ML20128M234
| ML20128M234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128M220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-85-23, NUDOCS 8507110623 | |
| Download: ML20128M234 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1985023
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-395/85-23
Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
Columbia, SC 29218
Docket No.:
50-395
License No.: NPF-12
Facility Name:
Summer
Inspection Conducted: May 13-17, 1985
Inspector:
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W.C.Kiu
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Approved by:
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J.
~ike, Section Chief
Date' Signed
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ering Branch
v sion of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 34 inspector-hours at the
site during normal duty hours, in the areas of mechanical maintenance associated
with safety-related piping systems, and licensee action on previous enforcement
matters.
Results: One violation was identified - Failure to follow procedures for hanger
inspection
paragraph 5.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Connelly, Deputy Director, Operation and Maintenance
- B. Croley, Group Manager, Technical and Support services
- M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services
- K. Woodward, Manager, Operations
- M. Browne, Manager, Technical Support
- F. Leach, Manager, Quality Assurance
- F. Zander, Manager, Nuclear Technical Training
- A. Koon, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- F. McKinnon, Associate Manager, Quality Control (QC)
- R. Cox, Supervisor, Mechanical Nuclear Engineering
- A. Torres, Supervisor, QC
- M. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Operation Training
Other licensee employees contacted included QC Inspectors and office
personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- C. Hehl, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 17, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new
items were identified during this inspection.
(0 pen) Violation 395/85-23-01, Failure to follow procedure for hanger
inspection, paragraph 5.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 395/85-23-02, Determination of inspection
requirements for seismically designed steel platforms, paragraph 6.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Unresolved Item 395/82-25-01, Overlap modeling technique for
seismic analysis.
The unresolved item involved the structural overlap
method that was used to divide the analysis of a large piping system into
smaller analyses without using intermediate anchors.
There were 50 piping
analysis problems that the overlap method was used to establish a problem
boundary. The major concern in the use of the overlap method is to provide
a seismic isolation between the subproblems such that higher seismic
excitation on one subproblem is not transmitted through the overlap.
The
inspector reviewed a study report prepared by the EDS Nuclear, Inc., dated
March 11, 1983, for the licensee with regard to the evaluation of the
overlap method.
With the results of the evaluation and the inherent
conservatisms included in the analysis, it was concluded that the over-
lapping technique was satisfactory as applied to the piping systems.
This
item is considered resolved.
4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems
a.
Procedure and Document Review
The inspector reviewed portions of the following maintenance procedures
and documents pertaining to safety-related pipe support and restraint
systems to determine whether appropriate procedures have been
established and whether they comply with NRC requirements and the
licensee commitments.
Procedure M-NQCP-6, Inspection of Pipe Supports and Components,
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November 12, 1984
Surveillance test procedure STP-403.002, Mechanical Snubber Visual
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Examination, June 23, 1983
Surveillance test procedure, STP-403.003, Mechanical Snubber Basic
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Operational Test, June 27, 1983
b.
Pipe Support Inspection
The inspector selected and examined the following pipe supports that
had previously been QC inspected for a verification inspection to
determine the effectiveness of the licensee's program.
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Hanger Number
Piping System
- EFH-4010, Rev. 2
Emergency Feedwater
EFH-4046, Rev. 4
Emergency Feedwater
- CCH-153, Rev. 2
Component Cooling
CCH-387, Rev. 4
Component Cooling
CCH-751, Rev. 4
Component Cooling
FWH-204, Rev. 7
6
FWH-145, Rev. 4
- SWH-4021, Rev. 5
SWH-089, Rev. 6
MSH-084, Rev. O
MSH-096, Rev. 5
- Indicates discrepancies identified during the inspection.
The above eleven pipe supports were partially inspected against their
detail drawings for configuration, identification, location, fastener
installation, welds, and damage / protection. The supports, in general,
appeared to be good and were installed in accordance with design
documents, with the exception of three supports identified below:
(1) Hanger No. EFH-4010, Rev. 2, in the emergency feedwater system was
examined.
It was found that the cotter pin was missing for the
strut end connection.
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(2) Hanger No. CCH-153, Rev. 2, in the component cooling system was
inspected.
It was noted that the embedded anchor bolts were
improperly installed in that washers were missing for the four
anchor bolts.
(3) Hanger No. SWH-4021, Rev. 5, in the service water system was
inspected.
It was noted that the pipe clamp was improperly
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installed with respect to one of the two strut assemblies in that
the maximum angular tolerance was exceeded.
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Summer quality control (QC) procedure for inspection of hanger
installation requires verification of:
the use of washers and snug
tightness for embedded anchor bolts; that proper spacers and pins are
in place; and that pipe clamp installation is within tolerance.
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Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned three supports
indicate that portions of these supports were not installed and
verified in accordance with the design drawings and the above procedure
requirements. As a results, these supports may not be able to perform
their intended function as required by the design. This is a violation
of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, and is identified as Violation
395/85-23-01, Failure to follow procedure for hanger inspection.
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
6.
Seismically Designed Steel Platforms
During the inspection, the inspector noted that there were ten concrete
expansion anchor bolts that were improperly installed in three base plates.
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The above anchor bolts were loose because the nuts were not in contact with
the washers.
The base plates were utilized to support the seismically
designed steel platform located at elevation 436' level inside the Inter-
mediate Building.
There were three 18-inch diameter feedwater pipe lines
underneath the platform.
All the supports for the feedwater lines were
designed to meet the safety-related criteria.
The inspector held
discussions with the licensee's representative with respect to the above
concerns.
It was noted that inspections for the platform and the other
seismically designed platforms had never been performed. The licensee's
preliminary evaluation revealed that the feedwater piping system in the area
of concern was not safety-related. The inspector was concerned that the
failure of the platform assembly could produce potential damage to
safety-related piping systems and equipment. Pending further evaluations to
be furnished by the licensee, this matter is identified as Inspector
Followup Item 395/85-23-02, Determination of inspection requirements for
seismically designed steel platforms.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.