ML20129D201
| ML20129D201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8506060058 | |
| Download: ML20129D201 (39) | |
Text
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ORigMLICA UNITED ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Vote on Lifting Immediate Effectiveness of 1979 Shutdown Orders for TMI-1/
Discussion if Necessary Docket No.
PUBLIC MEETING
(
l Location:
Washington, D.C.
Dator Wednesday, May 29, 1985 Pages:
1 - 36 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES g6060050050529 Court Reporters 10 FN PT9.7 1625 I St., N.W.
( -
PDR Suite 921
<ph Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 1
e i
1 D I SCLA l MER 2
3 4
5 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Wednesday, a
May 29, 1985 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracles.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 Informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of cpinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Cavaission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement' 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorize.
22 1
I C3 i
24 25
1 9
4 1
UNITED STATES 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
public Meeting 6
7 Vote on Lifting immediate Effectiveness e
of 1979 Shutdown Orders for TMl-1 9
Discussion if Necessary 10 11 Roam 1130 12 1717 H Street, N.W.
13 Washington, D.C.
14 Wednesday, May 29, 1985 15 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 16 p.m.,
Nunzio palladino, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
17 COMMISSIONERS pRESENT:
18 Nunzio palladino, Chairman 19 Thomas Roberts, Commissioner 20 James Asselstine, Commissioner 21 Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner 22 Lando Zech, Commissioner 23 STHFF SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
24 Samuel Chilk, Secretary 25 Herzel plaine, General Counsel s
s e
2 1
AROCEED i NGS 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Good afternoon, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
4 The purpose of today's meeting la to call for a 5
Commission vote on whether or not to lift the immediately 6
effective shutdown orders that were entered for Three Mlle 7
island Unit 1 in 1979.
S We will begin the meeting by asking the General 9
Counsal to summarize the draft order pending before the 10 Commission which would lift the 1979 shutdown orders.
11 Immediately following that summary, I will ask for 12 individual Commissioner questions or comments.
At that time 13 Commissioners are free to state their respective positions on 14 the issuance of a draft order.
15 After we have heard from Individual Commissioners on 16 the draft order, I will call for a vote.
if the Commission 17 approves an order, then I would anticipate that the order 18 would be actually lasued later today or tomorrow, 19 There is a possibility that some person may be 20 planning demonstrations or disruptions for today's meeting.
I 21 would hope that you would not do that, so that we can carry on l
22 the business at hand.
l 23 I ask all of you to please keep the meeting as 24 orderly as pogsible, without such demonstrations or l
25 disruptions, b
o i
3 1
Do Commissioners have other opening remarks at'this 2
time?
3 CQMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO Then let me turn the meeting 5
over to our General Counsel. Herzel plaine.
6 MR. ALM I NF. 6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 7
Commiaaion.
9 Three M6le Island Unit 1 was a licensed nuclear 9
power station that had been operating for approximately five 10 years before the March 1979 accident that disabled Three Mlle 11 Island Unit 2.
12 At the time of the TMI-2 accident, TMl-1 was in a 13 temporary shutdown undergoing a routine refueling.
The 14 Commission, on July C and August 9, 1979, issued orders 15 directing TMl-1 to remain in a shutdown condition.
Although 16 ordinarily the Licensee -- then Metropolitan
- Edison Company --
17 would have been entitled to a hearing on the orders before 18 they went into effect, in this case the Commission determined 19 that the public health, safety and interest required that the 20 orders be made immediately effective.
21 This meant that TM1-1 would not be allowed to return 22 to operation until the Commission lifted the immediate 1
l 23 effectiveness of the shutdown orders.
Extensive hearings have L
24 now been held on whether TMl-1 could be allowed to resume 25 operation.
e 4
1 Only two issues both management-related -- remain 2
pending before the agency, in that regard the agency's 3
appellate review of the Licensing Board's favorable decision 4
on the adequacy of Licensee's training program is underway, 5
and the Licensing Board is currently preparing its decision on 6
the Dieckamp mallgram lasue.
7 The order before the Commission today, after setting 8
forth the Commission's overall views on Licensee's competence 9
and Integrity, discusses the substance of the two remaining 10 lasues and the procedural lasues raised by the parties.
11 The order concludes that the two remaining 12 management-related lasues do not raise concerns warranting 13 maintaining the immediate effectiveness of'the shutdown orders 14 and, therefore, that lifting the effectiveness of those orders 15 is required.
16 With regard to Licensee's training program, the 17 order finds that after three exhaustive hearings and a l
18 Licensing Board decision favorable to the Licensee, there are 19 no concerns about the adequacy of Licensee's training program 20 which would warrant maintaining the effectiveness of the 1
l 21 shutdown orders.
22 Concerning the Dieckamp mallgram issue, the order 23 states that under the present organizational structure and j
24 procedures, Mr. Dieckamp's continued presence would not, could 25 not adversely affect the safe shutdown of TMI-1.
I i
s y
5 1
In sum, the order finds that Spu-Nuclear, the i
2 current Licensee at TMI-1, represents a significantly improved i
3 organization over Metropolitan Edison Company, in terms of 4
personnel, organizational structure, procedures and resources.
l l
5 The order also finds that the pre-accident 6
management faults at TM1-1 have been corrected, such that 7
there is reasonable assurance that TMl-1 can and will be 8
safely operated.
9 CApplause.3 10 However, because the plant has been shut down for 11 over six years, the order does impose two conditions which 12 must be met pelor to restart 1
13 First, Licensee la to submit for Staff approval a l
14 power ascension schedule with hold points at appropriate 15 levels, at appropriate power levels.
16 And two, the HMC Staff is to provide the Commission l
17 for its information a general description of a program for 18 Increased NMC Staff oversight of operators at TMI-1.
19 The NMC Staff on May 29, 1985 certified that all 20 other conditions which must be met pelor to restart have been 21 met.
22 Therefore, the order would authorize TM1-1 to return 23 to operation, subject to satisfactory completion of the two 24 conditions imposed in today's order.
25 Finally, the order will not become immediately
.-- =_. -
6 1
effective upon issuance so as to provide aggrieved parties a 2
limited time to seek relief in the federal courts.
t i
f 3
Therefore, the issue that you will be voting on is 4
whether to approve the draft order before you which would lift 5
the immediate effectiveness of the July 2 and August 9, 1979 6
shutcown orders.
7 The approved order would have the effect of 8
authcrizing the restart of TM1-1 subject to comp l e t i on of the 9
conditions imposed in the order.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINOr Does that complete your 11 statement?
12 MR. PLAINE:
That comulates my statement.
13 CHAIRMAN pALLAOlNO:
All right, thank you.
14 At this time I will ask for Commissioner questions 15 or comments.
As l' indicated in my opening remarks, individual 16 Commissioners may at this time state their respective 17 positions on the issuance of the draft order.
18 I will go first and then call on other Commissioners 19 in order of seniority on the Commission.
20 1 do not have any further questions on the draft 21 order, but I would like to state my position on issuance of 22 the draft order.
l 23 The decision on whether or not to lift the 24 immediately effective shutdown orders placed on Unit 1 at 1
[
25 Three Mlle island in 1979 has not been an easy one for me.
7 1
Extensive expressions of concern have been raised by many 2
local citizens and political leaders.
Last week the 3
Commission heard many of these concerns re-expressed in oral 4
presentations on TMl-1 Restart.
As a pennsylvanian, I know 5
first-hand the reaction of some of the public during those 6
stressful days following the accident at TMI-2, 7
The Commission has given careful attention to public 8
concerns through its attention to the underlying health and 9
safety questions in this case.
indeed, the Congress, in the 10 Atomic Energy Act, has directed the NRC to make decisions 11 regarding the licensing of nuclear reactors, such as this one, 12 on the basis of its own expert health and safety judgment and la analysis of whether the detailed regulatory requirements of 14 the Commission have been satisfied.
15 Thus, while we are aware of the sentiment of many 16 members of the public,*the Commission must base its decision 17 to authorize restart on its conclusion that there is 10 reasonable assurance that the plant will be operated safely.
19 I am voting to lift the shutdown orders and allow 20 operation of Three Mlle Island Unit I because I am confident 21 that GPU-Nuclear can and will abide by NRC requirements and 22 will operate Unit I so that public health and safety will be 23
' adequately protected.
24 My confidence is based on (1) the four favorable 25 partial Initial decielons of the Licensing Board after
e 8
1 extensive public hearinge s 12) the NMC Staff's review and 2
conclusion, sustained in the hearings, that the shutdown 3
orders should be lifted 6 and IS) my own review of the 4
available information as discussed in the proposed order.
P 5
My confidence is bolstered by the greater-than-usual l
6 NMC regulatory scrutiny that will be given to this Licensee t
7 and this plant during the initial start-up.
Our inspectors 8
will be there to oversee the Licensee's activities during this 7
9 Important time period.
[
l 10 l continue to believe that the Commission was 11 correct in its February 1945 decialen not to hold more l
12 hearings on additional topics.
There already have been more 13 than 150 days of hearings.
In addition, the Commission'ltself 14 spent countless hours on the TMl-1 restart matter, including i
15 sessions in Harrisburg, 16 it is important to recall that in 1979 the 17 Commission stated that the public hearing called for in the
.te shutdown orders was to resolve concerns so as to provide i
19 reasonable assurance that the facility could be operated l
20 without endangering the health and safety of the public.
l 21 Thus, the question that needed to be answered about i
L 22 the additional topics for hearings was whether or not the 23 topics would bear upon a decision to keep Unit 1 shut down.
24
'The information that was considered by the Commission in l
i l
25 making its deelslon not to hold further hearings, and the i
I y
9 l
1 reasons for these decielons, are public and i believe they 2
support that decision.
3 The Commission's February 1945 order addressed 4
specific matters proposed for further hearings at that time, i
l 5.
These included (1) the likely change in the Staff's position 6
in Supplement 5 of the Safety Evaluation Reports (2) the 7
handling of allegations by Mr. Richard parks, a former gechtel 8
operations engineer, regarding violations of TMI-2 clean-up 9
proceduress (3) the Hartman allegations on TMl-2 leak-rate 10 falsification and (4) allegations of TM1-1 leak-rate 11 falsifications.
I believe a belof comment on each of these 12 items is in order.
13 With regard to the question of the likely change of 14 the Staff's position, there were four issues raised by the 15 Staff.
The Commission's February 1985 order explained the 16 reasons for concluding that none of these issues posed a 17 significa'nt safety matter.
18 Two of those issues relate to Itama on which we held 19 hearings, and the remaining two items hold no continuing 20 significance because they relate to Individuals who no longer 21 are involved in operating TMl-1, 22 With regard to the parks matter, this had to do with 28 TNi-2.
The facts were investigated and harassment of 24 Mr. parks was found.
However, no widespread pattern of 25 discelmination, harassment or intimidation was shown, and the
10 1
major OpU-Nuclear official involved is no longer with TM1-1 or 2
OPU-Nuclear organizations.
Thus, this is a TM1-2 lasue.
3 With regard to the Hartman matter, as a separate 4
item, we have ordered that all individuals who were suspect in 5
the THI-2 leak-rate falsification are to be covered by a 6
future hearing, with the exception of those Individuals that 7
were found by the U.S.
Attorney not to have participated in, 8
directed, condoned, or been aware of the acts or omissions 9
that were the subject of the Hartman Indictment.
10 We also found, on the basis of a separate NRC 11 investigation, that it was unlikely that Mr. Ross know or was 12 Involved in the TMI-2 leak-rate falsification.
Thus, the 18 Hartman matter as a restart issue has beun dealt with.
14 The TM1-1 leak-rate falsification allegations have 15 been investigated by NRC, but no pattern of deliberate 16 falsification was found.
The Commission found that there was 17 no significant factual disputes concerning leak-rate practices 18 at TMl-1, and that the facts are currently known did not raise 19 a significant safety issue which might have led the Licensing 20 Board to reach a different result.
21 i believe that the major management faults which 22 n=lsted in 1979 have been corrected.
The current organization 28 is a different and improved organization frem the one which 24 operated Three Mlle Island in 1979.
It is a significantly 25 improved organization in terms of personnel, organizational
11 1
structure, procedures and resources.
I am satisfied that the 2
pre-accident management faults have been corrected.
3 public confidence is a key issue for GAU-Nuclear 4
and TMI-1, and f'or nuclear energy and its regulators.
Public 5
confidence must be earned over and over again, in the case of 6
THi-1, the public confidence was damaged by events surrounding 7
the accident at TMI-2.
SpU-Nuclear has publicly stated that S
excellence is its standard and has made changes aimed at 9
fulfilling that goal.
The NMC and, I am sure, the public will 10 be monitoring their performance closely.
11 in closing, let me reiterate my view that the 1979 12 shutdown ordere should be 'Iftede, thus allowing TMI-l to 13 resume operation subject to the conditions set forth in this 14 order.
I believe that this can and will be done with 15 reasonable assurance that public health and safety will be 16 adequately protected.
17 CApplause.3 1e Let me turn now to Commissioner Roberts.
19 COMMISSIONER ROgERTS I have no questions.
I have 20 a brief statement.
21 in August 1979 the Commission ordered TMi-1 to 22 remain shut down and a hearing to be held to determine whether 1
i 23 Its further operation should be allowed.
24 At the time they ordered the hearing, the five 25 Conmissioners who then held office anticipated that a decialen
)
12 1
on restart would be reached in approximately one year.
That p
2 assumption turned out to be overly opt'mistic.
Almost six N
3 years have elapsed and now the hearings on?all issues believed 4
by a majority of the presently incumbent Canmissioners to be 5
material to a restart decision have been completed.
No one 6
who was a Commissioner at the time the hearing was ordered is 7
a member of the Commission.
The record of proceedings is a x
8 massive one.
The Licensing Board charged by the Commission in g
taking evidence and reachinD an'in6tlal decialen has made 10 f indings f avorable to restart.
~
11 Noreover, the Appeal Board and, the Commission have 12 completed appellate review of all hardware design issues. all 13 emergency planning issues, and a l l'. ena nagemen t, i ssubs ex cep t 14 the training and mellgram lasues consid3r,td by the t.icensing 15 board on romand.
x 16 bnly if we have sufficient remaining concerns s
17 regarding favorable resolution of the training and mallgram 18 lasues to warrant maintaining the' effectiveness of the
.\\
ig
-shutdown order can we legitimt.tely de.;so.
The law requires 20 the lifting of an immediately effective license sumpension 21 once the concerns that justified imposing i t ha6/e been 22 adequately resolved.
23 That being so, and having neither found or been 24 provided any letitimate reason to delay any longer a decielon 25 on lifting the immediate effectiveneet. of the license
o 13 1
suspension imposed in July of 1979, I believe the Commission 2
has a duty to make its decision now.
3 Therefore, although I do not doubt the sincerity of 4
the concerns expressed by those who oppose a res t ar t dec i s ion -
5 now, and I am aware of but cannot agree with the fears of 6
those who believe the plant should never restart, I will vote 7
to allow restart.
8 Thank yeu.
9 CApplause.3 10 CHAIRMAN PALLAOINO:
Let me turn now to Commissioner 11 Asselstine.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have a detailed written 13 dissent that will be attached to the Commission's order, but 14 this afternoon in my oral statement I want to spend just a few 15 minutes summarizing my principal objections to the 16 Commission's decision to allow restart of TMl Unit 1.
17 One reason for the Commission's 1979 decision to 18 shut down TMl-1 was that the Commission had questions about 19 the management capabilities of Metropolitan Edison, the 20 predecessor to GPU-Nuclear 21 The utility had, after all, presided over the worst j
22 accident ever at a commercial nuclear power plant in this 23 country.
The Commission set up a Licensing Board to hear the i
24 evidence and to decide whether Spu-N had the requisite 25 corporate <tharacter and competence to be permitted to operate 1
f 14 1
TMI-1.
2 The Licensing Board's conclusion was favorable, but 3
in the years since the accident new evidence has come to' light 4
repeatedly which cast continued doubt on GpU-N's competence 5
and integrity.
This is one reason this proceeding has lasted 6
for six years.
7 in its order today the Commission 1 heaves a sigh of 4
8 relief and concludes that all questions about the management 9
capabilities of GAU-N have been satisfactorily answered, and 10 that OpU-N may be permitted to restart TMI-1.
11 I cannot agree with the Commission's conclusion.
12 CApplause.3 13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
please let Commissioner 14 Asselstine continue.
15 CContinued applause.]
16
~ COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The Commission has managed 17 to identify the primary question which must be answered:
Does 18 the Licensee exhibit the corporate integrity necessary-for'the 19-Commission to be confident that the licensee will operate the 12 0 plant safely.
Unfortunately, the Commission's decision-making 21 process has not been able to produce a dispositive answer to 22 this question.
23 This is primarily because the Commission has either 24 ignored or discounted important issues, and because the 25 Commission's approach to the --
^
15 1
CApplause.3 2
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And because-the 3
Commission's approach to the management integrity issues, 4
since the end of the Licensing Board proceeding in 1981, has 5
been a piecemeal one.
6 Each time evidence of a new transgression has come 7
to light, the Commission has chosen to deal'with that 8
particular issue in isolation.
While acknowledging that a 9
pattern of misbehavior would be significant, the Commission 10 has refused t'o see such a pattern in the history of GpU's 11 actions or inactions.
12 CApplause.]
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Even in considering the 14 various individual parts of the puzzle, the Commission has 15 Ignored the fact that there continue to be pieces missing 16 which leaves gap's in our information and precludes us from 17 discerning the whole picture.
18 The Commission has been satisfied with shuffling 19 around individuals as a solution to GpU's problems.
20 CApplause.]
4' 21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
This approach quite simply 22 begs the central question in this proceeding.
The character, 23 integrity, and attitude of our Licensees is a matter of 24 fundamental importance.
The Commission must be able to rely 25 on our Licensees to provide accurate and timely information.
16 1
A lack of candor or truthfulness in Licensee submittals to the 2
NRC~ undermines NRC regulation and poses a threat to the public 3
health and safety.
4 The Commission must also be able to rely upon 5
Licensees to have the commitment and willingness to implement 6
their programs in an effective manner and with a dedication to 7
safety as the first priority.
8 Finally, the Commission must be able to rely upon a 9
Licensee to comply with NRC requirements.
A consistent 10 pattern of violating the Commission's regulations may show a 11 lack of corporate integrity, such that future compliance 12 cannot be assured, thus demonstrating that the Licensee cannot 13 be relied upon to act in accord with a commitment to the 14 public health and safety.
15-What does an examination of the actions and 16 inactions of GpU over the past six years show us?
17 This is a Licensee which had the worst accident in 18 the history of nuclear power in this country.
One would 19 expect that such a Licensee would learn from its mistakes and 20 would want to strive for excellence in order to avoid even.the 21 possibility of such an accident ever occurring again at one of 22 its plants.
23 Instead, the history shows us a Licensee which has 24 been unwilling or unable to provide to the Commission accurate 25 and complete information on significant safety issues.
It
l r
17 1
shows us a Licensee which has been unwilling or unable to 2
recognize its own problems, to acknowledge responsibility for 3
its missteps, and to take quick, effective action to uncover 4
the causes.of those problems and to resolve them.
5 It shows us a Licensee with a pattern of violating
.6 Commission regulations for the sake of expediency, a pattern 7
which began before the accident and which continues even to 8
this day.
9 CApplause.]
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One sees this history of 11 failures on the part of this Licensee in the widespread 12 falsification of leak rate tests at TMI-2 prior to the 13 accident, the events which led to the utility's conviction for 14 criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act, in the material
'alse statement made by the Licensee to the NRC in responding 15 f
i 16 to the Notice of Violation resulting from the TMI-2 accident,
- 17 and in the cheating on NRC and company operator licensing 18 examinations and in the company's poor response to the 19 cheating incident.
20 The Licensee's failures also inciude the knowing 21 false certification of an employee's qualifications for taking 22 an NRC reactor operator examination, the failure to provide 23 relevant safety reports to the NRC in a timely manner, the 24 deliberate circumvention of safety requirements in the TMI-2
- 25 cleanup, and the Licensee's poor performance in ensuring that
18 1
safety equipment is fully qualified to perform its intended 2
function in the harsh environments resulting from a severe 3
accident like that which occurred at TMl-2.
4 Each of these events is discussed in detail in my 5
written dissent.
6 What the record of this proceeding shows is that 7
this Licensee has a consistent pattern of violating Commission 8
regulations.
The most recent evidence seems to show that this 9
pattern has continued, rather than it has been broken as the 10 Commission concludes.
11 I recognize that there have been many personnel and 12 organizational changes at TMI-1s however, given the history 13 and the seeming continuation of an inadequate commitment to 14 safety by this corporation, I am unable to conclude that GpU-N 15 has the requisite corporate integrity and competence, such 16 that we can have reasonable assurance that GpU-N can be relied 17 upon in the future to comply with NRC requirements and to act 18 in accordance with a commitment to the public health and 19 safety.
20 I am also unable to conclude that there is 21 reasonable assurance that this utility has the requisite 22 corporate character and integrity, because there are 23 significant gaps in the record of this proceeding.
On those 24 issues which the Commission has considered and which have not 25 been considered by a Licensing Board, the Commission's basic
19 1
approach has been to treat each issue in isolation.
The 2
solution to each issue has been to allow GpU-N to transfer 3
those individuals primarily responsible for various Licensee 4
failures to other parts of the GpU organization, not 5
responsible for the actual physical operation of the TMI-1 6
plant.
7 By following this piecemeal approach, the Commission 8
has refused to take a larger view of the Licensee's corporate 9
character or to address the root causes of OpU-N's problems in 10 the areas of corporate character.
11 The Commission has instead been satisfied with 12 band-aid, short-term fixes.
13 CApplause.3 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The Commission has not 15 addressed the issue of why this Licensee continues in its
+
16 patterr. of (diting to adhere to requirements or whether the 17 band-aid fixes really solve the underlying problems.
18 1 recognize that this broader integrity question is 19 not an easy issue to-address.
What is needed is an integrated 20 look at all of those integrity issues to determine what are 21 the root causes, why does this corporation seem to be 22 unwilling or unable to comply with regulations, and what 23 remedial actions are necessary to ensure future compliance.
24 The sub-issues are many and complex, and there are 25 massive amounts of information which must be considered and
20 1
experts to be consulted.
The Commission isn't really equipped 2
to do all~of this, but our Licensing Boards are particularly 3
useful in and perfectly capable of performing this function.
4 The Commission seems to have recognized this when it 5
established this proceeding in 1979 and decided to have a 6
Licensing Board consider the issues first.
In the interest of -
7 expedience, however, the Commission has chosen now not to 8
follow this more reasonable approach and allow the Licensing 9
Board to consider all of the relevant information on this 10 issue.
l 11 A further benefit to a hearing would be that the 12-gaps in the formal adjudicatory record would be cured.
Much b'
13 of the information relied upon by the Commission in making its-i 14 immediate effectivness decision today and its decision on 15 whether future hearings are necessary has never been the 16 subject of a formal hearing, as.the Commission said its 17 decision would be when it set up the proceeding in 1979.
18 While we have much information and the Staff's 19 conclusions about present management, the Licensing Board has 20 never been given an opportunity to hear the information,: and 1
-21 the parties have not been given an opportunity to test that i
22 information in an adjudicatory. setting.
Written comments on
)
)
23 written' reports are hardly an adequate substitute for the 24 in-depth treatment these issues would receive in a hearing.
l 25-In my dissent to the Commission's February 25th
21 1
order, I identified several issues which I believe 2
specifically ought to be heard by the Licensing Board to make 3
the record complete.
This would further enable the Licensing 4
Board to address the issue of whether all necessary remedial 5
actions have been taken to ensure Licensee competence and
'6 Integrity.
7 Still another benefit of hearing on these issues 8
would be to increase public confidence in our decision-making 9
and in the safety of the plant.
The people of Central 10 pennsylvania are not unreasonable.
All most of them want 11 before TMI-1 is permitted to restart is to know that the NRC 12
' carefully considered all of the evidence and did the best' it 13 could.to ensure that TMI-1 will be operated safely.
14 Having been forced to endure one serious nuclear 15 power plant accident, the people of Central pennsylvania 16 deserve nothing less than a full and searching inquiry into 17 every relevant safety issue before TMI-1 is allowed to 18 restart.
19 CApplause.]
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Above all else, the 21 Commission owes it to them to make every effort to ensure that 22 TMI-1 will operate safely.
Unfortunately, by its actions 23 today, the Commission is turning its back on that 24 responsibility.
25 The Commission's decision-making process and its
_---m-
22 1
refusal to allow further hearings has not promoted public 2
confidence.
Rather it has only served to harden opposition to a
restart and to cause needless distress for the people of the 4
TMI area.
5 CApplause.3 6
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Without the completion of 7
hearings on certain management competence and Integrity 8
issues, I am unable to concluds that there is reasonable 9
assurance that OpU-N will operate TMl-1 safely.
Given an 10 opportunity through further hearings on these issues, it is 11 possible that GpU-N could provide suf f icier t evidence to 12 establish that its present organization has; the requisite
(
13 competence and integrity to operate TMl in a safe manner.
But 14 since the Commission has refused to hold further hearings, 1 15 must reach'my decision based upon the record now before us.
16 The present record leads to one clear and 17 inescapable conclusion.
This Licensee has failed to 18 demonstrate that it is fit to hold an NRC license to operate a 19 nuclear power plant.
20 CApplause.3 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
please be seated.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
For that reason, I cannot 23 join the Commission's order which permits restart of TMt 24.
Unit-1 25 That completes my statement.
28 1
CApplause.3 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you, Commissioner S
Asselstine.
4 Let me turn next to Commissioner Bernthal.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL':
1, too, have a longer 6
version of this which will be available immediately after the 7
meeting.
I am sure no one here will object to getting the 8
short form today.
9 This decision today on TMI-1 restart and the 10 Commission's earlier vote on February 1S represent the most 11 visible failure to date of that illusive ideal and 12 disappearing ideal, I should say, in this city, of the 18 collegial decision-making process.
14 it has been evident for more than a year that the 15 basis existed for a Commission consensus decision on this 16 issue.
Unfortunately, the decision-making process, as 17 contrived by your Congress and your Commission, permits such 18 an outcome only as a long-shot, random, chance, coincidence 19 and views among Commissioners.
20 (Jhat the Commission and the public have lost, as the 21 Commission wandered down this unwise and ill-considered pcth 22 toward the restart vote today, is the opportunity to see a job 28 done convincingly and done right.
Instead, the Commission 24 has, in all likelihood, set the stage for endless wrangling-25 over what is done and what is undone, what is known and what
24 1
is unknown, what is true and what is untrue in these six years 2
and thousands of pages of on-the-record and off-the-record TMI 3
proceedings.
4 I suspect that only the lawyers may delight in this 5
decision today, because their future is assured.
6 CApplause.]
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I find the Commission's 8
methodology for restart to be crudely insensitive to what 9
should be a paramount concern, public confidence.
10 CApplause.]
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The Commission majority's 12 path for restart runs contrary to the broad public interest 13 and knowing all that can be learned about events leading up to 14 and following the accident at TMl, where the Commission should 15 have gone the extra mile in the case of providing support, for 16 example, for the pennsylvania Department of public Health's 17 fong-term health effects study and its receptiveness to the i
18 urgent pleas a few weeks ago of the TMI Advisory panel to 19 serve as a conduit for public concerns.
20 in the far-reaching decision in February not to 21 clear the air on all r ema i n i ng questions outstanding, the 22 Commission has instead chosen to go only the extra inch.
23 Indeed, the history of TMI has been a history of 24 such mistakes.
No-one would argue about the mistakes that led 25 to the accident itself, but early on in the wake of the
25 1
accident, there should have been less concern in all circles 2
-- local, state, and national -- for the possible consequences 3
of a utility bankruptcy and more concern for an expeditious 4
cleanup of the world's worst nuclear accident.
5
[ Applause.3 6
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The Congress failed to act 7
first and determine responsibility later in getting about the 8
urgent business of cleanup.
What other country in the world, 9
given the circumstances, would have haggled over the 10 responsibility or even the dollars first, and have then left 11 cleanup of the worst nuclear commercial power plant accident 12 to an uncertain future in the hands of an uncertain utility?
\\
13 Then the Commission itself contrived an 14 ill-conceived hybrid proceeding, neither fish nor fowl, 15 neither adjudicatory nor enforcement, a proceeding that 16 virtually precluded any possibility of orderly and timely 17 resolution of the issues.
18 And I have to say, I do not have particular 19 admiration for the way this Licensee conducted many of its 20 affairs before, during, or since the accident.
In a 21 real-world competitive market, ur.pr o t ec t ed by regulation at 22 all levels of government, such grievous mistakes would cost 23 you the store.
24
[ Applause.3 25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Nevertheless, despite the
_~
~ _.
26 1
occasional desires of some Commissioners to act as a surrogate 2
Board of Directors for this Licensee --
3 CApplause.]
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
that is emphatically not 5
the function of this Commission.
For all the breast-beating 6
that has gone on over the last several years about management 7
competence and integrity, it is still wonderfully strange, to G
me at least, that no Commissioner has ever raised more than a 9
halfhearted, second-thought question as to the same 10 management's credentials and abilities to operate another 11 plant at Oyster Creek in New Jersey.
12 CApplause.]
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And no Commissioner has ever 14-mounted a serious attempt to shut down or prohibit further 15 operations at that site.
One is led to expect that that old 16 flogging horse so useful to avoid difficult decisions, the 17 questions of management integrity and competence has more to 18 do with suspicions than with supportable basis in fact.
19 While I could continue at length to analyze and 20 ponder and pontificate, which I'm good at, on which issues are 21 closed, half-closed, or open, that would now serve little 22 purpose.
Whether this or that action, inaction, deed or j
j 23 misdeed renders GpU management fit or unfit, better or worse 24 than average, will not assuredly be debated for years.
25 Not one member of the Commission sitting here today
27 1
was present at the creation of this thing, and I find no 2
optimism or reason in the Commission's action of Feoruary 13th 3
that anyone here sitting today will see it brought to an end.
4 By now it is quite clear, I think, where the 5
Commission decision today is headed, and although I take 6
strong exception to the majority's disregard for what I 7
consider to be elementary and neglected public policy 8
considerations, it is also essential that where confidence is 9
-deserved in this decision, confidence should be fostered.
10 Before the arguing ensues, the public deserves to 11 know, whether by objective evaluation of the physical 12 preparation of this plant and by all reasonable measures of 13 Licensee management, personnel, and capability, I find that 14 TMI-1 can and will, with reasonable assurance, and then some, 15 l might add for the case of TMI, be operated in conformance 16 with t'h e requirement to preserve the public health and safety.
17 On February 13, the majority of this Commission 18 decided in its order that no further hearings were required as 19 a part of the TMl restart proceedings.
I agreed with the 20 majority at that time that further hearings were not required 21 as a legal matter.
I believed at that time and still believe 22 that"it is important, indeed critical, that our decisions be 23 decisions that will pass legal muster.
24 However, there is and always has been more-involved 25 in this matter than strict legality.
No available information
28
'l 1
leads me to believe also that a decision otherwise favorable 2
to restart would be impacted, as a legal matter, by further 3
examination of the issues identified either by me or by my 4
colleague, Commissioner Asselstine.
More importantly.
5 although sound public policy considerations dictate to me that 6
further hearings should have been held, I firmly believe that 7
as a technical matter, this facility can now be operated in a 8
manner wholly consistent with public health and safety.
9 Technical judgments that is, judgments regarding 10 the actual safety of a particular facility -- can best be made 11 in comparison to accepted standards of safety at other plants, 12-which the Commission has licensed to operate.
Technical
'l 18 issues of safety at TMI-1 are, for the most part, to issues at 14 other pressurized water reactors, and in particular to other 15 Babcock & Wilcox plants now operating.
16 Insofar as the procedures, the systems, and 17 operating crews are similar to other licensed facilities, the 18 Important question becomes whether_these procedures, systems, 19 management and operating teams are equal to or better than 20 that which is accepted and consistent with safe operation of 21 other plants.
22 All available information suggests that TMl-1 23 measures up well to that standard.
24 Having said this, I must also say that to the extent 25 I can do so, consistent with my mandate to protect public
f-29 1
health and safety, I do not intend, nor have I made a practice 2
of hcIding an otherwise appropriate Commission decision 8
hostage to the mistakes and poor judgment of this or previous 4
Commissions.
5 It is also in the public interest that the six year 6
suspension of operations at TMl-1 be lifted, when it is 7
obviously safe to do so.
Indeed, the law requires the O
Commission to do so.
9 There is clearly no reconciling that fact with my 10 dissatisfaction over the tortuous path the Commission has 11 chosen now to take us from June 1994 to June 1985, and I am i
12 sure, beyond.
18 The action of the Commission mr.jority in closing the i
14 record in this case might not inspire much public confidence 15 in the wisde-or common sense of the Commission, but the 16 public can and should have confidence that this plant is 17 indeed ready for operation, that it meets or exceeds the 18 standards the Commission has laid down and requires at 93 19 other plants in this company, from San Onofre to St. Lucie, l
l 20 from Grand Gulf to Oyster Creek.
21 I therefore will lend my concurrence to the vote of 22 the majority today in so finding.
23 CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
Thank you.
24 CApplause.3 25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me turn now to Commissioner l
.d 80 i
i 1
Zech.
I 2
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have 3
a brief statement.
4 Six years ago, the accident at Three Mile Island 5
Unit-2 changed the course of commercial n'Jc l ear power.
The 6
accident that was not supposed to happen did happen.
During 7
the first few hours and days of the accident, there was O
considerable confusion as to the danger presented by the 9
damaged Unit-2 nuclear plant.
The citizens of pennsylvania 10 became the vi^ctims of lack of information, poor communication, 11 and ineffective Licensee and governmental actions.
12 Even though our best evidence now indicates that 18 there were no adverse radiation effects as a result, 14 CAudience disruption.3 15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
please.
)
16 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
the emotional impact on the
'17 public was substantial.
The accident generated widespread 18 fear and a deep distrust of the Licensee and the responsible 19 regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
20 During those very early days of uncertainty, as a 21 precaution, and a proper one in my view, the undamaged nuclear 22 plant at Three Mile Island Unit-1 was ordered shut down by the 23 Commission.
The Commission then decided that TMl-1 should 24 remain shut down until the problems that led to the TMI-2 25 accident were identified, debated in a public hearing, and
31 l
1 adequately resolved.
2 There have been six years of adjudication, 3
investigation, analysis, monitoring, a Presidential inquiry, 4
as well as other actions.
5 As a result of'the accident, many lessons have been 6
learned and applied to TMI-1 over the past six years.
The 7
adequacy of the many changes that have taken place as a result 8
of these lessons have been argued in extensive public hearings 9
held by this Commission's Licensing and Appeal Boards.
10 I believe that as a result we now have the necessary 11 information to decide whether it is proper to allow the 12 undamaged Unit 1 to restart.
13 While many changes in personnel, procedures, and 14 equipment at Three Mile Island and elsewhere have been put in 15 place to enhance safety of operations and to minimize the 16 pos'sibility of another Three itile Island accident, the 17 question we are facing today is, have all the necessary 18-changes been accomplished at Three Mile Island to permit the 19 restart of Unit 17 20 ft is important, i believe, to separate where 21 possible the issues involving the undamaged Unit 1 and those 22 involving the cleanup of damaged Unit 2.
It is my opinion 23 that the cleanup of Unit 2 could have been managed more 24 efficiently and more effectively.
However, it now seems to be 25 progressing in a satisfactory matter, and in any event, the
S2 1
evidence leads me to conclude that cleanup of TMI Unit 2 will 2
not interfere with the operation of Unit 1 3
in addition, a very serious consideration must be 4
for the views of the people of Central pennsylvania.
Although 5
it appears that many citizens favor starting up the No.
1 6
Unit, it also appears that many do not favor restart and are 7
genuinely concerned for their health and safety.
8 While respecting this concern, we, as regulators, 9
are faced with a personal responsibility under the law which 10 requires that, if we are reasonably assured that public health 11 and safety will be protected, we must lift the order 12-suspending the license to operate TMl Unit
-1.
18 Attempting to arrive at this personal decision 14 concerning the health and safety of our fellow citizens places 15 a very heavy burden of responsibility on each Commissioner.
16 in the case of Three Mile island, I believe we have 17 a special responsibility.
The issues of management competence 18 and integrity have been central in this proceeding.
I believe 19 them to be the most important considerations in deciding to 20 authorize a restart.
.21 1 do not condone some of the conduct or the 22 practices which have occurred at the Three Mile Island site in 28 the pasts however, the crux of the matter for me is whether 24 these past occurrences continue to create doubt about the 25 technical competence and integrity of the Licensee's present
33 1
TMl-1 management team.
Both the parent corporate entity and 2
the management team responsible for the operation of TMI-1 3
have changed substantially.
The Licensee's current 4
organi=ational structure strikes me as sound with provisions 5
for sufficient checkpoints to assure that safety is paramount.
6 I have given careful consideration towards forming a 7
judgment c onc err. i ng the technical competence and integrity of 8
the individuals in positions of responsibility.
My conclusion 9
is that.I have confidence in them in both areas.
I emphasize
~
10 that l'have no reservations about the competence and Integrity 11 of the people who are directly responsible for the safe 12 operation of TMI-1 If I did, I could not support resumed la operation.
14 However, if subsequent events change my judgment, i 15 will dedicate my efforts to prompt correct.
16 CAudience disruption.]
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
please.
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Unfortunately, despite six long 19 years of NRC deliberations on Licensee management and 20 organizational changes,'public confidence in this Licensee has 21 not been fully restored.
In my judgment, it will be up to the 22 Licensee to sustain excellent performance.to earn the 23 confidence and respect of Pennsylvania's citizens.
While that 24 performance record is being accumulated, continuing vigilance l
25 and dedication by both the Licensee and the regulator will be
S4 1
required to ensure that the Licensee carries out its primary 2
responsibility to provide reasonable assurance that the public 3
health and safety is protected throughout the life of the 4
license.
5 I am satisfied that the Licensee has the team in 6
place to provide that assurance.
I will do all that I can as 7
a regulator to see that the Licensee maintains the requisite 8
competence and integrity.
9 1 am also satisfied that all other concerns have 10 been adequately addressed.
11 My conclusion, after reviewing the record with the 12 Staff's certification that all Nuclear Regulatory Commission 13 requirements have been me, is that Three Mile Island Unit-1 14 can be operated with reasonable assurance that the public 15 health and safety will be protected.
16 General public Utilities has an obligation to ensure 17 not only now, but during the term of the license, that TMI-1.
18 is operated with the greatest of care and with every regard 19 for the public health and safety --
20 CAudience disruption.3 21 CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
please.
22 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
that all involved with TMI-1 23 perform in the most competent manner possible, and that they 24 take every measure to earn the special trust and confidence 25 not only of the citizens of pennsylvania, but of all the
]
s.. u 35 1
citizens of'the United States.
2 1 vote for restart of Three Mile Island Unit-1.
3 CApplause.3 4
CAudience disruption.3 5
CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
At this point 6
CAudience disruption.3 7
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Will you please permit us to go 8
ahead?
9 CAudience disruption.3 10 CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
At this point, I want to 11 indicate that I will have some additional comments on some of 12 Commissioner Asselstine's statements, and they will be 13 appended to my additional remarks and attached to the order.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
At this time, if the Commission 15 is ready to vote, I would pose the following question:
16 Does the Commission approve the draft order before 17 us which would lift the immediate effectiveness of the July 2 18 and August 9,
1979 shutdown orders?
The approved order would 19 have the effect of authorizing the restart of TMI-1, subject 20 to completion of the conditions imposed in the order.
21 All those in favor, indicate by saying aye.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Aye.
23 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Aye.
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Aye.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Opposed?
.e 36 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That concludes our vote.
3 CAudience disruption.3 4
CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
Would you please I think we 5
have completed the business that we came for.
I had intended 6
to summarize what we voted on, but I think that has become 7
quite clear.
8
[ Audience disruption.3 9
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So unless there is something, 10 would you 11 CAudience disruption.3 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
The meeting stands 13 adjourned.
14 CWhereupon, at 2:55 o' clock, p.m.,
the Commission 15 meeting was adjourned.3 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 t
23 24 25
l i
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7
matter of:
Commission Meeting - Public Meeting 8
9 Name of proceeding: Vote on Lifting Immediate Effectiveness of 1979 Shutdown Orders for TMI 10 Discussion if Necessary 11 Docket No.*
12 Place: Washington, D. C.
13 Cate:
Wednesday, May 29, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13 (Signature)
,p (Typed Name of Reporter)
And Riley 20 21 22 1
23 Ann Riley & Associates. Ltd.
24 25
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.i Attached are copies of a (bmnission meeting transcript (s) and related meeting i
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3; or required. Existing DCS identification ntunbers are listed on the individual dnt'=arits wherever known.
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