ML20132D711
| ML20132D711 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1985 |
| From: | Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132D713 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#385-629, CON-#385-659 LBP-85-35, LBP-85-40, OL, NUDOCS 8509300265 | |
| Download: ML20132D711 (10) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA e-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Bercre the Atomic Sorety and Licensing Appeal Board tWc In the Matter or ) ) THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 (Tf,5 SEP 27 A!0:40 ILLUMINATING CO. ET AL. ) 50-441 OL 1 CffTED M W (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) U%il fR Units 1 and 2) ) HOTION FOR A STAY PENDENTE LITE I. INTnooucTION Pursuant to 10 CFR 0.788, Intervenor Ohio Citi: ens for Responsible Energy c ('0CRE') hereby seeks a stoy or the errectivness or LBP-85-35, 22 NRC ___, September 3, 1985 Concluding Portial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning, Hydrogen Control and Diesel Generators (served September 4,1985) and LBP-84-40, 00 NRC 1181 (October 4. 1984 Memorondum and Order (Denying Hotion for Summary Disposition on OCRE Issue No. 6 and Dismissing the Contention)) pending odministrative oppeal or these decisions. II.
SUMMARY
OF DECISIONS TO BE STAYED A. LBP-65-35 This Concluding Portial Initial Decision addressed the issues litigated at evidentsory hearings held April 9-12 1985 and April 30-May 3 1985. The hydrogen control issue concerned compliance of the Perry Mark III containment degraded core occident hycrogen control measures (o distributed igniter system) with the neu provisions or 10 CFR 50,44(c)(3)(iv)-(vii). Subjects oddressed occident included igniter system design and operation, containment copocity, scenortos and onolyses, containment response colculational models, and equipment survivability. The diesel generator issue concerned the obility or the Perry Tronsomerico peloval, Inc. ('TOI') diesel generators to reliobly generate on-site AC power. as requsrea by GDC 17, subsects addressed included TDI quality assurance, the 8509300265 850925 PDR ADOCK 05000440 ..- (>, JJ Q PDR Q})
-JL-progrom and plan of the TOI Owners Group to revolidate the engines, and the suitobility or 16 Phase I components and certain Phose II components. After *considering* the evidence on these issues, the Licensing Board, rinding that Applicants had met their burden or proor and that there was reasonoble assurance that Perry con be operated without endangering the public health and sorety, dismissed Intervenors' contentions and authoraced the Director or Nuclear Reactor Reguloeion to assue operatsng licenses for Perry 1 and subject to seven license conditions. B. LBP-84-40 This split dectsten concerned OCRE's Issue No. 6, Which, os admitted by the Licensing Board, stated: Applicant should install on outomoted stondby liquid 40ntrol system C'SLCS*] to mitigate the consequences or on anticipated transient without scrom C'ATWS'J. Arter issuonce or the Commission's new ATWS rule, 10 CFR 50.60, OCRE moved for summary disposition or this issue in its rover os the Perry SLCS hos outomatic copobility. It is OCRE's interpretation or the ATWS rule that BWRs with outomatic SLCS copobility be required to utilice it. As the replies or Applicants and Storr to OCRE*s motion indicated o dirrerence or interpretation or the phrase 'olready designed and built' in 10 CFR 50.60(c) (4), the Licensing Board requested briers from the porties on this matter. OCRE submitted a detailed onolysis of the legislative history or the ATW5 rule, which supports CCRE's interpretation. The former Chairman ogreed that the legislative history supports OCRE's interpretation. The majority, however, ignored the legtslative history and contrived on illogical orgument to justify its dismissal or CCRE's conteneton. III. GROUNOS FOR THE STAY A. LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING ON APPEAL
- 1. LBP-85-35 The Licensing Board in this Portial Initial Decision ('PID') hos disregarded the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission's regulations and cose low, and the weight
-3~ or the evidence to such a degree that the PID will not withstand oppe11ote scrutiny. The errors in the PID ore too numerous and complex to be rut!y evoluoted here. OCRE has outlined below some or the simpler and more egregious errors. I By using the vehicle or license conoitions, the Licensing Board had delegated contented issues to the NRC Starr for post-heoring resolution, o practice prohibited by consolidated Edison (Indian Point Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951 (1974). Several or the condietons involve ono]yses, which are not merely conrtrmotory matters but require on evoluotion or surriciency. Similarly, the fact that procedures are needed to operate the Perry igniter system (condition H 6) begs the question of their odequacy. The Board refused ) to consider this matter, however, and stated that 10 CFR 0.006 provides a mechontsm for Consideration or the procedures' odequacy in other proceedings. PID or 08-29. This reasoning controvenes Section 189(o) of the Atomic Energy Act in that it denies o hearing on on issue that even the Board round material to licensing. See Union or concerned scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ('UCS'). The provisions or 10 CFR 0.006 do not suorontee a hearing, os there is no requiremene that a proceeding be inittoted in response to o 0.006 request. UC5 or 1440-44 The Ecord's arguments (FID at 00) that it need not be concerned with radioo:tive releases from containment venting is doubly flowed. First, it neglects the Board's cWn Wording of the hydrogen control issue, Which Changed but little from the time When the stondord for its litigation was Metropolitan Edison (THI 1 Restort), CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674 (1980), which spectried 10 CFR 100 as the regulation under which hydrogen control could be then litigated.
- Second, it contains the circular reasoning that Perry will not be allowed to operate ir j
+ the hydrogen control system proves inadequate, forgetting that it is the Board's responstbility to determine thss for this contested issue.
-.. ~ _. _ =. -y-( The soord refused to occept its responsibility and rule on ene proper scope j of the preliminary analysts or the hydrogen control system, required bercre t operation obove 5%' power by 10 CFR 50.44(c) (3) (vii) (B), so that a rinding or complionce of non-compliance With the regulation could be determined, as required by 10 CFR 50.57(o) (2). Instead, the Board used on illegal and sub-standard. PID at 25-06. j Jective 'reosonoble assuronce or sorety in the interim a 'The scord relied upon iose dixit overments or the witnesses and other material that was not in the record and was incapable or being examined by CCRE. i or course, o Lscensing Board decision restang significant findings on I i i expressions of expert opinion not susceptible or being tested on examination or l the Witness is a fit condidate for reversal. Virginio Electric and power Co. l i (North Anna Nuclear Power Station. Units i and 0). ALAB-555. 10 NRC 03 (1979). l For exomple, the Board relied on a witness
- description or analyses or stresses at defective welds in the containment vessel at 50 psig when the onalyses were not even available for OCRE's scrutiny.
PID at 96. Finding 103: i Tr. 3315. l Similarly, the Board relied upon the statements or witness Lewis that flame J speeds lower than that assumed in the CLASIX-3 containment response model used by Applicants have been measurede despite the fact that he could not identiry the the experimental basis for his statements with surricient particularity to determine the applicooility to containment-scale conditions. PID or 100. l Finding 132 Tr. 3501-00. The Board otso relied upon the ossertions or Appliconts' witnesses that drywell leakoge or hydrogen (or the mognitude assumed by on unovatloble Genero1 would not arrect the results of their onolyses or hydrogen Electric calculation) despite the rock that the witnesses admitted that the transport and combustione errects had not been evoluoted. PID or 45: Tr. 3500. l The soord relied upon analyses or drywell copocity, equipment survivability. l ond secondary rires performed for the Grand Gulr plant which were not a port or ? 4 m..- m
-G-the record and were not mode available by Applicants curing discovery. PID at
- 98. Finding 114, 103. Finding 136, and 106, Finding 148.
The Licensing Board clearly railed to confront the facts in this case. os required by Public Service Co. or New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALA8-402, 6 NRC 33, 41 (1977), Instead, the Board ignored substantial evidence in the record contrary to its conclusions. For example, the Boord states that Sandia National Laborotories accepted the CLASIX code results with reservations, citing CCRE Ex. 01 at 11. PID at 39. However, all that is stated on that page of the exhibit is that the distributed igniter system (not the CLASIX code) is considered marginally adequate. The Board ignores the severe criticisms or the CLASIX code and its input assumptions throughout that exhibit. The Board ignored the evidence that hydrogen igniter location and the spray shield or the igniter assembly would arrect combustion chorocteristics (OCRE Ex. 21 or 195-96) and oceepted, without explanotion. Applicants' witnesses' statements to the contrary (PID at 41-42. 90 (Finding 81), 91 (Finding 84). 100 (Finding 131)), despite the Board's own recognition or Sandia's expertise in the field or hydrogen combustion. Tr. 3687. The Board similarly ignored expersmental dato (NTS tests. Tr. 3607) substontioting Sondia's concerns. The Board found that the APTECH onotysis or defective containment welds did not take credit for the annulus concrete, ignoring the rock that CCRE Ex. 18 eontains contrary informotson. PIO at 30. l The Board contrived on orgument for avoiding the sssue or contoinment spray availobility as on input to containment response analyses, despite its own admission that sproys are on important heat transfer mechanism and despite the Starr's better that sproy availobility is questionoble in a degraded core occident and should not be taken credit for in such analyses. PID at 43-44: OCRE Ex.19 at 4. On the TDI diesel issue, the Board relied upon a witness' statement J m
-{> ~ which 4 (concerning the length or time emergency power ss needed for core cooling) the witness later retracted under questioning by the Board. PID at 72s Tr. 2274. The Board also ignored Starr witness Kirkwoos's disopproval or Applicants' evoluotion (which the Board accepted) or the Perry engine roundoeson. PID or 75, 120-121. Finding 200s Tr. 2417-19. Or course, for o Board to admit evidence and then rail to explain why it was rejected ss grounds f or reversal. Public Service Electric and cas, (Hope creex Generating Station. Units 1 and 2), ALAB-429, 6 NRC 229, 237 (1977).
- 2. LBP-84-40 The majority in this Memorandum and Order ('H40') commits numerous errors to Justiry its conclusion. First, the legislative history of the ATW5 rule pertosning to the interpretation or 'olready designed and built' is completely ignored. The moJority instead relied upon o legal snterpretation or 10 CFR 50.f 2
(:) (4) by one Stort engineer, on interpretotson obviously contrived to rit the circumstances or Perry Unit 1. M&O at 9, 11-12. The majority concludes, Without basis, that the Commission considered in its rulemaking the situation at hand: o CP holder having o SLCS coPoble or automation at extremely low cost but whsch refuses to utilice that recture. Second, the moJority only opplies its interpretation to Percy Unit 1, leoving it 'to future cases to determine whether reactors which are not in on odVonced stage or Construction
- should automate the SLCS. M&O at 12.
- However, this category includes Perry Unit 2, and this ss on OL proceeding for both Perry units. The moJority completely avoided its responssbility to decide this issue i
for Unit 2', and such ovoidance is tontomount to the illegal action or-de169ating ene sssue to the Starr for post-heoring resolution. Finally, the moJority resects Applicones' own figure or $100,000 (mischoroctericed os OCRE's estimate) for SLCS outomation by concluding that o l 'rull rigorous site specific value impact analysis' would have to be performed 1
~]. to conrirm the estimate (H&O at 13), despite the obvious roet that generte rulemaking is undertaken to avoid such site spectric analyses. The moJority then advances the incredible theory that, in this Ferry-specific onolysis, sunk costs relating to automation or the SLCS should be considered forward costs. t' N&O at 14. ( The examples obove demonstrate the bi orre and illogical reasoning comprising the majority opinion, which will surely fall upon oppellate review. B. IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT A STAY
- 1. Exposure to Routine Emissions of Radiation
'If the PID becomes erfective, the Perry plant will be allowed to operate, thereby exposing the population to routine, non-natural radioactive emissions. This exposure hos been termed 'a direct and present injury' by the Supreme Court. Duke Power co. v. corolino Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). As is demonstrated by Exhibit 1, the arridovie or Dr. Cori J. Johnson, this injury is irreporable due to the coccinogenic oction of low level radiation. The exposure of persons mode espectolly susceptible to concer by genetic factors (as revealed by adverse romily history) to the radicoctive releases postulated in the Perry FES constitutes severe irreparable harm. Arridovit or Dr. Johnson at p. 4. Exhibit 0, the offidovit of Susan L. Hiott, shows thor on OCRE member having genette susceptibtitty to concer will be exposed to the l rodioactive effluents from Perry, OCRE will therefore suffer horm from the operation or Perry pendente lite which connot be rectified b/ o victory on oppeal, os the seeds of concer Will I have oiready been planted. This fact alone demands a stoy.
- 2. Risk or Severe Accidents If Perry is permitted to operate, OCRE members (and the general population) will be exposed to o risk that is now non-existent: the risk of a severe nuclear reactor occident.
There is no doubt that the consequences or o severe reactor accident con be m devostating. As estimated in the FES, NUREG-0884, o severe accident could cause 370 early rotolities, 18,000 latent concers, and about 36,000 genetic errects, j expose 8100 people to doses exceeding 000 rems and 650,000 people to doses over 25 rems, and cost sie billion for errsite mitigating actions. FES, Toble 5.9.
- p. 5-53.
Members or OCRE would undoubtedly be omong the victims due to their proximity or residence to the Perry site. Should a severe occident occur pendente lite, o Victory on appeal cannot compensote for the domoge done to CCRE by the occtdent. The opercelon of Perry therefore creates the risk or severe irreparable harm. 3, Loss or Status Quo Ante Necessary for o Correct Decision on Issue No. 6 As noted above, the correct resolution or Issue No. 6. On automation of the Perry SLCS, hinges on the interpretation or 10 CFR 50.6 (c)(4) consistent uith its legislative history. This reguloeien states: The SLCS initiation must be automotic ond must be designed to perform its function in a relicole manner for plants granted a construction permit orter July 26, 1984, and for piones granted a construction permit prior to July 26, 1984, that have oiready been designed and built to include this feature. A literol interpretation, os odvocated by Applicants and Starr, vould exempt BWRs that did not have on automatic SLCS c1 ready cesigned and built as of the errective dote or the rule. the However, information in the Federal Register notice indicates that decision to exempt certain plants from outomation (despite the significant risk reduction acheived therefrom) stems f rom o generic value-impact analysis. 49 FR 06038 (June 06,1964). The legislative history contained in SECY-83-093, specifically, Enclosure D, the ATWS Task Force Report, provides insight into this decision. The costs for SLCS outomation (upon which the rule is based) include 83.35 million for design, engineering, and installationi $10.0 million for downtime for insto11orions $5.0 million for spurious trips and $4.0 million for AFUDC, operation, and maintenance. Thus, the source or the phrose ' designed and built' is the lump sum for these activities considered in the value/ impact analysis.
_9-The Task Force assumed that existing plants would be subjece to tha full $23 million for outomating the SLC5. New plants (which are assumed to oiready be designed with this rectures see 49 FR 26038), clearly, would be subject to for less. Most significantly, there Would be no downtime for snstallation. The situation now existing for Perry with respect to the costs or SLCS outo-motion is closer to o new plant than to on operating plant. The automatic SLCS is already designedi ports or it are installed; to finish the installation would cost, by Appliconts' estimates, $100,000. Dissenting Opinion or Chairman Bloch, M&O at 19. It installed before cperation, there ore no costs or downtime. An interpretation of the ATW5 rule conssstent with this history would thus mandate cutomotion or the Perry SLCS. However, if Perry is permitted to operate, it will be subject to the costs of downtime and will foll into the class of reactors clearly meant to be exempted from automation: operating plants. The immediate effectiveness of the PID will therefore result in the loss or the status quo onte necessary to o correct decision on this issue. The opportunity to gain o significant improvement in safety will, obsent a stay, be forever lost. C. HARM TO OTHER PARTIES Clearly, the only porty which could be hormed by a stay is the Applicants. However, the only horm to which they would be subjected is that with which they have lived from the inception of the Perry Plont: that the bilitons or dollars spent on Perry will go for nought. With eyes open, Applicants have accepted this fish, however great. Compare Power Feoctor Development co, v. Inter-noeional Union of Electricol, Radio, and Hochine Workers, 367 U.S. 396 415 (1961). It is expected that App 15 cones wall complain of increased costs ir operation is delayed pending appeol. However, the only situotton in which this becomes relevant is if cperation is inevitoble, i.e., if intervenors have no chance or' prevailtng on oppeal, As long as the risk of denial of the OL exists, it for As demo,strated outweighs any possible cost increases resulting from o stoy, n
< /O ' ob;v0, th2 probability or ravercal of th3 PID is high. D. WHERE THE PUBLIC INTEREST LIES Since the public, os well os OCRE, will surfer injuries resulting from routine radiooctive emissions and will be exposed to the risk or severe occidents, it is obviously not in the oublic interest to permit the operation or Perry pendente lite. As demonstrated above, and by OCRE's Findings or Fact and conclusions of Low (Issue 8. June 21. 1985: Issue 16, t'7y 00, 1985), Applicants are in violation or 10 CFR 50.60(c) (4), 10 CFR 50.44(c5 (3) (ivj-(vii), and GOC 1 and 17, and the Licensing Board has violoted Section 189(o) or the Atomic Energy Act. These provisions were, or course, eno:ted to protect the public interest. 50 strong is the public interest in the enforcement or these meo5ures that the Commission's regulottons explicitly authori:e injunctive relier when they have been violated: An injunction or other court order moy be obtained prohibiting any violation or the Atomic Energy Act or 1954, as omended, or Title II or the Energy Reorgon-i:otion Act or 1974, or any regulation or order issued thereunder. 10 CFR 55.fc. Thus, o stay is mondotory to vindicate the public interest implicit in complionce with the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's regulations. IV. CONCLUSION As demonstrated above, OCRE has made on arrirmative showing on all four roctors or 10 CFR 0.768(e); the probobility or reverso1 or the illegal and erroneous actions of the Licensing Board is hight OCRE will surfer irreparable horm obtent a stoyl AppitConts will not be hofmed by a stayf and the pubite interest demands o stoy. The evidence and the low thus requtre that the requested relier be granted, CCRE prays that the Appeal Board is so moved. ResPectrully submitted, 4 r-:as.2t'- Susan L. Htott OCRE Representative @fRB: _h_fMM3___d_(_l,7f_6.$ or 4 060}}