ML20129J052
| ML20129J052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1996 |
| From: | Adney R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129J056 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-96-269, NUDOCS 9611060116 | |
| Download: ML20129J052 (5) | |
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l Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Offee Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000 R.J. Adney Site Vee President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant October 31,1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
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50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)- PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE (EA 96-269)
The following information was requested at the Predecisional Enforcement Conference held on October 24,1996 regarding the SQN fire protection program.
Question No.1 When were the activities completed for the corrective actions listed on page 16 of the Predecisional Enforcement Conference presentation package?
The new fire protection manager was assigned to ensure fire protection requirements are appropriately implemented and raise personnel accountability on July 31,1996. The subject procedure was revised to ensure transient fireloads do not remain in the plant for an extended period of time on August 16,1996. Combustible material was removed from the two subject areas by August 1,1996.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 31,1996 Ouestion No. 2 What are the safe shutdown or safety-rclated cables in the spare room on elevation 669 of the Auxiliary Building?
The only safe shutdown or safety-related cables in the spare room on elevation 669 of the Auxiliary Building are four steam generator (S/G) level cables. These cables are associated with only one of the three fire-safe shutdown S/G level indication circuits.
Therefore, in the event of a fire in that room, a three-hour rated fire barrier prevents the fire from interacting with the two redundant channels of S/G level indication (routed on elevations 690 and 714 of the Auxiliary Building). This three-hour fire barrier provides the separation required to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a. The ability to safely shut down the plant is not impacted by this condition. Attachment I provides a sketch of the S/G level cable routing. is a copy of the self-assessment that was performed by TVA on the SQN
Based upon careful review of our fire protection program activities to date, TVA determined that the problems pointed out by NRC and our Quality Assurance organization were associated with the failure to fully implement certain areas of the program. These problems did not, however, call into question or impair the effectiveness of the broad-based fire protection improvement plan of 1991. TVA has completed a significant amount of work in the fire protection area and, as we discussed at the Predecisional Enforcement Conference,61 of 63 fire protection improvement plan activities have already been completed. TVA is confident that the corrective actions taken and the increased management attention dedicated to the fire protection program will be adequate to prevent recurrence of such problems in the future.
If you have any questions associated with this submittal, please call R. H. Shell at extension (423) 843-7170.
1 R. J. Adney
4 i
j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 l
October 31,1996 RHS:KEM:EAM cc (Attachments):
Mr. R. W. Hernan, Project Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 t
NRC Resident Inspector i
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
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2600 Igou Ferry Road j
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 J
R. J. Adney, OPS 4A-SQN M. J. Burzynski, DSE l A-SQN P. P. Carier, BR 4G-C E. S. Christenbury, ET 10A-K K. N. Harris, LP 6A-C J. T. Herron, POB 2B-SQN l
M. O. Medford, LP 6A-C O. J. Zeringue, LP 6A-C RIMS, WT 3B-K 1
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doc 3:nrc:kem:eam i
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ATTACHMENT 1-AUXILIARY g
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CONTROL ROOM W
l FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES 8
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E CONTROL g
m IN THE OLD HOT TOOL ROOM x
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BUILDING i
o n
n n n x
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8 I,
ELEVATION 734 9
A &
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3 HOUR BARRIER 7
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g x
x E
CONTROL REACTOR g
GENERAL BUILDING m
ROOM ROOM AREA m
BUILDING o
o o
a O
O O
O j
j ELEVATION 714 I
n j
3 HOUR BARRIER i
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2-Ll-3-39 2-Ll-3-52 l
2-LI-3-94 2-LI-3-107 i
I 1
2 CONTROL I
E BUILDING m
I E
l ELEVATION 690 I
4 i
j 3 HOUR BARRIER i
a j
2-Ll-3-43 2-Ll-3-56 2-LI-3-98
-f i
2-LI-3-111 a
x x
x x
1 W
W W
w I
REACTOR
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OLD HOT y
CONTROL GENERAL AREA l
BUILDING g
ROOM TOOL ROOM g
BUILDING 1
m x
x i
g 8
8 8
x x
x x
ELEVATION 669 l
n n
1 j
3 HOUR BARRIER
I ATTAC.HMENT 2.
g43 g33007 003 l
l October 7,1996 M. J. Burzynski, DSD 1 A-SQN l
l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SELF-ASSESSMENT I
1 l
l The TVAN self-assessment of the SQN Fire Protection Program (FPP) was completed on schedule. The final report on the assessment is attached for your use. This team assessment addressed all aspects of the l
l nuclear safety-related ponion of the SQN FPP.
l The team confirmed previously identified problems / deficiencies in addition to identifying other weaknesses in program implementation. These weaknesses centered on the quality of program documentation and the organizational interfaces and division of responsibilities. Three Problem l
Evaluation Repods (PERs) were initiated by the team addressing weaknesses in Appendix R analysis l
documentation, sprinkler system code compliance, and the maintenance instruction for Appendix R lighting, respectively. The TVAN Self-Assessment Team also provided recommendations for program enhancement based on recent TVAN experience and lessons learned at Browns Ferry and Watts Bar.
To ensure that the proper scope and focus was addressed in the assessment, Mr. Brian Melly, an independent, industry recognized fire protection consultant visited the site for two days and reviewed the draft assessment report. His endorsement of the assessment is included as Attachment 2 to this report.
l If you have any questions about the attached report or the assessment, please contact Mark Salley directly I
a 51-8214 (pager number 10191).
l Don reen Chief Mechanical Engineer TVAN Engineering l
WAE:EHS Attachment cc (Attachment):
R. Abbas, EDB 2F-BFN M. J. Lorek, DSD 1 A-SQN W. F. Adcock, LP 4F-C R. S. Rosenfeld, BR 4P-C J. R. Casey, OPS 3C-SQN J. R. Rupert, OPS 4A-SQN E. J. Bradley, LP 4H-C R. H. Shell, OPS 4A-SQN T. R. Davis, MOB 2M-WBN J. G. Sterchi, MDB IF-WBN 4
l W. A. Fberly, LP 4G-C J. S. Summy, POB 2B-SQN l
J. K. Gates, BR SA-C R. V. White, PMA IB-BFN I. M. Heatherly, DSD 1 A-SQN R. C. Williams, LP 4J-C J. Herron, POB 2B-SQN J. H. Young, MOB 2J-WBN S. Hobson-Williams, BR 4P-C RIMS, WR 4Q-C H. L. Hustead, FTA 1 A-JAT L. L. Long, PEB 1 A-BFN I