ML20128D368
| ML20128D368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1993 |
| From: | Joyce T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| OSR-008-93, OSR-8-93, NUDOCS 9302100125 | |
| Download: ML20128D368 (3) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Comntnwealth Edis:n
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February 2, 1993 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
The enclosed Special Report number OSR/008/93, Docket No. 59-295/DPR-39 from Zion Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.21.2.B.
Sincerely, T. P. Joyc Station Manager Zion Generating Station TJP/KD/ cal
Enclosure:
Special Report cc: NRC Region III Administrator NRC Resident Inspector INPO Record Center CECO Distribution List 080023 9302100125 930202 PDR ADOCK 05000295 e
s PDR ZOSR-290(1) 1 i
t
february 1, 1993 OSR/008/93 f
To:
T.P. Joyce
Subject:
On-site Review of OA Fire Pump Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days On-site Review has investigated the failure of the OA (motor driven) fire pump relief valve.
This report is being prepared according to the requirement of Technical Specification 3.21.2.B.
On-site Review has determined the following:
On December 30th, 1992, a local equipment attendant noticed on night shift rounds that the sensing line to 0FP0052 (OA fire pump relief valve) was sheared. At 21:23 hours on December 30th, 1992, the OA fire pump was declared inoperable, a PIF (problem identification form) and PT-14 (inoperable equipment surveillance test) were generated.
In accordance with Technical Specification 3.21.2.B. the OA fire pump was placed on a seven day LCO.
The OA fire pump had been running for an extended period of time due to the fact that the OA service water booster pump was out of service.
At 03:30 on December 31st, 1992, the OA service water booster pump was returned to service and repairs were begun on the OA fire pump. After the disassembly of the sensing and control tubing, it was discovered that the tubing had failed at the flared fittings.
In addition, the valve's discharge pressure sensing 3/4" pipe had sheared at a pipe thread.
The disassembled parts were sent to a metallurgist for further investigation.
In the next two days the mechanical maintenance department checked another valve out of the store room and removed the 3/8" and 1/2" tubing and the 3/4" pipe and reassembled these parts on the valve in the field.
At 04:40 on January 3rd, 1993, the OA fire pump was run for post maintenance verification. The fittings were not seated correctly and were leaking. Another PIr was generated to investigate the second proposed failure of the sensing line on the relief valve. On January 4th an Engineering Service Request was generated, the request asked Engineering and Construction (ENC) to investigate the use of compression fittings versus flared fittings and the use of stainless steel tubing vs. copper tubing. A representative from United States Brass and Copper Company was contacted regarding flared fitting on 1/2" copper tubing.
The representative stated that before the end is flared the end of the tubing should be annealed with a propane torch.
The representative stated that the lack of annealing may cause the fitting to fail.
An engineer from the CLA-VA!.
Company was contacted to discuss the potential change in material and fitting of the sensing and control tubing on thtr valve.
The engineer stated that the material and fitting change would be considered an upgrade from the present configuration.
On January 6th ENC issued a letter to the station stating that the change in material from copper to stainless steel and the fitting change f.'om flged to compression was functionally and technically acceptable. On January 7 the tubing was replaced with stainless steel and compression fittings were used to complete the assembly.
ZOSR-290(2)
On January 8th at 17:20, OA fire pump $Uccessfu11y completed the acceptance i
cciteria of PT-201 (monthly check sheet for fire suppression water system).
The acceptance criteria for PT-201 were that the pump must run for 30 minutes and maintain 145-150 pst back pressure.
The FT-14 was closed out and the OA fire pump was declared operable.
The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), section 9.5.1.2.5 (Fire Service Water Supply and System Seismic Requirements), states that, "SU) ply (to the fire header) is normally handled by the two 4000 gpm service water -)ooster pumps.
Should system demand result in a pressure reduction, a 2000 gpm motor driven fire pump will start automatically.
If pressure continues to decrease, a 2000 gpm diesel driven fire pump will start automatically.
In the event that_
the system demand exceeds the capacity of both the service water booster p. umps and the fire pumps, water can be supplied to the fire protection systea: lidader through a bypass line around the service water booster pumps directly from the service water pumps."
During the-time that the OA fire pump was inoperable both the OB service water booster pump and the OB (diesel driven) fire aump were continuously available. Service water was also available from tie service water pumps through check valve OSW0008.
In addition, following identification that-the OA fire pump was inoperable, the OA service water booster pump was promptly returned to service. As a result, no special procedures or additional equipment were required.
Prepared by:
M. L 1 Disciplines required: A. G Cralf;, 'Lucke x/dec
'b l
8q T(ch' Staff Supervisor Opera' ting Engineer '
I concur and approve:
bar T.P. Joyth Station Manager Zion Station cc: R. P? Tuetken R. A. Chrzanowski S. A.~Kaplan P. C. LeBlond K. T. Dickerson G. E. Trzyna M.'J. Wallace R. E. Querto J. D. Bowers R? J. Budowle D. Farrar Reg. Assurance File
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-Master Flie-ZOSR-290(3) l
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