
l l
l
9 5.
The inspectgr1 conducted an tr. dependent inspection 0; the Hign Pressure Cociant in.1ection (HPCli system to determine system integri'.y/ operability.
Concerns on. the HPCI systems integrity / operability were raised by TVA'c Nuclear Safety 9 eview Staft (N5RS) Report No. 1-84-16-8FN.
The inspec'.rs interviewed selected licensee personnel in the areas of operations, mechanical maintenance, electrical maintenance, desiqr engineering and structurai support. The following documentation was revieweo:
NSR5 'teport 1-84-16-8FN 5 tear 8211 Test Results Stear 8202 Test Results Browns Ferry Procedure 12.8 Surveillance Instruction 4.5.E.1.d Surveillance Instruction 4.5.E.1.e HPCI Task Force Meeting of September 17, 1982 Minutes -
L26 821006-800 HPCI Task Force Meeting of June 22, 1984 Pinutes - L27 840724-964 Mechanical Maintenance Instruction - 23 Electrical Maintenance Instruction - 36 browns Ferry LetterT52;840404-856 DWG #47WB12-R15 DWG #47W455-5RC Trouble Request 131695 l
Maintenance Request A-172852 l
Maintenance Request A-172863 Maintenance Request A-170719 Maintenance Request A-17?851 Maintenance Request A-162181 Maintenance Request A-172981 Maintenance Request A-172934 Maintenance Request A-173749 Maintenance Request A-173748 Maintenance Request A-173747 Maintenance Request A-173746 Maintenance Request A-173745 Maintenance Roguest A-173744 Maintenance Request A-173743 l
Maintenance Request A-173742 The inspectors ' determined that Browns Ferry recognizes the safety signif t-cance of the MpCI system and has instituted a prograr to identify and resolve potential problems in the NPCI system.
This program was initiated in 1980 with the formation of a MPCI 'esk Force.
As a result of this program, extensive testing has been conducted ano modifications have been and are being made to the HPCI system to maintain and tworove the system's operability / reliability.
The inspectors identified the following inspector followup ttees durino the course of the inspection:
l l
l
3 4.
'aclkdowny of HPCI systen. pipint; and ripe ?,vpports etter e.sc* in,iectior are required by Browns terry Procecure 12.8 W. ram Proce6.rt.
Also, o monthly walkdown is required by Mechanical Maintenant.e.n'.f ruction. 3.
Womever. -neither of thr.e requirements specify the critt rie these supports and pipes are inspected tu.
For example, no checki'sts are provided stating what to look for with respect to restraints or pipeq.
Until specific criteria is provided es to what exact;y should l)e inspected during a HPCI systes piping and supprsrt walkdowr, this will remain an inspector folicwup ites (259, 260, 296/Pa-41-01),
b.
In January 1984, ret,traint P-74 was discovered failed ir the HPC!
systee 4tscherm ptptng of Unit 2.
In March 1984, restraint R-23 was discovered failed in the HPCI discharge pipios of. Unit 2.
Based on interviews with plant personnel and review of mechanical maintenance requests a possibility entsts that R-23 and R-24 could have both been failed at the same tien prior to the discovery of the first broken restraint in January 1984.
No stress analysis was subsequently performed on this section of HpCl piping to insure piping integrity.
- tintH-en-engineering design group st.essanalysis_is_perfarined_en_.the_
Unit 2 HPCI discharge piping, this will remain an inspector followup item (260/84-41-02).
The HpCI Task force has recommended that Electrical Maintenance c.
Instruction (EMI) 36 he revised to incorporate the Terry Turbine Governor Calibration procedure. Browns Ferry has instituted a revision to EMI-36; however, this revision has not beer. completed.
This is identified as an Inspector Followup Item (259, 26C, 2%/84-41-03).
d.
The licenset has identified the necessity to relocate the HPCI EGM control bones due to the harsh er.wironment of high temperature and high humidity in which the control box sits. Steam leaks and the resulting Condensation in the boa accelerate any Corroston and deterioration of the untt terminals and connections.
The licensee plans to move the coctrol bones off the WCI stands to an area where any leaks will not taptage directly upon them.
Until a Design Change Request (OCR) is approved and the WCI EGM control bones relocated, this item will remain an inspector followup ites (259, 260, 296/84 41-04).
No violations cr deviattord were identified.
- - - -.. _ _