ML20128M234

Insp Rept 50-395/85-23 on 850513-17.Violation Noted: Failure to Follow Procedures for Hanger Insp

ML20128M234
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	05/31/1985
From:	Blake J, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128M220	List: ML20128M217 ML20128M227 ML20128M234
References
50-395-85-23, NUDOCS 8507110623
Download: ML20128M234 (5)

See also: IR 05000395/1985023

Text

. .

pa noo, UNITED STATES

/ 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ ~, HEGION li

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

3 g

• I

e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

\...../

Report No.: 50-395/85-23

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

Columbia, SC 29218

Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12

Facility Name: Summer

Inspection Conducted: May 13-17, 1985

Inspector:

-

(( [ 7 88

W.C.Kiu ' Day S ned

Approved by: _

6 f/ .I

J. . ~ike,

l Section Chief Date' Signed

E i ering Branch

v sion of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 34 inspector-hours at the

site during normal duty hours, in the areas of mechanical maintenance associated

with safety-related piping systems, and licensee action on previous enforcement

matters.

Results: One violation was identified - Failure to follow procedures for hanger

inspection paragraph 5.

l{

.

l 5

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• J. Connelly, Deputy Director, Operation and Maintenance

• B. Croley, Group Manager, Technical and Support services

• M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services

• K. Woodward, Manager, Operations

• M. Browne, Manager, Technical Support

• F. Leach, Manager, Quality Assurance

• F. Zander, Manager, Nuclear Technical Training

• A. Koon, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance

• F. McKinnon, Associate Manager, Quality Control (QC)

• R. Cox, Supervisor, Mechanical Nuclear Engineering

• A. Torres, Supervisor, QC

• M. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Operation Training

Other licensee employees contacted included QC Inspectors and office

personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

• C. Hehl, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 17, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new

items were identified during this inspection.

(0 pen) Violation 395/85-23-01, Failure to follow procedure for hanger

inspection, paragraph 5.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 395/85-23-02, Determination of inspection

requirements for seismically designed steel platforms, paragraph 6.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

. .

2

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Unresolved Item 395/82-25-01, Overlap modeling technique for

seismic analysis. The unresolved item involved the structural overlap

method that was used to divide the analysis of a large piping system into

smaller analyses without using intermediate anchors. There were 50 piping

analysis problems that the overlap method was used to establish a problem

boundary. The major concern in the use of the overlap method is to provide

a seismic isolation between the subproblems such that higher seismic

excitation on one subproblem is not transmitted through the overlap. The

inspector reviewed a study report prepared by the EDS Nuclear, Inc., dated

March 11, 1983, for the licensee with regard to the evaluation of the

overlap method. With the results of the evaluation and the inherent

conservatisms included in the analysis, it was concluded that the over-

lapping technique was satisfactory as applied to the piping systems. This

item is considered resolved.

4. Unresolved Items

l Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems

a. Procedure and Document Review

The inspector reviewed portions of the following maintenance procedures

and documents pertaining to safety-related pipe support and restraint

systems to determine whether appropriate procedures have been

established and whether they comply with NRC requirements and the

licensee commitments.

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Procedure M-NQCP-6, Inspection of Pipe Supports and Components,

November 12, 1984

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Surveillance test procedure STP-403.002, Mechanical Snubber Visual

Examination, June 23, 1983

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Surveillance test procedure, STP-403.003, Mechanical Snubber Basic

Operational Test, June 27, 1983

b. Pipe Support Inspection

The inspector selected and examined the following pipe supports that

had previously been QC inspected for a verification inspection to

determine the effectiveness of the licensee's program.

,

. .

3

Hanger Number Piping System

• EFH-4010, Rev. 2 Emergency Feedwater

EFH-4046, Rev. 4 Emergency Feedwater

• CCH-153, Rev. 2 Component Cooling

CCH-387, Rev. 4 Component Cooling

CCH-751, Rev. 4 Component Cooling

FWH-204, Rev. 7 Feedwater

6

FWH-145, Rev. 4 Feedwater

• SWH-4021, Rev. 5 Service Water

SWH-089, Rev. 6 Service Water

MSH-084, Rev. O Main Steam

MSH-096, Rev. 5 Main Steam

• Indicates discrepancies identified during the inspection.

The above eleven pipe supports were partially inspected against their

detail drawings for configuration, identification, location, fastener

installation, welds, and damage / protection. The supports, in general,

appeared to be good and were installed in accordance with design

documents, with the exception of three supports identified below:

(1) Hanger No. EFH-4010, Rev. 2, in the emergency feedwater system was

examined. It was found that the cotter pin was missing for the

strut end connection.

l

(2) Hanger No. CCH-153, Rev. 2, in the component cooling system was

inspected. It was noted that the embedded anchor bolts were

improperly installed in that washers were missing for the four

anchor bolts.

(3) Hanger No. SWH-4021, Rev. 5, in the service water system was

inspected. It was noted that the pipe clamp was improperly

!

installed with respect to one of the two strut assemblies in that

the maximum angular tolerance was exceeded.

!

Summer quality control (QC) procedure for inspection of hanger

installation requires verification of: the use of washers and snug

tightness for embedded anchor bolts; that proper spacers and pins are

in place; and that pipe clamp installation is within tolerance.

I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

.- ..

4

Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned three supports

indicate that portions of these supports were not installed and

verified in accordance with the design drawings and the above procedure

requirements. As a results, these supports may not be able to perform

their intended function as required by the design. This is a violation

of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, and is identified as Violation

395/85-23-01, Failure to follow procedure for hanger inspection.

Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.

6. Seismically Designed Steel Platforms

During the inspection, the inspector noted that there were ten concrete

. expansion anchor bolts that were improperly installed in three base plates.

The above anchor bolts were loose because the nuts were not in contact with

the washers. The base plates were utilized to support the seismically

designed steel platform located at elevation 436' level inside the Inter-

mediate Building. There were three 18-inch diameter feedwater pipe lines

underneath the platform. All the supports for the feedwater lines were

designed to meet the safety-related criteria. The inspector held

discussions with the licensee's representative with respect to the above

concerns. It was noted that inspections for the platform and the other

seismically designed platforms had never been performed. The licensee's

preliminary evaluation revealed that the feedwater piping system in the area

of concern was not safety-related. The inspector was concerned that the

failure of the platform assembly could produce potential damage to

safety-related piping systems and equipment. Pending further evaluations to

be furnished by the licensee, this matter is identified as Inspector

Followup Item 395/85-23-02, Determination of inspection requirements for

seismically designed steel platforms.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.