ML20129D877
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| ML20129D877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1985 |
| From: | Chan T, Heishman R, Phillips H, Reynolds S, Rohrbacher R, Saunders A, Wheeler R, Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129D868 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-85-04, 50-423-85-4, NUDOCS 8506060254 | |
| Download: ML20129D877 (100) | |
See also: IR 05000219/2003001
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0Pt11SSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION OF INSPECTION PROGRAMS
REACTOR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS BRANCH
Report No.:- 50-423/85-04
Docket No.: 50-423
' Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3
Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut
Inspection Conducted: February 19-March 1 and March 11-22, 1985
Inspectors: ,
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sH. J. Wo ,)r. Reactor Construction Engineer Date Signed
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T. (L. Chan, Reactor Construction Engineer Date Signed
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H( W. Phil ps, Rdactor Cofistruction Engineer Date Signed
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S. D. Reyflolds, Lead Redctor Engineer (Region I) Date Signed
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Sr. Reactor Construction Engineer Date Signed
R. A. Rohrbache)rOlkM. aw Date'
A. H. Saunders, Reactor Construction Engineer
JJu Signed ;
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Date Signed
'
R.' M. Wheefer, R6sident ' Inspector (Region I)
Consultants: R. M. Compton, D. C. Ford, J. B. McCormack,
0. P. Mallon, W. S. Marini, E. Y. Martindale,
R. E. Serb and W. J. Sperko, Jr.
Approved By: [ - <
Robert F. Heishman, Chief
IJ[[h
Date Signed
Reactor Construction Programs Branch
8506060254 850521
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' TABLE OF CONTENTS
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; TOPIC. SECTION ,
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' INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES .................................... I-
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ELECTRICAL-AND INSTRUMENTATION C0NSTRUCTION'........................ II
MECHANICAL' CONSTRUCTION .............................. ............. III
,
- WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION ............................. 'IV
- CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION .................................. 'V
. M TERI AL TRACEABILITY ' AND CONTROL 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI
DESIGN' CHANGE CONTROL .............................................. VII.
.
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, : CORRECTIVE = ACTION SYSTEMS .......................................... VIII
ATTACHMENT A.- PERSONS CONTACTED AND DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
"
- ATTACHMENT B - GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ;
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I. INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of construc-
tion at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3. This objective was
accomplished through review of the construction program, evaluation of
project construction controls, and review of selected portions of the
Quality Assurance Program, with emphasis on the installed hardware in the
field. In addition, the scope and significance of identified problems were
determined.
Within the areas examined, the. inspection consisted of a detailed examina-
tion of selected hardware subsequent to quality control inspections, a
selective examination of procedures and representative reccrds, and limited
observation of in process work.
For each.of the areas inspected, the following was determined:
Were project construction controls adequate to assure quality
construction?
War the hardware or product fabricated or installed as designed?
Were quality verifications performed during the work process with
applicable hold points?
Was there adequate documentation to determine the acceptability of
installed hardware or product?
Are systems turned over to the startup organization in operable
condition and are they being properly maintained?
,
I-1
II. ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of electrical and instrumentation
construction was to determine whether components and systems were
installed in accordance with regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) commitments and approved vendor and construction specifi-
cations and drawings. Additional objectives were to determine whether
procedures, instructions and drawings used to accomplish construction
activities were adequate and whether quality-related records accurately
reflect the completed work.
B. Discussion
Within the broad categories of electrical and instrumentation construc-
tion, attention was given to several specific areas. These included
electric cable, raceways, raceway supports, electrical equipment, and
instrumentation components. Additionally, a review was made of a
selected number of documents associated with design change control and
nonconformance reporting.
A number of documents were generated by the licensee and Stone & Webster
Engineering Corporation (SWEC) as a result of observations made by the
NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors during electrical and
instrumentation inspection. Several are referenced in this report and
are listed in Table II-1.
1. Electrical Raceway Installation
a. Inspection Scope
Fifty-two segments of installed Class 1E cable tray, representing a
total length of about 1,300 feet, were selected from various plant
areas for detailed examination by the NRC CAT. These segments were
inspected for comp iance to requirements relative to routing,
location, separation, support spacing and configuration, identifi-
cation, protection and physical loading. Additionally, 24 runs of
installed conduit, with an aggregate length of about 1,200 feet,
were inspected for compliance to specified requirements such as
routing, location, separation, bend radii, support spacing and
associated fittings.
A sample of nine raceways (five conduits and four cable tray sec-
tions) were selected by the NRC CAT inspectors for comparison of
the actual quantity of cables installed with the quantity specified
to be prasent by the SWEC computerized system of scheduling and
routing cables, known as the "ECSIS Program."
Over 20 raceway supports were examined in detail for such items as
location, material, type, size, anchor spacing, weld quality, bolt
torque and installed configuration.
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Fifty-tso concrete expansion anchors associated with Seismic
Category I conduit supports were inspected in detail for compliance
with requirements relating to embedded depth,' plumbness, spacing and
thread engagement. The anchors selected were of various sizes and
from--several locations in the facility. A calibrated torque wrench ,
+
was used to determine whether appropriate torque had been applied
during installation to ensure proper setting of the wedges, and
ultrasonic test equipment was used to determine embedded depth.
See Table II-2 for a listing of cable tray, conduit, concrete
anchors and raceway support samples.
The following_ documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the. inspection:
^
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SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-D10.18-01B, " Seismic
Conduit Support, Conduit and Cable Tray Installation."
SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-D10.18-02A, " Cable Tray
and Support Installation."
SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-D10.18-040, " Raceway
and Cable Separation Inspection."
SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-D10.18-030, "Non-Seismic
Field Run Conduit Inspections."
*
SWEC Field Construction Procedure 299, " Installation of
Drilled-In Expansion Type Concrete Anchors," Rev. 1
SWEC Specification M924, " Drilled-In Expansion Type Concrete
Anchors
SWEC Specification 2400.000-350, " Electrical Installation,"
Rev. 7.
b. Inspection Findings
In the area of electrical. raceway, the NPC CAT inspectors observed
, that, in general, Class 1E raceway installations were in accordance
with applicable design criteria. Important quality attributes such
as material type, location,' identification' and installed configu-
ration were found to be as shown on approved construction drawings.
However, several construction deficiencies were identified and are
discussed below.
'
(1) Raceway Separation
The Millstone Unit 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Section 8.3.1.4 " Physical Independence of Redundant Systems"
provides the basic criteria for acceptable raceway and cable
installations. This section describes requirements for
physical arrangement of raceways pertaining to the requirements
F of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75 for independence of redundant
systems.
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In general, .these FSAR criteria specify the phy ical separation
that must be maintained between components of redundant elec-
trical' divisions. Additionally, separation is required between
components performing Class 1E and Non-Class 1E functions.
The NRC CAT examination of the selected raceway sample
disclosed numerous installations where the required physical
separation had not been maintained. Many of the identified
discrepancies were observed between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E
raceway components.
These deficiencies were discussed with the licensee and SWEC
personnel. The discussions disclosed that~in a number of areas
the licensee recently has elected to reassess currer.t commit-
ments to RG 1.75 and establish.through test and analysis that
lesser degrees.of physical separaticn are acceptable. Justifi-
cation for this approach is detailed in Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE
Standard 384-1974 which states..."In those areas where the
damage potential is limited to failures or faults internal to
the electrical equipment.or circuits, the minimum separation
distance can be established by analysis...."
In connection with physical separation criteria, the NRC CAT
inspectors reviewed Engineering Service Scope of Work (ESS0W)
No. 2412.000-732. This document established the testing
required to demonstrate the acceptability of lesser separation
and the use of barriers in lieu of distance to meat physical
separation requirements. In general, the objective of the
test was to demonstrate that a single enclosure is adequate
between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E cable. Additionally, for
cable dropouts and perpendicular raceway crossings, a spatial
distance of one inch is acceptable instead of the six inches
currently rcquired. Several other criteria changes would be
implemented based upon successful completion of the test
program. In some installations, one barrier would be used
instead of the two currently required and for certain conduit
installations a minimum of 0.125 inch spatial separation would
be allowed. Copies of this document have been provided to the
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for licensing
review.
NRC CAT inspectors also reviewed Engineering Design Coordina-
tien Report (E&DCR) FE-40530 which was issued to implement
separation criteria changes to the electrical specification
based upon preliminary test results provided by Wyle Labora-
tories. In effect this E&DCR permits many of the separation
deficiencies observed by tha NRC CAT inspectors. However, this
design change is not consistent with current FSAR requirements-
and thus the status of this issue is considered open pending
NRR review of test results and applicable FSAR changes. NRC
Region I is aware of this situation and their review of this
matter is continuing.
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In connection with this issue NRC CAT inspectors also noted
that a program to identify and physically tag raceway and -
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cable components requiring installation of fire barriers had
been-implemented by SWEC personnel. A review of this program
indicates that sufficient procedural controls exist to assure
that required barriers will be installed and inspected.
(2) Electrical Conduit
The conduit sample. inspected conformed to applicable design
and installation requirements relative to such attributes as
size, routing, identification and. supports. Conformance to
separation requirements are discussed in Section II.B.1.b.(1),
,
Raceway Separation, above.
(3) Raceway Supports
The examination of raceway supports was accomplished for both
conduit and cable tray applications. In general, attributes
such as location, material type and size, anchor spacing,
welds (location, size and general quality), and installed
configuration were found to be in accordance with design
requirements. No construction deficiencies were identified in
this area.
(4) Concrete Anchors
In the area of concrete expansion anchor installation, most of
the anchors inspected were properly installed. However, two
isolated discrepancies were identified. Concrete spalling was
observed in the vicinity of the lower right anchor behind the
attachment plate of conduit support CS-550. As a result of
this observation, SWEC QA Inspection Report ESA0 1210 and
Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) 11542 were issued
to document and disposition this matter. The second
discrepancy pertained to anchor location. The top anchor in
conduit support ES-1227 was one and three-fourths inches from
an embedded plate. Specification 2199.142-924 requires a
n.inimum of six inches from a half-inch anchor to an embedded
plate. As.a result of this finding, Inspection Report E5A01873
was issued to document this condition.
(5) Raceway Fill
Of the nine raceways selected to determine whether the speci-
fled number of cables matched those actually installed, eight
raceways contained the quantity specified by the computerized
program (ECSIS) used to schedule and route cables. In one
raceway, cable tray 3TC4100, 154 cables were physically in the
tray, but ECSIS could account for only 150. In order to
reconcile this difference it was necessary for the SWEC Site
Engineering Group (SEG) to review additional information not
presently contained within ECSIS. This additional information
was in the form of " Advance Cable Pull Tickets." An Advance
Cable Pull Ticket is one manually generated by SEG, issued to
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construction for installation, and incorporated into ECSIS at a
later~date. Although a rather lengthy review of many unincor-
porated. Advance Cable Pull-Tickets were involved, the installed
quantity of 154 cables in tray 3TC4100 was justified. However,
-it should be noted that the full intent of the ECSIS program to
, schedule and route cables cannot always be accomplished pro-
perly when.many (currently about 300) Advance Cable Pull
Tickets are not incorporated into the ECSIS program in a timely
manner. It was noted that the Advance Cable Pull Ticket for
cable 3MSSAOC043 had been in existence since May 1983 without
being incorporated into the ECSIS program.
c. Conclusions
Except as noted, raceway systems have been installed in accordance
with applicable design and installation requirements.
Physical separation criteria detailed in the licensee's FSAR have
not been maintained in many raceway installations. However, pre-
liminary discussions with NRR and the results of testing indicate
that lesser separation may be acceptable. This matter remains open
pending NRC final review and evaluation.
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2. Electric Cable Installation
.
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of installed Class 1E cable
runs that had been previously accepted by SWEC Field Quality Control
(FQC). inspectors. The sample included high voltage, power, control
and instrumentation cables. For each of the cable runs, physical
inspection was made to ascertain compliance with applicable design
. criteria relative to size, type, location / routing, bend radii,
protection, separation, identification and support.
Additionally, the NRC CAT inspectors selected approximately 400 cable
ends for examination. These were inspected to applicable design and
installation documents for items such as lug size and type, proper
. terminal point configuration, correct identification of cable and
conductors, proper crimping of lugs or connectors and absence of
insulation or jacket damage. Jee Table II-3 for a listing of cable
terminations examined.
The following high voltage and power cables, totaling about 1,600
feet, were selected from different systems, electrical trains and
locations:
Cable Type
3SIHBPH350 3 conductor 4 AWG 4.16KV
3RHSA0H350 3 conductor 4 AWG 4.16KV
3EJBA0K610 2 conductor 8 AWG 125V DC
3HVCA0K075 3 conductor 12 AWG 480V
3RHSN0K001 3 conductor 12 AWG 480V
3SIHN0K095 3 conductor 12 AWG 480V
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IThe[followingcontrolcables,totalingapproximately1,100 feet',were.
selected from different systems,.. electrical-trains and-locations:
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_ . Cable' Type
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i3EGPBPG455 4 conductor 12 AWG 120V
,
3ENSAOC453 '2 conductor.14 AWG 120V
1= 3GSNN00602- 2 conductor-14'AWG 125V.DC
.3RCSAPC702 2 conductor 14 AWG:125V-DC
L3RHSAOC034 -2 conductor.12 AWG'120V
'3RHSAPC910. 5 conductor 10 AWG 125V DC
3SIHAOC005. 7 conductor 12 AWG 120V
3SIMBPC010- 7 conductor 10 AWG 120V
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~The.following-instrument cables,. totaling approximately:1,200 feet, were
selected from different-systems, electrical trains and locations:
Cable Type
.
3NMIA0X800 2 conductor 16 AWG
3RPSA0X821 2 conductor.16 AWG
3RPSBPX800 2 conductor 16 AWG
3SIHA0X830 2 conductor 16 AWG
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-3SIL2PX802' 16 Tw/ pair 18.AWG
3SIL10X802 16LTw/ pair 18 AWG
The following documents ~provided the basic acceptance criteria for the
inspection:
I
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SWEC Quality A' ssurance Directive QAD-10.18ML, " Raceway and Cable :
Installation Inspections," Rev. 0
*
.SWEC Quality Assurance Directive QAD-10.17ML, " Cable Termination -
;and Connection Inspections," Rev. B
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.SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-D10.18-03A, " Raceway and Cable
Separation-Inspection"
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>SWEC Field Construction Procedure 330, " Installation of Cable In
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Ducts, Conduits or Trays," Rev. 1
*
Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., Millstone Unit'3, "Startup Manual,"
Rev. 3
l- b. . Inspection Findings L- .(1)' Routing
In' general, the routing of Class 1E cables through design
designated raceway systems was found to be in accordance with
- . specified criteria. A discrepancy was noted in the routing of
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cable 3HVCAOK075. The pull ticket issued for this cable shows
a "From" destination of cubicle 3M in Motor Control Center
i 3EHS*MCC1A2. However, the actual routing of the cable is to.
cubicle 2H of the same Motor Control Center.
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Discussions with SWEC engineering personnel disclosed that the
cubicle information shown on the cable pull ticket was an
" optional entry" and that the cable had been installed
correctly in accordance with the applicable conductor
termination sheet.
No further discrepancies were observed in this area.
.
(2) Separation
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The'-inspection of Class 1E cable installations revealed a
number of instances in which electrical separation criteria
had not been maintained. Examples included Class 1E cable
installations which did not maintain adequate spatial
. separation between redundant divisional cables, from Non-Class
1E cabling or from electrical raceways containing cabling of
other divisioks. Discrepancies were observed in a number of
locations, but these discrepancies were most prominent in the
Cable Spreading Room and in areas where cables exit design
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designated raceways and run free-air.
Although these installations were not in compliance with -
requirements detailed in Section 8.3 of the Millstone Unit 3
FSAR, discussions with the licensee indicate that alternate
criteria have been developed and are being evaluated. A
detailed discussion of this issue is presented in Section
II.B.1.b of this report.
Section 8.3.1.4.2.18 of the FSAR specifies the minimum separa-
tion distance required for cables located inside control panels
and cabinets. During examination of the Main Control Boards,
the NRC CAT inspectors identified extensive wiring separation
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discrepancies not meeting the above requirements. The discre-
pancies observed involved redundant Class 1E wiring which had
been installed by the vendor or modified by design or construc-
tion activity. Over 70 separation deficiencies were identi-
fied, of these more than 20 were installations in which
redundant Class 1E wiring or wire bundles were in physical
contact with each other. Although a detailed examination was
not performed, a number of separation discrepancies involving
Non-Class 1E wiring were also identified.
NRC CAT inspectors reviewed applicable inspection procedures
to determine whether the procedures had incorporated adequate
attributes for inspection of vendor or modified vendor wiring
separation in these panels. Project Procedure NEAM 128,
" Inspection of Separation," Rev. 1, was also reviewed. NRC CAT
inspectors noted that these documents provided for inspection
of field installed cables and wiring, but did not specify
inspection of vendor installed components. Therefore, it was
determined that sufficient procedural controls did not exist to
assure that wiring separation discrepancies in the Main Control
Boards would be identified and corrected.
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As a result of this. observation the: licensee has : issued a.
Change Notice to include the.following requirement.in Project
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Procedure NEAM 128: " Included in this inspection would be any
.
"* vendor wiring that may have:been affected-by field modifica-
tion." : Additionally,-E&DCR FE-41807 has been issued to assure L
a 100% inspection of wiring in this-equipment.~
In general, separation ~of cables'and wiring in other' electrical
equipment and panels was found to be in accordance with FSAR
requirements. -Where discrepancies did exist they had been
documented by inspection' personnel.
t
(3)~ Cable Spacing
Power cable installations have been designed in accordance
- with ICEA Publication' P-46-426 " Power Cable Ampacities." The ,
- Millstone Unit 3 FSAR Table 8.3-2 details a minimum spacing
requirement;for power cables installed in cable trays based on
-
- rated voltage and applicable derating. In general, this
spacing between adjacent cables is equivalent to one' quarter of '
, the sum of the overall cable diameters.
NRC' CAT-inspectors identified several power cable installations
in which.the requirement for spacing had not been met. The
following cable trays contained cables which exhibited this
condition: *
3TH4000
3TH304P
3TH103P-
As a result of this observation, SWEC inspection personnel '
have issued Inspection Reports ESA01331, ESA01335 and ESA0348
to document and correct this condition.
.
'(4) Cable Identification
One: example was identified'in which a Class 1E cable had not
been properly color coded. Most Class 1E cables have color .
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coded jackets.which match the divisional color coding to which
they are assigned. Class 1E cables _ manufactured-with black
insulation jackets are color coded every 15 feet with adhesive
markers. NRC CAT inspectors identified type NHT-40 cables run
in Electrical Man Hole 38 for a distance of about 25-30 feet i
without the required color coding for Class 1E Division "A"
cables.
As a result of this observation, SWEC inspection personnel have
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issued Inspection Report ESA01325 to document and correct this
condition. No other deficiencies were identified relative to
identification of cables.
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In general, the identification of Class 1E cable installations
was found to be in accordance with criteria specified in the
Millstone Unit 3 FSAR. It was noted, however, that color
coding of Class 1E cables every 15-feet, as stated in the
FSAR; does not conform to RG 1.75, " Physical Independence of
Electric Systems," Regulatory Position 10, which states in
part "...at intervals not to exceed 5 feet throughout the
entire cable length." Current cable identification practices
are to be reviewed by NRR as discussed in Section 8.3.3.2 of
NUREG-1031, " Safety Evaluation Report, Millstone Unit 3,"
dated July 1984. NRC Region I is aware of this matter.
(5) Tray Fill
:
The Millstone FSAR Section 8.3 sets forth requirements for
limiting tray fill to the top of the side rails of the tray.
NRC CAT inspectors identified no significant discrepancies in
this area.
(6) Terminations
In general, cable termination activities, as performed by
construction personnel, conformed to requirements. However,
several instances of inadequate design coordination and post
turnover wiring discrepancies were observed. These
discrepancies are detailed in Table II-4.
Eight discrepancies relate to incomplete implementation of
engineering changes required to revise termination configu-
ration. Generally, SWEC/SEG made the necessary drawing revi-
sions when termination changes were required but failed to
issue corresponding revised termination tickets. Revised
termination tickets are the only approved documents used to
initiate physical termination changes and subsequent inspec-
tions. Additionally, it was not readily evident or clear what
methods have been established to assure that termination
tickets are generated for all required terrination changes.
Seven discrepancies relate ta post-turnover wiring changes.
The Millstone Unit 3 Startup Manual requires wiring changes and
discrepancies to be documented upon discovery. For this group
of discrepancies, the licensee indicated that documentation
would be provided later - upon completion of testing rather
than when found. This is not in accordance with Section 5 of
the Startup Manual.
(7) Bend Radius
During the examination of Class 1E Motor Control Centers
(MCCs), NRC CAT inspectors identified several vendor leads
within MCC starter cubicles which violate requirements for
minimum bend radius. As an example, the lead from the motor
starter to phase T-1 of the bus bar in MCC 3EHS*MCC3A2 has a
bend radius requirement of 1.4 inches. The installed
configuration of this lead resulted in a bend radius of only
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10.6Linchl LAs a result of this observation, SWEC. inspection
+ ~ , personnel initiated an inspection of vendor leads.
fThe-following'_ list. identifies ~MCCs in which additional bend
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- radius = discrepancies were found:
'
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-3EHS*MCC3Al-F5H
-'
3EHS*MCC381-R6F
3EHS*MCCIA2-3F
'. 3EHS*MCC182-3F
,
3EHS*MCC1B1-4Fo
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As. a result of these observations, SWEC inspection personnel
'havefissued N&Ds 11,936 and 11,932.
Bend radius discrepancies were also identified in two field
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installed cables. . Cable 3CESAOC355, located in cubicle 311 of
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4.16kv Switchgear 3 ENS *SWGA,.and cable-3ENSBPC398, located in
cubicle 413 of'Switchgear-3 ENS *SWGB, exhibited unacceptable ..
bend radii. - As'a result of:these observations, SWEC inspection
personnel issued N&D reports 11,922 and 11,923 to document and
correct this condition.
-The instances'of bend radius discrepancies in field installed
cabling are considered isolated because other cables examined
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had been installed properly. _ Regarding discrepancies _ in
vendor wiring, further licensee attention will be required to
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assure that these components are properly installed.
-(8) Receipt of Allegation
During inspection of electrical cable-insta11ations, NRC CAT'
inspectors received an allegation pertaining ~,to-installation
records. The alleger was informed that the NRC Resident
Inspector would contact him and investigate his' concerns.
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c. Conclusions
In general, cable installation including terminations _have been
accomplished in accordance with requirements. However, extensive
wiring separation discrepancies exist in the Main Control Boards.
Further' licensee attention is required to assure that these
2
discrepancies are properly identified and corrected.
'
Some aspects of vendor installed wiring in motor control centers
will require additional inspection and evaluation.
One group of termination discrepancies were identified that were c
due to inadequate control of termination revisions. Revised
termination tickets were not issued so that required work could be
accomplished.
Another group of termination discrepancies related to post-turnover
activities. Some post-turnover wiring changes were not recorded as
required by the Millstone Unit 3 Startup Manual. Additional
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management-attention is necessary in the area'of procedural controls
to assure that. final wiring configurations are in accordance with
design requirements and are properly documented.
-3. Electrical Equipment Installation.
a. Inspection' Scope
Over 35 pieces of installed electrical equipment and associated
hardware items were inspected. Samples were based on system func-
tion and safety classification.
.The following specific electrical components were inspected in
detail:
(1) Motors
The installation of five motors and associated hardware was
inspected for such items as location, anchoring, grounding,
identification and protection. The motors inspected were:
Safety Injection Pump Motor 3SIH*P1A
Safety Injection Pump Motor 3SIH*P1B
Residual Heat Removal Pump 3RHS*P1A
Motor
Charging Pump Motor 3CHS*P1B
Component Cooling Pump Motor 3CCP*P1C
(2) -Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The following containment penetration assemblies were
inspected:
3RCP*E6V 480V Power
3RCP*E4V 480V Power
3RCP*F8V Control
3RCP*FlV Instrumentation
3RCP*F3V Control
The location, type, mounting and identification of these
,
penetrations were compared with the installation drawings and
vendor manual.
(3) Circuit Breakers
Circuit breakers for the following Class 1E motors were
examined to determine compliance with design and installation
documents for size, type, system interface and maintenance.
Emergency Service Water Pump Motor
Safety Injection Pump Motor
The use of circuit breakers with integral undervoltage trip
attachments was also investigated.
II-11
(4) Switchgear and Motor Control Centers
'
The following switchgear and motor control centers were
inspected:
Motor Control Center 3EHS*MCC1A4
Motor Control Center 3EHS*MCC3A2
Motor Control Center 3EHS*MCC1A1
Motor Control Center 3EHS*MCC185
4160V Switchgear 3 ENS *SWG-A
4160V Switchgear 3 ENS *SWG-B
(5) Station Batteries and Racks
The 125V battery rooms including the installed batteries,
battery racks and associated equipment were inspected. The
location, mounting, maintenance and environmental control for
installation of the batteries were compared with the
applicable requirements and quality records.
125V DC Battery 3BYS* BAT-1
125V DC Battery 3BYS* BAT-2
(6) 125V DC System Equipment
The following equipment comprising portions of the 125V DC
systems were inspected for compliance to design documents for
such items as location, mounting (welds, concrete anchors and
bolting) and proper configuration.
Battery Charger 3BYS*CHGR-1
Battery Charger 3BYS*CHGR-2
Battery Charger 3BYS*CHGR-3
Static Inverter 3VBA*INV-1
Static Inverter 3VBA*INV-2
Distribution Panel 38YS*PNL-2
(7) Control Panels
A number of Class 1E electrical control panels were inspected
for compliance to requirements for items such as location,
mounting and type. The panels inspected were:
Main Control Board 3CES*MCB-MB4
(Reactor Coolant)
Main Control Board 3CES*MCB-MB2
(Engineered Safeguards)
Aux Relay Panel 3RPS*RAK0TXB
Aux Relay Panel 3CES*RAKAUXA
Main Control Board 3CES*TB-MB8P
(Termination Cabinets)
Aux Shutdown Panel 3RPS*PNLAS
II-12
(8) Motor Operated Valves
Three motor operated valves were examined in detail.
3SIH*MV8923A
3SIH*MV8821B
3SIL*MV8804A
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria
for the inspections:
SWEC Quality Assurance Directive QAD-10.11ML, " Electrical
Equipment Installation Inspections," Rev. O
SWEC Quality Standard QS-13.12ML, " Material / Equipment
Maintenance," Rev. 0
SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM3-S10-51-010 " Inspections of
Equipment Subjected to NNECO Pre-Turnover Checkout Program."
SWEC Quality Control Instruction FM-S13.12-01B, " Preventive
Maintenance Inspection Schedule."
SWEC Construction Methods Procedure 1.12-3.79," Material /
Equipment Maintenance."
b. Inspectior Findings
(1) Motors
In general, the installation of Class 1E motors was found to
be in accordance with applicable design documents. Motors
examined were of the size, type and configuration specified
and construction maintenance activities had been performed in
accordance with approved procedures. However, deficiencies in
the areas of motor mountings and post-turnover maintenance
activities were identified.
Regarding the mounting of several of the motors examined, NRC
CAT inspectors observed that large diameter mounting bolts
used to attach motor bases to the associated pump skids did
not contain the required material marking. This issue is
discussed in detail in Section VI, Material Traceability and
Control, of this report.
During the inspection of electrical equipment, it was not
evident that adequate maintenance had been performed on some
electrical equipment. No formal documentation existed to
verify that required maintenance activities have been performed
on several pieces of electrical equipment while under NNECO
control. Examples include the Class 1E Residual Heat Removal
pump motors for which documented evidence of shaft rotation
does not exist since the time of construction turnover in March
of 1983. This issue is discussed in detail in Section III,
Mechanical Construction, of this report.
II-13
-
- _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ __ -
No other deficiencies were identified relative to the
installation of Class 1E motors.
(2) Electrical Penetrations
Penetrations examined were found to have been installed in
accordance with applicable design documents. Installation
requirements including performance of required maintenance
activities had been accomplished in accordance with approved
construction procedures.
During the inspection, NRC CAT inspectors identified three
penetration assemblies whose integral pressure gauges exhibited
zero pressure readings. A review of inspection records indi-
cates that pressure requirements had been maintained during
construction. However, additional discussion disclosed that
the licensee's position was that positive pressure was not
required on these assemblies during plant operation. To
augment this position the licensee presented a copy of a
telecon with Conax Corporation in which the vendor stated that
there were no requirements to maintain penetration pressure
during plant operation, but a positive nitrogen pressure of 15
psig was recommended to verify penetration leak tightness.
Subsequent to the NRC CAT observation of penetration pressure
readings, licensee personnel depressurized all remaining
penetration assemblies.
(3) Circuit Breakers
The examination of the selected circuit breakers indicated that
they had been purchased, installed and maintained in accordance
with the applicable design documents. Important installation
attributes such as proper alignment and main contact penetra-
tion were verified by physical inspection and review of
construction test records. Maintenance records were also
reviewed, and they indicate that lubrication and set point
verification had been performed.
NRC CAT inspectors also evaluated licensee initiated actions
and review of NRC Information Notice 83-18 " Failures of the
Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip System Breakers"
and NRC Generic Letter 83-28 " Required Actions Based on Generic
Implementations of Salem ATWS Events." NRC CAT inspectors
noted that Millstone Unit 3 design will utilize Westinghouse
type DS-416 breakers in the Reactor Trip System. The review of
supplemental actions to Generic Letter 83-28 indicates that the
licensee plans to comply with Westinghouse proposed corrective
actions and will ensure that all DS-416 reactor switchgear
undervoltage attachments are replaced with a new design and
tested prior to the current fuel load date.
II-14
-
~
k ; . . . , .
1
1
(4) Switchgear and Motor-Control ~ Centers
,In general, the installation of Class IE 4160V switchgear and t
*
; motor control centers was found to be in accordance with
-
. applicable requirements.-
Bolting materials used in 'the assembly of some motor control
centers did not contain . identification markings and thus were
.of indeterminate material type. This issue'is discussed in
-detail.in Section VI, Material. Traceability and Control
of this report.
(5) Station Batteries and Racks-
The condition'of the battery rooms was found to be in good
'
order, clean and free of debris. Ventilation systems were
installed and in' operation. Access to these areas was
controlled by keyed entry, and the appropriate danger signs
had been posted to indicate no smoking or open flames.
The 125V batteries were examined in detail,and found to be in
>
good condition. Maintenance activities were reviewed and, in
<
general, had been performed in accordance with. requirements.
The inspection of the 125V battery racks disclosed that L .
indeterminate bolting material had been used in the assembly
,
process. This issue-is discussed in detail in Section VI,
Material Traceability.and Control, of this report.
(6) '125V DC System
Inspection of components comprising the 125V DC system
disclosed no deficiencies relative to the installed
,
configuration of the equipment.
'(7) Control Panels
The various control panels examined were installed in accord-
ance with applicable design documents. With the exception of
the main control panel wiring separation deficiencies discussed
, -
in Section II.B.2.b(2) of this report, no significant deft-
,
ciencies were noted.
(8) Motor Operated Valves
'
Motor operated valves examined were installed and maintained
in accordance with applicable design documents.
c. Conclusions
The installation of Class 1E equipment and associated hardware at
! Millstone Unit 3 was generally found to be in accordance with the l
applicable design documents.
i
-
II-15
'
. - i L s..
,
Indeterminate fastening materials have been used in the assembly or
mounting of several pieces of electrical equipment for which
seismic bolting requirements apply.
It was not evident that adequate maintenance activities had been
performed on some electrical eouipment after turnover to NNECO.
4. Instrumentation Installation
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT inspectors selected a sample of instrument components
from various instrument systems at several plant locations to
determine whether installations met applicable design requirements
and installation specifications. Additionally, several instrument
loops were selected for detailed inspection of signal path routing.
Fourteen instruments were examined for conformance with requirements
such as location, mounting details, instrument type and comparison
of as-installed ranges with design parameters.
Four instrument racks and nine instrument tubing supports were
inspected for such attributes as installed configuration, mounting
details, material, location and identification.
Eleven completed runs of instrument tubing, comprising about 800
feet, were examined in detail for such installation requirements as
location / routing, supports, support location and physical inde-
pendence of redundant systems.
The signal paths of six instrument loops were traced from their
process connections to their final output devices. In most cases
the components inspected for each loop included sensing lines,
transducers, signal conditioning and isolating devices, indicating
and controlling instruments and the various interconnecting cable,
electrical penetrations, panel wiring and terminalt along the
signal path. Most instrument components were examined for such
attributes as type, range, output, identification, qualification,
location, mounting and physical separation of redundant
components. Interconnecting cable, panel wiring and terminations
were inspected also relative to applicable requirements.
Refer to Table II-5 for a listing of the instrumentation sample.
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspection:
*
SWEC Specification 2472.800-943, " Instrumentation Installation,
Piping, and Tubing," Rev. 9
*
SWEC Specification 2400.000-350, " Electrical Installation,"
Rev. 7
II-16
i
b. Inspection Findings
In general, the installation of instruments, racks, tubing runs and
supports conformed to appropriate requirements; however, a few
isolated discrepancies were identified. Two instances of bent
were noted: the high and low lines for flow
~instrumenttubingFT678(approximately18inchesfromtheroot
transmitter 3CCP
valves) and a line for flow transmitter 3FWA*FT51A (between supports
H009 and H010). Three instances of loose or missing tube block .
clamps were noted: the top half on support EK-501035-H002 and the
top half on support EK-501132-H010 were missing, and the tube block
on support EK-50134-H010 was loose. As a result of the above
discrepancies, SWEC QA Inspection Reports 15A00543, 15A00544,
15A00545 and 15A00564 were issued to document these identified
conditions.
The signal paths through the various instrument components and
interconnections in the six instrument loops inspected were as
shown on applicable drawings and related installation documents
except for a few minor discrepancies. For example, SWEC Drawing
EE-3HB, Rev. 3, shows cable 3SIL2PX802 from Protection Set 2
(3RPS*RAKSET2) to the Main Control Board (3CES*MCB-M82) to be
connected to jack 27. The cable was plugged into jack 26. As a
result of this observation, Inspection Report E5A01801 was issued
to document this condition. In addition, a number of cable and
panel wiring separation discrepancies were identified in which the
installation did not meet the separation criteria specified in the .
Millstone Unit 3 FSAR. This matter of separation of electrical
circuits is discussed in detail in Section II.B.1 of this report.
In general, the installation of the instrument loop components,
associated hardware and interconnections selected for inspection
was in accordance with applicable design and installation require--
ments.
c. Conclusions
Instrument components inspected were installed, in general, in
conformance with applicable requirements. The signal paths of the
instrument loops examined were generally as specified on applicable
drawings and installation specifications. The identified
discrepancies are considered to be minor.
II-17
o
TABLE II-1
DOCUMENTS ISSUED AS A RESULT OF THE NRC CAT INSPECTION
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION
Document Number * Subject Document Number Subject
IR ESA01335 Cable IR E5A01325 Cable
IR ESA01331 Cable N&D 11,936 MCC's
N&D 11,932 MCC's N&D 11,922 Cable
N&D 11,923 Cable E&DCR TE-03663 Bolting
IR ESA01809 Cable IR ESA01843 Bolting
IR E5A0348 Cable N&D 11,904 Bolting
IR E5A01910 Conduit E&DCR FE-41807 Separation
N&D 11,905 Bolting IR ESA01873 Anchors
Change Notice 2 Separation IR E5A01210 Anchors
(NEAM 128)
IR ESA01801 Cable N&D 11542 Anchors
DCR 742 Terminations E&DCR TE-03885 Terminations
TR 19M3112101 Terminations E&DCR FE-41870 Terminations
TR 19M3112742 Terminations IR E5A01782 Terminations
IR ISA00545 Instrumentation E&DCR TE-03766 Te'eminations
IR ISA00544 Instrumentation IR E5A01756 Terminations
IR ISA00564 Instrumentation IR ESA01796 Terminations
IR ISA00543 Instrumentation IR ESA01808 Terminations
*IR: Inspection Report
N&D: Nonconformance and Disposition Report
E&DCR: Engineering and Design Coordination Report
DCR: Design Change Request
TR: Trouble Report
l l
11-18
-
* e
3
' TABLE II-2
s
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
- Cable Tray:
3TC1270 3TC1280 3TC1250 3TC1020 3TC1310
3TC1030 ~3TC3000 3TC3010 3TC3029 -3TC3030
3TC4490 3TC4160 3TC4170 3TC4180 3TC4200
3TC4210 ~3 TL0010 3TL0020 3TL0030 3TLOO40
g '
3TC007P .- 3TC006P; 3TC005P. 3TC004P 3TC003P-
l
x 3TC002P :3TC010P 3TC440P 3TC441P 3TC444P.
3TC443P 3TC444P 3TC445P 3TC446P- 3TC447P-
'
-3TC448P- 3TC413P 3TC415P 3TC414P 3TC8800
-
3TC8810 3TC8820 3TK860P 3TK861P 3TK862P
'
3TK863P 3TK864P 3TK865P 3TK866P 3TK867P
3TH8800 ~3TH8810'
Cable1 Tray Supports:
Support No. Drawing No. Support No. Drawing No.
G203-42 34EN-2 G217-5 34EN-2
G400-31 34EM-3 A104-43^ 340X-8
A183-65 340Y-8 A169A-40 340Y-10-
A201B-25 34DZ-9 C297A-1 34DL-10
C101-188 34DN-10 R260A-36 34EF-8
R254-53 34EF-8
L
II-19 L _- _ _ -- - _ _ - - _- - - . .
rn -
~-
s
]
1
TABLE II-2 (Continued)
RACEWAY INSPECTION SAMPLE
Conduit Sample:
Conduit No. Length (Ft) Conduit No. Length (Ft)
3CK003PD5 110 3CC003PB1 42
3CL0020A 76 3CX999RF2 22
3CC002PA 70 3CX900BC1 61
3CL1060E 20 3CX1060A5 80
3CL103PB 50 3CC9310K 27
3CC128PB 12 3CC9310C7 28
3CC1000C1 80 3CK926GA 41
3CK9260A 26 3CC441005 58
3CK404RB 65 3CC407PE 27
3CC950BB2 61 3CX950BA4 89
3CC4120A 20 3CC864PB 20
3CX926PG2 46 3CC1080G 2
- Conduit Support Samplei
CB-1305 MA-939
MA-1060 MA-1245
CS-549 CS-550
CS-1711 MA-518 .
MA-760 ES-943
Concrete Anchor Sample:
Anchor Size Aux Bldg ESF Bldg Cont Bldo Total
3/8" dia. 0 2 0 2
1/2" dia. 4 8 12 24
5/8" dia. 4 0 0 4
3/4" dia. 7 9 6 22
TOTAL I5 B T5 5'2
i
II-20 ,
L .__ __ ___ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
e .
s
' ~
'
-
TABLE II-3-
CABLE TERMINATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
_
.
Original Sample
Main Control Board.3CES*MCB-MB4, Dwg. EE-3AJH-4, EE-3AJS-2,
'EE-3AJX-4 and EE-3AKN-4: 19 cables
4
'
'.Te'rmination Cabinet 3CES*TB-MB10,~ Dwg. EE-3DK-6: 70' cables
Logic. Cabinet "A" 3RPS*RAKLDGA,'Dwg'. EE-3GK-3: 29 cables
Logic Cabinet "B" 3RPS*RAKLDGB, Dwg. EE-3GT-3: 29 cables
Aux Shutdown Panel 3RPS*PNLAS,- Dwg. EE-3JA-4: 24 cables
Aux Shutdown' Panel 3RCS*PNLAS, Dwg. EE-3JB-5 and
EE-3JD-3: 47 cables
Expanded Sample
~
Termination Cabinet 3CES*TB-MB10, Dwg. EE-3DL-5: 73 cables
Termination Cabinet 3CES*TB-MB1P, Dwg. EE-30P-5 and
EE-3DQ-5: 152 cables
11-21
TABLE II-4
CABLE TERMINATION DISCREPANCIES
Engineering Discrepancies
1. Drawing EE-3DP-5 shows the BLK and WHT conductors of cable 3BDGAPC606 as
spares. As installed, the BLK wire is on terminal block (TB) 641, pt. 7
and the WHT wire is on TB-641, pt. 11. This configuration is consistent
with the original design, but on September 12, 1983, schematic diagram
ESK-78H-8 was revised to " spare" these wires, causing Dwg. EE-3DP to be
revised similarly. However, the SWEC site engineering group (SEG) failed
to issue revised termination tickets to direct construction forces to
perform the revision.
2. Drawing EE-3DP-5 indicates an ORG-BLK wire to be terminated on TB-641,
pt. 8, but does not show which cable this wire comes from. The licensee
stated that this is a drafting error and that this wire is from cable
3SSRAPC602.
3. Drawing EE-3DP-5 shows the BLK and WHT conductors of cable 3BDGCP606 as
spares. As installed, the BLK wire is on TB-642, pt. 27 and the WHT wire
is on TB-642, pt. 6. This configuration is consistent with the original
Jesign. However, on September 12, 1983, schematic diagram ESK-7BH-8 was
revised to " spare" these wires, causing Dwg. EE-3DP to be similarly revised,
but SWEC/SEG failed to issue revised termination tickets to direct construc-
.
tion forces to perform the revision.
4. Drawing EE-3DQ-5 shows the RED-BLK and WHT-BLK conductors of cable 3BYS1PB605
as spares. As installed, the RED-BLK wire is on TB-663, pt. 12 and WHT-BLK
wire is on TB-662, pt. 26. This configuration is consistent with the
original design. On September 12, 1983 schematic diagram ESK-78K-5 was
revised to " spare" these wires, cauc' , drawing EE-3DQ to be similarly
revised. However, SWEC/SEG failed .o issue revised termination tickets to
direct construction forces to perform the revision.
5. Drawing EE-3DL-5 shows a BLK conductor on TB-634, pt. 25 but does not
indicate which cable this wire comes from. The licensee stated that this is
a drafting error and no wire is needed at this point. This discrepancy
reflects incomplete engineering review of design changes prior to issuing
revised drawings.
6. Drawing EE-3JA-4 shows the BLK, ORG, WHT-BLK, and BLU conductors of cable
3RCSB0C005 on TB-2T10, pts.1 through 4, respectively. As installed, these
wires are WHT-BLK, BLU, BLK, and ORG on TB-2T10, pts. 1 through 4, respec-
tively. The installed configuration is in accordance with drawing Rev. 1.
However, drawing Rev. 3, dated May 9, 1984 revised this configuration, but
SWEC/SEG failed to issue revised termination tickets to direct construction
forces to perform the revision.
11-22
r
TABLE II-4 (Continued)
CABLE TERMINATION DISCREPANCIES
7.- Drawing EE-3GK-3 shows the shiel'd of cable 3ISCA0X800 on TB-517, pt. 1.
As installed, this shield is on TB-517, pt. 4. A review of the termination
ticket issued by SWEC/SEG to construction and QC shows that TB-517, pt. 4
was' erroneously indicated on the ticket.
8. Drawing EE-3AJX-4 shows the WHT-BLK conductor from cable 3EGPA0X403 on
the TB-DBF, pt. 9 and the RED-BLK wire on TB-DBF, pt.10. As installed,
pt. 9 has a BLK wire and pt.10 has a WHT wire from this same cable. This
cable is a two-conductor cable containing only BLK and WHT wires. The
licensee stated that this is a drafting error and that the as-installed
wiring is correct. Drawing errors of this nature reflect inattention to
detail during engineering review.
Post-Turnover Discrepancies
9. Drawing EE-3DP-5 requires the WHT-BLK conductor of cable 3LMSBPC002 to be
on terminal TB-640, pt. 9. Although the QC inspection record shows this
to be acceptable, the WHT-BLK conductor is not presently terminated. The
licensee stated that phase one testing of this circuit is not yet complete,
and that upon completion of such testing, a design change request would
be issued, if necessary, to document this condition. This response is
not consistent with the requirements of Section 5 of the Northeast Nuclear
Energy Company, " Millstone 3 Startup Manual," Rev. 3 which requires that
wiring changes / deficiencies be documented upon discovery.
10. Drawing EE-3DP-5 shows the RED conductor of cable 3CCPBPC350 at TB-648,
pt. 18 and the GRN-BLK wire as a spare. As presently installed, the RED
wire is spared and the GRN-BLK is at TB-648, pt. 18. Original QC inspection
records show these wires to be acceptable par drawing requirements and the
RED wire is actually cut shorter than other spares in the vicinity and is
the appropriate length to have once been terminated at the required point,
indicating that these two wires have been " swapped" subsequent to QC inspec-
tion. The licensee stated that, although phase one testing of this circuit
is complete, no documentation has yet been issued to document this revision
as required in Section 5 of the Startup Manual.
11. Drawing EE-3DP-5 shows the ORG-BLK conductor of cable 3CCPBC615 as a spare,
however it is terminated at TB-654, pt. 20. Original QC inspection records
show this wire to be acceptable per drawing requirements and the wires in
this circuit are tagged to indicate that phase one testing is in progress.
The licensee stated that, as phase one testing is not yet complete, a design
change request will be issued to document this condition upon test comple-
, . tion, if necessary. This is not in accordance with Section 5 of the Startup l Manual. l l l
II-23
_
TABLE II-4 (Continued)
CABLE TERMINATION DISCREPANCIES
12. Drawing EE-20Q-5 shows the BLK-WHT conductor of cable 3BYS1PC601 on TB-666,
_pt. 15. This wire is presently on TB-666, pt. 14. The original QC inspec-
tion records show this to be acceptable per drawing requirements. The
licensee stated that phase one testing of this circuit is not yet complete,
and that upon completion of such testing, a design change request would be
issued, if necessary, to document this condition. This response is not
consistent with the requirements of Section 5 of the Startup Manual, which
requires that wiring changes / deficiencies be documented upon discovery.
13. Drawing EE-3DK-6 shows the GRN-BLK conductor of cable 35WPAOC350 on TB-609,
pt. 22 and the WHT-BLK wire on TB-609, pt. 24. The as-installed configu-
ration is exactly opposite of that required. The original QC inspection
records indicate that these wires were correctly installed as of March 22,
1984, and the present appearance of the wires indicates that they have been
" swapped" subsequent to QC inspection. No documentation was available to
justify this change. This is not in accordance with Section 5 of the
Startup Manual.
14. Drawing EE-3GK-3 shows the BLK conductor from cable 3RPSA0X812 on TB-506,
pt. 4 and the WHT on TB-506, pt. 5. The as-installed configuration is BLK
on pt. 5 and WHT on pt. 4. The licensee indicated that, although phase one
testing of this circuit is complete and the circuit operates correctly, no
documentation had been issued to substantiate the wiring change. This is
not in accordance with Section 5 of the Manual.
15. Drawing EE-3GT-3 shows the BLK conductor of cable 3RPSBPX812 on TB-506,
pt. 4 and the WHT conductor on TB-506, pt. 5. As installed,_the BLK wire
is on pt. 5 and the WHT wire is on pt. 4. The licensee indicated that
although phase one testing of this circuit has been completed ard the
circuit operates correctly, no documentation had been initiated to substan-
tiate the wiring change. This is not in accordance with Section 5 of the
Startup Manual.
Minor Discrepancies
16. The WHT conductor of cable 3CHSNOC152 (Dwg. EE-3JB-5, TB-3T14, pt. 7) was
found with a cut in its jacket.
17. Drawing EE-3AKN-4 shows the shield from cable 3BYS2PX401 on TB-DBW, pt.
22 and the shield from cable 3BYS2PX451 on TB-DBW, pt. 21. As installed,
these shields are interchanged. Because these two points are jumpered
together on the other side of the terminal strip, there is no functional
difference in the circuit between the as-installed and specified conditions.
However, design change request 742 has been issued to document this find-
ing.
II-24
TABLE II-4 (Continued)
CABLE TERMINATION DISCREPANCIES
18. The BLK and WHT conductors of cables 3WTCBPC621 and 3WTCAOC613 were found
to be determinated in panels 3CES*TB-MB1P and 3CES*TB-MB10. Bypass / jumper
tag log sheets 221 and 223, located in the shift supervisor's office, show
that only the BLK wires are documented as being temporarily determinated.
As a result of this finding, log sheets 221 and 223 have been corrected to
indicate that both BLK and WHT wires are determinated. A review of other log
sheets for similarly determinated cables shows this to be an isolated case.
In addition, it should be noted that these log sheets were initiated in
accordance with Procedure ACP-QA-2.06B, " Station Bypass / Jumper Control",
Rev. 4 which has already been revised (Rev. 5, February 1, 1985) to include
additional procedural controls which should preclude future errors of this
nature.
11-25
L
TABLE II-5
INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
Instruments:
3 MSS *PT515 3LMS*PT936
3CCP*FT67B 3LMS*PT937
3QSS*LT930 3FWA*FT51D
3QSS*LS56A 3FWS*LT519
3QSS*LS54A 3FWS*LT529
3LMS*PT93A 3RCS*FT415
3LMS*PT935 3RCS*FT416
Instrument Racks:
3CES-RK12-04 3CES-RK12-06
3CES-RK12-05 3CES-RK12-07
Instrument Lines:
3 MSS *PT515(AW) 30' 3LMS*PT936(BW) 25'
3CCP*FT678(BP) 64' 3LMS*PT935(CB) 7'
3QSS*LT930(XR) ) 3FWA*FT510(00) 81'
3QSS*LS56A(X0) )17' 3FWS*LT519(AW) 234'
'
3QSS*LS54A(X0) ) 3FWS*LT529(BR) 219'
3LMS*PT937(AR) 12' 3RCS*FT416(AB) 70'
3LMS*PT934(DY) 21' 3RCS*FT415(AW) 70'
Tubing Supports:
EK-501035-H003 EK-501139-H026
EK-501035-H001 EK-501139-H027
EK-501034-H005 EK-501139-H016
EK-501139-H021 EK-501139-H017
EK-501139-H024
Instrument Loop Verification:
Steam Pressure
Loop Function: Senses steam generator 1A outlet pressure, provides
an input (trip) signal to the reactor protection system (RPS); indicates
steam line pressure on the main control board (MCB) and on the auxiliary
shutdown panel.
Components: The sample included the sensing line from the steam generator
outlet steam line to pressure transmitter 3 MSS *PT515, parts of the RPS,
pressure indicators 3 MSS *PI515A and 3 MSS *PI5158, and interconnecting
cable, panel wiring and terminals.
II-26
L
~
% _.a
.
,
,~ , .
: TABLE II-5-(Continued)
INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTION SAMPLE
! Pressurizer Pressure-
Loop Function: Senses ~ pressurizer' pressure and provides an input (trip)
signal.to the RPS, the engineered safety-features actuation system and
._ indicates' pressurizer.. pressure'.on the MCB.
'
< Components: - The sample included pressure transmitter 3RCS*PT456, electri-
cal penetration.3RCP*G1,~ parts-of the signal conditioning and logic
circuitry-(Channel II) of.-the RPS, pressure _ indicator 3RCS-PI456A and
interconnecting cable, panel wiring and terminals.
Reactor Coolant: Loop Flow
,
Loop Function: Senses reactor. coolant loop 1 flow and provides an input
'(trip) signal to the_RPS and indicates loop flow on the MCB.
Components: The sample included the' sensing lines from the loop piping
. elbow taps,. flow transmitter 3RCS*FT415, electrical penetration 3RCP*G1,
'
.
s . parts of the signal conditioning and logic circuitry (Channel II), flow-
; indicator 3RCS-FI415 and interconnecting cable, panel wiring and terminals.
~ Reactor Coolant Loop Flow.
Loop Function: . Redundant-to above loop.
Components: . Flow transmitter 3RCS*FT416, electrical penetration 3RCP*C6,
flow indicator 3RCS*FI416 and associated components similar to the above
' loop.
1 RHR Miniflow Recirculation
~ Loop Function:
~
Senses residual heat removal pump 3RHS*P1A flow, provides
q a signal to operate' valve 3CHS*FCV610 upon high or low flow and indicates -
>
; valve position'on the MCB -
Components: The sample included flow indicator switch 3RHS*FIS610, valve
posi_ tion-indicator 3RHS*FCV610'and interconnecting cable, p'anel wiring
.
:and terminals.
Safety Injection Accumulator Vent Valve
. Loop Function: Provides. signal to position valve in vent line from the
accumulator tanks 3SIL*TK1C&D and provides valve position indication on
.
_
the..MCB!and the auxiliary shutdown pane 1.
. Components: The sample included valve operator 3SIL*HCV943B, indicating
-and control instruments 3SIL*HC9438 and ZI943B on the MCB, indicating and
-
control instruments 3SIL*HC 9430 and ZI943D on the auxiliary shutdown panel,
-
electrical penetration 3RCP*E3 and interconnecting cable, panel wiring and
: terminals.
II-27
e
I
III. MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION
A. Objective
The objective of.the appraisal'cf mechanical construction was to
determine if installed and Quality Control (QC) acct.pted mechanical
items conformed to engineering design, regulatory requirements and
licensee commitments.
B. Discussion
The specific areas of mechanical construction evaluated were piping,
pipe supports / restraints, concrete expansion anchors, mechanical
equipment, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems. To accomplish the above objective, a field inspection of a
sample of QC accepted hardware was performed in each area. In
addition, certain programs, procedures and documentation were reviewed
as required to support or clarify hardware inspection findings.
1. Piping
a. Inspection Scope
(1) Piping depicted on the 26 Stone & Webster Engineering Corpora-
tion (SWEC) drawings listed in Tables III-la & b was selected
for the inspection sample. The piping encompassed portions of
the Chemical & Volume Control, Auxiliary Feedwater, Residual
Heat Removal, Quench Spray, Charging Pump Cooling, and Safety
Injection Systems. Piping configuration (i.e., layout geometry, ;
orientation and dimensions), component identification
and location, valve operator orientation, and pipe support
location and type were compared to the results on inspection
drawings marked-up by SWEC QC during their inspections.
Additional features such as maintenance of inservice inspection
./'
clearance criteria and site construction practice affecting
installed mechanical components were observed where appro-
priate. Piping component material specifications were compared
to controlled material take-off lists on a random basis. The
as-built and stress reconciliation programs were also reviewed.
(2) Hydrostatic test records for 20 piping isometrics were reviewed
for completeness, accuracy and content. These isometrics
encompassed portions of the Chemical and Volume Control, Safety
Injection, Residual Heat Removal, Component Cooling, Quench
Spray, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Containment Recirculation
Cooling Systems. A listing of the associated piping isometrics
are prov.ided in Table III-2a.
(3) Seven piping samples represanting approximately 75 feet of
pipe were selected to determine whether ASME requirements for
pipe wall thickness were met. The measured pipe wall thick-
nesses were compared against the minimum wall thickness
requirement specified by ASME (12.5 percent below nominal
thickness). See Table III-2b for the inspection sample and
observations.
III-l
<
-
~
* '
s
y w
' ~
.
The following documents ~provided the basic acceptance criteria and
m '
, background-information for the inspections:
f1
*
- :*' LSWEC' Specification M968, " Field Fabrication and Erection of
- , Power Piping," Rev. 7,: Add; 5.
x
: *-
SWEC Procedure NETM 31, " Procedure for Seismic Category I
'
,
~ '
' Piping Location Isometric.and Tubing Isometric Review and
, + Stress Reconciliation," Rev.~0, through Change Notice.No. 3-
*
'SWEC Procedure FCP-337, " Preparing Stress Reconciliation
.
-
Piping Location Isometrics (PLI's)," Rev.- 3
' *
'SWEC Procedure NEAM 122, "As-Built Program,"'Rev. 0 through
.
E
-
. Change Notice No. 2
.
'*~
.SWEC Quality Control Instruction'(QCI) FM3-S14.2-07C,
"ASME III_N-5 Inspections"
"'
'SWEC Procedure NEAM 134, " Processing of ASME III Certifica-
_ ,
tion," Rev. 0
,
*
-SWEC QA Attribute List No. M3-SP-968-15-4232 for PLI Inspection
"
:*
_SWEC-QA: Attribute List No. M3-SP-968-18-5052 for ASME III
Fabrication / Installation Inspection
*- SWEC' Procedure MTP-3, " Generic Pressure Test Guidelines for
,
' Fluid: Systems," Rev. 2
*-
SWEC Procedure No. 5.7, " Pressure Testing," ~ Rev. O through~
Change Notice No. 6
-* Applicable Piping Isometrics
' b. -Inspection Findings
The selected sample of piping ranged in size from three-fourths to-
20 inches, and classifications included all ASME pipe classes as
'well as class 4-(ANSI B31.1) piping. .This sample represented
approximately 400 feet of piping-two inches or less in diameter and
approximately 800 feet of piping greater than two inches in
diameter, all of which had been previously inspected and accepted by
SWEC Field Quality Control (FQC). Observations associated with
~~
. specific-piping isometric drawings are listed in Table III-1. A
summary of the findings are provided below.
.w (1) During the installation of process piping systems, various
,
-inspections by FQC were performed. The Piping Location _.
Isometric (PLI) inspection which verified attributes affecting.
the as-built effort such as dimensions, was one type of
inspection. A " pre N-5" inspection followed the PLI inspection,
~
and was conducted.in accordance with QCI S14.2 which directed
inspection of certain attributes-immediately before the ASME
N-5 Code Data Report sign-off.
III-2
u
p , ;
4
' '
lPLIinspections,whichwereperformedinaccordancewith
, ; Procedure FCP-337,~ required dimensions to be verified to the
Piping Specification M968 tolerance _of 0.5-inch. Sixteen
dimensional errors ranging ~from 1.0 to 13.0 inches were detec-
-
1 _
ted by-.the NRC. CAT'on the 26 drawings inspected. For pre-N-5
inspections,-QCI S14.2. required reinspection:of all " moveable
zsupport" location dimensions immediately prior to N-5 sign-off.
A moveable support-is any support which does not have inte-
- - '
<
grally welded attachments to the process pipe. Of the 16
errors previously'noted, four e'rrors which ranged in size from
1.~0 to 3.0_ inches were detected by the~NRC CAT on the 14
drawings which had already undergone the later pre N-5 inspec-
"
tion. The NRC: CAT is concerned that the reduced frequency and-
' . magnitudes of errors (4) found in the already pre N-5 inspected
sample is not truly indicative of.the effectiveness of the pre
.
N-5 inspection since most of the errors (16) were not asso-
Q ciated with moveable supports, and thus would likely not be _ detected:during the pre N-5 inspection.
During the NRC CAT inspection, SWEC studied the matter of
'
dimensional discrepancies, evaluated most of the discrepancies,
and found no resultant unacceptable stress conditions. As_a
result of the NRC CAT findings, FQC monitored the ongoing pre-
N-5 inspections for dimensions which were discrepant with those
found on the PLI drawings ~._ This monitoring showed a substan-
tially lower error' rate than that found by the NRC CAT; Based
*
primarily on the lower incidences of PLI dimensional! error
'
;found in that sample, FQC concluded that existing QC
procedures were adequate to. assure the accuracy of piping
. . dimensions. .FQC also issued a memorandum to piping. inspectors
which directed random remeasurement of PLI~ verified non-
moveable support and overall (i.e., straight run total length)
dimensions. No additional action was proposed by SWEC
regarding'this subject.
*
The NCR CAT is concerned that the FQC sample of PLI dimensional
' verification was limited to that piping which was ' inspected ~ for
N-5 sign-off during a one week period and was.therefore limited
in both time and scope. The resultant error rate was.not
>- . consistent with that found during the same period by the NRC
> '
' -
.
CAT. 'We are also concerned that the direction to remeasure PLI
verified dimensions on a random basis during pre N-5 inspec-
~t ions will not provide FQC with a quantifiable data base with
which to conclude the adequacy of dimensional measurement
quality control. Although the magnitude of errors detected by
'the NRC CAT is not extreme, the rate of occurrence warrants-
additional attention'and-corrective action.
- (2) The PLI for drawing QSS-3 incorrectly identified a support'
function.- Support PSR-063 was identified as a vertical and
axial pipe restraint when in fact, the support also restrained
the pipe laterally. This error appears to be an isolated
instance, and not-indicative of the overall QC effort.
e
s
, - -
-
III-3
6: '
--
2
7 -
,
,
m
Three drafting errors' associated with isometric CHS-31 were
^'
. . detected by the NRC CAT. .At least.two of-these errors, one
"
missing 1 dimension and one support for which neither the mark
'
. number nor function were identified, would have been detected
-during completion of the as-built reconciliation effort. The
-
' third er_ror.was a misorientation of a small pipe angle. These
drafting errors appear to represent isolated instances.
~
.^'
A total /of three violations to specified clearance criteria
. were< identified in our piping sample. 'In general, pipe
. clearance < violations between other mechanical and structural
'
. components were found to.be accurately. recorded for disposition
-
'by engineering-during the as-built stress reconciliation
^ analysis effort.
'
-
(3) In conjunction with the NRC CAT review of. design change control-
<
(Section VII), it was observed that the implementation of E&DCR
FP-22607 regarding the addition of a valve to process
-pipe, was'not. proper in that a steel plug was used on the
_
-
- Category II 'end of a valve _ nipple instead of a nylon plug -
'
~as specified by the E&DCR. The NRC CAT does not consider this.
,
'
particular discrepancy to be significant in nature, but is
.
nonetheless a condition'of noncompliance with respect to the
~
E&DCR. 'Although Category II piping is not subjected to the
same scrutiny of inspection as Category I piping, the licensee
~~
^
should be aware of the potential for misinstallations in
non-FQC inspected portions of Category II systems.
-
(4) In the course of the NRC CAT inspection of welding (Section-
IV), it was determined that a weld preparation detail which
~
affected piping design'was not adequately addressed by'SWEC
Engineering in that weld joint-stress considerations had not'-
~
~ been evaluated for the revised configuration. This weld detail
,- required counterboring of the process pipe at the feedwater to
steam generator nozzle connections. Resultant stresses were
not evaluated for the reduced cross-sectional area as a result
of the counterboring. . In response to NRC questions, SWEC later
determined that pipe stresses for these nozzle details met Code
stress limits. SWEC also determined that mechanisms to alert
SWEC Engineering of_such unusual weld preparations were in
place and that they had adequately addressed-such nozzle
~
details'affecting other equipment' supplied by the same NSSS
vendor. Since this discrepancy appears to be aniisolated case,
a review of similar circumstances-for nozzles ~ supplied by
vendors-other than the'NSSS vendor was not undertaken by SWEC
3 at the time of our inspection and is not contemplated.
Regarding-hydrostatic / pneumatic test packages, approximately 34
inspection-records were reviewed for the 20 piping isometrics
,~
selected. Pressure testing of embedded portions of piping were
-performed in'accordance with Test Procedure MTP-3 by field engi-
~
neers, and witnessed by FQC. Pressure testing of exposed and
completed piping systems were performed in accordance with pressure
Test Procedure 5.7, and were' generally performed under the direction
s of the Advisory Operations organization, with FQC performing the
III-4
_
-
witnessing and documentary functions. The NRC CAT inspector did not
identify any deficiencies such as missing or improper records,
overpressure or underpressure, or conflicting information in the
record packages kept by SWEC Construction FQC. Record packages for
pressure tests that were either stored in the vault or kept by
the Advisory Operations organization were not reviewed.
The NRC CAT did note, however, that on many of the associated
inspection reports which listed the applicable weld identifica-
tion numbers within the particular test boundary, various welds
were deleted from the test boundary after the date of the test.
These welds were then included within the test boundaries of other
pressure test isometrics which were to have been performed at a
later time.
Conversations with FQC personnel indicate that the FQC inspector (s)
who witnesses the pressure tests does not perform a point by point
weld identification comparison with the isometric drawing (s) when
walking down a pipe run. Rather, the welds are implicitly identi-
fied; it is assumed by the FQC inspector (s) that all welds which are
inspected between two reference points correspond to the weld
numbers listed in the inspection report by virtue of their physical
existence.
The NRC CAT is concerned that these types of inspection and docu-
mentation approaches are potential sources for errors such as
omitting an inspection of a weld, giving inadvertent inspection
credit for welds, and the failure to detect unauthorized or undocu-
mentedweldjoints.
With regard to the seven piping samples selected for minimum wall
thickness verification, none of the samples were found to be below
the specified' minimum values. Only one sample was within three mils
of the minimum will thickness limit. The various samples ranged in
diameter from one inch to 12 inches, and were specified to meet the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 1, 2, and 3
requirements (as appropriate). Pipe wall thickness was measured
using ultrasonic methods, with personnel and equipment provided by
the licensee. Circumferential measurements were taken at the ends
and the center of the samples; other measurements along the length
of the pipe were also obtained for those samples in which a poten-
tial for violating minimum wall thickness requirements appeared
likely.
c. Conclusions
No significant hardware discrepancies were observed in installed
piping systems. Site engineering and inspection personnel were
knowledgeable of procedures, requirements and responsibilities. The
NRC CAT observed evidence of effort to protect installed hardware
during ongoing construction activities and observed no significant
problems regarding construction practice. However, we are concerned
about the number of erroneous measured dimensions identified. We
are.also concerned that the results of the one time sampling of
dimensioning by SWEC as a result of the NRC CAT findings, which
III-5
!-
--
- - - - -__ _ -
_
.
_
4
~
contradicted the resultsLoffour sampling,' may.not be sufficient'to-
conclude the adequacy' of as-built measurements ~. As such, additional
' attention with respect to implementation and/or procedures in this
area. appears warranted.
.2. Pipe"Sup' ports / Restraints
a. : Inspection Scope
'
t ,
'
Twenty eight ASME Class 1, 2 or 3 and.five class 4 pipe supports /
-
. restraints which represented a variety of types, sizes, systems and
<
locations were selected for. detailed inspection. All but four
-
supports-had been QC inspected and. accepted. These supports /
restraints were: inspected for-proper configuration, clearances,
member size, location,_ weld size, fasteners.:and damage. See Table
III-3;for a listing of the-inspection sample.- In addition, approxi-
imately'75 other supports / restraints were observed at random in the
-field for obvious deficiencies such as loose or missing fasteners,
: improper clearances or angularity, improper locking devices,-
disassembled items,-damage and improper concrete expansion anchor-
spacing.
The FQC-inspection reports for four supports were examined and com-
pared with drawings and' current document revision cards to verify-
that the required attributes were inspected and that inspections
were performed to the latest design documents. This review was con-
ducted'for.QSS-1-PSR-146,-QSS-1-PSA-140,-QSS-1-PSR-126 and'
CCP-2-PSA-078.
.
Acceptance criteria for these inspections were contained in the
following documents:
*
SWEC Specification M968, " Field Fabrication and Erection of
Power Piping," Rev 7, Addendum 5
*
SWEC Quality Control Instruction QCI FM 3-D10.43-01B, "Inspec-
tion'of Pipe Supports"
,
*-
SWEC Quality. Standard, QS-10.43ML, " Hanger / Support and Anchor.
Bolt Installation / Inspection," Rev. 0
*~
SWEC Quality' Assurance Directive (QAD) 10.43, " Hanger and
-Anchor Bolt Installation Inspection," Rev.- A
..
*
SWEC Specification M924, " Drilled-In Expansion Type Concrete
Anchors"-
.*
Applicable design drawings and change documents.
~
b. Inspection Findings
At the time of this inspection approximately 98 percent of the
approximately.3800 large bore ASME supports / restraints had been
installed and 95 percent had been QC accepted. Approximately 96
c . .
III-6
.-
percent of the 3600 small bore ASME supports / restraints had been installed, with 86 percent QC accepted. The inspection and acceptance criteria for aspects of pipe support / restraint installation (e.g, welding, concrete expansion anchors, Richmond inserts, baseplates, general tolerances, locking devices, special inspections for snubber struts and spring hangers) were com- piled in a controlled digest called the Inspector's Handbook. This handbook provided the inspector easy access to the many pieces of information needed to perform proper support / restraint inspections, in one concise document. For the four supports / restraints which received documentation reviews, examination of the inspection reports indicated that they had been inspected for all attributes and were inspected to the latest design drawings. No deficiencies were identified. However, during our inspection of hardware, a number of discrepan- cies were identified including improper attachment locations, inadequate integral lug contact, less than full flange width beam stiffeners, loose fasteners / locknuts, missing or improperly instal- led bearing spacers, and drafting errors. See Table III-4 for a listing of inspection observations. Although the majority of these discrepancies noted were generally minor in nature, and would not likely affect structural integrity,'several rather significant discrepancies were identified. They are discussed as follows: (1) Five instances were noted where support attachment locations
were not as shown on design drawings. Discrepancies were
noted on attachment points to embedded plates, structural
beams and tube steel support members. Three cases involved
lateral positioning, one case involved axial positioning,
and one case involved attachment location on an embedded
plate. The causes of these discrepancies appear to include
inadequate attention to detail by QC inspectors, lack of
specific dimensional location requirements on drawings, and
confusion between Engineering and FQC as to the allowable
tolerance for attachment locations. FQC personnel indicated
they had been applying a plus or minus one inch piping location
tolerance to support attachment locations. The discrepancies
observed by the NRC CAT exceeded the one inch tolerance.
In addition, FQC stated that they had utilized the support
location tolerances shown on the support location sketch,
which was depicted on the BZ (support design) drawing. This
support location tolerance, which was as much as two feet in
some cases, was based on pipe stress analysis considerations -
not on support design considerations. SWEC Engineering
indicated that the standard dimensional measurement tolerance
of plus or minus one eighth inch was assumed to have been
used by FQC, unless otherwise stated.
III-7
- . . . . ~ - - . _. _ . .m
I
4
'The BZ drawing support location sketch for SWP-4-PSST-117
showed allowable relocation (from a pipe stress standpoint)
of 24 inches. The attachment point for this support had
been. moved the full 24 inches from the design location on
the axis of a tube steel beam, and had subsequently been
accepted by FQC. When the NRC CAT questioned the application
of this tolerance for this support,.FQC and Engineering
responded that the condition was acceptable. However, when
the NRC CAT inspector reviewed the support design calculation,
it was determined that a three inch tolerance to the specified
' location had been used.
Preliminary calculations indicated that based upon original
design location and configuration an overstressed condition
existed. Subsequent analysis by SWEC Engineering confirmed
that stress allowables had been exceeded. However, a
reevaluation utilizing as-built weld sizes and loading
configurations showed the support to be not overstressed,
and in fact, to be within acceptable limits. Prior to the
conclusion of the NRC CAT inspection, a " Report of a
Problem" had been generated by SWEC Engineering to address
the one-eighth vs. one inch tolerance question.
In addition,-the NRC CAT is concerned that wide location
changes have not been generically accounted for in support /
restraint design calculations. The NRC CAT inspectors
'
consider.that the clarity of attachment location tolerances
and the adequacy of FQC inspections need to be comprehen-
sively evaluated. Clear acceptance criteria for these
situations need to be established with reanalysis and
reinspection performed as required.
- (2) In the case of axial restraints on pipe risers utilizing welded
lugs or. trunnions, FQC inspection criteria required that only
one lug or trunnion be in contact with the restraint member.
However, the calculation for a spring support on a riser,
. '
3-MSS-1-PSSH-128, reflected the assumption that the load was
shared by two lugs. At the request of the NRC CAT, SWEC ,
Engineering researched and identified a total of 45 cases of
conflicting load sharing assumptions on spring supports on
risers. The cause of this problem apparently came from a
general relaxation of-the inspection criteria from two lugs-to
one lug in contact, when in fact the design guide for spring
hangers indicated load sharing by two lugs. Where more than
one lug contact was assumed or required by calculations, the
designer did not specify the required additional contact on the
design drawing for QC to verify. An earlier special support
design review initiated and conducted by SWEC Engineering which
included an evaluation of integral welded attachment assump-
tions, failed to identify this discrepancy with regard to
spring supports.
Subsequent to the NRC CAT identification of this item, an
evaluation of loading dynamics by SWEC designers indicated that
4
single lug contact would be adequate for spring supports. When
i
j , III-8
_ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .- _ _ _ __ . _ . _- _.
F
requested to determine the applicability of this problem to
rigid axial restraints, it was determined that all but the RHS
system had been or would be included in the aforementioned
special design review. A review of the RHS system requested by
the NRC CAT revealed that two of the nine supports / restraints
of the type in question had been designed assuming load sharing
by more than one lug. E&DCRs were issued to have F
the required contact and/or add shims as necessary.QC verify
(3) The NRC CAT inspectors identified an occurrence where stiffener
plates for a wide flange beam did not span.the width of the
beam. Support CCP-1-PSR-154 had beam stiffener plates which
were 5/8 inch short in span. After this was identified, SWEC
FQC performed a random field inspection of stiffener instal-
lations. Of 290 plates installed on 119 supports / restraints,
six plates on three supports were also found to be undersized
(five were 1/2 inch short and one was 5/8 inch short). FQC
personnel were apparently applying a " cut to suit" note on
design drawings to allow deviations in excess of the plus or
minus 1/8 inch allowed by design. FQC personnel were subse-
quently reinstructed on the requirements for beam stiffener
plate installation.
(4) With regard to the number of NRC CAT observations regarding
loose fasteners, locking devices and other hardware on accepted
installations, these deficiencies indicate a need to perform a
final inspection for these features after construction activi-
ties are essentially completed. This concern applies to Class
4 supports (non-safety system supports erected in seismic
buildings in proximity to ASME piping / components) as well as
ASME supports. Discussions with SWEC and NUSCO personnel
indicated several walkdowns were to be performed prior to plant
operation which could identify and correct many of these
deficiencies. NUSCO further committed to include an inspection
for loose hardware in the ASME Section XI preservice inspection
program. The NRC CAT considers this an excellent approach, but
considers that Class 4 supports / restraints in proximity to
safety-related systems should also receive an equivalent
inspection.
The NRC CAT inspectors also examined the licensee's program for
assuring conformance to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic
Design Classification," for Class 4 (Non ASME) piping and
supports in proximity to safety-related items. The attachment
welds to Seismic Category I structures and/or the expansion
anchor spacing on surface mounted plates are inspected by SWEC
FQC on all Class 4 supports / restraints. Until terminated in
August 1984, inspections essentially identical to those used
for ASME supports were performed on 20 percent of Class 4
supports / restraints. A " hazards analysis" program consisting
of safety-related area walkdowns by a single design engineer is
currently being used to identify and evaluate potential
hazards. The criteria used for the evaluation is based on a
study of seismic interaction experience at other industrial '
facilities (non-nuclear) primarily in California. The NRC CAT
III-9
1
. _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ __
inspectors primary concern in this area relates to the ade-
quacy of installation of these Class 4 supports. The NRC CAT
requested SWEC to perform an evaluaticn of inspection report
results to justify the conclusion that the 20 percent sample
program provided adequate assurance of proper installation.
The licensee has not yet completed this evaluation. The small
number of Class 4 supports / restraints inspected by the NRC CAT
exhibited no major installation deficiencies. However, as
previously noted, we consider that loose hardware and locking
devices on Class 4 supports / restraints need additional atten-
tion.
In conjunction with the NRC CAT review of design change control
(Section VII), it was observed that the implementation and the
FQC inspection acceptance of E&DCR No. T-J-01036 regarding the
attachment of support identification tags to their respective
supports were not proper in that the component support name-
plates which were attached to the supports did not conform to
the labeling description as required by the E&DCR. Although
the NRC CAT does not consider this discrepancy to be of major
significance, it is an additional example of a lack of atten-
tion to detail by FQC.
c. Conclusions
In general, pipe supports and restraints were found to be in confor- mance to design documents. However, problems noted with attachment locations and beam stiffener sizes indicates a need for clarifica- tion of acceptance criteria by SWEC Engineering and more attention to detail by SWEC FQC inspectors. The integrally welded attachment contact problem indicates that SWEC Engineering evaluations are not as complete as may be necessary to ensure that potentially generic concerns are identified and resolved for all systems and/or applica- tions. The licensee is preparing an evaluation to demonstrate the adequacy of-Class 4 support installations which may impact seis- mically designed components. Loose hardware, fasteners and locking devices need to be addressed in post-construction inspections. The observed drafting errors are considered to be examples of human error.
3. Concrete Expansion Anchors a. Inspection Scope
Ninety-nine concrete expansion anchors on 25 pipe supports /
restraints and 40 anchors on 10 HVAC restraints were inspected for
proper diameter, length stamp, embedment, edge distance, damage,
washers and residual torque (an indication of anchor preload). In
addition, the length of pipe support expansion anchors were verified
by ultrasonic testing. The anchors inspected were selected at
random on a variety of systems and ranged in diameter from one-half
to one inch. Anchors were torqued to the SWEC specified post
in3tallation test torque (80 percent of the minimum installation
torque). Table III-5 provides a listing of the anchors inspected.
III-10
1T > ;
Acceptance criteria for the field inspections were contained in the
following documents:
SWEC Specification M924, " Drilled-In Expansion Type Concrete
Anchors"
*
SWEC Quality Standard, QS-10.43 ML, " Hanger and Anchor Bolt
Installation / Inspection," Rev. 0
*
SWEC Quality Assurance Directive QAD-10.43, " Hangers and Anchor
Bolt Installation Inspection," Rev. A
b. Inspection Findings
Richmond inserts have been extensively used, thereby minimizing the
number of concrete expansion anchors. Pipe support / restraint expan-
sion anchors were installed by SWEC, and HVAC restraint anchors were
installed by the HVAC subcontractor, Northeast Ventilating Company
(NEVCO). Expansion anchor installations were inspected by SWEC FQC
and included either witnessing of installation torquing or appli-
cation of a subsequent test torque. Acceptance criteria of the
Specifications required that, if the anchor nut rotated at less than
the test torque, the full installation torque must be achieved
within one turn of the nut for the installation to be acceptable.
For 19 anchors on pipe supports / restraints and 12 anchors on HVAC
restraints, nut rotation was observed at less than the test torque.
Four anchors on the pipe supports / restraints required more than one
turn to reach minimum installation torque (1-1/2, 1-2/3, 2 and 2-1/4
turns). All other characteristics examined were either within
tolerance or had been previously identified and evaluated by SWEC.
c. Conclusions
In general, the concrete expansion anchors inspected by the NRC CAT
were installed in accordance with design and procedural require-
ments. The results of the torque tests are considered typical of
normal wedge type expansion anchor installations and do not indicate
significant installation deficiencies.
4. Heating, Ventilating and Air Condition (HVAC)
a. Inspection Scope
Twelve HVAC seismic restraints were selected at random and inspected
for location, configuration, member size, weld size and connection
details. Duct pieces adjacent to the restraints and others
selected at random were examined for proper attachment to anchors,
companion angle size and joint makeup. HVAC mechanical equipment
and concrete expansion anchor installation are discussed in other
portions of this section. See Table III-6 for a listing of HVAC
restraints inspected.
The following documents provided the acceptance criteria for the
inspection of HVAC hardware installations:
,
III-11
L
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __
SWEC Specification M565, " Installation of Ventilation and
Air Conditioning Systems," Rev. 7
SWEC QAD-11.5 ML, " Duct Work Inspection," Rev. A
NEVC0 Duct Brochure
*
Applicable design drawings and change documents
b. Inspection Findings
Approximately 99 percent of all HVAC restraint (approximately 3100) had been installed and approximately 90 percent had been QC accepted. In general, inspected HVAC seismic restraints conformed to design documents and procedural requirements for the NRC CAT selected inspection attributes. A minor brace angle discrepancy (two degrees out of tolerance) and one minor dimensional discrepancy were noted. Duct segments examined were tight, properly attached and otherwise conformed to requirements. It was noted that the licensee has committed to test Category I, II, and III fire dampers under design flow conditions, as discussed in letters to the NRC dated February 22, 1985 and March 20, 1985. As such, fire darrpers were not reviewed during this inspection. In conjunction with the NRC CAT review of design change control (Section VII), it was observed that the implementation and FQC inspection / acceptance of E&DCR FB-33829 regarding the instal- lation of a moisture element to ducting were not proper in that the overall as-built plate dimensions did not conform to the specified dimensions, and that conflicting fastening instructions existed in the E&DCR. This discrepancy is considered to be an example of inadequate inspection by FQC.
c. Conclusion
HVAC restraints and duct segments generally conformed to design and procedural requirements.
5. Mechanical Equipment a. Inspection Scope
Twenty-nine pieces of equipment for ten systems (Chemical & Volume
Control, Auxiliary Feedwater, Quench Spray, Safety Injection, Safety
Injection Pump Cooling, Component Cooling, Charging Pump Cooling,
Service Water, Control Building Air Conditioning and Control Build-
ing Chilled Water) were inspected for proper configuration, loca-
tion, condition and bolt size. Installation documentation for these
components were also reviewed for content, clarity, consistency and
thoroughness. Equipment examined included the Component Cooling
Water Heat Exchangers, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Chemical
and Volume Control Charging Pumps. Table III-7 provides a listing
III-12
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
____-___ _- _____
.
of inspected items.
The licensee's Preventive Maintenance Program was also reviewed.
Equipment whose maintenance records were examined for this review
are listed in Table III-8.
The following documents provided the basic acceptance criteria for
the inspections:
*
SWEC Specification M914, " Mechanical Equipment Erection," Rev.
2, Addendum 3
*
SWEC Field QC, " Mechanical Equipment Installation Handbook"
*
NNECO Procedure MP3704A, " Preventive Maintenance Program,"
Rev. 0
*
SWEC Quality Standard QS-13.12ML, " Material Equipment
Maintenance," Rev. O
Applicable equipment details and foundation drawings
b. Inspection Findings
Installation inspection reports exhibited proper sequencing of
inspection. The NRC CAT inspector examined documentation for
components which were considered to be completely installed, and
those which were still in process. Equipment which had received
final alignment and/or whose foundation anchor bolts had been
tensioned or torqued were considered to have been completely
installed.
Of the 29 components for which installation documentation was
reviewed, all had been inspected and found acceptable by FQC for
those attributes examined by the NRC CAT inspector. Of these
components, the NRC CAT identified discrepancies between
installation requirements and as-installed conditions for 19
components.
1. The following components did not possess documentation
which indicated that their foundation bolting was torqued
to the requisite values specified by the vendor drawing:
*
Quench Spray (QSS) Pumps (P3A,P3B)
*
*
Charging Pump Cooling (CCE) Pumps (P1A,PIB)
Safety Injection Pump Cooling (CCI) Pumps (P1A,PIB)
*
Service Water (SWP) MCC & Rod Area
*
Booster Pumps (P3A,P38)
Control Building Chilled Water (HVK) Pumps (P1A, PIB)
2. The following components were missing washers at all
foundation anchor locations, contrary to drawing and
Specification requirements:
III-13
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
*
Chemical & Volume Control (CHS) Charging
*
Pumps (P3A,P38,P3C)
Auxiliary Feedwater (FWA) Pumps (P1A, P1B, P2)
*
Quench Spray (QSS) Pump (P3A)
*
*
Safety Injection Pump Cooling (CCI) Pump (P1A)
Service Water (SWP) MCC & Rod Area (P3A,P3B)
Booster Pumps
*
Control Building Chilled Water (HVK) Pumps (P1A, PIB)
Boric Acid Transfer Pump CHS*P2A was observed to be missing ,
two washers and CHS*P2B was missing one washer at their
respective foundation anchor attachments.
3. The following components were installed without the specified
double nut arrangement on the foundation anchor bolts:
*
*
Safety Injection (SIH) Pumps (PIA,PIB)
*
Quench Spray (QSS) Pumps (P3A,P38)
Auxiliary Feedwater (FWA) Pumps (P1A,P1B,P2)
4. Boric Acid Tank CHS*TK58 was found to have nearly all of its
foundation anchor nuts loose, despite a SWEC FQC inspection
report verifying their tightness. It was learned that this
component had been transferred to NNEC0 responsibility.
However, NNECO at the time did not possess documentation
authorizing work on this component, nor were they aware of
the component's condition. NNEC0 did not have a formalized
procedure in place which verified the acceptability of equip-
ment conditions, protective measures, and surroundings. As a
result of the NRC CAT observations, the licensee performed
a reinspection of approximately 80 Seismic Category I compo-
nents (all mechanical equipment including HVAC) in order to
verify compliance to specified anchorage criteria. Several
additional discrepancies were identified. All discrepancies
whether identified by the NRC CAT or by the licensee were
documented on UNSAT Inspection Reports with corrective actions
to be implemented.
Eight components were found to have been installed to the specified requirements, and are appropriately noted in Table III-7. The NRC CAT inspectors also reviewed the seismic analyses for the Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Pumps, Quench Spray Pumps, Safety Injection Pump Cooling Pumps, Charging Pump Cooling Pumps and the Service Water MCC and Rod Area Booster Pumps for consistency between the foundation anchor bolt material type assumed in the analyses, and the as-installed material. No discre- pancies were identified. The seismic analyses for components supplied through Westinghouse, e.g., CVCS Charging Pumps and Safety Injection Pumps were not available for review. With regard to the review of the Preventive Maintenance Program, fornal maintenance records for the 25 components selected for this review were available and complete until the time the components were turned over to NNECO from SWEC. No discrepancies were identi-
III-14
_ _ _ _ _ . fied in the SWEC maintenance records. However, formal records of mechanical related activities for 23 components did not exist for the time period between " turnover" and Phase 1 preoperational testing (the exceptions being the periodic maintenance performed on the Service Water Pumps). The NRC CAT was concerned that preventive maintenance activities had not been performed on those pieces of equipment which experienced extended delays between turnover and Phase 1 testing, and that if maintenance activities had occurred, a means of verifying the performance of activities through formal documentation had not been established. This similar concern had been expressed in a December 28, 1984 NUSCO QA Audit A-40958. In response to our concerns, NNECO proposed changes to Maintenance Procedure 3704A, " Preventive Maintenance," which would include formalized review and implementation guidelines regarding storage preventive maintenance activities, and an evaluation of the effects of missed maintenance activities over two or more periods. Main- tenance Procedure 3719MB, " Mechanical Equipment General Inspections" was to be written also to document inspection criteria for mechani- cal equipment. In addition, equipment which have already been turned over to NNEC0 will be reviewed for inclusion into the Pre- ventive Maintenance Program in accordance with the revised proce- dures. These proposed changes, when implemented, will adequately resolve the concerns of the NRC CAT.
c. Conclusions
No major hardware discrepancies were noted during the inspection of
mechanical equipment. However, the NRC CAT inspectors are concerned
that final configurations for foundation aachor attachments are not
receiving adequate inspection to ensure their conformance to speci-
fled requirements. Although the licensee has performed a reinspec-
tion of all Category I mechanical components, additional attention
in the programmatic and procedural areas is warranted since future
inspections resulting from modifications, rework, and maintenance to
these components will likely be necessary.
The NNECO Preventive Maintenance Program was deficient in that
formal measures were not implemented to ensure continued maintenance
activities for components prior to preoperational testing. Changes
to the program have been proposed to resolve this deficiency.
III-15
. _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _
7
TABLE III-la
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE (Large Bore)
Drawing Diameter Pipe
System Number (Inches) Class Observations Notes
CHS CHS-11 3 2 None 1, 2
Sheet 2
Issue 7
CHS CHS-31 3/4, 3, 4 2 Clearance violation
Sheet 3 (7/8") at pipe sleeve
Issue 5 not identified
Drafting errors at PLI 4
include: omitted
dimension, omitted
support function and
identification, and
incorrect pipe
orientation angle (4 )
CHS CHS-32 3/4, 3, 4 2 5'4-13/16" design 3
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 6 approx. 4'7"
l'2-9/16" design 3
dimension measured
approx. 12"
CHS CHS-45 3 3 9'4-7/16" design 1
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 6 approx. 9'3"
7'6-1/16" design
dimension measured
approx. 7'7/12"
FWA FWA-1A 10 3 2'2-1/2" design
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 3 2'5-1/2"
Support PSR 193 3, 5
design location is
4-1/16" north of
branch to valve V954;
Actual location is
3-1/2" south of the
branch
III-16
TABLE III-la (Continued)
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE (Large Bore)
Drawing Diameter Pipe
System Number (Inches) Class Observations Notes FWA FWA-2 8 3 2'2-15/16" design
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 2 approx. 2'7"
3'11-1/8" design
dimension measured
approx. 3'9"
3'3 15/16" design
dimension measured
approx. 3'0.
FWA FWA-2 8 3 l'11-11/16" design 3
Sheet 4 dimension measured
Issue 2 approx. 2'11"
FWA FWA-3 10 3 None
Sheet 4
Issue 4
FWS FWS-13 16, 18, 20 2, 3 None
Sheet 4
Issue 3
FWS FWS-13 8, 18, 20 2 None
Sheet 5
Issue 3
RHS RHS-1 8, 10 2 None 2
Sheet 5
Issue 5
RHS RHS-1 10 2 None 2
Sheet 6
Issue 5
RHS RHS-501 1, 4, 12 1, 2 l'2-13/16" design 1, 2
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 7 approx. 12"
RHS RHS-501 12 1 1
Sheet 4
Issue 7
III-17
,
r
TABLE III-la (Continued)
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE (Large Bore)
Drawing Diaraeter Pipe
System Number (Inches) Class Observations Notes
QSS QSS-3 6,-8, 12 2 3'6-7/8" design
Sheet 4 dimension measured '
Issue'4 approx. 2'6"
Support (PSR-063)
identified as vertical
and axial restraint
only. Also provides
lateral restraint
3'8 5/8" design
dimension ncasured
approx. 3'6"
4'2-1/4" design
7 dimension measured
approx. 3'6"
,
SIL SIL-8 8 2 Clearance violation 1
<
Sheet 5 (3/4") between valve
Issue 6 and adjacent pipe
no. 3-DGS-002-62-4
not identified
CHS - Chemical & Volume Control
FWA - Auxiliary Feedwater
FWS - Feedwater
QSS - Quench Spray
RHS - Residual Heat Removal.
SIL - Low Pressure Safety Injection
III-18
, ,
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - , -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ ___ _ __
,
TABLE III-lb
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE (Small 8 ore)
Drawing Diameter Pipe
System Number (Inches) Class Observations Notes SWP 319702 2. 4 None 1
Sheet 3
Issue 5
SWP 319703 2 3 None 1
Sheet 4
Issue 5
SWP 319722 1 3 None 1
Sheet 3+
Issue 3
SWP 319728 1 3 Clearance violation 1
. Sheet 4 (5/8") between pipe
Issue 5 and adjacent pipe
SWP 319729 1 3 None 1
Sheet 3
Issue 5
,
RHS 371003 2 2 2'6" design dimension
Sheet 3 measured 2'8"
Issue 6
RHS 371702 3/4 2, 4 None 1
Sheet 3
Issue 6
CCE 410100 1-1/2, 2 3 None 1
Sheet 3
Issue 6
CCE 410511 1-1/2, 2 3 None 1
'
. Sheet 3
Issue 6
i
CCE 410512 2 3 l'10-7/8" design 1
Sheet 3 dimension measured
Issue 5 approx. 2'0"
CCE - Charging Pump Cooling RHS - Residual Heat Removal < SWP - Service Water
III-19
_ __ -, . _ . . _ . . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ . .._ __ . ,
_
_.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
t
TA8LE III-lb (Continued)
PIPING INSPECTION SAMPLE (Small Bore)
!
NOTES:
1. Pre N-5 final inspection was complete for this isometric.
2. This piping was partially or completely insulated at the time of the NRC CAT
inspection.
l 3. This dimension was to " moveable" (i.e., other than integrally attached) ,
- support and will be remeasured during pre N-5 inspection. i
4. This error would likely be detected during the as-built stress f
'
reconciliation effort. '
5. This error might be detected during the ASME III Fabrication / Installation
not yet performed.
;
l ! !
! !
f
,
*
.
;
;
e
t
i l I l l l III-20 ! !
, _ - - _ . . , - _ _ _ , , , _ , _ _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ _ , . _ _ , _ . , _ , . . _ _
_ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - . _ . . _ , . , _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ , , - - -
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
TABLE III-2a
l HYDROSTATIC / PNEUMATIC TEST PACKAGE SAMPLE
Isometric Package Isometric Packene
CHS-5 QSS-6
CHS-25 QSS-22A
CHS-54 QSS-30 1
CCP-151 QSS-800
CCP-269A QSS-801
'
FWA-13 QSS-802
FWA-800 QSS-803 ,
SIL-12 QSS-804
SIH-7 RHS-3
SIH-46A RSS-9
CHS - Chemical & Volume Control
CCP - Component Cooling Water
~ FWA - Auxiliary Feedwater
SIL~ - Low Pressure Safety Injection
'SIH - High Pressure Safety Injection
. QSS - Quench Spray ,
RHS - Residual Heat Removal
RSS - Containment Recirculation Cooling
l t !
III-21
,
. . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _
r
TABLE III-2b
PIPE WALL THICKNESS SAMPLE AND OBSERVATIONS
Specified Nominal Minimum Wall
l Manufacturer / Pipe Size / ASME (Minimum) Wall Thickness Measured
(Heat No.) Schedule Class Thickness (Inches) (Inches)
r
B&W(67292) 6/160 2 0.718 (0.629) 0.730
PSC (62886) 10/XS 2 0.500 (0.438) 0.475
A-T (08169) 1/160 1 0.250(0.219) 0.232 !
!
S (455674) 2/160 1- 0.343 (0.300) 0.317
'
B&W(M4865) 2/80 2 0.218 (0.191) 0.194
B&W(M3890) 8/160 2 0.906 (0.793) 0.898
C-W (2561-1-2)' 12/160 1 1.312 (1.148) 1.252
A-T - AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp.
-B&W - Babcock & Wilcox Tubular Products Division
C-W - Curtiss-Wright Corp.
PSC - Phoenix Steel Corp.
S - Sandvik Inc.
III-22
_ ._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ - __ _ __ _
.
TABLE III-3
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION SAMPLE
Pipe Size
S/R Number Tyge Class (Inches) Location
CDS-1-PSST-227 Strut 4 4 Annulus
CCP-1-PSR-154 Strut 3 4 Annulus
CCP-2-PSRH-175 Rod 4 2 1/2 Aux.
CCP-2-PSR-069 Strut 3 18 Aux.
CHS-2-PSR-324 Box 2 8 Aux.
CHS-2-PSSH-020 Spring 2 4 Aux.
QSS-1-PSSP-407 Snubber 1 12 Cont.
QSS-4-PSSH-050 Spring 4 12 Cont.
QSS-4-PSST-115 Strut 2 14 ESF
RCS-1-PSA-037 Clamp Anchor 1 4 Cont.
RCS-1-PSSP-522 Snubber 1 14 Cont.
RCS-1-PSSH-524 Spring 1 14 Cont.
RCS-1-PSSH-500 Spring 1 8 Cont.
RCS-1-PSR-025 Strut 1 4 Cont.
RHS-1-PSST-009 Strut 1 12 Cont.
RHS-1-PSST-011 Strut 1 12 Cont.
RHS-1-PSR-014 Strut 2 12 Cont.
RHS-1-TPSR-072 Bolted Clamp 1 3/4 Cont.
RHS-4-PSSP-413 Snubber 2 10 ESF
RSS-1-PSA-079 Box 2 10 Cont.
RSS-1-PSR-106 Strut 2 12 Cont.
RSS-1-PSSP-434/435 Snubbers 2 12 Cont.
RSS-4-PSRH-047 Rod 4 10 ESF
RSS-4-PSRH-053 Rod 4 12 Cont.
RSS-4-PSSH-141 Spring 2 10 Cont.
RSS-4-PSST-002 Strut 2 8 Cont.
SIL-1-PSR-358 Strut 1 6 Annulus
SIL-1-PSA-446 Clamp Anchor 1 6 Annulus
S!H-1-PSR-349 Strut 2 4 Annulus
SIH-4-PSST-105 Strut 2 4 ESF
SWP-4-PSST-117 Strut 3 18 ESF
SWP-4-PSA-142 Bolted Anchor 3 8 ESF
Annulus - Containment Building Annulus
Aux. - Auxiliary Building
Cont. - Containment Building
ESF - Engineered Safety Features Building
III-23
L _ _ . .
TABLE III-4
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
Primary Sample
Support / Restraint Observation QSS-4-PSST-115 Oversized strut installed (N&D 11,574).
Drafting error-failure to correctly
incorporate weld size (N&D 11,506).
SIL-1-PSA-446 Draf ting error-failure to correctly
incorporate weld symbols (E&DCR T-J-03609).
SIH-1-PSR-349 Strut rod end bearing spacers missing
(PLIR 1298).
RCS-1-PSSH-500 Attachment location 1-1/2 inch from
location indicated on drawing.
Weld of Pc. 9 to existing steel not
centered as shown on dwg. sect. 2-2.
RCS-1-PSSH-524 Orientation of lugs approx. 30 degrees
from that specified on dwg. Note 4.
(N&D 11,708).
Elevation attachment locations of Pc, 8
and 9 to embed 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 inch from
that shown on dwg.
One cotter pin not bent.
RSS-1-PSA-079 Improper structural bolts installed;
(Not yet final QC accepted) removal of stiffener plates required for
rework (IR P5A91133).
RSS-1-PSR-106 Loose locknut. RHS-1-PSST-009 Attachment location 2 inches from that
shown on dwg. (IR P5A91143).
'
Drafting error-failure to incorporate
weld symbols (N&D 11499).
Loose locknut.
SWP-4-PSST-117 Attachment location 24 inches from that
shown on drawing.
III-24
TABLE III-4 (Continued)
PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
Primary Sample
Support / Restraint Observation CCP-1-PSR-154 Weld of Pc. 6 to existing steel is welded
across the beam flange; Section 2-2 of
dwg. shows it welded along the run of the
beam (N&D 11,711).
Stiffener plates lack 5/8 inch from
extending full width of flange (N&D
11,900).
Unspread cotter pin.
RCS-1-PSR-025 Attachment location of Pc. 2 rear bracket
2-1/2 inches from that indicated on dwg.
(N&D 11,709).
QSS-4-PSRH-053 Loose rod
(CAT II)
Lockwasher installed on Hilti anchor (N&D
11,657).
Anchor spacing violation to adjacent
support (that had not yet been QC
accepted) (N&D 11,557).
Adjacent Supports / Restraints
Support / Restraint Observation RSS-1-PSR-114 Sheared cotter pin, pipe clamp out of
adjustment. (IR P3003277).
RCS-1-PSST-429 Clamp and bearing spacers missing. RHS-4-PSST-001 Strut not tight, tapered bearing washers
installed backward.
RHS-4-PSSP-410 Strut locknut backed off. SIH-1-PSA-342 Clamp anchor loose, missing flat and lock
washers, weld undersized and poor quality
(IR P549129).
III-25
_ _ __
TABLE III-4 (Continued)
l PIPE SUPPORT / RESTRAINT INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
Ad.lacent Supports / Restraints
Support / Restraint Observation
DAS-2-PSRH-416 Loose pipe clamp, loose rods with
(Cat II) inadequate thread engagement, riser clamp
not in contact with lugs (IR P5A91559).
SFC-1-PSRH-113 Cotter pins not bent. -
DFR-4-PSR-001 Box restraint has zero clearance top
(Cat II) and bottom (IR PSA91560).
MSS-1-PSSH-128 Only one lug in contact with riser
clamp. Design calculation is based on
load being carried by two lugs.
.
E
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,
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-
III-26
'
,
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;, ..
C
TABLE III-5
CONCRETF EXPANSION ANCHOR SAMPLE
Pipe Supports / Restraints
Number-Diameter Number-Diameter
of Anchors of Anchors
Pipe Support Inspected Pipe Support Inspected
CP408052-H003 2-3/4" RSS-4-PSR-190 4-1"
CHS-2-PSSH-209 2-1" CP41022-H001 2-1"
BDG-1-PSSP-430 3-3/4" CP319732-H001 2-3/4"
CP408056-H002 4-3/4" CH-2-PSR-354 4-1"
CP408056-H004 3-3/4" CCP-2-PSR-125 4-3/4"
CP408056-H005 3-1/2" CCP-2-PSSP-401 4-3/4"
CP405001-H003 2-3/4" SIL-2-PSA-287 13-1"
CHS-1-PSR-549 6-1" SIH-2-PSA-191 4-1"
QSS-4-PSSP-400/407 2-1" SIL-2-PSR-283 4-3/4"
CCP-4-PSR-113 3-1" CHS-2-PSSP-468 4-1"
CP394038-H001 4-3/4" CHS-2-PSA-353 8-1"
CPS 26022-H002 2-1" RSS-4-PSSP-412 4-1"
RSS-4-PSST-140 4-1"
HVAC Restraints
Number-Diameter Number-Diameter
of Anchors of Anchors
Restraint Inspected Restraint Inspected
DSA-1321 4-1" DSA-785 2-1"
DSA-1172 6-1" OSA-948/950 6-1"
DSA-812 4-1" DSA-1250 2-1"
III-27
m
-
,g:- l,t
.
TABLE III-5 (Continued)
s
"
' . ,
CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR SAMPLE .
'
_
HVAC Restraints.
5
'
Number-Diameter . Number-Diameter
Lof Anchors of Anchors
Restraint. Inspected Restraint Inspected
I 'DSA-863- 3-1" DSA-1251 2-1"
DSA-1240 3-5/8" 'DSA-431 5-1"
1-1"
,
~
DSA-758- 2-1"
,
9
s
T
W
g
..
+ ,,
e
4
%
. III-28
( .- -
,
,
p_
TABLE-III-6
,
. HVAC INSPECTION SAMPLES AND OBSERVATIONS
Suports/ Restraints
Support / Restraint Location Observations
s *
DSA 314 -Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
DSA 016 Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
DSA 1209 Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
DSA 1210* ' Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
DSA7q8 Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
.
DSA 1211 Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
-DSA 464 '
Aux. Bldg. Brace angles exceed dwg.
tolerance by 1 and 2 degrees.
(No structural significance.)
DSA 1166 Aux. Bldg. Acceptable
i
DSA'1167 Aux. Bldg. Extension of vertical member
past brace was 3-1/2 inches.
Dwg. shows 1 inch. (No
structural significance.)
DSR 277 ESF Bldg. Acceptable
DSA'278 ESF Bldg. Acceptable
'
DSA 403 ESF Bldg. Acceptable
r.
v
@
III-29
_
u , _.m., .,-.,um- -,- -,m _~ ,e -. -e.-e. r.,
9 ,. .- -g ,m-p
p ,
91 TABLE III-7
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SAMPLE
Equipment Acceptable *
Chemical & Volume Control Charging Pumps CHS*P3A, P38, P3C
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps FWA* PIA, PIB, P2
Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps. QSS*P1A,PIB .X
. Quench Spray Pumps' -QSS*P3A,P3B
'
- '-
. Safety Injection (SI) Pumps SIH*P1A, PIB
.SI Pump Cooling Pumps CCI*P1A, PIB
. Boric Acid Transfer Pumps CHS*P2A, P2B
Volume Control Tank CHS*TK2 X
Boric Acid Tank CHS*TK5A X
Boric Acid Tank CHS*TK58
Component Cooling Heat Exchanger CCP*ElB X
Charging Pump Cooling Pumps CCE*P1A, P1B
-Charging Pump Cooling Surge Tank CCE*TK1 X
: Service Water MCC & Rod Area Booster Pumps SWP*P3A, P3B
' Engineered Safety Features Air HVQ* ACUS-1A,1B X
Conditioning Units
Control Building Chilled Water Pumps
_
HVK*P1A, PIB
* Note: All components were observed having installation deficiencies
unless stated as " acceptable."
III-30
m
tr- ,
:s
_
f: t - -
~ TABLE III-8
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT = SAMPLE
Equipment
Boric Acid-Transfer Pumps- CHS*P2A, P2B
,
-.
. ESF. Building-Ventilation Fan' HVQ*FNSA
,, Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps. SFC* PIA, PIB
, Quench Spray Pumps- QSS*P3A,P3B
- CVCS Charging Pumps- CHS*P3A, P3B
Diesel; Generator Building Ventilation Fan HVP*FNIC
Auxiliary.Fsedwater Pumps FWA*P1A, P1B, P2
Residual Heat Removal Pumps RHS* PIA; PIB
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pumps' .EGF*P1A, P1B, Plc, PID,
Service Water Pumps. SWP*P1A, PIB
4
Safety Injection Pumps SIH*P1A, PIB.
'
Contro1' Building Chilled Water Pumps .HVK*P1A, PIB
.
t
D
N -
9
%
-N
,
-
III-31
1
,
-IV. WELDING AND NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (NDE)
A. Objective
The objective of the subject appraisal was to determine the licensee
effectiveness and program adequacy in controlling and performing activi-
ties in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) commit-
ment, design requirements and applicable codes and standards. An addi-
tional objective was to determine if the personnel involved in welding
and NDE activities were adequately trained and qualified to perform
their duties in accordance with applicable specifications, codes and
standards.
.B. Discussion
A detailed inspection of welding and NDE activities was conducted. This
inspection included welds in both ASME Code and AWS Code related areas.
The ASME Code area included piping, pipe supports, and pressure vessels.
The AWS area included electrical, instrumentation and HVAC. supports,
structural beam clip welds, component cooler beam stiffener support
welds, refueling cavity liner welds, fire protection pipe support welds,
HVAC duct welds, and refueling cavity support stand welds. The NDE
portion of the inspection included review of site and vendor radiographs,
NDE procedures, observation of FQC inspectors in the course of NDE
examinations and review of NDE equipment calibrations.
The inspected welds were representative of the licensee's site _ welding
and vendor supplied equipment in terms of welding processes used,
materials welded, various welding craft conducting welding operations
and existing weld-joint configurations.
During the inspection of NDE activities, the NRC Construction Appraisal
Team (CAT) inspectors reviewed samples of current radiographic film and
radiographic film in final storage in the vault at the licensee's
facility. In addition, the NRC CAT inspectors reviewed samples of film
which was stored at vendor facilities which was made available for this
inspection. No significant problems were identified in the area of
field and shop welding and NDE activities. However, several discrepan-
cies were identified in the areas of field and vendor NDE, and detailed
discussion concerning these discrepancies is included later in this
>
section.
The welding and NDE activities were examined in order to ascertain
compliance with the governing construction codgs and specifications.
This effort involved the review and inspection of the following areas
and contractors:
Field Fabrication and Contractors
Field fabrication of piping and pipe supports (Main Steam, Reactor
*
Coolant, Feedwater, and Safety Injection) - Stone and Webster
Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
i
IV-1
!~ >
- ,-
F
Electrical install tion and electrical supports - SWEC
Instrumentation tutIng installation and instrumentation supports - SWEC
Heating, Ventilatics and Air Conditioning installation and supports -
Northeast Ventilation Company (NEVCO)'
Structural steel fabrication and erection - SWEC
Fuel storage pool and refueling cavity liner fabrication - PX Engineer-
ing shop fabrication and SWEC installation
Mechanical equipment installation - SWEC
Fire protection system fabrication and installation - SWEC
1. Piping
a. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT reviewed activities related to fabrication and SWEC
installation of piping fabricated by TUBECO and Southwest Fabrica-
ting and Welding. These activities included visual inspection of
welds, welding procedures and welder qualifications documentation.
b. Inspection Findings
Detailed visual inspection was performed on portions of the Reactor
Coolant loop piping, Feedwater, Main Steam, Safety Injection and
other seismically designed piping. Approximately 800 large diameter
butt welds and 600 small diameter socket welds were inspected. See
Tables IV-1 and IV-2 for details. In addition to visual inspection,
the items listed in Table IV-2 were reviewed for correctness and
completeness of documentation. During this review, special atten-
tion was given to verifying that the required nondestructive exami-
nation had been performed, that the materials used met tensile and
impact test requirements, and that SWEC welders were properly quali-
fied at the time the welds were made. In addition, six SWEC welding
procedures which were widely used on piping systems were reviewed.
During the visual inspection of the piping welds, no unacceptable
welds were observed. During the review of documentation of those
items listed on Table IV-2, it was observed that one butt weld had
been allowed to cool at a rate in excess of that permitted by Code.
N&D 11791 was generated to address this finding. It was also
observed that there were code-related editorial errors on three of
the Welding Procedure Specifications which were reviewed. E&DCRs
41852, 41853 and 41854 were generated to address these observations.
During documentation review, the NRC CAT reviewed approximately 180
welder qualification records for eighteen welders, and verified that
- each welder had remained qualified from the date of his original
qualification to the date that he welded, as recorded in the docu-
mentation.
IV-2
, . -.- - .- .. - -. . .
' '
, .
.
'
,
- .
,
.
No' : problems were identified in the' area of- inspected welding activi-
ties. .
i
. .
,
- c. Conclusions
*
With'the exception.of the e'ditorial erro's r in three welding
. procedures and excessive cool down rate involving one weld...the ;
inspected piping welds'were found to' comply with the applicable
codes and standards,
i
2. -Tanks, Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchangers
a .' . Inspection Scope
~
c
~The.NRC CAT reviewed-activities related to the fabrication of twelve
-
-tanks,1 pressure vessels and heat exchangers manufactured by various
i- vendors as shown in Table IV-3. These activities included visual:
>
inspection of' completed welds, including ASME pressure boundary and
. -
support; welds.
~ b. Inspection Findings
.0ffthe. twelve,.one tank was found:to be acceptable, three had under-
-
, sized welds on supports only, eight'had undersized welds on nozzles,.
<
manways'and supports,.and one had an unacceptable weld surface con-
dition. These-items were identified for resolution by the N&Ds
listed on Table IV-3.
. Based'on the'NRC CAT findings-regarding the support welds,.a Report
fof a' Problem (ROAPL 85012 was issued and an additional52 vendor
i: supplied Category I tanks, pressure vessels :and heat exchangers
were-inspected by SWEC. Of these, 32 had fillet welds' undersized by,
one-sixteenth to one-eighth inch. . MMDs were written to cover 14 of
[ these items prior to the end of the inspection. SWEC indicated that
they.would inspect all nozzle and manwayLjoint configuration fillet ~
t
: welds on Category I tanks, pressure vessels and heat exchangers and
"
C
issued ROAP 85008-to accomplish this task.
1
c. Conclusions
,
~
-
With the exception-of the identified deficiencies involving under--
- sized fillet welds in supports,:in nozzles and manways on ASME Code -
fabricated tanks and heat exchangers, the tank and heat exchanger
~
,
, welds were found to comply with applicable codes and standards.
,
3.-~ Piping Supports and Restraints
l: -
a. Inspection Scope.
.
The NRC~ CAT-reviewed activities related to fabrication and instal-
,
lation of' piping supports and restraints manufactured by Corner'and
Lada and. supporting steel installed by SWEC. These activities
included inspection ~of welds and general configuration of supports
- and res',raints.
.
.
- IV-3
- !
,
.m'
-
,--,-,--,,U.n#w.
'
n e+ -- , - . , . ,,,-.E- ., , , m,,-. 4y-, . . . , - , - - , ,y 4 ~ e v E,e , ~ m , y r ,+, , +-v+--~,w- u
..
i
'b. ' Inspection Findings
-
-
A sample.of-35 supports and restraints was selected based on con-
figurations-whose complexities-provided fabrication difficulties.
These; supports were:then visually inspected for weld size and
appearance to determine conformance to engineering drawing require-
-
ments. The supports examined are shown in Table IV-4 and. included
'
- .approximately 400 welds. -A large number of skewed joint fillet
. welds were found by the.NRC CAT inspectors to be undersized on the
obtuse-angle side.of the connection. .No undersized welds were dis-
*
covered on the'. acute side'of such connections. A second problem was
. observed when the. skewed angle exceed 135*. In this case the engi-
neering drawings required that the toe of one of the members being
joined be cut back so that the required fillet weld size could'be
0
~obtained. Two cases were identified in which the member had been
_inadaquately cut back and did not produce the required fillet weld
size. As'a. result of the NRC_ CAT. findings, SWEC inspected 80 addi-
tional skewed configuration supports and found 41 supports which had
undersized fillet welds on the obtuse angle side.
SWEC analyzed the skewed connections generically for connections
welded on the heel (acute angle side) and two sides, taking_no
-
'
: credit;for any weld which might be~on the toe of the connection.
Calculation 12179-NP(F)-4046-ZC demonstrated that as the connection
, angle becomes more obtuse, the strength of the joint increases due
.to an increase in length of the two side welds,-and that'at angles
.of' greater than 130*,'.the skewed connection made with only the two
side welds will be stronger than a three-sided weld connection at
90*. : Based on the above review of the as-built condition, connec-
tions which were welded on either three or four sides were found to
<
be acceptable.by-SWEC engineering' evaluation.
'
'
SWEC review of skewed connections welded only on the toe and. heel
side of the connection; indicated that.these connections would have
to be inspected and evaluated on a individual basis.. This evalua-
tion will also include evaluation of possible insufficient cut back-
on connections made at' angles greater than 135*.
In addition to the undersized welds found on skewed connections, 16
.other undersized welds were observed. These items were identified
#'
and either repaired or evaluated by engineering for disposition as
noted.in Table IV-4. Of these welds, one type was observed to have
generic. implications. The others were found.to be isolated cases.
=
: Support SIH-1PSR-581 consisted-of a U-shaped-steel flat bar wrapped
1
around:the pipe. This support was found not to have the required
-
: full penetration weld, and several similar supports were observed on
>
* ;the SIH (High Pressure Safety Injection). system. Investigation
-. indicated that.this= support' design was unique to one design group
- -
tand only 21 supports of this type had been detailed. None of these
supports had the required full penetration weld. N&D's listed in
Table-IV-4 were generated for these nonconformances.
.In addition:to the above supports and restraints, an additional 60
, supports with approximately 800 welds were visually examined. No
significant defects were found. See Table IV-5 for details.
m-
IV-4
- .
$
_
c. Conclusions
With the' exception of those items previously discussed piping
supports and. restraint welds were found to comply with the appli-
cable codes and standards. No other problems were identified in
the area of. inspected welding activities.
4. Peactor Internals
a. . Inspection Scope
Approximately 140 welds made by the vendor (Westinghouse-Pensacola)
and at the site by SWEC under Westinghouse supervision.were visually
. inspected. These welds represented four joint configurations. The
site welder qualifications were reviewed. A special mock up test
assembly used for further welder training and determination of
actual throat dimensions was reviewed.' The applicable site weld
procedure specification (WPS) was reviewed as were typical site -
filler metal issue slips.
b. Inspection Findings and Conclusions
No problems were identified in the area of inspected welding activi--
ties which were fcund to meet the applicable requirements.
5. Reactor Internals Support Stands
a. Inspection Scope
A visual inspection was made of this seismically designed QA CAT 2
fabrication which was designed to Appendix G of ASME Section VIII.
It was penetrant tested to Section VIII and the final inspection was
performed at the vendor's (Portland Engineering) shop. In addition,
the SWEC M090 equipment specifications for the supports were
reviewed. Random areas were checked magnetically for presence of
materials other than austenitic stainless steel and the weld metal
was checked for the presence of delta ferrite.
b. Inspection Findings
Visual examinations of the welds indicated weld splatter and an
unusual-appearance of the GTA welds at the edge of shielded metal
arc (SMA) welded joints. The licensee initiated N&D 11,460 which
adequately addressed the findings.
c. Conclusions
Except as noted welds met specified acceptance criteria.
6. Refueling Cavity Liner Fabrication
a .' Inspection Scope
The refueling cavity liner and spent fuel pool liners were a combi-
nation of vendor (PX Engineering) supplied panels and SWEC site
IV-5
t.
o
. installation. The shop fabrication was in accardance with SWEC M110
which called for radiography of some of the butt welds. Site
installation was to SWEC M952 and called for visual inspection and
air leak testing of the finished liner. The NRC CAT visually
inspected.approximately 100 feet of the refueling cavity liner
welds, verified the presence of delta ferrite and checked for the
presence of non-austenitic materials. The ladder and bolted con-
nections were also checked for use of non-austenitic materials.
Review of PX Engineering radiographic film (discussed later) indi-
cated unacceptable film quality, but noted this was previously
identified by SWEC vendor inspection on N&D A-006 which was disposi-
tioned to " accept as is" and voided the. radiographic examination.
Approximately 30 inspection reports indicating the results of the
air leak test of the finished fabrication were reviewed.
b. Inspection Findings
The. visual inspection of the welds indicated no rejectable indica-
tions and the welds contained adequate levels of delta ferrite.
Review of N&D A-006 indicated a lack of explicit engineering
explanation on the voiding of RT requirements. The licensee
-responded to this comment with the issuance of E&DCR T-J-03875 which
makes the necessary specification changes to M910.
c. Conclusions
Welds met acceptance criteria.
7. Electrical Panel Attachment Welds
a .' Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT visually inspected approximately 240 panel attachment
welds for compliance with the specified criteria. The applicable
WPS document for this fillet welding was reviewed.
b. Inspection Findings
- The welds exhibited acceptable size, configuration (shape) and met
minimum drawing requirements for length and spacing.
- . c. Conclusions
- Welds met acceptance criteria.
I 8. Electrical Support Welds
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 434 electrical support welds were visually inspected
for compliance with the specified criteria. The qualification
records of 9 welders were reviewed. The applicable WPS documents
were also reviewed.
IV-6
l
.-
_ _-
,
1
J
I. b Inspection findings
The;inspecte'd welds met drawing requirements and exhibited accept-
able shape and post weld finishing.
c. Conclusions
-
Welds met: acceptance criteria.
9. : Instrumentation Supports
a. Inspection-Scope-
~
'Approximately 130 welds, involving supports, tubing blocks', instru--
. ment stands, and' standard wall mounting brackets were visually
inspected to ascertain. compliance with the specified acceptance
criteria. Applicable welding procedures,'. filler metal issue slips,
and welder qualification records for 11. welders were reviewed.
~ '
~
- b .- Inspection Findings
The welds inspected met the acceptance criteria. In the process of
reviewing welder qualifications-it was noted that welders required
to utilize F43_SMAW filler metal were qualified using F42. filler-
metal which currently is an unacceptable ASME Section IX practice.
However, review of ibis subject with the licensee and SWEC indicated
that the. edition of'Section IX in force at the time of qualification
-
. permitted this practice.
'In the process of reviewing _the filler metal issue slips it was
apparent that designations other than that shown in-the WPS docu-
ments are used for non-ferrous metals. This lead to an expanded.
Lfiller. metal control inspection which-is discussed in paragraph.15
of this section.
'
c. Conclusions
Welds met acceptanc. criteria.
'10. HVAC Duct and Duct Support Welds
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 133_HVAC duct and duct support welds made by NEVC0
were visually inspected for compliance to welding specification and
, -. inspection criteria. Also reviewed were NEVC0 welding procedures-
'
qualified to AWS 09.1 and their structural welding procedure utiliz-
-
zing AWS D1.1 prequalified procedures. The NEVC0 welder performance
qualifications records of five welders were reviewed.as were QC weld
records and filler metal issue-slips.
IV-7
~
L
m
n+.
u
.L
'
,
b .' Inspection: findings-
- '
<
'Special-efforts were made by.the NRC CAT to verify the required
'
.
removal of the galvanizing for all structural AWS D1.1-HVAC support
welds. This.was.a SWEC specification requirement,.but no inspection
-
. hold point was setup to check for zinc removal. Removal-of zine was
checked in the final QC inspection.
I The NRC CAT noted that the GMAW-S sheet metal ~ welding procedures , ,WP-24, WP-28,.and WP-29, specified ER80S-D2 (formerly ER70S-1B) weld. -
'
rod. The utilized amperage and voltage ranges for the' filler metal-
-
F size exceeded.the, range for the.short-circuiting mode of metal
transfer. The yield strength.of the utilized filler metal (over
-
95KSI) greatly exceeded the base metal properties. The licensee
' ~
.. response to the.first. concern was:that the usability of the ER80S-D2
_
exceeded that of the_ unalloyed ER705-2 or S-3 and that the high
.e '
strength was not considered detrimental due to the limited. loading
on the, sheet metal welds. The mode of metal transfer question was
- resolved by discussion with NEVC0 personnel who all indicated that
the parameters actually' utilized were within the short-circuiting
,
range. This was confirmed by visual inspection of completed welds.
J
,
c. Conclusions
The inspected welds'were found to conform to the applicableLspecifi-
cations, codes and standards, and the filler metal and mode-of metal
transfer questions were adequately answered.
11. Component Cooler Support Welds
la. ; Inspection Scope
Design modifications for the subject ASME Section III, NFS suppart
(CH-CCP-SPIA) requiring plate beam stiffner welding was underway
.which permitted visual observations of.preweld cleaning, layout,
_
fitup and visual inspection of approximately 100 welds.-in accordance
with. Technique Sheet W2N-1. Review was made of the welding proce-
. dure,. welder qualification records and filler metal issue control.
b.- Inspection results
No. problems were identified -in the area ' inspected.
-
c. Conclusions
Welds met acceptance criteria.
12. Fire Protection-Piping System
a. Inspection Scope
"
< Visual inspection was made of._approximately 30 field welds. Six of
which were in a Class 2 piping portion of the system. The inspec-
ition records and surveillance. records for the inspected welds were
also reviewed.
IV-8
(
.q-
p p
b. -Inspection results
No problems.were identified in the area inspected.
c. Conclusions
Welds met acceptance criteria.
13. Structural Steel Welding
a. Inspection Scope
Approximately 39 beam clip angle welds were visually inspected for
conformance to drawings, specifications, and codes and standards
requirements.
b. Inspection Findings
The NRC CAT inspectors found that beam clip angle welds for slotted
and.non-slotted clips did not meet drawing requirments for fillet
sizes and number of sides welded, due to a conflict between the
" typical connection detail" on drawing ES-31J and special detail
"EH" on this drawing. This resulted in issuance of R0AP 85013 and
N&D 11973. For additional details see Section V.B.2.
-Two fillet welds were also found to be undersized. The licensee-
issued UNSAT IR's S-5A01208 and S-5A01209 to address the undersized
fillet welds on the-neutron shield surge tank platform and cubicle
"A" platform, respectively.
c. Conclusions
Except as noted, welds met' acceptance criteria.
14. Welding Preheat
a. Inspection Scope
In the review of welding specifications and procedures, it was noted
that a variety of preheating rules were applied for various
seemingly identical structural type weldments. This finding neces-
sitated an in depth study of the methods of specifying and control-
ling preheat.
b. Inspection Findings
Preheat rules are shown in WPS technique sheets (e.g., W200C-W2N,
-
#
W31.1-01, and W1.1-01) and in SWEC specification M968. These
rules all relate to structural welding. An attempt was made to
utilize the complicated rules of 831.1-73 in the W31.1-01 document
and the AWS D1.1 rules in W1.1-01. The SWEC rules were found to be
unnecessarily confusing to all personnel.
IV-9
4 -
. _ _ ..
The actual method used in field fabrication was witnessed to be as
follows: The welders are given copies of the technique sheets with
their filler metal issue slip and at the same time _are given
Tempilstiks to be used for preheat and maximum interpass temperature
checks. .The welding supervisors determine which Tempilstiks to be
issued. QC does not include preheat as a hold point, but does check
preheat as a surveillance inspection (IR) item. The surveillance
inspection reports rarely indicated the temperature observed, but
rather indicated "S" for satisfactory (meets technique sheet
requirements). A large number of.IR's were reviewed to verify that
preheat is one of the criteria checked.
The B31.1-73 " Rules for Preheat and PWHT", Table 131, permit the
. preheat for socket, fillet and seal welds to be based on the throat
thickness of the weld. This approach is reiterated in W31.1-01 and
W200C-W2N. Discussions with site personnel (Welding Engineering,
QA, QC, welding supervisors and welders) indicated that they base
-preheat on the thickest part welded which is the AWS D1.1 approach
and the metallurgically sound approach.
'Part of the confusion in the preheat rules is the inclusion of
materials which are not used or have extremely limited use, such as
A572 Grades 55 to 65 and AWS Groups 4 & 5. These materials appeared-
in W1.1.-01.- In this case there are three sets of rules where only
one is required. In the case of W200C-W2N there are six sets of
rules where only one or two are required and again the rules are
based on throat thickness not base metal thickness.
In summary the inspection indicated the following:
1. All interviewed personnel stated that they are committed to use
preheat based on the thickness of the thickest part to be
welded and not on the throat thickness of the weld.
2. All interviewed personnel indicated that thicknesses over one
and one-half inches-required a minimum preheat of 175 F.
3. In all cases reviewed, the materials involved were ASME P-1 or
AWS D1.1 Groups I, II, or III (Except for a specific case of a
pipe whip restraint pad made of A514, but welded with preheat
and E7018 filler metal per E&DCR RM-1420S.)
' 4. In all cases reviewed, the sections requiring preheat were
welded with low hydrogen electrodes (E7018) which are kept in
portable electrode ovens after issuance for welding.
5. The licensee committed to review the various documents specify-
ing preheat for structural welds, incorporate the M968 preheat
requirement into the appropriate technique sheet and verify
that only the preheat (1) column is applicable in W1.1-01.
IV-10
. - - - . -
. - -
-_ -, . . . - .
;-
.
c. Conclusions
The NRC CAT considered this item resolved on the basis of the above
commitments and the NRC CAT inspection indicated that 175 F minimum
preheat is being used for thicknesses over one and one-half inches.
E&DCR FM-41-804 has been initiated to revise WPS W31.1 to specify
200 F preheat.
15. Filler Metal Control
a. Inspection Scope
It.was noted by the NRC CAT inspectors that the welding supervision
was utilizing filler metal issue slip identification that differed
from that shown on the welding technique sheets. .The scope of fil-
ler metal control inspections was expanded to include review of
welding technique sheets, purchase orders,.SWEC ME-xxx purchase
order specifications, review of CMTR's for filler metal, review of
the labeling of filler metal in the rod issue rooms, and cursory
review of approximately 18,000 filler metal issue slips.
b. Inspection Findings
The inspection indicated confusion in the use of filler metal
nomenclature. The following examples were noted:
W31.1-72 revised in 1983 specifies RCuNi 'to ME-110 whereas the
correct identification is ERCuNi'(which appears on the. flag
tags).
*
Technique Sheets called for "Chromenar 521" with no F number
where the proper identification from ME113 is'SFA5.28
ER905-B3L. -
Some purchase orders specified SFA filler metal to military
designations.
*
The filler metal stock sheets in Receiving QC indicated filler
metal by SFA and/or military designations.
Some filler metal issue slips utilized military designations
rather than SFA designations.
GTAW filler metal is contained in the Rod Issue stations in
bins labeled with military designations even though the filler
metal in the bins is flag tagged with the proper SFA designa-
tions.
The confusion in filler metal designations is basically limited to
non-ferrous materials. The filler metal CMTR's reviewed met appli-
, cable SWEC'and SFA requirements. The filler metal utilized for
those items checked met the correct chemistry with the exception of
one application. The issue slip M365475 called for ERNiCr-3 filler
metal whereas the technique sheet called for ERNiCrMo-3. An N&D was
IV-11
_
--. -_.
w
issued:to address this item. The licensee's response to the. filler
metal designation question was to point out that the tables-in the
Appendices of.the nickel alloy filler metal specifications show the
direct comparison of military and SFA designations. The NRC CAT
pointed out;that this was not the case for SFA 5.7 for copper
alloys.
,
c. Conclusions
This item was resolved on.the basis that the correct chemistry fil-
1er metal (tested to the correct requirements) was utilized for all
weldments except as noted (which is considered to be an isolated
case).
16. SWEC NDE Activities
a'. Inspection Scope
The NRC CAT reviewed 1663 films representing 90 SWEC field welds. A
total of 13 FQC NDE Level II Inspectors were observed and reviewed
in the process of conducting various examinations (i.e., penetrant
examinations, magnetic particle examinations, visual weia examin-
ations, and ultrasonic thickness determinations). The personnel
qualification records of nine inspectors were examined in detail.
The system for calibration of NDE equipment was reviewed and veri-
fied for 14 pieces of equipment. Table IV-6 lists vendor
radiographs reviewed.
b. Inspection Findings
Review of the film for 90 welds indicated that the radiographic
review did not identi.y defects in excess of that permitted by the
applicable standard in three of the welds. Although this represents
a small percentage of the 1663 films reviewed it represents 3.3%
based on number of welded joints. In addition to the finding
.results indicated in Table IV-7, there were several minor report form-
irregularities such as failure to check off " accept" or " reject",
incorrect dates on some forms and failure to note conditions affect-
ing subsequent radiographic interpretations.
Thirteen FQC NDE Level II personnel which included 2-PT, 2-MT, 3-UT
and 6-VT inspectors, were observed and evaluated for level of train-
ing, knowledge of SWEC NDE procedures, and conformance to applicable
codes and standards rules. The 13 FQC inspectors were judged to be
fully trained and cognizant in their area of expertise. Review of
personnel qualification record files of 10 FQC NDE inspectors indi-
cated conformance to SNT-TC-1A, ANSI, ASME, and SWEC procedure
requirements.
Evaluation of the calibration of NDE equipment indicated acceptabil-
ity in all cases except for the use of one UT thickness gauge.
U,ltrasonic procedure, QAD-9.52 Revision C dated 9/12/84 para. 5.2.2,
provided for a one point calibration only. It was discovered during
-a witness check of ultrasonic thickness on production pipe that an
error was made during the calibration for the test. The error was.
IV-12
<
~ .. ;-. - . . -- -. .- .
s
, .
approximately'7% and that coul'd lead to accepting rejectable condi-
'
tions. The error was detected by the NRC CAT inspector who asked
for verification by comparison'with a calibrated micrometer. : S&W
,
personnel repeated the error and decided to revise the procedure
with a.two point check to prevent reoccurrence.- Due to this finding
- 24 test records for work performed to the-one point procedure were ,
audited. It.was discovered that the inspectors had actually used
three points to verify their calibrations, in addition -SWEC -retested
~
'
20 welds and the results of the retest were acceptable.- QAD-9.52 ML
Revision A-was issued to require multipoint calibration.
'c. -Conclusions
E The three ' radiographically rejectable welds and other minor irregu-
,
larities indicated some inconsistancy involving interpretation and
>
completion of report forms.-
17. -Vendor NDE Activities
[ a. Inspection Scope
. The_NRC CAT visually inspected welds representing pressure vessels
. supplied by seven vendors as discussed in Section IV.B.2 and shown
on Table IV-3.- Radiographs representative of 30 vendor supplied
items were reviewed as shown in Table IV-6.
b. Inspection Findings
..
The vendor film review resulted in review of approximately 1735 feet -
of weld,-21 valves,14 forgings, six clevises, one. support cylinder,
- one diffuser, one pump body and one pump gland. . The film reviewed
was satisfactory except as noted. One vendor had film that was
, -rejectable on a film quality basis,~ but this was dispositioned to
represent unneeded and unrequired radiography in E&DCR FJ10978 and
.TJ03875. One film from one other vendor was rejectable because of
'
- film density.
$ 'c. Conclusions ! i_ The review of vendor radiography indicated acceptable technique and L interpretation except as shown in the notes to Table-IV-6. ! t l i,
'
b
'l
p I' l
.
..
IV-13
L
- ,_.._ . - _ . . - .
-
~ _ _ . . , . _ . . . _ _ . . - . . . . _ . _ .. ._. - ..-.,- -_ _ .--.---,. _- ,,__-- -,_. -
m
ju .
^
g-
'
,
' TABLE IV-1
' PIPE VISUALLY INSPECTED- >
1 PIECE-MARK. . SYSTEM ' PIPE-SIZE (Inches) MATERIAL
'
CDS-15-5-2-2A' CHILLED WATER- 8 . CARBON STEEL
CHS-4-3-2-3 CHEMICAL & VOLUME 3 STAINLESS STEEL
T
CHS-44-1-2-2: CHEMICAL &' VOLUME- 3, 2 STAINLESS STEEL
CHS-001-719-2 CHEMICAL'& VOLUME' -1 STAINLESS STEEL
CHS-002-198-2- CHEMI' CAL & VOLUME- 8 STAINLESS STEEL
DGS-6-1-1-4 REACTOR GAS DRAIN 4 STAINLESS STEEL
.SIL-1-1-3-2- SAFETY INJECTION. 8- STAINLESS STEEL
RSS-1-3-4-2- REACTOR C00LANT' 12 STAINLESS STEEL
RSS-15-4-4-2 REACTOR COOLANT 12 STAINLESS STEEL-
~MS-34-1-5-2A MAIN STEAM 30 CARBON STaEL-
'SFC-523-4-3-3- FUEL P0OL COOLING 10 STAINLESS STEEL
.. SI L-1-2-3-2 SAFETY ~ INJECTION 8 STAINLESS STEEL'.
FWS-22-6-1-2 FEEDWATER 16, 20 . CARBON STEEL.
IFWS-22-4-1-2 'FEEDWATER 20 CARBON STEEL
FWS-22-1-1-2 :FEEDWATER 20' CARBON STEEL
'FWS-22-2-1-2. FEEDWATER 20 - CARBON STEEL
-FWS-22-3-1-2 FEEDWATER 20 CARBON STEEL.
RSS-18-3-4-21- REACTOR COOLANT 10 STAINLESS STEEL
~CCE-502-1-2-3 COMPONENT C00 LING 2 COPPER-NICKEL-
CHS-002-208-3(2) CHEMICAL & VOLUME 2 STAINLESS STEEL
?CHS-18-6-2-2 CHEMICAL & VOLUME 4 STAINLESS STEEL'
-IV-14
'
,
_
TABLE IV-2
,
< PORTIONS OF PIPING SYSTEMS VISUALLY EXAMINED
.AND FOR WHICH DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED
ITEM. SYSTEM PIPE SIZE (Inches) DESCRIPTION
.
- SIH-507-1-1-1 SAFETY. INJECTION 6, 2 STAINLESS. STEEL
.
- SIH-507-2-1-li . SAFETY. INJECTION 6, 3/4 STAINLESS STEEL
. SIH-504-1-1-2 ' SAFETY INJECTION 4, 3/4 STAINLESS STEEL
- SIH-7-1-4-- SAFETY-INJECTION 4 -STAINLESS STEEL
- SIH-7-2-4-2. SAFETY INJECTION 4 STAINLESS STEEL
SIH-7-3-4-2 SAFETY INJECTION 4 STAINLESS STEEL
- SIH-7-4-4-2- SAFETY INJECTION 4 STAINLESS' STEEL
L - SIH-7-5-4-2 SAFETY INJECTION 4' STAINLESS STEEL
CI-SIH-507. SAFETY INJECTION 6,'2, 3/4 STAINLESS STEEL
CP-408-500 SAFETY INJECTION 2 STAINLESS STEEL-
CP-407-252- SAFETY INJECTION 2 STAINLESS STEEL
- CP-407-027 SAFETY INJECTION 2, 3/4, 1/2 -STAINLESS STEEL
- CI-SIH-504 SAFETY INJECTION 4, 2, 3/4 STAINLESS' STEEL-
'
1
CI-SIH-7 SAFETY. INJECTION 4, 3/4 STAINLESS STEEL
. MSS-22-2-5-3. MAIN STEAM -30 CARBON STEEL
~
M'SS-22-1-5-3: -MAIN STEAM 30 . CARBON' STEEL-
MSS-35-1-5-2A MAIN STEAM 30- CARBON STEEL
MSS-35-2-5-2 MAIN STEAM 30 CARBON STEEL
'
MSS-35-1-5-2B MAIN STEAM 30 -CARBON STEEL
- MSS-503-1-1-2 MAIN STEAM- 30 CARBON STEEL
1
-MSS-503-2-1-2 MAIN STEAM 30 CARBON STEEL
! MSS-503-3-1-2A MAIN STEAM 30- CARBON STEEL
L
-
b IV-15 C_
y,. . . ._ . -. . -. - - . . . - - -. -. . .- . - p '
,
-
TABLE IV-3 :
TANKS,' PRESSURE VESSELS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS
VISUALLY INSPECTED AGAINST DRAWING REQUIREMENTS
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM INSPECTED MANUFACTURER FINDINGS
-(CHS-TK2)' VOLUME CONTROL _ TANK LAMC0 INDIKTRIES, INC. Acceptable
(CHS-E7) LETDOWN REHEAT-HEAT EXCHANGER ATLAS INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING (1)
_(CCP-TK1)'. COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK
-
P.X. ENGINEERING CO. INC. (2)
E
P.X. ENGINEERING.CO. INC. (3)
-
(CCE-TK1). CHARGING PUMP COOLING' SURGE
.
TANK .
'
.
'(EGF-TK-2A) GENERATOR FUEL OIL DAY TANK P.X. ENGINEERING CO. INC. (4) ,
'
' '
(3CHS-E2). VERTICAL LETDOWN HEAT JOSEPH OAT C0. INC. (5)
EXCHANGER
'
-(CCI-TK1)~ COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK P.X. ENGINEERING C0. INC. (6)
'(SIL-TK10) ACCUMULATOR TANK SOUTHWEST FAB. AND WELDING CO. _(7) _
'
-(3SFC-E1A) FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT AMETEK, INC. (8)
EXCHANGER
(RSS-ElB) RECIRCULATING COOLER ~ HEAT' JOSEPH OAT CO. INC. (9)
EXCHANGER.
'
L(RHS-E18)' RESIDUAL-HEAT REMOVAL HEAT JOSEPH OAT'CO.-INC.- (10)
EXCHANGER
=(CHS-TK5A)(11) BORIC ACID TANK. RECO INDUSTRIES, INC. (11)
NOTES
.
(1).-Fillet welds on supports undersized. (N&D 11641-Accept-as-is)
(2) Undersized fillet welds on all nozzles, manways and supports. (N&D 11910),
(3)' Undersized fillet welds on'manway, one. coupling and'some supports. (N&D 11912)
(4) Undersized fillet welds on 7 nozzles and portions of supports. (N&D 11914)
(5) Undersized, fillet welds.on 4 nozzles and on supports. (N&D 11915)' '
~
-
~
.
'(6) Undersized fillet welds on manway, 5 nozzles and anchor pads. (N&D 11911)
'
(7) Undersized fillet welds on anchor ring. (N&D 11994)
-(8)'fundersized fillet welds 1on supports, overground base metal at one nozzle.
.(N&D 11913).
~'
.
:(9) Undersized fillet welds on 3 nozzles, 2 saddles, support brackets and
unacceptable weld surface condition on one reinforcing pad. (N&D 11918)
7 -(10) Undersized. fillet welds on one nozzle reinforcing pad weld and one support-
- .
bracket.-(N&D.11919)
'
(11) Undersized fillet welds on anchor pads. (N&D 12167)
p-
IV-16
.
--w,. w--s -- s +,.y.-,-- . , , ,-c e yv- *-cer, -+--,wm1---, ,- -rm -. - - - . - , - . , -%. if-%. -y-. ,
- - . . ._ - . - . . .. - .. . . - .
m
.
~ TABLE IV-4
,
' SUPPORTS EXAMINED IN DETAIL AGAINST DRAWINGS
>
: SUPPORT' FINDINGS- SUPPORT- FINDINGS-
MSS-1PSR-122 (1) SIL 1PSR-028 (2)
RHS-1PSR-014: BDG-1PSR-030,
'CHS-2-PSSP-420 CDS-2PSR-001
CDS-2P'SA-003' (3) CCP-2PSR-062
.
~.
RHS-IPSSP-405- '(4) SWP-2PSSP-409/410- '(5).
-
CHS-2 PSST-282 (7) CHS-2PSSP-426/427 (6)
^
- SFC-3PSR-147 SFC-3PSR-126
' FWS-4PSR-003 ~ FWS-4PSR-053
- FWS-4PSR-050 (8) - MSS-3PSR-11
:
MSS-4PSR-019 (9) FWA-4PSR-245 ,
:' RSS-4 PSST-140 SWP-4PSSH-119 (10)
-
. RSS-4 PSST-031- RSS-4 PSST-134
SVV-4PSSP-034 (11) FWS-4PSR-051-
'
-
FWS-4PSR-001 FWS-4PSR-018- (12)
CP-379008-H006 CP-379008-H005
CP-407018-H002 (13) RCS-1PSSR-1093
-
: SIR'-IPSR-581 -(14) . BRS-2PSSH-006
- QSS-4 PSST-115
- ,
i , F- ! i r.
-
IV-17
,
6
, .i%4 ....,-.--e , , ,.-.,-,y-, , . - . , .,,-ir , _ - ,v. ,,.-.-.~4,, - 4,,m.. , ,m. - ~ , , - - , _ .w-,-*-. , , -.
m ,
TABLE IV-4 (Continued)
SUPPORTS' EXAMINED IN DETAIL AGAINST DRAWINGS
1 NOTES
'(1) Seven obtuse skewed fillet weld's undersized. (N&D 11527)
(2) Two fillet welds more than 1/16" undersized. (IR#P5A91086)
(3) Two skewed fillet welds undersized. (N&D 11527)
-(4)'Oneskewedfilletweldundersized. (N&D 11527)
(5)--Two skewed fillet welds undersized. (N&D 11527)
(6) Three 6 inch long welds short by 1/2 inch. (IR# PSA91101-repaired)
(7) One fillet weld undersized. (IR# PSA91101-repaired)
-(8) Eight inch long flare bevel weld short by 1/4 inch and weld not filled to
flush. (IR# PSA91144 and IR#PSA91115-repaired)
(9) Two welds rotated 90 from location on drawing, one skewed fillet weld
undersized.- (N&D 11527)
-(10) Three skewed fillet welds undersized. (N&D11527)
(11) Skewed fillet weld undersized. (N&D 12178)
(12) Extra plate-cn support, 8 seal welds where drawing requires fillet welds.
(N&D11543)
(13) 0ne skewed fillet weld undersized. (N&D 11543)
(14) Full penetration welds required. Partial penetration obtained. (N&D 11652
and 11653-Generic problem with 21 brackets)
i ,
IV-18
E
_ _
, , ~ . , ..-._an -sw ,. . ..a a _, wa .s.
*
1
, .
.,
.
.
_
TABLE ~IV-5
SUPPORTS WHICH WERE' VISUALLY EXAMINED
'
,
'
: SFC-3RSS-123- MSS-4PSSP-401- - MSS-4PSSP-400
'
-CCF-1PSR-016 CCP-2PSR-100 - CCP-2PSSP-405
'
CCP-2PSR-003L SIH-2PSSP-012 - CCP-3PSR-008-
- ~
RSS-4PSSH-141-2- -
SIL-3PSR-051 MSS-4PSSH-128
- CCP-2PSA-010- CCP-2PSR-009 CCP-2 PSST-024
. CCP-2PSA-010 CCP-2PSR-076 CCP-2PSR-070
.
- .
- CCP-2 PSST-077- CCP-2PSR-071 CCP-2PSA-019
~
CHS-3PSR-090 CHS-3PSA-037 CHS-2PSR-091
-SFC-2PSA-026 CDS-2PSR-004~ CVS-2PSR-091
,
' CP-355700-H004 CP-355700-H007
.
9
.
4
i
A.
'
'.
i i
a k'
i >
_
IV-19-
i- .
.1. ' ?
, , , . . , - . . . > . ....,J,..,---..,e .,-~--..........__,,,_v._~--.,.,
^
,.-,_..,,m,, -, , ,. - . , ' . -
-
,. , . . - . . _ _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
TABLE IV-6 -
VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
.Clevices
'
. .
.. ..
Pumps Forgings l Feet
-. Contractor' ' Welds Valves- ' Castings of Weld Film Results- Notes
'
! Permutit . -6 -- --
11 52 A
:Ametek Div. 6 -- -- --
-40 A
Schutte &
-Koerting
.
~ Bingham .. 5 -- -- --
108 A
.' Williamette' .
= REC 01 6 -- -- --
39 A
,
'Walworth 3 valves-
'
-- -- :-- 142 A
Graver. -- -- --
1089 .206- A
' Joseph Oat- 7 -- --
20- 40 --
(1) 4
' -
'PX Engrg. 12- --
134 75 --
(2)-
IIT/Grinnel --- 2 -- --
38 A
Wisconsin. - -- --
1 --
36 A
: Centrifugal ,
-Dresser' 5 ~-- -- --
19 A
~ Industries
Gould' Pumps 1 body 1 gland --
-43 A
: Anchor --
2 valves -- --
110 A
: Darling ,
,
,
LTubeco 17 -- -- --
180 A t
.
Southwest- 60 -- ---
.
'
--
750 --
(3)
Welding
YUBA Heat- -- -- --
100 100 ~A
Transfer
'LAMCO
-
-- --
6~ --
118 A
; Rotterdam -- --~ --
80- .60 A
Gary Tool: -- '-- 14 --
28 A
' '
Texas Pipe '-- -- --
15 13 A
,- -
IV-20
. _ . . _ . . _ . . , ._.- . . . - - . . . , _ . . . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ -_ ,__ _
'
, .~ - . . ~ . . . _ - --.- . _ - . - . . - . - .- - _ . . . - .
,
/C} _
-
.
~
[ TABLE.IV-6 (Continued)
; VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS' REVIEWED
.
'
,
<
-CleUicesi
'
Pumps : Forgings . Feet .
-Contractor Welds ' Valves
. - Castings of Weld Film Results Notes.
-Pro Fabi -- --- -- 100 93 --
(4)
Rockwell 15 -- -- --
. 143 --
(5)-
1 Westinghouse! -- 1 valve -- -- 48 'A
-(Cheswick)_
s Haywood1 Tyler -- Diffuser -- --
9 A
' Pacific V'alves - -
-2 valves - - - - --
14 A
Henry Pra'tt 40
-
- --
24"_ Disc -- --- A
Sulzer 1- MSIV --
15 '12 A
Reco-Koch- 8 --- -- 6 4 A i
Fisher- ---
-1 valve -- --
25 A
' Controls '
/
.
Leslie Co. --
1 valve -- --
100 A
' Carrier - -- -- -- -- --- --
(6)
t-
NOTES
. - .
A : . Acceptable - meets Codes and Standards requirement
'. (1) . . View 2 of. nozzle "A" on; the Letdown Heat Exchanger showed a _ linear
indication 1/2 to-3/4 inch long which was not recorded on the reader. sheet.
~
_
~(2) - Reader sheets for acid tank and caustic tank were in the wrong film
packets; unsatisfactory radiographs on the pool liner and the storage liner -
'were-determined by engineering to be unnecessary and were deleted from the
Lspecification by._ E&DCR number F-J-10978 and number T-J-03875.
;
'
(3) - Several Eradiographs displayed indications requiring re-radiographing or
,o visual examination to confinnEacceptability, i.e. , weld '3, SW-4 - an indi-
cation with_ a cracklike appearance was re-radiographed at various angles -
and found to be a surface condition.
(4) -HMany film above 4.0 density causing interpretation difficulties even with
- -high intensity viewing. .N8D 11,953 was issued to correct.this condition. j
_
. 7
IV-21
-
4
, , 4.- - ,, m- , ,_. ,. n,%,,....e -
..,_,_w. .,_,,-._m._,-- . ~ , - - - , - - - . . _ , . _ - . . , _ _ _ . - . , . ~ , _ . . . - . . - . _ - . - . .
'
TABLE'IV-6.(Continued)
-VENDOR RADIOGRAPHS REVIEWED
.
'(5) . Indication noted on one film: Re-radiography using special technique-
' determined that' the indication is an ID surface condition. Acceptable.
.(6)- Film not available for review. ' Paper work found to be acceptable.
,
, i: ,
:
f i J
, IV-22
b
;_-.- --
q 7 -
t
4,
'-
i 1
'
. ,e *2 ,
a .C
[t TABLE'IV-7 h
' '
i SWECRADIOGRAPHICFILMREVIEWRESULTS
--
A. Of the 93 field fabricated welds reviewed'the following radiographic con-
cerns were noted: ,
'
1. Weld 3-HVU-042-3-2 CI HV0-1, FW-1: aligned porosity view 56-70. I . R.
P5A01490 was: issued for repair welding.
2. WeldCI-RCS-513,$FW1:' rejected .for lingar indication-in excess of code
in one area. N&D11,f43was'it, sued; repair. p
3. Weld CI'RSS-501, FW-66; rejected for , linear indications indhree areas -
0-10, 20-30 and 30-0. N&D 11,470 was'. issued; repair.
4. One weld, 3115-00I5'2-2.'CP-407009, FW-1; was withheld for further review
by CAT inspector oue to incorrect view being re-radiogrnphed. The
- original viev 3-4 was rejscted by SWEC for film quality. The re-radio-
graphed area in the packagt was 2-3 rather than 3-4. SWEC
re-radiographed the area and completed the package with 100% coverage
and the correct view.
5. Welds CP-374-019, FW15 and (GE 843E740) fiSS-5843 Line #1, FW2:
Pentrameter in weld' area r:reventing adcquate interpretation.
.
Acceptable on fe-radiogrg hy.
6. Weld CJ-RSS-9, FW4: Film artifacts-<in both films in the same area.
Re-review of film verified originaU dis' position as acceptable.
,
t
\
,
I
IV-23
.
- .-y _..m.. ~ ,- - ,p--,
. - . . . . - _ - -. .
-
.
c
'
(V. 'CIVIlfAND STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION
A. _ Objective
. 1The objective of _ the appraisal of civil and structural construction was.
to determine by evaluation of completed work and by review of documen-
"
<
tation_whether work, inspection, and test-activities relative to civil
,
andjstructural construction areas ~were accomplished in accordance with
: regulatory. requirements, Safety Analysis Report (SAR) commitments,
cand project specifications, drawings and procedures.
I- B. Discussion
The specific' areas of civil and st'ructural construction evaluated
.were: . concrete, reinforcing steel configuration, cadwelds, structural'
~ steel installation and bolting, masonry walls, the concrete expansion
,
anchor bolt. qualification program and building settlement.
<For concrete', reinforcing steel configuration, structural steel
' installation and bolting, and masonry walls, a physical or hardware
inspection of previously inspected and accepted work and a Quality.
: Control (QC) documentation ~and field procedures review were conducted.
o- A review of QC documentation and field procedures was performed for
cadwelds,_the concrete expansion anchor bolt qualification program and
building settlement.
,
1. ' Concrete Activities
- 3
a. Inspection Scope
i- -The: reinforced concrete activities reviewed by the NRC. Construction
Appraisal Team (CAT) inspectors included two construction openings,
-two. removable hatches and one area in which the concrete was removed
for' repair. These areas were' reviewed for'conformance of rebar i
.
placement with the design drawings (see Table V-1), specifications '
and: associated design changes.
L f .Three concrete placements were reviewed and general concrete.
quality was'also examined from surrounding areas for conformance to ;
i. site specification requirements. Records associated with the [ concrete placements were also reviewed. This review included the
-
-concrete placement reports, concrete placement checklists and the
,
field inspection reports for reinforcing steel. '
i. Concrete-placements for Containment Building removable s1 abs RS-F n and RS-B and dome ~ vent pour back were observed by the NRC CAT !
: inspectors. The-in process concrete tests were compared with the
. . limits shown in SWEC Specificiation 281, Revision 1 " Mixing and.
. Delivering Concrete" for slump, air, temperature, unit weight,
'
truck revolutions and water / cement ratio.
(' The cadweld splice performance records were reviewed to determine
-adequacy of.the production and sister splices testing frequency.
.
r Documentation and requirements for cadwelder qualification and j requalification procedures were reviewed. The qualifications of-
. V-1
f i
. - . . . . _ . . _ - - - . - - - - . . . . , , , - . . - - - , . . , . - _ - , , . , , - -
g> .
m ,
<
< ;Q
Lthree:cadwelderswerecheckedtoseeif'theymetvisualandtensile
,
,
-
test--requirements.
b. Inspection Findings
-Inlthe,five concrete areas inspected.one. area was identified where
:the rebar was not placed in'accordance.with the design drawings.
In this area (cubical D of the Containment. Building), the NRC CAT
inspectors reviewed a void in-the grout placement for wall attach-
: men _t plate 3RCS-PRRG. SWEC Field Quality' Control (FQC) had issued
1Nonconformance Disposition (N&D) Report 11,544 on September 25,
1984 to' document the grouting deficiency. It was noted by the NRC
-CAT. inspectors'that several vertical #11 rebar were visible in the
area and wereJin' a bundled conditiori. The design drawings (EC-51P
Rev. 4 and EC-51G Rev. 5) did not call for vertical bundled bars-in
~
this' area. The N&D was revised to include the bundled #11 rebar..
The'N&D was dispositioned."use as is" and the supporting calculation
.12179-SE0-C51.3 Rev.:0 was reviewed-and found acceptable.
T
-The 16 cubic yards of concrete placed were observed to be in accord-
"
!ance with Specification 281, Revision 1. The in process concrete
" test results for the Containment Building dome cap concrete place-
> ment were compared with the specification and found to be accept-
E able. SWEC.FQC rejected-3 cubic yards of concrete when after
initial samples were obtained additional water was added to the
truck mixer making the water / cement ratio indeterminate. . Based on
FQC actions and the'in process test results, no' discrepancies:were
noted.
# Concrete truck' mixer uniformity tests for. truck number 77 at the
Soneco Service Batch plant in Groton, Connecticut was observed by
the NRC CAT-inspectors. The Standard Specification _for Ready-Mixed
Concrete-(ASTM-C-94) was used as the basis for conducting truck ',
mixer. uniformity tests. Appendix XI entitled " Concrete Uniformity
Requirements" provide. the acceptance. criteria for determining truck-
mixed concrete' uniformity.
The test variations'at approximately 15% and 85% of the load were
. compared for air content, slump,. concrete unit weight, mortar unit
,
.weight, weight of aggregate and compressive strength. The NRC' CAT-
inspectors: observed the slump, air content and unit weight test
associated with the truck uniformity tests. The' tests observed
i were found to be in accordance with the specified test requirements <
and the test equipment,.when required, was-in calibration.
'
During the inspection of general plant structures, it was noted
by the NRC CAT' inspectors that the rattle space between the Reactor
Containment Building and the Main Steam Valve Building (MSVB) was
less than.that specified in the.FSAR Section 3.8.5.1. The FSAR
required a'four inch space between these two buildings. The
, . existing' space was found.to.be approximately three inches. The
-
licensee' stated that the FSAR will be revised to show a minimum
~
-
space of two: inches between these buildings. The NRC CAT also noted
1
that-debris and concrete were present in the rattle space between
the' Reactor Containment Building and the Main Steam Valve Building.
V-2
, A ,
, The debris was subsequently removed. An evaluation was to be perfonned by SWEC Engineering in order to determine whether the concrete could be left in place. No problems were identified with the qualification of the three cadwelders that were reviewed.
c. Conclusions
The concrete quality was found to be acceptable and rebar was placed in accordance with the design drawings for those areas inspected. The concrete material certification and testing records reviewed indicated conformance to the construction specifications and regulatory connitments. Concrete chipping and rebar cutting inspected was performed in a controlled manner. The failure to identify a rattle space smaller than committed to in the FSAR and concrete in the rattle space between the Containment Building and the Main Steam Valve Building is indicative of inade- quate inspection in these areas. This condition should be evaluated and additional inspections performed if interferences in the rattle spaces are found to be unacceptable.
2. Structural Steel Installation a. Inspection Scope
Installed and QC accepted structural steel was inspected for member size, configuration, and conformance of bolted connections to the design drawings (see Table V-2), specifications, and associated design changes. Structural steel bolts were tested using a calibrated torque wrench to determine whether the bolts had been properly tightened. The inspection sample was selected randomly from structural steel installed in the Reactor Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Building and the Control Building. Structural steel installations inspected included 34 members and 36 connections for proper sizes, dimensions and configuration, and 297 high strength-bolts for torque. The licensee inspected an additional 692 high strength bolts for torque during the NRC CAT inspection. The bolts tested included seven-eighths inch and one inch diameter A325 bolts. The site used load indicating washers (LIWs) in the structural steel connections. These were inspected on the basis of measurement of the gap adjacent to the LIW. Test torques were obtained by the NRC CAT inspectors using a Skidmore-Wilhelm tension tester in which bolt tension and torque values were measured.
b. Inspection Findings
No discrepancies were identified between the 34 installed
structural steel members inspected and the design drawings.
V-3
,
, . .. _ ., .. . _ . _ .. . _ - . _ . . .. _. _. ___
'
,
n' L
a v ,
.Nine structural' steel connections in the Main Steam Valve Building
were found with' incorrect bolting and welding configuration. 0f '
the nine,'five slotted structural steel connections were found not~
.to meet the installation requirements. -Four of the slotted connec-
, tions were found with bolt torques in excess ~of 450 ft-lbs, while~
the design detail required the bolts to be finger tight. The fifth
. . - = slotted bolt connection was found without any hardened washers as
required by AISC.
' Four other structural connections.did not comply with the clip
' angle to embed weld detail as'shown on drawing ES-31J, Revision 3.
-
4
- This detail required a seven-sixteenths inch fillet weld on all.
.three sides of the clip angle, but in the actual installation only
I
one side of the clip angle had been welded. ' Additionally, the
b
detail'on ES-31J, Revision 3 requires a seven-sixteenths inch weld
but the actual field weld was five-sixteenths ~ inch. Based on these
'
concerns, SWEC FQC reinspected all structural connections in-the ,
MSVB. Inspection Report (IR) 55A01205 was issued which describes 70
? slotted connections that were not finger tight, had peened threads
[ and were missing-plate washers. N&D 11,973 identified 96 fixed end E connections that did not meet the welding requirements for Typical ! ;End Connection detail on ES-31J Rev. 3. Based on the connection
' problems, SWEC issued a Report of a Problem-(ROAP) on March 22, 1985-
to determin~e the generic and reportability implications of these
, connections.
In discussions with licensee personnel regarding the use of L'IWs',
- -it was.noted by'the NRC CAT inspectors that SWEC Engineering did
2
-not perform any on-site testing to independently verify the
> - performance of the LIWs. SWEC relied on a report on LIWs by_the:
.AISC Research Council on Riveted and Bolted Structural Joints.as the '
basis for acceptance and use of LIWs. 'As additional verification,
-the SWEC specification for structural steel. required the supplier to
test'3 LIWs from-each lot. Several examples of. these tests perfor-
-
s "
med by Thames Valley. Steel Corporation'-(TVS) were provided to the-
NRC CAT inspectors. From the TVS test report-it was not clear how
=
TVS conducted the test. In addition, SWEC. Engineering was unable to
j provide specific information as to how TVS conducts the LIW accept-
- -
ance test. Also, there was no information available in the manufac-
'~
turer's test data to correlate bolt tension to the 0.005 inch LIW
_ gap acceptance criteria.
Based on.SWEC Engineering's response to the NRC CAT inspector's
- questions regarding the use and acceptability of LIWs, it was
E apparent that'SWEC Engineering did not adequately investigate the !
parameters important and essential to the LIW's performance. -
l To determine bolt torque-tension relationship and verify performance .. of the'LIWs, 21 tests using the Skidmore-Wilhelm tension tester were [ performed:on-site at the request of the NRC CAT inspectors. A total I :
of eight of the 21 LIWs tested did not meet the minimum bolt tension
P .as-required by Table 1.23.5.in AISC specifications for the Design,
- _ Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings.
f p : Bolts were found in testing to be as low as 34.5 kips in tension
V-4
L
,, 2_ _ _ . _ . __ _ _.-_-._._. _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ -
_ _
,
.
,
versus the minimum requirement of 39 kips and had met the LIW
gap acceptance criteria. The'eight failed LIWs consisted of'six
manufactured by_ Cooper-Turner and two by Bethlehem Steel. -The'LIW
: gaps appear to give an apparent accepttble result but actually the
bolt did not meet the minimum required tension. SWEC issued a
1
Report of a' Problem (ROAP) regarding the Cooper-Turner washers. The
'_
_NRC' CAT inspectors did not agree that the scope of LIW performance
concerns was limited to only Cooper-Turner washers based on the
: limited testing and test results for LIWs conducted on site.
:In the Main Steam Valve Buildingr the' Containment Building, the ESF
Building and the Auxiliary Building, structural steel connections
containing seven-eighths: inch and one inch A-325 high strength-bolts
were-torque tested to 425 ft-lbs and:700 ft-1bs respectively.
Approximately 256 seven-eighths _ inch diameter A-325 bolts were
. torque tested to 425 ft-lbs with only four bolts not achieving the
7 minimum torque. Approximately 41 one inch diameter A-325 bolts were
torque tested to 700 ft-lbs with all bolts achieving the minimum.
' torque. As'a result'of the concern with the performance of the LIWs
,
the licensee tested an additional. sample of 692 seven-eighths' inch
diameter A-325_ bolts with_only six failing to meet minimum torque.
'
c. Conclusions
In general, the structural steel installation activities for member
. size and configuration'were found to be in conformance with the
design drawings!and specifications. However, deficiencies were
identified in the following areas:
A significant number of' discrepancies were identified by the NRC
CAT inspectors in structural steel connections in the Main Steam
c Valve Building. Based on the NRC CAT inspectors. finding, the P '
licensee inspected all the connections in the Main Steam Valve-
Building. The deficiencies were identified on-inspection reports on
'
the 70 slotted connections and an N&D was~ issued on the.96 welded
connections. The_ROAP issued March 22, 1985 by SWEC was to initiate
action to determine genenic and reportability aspects.of structural
connections at the site.
cA' total of 989 bolts were torque, tested by the NRC CAT'and the
licensee with only 10 failing to achieve the minimum. inspection
torques. The high strengths bolts installed in the Class I struc-
i tures appeared to be properly installed. b . 3. -Masonry Walls i L a. -Inspection Scope l~ In the area of masonry wall construction, the NRC CAT inspectors
- reviewed specifications and completed block walls. For the block
walls,' the inspection' concentrated on the bracing modifications.
-
All masonry wark reviewed was in the Control Building (See Table
V-3).
V-5
.
W1 F t- ,e yv- g -reees-- pW 9 y8,-V 7 '-*F*'tw-'1 - * 'e---4pr+wv-@ "
v-
,
/ '
.- '
E >
<
- '-
'b. . Inspection Findings
The masonry (walb seismic bracing modification installations were
(compared to the design drawings and .in' general, found to conform
'
.with design drawings and specifications. -The structural steel
~
itrusses used.to brace ~the concrete block walls were reviewed as part
ofithe structural ~ steel sample.
Duringithe NRC CAT inspection it.wasidetermined that walls were not
constructed as' safety-related structures. However, the. bracing was-
constructed as Seismic. Category ILstructures.
'
,
c. Conclusions ,
,
In general, masonry wall activities were found to be acceptable.
4. ' Concrete Expanr. ion Anchor Bolts
a. Inspection Scope
-The qualification test-report for the wedge type concrete expansion
~
anchors used at'the site was reviewed for technical adequacy,.
'conformance to the project specifications and demonstration of '
; satisfactory anchor performance. -
,
b. Inspection. Findings
The qualification test report was found to be consistent with the
specifications and procedures for installation and inspection. 1
c. Conclusions
The concrete expansion bolt qualification test program was found to
be acceptable.
5 .~ Building Settlement
-
a. Inspection Scope
, The-surveying data for Seismic Category I structures were reviewed
by the NRC CAT inspectors.and compared withLthe predicted maximum
settlement values shownlin Table 2.5.4 ~49 of the Millstone Unit 3-
.FSAR.
9
- "
b. Inspection Findings
The building benchmarks are surveyed by.SWEC annually for founda-
'
tions'on bedrock-and semiannually for foundations on structural-
backfill. The NRC CAT inspectors reviewed the settlement surveys.
conducted and found the survey frequency to be generally in com-
> f
E
~_.-
V-6
~
, f
^
-,,,n.-.,.,n----<-~-,.m.- ww-wm --o
_
,
s
'
pliance with the-field construction procedure. It was noted that-
Auxiliary Building benchmark 16 had been destroyed in late 1982 and
-had'not been re-established. .The licensee has committed to estab-
lish a benchmark-in the area of Auxiliary Building benchmark'16.
~
-The' Main Steam Valve Building, Containment Building and the Fuel.
Building survey. data showed that, although these buildings were
founded.on rock, the actual experienced building-settlements had
exceeded.the FSAR predicted maximum values. -SWEC-geotechnical
engineers indicated.the values are not indicative of actual settle-
-ments but represent an accumulation ~ of survey errors. This magni-
tude of-survey error is reasonable and is well below levels of
. structural movement that would cause concern to either buildings
or interconnecting piping.
- c. Conclusion
:The discrepancies batween'the recorded building settlements and the
-predicted building settlements in tha FSAR are probably survey
errors. Even.if the measurements were correct, the settlements
were below levels of structural movement that would cause concern to-
either buildings or interconnected piping.
,
l
I
V-7
e
,
~ TABLE V-1
CONCRETE DRAWINGS
Drawing No. Revision Subject
EC-10G 7 Control Building - Wall at-Line
55 and Elevation 46'-8"
EC-49P 5 ~ Dome Details Sh'#2 Containment-
Structure E&T
.EC-50E 2 Details Elev. 514 Sh #1 Contain-
ment Structure Intermediate
Concrete
EC-50V 7 Plan Elev. 51'-4 Outline
Containment Structure Interme-
diate Concrete
EC-50Z 2 Removable Concrete Shielding
Plugs (RS-F, RS-B)
EC-51G 5 North Walls Elev. and Details Sh
#1 Containment Structure Inter-
mediate Concrete
.EC-51J- 6 North Walls Elev. and Details Sh
c._ #3 Containment Structure Inter-
mediate Concrete
EC-51P~ 4 Refueling Cavity Walls Sh #1
Containment Structure Inter-
mediate Concrete
EC-750E 7 Embedment Penetrations and
Openings Floor EL 51'-4
Containment Structure
EC-751B 6 Embedment Penetrations and
Openings Containment Structure
Walls Sh #2
EC-751L' 3 Embedment Details Containment
Structure Walls Sh #4
V-8
nc .
-
.. ;
'
;
-
, .
'
~,
'
TALBE V-2
,
STRUCTURAL STEEL' DRAWING 3
^
3 Drawing No. Revision Subject
EC-731H1 2 Eabedments, Penetrations and Openings
Details Main Steam Valve Building
-
IEC-751L: 3 Embedment Details Containment
Structure Walls Sh #4-
-_ES-3A; 10 Operating Floor Framing Sh #1
Turbine Building (General Notes)
ES-31H' 3 ~ Framing Plans and Details. Main
Steam Valve Building
ES-31J 3 Framing Plans and Details Main ~
Steam Valve Building
ES-31X 1 Framing Plans and Details Main
Steam Valve Building ,
ES-508 7~ Annulus Platform Elev. 24'-6
Containment Structure
.ES-50AD 2 Reactor Containment Shield Door
Framing and Details Elev. 3'-8
EV-56D 3 Pipe Break Restraints FDW Bypass'-
Main Steam Valve Building Sh #1
,
EV-56E 3 Pipe Break Restraints FDW Bypass
' Main Steam Valve Building Sh #2
- .EV-132D 4 Intermediate Structure Staam:
Generator Cubicle.- Cubicle D-
Plan 28'-6
-EV-132EE- 5 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Connection
Details Sh #1
EV-132F '- 4 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Connection.
Details on SH #2
.EV-132G. 4 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Connection
Details Sh #3
V-9
-
TALBE V-2'(Continued)
STRUCTURAL STEEL DRAWINGS
: Drawing No. Revision Subject
EV-132H 4 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Connection
Details Sh #4
EV-132J ~3 Intermediate Structure Steam
-Generator Cubicle Connection
Details Sh #5
EV-132K 3 Intermediate Structure Steam
~ Generator Cubicle Restraint
Structure Details
EV-132LE 3 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Restraint
Miscellaneous Details
EV-132M 3 Intermediate Structure Steam
Generator Cubicle Connection
Details Sh #6
s .-
4
V-10
n: - ,
E
' '
:v e
, ' TABLE-V-3-
, . CONCRETE BLOCK' WALL DRAWINGS
,
LDrawing"No. Revision; . Subject
' ~
'
'EA-1F -12 . Floor Plan Elev. 47'-6 Control
Building Sh #2-
.EA-1E' - 11 -
.
-Floor Plan Elev. 4'-6. Control
Building Sh #1
CE A-90' 6' Masonry Details 9 Elev. 47'-6
Control Building-
"
-
ES-60F 2 Block Wall: Bracing Elev. 47'-6-
-
Control Building Sh'#1
IES-60G- 2 Block Wall Bracking Elev.c47'-6
Control. Building Sh #2~
ES460H 2 Block Wall Bracing Elev. 47'-6.
Control Building Sh #3
JES-60J. 2 Block Wall Bracing'Elev. 47'-6--
Control Building Sh #1-
~ ES-60K'- 1- Block Wall Bracing Elevi 47'-6
Control Building Sh #2
' ES-60L: 2 Block Wall Bracing Elev. 47'-6;
Control Building'Sh #3
_
F
:b
e
-
L.-
V-11
. ,
-
,
! VI .~ MATERIAL TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL ~
, A. Objective
The objectiveof this portion of the inspection was to examine trace-
-~
a bility and control'of material and equipment, and to determine the
adequacy of the licensee's program r' elative to these activities.
B. Discussion-
iThe approach'to perform.the inspection was to identify-and select
samples of various' types-of installed material and equipment for exami-
-
nation. -Some samples _of installed material, such as _rebar, that were -
cnot accessible were selected from records. Also, some samples of
' delivered material, such as protective ' coating materials, not yet
installed, but-inspected in warehouses or shops, were included. A total
of 297 samples were examined to varying extents.
' Applicable organizations and procedures for various activities were
reviewed. 'The following Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
procedures were reviewed:
*
NEAM 3,-Rev. 10, Specification Inquiry and Purchase
Procedure, Change No.-3
* - CMP No. 1.12, Rev. 3.79, Material / Equipment Maintenance
P-CMP 1.2,1Rev. O, Receiving Material and Equipment
*
~
P-CMP 1.3, Rev. 3.79, Material / Equipment Storage,
Change No. 3
*
QS-7.1ML, Rev. O, Receiving Inspection, Change No. 3
*- QCI No. FM3-S7.1-070, Traceability Requirements
*
FCP-121, Rev. 5, Equipment' Storage History Card
"
FCP-354, Rev. O, Transfer of Traceability Markings
on Plates and Shapes
~
-
An inspection of installed material and equipment was conducted in the
plant to select and verify markings on various ' samples, such as equip-
ment (mechanical, electrical and instrumentation),. pipe, supports /
restraints and weld' joints. Other samples were inspected in warehouses
or shops. Table VI-1, " Summary of Samples," indicates the types and
' quantities of materials examined. Table VI-2, " Weld Filler Material
Compliance," contains a list of the 39 weld filler material samples
selected.
VI-1
=- - -
E. >
n
-1. : Material Traceability and Control
a. Inspection Scope
'
A total of 297' samples were selected and examined for traceability
to applicable-drawings, specifications, procurement records, certi-
fied material: test reports (CMTRs), certificates of compliance
(C of Cs)~, heat numbers or other required documentation.
b. Inspection Findings
^
In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in place
for material traceability and for control of material at the site.
'Except for a lack of traceability for certain fastener materials,
.the material traceability program was found to be generally accept-
able. The following observations were made by.the NRC CAT inspector:
(1) Manual and computerized records were used to help control the
identification and status of material and equipment at the
site.
(2) Thirty-nine samples of weld filler materials listed in Table
VI-2 were examined for traceability and compliance with speci-
fications and codes, and were found to be acceptable.
Twenty-five weld filler material holding ovens in two issue
stations were examined and found to meet requirements for
temperature control and thermometer calibration records.
-(3) NRC IE Information Notice No. 85-15 described a problem regard-
ing the identification and marking of ASTM A-36 steel plate
material supplied by Interstate Steel Supply Company and noted
that this firm had supplied material to Millstone Unit 3.-The
NRC CAT inspector inquired as to the control of Interstate
Steel as an approved vendor, the quantity of material supplied,
applications of the material, and the status of the licensee's
action relative to this matter.
An interim response from SWEC to Northeast Utilities Service
,
Company (NUSCO) dated March 8, 1985 stated that 175,347 lbs. of
A-36-plate (cut pieces) had been furnished by Interstate Steel.
It was noted that early orders were for Category II applica-
i
tions, but that one order (P.O.08766 dated October 4, 1979) was
'
for Category I applications. A review of the status of Inter-
state Steel as an approved vendor revealed that a February 1980
evaluation resulted in removing this firm from the approved
list for Category I material because of material identification
and documentation problems. Interstate Steel was reinstated as
an approved vendor for Category I material as a result of a
survey in March 1980, and subsequent surveys resulted in
retaining this firm on the approved list.
Only one piece of A-36 steel plate material supplied by Inter-
state Steel that had not been installed could be located. This
sample was_found in the pipe hanger fabrication shop. The
VI-2
.. - - - - _ - - - . . . - . - . - . - . . - . . . . - .
.
m
lN -
9 1
#
' ~
; markings. stamped on this' sample were traceable to the appro-
.priate certified material test report. No discrepancies were
noted.-
c. 'SWEC representatives stated that their review and examination
of records'related to NRC IE Information Notice No. 85-15 was
. continuing.
-
. (4); Material an'd equipmentflisted in Table VI-1 were examined for
^
traceability and control. Most items examined were found 'to
have the required material traceability; however, some .defi-
ciencies were found regarding the traceability and control for
11arge motor mounting bolts and other fastener materials as
follows:
(a) Equipment mounting bolts for 10 of 49 fastener installa-
-
tions examined were found to have-unmarked bolts and thus
the bolt material was' indeterminate. The 10 instances of
unmarked mounting bolts were for motors for the' following
pumps:
,
Quench Spray Pumps (3QSS-P3A, B)
*~ Safety Injection Pump (3SIH-PIB)
~ * Chemical Volume Control Pumps (3CHS-PIA, B;-P3A, B, C)
-
*ComponentCoolingChargingPumps(3CCE-PIA,B)
.
~As a result of these CAT findings, the licensee issued
Nonconformance~and Disposition Reports (N&Ds) 11765, 11767,
11904, 11905 and-an UNSAT Inspection Report (IR) M5A51085
to initiate corrective actions. Also,.a Report of a
Problem-(R0AP), " Unidentified Bolting Material on Vendor
Supplied Equipment," was issued March 14, 1985, to initiate
reviews for generic and reportability aspects.
'
(b) Battery rack assembly bolts (specified to be ASTM A-307 in
the seismic-qualification report) in the five battery
rooms in the Control Building were inspected. It was found
that 282 of 700 bolts (approximately 40%) were unmarked
1(not. meeting ASTM A-307 requirements) and thus were'of
indeterminate material.
As a~ result of this finding, the licensee issued N&D 11498
for corrective' action. Subsequently, the licensee selected
- samples of unmarked bolts from each battery room for
-testing by Bridgeport Testing Laboratory. Testing showed
all 97 bolts tested to conform to ASTM A-307 material
.
specifications. N8D 11498 was dispositioned " Accept as
is."
.
-(c) For four motor control center (MCC) interconnections
examined, all four had unmarked bolts for connecting
adjacent cabinets and thus were of indeterminate material.
It was noted that 20 such-cabinets were furnished by Gould,
Inc. .The specified bolting material was SAE Grade 2 which
requires at least the manufacturer's identification
marking.
VI-3
,
As a result of this finding, the applicant issued E&DCR
-T-E-03663. In reviewing this document, NRC CAT inspectors
concluded.that the response shows a lack of thorough-
ness on the part of.. site engineering, in that.the response
indicates that the bolting material is SAE Grade 2 without
adequate techical justification. Since the bolt markings do
not meec.the requirements of SAE Grade 2, the material can
only be considered to be indeterminate.
NRC CAT inspectors concluded that the use-as-is response
indicated on E&DCR T-E-03663, is not adequate to assure
that fasteners used in the assembly of MCCs are the
specified SAE Grade 2 material, and that further licensee
action will be required to resolve this issue.
'
(d) Bolts for mounting Control Board Termination Cabinet
(3CES*TBMB30) were unmarked, and thus material was indeter-
minate. The applicant-issued UNSAT IR ESA01843 to' initiate
review and corrective action. This appears to be an
isolated case.
c. Conclusions
In general, except for certain fastener hardware, the material
traceability and control program was considered to be satisfactory.
Significant lack of traceability was found for fastener materials,
including bolts for mounting large pump motors, bolts for battery
racks and bolts for interconnecting adjacent MCC cabinets.
VI-4
- = ~ '
y' ~
_,,
- ,,
n
.N
'
_
TABLE VI-1
SUM 4ARY OF SAMPLES
Item .No. of Samples
-Equipment 25
Pipe 22 (L)*
- Tubing- 9 (L)
Steel-Structural 10 (L)
Steel-Rebar 10 (L)
Steel-Plate 10 (L)
Steel-Tube 10 (L)
. Hangers / Supports / Restraints 3
Embedments 4
Inserts (Richmond) 4 (L)
Insert Studs (For Richmond Inserts) 4 (L)
Weld Filler Material 39 (L)
Weld Joints 25
Electrical Cables (Reels) 27 (L)
Fasteners (Sets) 49 (L)
Cadweld Sleeves 28 (L)
Coatings 5 (L)
Unistrut 5 (L)
Raceway 3 (L)
Shims 5 (L)
TOTAL 297
*(L) = Lots
VI-5
1
. - . . . . _
.--- ._-- __ -_ --_- - _- _ _ __ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
x
'
Y
,
TABLE VI-2
., ,;
. WELD" FILLER MATERIAL COMPLIANCE-
' Material Heat'No.'/ Compliance
'
Designation- Material---ID Comments
E1001802:1/8 Lot'5043A49144 Acceptable
'
ENicu-7 3/32 -8M12C Mix 23' -Acceptable
-806-9N10'1/8 8K22B Mix 14 Acceptable
~.ENicu-7 1/8 10678-1-3 Acceptable
E308-16 1/8 5E17B Mix 7 Acceptable
E7018 3/32 '411A0952 Acceptable
-ENiCrFe3 1/8 Lot 10748-1 Acceptable 1
E309-15~1/8 Lot 11501-1 Acceptable
E309-15 1/8 Lot 11631-1 Acceptable i
E7018 1/8l 8215 Acceptable
E316L-16 1/8 782860 Acceptable
E308L-16 1/8 782815 Acceptable-
- E308L-16 3/32
.
761127 Acceptab1_e~
E316L-16 3/32 743528 Acceptable-
E309-16 3/32 743202 Acceptable
E309-16 1/8- 743880- Acceptable
,
E316-15'1/8 Lot 10499-1-1 Acceptable
E316-15 3/32 Lot 50148-1 Acceptable
E308-16 3/32- Lot SK13A Mix 29 Acceptable
E308-16 3/32 Lot SM2A Mix 29 Acceptable
.E316-16 3/32 Lot SF7A Mix 28 Acceptable
E8018G 1/8 48348 Acceptable
E8018G 3/32. 48429 Acceptable
!
VI-6
'
.
e
L
l TABLE VI-2 (Continued)
-WELD FILLER MATERIAL COMPLIANCE
. ~ Material Heat No./- Compliance
: Designation -
Material ID Comments
E308-16 1/8 Lot SK98 Mix 10 Acceptable-
E308-16.3/32 Lot SG16A Mix 19 Acceptable
.
~
E30s-16 1/8 Lot CX Acceptable
E309-16 3/32' ' Lot 90151-1 Acceptable
E7018 3/32 411X4302 Acceptable
22768 Acceptable--
'
E9018-B3.1/8
E9018-B3 3/32 39586 Acceptable
E9018-B3 3/32 39610 Acceptable
E8018-C1-1/8 '421T2133 Acceptable
E8018-C1 3/32 421T2133 Acceptable
' ER309.3/32 Lot C2970E308 . Acceptable
: EB Weld Insert 308L 5/32 Lot E2267-308L Acceptable
E308-16 1/8 Lot SE17B Acceptable
E7018 3/32 411A0952 Acceptable
NiCrFe-3 3/32 Lot 50225-1 Acceptable
E7018 3/32 402A9061 Acceptable
l r a
VI-7
i;
VII. DESIGN CHANGE CONTROL
A. Objective
The primary objective of the appraisal of design change control was to
determine whether design change activities were conducted in compliance
with regulatory requirements, Safety Analysis Report (SAR) commitments
and licensee, architect engineer, and constructor procedures. An
additional objective was to determine that hardware modifications
described in a sample of design change documents were properly imple-
mented in the field.
B. Discussion
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III " Design Control" and Criterion VI
" Document Control" establish the overall regulatory requirements for
design change control. These requirements are elaborated in Regulatory
Guide (RG) 1.64 " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of
' Nuclear Power Plants" and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
Standard N45.2.11-1974 " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design
of Nuclear Power Plants." The licensee's commitment to comply with RG
1.64 is stated in Appendix D of the Northeast Utilities Quality
Assurance Program (NVQAP) Topical Report. Stone and Webster Engineering
Corporation's (SWEC) commitment to RG 1.64 is stated in Appendix VII of
the Quality Assurance Program Manual for Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 3 for construction activities.
The areas of design change control evaluated in this inspection were
. control of design documents and control of design changes. In each of
these areas, interviews were conducted with personnel responsible for
the control of activities, procedures were reviewed, and a sample of
controlled documents was reviewed. In addition, a sample of the com-
pleted structures and hardware wMch had been inspected and accepted by
Field Quality Control (FQC) personnel was verified in the field for
compliance to design change document requirements.
1. Control of Design Documents
The key aspects of this inspection were to determine if sufficient
site controls existed to assure that the latest design documents
and design change documents were available for field use in a
timely manner, and that the latest documents were actually available
in the field,
a. Inspection Scope
(1) Design document control for drawings, installation / erection
specifications and Operating, Installation and Maintenance
(0IM) manuals was evaluated from the point of engineering
issue to the point where these documents were considered
working documents for field construction and FQC acceptance.
Control of Engineering and Design Coordination Reports (E&DCRs)
and availability of E&DCRs, Nonconformance and Disposition
(N&D) reports and Vendor Information Requests (VIRs) at
selected drawing stations were also evaluated. The major
VII-1
R*^
-
,
, . N
'
' emphasis was1to determine if the correct revision of documents
, including applicable changes were available in the field based
-
on the master records. Document Record Cards (DRCs) for 69
Ldesign documents and some of the associated E&DCRs/N&Ds/VIRs
~ -
..
'
were reviewed at six site drawing stations. Sixty-seven DRCs
were also reviewed at the FQC drawing' station. In addition,
control of 10 specifications and.12 OIMs was reviewed.
:(2)'. Document control audit plans, attributes, reports and
= responses, surveillance reports as well as' Interoffice Office
: Memorandums discussing document control : findings were reviewed.
These documents were evaluated for relevancy of attributes,
-
sample sizes, proper audit methods, trends, frequency, and
l
corrective actions'for. assurance that.the latest design docu-
ments were being used for field work and-QC. acceptance. Six
-FQC monthly drawing ' station audits.(each' covering 100% of-
- change documents issued for one week out of each month), 5
' -
' weekly FQC drawing station surveillances', and 4 Boston Quality
'
Assurance Auditing Division (QAAD) audits of site document
control were-reviewed.
.
(3) SWEC Engineering and Construction Document Control, FQC, and
Boston QAAD personnel were interviewed concerning distribution,
control and use of design and design change documents, and.
document control audits and surveillances.
(4) The'following procedures relating to control and distribution {
of design documents were reviewed:
9
* '
SWEC Engineering Assurance-Procedure (EAP) 4.13, " Processing
ofProjectSpecifications,"Rev.O, Change 6LR.
*
SWEC EAP 5.4, " Review and Approval of Project Production
,
. Drawings, Rev. 3, Change 7
-
*
SWEC EAP 6.1, " Document Control," Rev. 1, Change 5-
*
SWEC EAP 5.8, " Review of Supplier Drawings," Rev. 1,
Change 2
SWEC EAP 6.5, " Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of
Engineering and Design Coordination Reports (E&DCRs) -
Computerized Logging and Tracking System," Rev. O, Change 1.
SWEC EAP 9.2, " Review and Approval of Supplier Technical
Documents," Rev. 4, Change 6
* -SWEC Construction Methods Procedure (CMP) 11.1, " Job Site
Document Control," Rev. D
*
SWEC NEAM 3, " Specification Inquiry and Purchase Proce-
dure," Rev. 10, Change 4
*
SWEC NEAM 5, " Supplier Document Handling System - IS 249,"
Rev. 9, Change 1
.
VII-2
y ,
*
1 -SWEC NEAM 19, " Handling, Review and Distribution of SWEC
Production Drawings," Rev. 11, Change 0
*
SWEC NEAM 32, " Supplier Technical Document Review and
Distribution Millstone 3 - NUSCO," Rev. 9, Change 0
SWEC NEAM 38, " Authorization of Engineering and Design
Changes," Rev. 8, Change 4
SWEC Quality Control ~ Instruction (QCI) FM3-S14.2-06, " Site
QA Program Monitoring," Rev. A
~
= SWEC QCI FM3-56.1-04, " Drawing Control Verification," Rev. 0
b. Inspection Findings
(1) A random sample of 69 DRCs obtained from the master DRC file in
construction document control was taken to drawing stations 12,
33, 34, 62, 138, and 143 and compared to the documents filed at
each station. A DRC exists for every plant drawing and lists
all applicable E&DCRs, N&Ds and VIRs for each drawing as well
as showing the latest drawing revision. The DRC, drawing,
E&DCRs, N&Ds and VIRs are required to be checked by construc-
tion personnel for correct drawing revision and applicability
of outstanding E&DCRs, N&Ds and VIRs to the specific work area
prior to construction work. CMP 11.1 is the governing
procedure for site drawing station controls. Associated with
the 69 DRCs reviewed, 69 drawings, 79 E&DCRs and 37 N&Ds were
also checked at the stations. Fifty-one document' control
errors contrary to CMP 11.1 requirements were noted as follows:
3 DRCs not current
1 missing DRC
11 missing E&DCRs
7 missing N&Ds
4 missing drawings
2 drawings at same station had 2 different revisions
3 improper voidings of E&DCR or DRC
20 DRCs with missing descriptive summaries
See Table VII-1 for specific drawing numbers and summary.
(2) FQC has its own drawing station (number 31) which is con-
tinuously staffed with an attendant unlike the field drawing
stations used by the crafts. Because of the high error rate
noted at other site drawing stations, the FQC drawing station
was looked at separately for non-current and missing DRCs only.
Document control errors contrary to CMP 11.1 requirements were
found. Out of 67 DRCs checked, 6 were not current and one
was missing. This error rate was considered of particular
significance since the FQC station provides the documents used
for acceptance of plant construction. Table VII-1 lists the
DRC numbers checked at station 31.
VII-3
L
ma --
,
) A' > , .{.
- -
-!
~(3) LIncluded above are two cases'in which the back of thelDRC=
.
= copy" reflected information which did not apply'to the-drawing
,m specified on the front. --The back sides of the master DRCs were
~
not annotated with the drawing. number so applicability of the
.
.information on the back could not be verified with the front.
iApparently a mixup had occurred in copying of the DRCs. This
' problem-had also been noted previously.by document control-
g '
: personnel and the DRCs known to be incorrect were recopied.
However, no corrective actions had.been taken to. identify the'
'. back side of DRCs with the document number to preclude
undetected copying errors. This.is considered to be inadequate.
corrective actions by Construction Document Control.
- (4).Yellowdrawingswerenotbeingdatestampedwhencopiedand
'
provided for.use. These drawings.are uncontrolled but are
'
used as information. copies for construction. The drawings are
considered acceptable for use on the. day of issue only, unless
reverified and initiated by the user. Since the drawings were
.not date stamped it could not~be determined when the drawings
-
.were issuedLand that proper reveritication had occurred prior
to use. The lack of a requirement for date stamping of yellow
drawings when. copied is considered to be a procedural weakness
in CMP 11.1.
. (5) Control of specifications was evaluated for a random sample of
ten specifications. One control point for each specification
t
. was checked to determine if latest addenda and revisions per
the Engineering Document Control Specification Index were
received and filed. Numerous errors were noted as follows
contrary to NEAM 3 and CMP 11.1 requirements:
*
-Two cases of the latest-specifications revisions and
' addenda were found not filed in the specification books.
The specification revisions were located in a stack of'
documents to be filed. . The superseded specifications,
'
revisions and addenda were filedLin the specification-
books.
4
*
In one case the Engineering Document Control Specification !
Index did not indicate the. latest addenda.
*
In one case the entire specification was missing-from the
file book but was later located.
*
Two cases were noted of E&DCRs not being filed. They were
also located in a stack of documents to be filed.
*
One case was found of E&DCRs being filed by date received
and not by E&DCR number such that retrievability of
specific E&DCRs was very difficult.
*
One case of E&DCR posting errors.
See Table VII-2 for document numbers and summary.
'
VII-4
v; c a; s .
.
I
*
(6) Control of 0IMs was' evaluated for a random sample of twelve
OIMs. The following' problems were noted contrary to NEAM 32
M
'
and CMP 11.1 requirements:
..
* - The index in Engineering Document Control did not indicate
<the latest manual revision in one case.
*-
The record log.in Construction Document Control did not
x have-al1 the applicable E&DCRs posted in two-cases.
:*
.The IS-305, system had two data entry errors in one case.
Even though the above problems were identified, all 12 of the
'
manuals on the shelf were the latest revision and had the.
applicable E&DCRs filed with them. See Table VII-3 for docu-
ment numbers and summary.
(7) .In the area of document contro.1 audits, it was found that l
audits were generally being accomplished in accordance'with
requirements. In fact, audits and surveillances-had been-
-
increased within the past year due to the number of errors
found'at drawing stations by various auditing activities.
Just prior'to the NRC CAT inspection, a 100 percent audit of
all drawing stations was performed by FQC. This audit covered
186,706 drawings and DRCs. However, as the NRC CAT identified
discrepancies.in document control have shown, the audits did
-not identify the underlying problems'and were considered weak
for the following' reasons:
*'
The FQC monthly audits were not using the master DRC or
engineering computer data a'vailable for determining l latest
drawing revision numbers or applicable drawing changes.
~"
.There had been no specific audit attention given to speci-
fications or 0IMs for the past two years. In view of
the' errors found in this inspection additional attention
is warranted.
*
, Boston QAAD audit reports were not sufficiently detailed
to allow determination of how document control audits were
conducted. Audit attributes also lacked sufficient. details-
for conducting thorough, consistent and uniform document
,
control audits.
*
Although Construction Document Control-had accomplished
some self audite at specific stations when errors were
identified, there was no formal plan for accomplishing self
audits and taking permanent corrective actions on an
overall basis. In view of the continuing drawing station
errors being identified, Construction Document Control
should have been determining and resolving their problems
much sooner. This is considered to be inadequate correc-
tive actions ~by Construction Document Control.
VII-5
e
c. Conclusions
Although the basic system framework for design document control appears to be adequate, a large number of errors were found to exist in site document control in spite of increased attention the past year. The actions taken to date have not been effective in properly maintaining drawing stations and improving document control. Audits and surveillances have not been effective in identifying problems and root causes. Considering the above, document control needs special attention to resolve the underlying problems and to reduce the error rate to an acceptable level. Two cases of inadequate corrective actions in document control were noted. These are discussed further in Section VIII-B.1.b(4).
2. Control of Design Changes
The specific aspects of this inspection were to determine if effec- tive measures were present for control of design changes, that these measures were being followed and design changes were properly implemented in the field in accordance with design change require- ments.
a. Inspection Scope
(1) The principle method of accomplishing design changes is by
E&DCR. Other methods not included in this inspection were
use of N&Ds and VIRs or direct design document revision.
Approximately 45,000 E&DCRs have been issued for construction
at Millstone 3. About 200 random E&DCRs were reviewed in this
inspection for conformance to site procedures including need
for the E&DCR, need for design change, clarity of problem
desciption and solution, reasonableness of solution, technical
justification for design changes, appropriate reviews and
approvals, and reference to calculations when appropriate.
(2) Supporting calculations associated with eight E&DCRs were
reviewed for conformance to site procedures including
retrievability, clarity, cross referencing between the calcula-
tion and E&DCR, general neatness and basic approach. Also,
calculation controls were reviewed.
(3) Incorporation of design changes by E&DCR into parent documents
was evaluated for conformance to site procedures. Forty-six
design documents (i.e. drawings, specifications or 0IMs)
designated to be changed because of E&DCRs were reviewed to
determine if each document had been revised to incorporate
E&DCR requirements or was within the control system for
eventual incorporation of E&DCR requirements. At the time of
the NRC CAT inspection the site requirement was to revise
drawings within four months after the sixth "to be incorpora-
ted" change document was issued.
VII-6
4 .a s
.
< '
- o
. (4) ..The Project' Change. Request (PCR)-and Westinghouse Field Change-
. Notice (FCN) systems were evaluated for conformance to site
procedures including proper control of design changes imple-
,
-
-mented:via-PCR or FCN. ' Site procedures-require that-design-
1 ichanges cinitiated by.either.PCR or FCN be implemented by E&DCR.-
~
~
(5) -Design' control audit p1ans,' attributes and reports.were
-
reviewed.-for relevancy of attributes, sample sizes, proper
.. audit methods, trends, frequency and corrective actions for
assurance that proper design change control procedures were.
:being followed. Three SWEC Engineering Assurance (EA)' design-
control audits and two EA technical audits were-reviewed.
(6) A random sample of 16 E&DCRs for which work was completed and
FQC' accepted were inspected in the field to assure E&DCR
. requirements had been' implemented.
-(7) Various SWEC engineering discipline and principal engineers as
well as FQC personnel were interviewed concerning E&DCRs,
calculations, audits, programmatic controls and hardware
installations.
-
'(8) The following procedures relating to control of design changes
were reviewed:
*
SWEC .EAP. 3.1, " Verification of Nuclear
'
Power Plant Designs," Rev. 2,- Change 5
*
~
SWEC EAP 5.3, " Preparation and Control of Manual and
Computerized Calculations (Nuclear Projects)," Rev. 3,
Change 3
*
SWEC EAP 5.4, " Review and Approval of Project Production
Drawings," Rev. 3, Change 7
*
SWEC EAP 6.5, " Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of
E&CDRs - Computerized Logging and Tracking System," Rev. O,
Change 1
*
SWEC NEAM 38, " Authorization of Engineering and Design
Changes," Rev. 8, Change 4
*-
SWEC NEAM 41, " Processing of Calculations," Rev. 6, Change 9
*
SWEC NEAM 68, " Handling of Nonconformance and Disposition
Reports by Engineering and Design," Rev. 6, Change 0
-* SWEC NEAM 83, " Vendor Information Request," Rev. 3, Change 3
7
, b. Inspection Findings
(1) In general E&DCRs appear to be used as intended by site proce-
dures. Review of a random sample of approximately 200 E&DCRs
identified the following discrepancies:
.
VII-7 *
es j. -
, g
%
^
, y
n
.
*
iNo technical justifications were provided for five E&DCRs i
:(FP 35766,'FB 39126,.FC 39127. FE 35758, FE 33638) as- '
F 7 frequired by Revision 8 to NEAM 38.-
*
F.1;17774 was not dated by the Project Engineer when signed-
^
as required by NEAM 38.
(2) f A significant number of design documents were found to be over '
'
due for updating by the 6 and 4 rule as required by NEAM 38..
- Forty-six design documents associated with E&DCR changes were
,
reviewed to see if they had been revised or were in the
tracking system. The results were as follows:
'
*
All 46 were being tracked in the IS-305 system.
*
Eight had already been revised and listed the E&DCR numbers
in the revision columns.
*
Nine of the 46 had more than 6 E8DCRs and 4 of those were
overdue for revision (i.e. overdue by 6 and 4 rule).-
*
Upon additional review of all plant drawings with "to be
incorporated" E&DCRs outstanding, it was found that 421
drawings had reached the 6 and 4 requirement and 35 percent'
of those were at least one month overdue.
*
It was noted that'in October 1983 there were approximately
40 documents overdue for revision, in December 1984 there
were about 80 overdue and in March 1985 about 150. Even-
though a list of drawings that had reached the 6 and 4
requirement was published monthly and subsequently discus-
sed at management meetings, the number of overdue documents
continued to increase. This appears to be a case of'
inadequate corrective actions to reduce the number of
documents overdue for revision.
(3) A lack of followup and implementation of corrective actions
associated with the NRC Region I~ Construction Team Inspection
(CTI) Report 50-423/84-04 of May 30, 1984 was noted. The CTI
finding addressed the need to relate implementing EADCR numbers
SWEC had changed the governing
backtooriginating)PCRs. procedure -(NEAM 117 to accomplish the new
revised procedures had not been implemented. Otherwise, the PCR
:and FCN processes evaluated in this inspection appeared to be
,
in confonnance with site procedures.
- (4) Of the eight engineering calculations reviewed in detail, no
discrepancies were noted relative to site procedures. The
calculations were retrievable, clear and appeared adequate.
The logging and control procedures also appeared adequate.
(5) The EA audit program for assessment of site design change con-
trol implementation appeared to be quite thorough and was con-
sidered satisfactory.
VII-8
_ . _ .
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
(6) The 16 E&DCRs reviewed in the field were satisfactory from a
design change process standpoint. However, three of the 16
checked did have implementation problems from a construction or
FQC standpoint. These three (TJ 1036, FP 22607, FB 33829) are
discussed in Section III. The other 13 E&DCRs (FE 33638, FC
34777, FJ 34743, FJ 34710, FJ 35220, FJ 34265, TS 1258, TJ
1096, TJ 1021, FE 39121, FJ 35703, FE 39107 and FP 23624) were
found to be satisfactory in the field.
c. Conclusions
For the sample inspected, there is adequate control of the design
change process with the exception of updating design documents with
the latest change information. Considering the number of E&DCRs
that are outstanding against design documents, the potential for
errors would be significantly reduced if design documents were
updated in a timely manner. Management attention needs to be
directed in this area.
Two cases of inadequate correction actions in design change control
were noted. These are discussed further in Section VIII-B.1.b.(4).
,
VII-9
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _-- _ - _ _ . . _ _ . . - - _ _ _ - _
- <
t-
,
,
. .
TABLEV{I-1
s
DOCUMENT RECORD CA,RD g AUDIT SUMARY
-
^
,. ' ' Drawin(1
'
DRC/Drawine # E&DCR #- N&D'# Station W Discrepancy
b !- BE-52BC- 333 31
~'
BE-52GC ,
33,31 missing summary *
'
FE40552 - ,
i FE39053 '
FE34149 missing 9 33
'~
(/ ' EB-39P ~33, 31
FB37429 .,
FB36108
,
EB-39N - 33,31
- FB36328 missing summary
FB37429
FB36954 DRC voiding error
EE-34L ,
'
33,31 DRC not current
"
& 31.(back to:
back printing
problem);
missing summary
.
EE-34M ,
'
33,31
'
! EE-34N .. 33,31 DRC not current 9
' 31 (back to back
'- printing problem);
2 missing summaries
~
EE-34P 33,31 '2 missing summaries
'
EE-34Q 33,31 .[ .
EE-34R 33,31
' '
EE-51C 33,31 ;
, FP35373' , '
, FP33149
:
FE32650 1 E&DCR not voided
33,31
EE-34AV
'
FE27135
-
l FE18930
FE.6361
.
p
9
L , VII-10 - I !
~~ '
a
-
, .
qip
'
. TABLE VII-1 '(Continued)
DOCUMENT RECORD CARD AUDIT SUMARY
,
Drawing-
LDRC/ Drawing #. E&DCR # N&D # Station #. Discrepancy
'
:EE-34DL :33 2 revs at station
EE-34JB 33 2 revs at station
- EE-34BE-- 33,31
'
..
FE29279 missing
PE7161 E&DCR marked void
~ EE-34JCl 33,31
-10349
9720
8070
'
EB-15Y 143,31
FP39301
5904
, FJ17866
ES-318L 143,31 DRC not current @ 31
10631
4879
4968
ES-31D. 143,31
5025
4304 o
FS26024
ES.-31E. 143,31
5904 '
FS23123
FJ15645
BZ-501A-1 143,31. DRC not current 9 143; l
4 missing summaries'
11078 missing
FJ40308
9837-
9230
FJ34694
BZ-515G-1 143,31 DRC missing @ 31
'10925
10683
CJ3035
VII-11
___
. _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
TABLE VII-1 (Continued)
DOCUMENT RECORD CARD AUDIT SUMMARY
Drawing
DRC/ Drawing # E&DCR # N&D # Station # Discrepancy
BZ-515K-1 143,31 missing summary
10934
FJ40812
10722
2170.430.565-138 143,31 DRC not current @ 31
FB39178 missing
FB38808
FB38480
2170.430.565-144 143,31 DRC not current @ 143;
2 missing summaries
FB3043 missing
FB40733
FB39302
FB38335
FB37820
2170.430.565-147 143,31 DRC not current @ 31;
missing summary
10061
FB39723
FB39302
LBZ-79C-1 62,31 3 missing summaries
10763
10777 missing
10654
10705
10813
FJ40581 missing
10656
10655
FJ40568 missing
BZ-79C-3 62,31 missing summary
-BZ-79C-7 62,31 6 missing summaries
BZ-79C-17 62,31 5 missing summaries
BZ-79C-77 62,31 5 missing summaries
BZ-79C-13 62,31
'
'BZ-79C-33 62,31 7 missing summaries
VII-12
. _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . ..
,
TABLE VII-1-(Continued)
DOCUMENT RECORD CARD AUDIT SUMMARY
,
Drawing
DRC/ Drawing # E&DCR # N&D # Station # Discrepancy
BZ-79C-49 62,31
BZ-79R 62,31 4 missing summaries
10311 missing
10690 missing
10692
10691
FJ37525
FJ36743
BZ-79R-2 62,31
BZ-79R-7 62,31
BZ-79R-17 62,31 4 missing summaries
'BZ-828-1 62,31 DRC not current @ 62
11252 missing
11136 missing
10516
10027
10519
-TJ-2078
*
-TJ-2044
FJ-34317
BZ-82B-20 62,31 missing summary
EE-3AMX 12,31
PE7099 missing
TC1661
EE-3QR 12,31
FE40194
DE233
-EE-9A 138,31
EE-9B 138,31
TE397
'
EE-9C 138.31
1TE372
FE21059
EE-90 138,31
FE34408.
.TE372
V.li 3
L'
o, -
.
, TABLE VII-1 (Continued)
DOCUMENT' RECORD CARD AUDIT SUMMARY
Drawing '
DRC/ Drawing # E&DCR # N&D # Station # Discrepancy
.EE-9E 138,31
FC21059
FE20793
i
'
EE-9AH. 138,31
PC134
lFE30057
FE29248
~EE-9AL 138,31 '
FE21059
l FE20793
EE-9R 138,31
FC21059
FE20793
JFE16126
EE-9W 138,31 missing. summary '
TE2347
TE1819
FE39660
FE38584
EK-501001 138,31
EK-501002 138,31-
EK-501021shi 138,31
.
EK-501021sh2 138,31 DRC missing 9 138;
DRC not current 9-31
EK-501049. 138,31
EK-501050 '138,31
EK-501065' .138,31
5EK-501083 138,31
,
EK-501084 .138,31 ,
EK-501136 138,31
EK-501137 138,31-
VII-14
.. .- . - .
.,
_
TABLE VII-1 (Continued)
DOCUMENT RECORD CARD AUDIT SUMMARY
Drawing
DRC/ Drawing # E&DCR #. N&D # Station # Discrepancy
EP-17G 34,31 drawing missing @ 34
.PP7188
FP36330 missing
FP35795
EP-71A 34,31 drawing missing @ 34
9736
FS38804
4700 missing
-
EP-72G 34,31 drawing missing @ 34
PR6335 .
PR6221
'PP5420
EP-72J 34,31 drawing missing @ 34
EP-72T 34,31 2 missing summaries
FP35921
8191
FP37554 missing
- EP-74P 34,31
TP2830- missing-
TP2334
FP38340-
-
EPL109C 34,31
FP31059. missing
PP5986 missing
,
v
$
VII-15
TABLE VII-2
SPECIFICATION AUDIT SUMMARY
Specification #. Subject E&DCR # N&D # Discrepancy
,
L2412.100-247 Electrical Penetrations spec missing from
control point
FE34301
FE36450
FC37909 posting error (NA to
this spec)
FE39071
FE36284 posting error, (not
listed on spec
Document Control Log)
2400.000-350 Electrical Installation
FE41022
FE40990
TE3090
- 2472.210-377 D/P Indicators &
Switches
TC645
TC693
FE33550
'
- 2190.371-442 Metal Siding and
Roof Decking
PS-4198
PS-5959
PS-6885
PS-7247
2170.430-565 HVAC Installation
10439
10426
10023
2472.310-683 RTD & Thermowells PQ5416
PC5929
12282.150-713 2" valves PP5925
PP7333
A235
'
2200.000-914 . Mech. Equip. Erection latest spec rev'not
filed; latest E&DCRs
not filed
VII-16
L
,w
TABLE VII-2.(Continued)
SPECIFICATION AUDIT SUMMARY
-Specification # Subject E&DCR # N&D # Discrepancy
-2472.800-943 Instrusentation
Installation
FC40336
FC40337
FC40983
TC2414
TC2750
2280.000-968 Ppg Fab & Erection E&DCRs not filed
properly (at one
control point)
latest spec rev and
addenda not filed;
latest E&DCRs not
filed (at another
control point)
Engineering Spec Index
did not show latest
spec addenda
l
VII-17
*
F.: ,
-
s
-TABLE VII-3
OIM AUDIT SUMMARY'
,
'
-0IM # Subject Discrepancy-
.
' 109-001A.- Personnel Air Lock
1140-001A Axial Flow-Fans All E&DCRs were noti
posted in CDC' log
154-003A- - 1500 lb valves
162-1A- MS Safety. Valves
'177-1A MS Isolation. Trip Valve
-190-2A- Orifice Plates
~ 241-001A Emergency Diesel Gen. EDC 0IM Index did not-
show latest rev; all'
E&DCRs were not posted
in CDC log; 1S-305-
data entry errors
244-001A Motor Control Center.
- 261-001A Static Inverter
:263-001A- AC Dist. Panels-
1943-001A- CPI Tube Fitting-
,
943-25B Photohelic. Press. Sw
-
f
-
VII-18
'
.c
L. ;
VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEMS
A. Objective
The corrective action systems and related activities were examined to
determine whether measures were established and implemented to assure
that nonconformances and other conditions adverse to quality were
promptly identified and corrected.
B. Discussion
An examination was made of the licensee's program for identification and
control of corrective actions, including review of sample documents and
inspection of some material / equipment for verification of actual cor-
rective actions in the plant. Items such as the following were
!
reviewed:
Procedures and organizational interfaces
*
. Trending
Audits and surveillances
*
Measures for identification and resolution of nonconformances
*
Measures to prevent recurrence
Control of equipment qualification nonconformances
Tracking of nonconformances
Stop work process
. Control of actual material and equipment corrections in the plant
Control of open nonconformances at turnover for testing or operation
The following procedures by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation
(SWEC), Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) and Northeast
Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) related to corrective action systems
were reviewed:
SWEC " Quality Assurance Program Manual," Rev. H
NUSCO " Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program Topical
l_ Report," Rev. 6
*
NUSC0/NNECO Nuclear Engineering and Operations Procedure (NE0)
2.11, " Trend Analysis From Quality-Related Documents," Rev. 1
SWEC Project-Test Program Directive (PTPD)
5.1, " Control of Nonconformances at Turnover," Rev. 3, Change No. 2
VIII-1
. . - _ - . _ _ ._ _ - _. ._ __. -_ _. _. . .
,
-
4
'
*-
SWEC Quality Standards-(QS):
3
~
2.3; Rev.LA, Stop_ Work Action
14.2,' Rev. F, Inspection' Report System
~
'15.1, Rev._B, Nonconformance & Disposition Report, Change No. 1
~
15.3, Rev. C, Risk Release of UNSAT/ Nonconforming i
-
Material / Equipment:
16.1,-Rev.-B, SWEC: Problem. Reporting System
;16.2,. Rev. , Notifying . Clients of Potential- 55(e)
116.3, Rev. A, Identifying and Reporting 10 CFR 21
18.1',1Rev.~B,- Quality Audit Program
14.1 ML, Rev. B, Post-Acceptance Work Control
*
SWEC Quality Assurance Directives (QAD):
14.1, Rev. D, Inspection Report System-
t
s '18.1,~ Rev. C,. Quality Assurance Audit System
.
118.'2, Rev. C,-Quality Audit plan
18.11, Rev. F, QA Program Audits of Sellers s ,
* ~
SWEC, Quality'Contro1' Instructions (QCI):
%
-FM3-514.2-06, Rev. A, Site QA Program Monitoring
FM3-S14.2-07, Rev.'C, ASME N-5 Inspections
*-
SWEC Northeast Administrative Manual (NEAM):
-
:
*
. .31, Rev.:7, Handling of Problem Reports, Reports of. Problems and -)
' Initial Problem Reports
-
68,'Rev. 5, Handling of,Nonconformance and Disposition Reports,-
Change No. 3
114, Rev. 1, Reportable.0ccurences Reports,- 10 CFR 50.55(e) and-
10 CFR 21- -
~* '
SWEC Field Construction ~ Procedures (FCP):
292, Rev. 1,: Disassembly / Reassembly of Components / Equipment
335, Rev.'2, Trend Analysis and Corrective Action Committee
' '
337, Rev.' 3, Preparing-Stress Reconciliation Piping Location-
'
Isometrics (PLIs)
' ~
'
'
-*
'
SWEC-Quality Assurance and. Control Manual,~ASME-Section III,
Division 1
'
;
'
lSection 15, Rev. J, Nonconformances
'
1. Corrective Action Measures
L ' a. ' Inspection Scope -
'
o
A review was performed of applicable portions of~the QA program and
procedures. A total of 263 corrective action documents were
reviewed and 10 material / equipment samples were inspected for
, '
' verification of corrective actions in the plant. _Also, three
-
-samples of risk releases were selected for-field verification of
L
- -
- +- _
L L n
__
control and status of work on material / equipment to correct the
deficient condition involved. Table VIII-1, " Corrective Action
Samples," contains a summary list of documents and material /.
equipment samples that were randomly selected and inspected.
b. Inspection Findings
In general, it was found that satisfactory procedures were in place
for corrective action systems to identify and correct conditions
adverse to quality at the site. _ Generally, except for concerns
discussed-below, the corrective action measures were found to be
acceptable. The 10 material / equipment samples requiring rework in
the plant were inspected and corrective action was verified. The
.three samples of risk releases were inspected and found to be
properly controlled. However, the following observations were made
.by the NRC CAT inspector:
(1) Nonconformance and Disposition Reports (N&Ds) and UNSAT
' Inspection Reports (irs) did not document actions or need for
actions to prevent recurrence of nonconformances. SWEC
representatives stated that, while no provision was made on
N&D and IR forms to document action to prevent recurrence,
such actions were provided by other means. It was stated that
the trending activities of the project required a review of
programmatic Type C irs, N&Ds and UNSAT Type A irs to identify _
nonconformances and negative treeds, and that the results of
such reviews would bring about action to prevent significant
recurrences. Also, SWEC representatives stated that the
practices at the site included action by discipline quality
control (QC) inspectors as well as construction supervisors, to
promptly notify responsible parties by interoffice correspond-
ence,-memorandums, or verbally to expedite review / action to
avoid recurrence of significant N&Ds and UNSAT irs.
This response was of concern to the NRC CAT inspector because
of these informal practices and delays in the trending program
to bring about action to avoid recurrence of significent
nonconformances.
This matter requires additional management attention to assure
that nonconformances requiring action to prevent recurrence are
promptly identified and appropriate action is taken.
(2) NUSCO Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Audit No. A-40958
(conducted 7/9/84-11/28/84) of preventive maintenance and
in place equipment storage documented findings regarding
improper preventive maintenance of mechanical and electrical
equipment. However, follow-up responses did not address the
damage that may have been caused due to improper maintenance.
Also, the NRC CAT inspectors found deficiencies (without correc-
tive action) in preventive maintenance of various mechanical
and electrical equipments. Refer to Section III.B.S.b for
details regarding mechanical equipment, and Section II.B.3.b(1)
L for details regarding electrical equipment. '
VIII-3
L
C. ;
^<
e.-
- -
- .
. ,
"
(3) Review of. Deficiency and Construction Work Permit (CWP).
. Reports by NNEC0 revealed an. increasing magnitude of open
. N&Ds, UNSAT. irs,f and other deficiencies. <
b A1 total _of'9,051.open items for approximately 200 system
; packages.(of a total of 245) already turned.over to NNECO was
noted as of March 21,:1985. - Also, the Master Deficiency List
. included in Deficiency _and CWP Report as of March 26, 1985~
showed an increase of open items for six reporting periods,
-
from 8,369 as'of January 30, 1985 to 9,021 as of March 16,
1985.
The concern is the increasing magnitude of open deficiencies-
to be resolvediafter-turnover to NNECO, with rework activities
proceeding under different' controls and conditions,.may. result
in decreased contro1~of. quality of such work to complete the
plant.
This matter requires special management attention.
'
-
-(4) Review of design. change control activities at the site revealed
2
deficiencies for which effective corrective actions were not :
, _ performed. .The followin'g.is a list of some such deficiencies:
*
Incorrect information printed on back of document record.
~
cards (DRCs). (Refer to Section VII.B.1.b.(3) for details.)
*'
-
,
~ Numerous recurring document control. problems at site
'
: drawing stations. (Refer to Section VII.B.1.b.(7) for
>
. details.).
i
*
, . Increasing number of design documents overdue for updating.
(Refer to Section VII.B.2.b.(2) for details.)
'"
Improved procedure for relating engineering and design
change requests.(E&DCRs) to originating project change
r ,
-requests (PCRs) was not. implemented. (Refer to Section
't -_VII.B.2.b.(3) for details.'):
- c .' Conclusions
Y -Weaknesses in the licensee's corrective action program were.found
in the following areas:
'
.
*
'
'
' Failure to promptly document the need for action to avoid
- recurrence of nonconformances.
"
*
-
' Lack of control of preventive maintenance and corrective action-
< '
for def.icient. preventive maintenance after turnover for
testing / operation.
*
l The increasing magnitude of nonconformances at turnover for .
,
testing / operation.
*
Failure to apply effective corrective actions for design change
. -control and document control deficiencies. <
VIII-4 <
-
n =
+ -
-
TABLE VIII-1
CORRECTIVE ACTION SAMPLES
ITEM :' QUANTITY EXAMINED
.'(1) Construction-Quality Assurance (CQA)- 6
~ Audit (NUSCO)-
-
-(2):?In' Process, Verification Report (IPV) (NUSCO) 5
T(3)J Surveillance Report'(NUSCO)
- 24
(4) Significant Deficiencies (SDs) (NUSCO) 4
(5)..QA Site Audit Report (SWEC-Corp.)
-
3
,
L(6) Audit of Contractor (SWEC-PQA) 1
:(7) ~N&D' Corrective' Action Committee Report 3
(Including N&D Trend Report) (SWEC)
-(8) QA Department Monthly Project Report (SWEC-FQC) 5
(9)- Monthly QA Progress. Meeting Report (SWEC) 3
-(10) Stop Work Directive (SWEC) 2
(11) Report of a Problem (ROAP) (SWEC)
-
4
~(12) Inspe'ction Report -Type C (SWEC) '53 *
~
(13) Inspection Report - Type A UNSAT (SWEC):
* Mechanical 10
* Piping 15
* HVAC 5
* Electrical -20
s -- * Instrumentation 15 i
* Structural
-- 'S-
.(14) Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) (SWEC):
* Mechanical- 8
* Piping' 10
, * Welding 9
* HVAC 6
* Electrical 12' --
L* Instrumentation- 5
* Structural 3
*~ Preventive. Maintenance 6
~(15) Risk Release (SWEC) 16
.
~
.'VIII-5
,
TABLE:VIII-1 (Continued)
CORRECTIVE ACTION SAMPLES
ITEM QUANTITY EXAMINED
(16) Installation Completion Report (SWEC)- 2
. (17) Deficiency and Construction Work Permit 2
(CWP) Report NNECO
SUB-TOTAL DOCUMENTS 263
(18) Material / Equipment Samples for Field 10
Verificatico of Corrective Action
(19) Risk Release Samples for-Field Verification of 3
Control'of Corrective Action
TOTAL SAMPLES 276
,
9
t . [ ?
f
VIII-6
,. . _ ._ . - . _ . . _ ._ _-
>
-
o .
ATTACHMENT-A
u , <
1< A. PERSONS CONTACTED
L The 'following ' list identifies licensee representatives and NRC personnel '
.present atithe exit meeting, licensee discipline coordinators for each
- area, Land individuals' contacted during the inspection.
1. Exit meeting
Licensee
11. Albee R. Lefebvre G. Pittman
G. Baston D. Miller P.-Quinlan
R. Busch E. Mroczha F.-Rothen
J. Crockett L. Nadeau .W. Rotherforhh
-J. Ferland D. Nordquist C. Schaffer
A. Silva
~
.M. Hess S. Orcfice_
R. Josh V. Papadopoli. R. Werner
-Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
R. Ackley G. Milley. R. Scannell
.W..Curtiss- L. Nace C. Sprouse
W. Emerson
"'
R. Plant G. Turner
f
'
R. Kelly R.. Rudis-
,
LNRC and Consultants
-T. Chan' E. McCabe A. Saunders -
R. Compton. J. McCormack .R. Serb
'E..Doolittle J. Partlow . W. Sperko
D. Ford H. Phillips: R. Starostecki
.R. Heishman T. Rebelowski E. Wenzinger
a 0. Mallon S. Reynolds
.
R. Wheeler.
1 W. Marini R. Rohrbacher H. Wong
E. MartindaleL
2. Licensee's Coordinators and Contacts
Area Name
,
' CAT Coordinator- L. Nadeau
W. Curtiss
-
' = Electrical. and- Instrumentation R. Clark
J4! < D. Evans i.. P. Hogan ,
'^-
R. Dietsel
Mechanical R.L Avery
C. Clement
R. Hagerman
,
L. Peterson
i G. Wilson [
, AA-1
'
(-' . E _ . _ . _ . . - _ _ _
.We_lding and NDE 'L. Peterson
W. Taylor
- N. Hamer
Civil and Structural R. Zawacki
A. Morales
~ Material _ Traceability' A. Little
Design Change Control R. Rudis'
~ Corrective Action Systems W.' Vos
In addition to the above personnel, numerous other inspectors, engineers,
and supervisory personnel were'also contacted.
.
.
4
'
k
<
d 4 .
;-
~
AA-2
L_-
-
~
B. ' Documents' Reviewed
The' types'of documents listed below were revi.ewed by the NRC CAT
members ~to the extent necessary to satisfy the. inspection objectives
-stated in Section I of this report. References to specific procedures,-
; specifications,-and drawings are contained within the body of the report.
: 1. Final Safety Analysis Report
2. Quality assurance manuals
-3. ~ Quality assurance procedures
,
4.1 Quality' control procedures
5. Administrative procedures
16. General electrical construction procedures and specifications-
7.- General instrumentation construction procedures and specifications
-
9 8.' ' General! piping and' pipe support installation procedures and
-specifications
9. General _ mechanical equipment installation procedures and
. specifications.
10. 2 General concrete specifications
.11. _As-built drawings
12. Welding and NDE procedures
,
~13. Personnel q'ualification records
l14.~ Material traceability procedures
15. Procedures for processing design changes
16. Procedures for document control-
- 17. Procedures for controlling as-built drawings
18 _ Procedures for_ processing nonconformances
-
'
AA-3
ATTACHMENT B
' GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AISC American Institute of Steel Construction, Inc.
ANNULUS. Containment Building Annulus
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society of Testing & Materials
AUX Auxiliary Building
AWG American Wire Gage
AWS American Welding Society
BLK Black
BLU Blue
CAT Construction Appraisal Team (NRC)
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CMP . Construction Methods Procedure
CMTR Certified Material Test Report
C of C Certificate of Compliance
CONT- . Containment Building
CQA Construction Quality Assurance
CTI Construction Team Inspection
CWP Construction Work Permit
DRC Document Record Card-
EA Engineering Assurance
EAP Engineering Assurance Procedure
E&DCR Engineering and Design Coordination Report
ESF Engineering Safety Features Building
ESS0W Engineering Service Scope.of Work
FCN Field Change Notice
FPC Field Construction Procedures
FQC Field Quality Control
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
GRN Green
GTAW Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
HVAC Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
ICEA Insulated Cable Engineers Association
IE Office of Inspection and Enforcement (NRC)
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IR Inspection Report
IS Information System
LIW Load Indicating Washers
MCB. Main Control Board
MCC . Motor Control Center
MSVB Main Steam Valve Building
N&D Nonconformance and Disposition Report
NDE Nondestructive Examination
NEAM Northeast Administrative Manual
NETM Northeast Technical Manual
NE0 Nuclear Engineering and Operations Procedure
NNECO Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
AB-1
e
ATTACHMENT B
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System
NUSCO Northeast Utilities Service Company
NUQAP Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program
NVEC0 Northeast Ventilation Company
OIM Operating, Installation and Maintenance Manual
ORG Orange
PCR Project Change Request
PLI Piping Location Isometric
PTPD Project Test Program Directive
PWHT Post Weld Heat Treatment
QA Quality Assurance
QAAD Quality Assurance Auditing Division
QAD Quality Assurance Directives
QC Quality Control
QCI Quality Control Instruction
QS Quality Standards
RG- Regulatory Guide (NRC)
ROAP Report of a Problem
RPS Reactor Protection System
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SEG SWEC Site Engineering Group
SIH High Pressure Safety Injection
SMA Shielded Metal Arc
SMAW Shielded Metal Arc Welding
SWEC' Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
TR Trouble Report
TVS Thames Valley Steel-Corporation
UNSAT -Unsatisfactory
UT Ultrasonic Test
VIR Vendor Information Request
WHT. White
WPS- . Weld Procedure Specification
AB-2
u
,
NRC Form 8-C
(4-79)
NRCM 0240
COVER SHEET FOR CORRESPONDENCE
! Use this Cover Sheet to Protect Originals of Multi-Page Correspondence.
i
}}