ML20132C941
| ML20132C941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/25/1985 |
| From: | Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509270191 | |
| Download: ML20132C941 (6) | |
Text
,
SEP 2 51985-MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division'of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
MISPOSITIONED CONTROL RODS Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues:
Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.and Mispositioned Control Rods.
These issues were addressed by IE information notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) significant event reports (SERs) and significant operating experience reports (SOERs).
The 50ERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.
The primary purpose of our survey was to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues.
The secondary i
purpose was to determine the actions that licensees were taking in response to the recommendations in INP0's 50ERs.
Regarding the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the responses have been received and the report was issued July 30, 1985.
Responses for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received and that report is enclosed.
The survey indicated a high degree of industry compliance with the INP0 recommendations.
In view of this, we do not plan any further action on this issue.
Gioinal sign d 3y, L Q krden Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Summary of TI 2515/67 Responses Second Half Mispositioned Control Rods
Contact:
Mary S. Wegner, IE 492-4511 DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer ELJordan SSchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DAllison MSWegner BKGrimes GHolahan, NRR CBerlinger, NRR GGZech CHeltemes, AE00 JHSniezek, EDO RStarostecki, RI RWalker, RII CNorelius, RIII RDenise, RIV
'DKirsch, RV CDCSW PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F
- See previous concurrences
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE
- PSB:IE
- DEPER:IE DEPER:IE D
R IE MSWegner DAllison-DGable RLBaer SASchwartz LJordan 9/5/85 9/11/85 9/13/85 9/20/85 9////85 9/ y/85 7
&id 8509270191 850925 i
d MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director i
Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement j
l
SUBJECT:
MISPOSITIONED CONTROL. RODS i
Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues:
Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems and Mispositioned Control Rods.
These issues were addressed by IE information notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),significant event reports (SERs) and significant operating experience reports (50ERs).
The 50ERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the' safety concern.
The primary purpose of our survey was to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues.
The secondary purpose was to determine the actions that. licensees were taking in response to i
the recommendations in INP0's'50ERs.
Regarding the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the responses have been received and the report was issued July 30, 1985.
Respons-es for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received and that report is enclosed.
The survey indicated a high degree of industry j
compliance with the INPO recommendations.
In view of this, we do not plan any i
further action on this issue.
I i
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness i
l and Engineering Response j
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Summary of TI 2515/67 Responses Second Half Mispositioned Control Rods
Contact:
Mary S. Wegner, IE l
492-4511' DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer ELJordan SSchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DAllison MSWegner
' CHeltemes, AE00 BKGrimes GHolahan, NRR' CBerlinger, NRR GGZech RStaro'tecki, RI RWalker, RII CNorelius, RIII JHSniezek, EDO s
i RDenise, RIV-DKirsch, RV DCS PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F
- See previous concurrences
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE-
- PSB:IE D
DEPER:IE DEPER:IE t
l MSWegner DAllison DGable R
SASchwartz ELJordan i
9/ /85 9/ /85 9/ /85 9/,10/85 9/ /85 9/ /85 l
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
-James M. Taylor,. Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement J
FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
MISPOSITIONED CONTROL RODS Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offi,ces to conduct surveys of licensee responses ~ to two identified safety issues:
Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems and Mispositioned Control Rods.
These issues were addressed by IE Information Notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) significant event reports (SERs) and INPO significant operat-ing experience reports (SOERs).
The 50ERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.
The primary purpose of our survey, was.to determine the actions that licensees i
are taking in response to the two selected safety issues.
The secondary purpose was to determin'e the actions that licensees were taking in response to the recommendations in INP0's 50ERs.
Regarding the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the responses have been received and the report was issued July 30, 1985.
Responses for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received t
and that report is enclosed.
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection a'nd Enforcement i
l
Enclosure:
Summary of TI 2515/67 Responses Second Half Mispositioned Control Rods
Contact:
Mary S. Wegner, IE
~
492-4511 DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer
-ELJordan SSchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow.
DAllison MSWegner BKGrimes GHolahan, NRR CBerlinger, NRR GGZech CHeltemes,.AE0D JHSniezek, EDO RStarostecki, RI RWalker, RII CNorelius, RIII RDenise, RIV DKirsch, RV DCS PDR DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F
- Seepreviouscon%orrences
- DEPER:IE DEPER:IE' PSB:IEd DEPER:IE DEPER:IE
- DEPER: IE MSWegner DAllison' DGab1 P RLBaer SASchwartz ELJordan 4
9/ /85 9/g/85.
9/p/85 9/ /85 9/ /85 9/ /85
-.=
i MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
SUBJECT:
MISPOSITIONED CONTROL RODS r
i Temporary Instruction 2515/67 directed the regional offices to conduct surveys of licensee responses to two identified safety issues: Steam Binding in i
- Auxiliary Feedwater Systems and Mispositioned Control Rods. These issues were addressed by IE Information Notices (ins) and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) significant event reports (SERs) and INP0 significant operat-ing experience reports (SOERs). The SOERs contained specific recommended actions to alleviate the safety concern.
The primary purpose of our survey was to determine the actions that licensees are taking in response to the two selected safety issues. The secondary i
i purpose was to determine the actions that licensees were taking in response to the recommendations in INP0's 50ERs.
Regarding the first issue, Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, the responses have been received and the report was issued July 30, 1985.
Responses for the second issue, Mispositioned Control Rods, have been received and that report is enclosed.
t Edward L.' Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
i
Enclosure:
Summary of TI 2515/67 Responses j
Second Half Mispositioned Control Rods
Contact:
Mary S. Wegner, IE 2-492-4511 DISTRIBUTION RHVollmer ELJordan SSchwartz RLBaer JGPartlow DAllison MSWegner BKGrimes GHolahan, NRR CBerlinger, NRR GGZech CHeltemes, AE00
' JHSniezek, EDO RStarostecki, RI
.RWalker, RII CNorelius, RIII RDenise, RIV DKirsch, RV DCS PDR t
DEPER R/F EGCB R/F MWegner R/F i
DEPER:I DEPER:IE PSB:IE DEPER:IE DEPER:IE DEPER:IE MSWegne DAllison DGable RLBaer SASchwartz ELJordan-l 9/sr/85 9/ /85 9/ '/85 9/ /85 9/ /85 9/ /85 1
i
i,
SUMMARY
OF TI 2515/67 RESPONSES SECOND HALF, MISPOSITIONED CONTROL RODS For the most part, the recommendations of INP0's SOER 84-2 concerning mispositioned control rods have been implemented or justification exists where they are not. The results are summarized below.1 Those nonconformances that do exist generally involve highly subjective questions about just how much a procedure should or should not say.
In view of the high degree of conformance with the recommendations and the limited and subjective nature of the noncon-formances, we do not plan any further action on this issue.
PWR Recommendation 1:
95.0% (57 of 60) had full compliance All PWRs have procedures necessary to recover from a mispositioned rod with three partial exceptions.
Robinson's and Yankee-Rowe's procedures do not require the determination of the length of time the rod has been misaligned or specify the rate of control rod movement during recovery.
Palisades does not notify plant management or nuclear engineering personnel of a mispositioned rod unless a flux tilt of greater than 5% exists, nor does Palisades have proce-dures to determine the time of misalignment or specify the power level to recover a misaligned rod.
PWR Recommendation 2:
96.7% (58 of 60) had full compliance All PWRs, except McGuire 1 & 2, have procedures for verifying rod position when one form of normal indication is lost.
PWR Recommendation 7:
98.3% (59 of 60) had full compliance All PWRs, except Palisades, were reported to have provided training for opera-tors in the proper movement of control rods, the consequences of improper movement, and the consequences of operating with a mispositioned rod.
Pali-sades has no procedures addressing the adverse consequences of improper move-ments or industry operating experience related to incorrect control rod movements.
BWR Recommendation 3:
100.0% (23 of 23) had full compliance All but 6 BWRs have procedural requirements for written instructions with management concurrence and briefing of operations personnel during rod movement when a nuclear engineer is not present.
The other 6 units have a nuclear engineer present during scheduled rod moves; therefore, they do not need the procedural requireme~nts.
BWR Recommendation 4:
95.7% (22 of 23) had full compliance I
All BWRs, except Limerick, have implemented procedures which identify the conditions under which the rod worth minimizer may be bypassed.
1 Ft. St. Vrain, an HTGR, Lacrosse, an Allis-Chalmers BWR, and Big. Rock Point, an early GE BWR, were not included in this tabulation because they have little equipment that is the subject of this survey.
1 BWR Recommendation 5:
73.9% (17 of 23) had full compliance Most BWRs have procedures to prohibit the use of scram timing test equipment except in testing and emergencies.
Eleven BWRs do not have these procedural prohibitions, but for five units, the scram timing test equipment is not readily accessible to control room operators, thus the procedural prohibitions are not needed.
FitzPatrick, Browns Ferry 1, 2, & 3, Limerick, and Oyster Creek do not have the procedural prohibition.
i BWR Recommendation 6:
87.0% (20 of 23) had full compliance Procedures containing guidelines on the appropriate use of the " emergency-in" and " notch override" switch are used by all BWRs except LaSalle 1 & 2, Vermont Yankee, and WNP-2.
WNP-2 does not have an " emergency-in" mode of operation and notch control is automatically invoked by the rod control system.
LaSalle 1 & 2 and Vermont Yankee procedures do not address the " emergency-in" mode.
BWR Recommendation 7:
100.0% (23 of 23) had full compliance All BWRs reported providing training for operators in the proper movement of rods, the consequences of improper movement, the consequences of operating with a mispositier.ed rod and the functions of the RWM, the rod sequence control system, and the scram timing test switches.
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