ML20129C038
| ML20129C038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290331 | |
| Download: ML20129C038 (55) | |
Text
.. . _ .. .
- . 172 I
1 Tuesday Evening Session i
D' E'" June 11, 1985 2
3 5:55 o' clock p.m.
.; 4 - - - --
i 5 (P resent: Messrs. Burns, Rossi, Bell, i:'
6 Beard, Lonning, Shafer,. Jackiw, Kosloff and 4 .
7 Rowles.)
8 MR. ROSSI: What we are going to do now-9 is talk to-the people-from Region III including the 10 resident that ca'me-to the site-soon after the event 11 Estarted and discuss their analysis of what happened j 12 in sequence of events.
1 fi
() 13 Is that a fair assessment of what we are
, 14 going to do? And I guess for starters-we have a 15 ' listing here of-the Sequence' O f Events that you t-
! .16 prepared, and you can tell us how you did it. You
{ '17 ,might als o tell us when you got here after the 1
i 18 event started.
4
} 19 MR. MOSLOFF: Right. Okay, I'm Don l 20 Kosloff, I'm the resident inspector, Davis-Besse.
21 I was informed of the event at 22 approximately 2:20 in the morning via phone call -
4 23 f rom plant manager, and.after I' received that call,,
t eg 24 I called the senior resident to-see if he had been ,
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173 1 informed of it and he had already been informed and
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2 was aware of the situation, so I then went on out 3 to the plan t.
-4 I got here about 3:20 and I noticed that 5 the steam was coming out of the right places, Aux 6 Feed water pump s team di scharge was exhausting and 7 the atmospheric vent valves were steaming. And I 8 went to the control room to see what the situation 9 was there.
10 One thing that I learned in discussion 11 with the. operators that isn't -- that I didn't put 12 on my Sequence Of Events was that they had no
() ~13 source range indication, and we discussed their 14 response to that, and it was satisfactory regarding 15 the Boron concentrations that were in the reactor 16 coolant.
17 MR. ROSSI: Still at that t i m3 they 18 didn't have it back.
19 MR. KOSLOFF: No. They had put a 20 considerable amount of Boron into the reactor 21 coolant because of that.
22 HR. BELL: Do you have any idea as to why 23 the other' source range didn't energize when the
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J 174 1 minus ten?
O 2 MR. KOSLOFF No. The high voltage 3 lights were on.
4 MR. BEARD: Appearing dead for no obvious 5 reasons.
6 MR. I;OSLOFF: Yes 7 MR. BEARD: And the one that was previously 8 declared inoperable was still not behaving?
9 MR. KOSLOFF:' Well, they were unsure of 10 the validity of its indication because they knew it 11 was inoperable.
12 The problem they had with it in the past
() 13 was that it --
they had two problems. Number one, 14 it gave a readout with the high voltage turned offr 15 and the other proble m was when you -- there is one 16 sw it ch on the control panel, I forget which one it 17 is, that when you turn that switch, the s ource 18 range would jump a couple of hundred counts. So 19 they did not have a lot of confidence in it.
20 Sometimes the operators will declare a 21 piece of equipment inoperable when you could make a 22 good argument for saying that it wasn't inoperable, 23 but they do that in order to get some pressure on 24 it and. repair of it on the maintenance side of the (m
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175 1 organization.
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' 2 MR. BEARD: -When you got to the p la n t ,
3 was there a positive indication for each of the 4 control rods that they were fully inserted?
5 MR. KOSLOFF: ' Yes, I checked the control 6 rods. What do you mean? The rod bottom lights 7 were on and the individual indications were all 8 down.
9 MR. BEARD: So there was indi cation that 10 all the rods were down?
11 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
12 MR. LANNING: Let me understand how you
() 13 performed your review of the event when you arrived 14 on-site. Is this a formal proceduro you.go through 15 or do you go to the control room and just discuss 16 with the operators the events that's transpired and 17 the status of the plant? Is the senior resident 18 on-site at the time you do this?
19 MR. KOSLOFF: Well, in this particular 20 case, I got here first, which is not always the 21 case. Sonotimes --
the nrocedure is for the 22 Lic3nsee to call the senior resident when something 23 of significance occurs, and he usually is the one rs 24 who makes the decision as to whether his or my
()
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176 1
1 presence or both of us is required at the plant.
4 2 In this particular case, since he was on 3 training, the Licensee had been informed they 4 should call me instead of him. However, the shift 5 supervisor wTo was on shift had -- when it happened, 6 he looked up on the board and there was a littlo 7 piece of paper there with the senior resident's 8 phone number on it and he just called the first 9 number that he saw, and then he also at that sano 10 time, he was calling his management people.
11 They have a more formalized proceduro and 12 they Vere aware that -- they didn't know that the
() 13 nonior resident was at home for the weekend. They j
14 thought he was in Chattanooga, so they called me 15 and there was a lot of calling around at that time.
i 16 HR. LANNING: But they also called him I 7
, 17 understood you to say --
! 18 HR. KOSLOFF: The shift supervisor had
(
19 called the resident also.
- 20 HR. LANNING
- Okay, fine.
21 HR. KOSLOFF: As I say, I got the call 22 from the plant manager. I didn't take a lot of 4
23 notes at that time because f rom what I heard, I 24 knew I was going to be out at the plant very shortly ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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177 i I anyway. And due to the severity of the incident, I O"# '
4 2 wanted to make personally sure that the senior 3 resident was aware of the situation, because there i 4 was no doubt in my mind he would -- if he hadn't f I 5 heard of it yet, he would be on his way out.
- 6 We don't have a formal method. I don't 7 have a fornal method of reviewino it. I basically 8 look at all the indications that are available and 9 talk to as many people as I can without interfering 10 with transient response. And you know, I get
[ 11 people as they are available to talk. Whenever I 12 catch somebody standing around looking like he's
() 13 not immediately occupied with something, I discuan 14 whatever he might know.
15 MR. LANNINO: Where do you go to get l 16 information to compile the Sequence Of Events?
17 MR. KOSLOFF: Okay. The Sequence Of i 18 Events, initially when I was doing the rough 19 developnent of this, it was -- I had some data i i
- 20 points that were based on the SOE printout and 1
21 conve r s at i ons . But as I went line by line throug4 22 the SOE printout, I found I could get a nore exact 23 time for some of thone events from alarn printouts. -
i 24 HR. ROSSI: So what we have here on this
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1 piece of paper people is from the alarm --
O 2 MR. KOSLOFF: This is a combination of 3 the alarm printer, the Sequence Of Events recorder, 4 which is printed out on the same sheets as the 5 alarm printer, and an interpretation of data that 6 is on there -- their data' acquisition -- I don't 7 renomber --
8 MR. SHAFER: Deta base.
9 MR. KOSLOFFr DADS.
10 HR. ROSSI: The Technical Superintendent 11 Support Center.
1 a 12 MR. KOSLOFF: Right. And I also discussed ,
() 13 sone of these items with the senior resident from 14 his notes and his recollections to come up with the i 15 decision of which of those items to includo here. t 16 HR. DEARD: You have given us this piece 17 of paper here today, could you tell us roughly at 18 what point in time this was compiled, like was thin 19 let's nee, the ovent happened on Sunday morning 20 early.
21 HR. KOSLOFF Right.
22 HR. DEARD: This is now Tuesday. Roughly 23 when was thin available? I don't mean the typing 24 of it.
t i
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4 179 1 MR. KOSLOFF: I did this on a computer.
h 2 I used a computer like a note pad, and then I just 3 printed it out. I finished this about 11:00 last 4 night I guess.
5 MR. BEARD: 11:00 Monday night?
6 MR. KOSLOFF: Monday night, right.
7 MR. SHAFER: I would like to add, this 8 started about the same time that we were notified 9 of the formation of the team. We were gathering 10 all the information, Don was working on it by 1
11 himself, and at that time is when Jack and I also j 12 went out to the trailer and started working with 13 Don.
14 MR. BELL: May I ask you a couple of
. 15 questions? First of all, when you first got here, t
16 the plant was stable.
17 MR. KOSLOFF Yen. l 18 MR. DELL: In Mode 37 19 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
20 MR. DELL: And no vacuum in the condenser 7 i 21 MR. KOSLOFF: I believe there was vacuum 22 in the condenner at that time.
t 23 MR. BELL: Dut not sufficient to cool i l 24 -down to the condenser. They worn still electing to i
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180 1 cool down.
2 HR. KOSLOFF Well, they were not -- they 3 were going through their procedures, making sure ;
4 that they had everything, all their lists signed i
5 off and that they hadn't missed sonothing, and they 6 didn't feel concerned that they needed to go to the 7 condensers right away. That was a long-term goal, i 8 but they wanted to clear up a lot of the other
! 9 problems that they had.and make sure that they had 10 good records of everything that they had done and 1
2 11 that overything was the way that they thought it i
12 was.
() 13 H .. BELL: My other question is how long
, 14 had the in(perable source range channel been i
15 declared inoperable?
16 HR. DEARD: You are thinking in hours or 17 days prior to the event?
10 HR. DELL: Yeah.
- 19 HR. KOSLOPP In terms of weeks I think 20 is a r.o r e appropriate --
21 HR. BELL: Okay.
22 HR. KOSLOPP -- characterization. I 23 don't renenber the exact date.
24 HR. BELL: Say it was inoperable say ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. ,
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, i 181 1 during the trip on June the 2nd, also?
O 2 MR. KOSLOFF: Now that you mention that, 3 that may not have--- that particular instrument has 4 been failing and behaving orratically for an extended 5 period of time and I may be -- it's been inoperable, 6 operable, inoperable, and so it may have been 7 inoperable then or it may have been operable. I 8 don't remember, to tell you the truth.
9 MR. BELL: Okay.
10 MR. BEARD: It's been on on again/
11 off again status for a period of weeks?
12 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
() 13 MR. JACKIW: John, do you know, is it 14 just the one channel to be operable-to restart, do 15 you recall?
16 MR. KOSLOFF: The tech spec requirement 17 is pretty loose on that picco of equipment. There 18 is not much --
19 MR. BELL: It's speculation on ny part, 20 it may only be in Mode 6 for spec handling.
21 MR. KOSLOFF Thore is some other 22 considerations, but I think there is no time when 23 they need more than one. So they could essentially 24 have that thing out of service forover and be ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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182 1 within their license conditions.
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# 2 MR. JACKIW: I think wo looked at that.
3 We knew about the problems they had with that 4 channel and we looked at it, and we agreed that the 5 toch spec --
6 MR. KOSLOFF We couldn't force them to 7 fix it through the tech spec. All we could do is 8 use-it as an example of poor maintenance practices 9 and say, Hey, you know, you guys ought to fix that.
10 MR. DEARD: Don't they have a standard 11 304 clause that would require it to be out for a 12 period of time but operable prior to the next restart '
() 13 MR. KOSLOFF: Not in this textbook.
14 MR. BEARD: Does Davis-Desse have custom 15 tech specs?
16 MR. KOSLOFF: They may be standard toch 17 specs, but they don't look like standard toch specs, 18 because I looked at standard tech specs. If the 19 Davis-Bosse toch specs are defined as standard tech 20 specs, then someone has badly twisted the meaning 21 of standard.
22 MR. LANNING: Don, you not in the control 23 room about two hours after the ovent. In that l 24 correct?
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183 1 HR. KOSLOFF Right.
2 HR. LANNING: How many people were in the 3 control room after you got there, about?
4 HR. KOSLOFF: About seven or eight.
5 MR. LANNING: Seven or eight. How would 6 you characterize the atmosphere, the feeling about
.7 the~ event?
8 MR. KOSLOFF: There was a great deal of i 9 concern. People were -- how would y ou characterize 10 it?. I think the initial shock of the event had 11 warn off to a certain degree.
12 I don't know if you have seen people i
() 13 after something very tenso has happened.. people j 14 roact in different ways afterwards. You can see --
J f, 15 like some people would be very calm and collected 16 during an event, and then after it is over, their l
17 hands are shaking and they are puffing on their 18 cigarettes.
i 19 And knowing the people involved, having 20 seen them in their normal way of functioning and at 21 other times, minor stress, I could tell that in j 22 their own individual ways they were - r;ea cting to 23 that.
! 24 Things were being done in a very. calm and ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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184 1 well directed, organized manner. There were peoplo 2 who were not in the direct chain of command who 3 were offering assistance as needed, but yet they 4 were not interjecting themselves in a way that 5 would dilute the authority of the shift supervisor.
6 MR. LANNING: Who was in charge?
7 MR. KOSLOPP: The shift supervisor was in 8 charge.
9 MR. BEARD: Did they invoke the function 10 of shift technical advisor for this event?
11 MR. KOSLOFF The shift technical advisor 12 was in the control room.
() 13 MR. DEARD: Was he functioning in that 14 role or did he --
15 MR. KOSLOFF: He was functioning in that 16 role as I understand it. I have to admit, my 17 understanding of that is not as good as I would 18 like it to be. But he was providing a -- he was 19 providing technical assistance to the operatorn and 20 evaluating conditions in conjunction with them and 21 also, you know, I could tell that he was looking a t 22 things himself to get sort of an independent i
23 analysis of things.
rw 24 MR. DEARD: Did they activate any of the b
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185 1 parts of the emergency procedure such as the
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s e
3 MR. KOSLOFF: The Technical Support 4 Center was not activated to my knowledge. But 5 there were people out there. I don't k now -- there 6 was not a formal activation I do not believe, but I 7 didn't verify that myself. I knew at the time that 8 there were people from the technical section in the 9 Technical Support Center gathering information.
10 MR. LANNING: What kind of event did they 11 declare, if any at all?
12 MR. KOSLOFF: When the plant m1 nager
() 13 called me at 2:20, he was trying to ve ri fy in his 14 own mind whether or not it was an unusuni event.
15 His -- h e was looking at the procedure. I could 16 tell from the way he spoke that he was reading 17 things cu , of the procedure and trying to see if it 18 fit into any of the items in the procedure.
19 When I arrived at the site, I noticed 20 that they had a procedure out of their manual, 21 their emergency procedures manual tha t had been j 22 filled out. But at that time, they were not in --
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186' 1 event'at.that point. I haven't reviewed that 2 information.
3 MR.' BEARD: Dy being considered an 4 unusual event, are you referring to the fact -- are j
5 you. referring to the situation that regardless of 6 the safety significance of.the event, it may-not >
7 have fit the outline prescribed in the procedure on 8 when to declare it as'such?' Is that what you a re 1 l
. 9 trying to say?
10 MR. KOSLOFF: Well, I think at the point i 11 tin time that I.became aware of it, it was no longer -<-
l'2 the safety significance had' decreased so that it
() 13 was not'in the category 14 MR.. BEARD: Why.would you say the safety 15 significance had decreased?
16 MR. KOSLOFF: Because they had both Aux 17 Feed pumps operating, the steam generator levels ,
4 18 were approximately 50 and 90 inches, and there was
, 19 no equipment that was malfunctioning that would 20 prevent them from per, forming their safety functions. ,
1 21 MR. DEARD: Well, I guess what I hea r you ,
22 saying is largely'that the plant had recovered c ,
! 23 wh'ere it was now in a stable situation, that enough
} 24 equipment.thatEhad misbehaved previously had been l
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187 1 cranked up to where they had adequate core cooling, 2 didn ' t ha ve containment troubles, there were no 3 . radioactive releases, as I understand it?
4 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
5 MR. BEARD: And so the immediate hazard 6 had been mitigated, if I can use that word, very, 7 very carefully. But I guess I was really probing 8 around in the area of did they have a keen 9 perception that they had been through a very near 10 miss?
11 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes.
12 HR. JACKIW: Maybe I could add a little
() 13 bit, because I had talked t o Walt Rogers roughly it 14 must have been about an hour after the event. He 15 called me because he was ca lle d by the Licensee, 16 and he gave me very little information. I didn't 17 take any notes. He was I guess in a hurry.
18 He had talked to Don and he informed re 19 that he and Don were going to the site. I hung up 20 and called the duty officer, the headquarters' duty 21 officer just to verify if the duty officer had 22 known what bad happened, and the duty officer 23 informed me there was some discussion about the 24 classification.
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19 8 1 And so when I called the duty officer (D .
~
2 again, he gave me a little more information on the 3 discussion between the plant and him. I guess the 4 duty officer said that the Licensee was not sure 5 what the classification was. In fact, when they 6 gave him the original call, the intent was just to 7 let the NRC know they have got a problem and thev 8 hadn't really looked into the classification.
9 And after some probing, some asking 10 questions, they agreed. I think maybe it was a 11 common agroomont that it looked like an unusual 12 event and at that timo the event had -- the fact
() 13 that they had the Aux Feed pumps back on, the 14 severity of the event, like Don le saying, had been 15 lessened.
16 HR. ROSSI: We will got, by the way, the 17 tapes from the operations center on the calls, so 18 we will have exactly what they told the duty 19 officer concerning the classification. And my 20 recollection of what you will find is that by the 21 time they phoned it in, that the imnadiate safety 22 concern was passed because it was over, in, what, 23 fifteen minutes or something like that to the point
/~g 24 where they had recovered their au xiliary feed?
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-7 189 I flR . SHAFER: If I may as a point for the n-2 record,'this is one of the issues that we have in 3 'our confirmatory action letter to try to understand {
l 4 the'Licenree's thinking at the time of incident.
5 The Region questions whether it should have not 6 been an alert, but the incident, as Ray pointed (
7 out, was over.so quickly, we may have to look at 8 our own reporting requirements, which I belisve in 9 'this instance is within one hour.
10 HR. KOSLOFF Well, I am starting.to get i
11 concerned that we are looking at reporting 12 requirements as more'important than public health
() 13 and safety. This is ailittle upsetting-to me. I 14 MR. BEARD: I certainly hope that's not 15 the case.
16 MR. KOSLOFF: I do too. I'm perfectly 17 willing to discuss it, but some of the things that 18 are starting.to be said now are both'ering-me.
19 HR.' BEARD: I don't thi nk anybody wants t
20 to focus so much on the reporting aspect as much as 21 .use that as a tool to,get some feel'for what the .
22 Licensee's perception of the severity of the 23 transient had been. At-least that's been my intent. ;
-24 And I~certainly believe that-during the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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190 1 first hour that the operators need to focus on t
2 whatever is necessary to determine what sort of an 3 event they have on their hands and take the 4 appropriate safety actions. And if the reporting 5 can be done in an hour, that's fine. If it has to 6 be delayed, it has to be delayed.
7 The telephoning to the government in my 8 personal opinion is clearly secondary.
9 MR. JACKIW: I think the Licensee has the 10 option -- as far as being delayed, I don't think 11 they have that option. But as far as the detail of 12 the report, they have got the option to I think, I o
(_) 13 believe, to call and say we have got a problem.
14 Here is what we see.
15 MR. BEARD: I think we wrote that in '72 16 when we issued a report.
17 MR. JACKIW: At this point we will get 18 back to you as soon as possible.
19 MR.-ROSSI: And the headquarters has the 20 option.of naintaining an open line, which we have 21 from time-to time done.
22 MR. LANNING: I would like to get back to 23 the first impressions when you got to the control
,m. 24 room. Did the shift superviso; have any
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191 1 preliminary indications as to why there was
<O 2 interruption of auxiliary feedwater flow?
3 MR. KOSLOFF: No. He knew'the pumps had 4 tripped on overspeed, but he:did not understand why i
. 'S it happened. And'he did not understand why his J
6 MSIVs had.gone closed on him. -
7 The. discussion was that, you know, they 8 -had seen the MSIV open light go.off, and that he 9 looked over to.the panel, th e enunciator panel that t
- 10 has the SFRCS indications on it to see what knocked i 11 his MSIVs-out,.and there was nothing;up there. And i
12 I'n sure that- had a tendency to shake the
( )- 13 operator's confidence a little bit when.they saw 14 - that.
15 The atmosphere was sort of subdued.
16 People were-functioning, they were doing'their
' i 17 ' individual and unit tasks, but I think-subdued is ;
- 18 the' bestecharacterization
- of the~ atmosphere in the 19 ' control-room.
- 20 MR.;LANNING: Do you recall-who was there
. -21 besides the four operators?
22 MR.-KOSLOFF The .v i ce president nuclear 23 was: there, plant manager'was there, the operations
. 24 superintendent was there, the operations. supervisor.
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I was there, the STA was there, and there were other (I- 2 individuals.
3 There were maintenance i ndividuals who ;
4 were waiting outside the control room, you know, as ,
5 they were needed-to perform.any. tasks that the 6 operators would want them to do. And that was the 7 situation at that point in time.
8 MR. DELL: Had the operators lined-up the 9 low pressure injection system to the suction of the f 10 -high pressure injection system?
11 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes, that had been done. 1 12 MR. BELL: So then they did this while
( )- 13 they were attempting to get auxiliary feedwater 14 back.
- 15 MR. KOSLOFF
- Right.
16 HR. BELL: So they were.really concerned 17 about= core cooling then.
I 18 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes. They had the HPI pump 19 inLoperation-also.
20 MR. BELL: I don't think that was brought 21 out with.any other of our people.
22 uM R . BEARD: I'think it could bc -- you 23 can-get a higher head, but I don't.think it was jes 24 done.
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193 1 MR. ROSSI: I think were we talked to tho
>} 2 Licensee. I don't think we talked about the PORV
^
3 injections at all.
4 MR. KOSLOFF: They lined up. They did in 5 fact ~ inject about 10 to 15 gallons as a result of 6 primary pressure 6screasing to below the head of 7 the system, and'in that configuration.
-8 MR. BELL: And they.made this line up as 9 a result of guidelines provided in their emergency 10 procedures?
11 MR. KOSLOFF They had the guidance in
.12 their emergency. procedures. They also had the.
() 13 _d irection of the operations superintendent.
F 14 MR. BELL ' That's Mr. O'Connor.
. 15 MR. KOSLOFF: That's Mr. O'Connor. Very
-16 early in the event f rom conversations with. him, he 17 was notified within five ninutes of the' trip as l'
- 18 soon as they got to the p o'i n t where they.had no
, 19 feedwater. So I can't say'whether, if they hadn't 20 have talked to him,.you know, it's right there in .
21 their procedure, I' have to assume, 22 'MR. BEARDS. Is that an immediate action 23 procedure?
j f- 24 MR. KOSLOFF No, it's' supplementary.
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194 1 MR. BEARD: So it's not part of the steps 2 of the procedure operators are required to have 3 memorized?
4 MR. KOSLOPP No.
5 MR. BELL: So core cooling in your 6 opinion, core safety was of prime importance to 7 them or they wouldn't have made this line.
8 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes. I think they were 9 well aware of the potential of the situation that 10 they were in.
11 MR. BEARD: How would you characterize 12 the particular shift that was on this night in
('_'js 13 terms of is this, say, their best shift, lousiest 14 shift, some-sort of mix or --
15 MR. KOSLOPF: I would say it's a mix.
16 It's not as though all of their best operators are 17 put on --
are on one shift. There is a mix. If 18 you took all the shifts as they are put together 19 now, I w ou ld n ' t say this is the top -- this is the 20 best shift. But it's pretty hard t o -- they a re 21 not that much different. There are individual 22 strengths and weaknesses and they tend to l
23 compliment one another in a lot of respects.
l ry 24 MR. BEARD: Maybe we ought to get on to l '\ /
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195 1 t'n e sequence here.
'-)
2 MR. LANNING: Have you compared your 3 Sequence O f Events to the one the Licensco prepared?
4 MR. KOSLOFF: Only because I'm familiar 5 with mine.and I read through their's. I didn't do 6 a one-to-one correspondence or anything of that 7 nature.
8 MR. LANNING: Okay. Did you find any 9 discrepancies when you give it a quick look?
10 MR. KOSLOFF: Well, I noticed that it did 11 not go into the detail of the one that I had made 12 up. I also was -- I noticed that the comments on r8 ts ,) 13 the Power Operated Relief seemed to leave a little 14 bit of information out, whether that information 15 hadn't been evaluated or not I don't know. But 16 that was not t h e r e '.
17 MR. LANNING: What information are you 18 referring to?
19 MR. KOSLOFF: On the third cycle,.the 20 core,. it had to be isolated by the operator. I 21 ~ shouldn't say had t o, the operator felt it was 22 prudent to isolate it because the pressure had 23 dropped below the receding setpoint and it's an
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. . m . . . .. _. _
1 196 11 1had'done that, and I think that was a significant
, I) 2 item to' include in a sequence of events.
3 MR. ROSSI: I'm looking through your 4 . Sequence O f Events and I notice when you get down
~
5 to the Steam and Feedwater' Rupture Control System, 6 that you-indicate that they got a low level half
'7 -trip and then1that the Sequence Of Events recorder 8 also shows that they.got a-full trip.
9 I didn't recall that from what we were 10 told this morning. That looks a l'ittle -- and then- l 11 both of those cleared shortly thereafter.
! '12 HR. KOSLOFF: My. reason for writing it
() 13 that wayLwas to indicate there was an anomaly i 14 betweenuwhat actually happened and what'the-15 Sequence Of Events recorder'portrEyed. If somebody
~
l 16 was looking.at the two-documents, they would notice .
17 that differance and.that question might be 18 clarified in their minds, and at the same time I 19 was trying to keep some degree of brevity in this
, :20 Sequence O f Events. '
21 MR.-ROSSI: When you say Steam and 22 Feedwater Rupture Control System low level half.
23 trip, they must have determined they had that in 24 some manner = other than- the SOE recorder.-
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_r 197 1 MR. KOSLOFF: Well, the alarm p rinter 2 prints out a half trip. The SOE recorder has in 3 the past printed out half trips and characterized 4 them as full trips when a review after the fact 5 would indicate that there was no condition that 6 would have given a full trip.
7 HR. ROSSI: Does that mean even if they 8 had like, say, a full trip signal for a very brief 9 period of time, have they ever found relay races 10 that caused the SOE recorder to record it was a 11 full trip when it was really only a half trip?
12 MR. KOSLOFF It sounded like you asked (m_) 13 two different questions there. There have been i
14 cases in the past where the Sequence Of Events 15 recorder has printed out that there was an SFRCS 16 full trip and-that if you compared -- first of all,
.17 if you looked at equipment actuation, when the SOE 18 recorder had printed out a full trip, you would see 19 ono equipment actuation.
20 Secondly, there was no enunciator 21 indication of an SFRCS trip.
22 And thirdly, after-the-fact analysis of 23 plant conditions would indicate that at these 24 points, at some points in time when the SOE je\
v ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS Ilic .
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4
198 1 recorder showed a full trip, there were no plant
()/ 2 conditions which should have generated a full SFRCS 3 trip or even a half SFRCS trip.
4 Part of the reason that this would not 5 show up all the time is because the only time that 6 you get a half trip that's really only a half trip 7 is when you have a spurious half trip. So if all 8 you ever had was real SFRCS trips, then you would 9 never know that your SOE recorder printed out full 10 trips when it should have only -- well, it should 11 have printed out --
I don't know if the SOE 12 recorder prints out half trips. I think it only prints out full trips. There is some problem in (ex_) 13 14 the buffer or in the computer.
15 MR. ROSSI: Or maybe just in the labeling 16 of what the SOE --
17 MR. KOSLOFF Well, it doesn't. That 18 could be. I don't know.
19 MR. JACKIW: That question, Ernie, if you 20 recall, came up during earlier discussion with' 21 Jacque Lingenfelter, and he concurred they had some 22 problem with the trip a week and a half ago where 23 you were getting a half trip and the SOE recorder
,s 24 was showing a full trip. They thought they had
()
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199 1 corrected the problem --
2 HR. KOSLOFF: Well, they started to 3 trouble-shoot or they started to1 trouble-shoot the 4 problem to'look'and see if there was an obvious i'
5 cause. They didn't_see_anything obvious in their
~
6 initial trouble-shooting, so then they tested it, 4 _
.; ~7 and they couldn't get it'to repeat-the condition.
8 So they c o n c lu d e'd that there was some i 9 kind of a' problem with contacts that in their {
~
'10 trouble-shooting by looking_at thel contacts and-
- ., 11 . checking torsee if there'were loose' contacts, that l- 12 -that had corrected the problem. They apparently
() 13 were mistak en' in - that- judgment from the fact that 14 it' happened again. .Dut that's the reason that I 15 put that'in there. .
16 MR. LANNING: tha you know if.there are 17 procedures that address the interruption of all 18 feedwater?-
19 MR. KOSLOFF: There are p roc e dtt re s . t i
20 There are-energency procedures that discussesEthe l
! ~21 . interruption of all feedwater flow.
- . _ 22 MR. LANNING
- That includen emergency
- 23 ._feedwater flow. I.say all of them.. I'm
- j e 24 emphasizing all.
iV L _ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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- 200 1 MR. KOSLOFF: Yea, it does. In fact, that's the procedure-that gets you into the IIP I
~
2
-3 injection ~ in. conjunction with the-operation o'f the 4 LPI ~ to the. suction of the HPI.
f' t
5 -MR. LANNING: And that procedure would 6 - also. talk to the'nonsafety startup feedwater pump ,
f' 7 beingLnade operable.
8 'MR. KOSLOFF: ' Yes. It gives i ns truct ion s
! 9 -
on.us'ing that as a backup source. !
- 10 MR. LANNING
- In your opinion, is l
! 11 seventeen minutes, about seventeen ninutes'a '
4
. 12 ' reasonable; time to'-have this. auxiliary -- let me 1
!l[ 13 make:sure theJterminology is correct --
startup l 14 -feedwater: pump injecting water to the steam l-15 generators?
j- li6 MR. KOSLOFF' Given-the-sequence of the- =i
! 17 events and'the things-that had to'be done, yes, i t-
- 18 probably could be' improved, but it's hard to say 19 without actuallyfhaving been there at the time.
i
). - 20 -The problem is that~you have to go down i
21 : and. unlock a doors it's actually a hatch in.the .
- 22 'flo or . -It's,a little bit 1 harder-to get to than s
23 most of the other equipment'~-in the plant.: ,
[- 24 MR. LANNING ~ There is not an operator's l
+ i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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201 1 station in this area now, is there?
(~
2 MR. KOSLOFF There is an equipment 3 operator in the general area, okay, but he's not in 4 the room and he doesn't have easy access to the 5 room. It's not like, you know, most places that 6 you need to get to, you can open a door like a 7 regular door, you know, in a building. The Tux 8 Feed pump room where the startup feodwater pump is 9 located is in a room that is accessible only by a 10 locked hatch that has to be unlocked and then slid 11 open. It's a hatch in --
it's actually part of the 12 floor.
() 13 MR. LANNING: Why is it locked?
14 MR. KOSLOFF: It's a vital area. All of 15 their vi tal areas are controlled alth locks.
16 MR. LANNING: Does this equipment 17 operator carry with him a key to gain access to 18 this piece of equipment?
19 MR. KOSLOFF: I don't know for sure if he s
20 does or not. I_know the operators at some times do ,
21 have keys in their possession, but I'm not familiar 22 enough with that procedure to answer th a t question 23 MR. LANNING: I want to get back to the gg e
24 time interval to establish some feedwater to the
% /.
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202 1 steam. generator. Is it a fair assumption that the --
2 let me ask the question. How soon do you think the 3 operators realized that they had no emergency 4 feedwater?
5 MR. KOSLOFF: I think they recognized it 6 when the Aux Feed pumps tripped, which on overspeed, 7 which is --
8 MR. BEARD: Looks to be like six minutes 9 into the event.
10 MR. KOSLOFF: Second overspeed trip, 11 1:41:44. So that's about eight minutes.
12 MR. BEARD: I f you start from the time
() 13 the reactor trip occurred, which appears to be 14 around 1:35:29'or 30?
15 MR. KOSLOFF But that --
at that point, 16 they were not --
there was no problem in terms of 17 feedwater.
18 MR. BEARD: I'm just saying just for 19 timing considerations, i f you use a point of 20 reference the time the reactor tripped as sone sort 21 of reference time, then it appears as though the 22 two Aux Feed water parts tripped out on overspeed 23 about six minutes after that rupture. That's all 24 I'm saying.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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203 1 HR. KOSLOFF: Right.
\~' 2 MR. ROSSI: I'm looking through your 3 Sequence Of Events. There are a number of 4 questions I have. I'm not sure y ou can answer them S or not. But like at 1:45:50, it indicates that 6 auxiliary feedwater pump turbine No. 2 overspeed 7 trip was reset.
8 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
9 MR. ROSSI: That has to be done locally 10 at the pump; right?
11 MR. KOSLOFF: That is my understanding.
12 I have not verified that, but I think that means
() 13 that the trip has been manually reset in the 14 turbine or in the Aux Feed water pump rooL.
15 MR. ROSSI: Now, the next one has the No.
16 1 pump starting, but I don't see when it is 17 overspeed trip was reset.
18 MR. KOSLOFF: They didn't. My understanding 19 is they couldn't --
that they had some difficulty 20 with resetting the trip, so it may not ha ve ever 21 printed out on the alarm printer because perhaps 22 the logic for that alarm point was corrected.
23 MR. ROSSI: But they got the pump started 73 24 at --
\f ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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204 1 MR. KOSLOFF Right.
O 2 MR. ROSSI: They got the pump started, 3 but~ they nust.have-done'something to correct the 4 situation with1the overspeed trip, because it did --
.5 does indicate 1that it tripped on overspeed.
j 6 MR. KOSLOFF: Right. I suspect that ,
7 either -- the alarm printer seems to printout '
i; 8 everything, either I overlooked that onIthe alarm
} 9 i 9 p'rinter or they did have'some difficulty in ,
$ 10 preparing.that feedpump to operate and perhaps in
~
i l
} 11 that methodology that they had to use, they by-passed 12 the l'ogi c that would have printed out that alarm
- -O 13 voiot>-
f ~14 EM R . ROSSI: 'Okay. The next entry is'that i
15 the auxiliary feedwater_ to No. 2 steam generator ,
l, 16 isolation valve opens. .Now, is_that one of those
- 17 valves that was supposed to automatically open when 18 they re' set the'SFRCS. low pressure, that they had to I
[ 19 go-down and manually;open?
20 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes. This is-either 599 or i
! 21 608. I don't remember which. ;
22 HR. ROSSI: Then on down they have the n .
- 23 No. l' a t 49 minutes and 28 seconds. .They have that
-24 same valve! a ssociated with the ' No. I auxiliary ,
i ' ACE ~ FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. '
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l 205 1 feedwater ~ pump open.
g 2 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
3 MR. ROSSI: At that point they must have 4 flow because, I mean, if this Sequence of Events is 5 right, they started the No. 1 pump at 46 minutes 32 6 seconds, and they got the valve open at 49 minutes 7 and 28 seconds. It would appear to me from this 8 they had below.
9 MR. BELL: Doesn't that depend on turbine 10 speed?
11 HR. KOSLOFF: Yes, it does. I was trying 12 'to -- I looked at that information on the printout
() 13 of --
there is a data point that shows Aux Feed 14 water flow also, and apparently I didn't -- I 15 didn't put that down on herte.
16 HR. BEARD: It seems like it didn't have 17 a significant flow because sone later entries 18 indicate the level is still continuing to drop.
19 HR. ROSSI: I mean, I'm curious from the 20 Sequence Of Events as to which flow they really got 21 -first, because it was my enda rs tanding from earlier 22 this afternoon there was a startup feedwater pump 23 feeding the No. I steam generator that they got 24 first. And this would indicate that maybe they did ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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l 206 1 get auxiliary feedwater earlier than I thought. l
'-)
/ \ l i
2 MR. KOSLOFF: I f you look further on down 3 1:53:25, according to the data --
I did record 4 those points on here after all. I knew I looked at i 5 .i t but I couldn't re m e'mbe r . 1:53:25, AFW flow 6 starts to No. 2 steam generator.
7 MR. ROSSI: I see. Then on the next page 8 it's flow starts to No. 1.
9 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
10 MR. ROSSI: So maybe it was the speed of 11 .the pump or something as to why the flow lagged 12 behind all these other things?
() 13 MR. KOSLOFF: Right. Because the-point 14 where I say on their the No. 1 Aux Feed water pump 15 starts, that's based on an indication of Aux Feed 16 pump turbine speed coming up. That's another data 17 point.
18 MR. ROSSI: So it's just starting up then.
4 19 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
20 MR. ROSSI: You hadn't pumped anything at 21 that point?
22 MR. KOSLOFF: No.
23 MR. ROSSI: This other entry down here on 24 au xiliary speed water flow starts comes from an ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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207 I actual flow indicator'. That was the first timo you
.O 2 actually saw flow from a sequence of events going 3 to a steam generator?-
4 MR. KOSLOFF: Yeah. This is the DADS
-5 printout that they have.
6 MR. SHAPER: And that is verified by the ,
7 set of sheets you received?
8 MR. ROSSI: You have other --
9 MR. BELL: That is not from'the --
10 MR. KOSLOFF: -That is-just a graphical 11 . representation of.the DADS.
12 MR. ROSSI: Okay. . The other question is
() 13 this entry that the auxiliary feedwater pump 14 suction transfers to th'e serv' ice water, is that 15 another anomaly thatiought to^.he-added to our-list 16 that is not understood at this time?
17 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes.
18 MR. ROSSI: I thinkiwe went_down through 19 and listed them. That's another anomaly on here 20 that I don't.think we have on our list.
21 MR. LANNING: Is this a recurring event?
22 MR. KOSLOFF: This has-happened before.'
23 I don't know for sure how many-times, but'it has -
.24 happened before'. They have a design' change th a t ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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-.7., . . .- - . _ . . . _ _ . . . _ . _. . _ . . . .
.. y 208 last ?I' hear 6 was being developed to put a time
~
1 h' 2 ' delay in there.
3 But after this event and discussions with i
2- 4 the~ senior resident, our concern with this has
. .. 5 ' escalated somewhat because we looked at the speed 6 . indication for the Aux Feedwater pump at that point
~7 in time and for the interval before and after.that, i
8 and we looked at the flow indication a t that _ point 9 .in time and-the time surrounding that, and we could 10 see no anonalies .i n flow or turbine speed that-1
~11 would. account for that-having occurred.
1
- 12 MR. LANNING: This transfer is based on a
=.() 13 pressure, isn't it, water pressure?
14 MR. KOSLOFF: It's. base'd on low suction
-15 pressure.
.l.6 MR. LANNING: I'm not sure how you would
{ 17 see that from a flow in speed.
!~
18 MR. KOSLOFF: I'm not either. We were 19 just looking for sonething to give us some clues.
i
, _20 We don't'always look in the right spot,'but we try i
- 21 fto-find something that gives us some directions to 22 look in.
l' 23 HR. BELL: Is there any -- if I remember I 24 that' drawing _ correctly, the Aux Feed pumps can take ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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209 1 a suction out of the deaerator storage tanks; is n
2 that correct?
3 MR..KOSLOFF: Yeah, they can.
4 MR. BELL: Is there any possibility we 5 got some hot water in that suction and flashed that 6 suction temporarily?
7 HR. KOSLOFF: There is a possibility.
8 MR. BELL: Well, I'm thinking about these 9 valves for the startup feedpump. Is the suction --
10 he has to open a suction and a discharge valve to 11 put that pump in service; right?
12 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
() 13 MR. BELL: Is the suction valve he has to 14 open very close to the suction valve from the 15 deacrator?
16 MR. KOSLOFF: No. The suction valve is 17 right above the room.
18 MR. BELL: But he wou ld n ' t he playing 19 with Aux speed functioning. I'm thinking incorrectly ,
20 MR. KOSLOFF The valves are --
there is 21 where you have to start. But when you actually go 22 out and look at where the valves are and the piping, 23 it doesn't look like that's a likely cause. We rm 24 haven't looked at this extensively, but so far --
Q ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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V 210 1 in fact, the senior resident has looked at it a O'#
2 -litt1'e bit in more detail than I have and he 3 doesn't understand.
4 MR. ROSSI: It just switched from the S condensate storage tank overLto the service water 6 and then back again a couple minutes later.
7 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
8 HR. BEARD: Did it switch back by itself 9 or was it manual?
10 ,
HR. KOSLOPP: Manual switch back. It 4
11 transfers over automatically. But to get it back, 12 you have to transfer it, well, manually. There is
> s (m) 13 a button to push on the back panel in the control 14 room.
15 MR. ROSSI: And it's on low nuction 16 pressure of the pumps, so any kind of spray by low 17 suction pressure that exists would switch it over 18 and then they would have to manually switch it back.
19 MR. KOSLOPP: R i gh t . Let me find that on 20 here.
21 HR. BEARD: I think that's one-of the 22 fixes that we asked people-to put in was to avoid 23 damage to the pumps on Aux Feed water, that they
- 24 have some provision there to automatically protect k_)s i
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211 !
1 against: damage due to low suction and loss - of water.
1 ;.,
i l: 2 MR.-ROSSI: When you have condensato 3 storage tanks I would think. t
! 4 MR. BEARD: There have-been pros and cons 5 and discussions up' one side and down another on 6 that particular feature in the plant design.
7 MR. KOSLOFF: But some kind of a time l.
'8 delay in.the circuit should be able to --
- . 9 HR. BEARD
- ~ I think a. lot of people ,
! -10 proposed a lot of different ways to ga t a rca nd the
~
11 spurious problem. Can I.go back and I'm not sure >
l
^
12 -Ernie has finished his line of' thinking here?
-( ) 13 HR. 'ROSSI - I was just going'through his
- 14 sequence of events and.findingfthings~ I wanted to 15 ask questions-about and~ things that were obvious on 16 here that may.not have. agreed with my
- understanding i 17 from earlier. I don't see any.others right now, i .. <
18 but you know, we can carefully study it later on.
]
19 MR. BEARD: I have two separate questions.
4
! 20 In'some events where-there is some confusion as to E 21 what has happened or what happened, there'is a 22 . bogus signal or bogus indication' , the operating
-23 staff has consulted the Sequence of Events recorder i
.24 or the ' alarm printer ' t o see what that source of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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t
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212 [
L 1 'information~ told them.
j-2 MR. KOSLOFF: Uh-huh. ,
I 2 L3 MR. BEARD: During the course of this i
4 transient, do you know whether'they consulted these l 5 bits of information or what do_you think they used.
l 56 besides the main indicators on the control board?
i
^
- 7 Did;they go down and get any of this kind of 8 :inf ormation ' tha t . we ha ve ?
s 1
They were using
, 9 MR. KOSLOFF: -- there ;
- 10 were people offland on looking at-the. alarm
'll printers trying to: determine'what had h'appened.
12 When I1was-in the control room,,the.more detailed i:[) '13 information from the DADS system was not available 1
14 .ye t . That takes ~a while to printout, although ;
L . .
l 15 -later in the morning about 7:00 when the senior 16 . resident and I went' ove r - to - the TSC , Technical l 17 Support Center,.the technical staff, technical i-I ~ 18 section' staff'had the:dat'a, their initial run of i -
i .19 the data laid 1out and they were trying to piece l .
l 20 together.the-events.
~21 MR.DBEARDs. -Does this plant have a Safety L 22 . Parameter Display 1 System readout installed and
. 23 operational in theLcontrol. room? .
f' L= 24 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes, but it-was not it "O:
l' '
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS-INC. ~
L t (202)~347-3700 fn. :
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4 213
.1 'w a s E n o t. on : initially. Let me think.
- O- 2 MR. BEARD
- By.on, do you mean turned on !
3 t
or inoperable?
4- 4 MR. KOSLOFF: .There was some kind of 5 : problem - wi th i t . I don't recall what it was. My 6 memory'is giving me mixed signals on this. At some 7 point it was off and later on I think initially it 8 was off, the monitoring lwere blank and later in the 4 9 day there was a-display on it.
10 MR. . BEARD: Do you know whether they l 11 tried to use this source of information during the 12 event?' Like for-example, they would go over and t
() 13 - turn.it on?
14 MR. KOSLOFF:~ Usually whenfit's available, i
~
15 it's on. ,
j 16 MR. BEARD: .I'see. So it's normally at
~ 17 this plant kept running?
18 MR. KOSLOFF: Yes.
i 19 MR. BEARD: So there was'-a' preexisting
- 20 problem?
21 MR. KOSLOFF: .There must have been a 22 . problem with that.
-23 MR. BEARD ' .The second area I;would like'
-p-24 to-ask youfabout11s.on the;PORV with' regard to A
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214
-1 indications of the closure of the P O RV , I guese the
' O 2 question really is in two parts. Iha they have .
3 caustic monitors or something comparable to.that, t
4 maybe pressure monitoring downstream of the PORV to i 5 indicate-beyond the temperatures whether the PORV 6 is open or closed? t 7 -
- MR . KOSLOFF: They have a caustic y 8 monitoring. ,
9 MR. BEARD: They have a caustic 4 10 monitoring? y.
12 MR.' BEARD: Do you know if_they were used
() 13 fduring the even't_when there was a question about 14 the-PORV being' closed?-
15 MR. KOSLOFF: I did not ask: the_ operators 16 that question. Today'I askedithe operation
- 17 superintendent, and he said that to his-knowledge [
l 18 they were not used,_that they relied on the 19 -pressure, the fact that_ pressure was dropping.as an ;
20 indication that the PORV was remaining open.
'21 MR. BEARD: Seemed like I had one last i ;
22 tidbit-_along that same line. It seemedilike -- I j 23 can't. find it right now, but_it seemed like you put 24 an entry _in your summary hero that the PORV-was ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS'INC.
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--.. . , - . . - . . - - . . . . .-. , , 2 :-- _- - .- , . .- ., -,
w 215 1 closed, not;the block valve, t h'e isolation valvo, O 2 but the PORV itself closed.
3 MR. KOSLOFF: It's 1:51:49.
4 MR. BEARD: Okay.. I guess'what I'm 5 curious about is the source of that data point.
I 6 MR. KOSLOFF: This is a combination of 7 the alarm printer and review of the pressure 8 . indications, this' pressure was' dropping, and at. t W
I 9 1:51:49 the pressure stopped dropping, and that's 8
I 10 the same time that the alarm printer shows that the i
! 11 LPORV was closed.
12 MR. BEARD:~ So'it's-an incorrect I
e
{ ;( ) 13 measurement? ,
[ 14 MR. ROSSI: But if the isolation valve 15 was closed,'that would have stopped the pressure l ,
16 - from going down, wouldn't it?
l 17 MR.[KOSLOFF: Well, that's true.- But --
e L ' 18 yns. It's the indirect indication. But-this entry l 19 here, 1:51:42 PORV isolation valve closed, i f you 20 notice the pressure, 2141 and the pressure seven !
. 21 ' seconds letterfwhen the'PORV indicated closed f l 22 2112.9,:you will see the pressure was still l 23 dropping.
r 24 And - in reviewing the data, ,
the pressure _
f ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700 t
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216 I was dropping at a rapid rate. At 1:51:42, the rate
(,) '
2 of decrease slowed and the rate of decrease 3 continued to slow until 1:51:49 when the pressure 4 indication showed a constant pressure.
5 MR. ROSSI: Could that mean that the 6 isolation valve didn't fully close when they closed 7 it?
8 MR. KOSLOFF: I suspect this indication 9 at 1:51:42 on the alarm printer is when the 10 operator took the switch to the closed position and 11 then it took some time for that valve to close.
12 You know, it had flow through at that pressure.
l)
13 I'm sttre that it takes a little effort to operate.
14 MR. ROSSI: They-opened the isolation 15 valve again here, didn't they, and presumably the 16 PORV was closed at that point or they would have 17 known it, I'm sure.
18 MR. KOSLOFF: Right.
19 MR. DEARD: That's the part I'm trying to 20 understand, is whether or not the PORV was open and 21 blowing down apparently until you got to the time 22 frame of 1:51:42, because at that point apparently 23 the operator chose to isolate the valve. So at 7-q 24 that point he told it-to go closed. And I'm trying
\_/
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T 217 1 .to. understand whether or not at later timos did the
' G'c 2 valve reclose itself or why the valve closed.
. 3 MR. KOSLOFF: I don't know the answer to 4 that. One answer would be that once the isolation 5 valve was elos'ed, then the conditions that the PORV
- 6 was exposed to were made less severe.
7 MR. BEARD: If the --
if that were the 8 case -- I'm not arguing with you.-
9 MR. KOSLOFF: I'm just speculating anyway.
! l'O MR. BEARD: If that's the case, that 11 would.suggest the reason the valve stayed open is l'2 .more mechanical in~ nature whereas by the controls O- 13 -in nature.
14 I M R. KOSLOFF That would be the case.
The possibility is.it is1 controls.
~15
- 16 MR. BEARD: -I know. But it would tend to
'17 push you in that direction,=I think.
. ]8 MR. KOSLOFF: .Dut'I don't know what --
19 this isLthe caso of the chicken or the egg here.
20 MR., BEARD: -But'it~does appear they have 21 a stuck open PORV a'n d that the-operator saw'this l 22 reactor cooling system blowing down, he isolated 23 the' valve, as a', good operator should, but it.does c
24 appear on the surface --
and it's getting late'in i
l : ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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218 I the dayfand-I am not sure'I really want to say this,
.rm
~ . 2 -but'it'does ~ appear'that the transient the plant 3 -went through started out as a feedwater type 4 - transient-for which the system response including i
-5 -operati'on of'the PORV and the PORV stuck open, 6 which' constitutes a sniall break LOCA, loss of 7 coolant' accident, I guess _to help the reporter.
8 Land I guess i f we characterized the transient;as t
9 ' starting:out ingone direction, a feedwater 10 -transient and then growing to a small-break ~LOCA,
.11 -the connotations and th e 'Li'mp li ca t i on s of that type 12 :of characterizations-are different from.what'we had O 13 decore - errivea et **e ite-14 I-guess because of that, it.seems to me
- 15 personally that we really.need to pursue-information with regard to 'more. direct ~ information 16 -
17 on-the PORV. status, for example, the'accoustic 4
18 monitoring, maybe there is some alarm that's 19 connected to 'the' alarm printers and maybe we can 20 dig-that'back-out or.other things to see if we can
- 21 confirm,or, deny that the PORV was stuck open.
22 MR. KOSLOFF: Your mentioning the alarm 23 printers jogged my memory-here. My-understanding 24 is that: thefalarm printer indication is from the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700'
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, 219 1 accoustic monitor.
'# 2 HR. BEARD: Oh, it is? And do you know 3 what the alarm printer sentence is of th e PORV7 4 MR. KOSLOFF: That's the primary source 5 of:this information on the PORV being opened or 6 closed here.
7 MR. BEARD: Because earlier you said this 8 is really a compilation from a number of sources 9 and I guess I did not fully appreciate that the 10 PORV entries was primarily'from th e alarm printer 11 - and that in turn the.accoustic monitoring.
12 MR. ROSSI: It makes it very difficult to t .~) 13 know whether the PORV closed at this point or the 14 isolation valve closed, because if you are look i n g 15 at the pressure and accoustic monitoring closing, 16 either one of them will give you the same 17 indication.
18 MR. BEARD: You look like you are talking 19 six or seven seconds, it looks like seven seconds,.
20 which is really not unreasonable for the isolation 21 of the block valve, but it did bring up the 22 question of --
~
realizing this is a s u mm a r y --- d o e s 23 the alarm printer or the Sequence O f Events printer g4 24 ' distinguish between the command of a piece of x,. /
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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- 'l equipment t o do . something versus the completion or
's (d
~2 confirmation of that' command, that action?
3 MR. KOSLOFF: It depends ~ on the item.
4 some items have several indications, for i nstance. ,
5 Some valves will-have a closed, not closed 6 indication.- Others will-have closed, not closed, 7 open. And to answer that question fully, you have 8 to-have at your_ disposal, there is about a-four-- .
9 inch thick description of_what all the alarm points
[10 are and how .they perform and what their various 11 indications are. But-there are a lot of different i
12 in'dications which I didn't -- I didn't.put on here.
() 13 I tried to interpret them as-I understood them.
14 MR. BEARD: I'minot criticizing you.
- 15 After all,.this-is supposed:to be a summary.
1 16 MR..KOSLOFF: I'm justLexplaining, those 17 are a vai lable .. The' things.like NC for not closed, 18 NO for not open, normal, trouble. There is a 19 variety of-indications.
20 MR. BEARD: But I think'what I hear you 21 saying that-directly relates to the question, that 22 for at least some of the valves, the alar m p'rinte r 23 - would distinguish between a switch command to do
( ~ 24 something and the actual. final position of the
(./)
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221 1 valve, and it may or may not be the case with the 2 PORV and we can look into it.
3 MR. KOSLOFF: Right. I don't recall what 4 the --
5 MR. BEARD: I guess what I'm really 6 coming to, Ernie, is that we are going to have to I 7 think look at not summaries, but the actual 8 material that the summaries were developed from to 9 determine the situation on this PORV.
10 MR. ROSSI: And where the signals come 11 from.
12 MR. BEARD: Because, you know, if you do
( I 13 chose to characterize the transient as starting out 14 as feedwater and proceeding to a small break LOCA 15 which was then mitigated, I'm not sure what the 16 significance of that is, but it is certainly 17 different.
18 MR. BELL: It's speculative now anyhow.
19 MR. BEARD: Yeah, clearly.
20 MR. KOSLOFF Part of my purpose in 21 developing this was to sort of be as a starting 22 point more than anything else to get things in an 23 organized manner that's also digestable and then --
ex 24 MR. ROSSI: This is very useful.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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cMR. SHAFER: If I may, it might'be 4
2 helpful, we know that the. operator opened the 3 blocked, valve.or isolation valve two minutes.later. ;
4 And his decision' f or lopenin g 'tha t, valve would d
e 5 hopefully be based on positive-knowledge that the.
6 : PORV'was closed.
7 MR. BEARD '- But I.' d o n ' t know how one gets F
8 that,information. .
9 MR. SHAFER: I don't-either.
T 10 MR. ROSSI: Off the record.
11 - - - -,
i 12 Thereupon, proceedings were h 13 -adjourned at .7:10 o' clock p.m.
~!
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-n N' 2 CERTIFICATE 3 I, Nicholas !!a r t o n e , a Registered 4 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for 5 the State of Ohio, do hereby certify that I took 6 the aforementioned proceedings and that the 7 foregoing transcript of such proceedings is a full, 8 true and correct transcript of my stenotypy notes 9 as so taken.
10 I do further certify that I was called-11 there in the capacity of a Registered Professional 12 Reporter, and am not otherwise interested in this
() 13 proceeding.
14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 15 my hand and affixed my seal of office at Columbus, 16 Ohio, on this h day of )%4 , 1985.
17 18 i A ,, gehy _
IIICHOLAS A. liARRONE,. Registered 19 Professional Reporter, Notary Public in and for the State o f Oh i o .
20 21 My Commission expires November 1, 1987.
22 23 24 7s V
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