ML20128D198

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Summarizes 730517 Meeting W/Util in Bethesda,Md to Discuss Basis for Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Re Control Rod Reactivity Worth Limits
ML20128D198
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/1973
From: Reid R, James Shea
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 9212070175
Download: ML20128D198 (6)


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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION / L 4' 4

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yj5y 7- ~3 Files (Docket No; 50-263)

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3 v. . ...s CONTROL ROD REACIiVITY WORTH - MONTICELLO MEETING (NORTilERN STATES p0WER COMPANY)

Representatives of Northern States Power Company (NSp) and the Directorate of Licensing met in the Bethesda AEC offices on May 17, 1973, to review and clarify in certain areas the basis for proposed revisions to the Tech-nical Specifications Centrol Rod Reactivity Worth Limits (l). As originally proposed by NSp in September 1972, Section 3.3.B.3 which present.ly requires that the control rod withdrawal and insertion sequence be established so that the maximum reactivity worth of any operabic control rod is less than 2.5% Ak would be changed to limit maximum in-sequence control rod reactivity worth to 1.5% tak when the reactor power icvel is less than ten percent of rated power. The proposed control rod limit of 1.5% was later reduced (April 1973) to 1.4% by General Electric for consistency with a general limit of 1.4% for all operating SWRs. GE expressed the desire to word the proposed change so that the drop of a maximum rod would not cause the core to become mor e than 1.4% supercritical rather than in terms of maximum rod worth. Coincidently new operability requirements were to be placed on the Rod Worth Minimizer. Reanalysis of the kod Drop Accident (RDA) assuming (1) technical specifications scram times, about 5 seconds, instead of measured scram times of about 2.8 seconds (more reatrictive), (2) calculated rather than linear functions for scram reactivity (more restrictive), and (3) statistical rod drop test results, i.e., 2.8 feet per second rod drop time instead of 5.0 feet per second (less restrictive) yields a 'vorst case" comprehensive value of 1.4% 6k for all operating plants. According to General Electric, the proposed 1.4%4k control rod limit represents a combination of conservative inputs which are inherently fixed and judgement inputs and result in peak RDA enthalpfes less than 280 cals/gm (250 cal /gm was stated as a more likely peak enthalpy if conservative judgement was omitted). The discussion topics briefly summarized below were not satisfactorily resolved in all instances, but there is sufficient under-standing to proceed with more definitive changes to the Technical Specifications beyond those already proposed by GE. In addition to the information(l) submitted by NSp, reference was made to topical reports (2) submitted to the AEC by GE.

The new proposal for specifying the limiting conditions of operation with respect to the rod drop accident recogniet that specifying only the in-sequence rod worth is not sufficient assure that the required protection will always exist. It was proposed ! General Electric that additional 9212070175 730615 PDR ADOCK 05000263 P PDR f

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!I Files Jb!< I s <si boundary conditions be included in the technical bases of the 'lechnical Specifications. These boundary conditions would consist of (1) accident reactivity shape characteristics, (2) Doppler reactivity feedback, and (3) scram reactivity feedback, in the presentation of the methods for calculating accident reactivity chapes, General Elect ric stat ed that the effects of non-uniform burnout of the core and non-uniform xenon distribution in the core were included in the determination of total and difforential control rod worths. The cal-culational model spatially nodalized the core into approxin.ately six-inch cubes. It was stated that rather than using design intra-assembly local power peaking factors these factors would be varied depending upt>n fuel bundle design and exposure. It was also proposed by General Electric that rather than using a delayed neutron fraction for a highly exposed core that this parameter would be varied with exposure. Agreement was not teached as to whether or not the conservatism of using a Doppler reactivity coefficient for zero exposure would be a fixed condition. Resolution of this item is planned prior to the issuance of changes to the Technical Specifications.

The rod drop velocity is an important factor in the rod drop accident analysis. A rod drop velocity at 5 feet per second was used in the analybis presented in the FSARu for the operating lA'Rs with rod drop velocity limiters. It was proposed by General Electric that the measured rod drop velocity plus three standard deviations be used in the accident analyuis. This value, according to the GE analysis of 720 laboratory data points obtained on nine production rods, is 2.79 feet per second.

It was agreed that the methods used to reduce the data would tie discussed f urther bef ore acceptance. In a telecon with GE representatives on May 22, 197 3, it was agreed that there were sufficient uncertainties concerning the data reduction methods that a rod drop velocity of 3.1 feet per second should be used in the rod drop accident analysis. This value is based on rod drop testing of control rods which were constructed with all dimensions at the unfavorable extremen of the purchase specifications for these rods.

The accident. dose calculations for the rod drop accident are based on the release of fission products from those fuel pins which exceed an enthalpy of 170 cal / gram during the transient, for the currently operating la'Es with rod velocity limiters, 330 !alled fuel pins are calculated to result from the rod drop accident in the analyseu presented in the FSARs. For Monticello, with the new proposed technical specifications, 600 failed fuel pins are calculated. The resultant accident dose would increase in proportion to the number of failed fuel elements. However, the accident dose calculated for the rod drop accident is typically in the range of 10 K (to the thyroid) at the site boundary, thus the increase is well within 10 CFR 100 guidea.

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l'i l e s J N, i, a in a telecon on May 22, 1973, General Electric agreed that they would reexamine the number of f ailed f uel elements assuming all parameters, especially the local peaking factor, were at the boundary conditions.

General Electric pointed out and the staff agreed that rod drop accident calculationn being peric.rmed by brookhaven Laboratory have shown good agreement with those perf ormed by General Electric in the low power range.

1he brookhaven calculations are linited to beginning of core lif e conditions.

Additional comparisons are in progress for low-power cases (void effects).

The maximuni in-sequence control rod typically har, a reactivity worth of -

coasiderably less than libk. Therefore, the reason f or specif ying a maxiinum in-sequence rod reactivity worth limit of 1.4% tsk was questioned.

General Electric stated that the margin was needed to avoid extensive calculational effort to demonstrate centinued corrpliance with the limit and to allow flexibility for reload designs, in the telecon on May 2'2, 1973, GL agreed that they would include a state-ment that normally the maximum reactivity worth of in-sequence rods would be significantly less than 1%6 k.

1he meant, for specifying the rod drop accident parameters were also discussed.

Specification of the maximum worth of an in-sequence rod has the dis-advantage that rod worths are a calculated value thus not subject to direct audit. It was agreed, however, that to accomplish the changes to the technical specification expeditiously and because no r,imple alternative means of specif ying the necessary limitations is currently available, that the preparation of technical specifications should proceed on the basis of identifying a maximum in-sequence rod worth with the necessary boundary conditions in the technical bases.

11r11er conversation with the Mont icello Assistant Superintendent revealed that during startup the reactor is normally brought up on a period of 40-60 seconds. llowev e r , the period can be as short as 20 seconds which in equivalent to 0.21 supercritical. Some allowance for this should be made in determining starting conditions for assumed rod drop. During this telecon GE personnel said that no allowance for the reactor being supercritical was made - they (GE) have not looked at it. This, in our opinion, lends further support to phrase the limit in terms of a rod drop that would result in less than a 1.4% supercritical core rather than in terms of the rod reactivity worth (also covers stronger rods dropped with reactor subtritical).

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I Files JUN l 51973 It was stated by GL that in order to assure that operation was always within the est ablished boundary conditions, they would propose that the technical specif1 cations require a review of the rod drop accident ior each ieload.

It was agreed that a modified technical s,pecification change for the 11onticello plant would be prepared by GE f or USP and that the proposal, af ter review and approval by the !!onticello saf ety committee, would be bubmitted to the Directorate of Licensing for approval. During the telecen on May 22, 1973, CE indicated that they expected to be able to have their proposal to NSP in two weeks. Additional information responsive to the conecrns expressed during the meeting as listed above will be included.

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I jJamesJ.hhea Operating Reactors Branch f 2 Directorate of Licensing

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Robert W. Keld Operating Reactors Branch #2 Directorate of Licensing cc: AEC PDR Local PDR RI' Reading L Reading RP/TR Assistant Directors TJ Car t e r RP/TR Branch Chiefs J He nd r i. e MRosen J JShea RWReid Ro (3)

JGallo RBevan P.eg Attendees l

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REFERENC ES (1) a . Supplement No. 1 to Change Request No. 3.

Submitted by NSP letter dated September 22, 1972.

b.

Request for additiatal information.

Directorate of Licensing letter dated December 21, 1972.

c. NSF responses to request for additional information.

Submitted by NSF letter dated March 2,1973.

d. Supplementary information in the Rod Drop Accident.

Submitted by NSP letter dated April 11, 1973.

(2)a. Rod Drop Accident Analysis for large boiling water reactors.

NEDO-10527 - March 1972 by General Electric.

h. RDA Supplement 1 - NEDO-10527 - July 1972.
c. RDA Addendum No. 2 exposed cores - NEDO-10527 - January 1973.

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LIST OF ATTENDEE _S MEETING WITil NORTilERN STATES POWER COMPANY General Electric R. Lawler N' ""S8 AEC - Licensing J. lienson N' b'II" J. Shen R. Reid Northern States J. Riesland

11. Richings g, ygg E. liailey NUS Corporation D. Fitzgerald Commonwealth Edison L. Ilutterfield A. Chomacke

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