ML20128D076

Provides Comments on Draft Fr Notice of Denial of States of Washington & Oregon Petition PRM-60-4

ML20128D076
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/06/1991
From:	Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:	Silberberg M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
Shared Package
ML20128D049	List: IA-92-174, Provides Comments on Draft Fr Notice of Denial of States of Washington & Oregon Petition PRM-60-4 ML20128D045 ML20128D076
References
FOIA-92-174, RULE-PRM-60-4 NUDOCS 9212070137
Download: ML20128D076 (23)

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y. _,og f. g-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' wasmuoion. o. c.rosss. %....+/ November 6, 1991-nout Aleg Pu? tic Ai10% IP. MEMORANDUM FOR: Mel Silberberg, Chief '91 NOV 12' P 1 :24 - Waste Management Brape r Division of Regul t-6ry Resear gcQ u>^ ~ FROM: Carlton Kamme r Direc o Pf4 %"I State Progra s / p g'AO^' Office:of Gov rfFmental and Public Affairs W *A 4

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SUBJECT:

DRAFT FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE OF DENIAL 158 OF WASHINGTON AND OREGON PETITION (PRM-60-4) 3449 l ti-il"$8 State Programs has reviewed-the subject draft notice and offers the following comments. The States.of Washington and Oregon snould be notified of the denial prior to publication in the Federal Reaister. This is similar to NRC's practice of prior notification to States of. those reactors to be placed on the-NRC " Watch List." The Yakima Indian Nation,- who were part of the original petition (January 2,1990), should also be notified 'of the denial, along with-the State Liaison Officers for Washington and Oregon. We have provided those names, addresses and telephone numbers below for your convenience. q Cecil'Sanchey, Chairman Radioactive Hazardous-Waste Committee Yakima Indian Nation l Post Office Box 151, Fort-Road Toppenish. Washington 98948-509/865-5121' David Stewart-Smith,' Administrator l = Division of Nuclear Safety-and Energy Facilities Oregon Department-of Energy 625 Marion Street, NE? n Salem, Oregon-97310-- 503/378-6469' Dan Silver-Office of the-Governor - Insurance Building ~AQ-44 j Olympia, Washington 98504 R .206/753-1948 cc: S. Treby,-OGC-D.L. Meyer, 0A J. Holonick, NMSS J.H. Austin,.NMSS l- 'g 9212070137-920501 I PDR FOIA FACAROS92-174-PDR- \\

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9l[... - -. - + \\r,. N:0l, G. Ch .--8'-[b [ -:e g },9,/ s 4 i /1-g/' o' D'g p p, 0-( g,9, g g p TABLE-1 (M 4 i q n gs',0 gi ESTIMATED RADIONUCLIDES DISPOSED TO GROUT-q Nuclide mci s con a C-14 0.0027 Tc-99 0.016 -'O.028 a. f I-129 33 x 10-6 .I Sr-90* 1-8 t Cs-137* 12 13 TRU 0.002 - 0.01 (p s e,$). > P va dh2 - Total Activity ** 13 - 21

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[.Ek CHRONOLOGY 1-CHRONOLOGY OF NRC INVOLVEMENT ON HANFORD TANK WASTE O NRC COMMENTS ON DOE'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO PREPARE AN EIS MAY 1983 0 NRC COMMENTS ON DOE'S DEIS SEPTEMBER 1986 0 DOE ISSUES FEIS DECEMBER 1987 0 NRC-DOE MEETINGS ON CLASS;FICATION OF DOUBLE-SHELL TANK WASTES JUNE AND SEPTEMBER 1988, JANUARY 1989 PRINCIPAL RESULTS FROM NRC-DOE MEETINGS: TWO TANKS CONTAINING NEUTRAllZED CURRENT ACID WASTE ARE HLW DOE PROPOSES ADDITIONAL RADIONUCLIDE REMOVAL FOR COMPLEXANT CONCENTRATE WASTE 0 DOE SUBMITS PROPOSAL TO NRC FOR CLASSIFYING TANK WASTES MARCH 1989 0 STAFF INFORMS COMMISSION OF DOE PROPOSAL MAY 1989 0 COMMISSION DIRECTS STAFF TO SOLICIT COMMENTS FROM' STATE OF WASHINGTON AND YAKIMA INDIAN NATION JULY 1989 0 NRC STAFF MET WITH STATE, TRIBE AND DOE AUGUST 1989 ,0 STATE AND TRIBE SUBMITS COMMENTS TO NRC AUGUST 1989 0 NRC RESPONSE TO STATE, TRIBE AND DOE SEPTEMBER 1989 N

f' ~ gi,ck w Q vcTrieut V*O f*-* (jpg,oo ep ScwnTr [o~r inY ' sg cmw.c~ nt M f w r, & <rc 1, m Whnt is NRC's position on the Hanford double-shell tank V. wastes? ANSWER: NRC concluded in 1989 that the residual wastes remaining after removal and treatment of most of the radioactivity in the Hanford double-shell tanks are incidental wastes and, therefore, not subject to NRC regulation. NRC based this conclusion on its review of DOE's Environmental Impact Stats.aent on Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, Transuranic, and Tank Wastes and several meetings and correspondences with DOE between 1986 and 1989. NRC's determination of incidental wastes was consistent with the rationale for the definition of high-level waste contained in NRC's regulations in Appendix F of 10 CFR Part 50. More than 97% of the original activity introduced to the tanks has either decayed during decades of storage, or will be removed from the tanks, solidified in glass, and disposed of in a deep mined geologic repository as high-level radioactive waste. We understand DOE is presently planning to dispose of the incidental wastes in near-surface grout vault disposal facilities. 34

^ a ,e W. What is NRC's response to th the Hanford ' tank vastes? e Washington-Oregon petition Why has it taken NRC so l on respond? ong to ANSWER: The NRC staff is presently for the Commission's revipreparing a recommendation States of Washington and Oew on the petition submitted b y the and disposal of the Hanford do blregon regarding the classif u on recommendation should be present e-shell tank wastes. This the next several weeks. ed to the Commission within our response. We regret the delay in d legal and technical issues thHowever, the petition r eveloping e substantive consideration prior to devel at required thorough oping the recommendation { f: t 35

~ a . Ati.a chme n t 't - CONVERSATION RECORD ((:'30a.m. [ ^ 12/12/89

• I" O VISlf O_ CONFERENCE -

3 TELEPHONE Q INCOMING -NAuc/smsot. iNr ' Location of Vitat/ Conference: O QUTGOING ~ gart.! RBan Naut CF PER$on(s) ConfActts on IN CONTACT . oRGANilAttoN (o*mce, eset.. Deresis.

• TrttPwong he witN Tou ce: Westinghouse for FTS 440-2380 MBell Nick Kirch

' DOE Richland Operations: l RBoyle i SUBJECT l Potential for Explosion in Kag ord Tanks,,,,_

SUMMARY

Over 1954-1957 timeframe. K &_.11L hrr.ncyanide.vam addad ra R4=="*h Phn=nh=ra vaste'(early reprocessing waste) w remove cesium from SST supernate. Due to the low' solubility and low PH of ferrocyanide, this chemical precipitated and now resides in the sludge in some SSTs. Approximately 90% of the ferrocyanide is thought to be contained in 10 SSTs. The DSTs are not believed to contain this chemical in concentrations that represent a potential hazard. _,$ L,_ipsued a renort (PN1. %41) nn ferentyan4Am in I Q Ali The report idanH f f ad an explosive reaction when a sample was heated in a lab above 460*F. Sen. Glenn released this report in October 1989. PNL is pursuing this question and is expected to publish its findings in late 1990. The State of Washington has also initiated _its own study on this issue in November 1989 and expects to is_gue a rep.qrt in early 1990_. PNL's ongoing work seeks to define worst-case tYDes _of_w(RI.e_R1RMI.tijand_ht&C required to trigger 4.n explosion. The highest temperature ever recorded for a SST + containing ferrocyanide was 135'F. The temperature in these tanks have been decreasing approximately 3*F/ year. ACTION REQUIRED NAug of PER$oM DoCVWENTING CONytRSATioN SIGNA RE oATE y Chad-Glenn _b_. 12/12/89 ACTION TAKEN SIGNATURE TITLg oATE

• #8-888 CONVERSATION RECORD ggog*ylg,8)

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Vlwt i QAfg CONVERSATION RECORD 2:00P.M. 4/5/90 /_, 6 0 V' sit O CONFERENCE $ TELEPHONE O INCOMINa "'"'f" '"Y Location of Visit / Conference: O ouTooiwa R. Ban grt Haut or ptR50N(S) CONTACTED oR IN CONTACT , ORGANilATION (QMice. Sept.. Dwreev ! TELEPNoNE Pect ~ ~* WEtin5houseCorp. J. keens Don Woodrich Hanforc Site FTS440-2038 R. Boyle SUBJECT Potential of Explosion in Hanford Tank due to Hydrogen Buildup

SUMMARY

In a March 27. 1990 letter to Secretary WathIns. the Conway Safety Loa *11 tee t of Defense Nuclear Saf ety Board) concluded that there is a very low probability of an explosion in a Hanford tank due to ferrocyanides. However. In this letter the Committee reported that Hydrogen buildup in double-shell tan 6s (DSTs) is a more serious concern. The principal focus of this concern is with DST tank 101SY although hydrogen buildup is a concern to a lesser degree in 4 other DSTs and 15 single-shl! tanks (SSTs), fank 101SY was filled with 1 million gallons of neutralized waste between 1977-1980 and no waste has been added to this tank since that time. The waste in the tank have been run through an evaporator, and as a result, it is very viscous with the exception of a surface -crust which has formed. The tank has an average organic content of approximately 18 grams / liter. This organic content results from a former solvent extraction process used in B Plant for Sr removal. Organic degradation is apparently occurring along with radioactive decay. The organic decomposition appears to be producing Ni trogen, Nitrous Oxides, and Hydrogen under the-surf ace crust in the tank. This gas buildup is raleased periodically (every 2-3 months) with a rise and fall of the tank level. The main concern as with nitrous oxide supplying oxygen to hydrogen-forming a potentially flammable gas 11 there is an agnition source. In one instance, a potentially flammable concentration of hydrogen (5 %) was measured near an exhaust vent. Activities around this tank have been restricted as a safeguard to prevent any potential source of ignition. Mr. Woodrich indicated the pot.ntial threat. of an explosion due to the buidup of gases is very low. DOE is presently trying to sample and analyte the gases produced-to better-charactarite the chemical reaction - taking place. DOE expects to have an internal plan in place this sunser to mitigate this problem. The State of Washington and the 00A are also investigating this concern. Naut OF PERsOM DoCUwtNTING cQNvtRsATION Si3NATUR E ' oATE' Y N w ACTloN TAMEN None I slGMATURE TITLE DATE l '**'888 CONVERSATION RECORD gg,g-453 . x, twi o at-in mm 7h

CONVERSATION RECORD l "j:35 pg l""g_3,99 I O vis:T g CONrERENCE ,jTELEPHONE O 'm'No Loct.on of Visit /Confererte: O oUTOOING NAME OF PER50N($1 CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT ORGANIZATION (Omce, dept., tvroeis. TgttPHONE NO. J. Greeves vou .t o~ %171a Clark (DOE Hanford Office) FTS 444-4718 Don Woodrich (Westinahouse) J. Austin SUBJECT Hydrogen Build-up in Hanford Double Shell Tank 101 SY

p. goyle D. Fehrinaer mu ua av

. _ _I called DOE's Hanford Operations office On August 3.

1990, for status on the hydrogen build-up in Double-Shell tank (D5T) 1015Y.

Organic decomposition in this tank is thought to be producing nitrogen, nitrous oxides and hydrogen unoer a surface crust. This gas build-up, and rise in tank level, is released regularly every several months resulting in a drop (approx. 10 inches) in tank volume. The next gas rele+se is expected within the next several days, riDF reported that tlie last gas release occurred April 19 1 GO. In anticipstion of the last event, DOE equipped the t sni with a continuoun hydrogen monitor, a gas I c hr ama tograph. and had arranged for grab samples to be talen. he event yielded a pressure spike for a couple of mtnutes and an increase in hydrogen concentratien. The c.a " A mun, hydrogen concentration measured was 3.57 which Iasted 5-10 minutes (hydrogen is potentially explosive at a <oncentration above 57. ). The tank is also equipped with ther mocouplen running from top to bottom inside the tank at one location. The temperature in the tan 6-varies with a niertmum temperature of 140 degrees F at the base. Gaces sampled were analy:ed using a mass spectrometer and fnund to be predominantly nitrous oxide and hydrogen, The principal gas constituents are thought,to be hydrogen (30% by volune). nitrous oxide (30% by volump) and nitrogen (30% by volume). DOE estimates that be tween *'4,'000' t'a 10,000 cubic feet of gas was generated in this event. l l DOE'e Hanford Operations office has a " Safety Improvement Flen" in place to mitigate the problem 'with the hydrogen b1uld-up. The pl'an calls for data gather'ing and lab studies to better understand the chemical reaction producing the gas. DOE intends to continue to sample the gas generated. A sprinkler system will also be installed to increase the moisture content above the surface crust in the tank. After the sprinkler system is installed and activated, DOE plans te to core (1" diameter) the tank from top to bottom and use these core samples for chemical analysis. DAM CIGNATURE Tm.g CONVERSATION RECORD

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m__ a2___ g,jgegg. = LL i [7590-01] Nuclear Regulatory Comission 10 CFR Part 60 [DocketNo.PRN-60-4] States of Washington and Oregon; Filing of Petition for Rulema king AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission, i ACTION: Notice of receipt of petition for rulemaking. l

SUMMARY

The Comission is publishing for public coment a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking dated July 27, 1990, which was filed with the Comission by the States of Washington and Oregon. The petition was docketed by the Comission on July 31, 1990, and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-60-4 The petitioners request that the Comission amend 10 CFR Part 60 to adopt a regulation concerning classification of high-level radioactive wastes currently stored in retrievable, surface, storage facilities at the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford site. The petitioners seek to establish a procedural framework and substantive standards by which the Comission will determine whether a particular waste is defined as high-level radioactive waste and therefore is subject to the Comission's licensing authority. DATE: Submit cokments (60 days after publication in the Federal Register). Coments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but cons' *eration cannot be given except as to connents received on or before this date. I I ~ tl I

r ADDRESS: Sua.i convents to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, ' ' Th55. Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. For a copy of the guition, write: Rules Review Section, Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DC 20555. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules Review Section, Regulatory Publications Bronch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone: 301 492-7758 or Toll Free: 800-368-5642. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Petitionars' Request The petitioners request that the Comission amend 10 CFR 60.2 to clarify the definition of "high-level radioactive waste" (HLW) and the definition of "HLW f acility". The petitioners request that the ( x iicsion - -

1. Establish a process to evaluate the treatment of defense reprocessing wastes in tanks so that such wastes will not be considered HLW ff, prior to disposal, each tank is treated to remove the largest technically achievable amount of radioactivity; and 2 Require that the heat produced by residual radionuclides, together I

with the hcat of reaction during grout processing (if employed as a treatment technohigy), will be within limits established to ensure that grout neets temperature requirements for long-term stability for low-level waste forms. As used by the petitioner and defined by the Department of Enargy (DOE), grout is a fluid mixture of cesentitious materials and liquid waste that sets up as a solid mass and is used for waste fixation and imobilization. 2

7 t The petitioners seek clarification that the disposal of wastes treated to this standard is not disposal in a 'HLW facility" as presently defined in 10 CFR 60.2. The petitioners state that should the Comission regard 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix F as the controlling regulation to determine whether a waste is HLW, that the Cominion also modify that definition as proposed in the petition. Basis for the Petition The petitioners state that this rulemaking is based, in part, on Section 202 of the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, which defines Comission authority over retrievable surface storage facilities and other facilities authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste generated by DOE which are not used for, or are part of, research and development activities. The petitioners further state that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) 42 U.S.C.10101 (12) gives the Cor. mission the authority to define whether wastes are highly radioactive material or solids derived from liquid reprocessing wastes that contain fission products in sufficient concentrations. According to the petitioners, legislative history reveals that Congress intended the Comission to license defense reprocessing tank wastes at the point of long-term storage of disposal. (H. Rep. No. 785, pt.1, 97th Cong., 2dSess.,38,Aug.20,1982). The petitioners note that low fraction wastes resulting from pretreatment of tank wastes are scheduled to be grouted and disposed of in land-based grout vaults on the Hanford site in accordance with regulations developed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The petitioners believe that if such wastes are HLW, they clearly fall under the Comission's licensing jurisdiction under Section 202 (4) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 3

Reasons for Petition The petitioners question the ability of the 00E to demonstrate that the largest technically achievable amount of activity from each tank can be or will be isolated for vitrification. The petitioners state that this is evidenced by the exceptionally large range of uncertainty concerning DOE's-estimated residual cctivity scheduled for surface disposal via grout (between 13,000,000 and 21,000,000 curies). The petitioners state that over the last 45 years, mixing of wastes from different sources has complicated the classification of Hanford tank wastes including double-shell tank wastes. Moreover, the petitioners state that radionuclide inventories are estimates and subject to substantial uncertainty. Variables contributing to the uncertainty include incomplete and inaccurate records, the lack of actual fuel and/or waste analyses, and an incomplete understanding of the chemistry and pathways in reprocessing and waste treatment processes. The petitioners assert that neither DOE, the Comission, nor the petitioners have adequate information regarding the radioactive portion of the double-shell tank waste. The petitioners state that the present definition of HLW in the Comission's regulations and the NWpA is source based. According to the petitioners, incidental waste source is impossible to ascertain due to mixing in defense waste tanks and the unavailability of accurate records. The petitioners offer that radioactive contamination in incidental waste may be from a HLW source, even though the emount of activity is comparable to LLW, and human health and the environment would be protected adequately by grout disposal. Thus, the petitioners believe that unless the Comission modifies the present definition of HLW and HLW f acility, incidental wastes must be considered HLW because of their source and would be required to be disposed of according to Section 8 of NWPA. 42 U.S.C. 10107. The petitioners state that because the definition of HLW has heretofore been based solely on the source of waste, the legal basis for finding that incidental wastes resulting from the treatment of defense high-level wastes 4 i

in tanks would not be HLW, must derive from 42 U.S.C.10101 (12) (A), the NWPA definition of HLW. The NWPA definition corbines a source-based definition and a quantitative-based definition for solid wastes derived from liquid processing. Further, the petitioners belfo e that characterizing incidental waste disposal in grout vaults as non-HLW is lege11y supported only if such wastes would not be HLW under the NWPA definition. The petitioners conclude that if solid, grouted wastes which are derived from defense HLW do not contain " fission products in sufficient concentrations," they could be considered incidental wastes and not HLW. The petitioners believe that the Comission needs to establish both a procedure and a standard for making this evaluation on a tank-by-tank basis. Petitioners Proposal The petitioners suggest that the definitions of "High-Level Radioactive Waste' and 'HLW Facility" in 10 CFR 60.2 be revised and a new Appendix A be added to 10 CFR Part 60. The specific language suggested by the pettsioners reads as follows:

1. In 5 60.2, the definitions of 'High-Level Radioactice Weste" and "HLW Facility" are revised to read as follows:

i 60.2 Definitions. "High-level radioactive waste" or "HLW" means: (1)Irradiatedreactor fuel.(2)Liquidwastesresultingfromtheoperationofthefirstcyle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel, and (3) Solids into which such liquid wastes have been converted; provided that if, prior to disposal, defense reprocessing tank wastes are treated to remove the largest technically achievable amount of radioactivity on a tank-by-tank basis (asprovidedinAppendixA),thetreatedresidualfractionshallbe considered an incidental waste and therefore not

".W.

5

'HLW facility' means a facility subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority of the Consnission pursuant to Sections 202(3) and 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974(88 Stat 1244).2

2. A new Appendix - A is added to Part 60 to read as follows:

Appendix A - Procedures for Determining Largest Technically Achievable Treatment At least one year before a tank of defense reprocessing wastes containing high-level waste components is treated, pretreated or blended prior to permanent disposal DOE shall submit the following to the Comission and the affected state and publish in the Federal Register: 1. Data on physical characteristics of the waste, including dentistry and percent solids, inorganic and organic constitutents, and radio-chemistry (e.g., gamma energy analysis, total alpha, total beta); 2. Volumetric data on untreated waste, on volume changes expected as a result of treatment, pretreatment or blending activities and the expected volume of the final waste form (grout, salcrete or vitrified waste); 2 These are DOE ' facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under such Act [the Atomic Energy Act)

• and " Retrievable Surface Storage facilities and other facilities authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage of high-level radioactive wastes generated by [ DOE), which are not used for, or are part of, research and development activities".

Facilities for the long-term storage or disposal of incidental wastes l I resulting from treatment of defense reprocessing wastes are not HLW facilities. I 6 l

3. A description of the treatment processes, including an estimated mass balance for each process, and estimated percent recovery for each separation, and concentrations of major waste components before and after treatment; 4 The proposed grout or salterete formulation, together with heat transfer calculations for the waste form; and 5. To the degree possible, treatment system models stallar to the attached grout system model should be used to present data and describe processes. At least six months before a tank of defense reprocessing tank wastes containing high-level waste components is pretreated, treated or blended prior to permanent disposal in near-surface or deep geologic facilities, the'Connission shall require a license under Section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act (2 U.S.C. 5842 (4) unless the Corsnission, on a tank-by-tank basis determines the following: 1. The USDOE has demonstrated that the largest technically achievable amount of activity from the tank will be isolated for vitrification prior to permanent disposal; and 2. That use of permanent shallow land disposal for the tank waste will be limited to the incidental waste portion, which is the activity remaining after the largest technically achievable amount of activity has been removedt and 3. That the treatment, pretreatment and blending processes described in the USDOE submittal will achieve the stated separation and/or recovery efficiencies; and 4 That the treatment, pretreatment and blending processes described in the USDOE submittal are proven, cost effective, state-of-the-art processes, which are capable of removing the largest technically achievable amount of activity. 7

Conclusion The petitioners state that rulemaking procedures are necessary to determine the nature of the incidental, lesser radioactive fraction of wastes and that rulemaking is appropriate to establish a procedural framework and substantive standards by which the Comission will determine whether a particular waste is or is not HLW. The petitioners state that this proposal is particularly appropriate because it establishes a process and general standards by which particular wastes will be assessed. The petitioners believe that particular determinations of how specific wastes will be characterized under these general standards can be left to individual adjudicative proceedings. The petitioners believe that the amendments suggested by their petition would protect human health and the environment, would facilitate meaningful Comission involvement in the ultimate disposal and/or long term storage of Hanford double-shell tank waste, and would support implementation of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The petitioners believe rulemaking procedures are appropriate to provide the maximum degree of public involvement and scrutiny to HLW treatment and disposal decisions. They note that the controversial evolution of the defense waste program and the equally controversial history of the deep geologic repository program demonstrate a keen public sensitivity and awareness of HLW issues. Therefore, the petitioners encourage the Comission to use rulemaking as the optimal vehicle to satisfy the public that treatment and disposal of HLW in tanks is being carefully scrutinized in a protective manner. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of 1990. For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Comission. 8

v- - DOCKET NUMBERPRM44""k j 1 6 PETITION RULE Lys M sI73*) * ;t,t.L 1L L' \\l l N M. J. PlodinecVaNAC i i 14 Caw Caw Court Aiken, SC 98 g, I rit t n United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission L.g,G W( Y, 1.1 Docketing and Service Bran'ch Washington, DC 20555 q I Re: Definition of the Term "Righ-Level Radioactive Waste" Docket Number PRM-60-4

Dear Sirs:

As noted in 55 FR 51732, the states of Oregon and Washington have petitioned the Commission to alter the definition of high-level waste (HLW), to establish a process to_ determine whether particu i lar defense reprocessing wastes fit that definition,- and to place certain restrictions on the solidification of wastes which do not meet the proposed definition. The purpose of these comments is to urge the Commission to reject the petitioners' proposal because it is unnecessary, and, indeed, is not in the best interests of the petitioners

• constituents.

SUMMARY

OF PETITIONERS' PROPOMAL The petitioners' propose that the Commission do the followings -

3) -Redefine HLW so that removal of the_ largest technically achievable amount of radioactivity from any waste will render.it non-HLW.

2) Establish a process to determine whether defense HLW meets that definition, specifically _ One year before processing waste from any tank, DOE must provide data on the physical characteristics of the waste, its. radiochemistry- (e.g., determination of the radionuclide inventory), its-volume and the anticipated _ change in volume ~ due to processing, a flowsheet for each treatment. process,- and any formulations for grouting residues from treatment. least six months before processing of wasteLin any r Then, at tank is to begin, DOE must either obtain a license for pro-cessing, or a waiver from the Commission based on DOE's demonstrating that it will remove the greatest-amount of-radioactivity from the waste.which:is technically achieva-ble..The Commission must agree that the separation pro-cesses to be.used are technically correct, proven, cost ef-fective, and state of the art. Shallow land disposal shall- .n Iff f C Vf ~ ~ ,k [ 4;p

t 6 be allowed only for the residues of such processing. 3) Establish a limit on the heat from residual activity in the waste plus the heat of grouting to ensure that grout meets the long-term stability criteria for Low-Level Waste. CtENEPAL CONSIQIJAT1Q1{$ The specific comments below reflect the following general consid-erations. Many of the waste tanks in the DOE complex are nearing or have exceeded their design life. Thus, any proposed changes to dispo-sal regulations should not inhibit the expeditious immobilization these wastes. t:hile the plethora of panels and committees now looking at all aspects of DOE's waste management programs may prevent mistakes, they are also impeding progress. The Commission should decide the worth of the petitioners' proposals by balancing any incremental safety factor added by the additional review against the delay in stabilizing the waste. Review of the proposed procedural steps indicates that the only thing certain to be accomplished is fur-ther aging of the waste tanks, and thus further diminution of their safety. 'jfECIPIC COM3Eli1S ON PROPOSED REDEFINITION OF HLW The-proposed redefinition is unnecessary. The Commission has already taken a substantial step in the right direction by deciding that any waste with activity greater than that defined as the upper limit for Class C must be disposed of in a repository, or in another manner acceptable to the Commission. This salutary approach looks toward the risk associated with the waste, rather than the source. This forces DOE to allocate re-sources to handle the hazards, rather than to waste further time fruitlessly searching for ways to remove more and more activity from one part of the waste. As the Commission noted in its amend-ment of 10 CFR 61 (53 FR 17710), "the Commission sees little prac-tical importance or significance in proceeding with & precise def-inition of RLW." The proposed definition will not increase the safety of disco-sal of the waste. Some of the wastes of concern to the petitioners appear to have been converted to mineral forms in the storage tanks at Hanford. It may well be that the only possible method to mobilize and re-duce the activity of this material is to treat it with strong ac-ids. However, this would compromise the containment afforded by the waste tanks. Therefore, strict application of the proposed definit'on would potentially force DOE to perform extremely dan-gerous actions, with potentially grave consequences to the peti-tioners' constituents. l

5 t o The proposed definition also could be counterproductive in another In order to comply with the "as low as technically achieva-way. ble" standard, DOE might be forced to treat the waste with chemi-cals which would not be compatible with immobilization processes for the radionuclides. As an example, arsenophosphates are excel-lent complexing agents for technetium, and are capable of removing even trace amounts from wastes. However, phosphates are not com-patible with borosilicate glasses. As another example, alkali tetraphenylborate salts are excellent means of removing cesium from even concentrated alkaline wastes; however, they are not com-patible with crystalline ceramic waste forms. SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED PROCESS The waste tanks at Hanford have alreadv exceeded their desien lifcLine. There are major concerns about the safety of the waste in the tanks at Hanford. Several panels have been-established to look at different facets of the problem. Although no single concern may be reason enough for decisive action, the citizens of Washington-and Oregon are ill-served by any process which needlessly delays the immobilization of the waste. And yet, the petitioners propose to add two new steps to the tortuous path being followed toward eliminating this hazard to their constituents, which will not add to the safety of disposal. e 13,the information on the radionuclide inventory of the waste in the tanks at Hanford inadequate? One of the reasons the petitioners advance as motivation for their proposal is their opinion that the radionuclide inventory of the waste in the tanks at Hanford is inadequately known. Unfortunate-ly, the petitioners never come to grips with the question of "in-l adequate for what?". It is a fact that the contents of the waste tanks at Hanford have not been as thoroughly characterized as those at Savannah River. However, the contents of those tanks can be bounded well enough to judge the relative safety of various disposal options, and to direct DOE toward an environmentally safe solution. The petitioners would-do better for.their constituents if they attempted to move DOE to take this approach and then im-- plement the solution adopted in a conservative manner, one which would be relatively immune to the effects of-the uncertainties in waste characterization, gggcIryc Coten!yTs ON LIMITS ON MEAT OF FORMATION _OF GROUT While I disagree with the petitioners about the definitien of;HLW, it appears that the concept of limits on the heat of formation of However,:it appears that the appropriate place grouts are good. for this limit would be in a plan for a solid waste processing fa-thus, should be included'in its " Process Control cility, and, I suggest that the Commission consider inclusion of this Pirn." concept in its guidelines for preparation of the " Process Control Plan." w. ve-t b-- - y wwer Taw -w-ae is-t-w---m+ve+er% a wsm -- W Wpn'*wy-o--* 3ws-ya gr p>wri-9- g' 9-,yM9-pg g --9i e g*-as-y y e-g 9ps---a- ,g-y,.m-g, mar.-yo-.-g-- py,me g

t 6 In closing, I strongly urge the Commission to serve the citizens of Oregon and Washington better than those who should be repre-senting them. The proposals advanced will not benefit those citi-and by slowing progress toward immobilization of the wastes

zens, at Hanford, actually places those citizens at greater risk.

Respectfully, Ifd'h[f /dn wt H. John Plodinec / 4 D Q 4

~n M. -. FORD 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) ACCESSION NBR 9103210171 DOC.DATE: 91/03/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET # FACIL: AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION THOMAS,J. Affiliation Not Assigned RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CHILK,S.J. Office of the Secretary of the Commission

SUBJECT:

Comment opposing petition for rulemaking PRM-60-4 re definition of term "high level radwaste." DISTRIBUTION CODE: DS10D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR onProposedRule_(]PR)-10CTR ENCL SIZE: ) TITLE: SECY/DSB Dist Public Comment NOTES: 3 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL 3;

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Harford Education {E mi( Juhb {'" James Thomat Act on League a R c. H eA c. [So4) 3.W33*10 [*"both 4 93 -IGM. '"(roe 336-pt 32 March 15, 1991 i. g C' ~

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H t' $>,T Samuel J. Chilk I' oo Seeretary U S. Nuolear Regulatory Cossnission u Attn.: Docketing and Servloes Branch E Washington, DC 20555 C Re: Dookot No. PRM-60-4, Definition of High-Level Radioactive Waste

Dear Secretary Chilk,

I have enclosed the coassents of the Hanford Education Action League on the Petition for Rulemaking by the states of Washington and Oregon (Docket No. PRM-60-4). This concerns the creation of a new vaste category, "inoidental vaste," and has an important bearing on the cleanup of the contamination present at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Thank you for your serious consideration of HEAL

• s comments.

have any questions concerning them, please contact me directly (the If you address and telephone number are printed below. I look forward to the Comission keeping HEAL inform 9a 'as to the prog)ress of your deliberatuna concerning this important matter. Sinoeroly,

1. nf(#

V24dk:2.- James Thomas Research Director 9103210171 910315 PDM PRM 60-4 ppg enclosure 0 pb 1720 N. Ash = Spokane, Washington 99205 * (509) 326 3370

• FAX ($09) 326 2932

i Comments on Nuclear Regulatory Commission i 10 CTR Part 60-Petition for Rulemaking l' lDooket No. PRM-60-4) Definition of the Ters *High-Level Radionotive Waste" bY Hanford Eduoation Action League 1720 North Ash Street Spokane, WA 9980$ March 15, 1991 The IfAnford Education Aotion-league (HEAL) is a nonprofit, research and public education organization conoorned with the Department of Energy's operations at Hanford. Established in 19 H, HEAL has approximately 400 members dedioated to public openness and a government which is sooountable to its oitizens. As HEAL reviewed the petition for rulemaking submitted by Washington and Oregon, it was frustrating that the petitioners aboluded scant information to support their many broad claims. Two of their claims caused HEAL particular concern. Tirst, Washington and Oregon alleged in their petition to the Cormassion that "the pr.oposed amendment is essential to provide protection-of the future health and safety of the citizens of the Pacific Northwest."1 The states have failed to provide any seientific or- ~ ~ objective rationale to support this olata. More 1ayertantly, the states have-failed to establish Thy their proposed procedure -is any better than-the current NAC licensing process, Given that the petitioners' proposed $mendment is based on the ALARA prinolple'(best technology that is cost effective), the publio has noi s 1 Eastaewe with 1stter 2ree toente R. ertaaley, asC, to Terry ausseena, dated. December !$, 1999, p. 5. q (4 y g-3---+-.-ov,v---,, r, -r,- ',- e r w, m. .w-.-,,-+-.---e---r-- mv+

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nr./d, ccaments on Dooket No. PM 60-4 Hvo 2 Affurance that this vill be An adequate protect 103 of their health and safety or of the environment. The Commass1on must keep an mind that the }!anf ord grout as not a proven vaste form. Even if the grout facility as certified as Keeting P.CM requirestats, it is not at all oloar whether it will be able to suffiolently prevent the migration of radionuolides, espeolally those which are water soluble (e.g.1-129 and 70-99). Dy only proposing best available technology and cost offootiveness as the critersa, the public has no asvurance that any comments it might sutait based on environmental or health oratoria would have to be considered by the Commission. Adiationally, the states' petition is not at all clear on how the public should be involved nor if the publio would have any rights to appeal a decision by the Commission. While the tank-by-tank basis has some technical and practical scrit, there as the danger that the public vill not be presented with suf ficient antornation to understand the total potentani impact and rask assooisted with the aggregate amount of radiation (from all the tanks) disposed of to grout. In their petition, the states have failed to present any information to support their 01Als that the proposed amendment will " provide protection of the future health and safety of the citizens of the Paolfso Northwest.*8 This information needs to be supplied before the public wall be able to evaluate whether the proposed amendment or the existing lacensing process is better at protecting the Northwest. The aeoond claim about whloh IEAt. As concerned is that the Commission's rulemaking procedure would be the best way to involve the publio. Howhere do the states offer any Justittoation that their proposal a o gg,, y, 3, 1 i e-rrw- .-vn ,v.-..w.m.w,.. ,..r, ,y -,.-... -,....m ,,,w, -,v%.y, ,,v,..- .v,, ,ow.<--v-n,..-.v,, e.<m -e.m.,-....,... ,-r~e+

.- _ -- -. - - ~.- f Mt.AL Ccuments en Dorket No. PM-60-4 page 3 9 vould grant tbt olt12 ens of the Paolfio Northwest a greater access to the decision making process. The states only dientas the current 11oensing prooecure with the following disparaging remark: the rule amendment... would allov. the avoidance of the admittedly oumbersese licensing p opees "8 HEAL regrets that the states of Weehangton and Oregen consider etteotive publio involvement as "oumbersome." Upon this basis, HEAL is extremely skeptical that the proposed emendment vill lead to eff ective involvement by the publio in the decisions affooting Hanf ord tank vastes. HEAL finds at a gross defiolency that the proposed amendment only mentions the double-shell tanks at Hantord. If the Consnission adopi:s the { petition, it would aff ect the high-level radioaotive vastes in Hanf ord's aangle-shell tanks. It is quite possible that a signifloant proportion of these vastes will also be grouted an the future. The petitioners' serve-only the interests of the Department of Energy by not considering the impacts to public health and the environment from the possible grouting of all these other high-level radionotave vastes. HEAL must also take eroeption to the petitioners' claim that NWPA, 42 USC 10101 (12)(A), enables the Connission to create an incidental vaste category.4 llEAL oontends that the NWPA is not applicable to Hanf ord's grout situation. The NWPA introduces the concept of a conoontration-based de11nition. Whereas this As applicable to the deep-geologio zepository and the regulations governing the repository take at into account, the Conunission vould be in direct contradiction with_the Energy Reorganization Aot (ERA) of 1974 11 at adopted this as a basis for "anoidental vaste" concerning the Hanford grout vaults. 8 Petition for talemaktag, July 27, 1999, p. 7. 4 iMA., p. 5. 6 D-?- eyW'a=e t M+e3--r--=r--+-re-e-ew W -h et -.e.--e+e-+-.ee,*e-+-m.m,,s,ym--w ppeT'-"S'M97---79'M"d'*-MTWT' 'D Tf"'*V+e*TW 'TN'+v'WMTr*vt-g s W"o'We-v1iir e-y '4 %

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!!EAL Comments on Dooket No. PRM-60-4 page 4 The petitioners' proposal 18 ooattary to the intent of Congress when at drafted the ERA in 1974. The reason Congress adopted a scuroe-based definitaon was to prevent the Department of Energy and others from dilutang high-lev 01 rAdloAot1V9 Vestes 80 A8 to Etet A concentration-based definition. The proposed greyting of tank vestes at Hanford will signafloantly dilute the tank vastes. At this point, it is important to state for the record that there is some agreement between HEAL and the states of Washington and Oregon. HEAL agrees with the petitioners that "under existing law, defense reprocessing vaste, including Hanf ord double-shell tank vaste, is HLW... Consequently, long-tera storage or disposal of such tank vaste is currently subject to lacensing by the Constission."S There are enormous complex 1ttes involved with this issue. More anf ormat Aon is needed (perhaps the only point that all parties acknowledge). More publio involvement is a necessity. The current !ederal law does not provide a su!fiolent process to address the Hanford estuatson. However, the petitioners' amendment as perhaps even more problematio than the current situation. Therefore, HEAL urges in the strongest terms that the Commission seriously consider the following reocnemendation. EKAL's Reseaunesdation to the Ceaunission In order to have an informed oltizenry effectively participate in-the decision of how to properly dispose of the low-activity vastes frna the Hanf ord underground high-level nuoloar vaste storage tanks, REAL urges the Conanission to underteke a publio decision-making proosse that would anolude (at a munimum): 5 ibid., p. 4.

,a utAL commeate sa D+: hot No. PRM-60-4 pag) 5

1) A series of publio information verkshops to eduoate interested oitatens as to the issues at stake; including, but not limited to, the proper role of the Commission and other regulatory agencies, the 11adted knowledge of the tank vastes, and the possible saf ety, health, and environmental consequences of each of the options.

2) Af ter a short amount of time to allow the public to reflect on the information presented at the workshops (2-4 weeks), the Commission should hold a series of official bearings ;o receive public comment on the proposal.

3) The series of informational workshops and offlosal bearings should be held in at least the four mayor metropolitan areas of the Paolfic Northwest (i.e. Seattle, Portland, Spokane, and the Tri-Cities).

Conclusion Even though HEAL has numerous problems with the current petition, !!EAL as reticent to rooommend that the commission totally reject it. This would leave the ottizens of the Paolfic Northwest right back where we vore several years ago when the Commission's staff were meeting secretly with the Department of Energy and looking for ways of skirting the law to allow the disposal of high-level radioactive vaste in the grout vaults at Hanford. HEAL is willing to consider that good and suffiolent reasons do exist for uniquely addressing the disposal of low. activity vastes to the Hanford, rout. However, auch reasons have not been presented in this petition. Therefore, HEAL urges the Comadssion to uadertake our recommendation for an extensive public process that would develop an adequate basie upon which a vaso decision oan be based. i -.-.m.,....~.._,m ...,...--.,.,.-~_..-....,_-,mm..-~-mm., . _,,. _ ~. _.,

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM d g (G5FKS{73b 2552 Harris Avenue .3440 Richland, Washington Uhkr0 March 12, 1991 31 WR 18 P4 :07 2amuel J. Chilk Secretary, 9.3. NRC deshington, DC 20555 r i., ,,3, g att: Docketing and Service Branch i h SUDJECT: FR Vol 55, No. 242, 12/17/90,' NRC Docket No. PRM 60-4, Definition of the Term "High-Level Radioactive Waste", Petition for Rulemaking.

Dear Sir:

INTRODUCTION I as a

Richland, WA realdent, receiving drinking water from the

olumbia River below the Hanford Reservation and living within 25 miles of e x i s t 1_ag high-level radioactive wasta long-term atorage facilities and disposal sites of the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the proposed new high-level radioactive waste disposal facility, referred to as the

" land-based grout vaults" by the petitioners in the subject petition for rulemaking. BACKGROUND It la my, conclusion that the DOE is currently in violation of 10 CFR 30 requirements for a license since various near aurface geologic repositories, referred to as criba, ditches and single shell tanks, but meeting the definition of " geologic repository" in 10 CFR 60 have received and currently hold in "long-term storage" or " disposal" "high-level radioactive wastes." In come cases the specific activity of such wastes is low compared to much of the "high-le' vel radioactive waste" at Hanford; however, the source of the wastes I refer to is consistent with the source-based definition intended by Congress in Section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act j (ERA) and reviewed by the petitioners. Definitions in Attachment A, a portion of the 1973 AEC Manual, further illuminate the source-based definition in use at the time the ERA was enacted. A key fact contributing to ay conclusion is that

DOE, ERDA or the AEC expressly authorized the "long-term storage" or " disposal" of

1. It has been suggested that the Congress by Section 202 (4),

regarding long-ters-atorage facilities, in specifying "authorLzed for the express purpose" meant authorization by Congress. However, the more logical meaning is authorization by a Director of a Division of Waste Management and Transportation as provided by Chapter 0511.032 (c) of the AEC Manual in 1973--see Attachment A. It should be noted that Congresa did not routinely authorize specific long-ters storage facilities, but authorized l general, funding for waste management. -9103210213-910312 ) ]) g R PRM $o4 PDR

these wastes by operations contractors. The operational definition of long-term

storage, established oy the

AEC, is contained in ATTACHMENT A.

This definition was being used by the AEC contemporaneous 1y with the writing of the ERA and it can logically be concluded that this was the definition intended by Congress, consistent with the logic described by the petitioners in deducing the i n t Cat of Congress with respect to the source based definition for "high-level radioactive waste." As with the definition of "long-term storage", " storage" entails the capability to readily retrieve wastes. Disposal is defined as an operation that does not ~ provide for recovery. (There was no concept of interim storage expressed in the AEC Manual in 1973.) (This can be seen from the definitions of Attachment A.) The DOE and its predecessor entities have long recognized that the " stabilization" and " interim stabilization" of in-tank single shell wastes and the "atorage" of waste in soil columns, and otherwise in non-retrievable earth and ground water Lt long-term storage and/or disposal. This can be seen-from various historical documents concerning the decision in the early 1960's to proceed with solidification of wastes in single-shell tanks at Hanford in contrast to General Electric recommendations for a sound program of waste management at Hanford involving the calcination of tank wastes with storage in bins similar to the scheme currently used by the Idaho Chemical Reprocessing F6cility. The current immense problems casociated with safely sampling, much less retrieving, waste, in single shell and some double shell tanks at Hanford attest to the " disposal" of the waste accomplished by DOE and its predecessor entities in the past. COMMENTS 1. The NRC abould not attempt to redefine the term "high-level radioactive waste" since this term was established by Congress. Only the courts can embellish this term in their roll of interpreting laws. The origins 1 source based definition should be maintained and compliance with the spirit and intent of the law achieved. Therefore, the issue which NRC should be concerned with is the regulation and/or licensing of the Administration's (DOE's) long-term storage and/or disposal facilities. In this regard-a definition of "long-term storage facility" should be incorporated intu Part 60 or part 30 (see comments below) as a subcategory of "HLW facility". The definition of "long-term storage" in Attachment A should be used in developing the new term. 2. The purpose and Scoon of Part 60 does not apply to all DOE facilities for long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste, but only those subject to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Thus, if the subject petition is considered as a change to Part 60, the Purpoao and scooe must be changed. For example, this Section might be cevised to the wording originally used in Part 60 to cover licensing at a geologic repository operations area. Other major changes would also be necessary.

3. Anticipating the modified scope indicated in comment 2.

above, and reviewing the significant changes to Part 60 from the original version as a result of the NRC's action to implement the Nuclear waste Policy Act, it appears unwarranted and potentially confusing to attempt to revise Part 60 to re-institute its previous general coverage for the licensing of DOE activities, stemming from authority of the Energy Reorganization Act alone.

4. The Pureose and Scong of 10 CFR 30 clearly applies to the licensing of DOE long-ters storage (including disposal) facilities for high-level radioactive waste. Section 30.12 points out that auch facilities are not exempt from the requirements of Part 30. It appears that modification of Part 30 and/or'the addition of a new Part 36 pertinent to the near surface long-term storage and disposal facilities at Hanford and other DOE sites is more reasonable than modifying Part 60 to accommodate the subject petition request for regulation of DOE at Hanford. This conclusion reflects the limited scope of Part 60 to deep geological repositories as a result of changes to invoke the Nuclea-Waste Policy Act, which applies only to deep geological repositories.* 5. A substantive standard for near surface disposal of waste is required, particularly for those long lived and short-lived mobile isotopos such as 1-129, Tc-99, Se-79. C-14, Cs-135, Cs-137, Sr-90, Co-60 and the actinides. Even small quantities of I-129, if it pollutes ground water at concentrations of 10xE-12 ci/1 or greater, would render the water resource useless. Much of the Hanford groundwater already exceeds this EPA limit for drinking water, and cleanup of the affected aquifers will be very expensive. For example, for any given site out to the accessible environment or boundary of the site, the inventory of any given long-lived isotope disposed of in that site, if mixed with 1/10 of the volume of water determined to exist in the unconfined aquifer or first confined aquifer, whichever is highest, under the specified surface area of the site, should not exceed the drinking water standard for that isotope. For example, if the first aquifer under a disposal site were determined to have 10xE13 liters of water, then 1 curie of I-129 could be disposed of in that site, assusing the drinking water standard of 10xE-12 ci/1. As an alternative, performance based criteria such as those specified in 10 CFR 60 for =a deep geological repository could be specified for the near surface long-terms storage site or disposal 2. The ters " repository" as defined b the Nuclear Waste Policy Act includes systems for the persanent deep geological disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. Thus, shallow isnd disposal such as that accomplished and planned at Hanford and. are not covered by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and hence outside the Purpose and Scope of Part 60.

,m.--_ site. In auch a came the engineered barrier ayatom would necessarily have long term performance requirements out to 10,000 , ears. Given the near surface disposal of the waste, aubstantial waste forms would be necessary and various land use acenarios, .ncluding nearby farming and other human activities, would necessarily have to be considered in determining hydrologic conditions for the wastem. Containment for a 1000 years or more .ould be indicated, since An contrast to a deep repoaltory, geologic Asolation la not provided with the near-surface placement of wastes. I would agree with the petitionera desire to minimize the amount of sente to be incorporated in grout. However specific design requiremonta should be specified with an ALARA type criterion applied in addition to the specific requirementa. If grout is an insufficient waste form to accomplished specified design requirementa for the waste form performance, then a better waate form should be developed. o. Licensing proceedinga abould be conducted to obtain public input and adjudication of technical inauen an suggested by the petitioner in his conclusions. In addition, for existing facilities subject to licensing, DOE should submit license applications with all due haste, since they and some of their contractors are in violation of 10 CFR 30. The NRC should notify DOE of this requirement to submit license applications for existing facilities. NRC should establish licensing conditions that assure safety of the facilities and otherwise protect the environment, the public and the workers from undue risk. For critical safety laauen auch as those osmociated with single shell tank wastem that are not readily retrievable, en ongoing licensing proceeding abould be conducted to allow for continued adjudication of design issues and access by the public of pertinent technical information. All operations at the applicable facilities should be subject to NRC regulation. For example, the sampling of wastem and geologic media and the mitigation of existing radioactive pollution should be subject to licencing and subsequent NRC overnight. Implementation of other environmental

laws, for example, RCRA, CERCLA and SARA abould be a condition of the license.

7. Construction and operation activities, including design activities and site characterization, should be subject to NRC oversight and regulation. Therefore, the requirement for submitting a license application, or a separate construction permit before the initiation of any of these activities, should be established. Such formal interaction with DOE and its contractors will allow effective and timely resolution of technical inauen associated with long-term atorage and disposal. 8. I would point out that the petitioners conclusion that the definition of high-level radioactive waste must derive from NWPA la incorrect. In fact the operative definition of high-level radioactive waste pertinent to the DOE facilities at Hanford derivea from the ERA as suggested above. The use of the term in the "WPA only applica to deep geologic repoaltories which are the. subject of NWpA.

Thus, as suggested by foot note

1. 4 on page 51732 of the Federal Register

Notice, the petitioners discussion of the NWPA is not relevant to delimiting. NRC's authority to license and otherwise regulate the DOE *s long-term storage and disposal facilities at Hanford.

The concept of " sufficient concentrations" although applying to the determination of waste for disposal in a deep repository, does not exempt dilute high-level radioactive wastes from NRC's regulatory authority. Sincerely,- j f. .4-F. Robert Cook (509-375-3207) ATTACHMENT: A U.S. Atomic Energy Commission AEC Manual, Chapter 0511, Radioactive Weste Management, September 19, 1973. (10 pages) 1 h E b 5 L t r-v- -~,. ,a-a ,,,www ,,-.,,,e .n,,,,,-n,, e-.,-,n- ,,,,www.,n.,-,,, ,--+,vasee,,,vm~,,,--e.--s- ,-,,,n,w,----,,,., er,---,,, y-

maw. =c.z ;. :.. u w----------- --- - --- --- --- - -- -- -== IAS. ATtM4tC ENERGY COMM485000 ASC MANUAL. Veheme: G300 Gemrd Aeninsemien ASC 081101 . j-{], ert t 500 Hearin aW $simy wwy Chaptar 0511 MADICACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT asti4 poucy

4. somenise da w r and ones upduhg of se ovesaBW far the la,h the pousy of the ABC to assage radisenho managemes of adosassw wmse from ABC wens la sunk a ammmer as to==w== tae radiasten,

eposedsen. exposee and ammaisted ridt, to man and his s. eens per Asid ofnes wuns massomment esmrommam ever she lifetime of the adisemandes. plass, sevtews them weih advlas of proyen dhleses, and detsmuumas thstr emepsethy c51141 OBJECTTYE wak the overat pass, f. smerada event sogstamma, eserensdsa. To samme afe lengasna manapasst of at and rev6sw d woes==nsp==8 amhttia. runoushe wans pawned by AEC operadoes and % the daye W propen b.maseng a that rasenson==u wedsk is d thmed to the ishedsla and eblessmus, m amme -AEC by lessened eposadoes a napsired by sempusses with ABC pousta and requistisen, requirassess somensse whh es preyse evideas to samme that emas as11 a3 AESPONseguTTES AND AUTNOMmES wame management pisemag ud budgedag are *t wie the ABC eosrat plan. I'F' "I P'""N '" "nda ' seiden, and -regehemmes for 031 The Cassel Hamspr approves the ABC 3' F runeasshe won maanymans plan mir' mined by the pe Dhtdos d Wasse Manapmans and T - M "'" "" "'8 "*"8' 'I 888e"ng 8 (WWT) and estarummes sesspedh0ky of fin'id smas 8"sem wanas a ABC lads wans====& pisas wink the ABC plan if the doesidea d esagaha of wans: amine s 'I:

• f 7'

so se. a.d re,.m a,E'I" r by Asissass ar. reissa m,es,,sd. of ransamme senses to es erstremaani. h. deternises er approre ahorts and 031 The Diresser. Dhansa of Wsses h==g==== _.--- % he pasinging and samspen, far wo% e andT-ma etish m are a he wered la amaremfase land burtal s. b neponsels for pregna diressies and gi,seds er enginemed nerop semits a ABC thest sentret of the W mannesens fasitaisa, er me a he stared in Federut of hiel>3ent ruunnedw wasse a ABC redlemasse vesse.ftartes. fadates-I. sresens k esperedes whk appropetsee. b. k,suspoetle per progmas diresstse and ?! eld emees and eestramer ana'. Assai sommet et at amaremfaas mesesshe seriremmemmi unmemens and notemsnm soud wome bortal grounds at ABC fastides. for asper ABC was assernet fasthuish, and of ammy vanha a AK (1)- asammi resords af thel la assadames wedilADef1MD. fassisies tuertus marap e( snud j; =d== he radensen wems: tem assumed asswetten, espmMades sud apassess of AK heeses c. la nrysasels $sr psepas tresdma sad and Federsi rupesisudse for sempdag, asser seemel er opendams W Fedmal promehg mertag,buytag,and esyndus of repostiertas fur.the esponsi er lese *sem reesssen wusst and (2) amami tsunearte suorap of reesnahe wensa, to lashadst of ramassehe wuss being used, bated.or developias, performing ssedia for, dhyssed d a AE fassess and Pederal destamos, sansuesdag, demoussasms, and reynmortak a6tassag mammary asserent attsws sad k. prov6dm poema erudes sad Amalasnel appiersh. of a ressmak sad _, propen for Approved: Sepasher 19.1973 g,- e-203 = _.j ~

RAD 10ACT!YE WASTI MANACIMENT . AEC 03110JJ ig

0) techniques for long-ter n aange or c.

la coo pendon with WT..evthartes p";C dirposal of commsnial and AEC high levst railaecstm wate mersyment popams to wute:C) compacuen lactnentma. or other amm skat the AEC podcy o(contro41ag the ..lmrms.ents la handEng prsedcas fa releash of radioacttermesertais te thefowne - ~. eoatamiaa ed :olid vsne: and (3) Ie,elas tachalodly and econcenkagy Imtrovements be tir cissains or liquid pseticad is betagimplemasted. d. spyrmnes the u(ety myects.of Md o(Itas-t([Loen: tres tment. . _. 1. deve6 ops und defends budpt wttmetas for weste managmem propuns and actrnden. e. renews waste managwoest plans la retados Its waxe manspment repondbalties tad acttedes. W*ag fsefRry requitstaants. to thsic isopect on man and the entroament and exartises fiscal control over such and recommeads say appropriate medille='ha to the Direc:or, mets 6am o( actMrtec prtmdes stui usisunce to other. Wtste kamgement and Tnneportados. divabns la the budpt subemmons of wuse mantymans items for whkh they arv f. .cqonfinstes wit appropnate directors o(, propus divisions pnot to establishing poky 'rerj~onsible, standards which may have a progrunnetic rn. provides advice on applicabairy or tnterpretados of the providons of this impact. chapter and eyrvm exceptions, whee 0.34 Dire ct o rs of Program Divisions. ~ wartrated, cosniinating these act2ons with 8 lleadquarterm appropnate Headquanen divuierts, rt, spomers and coordtriar.es testing and e o a sinte at with prostammstle s. dmbpmmu d impnrad poh armi gww tGLdas and the provtsions o(secdons rynems (mach as $5h NCy W88 032 above and 044 below.preide direction economicsity and technicauy praedcalpleni Att F1 ten) for reducing to the ost g g g,,,,,,,,, % gestaag la their popams. ra di e v.stve matensi rsleases to the h. wttida p t y. A twpossibEdes, mey i o. with regstd to the annove anziped

• N P'" O
  • P r "d

I ras pc astblitties, acts ss its Censrei '8mm 8588seast @ to Wh h Manspr's staff Utison sad polat of corrtacs 7 ed with the Omco of Rydadon and with other ' by Md o(!ke M h mack siu

• Federal. state or local poups witit regud ts addas conenaang 0) AEC W at which they have propeaunede vastes and (2) commaxfagy genented rapoembilldes. lacteding related connaass wutas to be deuvered so the AEC as of oder propse dietness widek kuve n#nd by regulawns.

se:Mdes a chose sann stems and coandt with the Director. WMT. conewstag tds 013 T1w DLeector. DMdca *( Operedessi review functhan descrbedla032fe). Salwyt d. es i;---W hy the Diressor. WWT,retew s. develo n. ie== 4t and promulgues ingiries en the appilcant!!ty or poucy. standards, and requirements relevnes 1sterpointtom of the pmvistoms of this to 0) the protek e( ama and

• th' chrpest and repass for assarydeas.,

.a==de wish du mresear. OS. la maurs-e avit o a as e a t froa radlation or s. cone d-- and (2) safety d rysseas reistfug to policy. standards. and . relevant to the potsedom of and syriam componems mad for coastelung gg __ tsdloncette matarial discharge to the mA sad the artironment from rwierna er envircament. ansamleados. '.h. uarczass oversu suminancs, evaluatba, and appraisal of AEC site of!! asst and 01s ne mroceer, DMdes # Nrad F-se== the sense rarpassibgldes as menspts o(Geld eenv =al monnotung pee to assure to mpDance with. AEC safety oslices for its respectjve popas acdvides. rnadards and policy reiadng to prose 4am G34 Tire Dinctor. Omee e( h of man and his entstaruneas in accordance Ser*en, aemanas twpoembiittais (or weste sessersted with AECM 0513. and coordinata sodi monitarms propsms wah comparabia la coanscatan with ancient ahhits soc under dirwma of say hid orYlce mensper.

C}.u..

proptma of other syne:es. r i e Appmed: September 1p.1973 204

,,n .- ~. RADioACT!YE WASTE MANAGEMENT - AgC est1037 ~ 037 The Diremes. Dhhies of Cassweseos has enlade fdl auss, assiche of. ~ I ad.

4. r 1 added - famar. - t.ad s.

daciops. w appre,a k confuscuss wie perpeni cas.sms per..,urpose w,_ __.TQ.

WWT, Eus..and cour someerned Handquenas coerpsada esa e,shause a' med wens e.c

s. dodge erheds for facindes la he

' bwal er stange stik and wthmet adedonal _. _ - d 7 construssed er mue5sd far tk. purpose of for $ shams redesden. af sums ase prusieng er mortag messesNe wesses er af e.4 depresiedes of lasedes.ess r esmooEhg the reisme of radhamse unmas of Isad, and pream were of perpermd cass to abs entsomsses. cons. b. rWews want mas.m-Isa.s.utessus se f. masash records of sedieasshe wass seered [ their pisamed esaudadat estmaar and er bw6sd as theirahes. advises the Diressus, Divtdes af Wasse 3 sendess a ' propen af ausmal'appnisk af M ssesunset and Transperm een, es the sonessant redisesNe wenn meangsmast estimated costs sad schedelis and as:Hede.. 0811.e4 3Asc h80umEMEMI

• tus M

,as of ridd oaksa 041 Appesabasy. This elapser to a. assure that r% relemas atters b 044 dhtdees sad omssa. Needgesetssa. 5sid and below, are fatwwed in dovevpas precdses costructors wins opersis ABC.ewned er emessest for roudme and essergency openuous a faccides and wbses somrassa semais the 1:sakt AEC wanda== under their jurtsdicdses $afety. Manith, sad - pire Preresden Class (see and that surrent =W where diffedag. AECPR S.7J0047). are restead a soeply with the artesets, b. refer, questless as to spWisabaky, . 042 Ceewegs. This shapter and is appeses laterpretaties, er sensmales fross the 3,.ecify the.__, -_ % regnaressema, sad cdtana (ses 044, below) to the Diresser, procedures whisti shot gr ora the semagenes of Division - of Wasm Mm.sgreanut and radionske wees. T. 1 *through the appropdses 043 es11. Appendes 0$11 eessaias program evideas. l c. propre sad ashek as WWT. with copia se defistdans part !) and seidenes (part 5) far me is - .~ - l the appropresas program dk=ma=% saqu% iseplaneneing the possim and repondbatim of tWs vpdm.4 wasa -g==.== piens (= emir . chspear. The dess of de appenas k as is he mhan. sites. As5owleg the smammt pidases A as a54asham ser desid k preempt the ens ofseed i appeudht0$11 part 5. jsegment by hassisdgeable -_ $dd of5ss and. d. maissais membh approwd concrea== kef cosase:or sistTis ihe emispassi d are pranks wuse sessensuses decadoes* e( operadag and somsreis k the =e of mesnahe wuss. costassen. sedt as the estahUsinness er major =adth d== ab. 044Opsadag Chuda. To esame an egendue (1) epersehag lens for gesatiJes er propse for the g===== e( raesssen wees. j

========d=== er ediassche matartels the resowtag artssets est be obss'est reisused is the enverensness. l~ (2) reisses losedsen and tipths of reimsm.

a. Gement l

(3) assede of tusemasas of M es. (t) Phid of5em and thstr - AmE. l minimise-r:1 sas ef - romanahe .medem eser spendom and espam of sm. sad mese sm5esmen wees la smak a (4) maheds of somemmiss of hieb4 pet sammer a e samre thss presses and Egid.1 wens ist iststa morses er Amme messen esposons to ledhtsmis

espong, sad populsema yemps wE be at the -

h (5) prosum Seeshemm. so the mams' dus lewest leesis teshalently - and mer desernens the gestry air gesuder - maammimey pandel em aument g,e,sm, nues anMhhad la ABCM 0534 (5) asshuds of bassan songs of asti appmesym=IandE. ('D Connemeng efers shut be made ta = aimere em for AEC operstiend stussions, deveisp and me hopend nedeneser calculations - relased to buna#sarsgs te redsslag cs =da===dvay misam se j 4 Appre,et; 5., " 19.1973 205

• l;

.e W nen : s. mmm

AEc osilm RADIGACTIVE WASTI MANAGEb(INT gV' ed newet teshakney and,. _-"; low.he s Equw w e m -shas have . pretchel lessi, sreasue ror,ses,sp essgsy i.

h:.,?

(J) Hlplevet liquid radiancasse vuu shan -wa= its anstants - et du ast be taasported offstas. larpus tank. la the syntaa. Whme latcreensestad taak farms se (4) The essamt and dayes' of radioambe a=' h e(land by AEC waste N dans that the dass required management activities. shas he -

s trander tank saamma between hrma adshmhed.

are deuter to the temas required a transfer tank sossess withis a farm. b. IllgM.evel Radensshe weses sedi tatsreammamed task Auss ear be (1) HI h level ligisid wasus shas be onesidered as a single tank thsus ist-6 soeverted to saltable 3 ynicui sad purposes of the aben requirussums. A chsaucal forsas ~and con (hand la a ensamer wtuch shaA pnmde high c. OtherI.lquid Radamake Wees aremmet of teolatlas from man's (1) !.lquid endossow wees est mesdag suvtroament wah musimal reusase sa ,,the datinition e("higb4ssolves" shat. perpensal maastarance and aswdtamos .be converted lass two Anaises, ese coadsdag. e( th eids,.which ma he l by maa under conditions et credible pelogia, seisamis, and' oder assassy desharged to tes savtreament pesams 5 ARQd 0524 - (La. pemons is. W, evvata. (2) EDeb4svet liquid radiancthe womes may uneomreRed arums *El est be espeesd V ',' be lattially stored ha careedly to esasusescloes la asioam'ef. these engineered systems equipped with preendsed la able D. ammma A. ' eds.quate provtsion for leak dessedse appendia QS24) and the aber esedning ared control. Tanks and transfer syseram et alche: (a) high4evel Eqdd wassa. hall - be desipad as rmUt eredible whisk wesid be taaded is assordness noterani and extasaal forces. Technology with the-poGdas of b., abem er (b). det be deveisped ' and employed as ssGd wees whisk would be kneemd la, anos as prece6mi to reduas the volesse sessedesse with the pe5shs la d ad smahdky et the ldgi>4evel Eqbid

bdour, wome pissed is laidal soap faamden.

(2) As men as =*=s-ay and momendeny . (T) Hi>4evel IIquid wasiasla taidal snarap presidei, the une erassunbaat animmes sad web 4e, i wins la lonearm (msk as ses, surps, pueda, ad moraga. = na pila piana hendes men, shasar heada) for Egeu seemus thus

• in ensk saas, be contained and einpissed erased asutushed usadeds far reisens f

e as no be retriaiskie for nasovel and of radenadstry a ammessmEsd ses irsasfer elsewham. The modsed of Ann be regissed utsk other armensser sossy and the pirydet and chraded sysimum.-It should be resoposed thus. foams o(. the mored wome shat be Egidd wtdeh meses.amh5shed samaderds and la reimand as set antasma mE may predated on afety sad aos en pealkie l l rembrini for issovery e(Gmean prodmas tendt la a budsey(as a doou um) et for bensodal uses. mesesshity la the ama enhuma,thus,it (a) Tine raesaschuy and the alumkal and waaid be advenagsom se desip sei mimma aruseme a sederits ma ma pirydama eher a w-er as weband wanas he laddni. longeens. er pilot be readeved and ruleused er the paises . pissa. storage shat be desarmens( hr - et reisess av spesad to the assus endtsendeose(mamen, thes the biddmp of -n-e*y la the - (s) spaes tasha saa he -+ w na enhums we ses mend an sesspaahie is,d. provtdag iolemse la ammes e( initial - (3) Adequasa dwarates syssame shst be - seemos tvupsiramaan for higb4eial liquid wmen. Eask task fans holeng provedsd a asum e m osamesy higbasses Eqmd wuss sha5 hsw rolessable _ stramma, suht, a.a i avsdaisia. la tanks surpry sunsps Ihr a esasequemos e( aoshimst er speedosai rendusi kesL sense eeunalass re the igues. escasd =m standeses (cesed la A808 0524) for reismus a - istpas volume o( such 'wasas mored 'm mamuroGod areas, are assamudenEy any one tank. Esk tank fans hondag a.., b 4,,,w.ed s.,,em.ar o. im 208 .-,.,-.,.-,m,.m-.- ,a ~,-rm-, ,,.,n, ,,..n-4

= . AAD10ACTtyt DAsTs MANACDGNT ' M c 0511445 daasted ad earted a manoued oss Ratsumes.. ...... % a,es and am resyded er 2401. < 'Thyssent Proteetten et presumed to yised a rdeamble arous. a. AECM Clasetled Matter and' lafernadas." for .g. "Q")

d. Raesmaine Send waar Other Than That addlemani proteessa required for danified Censmand by SeEdiGnados of HigbW radenedn vana.

1lged Wessi

b. AEG 0510. "Pmunden. Casoul and (1) Tsuineal and adammesdw e#ers Absamansas of Ak and Wasar PeDuden."

MW 0813. "Inhasma and Imtrummensal ihat be ersmed seesd a mukad s. admedna of (a) the you vehums of Moeisartas and Rapental." mild woma pensatedla AEC opersdesP

d. AEQi 0524. W far Raesstas sad (b) the arovst et radk M.i n Prosasess."

i

e. ARQi 9$29l " Safety Standards for the ash woma.

(2) Voimme<mhenom techmoney, smak e Paskagles et Fisses sad Other Radtensove - "-m and inanerstion, shas be Matsnais." =+=y==J foi ese was radoecuw soud f. AECM 0530. Nudeur Catdestoy safety." wnme and placed in opeados wherner 8 AEOd 0$44. "Pluntag for Emergmanes is prankst. AEC Operadam6" (J) Esasps as dicssee4 by (4),below,seIM h. ABCM 4301.*Casal Desip Cat arts." nemmede wens any be stored in 1. AIOi 1401. " Safeguards Ceamet and coev==la==l bertal grounds appened Managnoses e(Nesisar Masadds.* by the ABC. ). WA3R.1301. " Plan for the u g et (4) Soud wuse sensrated at MC skes and AECCaesrated Radensdus Wenst" Mass 1sarordous costalaimg signifimat U 233 or k. ABC Property 105 45J0. ys and Sarphs trassersaisse nuclide contammaties Subpart aam sha5 he mored et ABC sism.aspegated Radioactively Costandsmand Perssant from other reeseenive6y sostanumstad Property " soud wise and wkh sombasstile and noase absstible traasstaalam. 0E1148 NAT1088AL D8ERODICY APpuCATIOff sentamisstad waste packaged la the man of a sadeant emarguesy. as deemed la - arperusly. The yndingmg and storap ABCM 080144, the pawitsions et this shopser sad is sendteses shat be ends that the pnelays ens he radDy recetreed ha sa appendk shat sondame in eSess. tasans. - ' & 'ne comudos for - 20 yeus.The psaluges abaB be udtaby labes.d a de wome say eneata en be ideat! fled by crasawe(eresse to Permansar senerd6 Airtisses Am5eesde Fh Gageous and s. odser airtperse messedw efflusses absR be anstrated.st dse lowest level below the thnen of AECM 0524 enesisar iak the si,,,,,,,,,,*,e in,,,n,, m.,,,,,ni ascu sense of the technoing and gr-Joomis or2a.st2. 'ta the masmis et es psasr sammame'Is ABCM orM2. f. Othes. Raeseadge -wines genersaed by undaryound endser tasm. and raadmin5

• pe parysses er en essenes, poema edsass==

in a sammaesuus eMemas tant preads temessues undarysend shnA be cosendered as a specul dhentees of askimus sehe samune radiosses= unat

aus, e

Approved: September 19.1973 7Q O 207 [

-TwW + ulgiyyy wgy.,,.. l ' ' WQ ogfg ~~-~ -- 1U@lOACT!Y1 WASTE MANAGDGNT b PAKrI-i. TERAttNCLOGY j of "-S a.rfes budd ponds, the y A. PWIPCst ima mor.gr d .e m.o This put proddes temdmolosr es be med is l 6. Diversion-As syytted i s asekser t (dispur. For w siddareises,e % W is e** q andesusy, im um h. dans somssmans redlemsstse wasms g ,,g,,,4 c . adkuserter ud eswess the same e a retsades nyonen for tussmes. + s-

s. UsAggs

7. EfSusens-Airbons and Equid armens 1.

Airberse Radlesethe Ef5aesa disaharyd"fue Assky aAar - aE. n "- shes, voyam, sugissared posses wees insesser 'and Kadesstew fasma, and/or pass. -sa=d er esordnad afrimous commels haie been stressed, la sir ommons. (Note: The speaki ass a( Rahusas edidas er lose,.__ and assadais ask as Er4s anmend Ama marisse arenas widsk lean the she er se as etDssess and podcayd for retnudos,deonid the atmosphere hem saghound syusses be esondhed a W.mdionset,e . susk a masks. lapens. rand.a ponds, w smas" a "Adsorind esensedw pass.") ludsodes webs ase to be eseddamd ~m n afEmmass The torus dem not inde s med Cambanthie (fur purposes et A338 wenn er edser wees whhk k emessimed 1 0511444 4(4) Orpses masadal upshis et (e4. udaryeomd madner tem dehnd, l h,,y - bales bened, ammys thss sr the sair mored (e4., la lassens, asesudes ponds, / L Ihdus er wrapping used for ge h phsde trumshes,usin),er,shippedoftha, usehemede semians et a passa i(. l commet parysens asoud 6==-==m 8~ of sanansen wens to

• =

objana er-mamuish. the mammans et ths some type.ef mamaande devisa, smak as t padsags as a winds may ts _ senddared task er nuk, la a meneer psambdug reakesL

3. N (for payeses of ABCM 7, Laag Tern storsgs-The status e(

05114u d.(4)-A====ike== e( the esser __ radlesentie wenn under seend and l ser6sse et sesed eessaissus, as des==d==d servasismen, and ruer sostesakes, tes la by appsprimer Mye -serveye er.eres assh a fussa and immens than as Amtsr radies6am imamunes unwys, mSmissely passadas e. '="dr='== k asuddend Aos of usenadanden a thus amrier sendeed assamurF st a poded of times wthkisvery 8 riessian weds poemdmes for es ses is less====r==-(d ersies an emmyne semid L se eher paneds af sism,m - l 'gesmesa nephesser pommens va sus no its m aiser an L -p requireddansesaminartw be meest la a hiebquaky sus >emdies 4., Cab Aa 'sudesgrenad Essessuek er mesage 9mmit with e impemed emakery of -

meer desadas.

sammes less wedsk Equid. wasms. me . dhsharged, loansed as that atm radimmalvky 18, Fedesi Repedesry-A Fodsmar sweed and (enher ens teidum) k snehad as tem smE epsusst fasesy for semes er espeed e(- . befuse es Equid renstes yemadnesar, spesias types of mesmat= wuss drum Asc l-masand/or h

5. WThe plassed misess of seasendse wasm in a asammer thes prudesse nuevery, 11: Padest Raserudse-Aa AN: es requiries or ks p1====== la a-sammer whldt is losgeira asemet and sammedoms beamus e( -

conddend & se esa reasserr h ses - mored er barned wome er "- povided Air. (Neem 3' resosary b pieused. faseides. . (4 t, ar could be provkied for samly as is es seus W >~ M sspsumher 19, tru t 208

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a m.m.. 4 ,r-_wm., ..w-,- e. -,.,,w,..,,m,e an,, ,,-y.,,e-,

.tEC Aapendts 0$11 fsri.l.. RADICACTIVE-WASTE MANAGEMENT ~~

12. High.Het 1)qdd Wesse ljqad wesse

19. Reteettes Besie-A wsterdske basis is cor.tauumg suMelent thermal endrgy to which uqed wate k held for say one er require some supplemetsi mesas c( coeuo6, rnare of Itw foGowmg reasons:(s) the doesy

?]....,, such as sooling co0s. of short liwd radiosc:Mty; (b) naalysis to gdf verify actMay levels permkung reisess:(c)'

13. HiqM.avelIJguid Wasse-The aqueous wasu f*CyCI' I'f L'estiment:(d) eruperation, t e suiting from the opennes of the (kst.cyde extractlas systata. oe equivalang

28. Seepage Baie-A basis la peringsble eart

• concastrated wanas from sow ;;

tirough whick liquid persolates and la exameths cydet. or eqwvajein westes frees which r.dlanc:Mry, enceja for tritimes, is a procus not udag notvent ernacion is a serbed. , raditry for @ trradined reaczer rwts.

21. $enung Seein.A wstertight besta designed for separating sludges and Wim*aa a a

14. Eglant weste -(sl bish-leni Bqvd wasta.

layerr os dw bonom. The wetar is disposed or (b-) tbs puducts from sofkilacJos of of by owrkw orsehr evsporsues, higMessi liquid wans. or (c) Irradisted foul siemeen if dbcardd without prie:ssning.

22. SeQd habeectie Wasse-Matertal abat is enemhDy dry but may sostain sorted,

13. Othat Liquid WsEte-lJguld waste nog 18 8BMussedy usee withis tlw defkitions r4 h!sb4 vel Uquid 7a to be M wtma buriedla day wana.

23. Trsssursalem.Contanslasted Solid

16. Ligald Radioa ctive Wem-soludams.

Wesse-Dwee conuseimmed wt* eartah t u s yessio ns. sad mobile aludges. ggggag awa *f1886 belf use 1 8CC*"'""ad wth sucDoecdw ozetarisis. and high specine as&% to prestar Il thaa 10 assocerles/stam (10

17. Manasemea (Wss e)-Tha plaasiat mlerocurfulldlogram), abjoss so the -

(hwhading desiga and practa lmpromment), fonowiseg onaditions and malarenan.pr. exeorJea. sad mmmave # esenctai s. The rafha=&tas included are IJ233 V feicooet relskd to i.wntrol of ndkmeda (with ks daughter geducts),3 assaissa, d wust. laciudag areatmeert. soud!Acation. and inaspivtonness sucindes except init k! ar nogears itwags.and dispoest Pe 38 and P>241. (Note that PS238 and Po.241 wase should be tsadled as

14. Railousten Wasse-Materiak or as wier.

triaamimawnaranteested wome when l coastsdel or, locinding, or comsmanated s) Indcated by Pe.239 layertsies er g with ratloactive tratorial la acess of the ' when required by Iceal buriel artterls.) Imis.or concsmastkaa pemucted la AEC

b. The wiw of to aCVg is dottred fross Properry Managecent kmemcsions for the opper range of concescutions,e(

unconddonal rdsase of ezesa F.+ y. ndun>:26 la the earth and le subject This ladmies (s) norsd Sqidd, scad, sr so tredlocation heed as long esna gassoas residun froce chauncsi er audia:Waacilde sr.igradeels sot. m* Lslierylcul procesing of mdioactise C. The actMty desalty Insy be avesa,ged owe the contems ofindMdealddypier matartals: ib) dbeambed* kees ads a defecdur equipasema and bedidke rubbk. containers. mch as $3-smilan drumas not radioastive is abemostwr but bdadlag ann =rkis am for dtiekling contusilessed wisk sh MJ:assi or scrydost af liqwisk W disconry (s) dheansed itaca contaneng hawad (for exsmpes, as rer.aw.i=ha of desa) radiancnMey. Tressed as a squesas covery that sa ladMdual muntainer is above this

• ars: (1)IrneReed fusis stored for possede 145si ett met be considered as rq (2) redloecow scrap acred for nacsanssting ks retrieval provtdad there parable re:nwry of aeful newe and (M k rescathie saurance str the anrats matenals and equipawart acrid far passible ts' the conturwr sad the balanas of the -

future as fonowsts d~aa*=" dos. asas..inted m:rmainers is bekw ttw level e A;; proved: Sejrtember 19.1973 h 209 h b.=

.-_--.c==-r--= ---~-----~-- --~ ;== ""="~~ = "~ ~ " ' " ~ ~- AIC A;pendts 0511 RADIOACTTVE CAST 2 MANAGEMDf7 Part! I. .. d. _For typiad ped 9 wesa st this actfetry f. Raquests for excettbu for applytag.tha_...

• f*f.-

6 mery, k is sw that Indirect to nC1/g nine os a pacby+ypedose %ik metsseesesta or enthastas ami buis, wth shstitstion of an swptulear

• W matJols smst be me qssastry timk app 5calde to a burini r

becand o(dhoca exzeenni ne fadBay, w requests for exampstos (nr A s ar= = pla of such d=' hin species short halfund m:--y _ _ coacroh k tt.e ="% of spec Sc w as ss. w e be conddared es a hydnes % areas fraca wideh esu-by case basis, as per AICM typical wasses haw been asutdished by 0$lic%m). smtmHs undles as bdtg sizhat aban or 3 The 10 aCl/s vilas is a echados for below the canael & cho6 dog differsat matbods o(band 5mg a. k k ramsnimd tint ondar pr=== arranen kfate of rimaneira wiew: a e *- -;f certain wusia. pti shocid not be centused wtsh a vehe baDry escarded process gtrposat. below widch excess matarsak may be en trr=r==vena cosans =bove this

• *- = W--:-_ily rotassed, u par AEC eihar stay not land c u.dv.4 m Property Management lasur.cdcas praedcol storage in ful compaance widt ICS 45.$0.

AICM 0511044, d(4). Howme, these items should be recorded u truaurantum wutes. + e i ? t 4 9 4 a . jW.~ 3

1. Pre a u septaitamt19.1973 210

^ L

x ACUVE WAffE MAF FET ,,.AE ( 4ppendts.1411= ~T PARTil 1 WASTE MANAGEMENT PLANS P.h, A. PURPCsii 30 Descriptica of Waste Trasumma Pseekim TMs part prowdss padmase sa the development o(s 3J Demetythe of Wane saansp Passess redlemsstw wans P pina for each she. as 3.4 Desertprian e(Imunes Centret Symses rapdred try AECW 051144a. 3J Stee Adamataredse L6mbs sa ISesen 5. DiscutS80N 4 Radesselve Weses Sensed y.** n 4.1 High. Level Wome From Cheadel h a the eartput b'Al8 b w$l reqare dlNerent tyyss sad dryses of enert so mest C. hhh the operating ertede e( AECW 0511 044 So m W Wome j Assordlagly, the plans W ader AECM

1. 3

• M 051103H need est be insadeni ta deyes of dent APyropetais referseas a supplemust er shenassiste 5.

Pleas and Budest Projemises the infonastkes er esodudoes mated la the plas e should be provided. The ousans of a weses $J latertin Storap of Nidet.sval LiqEd [] a mamapment pas in C,below, k a be followed. Wome S.lJ M5emoneChern I' C. PQRMA7 F0R THE StT1 W ASTI

• 5.1.2 Expossed Assomplisimmanu la l

W 1972 MANAGEMENT PLANE 5.1J Proposed Progress for W le73 -l' L Propse A h 3.1.4 Proposed Preyns for W 192 sad Beyend \\ 1.1 Sine 3.lJ Fiv6 Year tudyt Profess for Mt ei It w sad asy md 1.2 omes a N.h 50 Lane. Tens Seerser of EgM.sielWane-IJ Casummam 1.4 Lmd RaspeamQdiky for She Flams $J Wsaagansat of Leer and ines. IJ Somos of M 1972 Funds for Weses sneenas4 met LiquidWome Meanymsms SA Maaa3emeat a f ' Solid - Waste.- Costandssted Wkk Radisespeley 2. D.saipde seWem ca.emd : Pros us $J Mansyment af Abbene Radeemtw-I' Waste-2.1 PreamsFkrwchers la Reempituistian of 3edest Projemha i

3. W et Wmes _"-

n Facadas Dotated Instnacdeas for die weste smangenes piani j l. wel. he forwarded pertedimer a. Held emer.. 3.1 Id -** da= med f = dan e(Facedes sammesa.~ - a .o + t I g g F p_her i,. l.,, 6 211 --m . ~... _, m o

-.a. a--- - -..a -.. - === : = =.2.-.----. DOCKET NUMBER <ETm0N RLA,E PRM 4OM h (ss re e n d/..u..t. t. c March.10, 1991 WNhC 71 MAR 18 P4 :27 'Ib sham it may concern; p,g,; etcni Ts.gv u0CKEimG A SVICI I am appe.lled at attempts by Wachington and Oregon to chathMC6' the definition of high-lewl radioactive waste. It is what it is, and calling it " incidental waste" is a lie and a blatant attempt to distort. 'Ibe deceit inulved in this distorting of what 1,t is called so those entrusted with disposing of these tbkins can continue to weasel out of their responsibility without regard to hwan or planetary degradaticm, is sad and sick. It is an atteupt to perpetrate a ruse on the public, for the same purpose as any eco can, to make a buck. I think there should be criminal negligence chazues filed seeinnt those who have dtcped radioactive wastes in the gTound, and thnen who wrote Ivgulations allowing it, and those who seek to continue this egregious and irn.c.p.usible act till 1995. There should be a halt to anything whidt generstes nuclear waste until the prublem of dim =1 is solved, and the present level of blatant poiannina of land and water has been eradicated. Attecpts by the federal government to delay the vitrification plant, sbow a gross lack of awareness and conce2m for the enormity and seriousness of the problem. I am totally opposed to any exa:ption from NRC licensing for the IXE grout vaults. Further,'I am W to the DCE diennaing of waste water in Z-20 cribs. This totally perpetuates every problem which curzintly exists. The goverunset has lost its credibility with the public mw its history of deceptico,- stonewalling, and grossly ineffective managemaatt, pztblan-solving, and prioritizing. 'Ibers has been no accountability to date. I am wry concerned. Sincerely, J. Mwe East 1010 20th Spokane WA 99203 ~ 9103210169-91031o 0 )5g. PDR PRM PDR 1 60-4 J

u.~._ _. _. _. _ _ _. _..___._._ u_.-_ ___ _ ___._ r i - DOCKET NUMBER i PETm0NRULE PRM do 5 (swa sirsi n a 7/19/ qu? y tdR 18 P4 :28 - / Aw

AM b 'Am kc,h.ea u %4 te9W" L u f,Ac,a,.rcr 4 ~ w 7, _ g h s

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} Q,-- Q A -- J '-j;g j A ^ ed & 4 9 f~ r 1 xdL& a __ j--s - .-4<>-e-< a l b n f M 4 a k ,a U MA' C kk 4A mA /t~), W L JW&J>pk_% M 4, 7w a'm, + a -m x u w-c e an s, w n. - > 1. m %,. j. ?A Y ne a L 2 s.n - > kt A s& l-4h & y A g, I W' D. N$h m. 2 a io wL 60et. 99A0 33,g -9103210203-910309 m-- -ocw

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i m.,_. .___.7._..___ _m m._.s._____._ m_. v-4 DOCKET NtMBER PETITION Rt1E PRM 48-k)? (sa n s/7% ~ M Ap.cn t5, a s 4 .,i i,nts e4:28 l-l"IE1 I fo2N1 1 to'. Sec. RET *n_v j MtAcLEAR RE GuL 4 TORY 00e u( s,S fo.d W A s4ioGTod 9.c. 20555 ATTo: po cKETt4G

• SE R0 t cE.

SR40CM RE: DEFto t Tlod tV 41GM-AEVEL LOASTE FoRx.44-REARt465 ta was co retatoesT. snouto 6E HELD -to SEEK _5aa.THER f M6 Lic - O o m M. E4 \\ (~R.E G A R.b t 4 6 H4 E. CSAd6E N PEF l4 (T t o d OF Rt64-CEVEL Lv A s rE. fu6uc-lovoc.veW e.aT 13 e e e,e ss 4.gy 04 Aa i s s ue. A-s pAa G ER ou.s As Tu t s.. gg39g;73,sosia 60-4 PDR LEt4. Aat -Scott l4Ll E. WAnoRews o Yt Me o cord ca S7 soy {

=....- . --.n ....,,,. c.

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v,l 5b f.k.5/73 L). ( =y y .. w Westinghouse Y-n;a 20 p 4 30 g f T: ^ * ' 9s'<s w eson Electric Corporation

Q;yg%,n,, n2 3 n

~ March 15,1991 Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 CERTIFIED MAIL . RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED RE: NRC Docket No. PRM 60-4

Dear Sir:

Enclosed herewith are an original and two copies of the Westinghouse Electric. Corporation's comments on the Petition for Rulemaking regardmg the definition of-the term "High Level Radioactive Waste". We appreciate this opportunity to comment on this important petition for - rulemaking..If you have any questions on this information, please call Jim Bearden at 412-642 3990 or me at 412 642 2455. Oh S. A. Manager GOCO ES&H Programs Environmental Affairs Westinghouse Electric Corporation 4 d A g e s

---

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a_.~- x. = --. ~. x :. :: .-a n 1 t WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION COMMENTS ON THE PETillON FOR RULEMAKING TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM 'HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE" 10 CFR PART 60.2 Lntroduction On December 17, 1990, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published and requested comments on a petition, submitted by the States of Washington and Oregon (Petitioners), to amend the definitions of "high level radioactive waste" (HLW) and "HLW facility" as defined in 10 CFR 60.2. The following are Westinghouse Electric Corporation's (Westinghouse) comments on the petition for rulemaking. Comments The Petitioners' concem appears to be with the Hanford Site, yet the request is to clarify the NRC definition of HLW for " defense reprocessing waste in tanks". The petition should be assessed for its national ramifications rather than the sole affect on Hanford waste management programs. The petition would could impact not only the reprocessing of HLW at Hanford but similar efforts at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the West Valley Demonstration Project and Savannah River. The waste management programs at these sites are at different stages of implementation, and therefore the proposal would have varying impacts. At no site will the proposal measurably increase safety if adopted, however it would delay waste treatment and disposal, increase costs and potentially hamper safe management of tank wates. 1 l

. x_ Or;a-.z_.~ - a.:._ .-. -_ ::-.:.:,. :,. : La.: L a L. ., mi.- = De Petitioners propose to add to the definition of HLW in 10 CFR 60.2 the statement "provided that if, prior to disposal, defense reprocessing... remove the largest technically achievable amount... and therefore not HLW." Because reprocessing tank wastes are not defined and HLW is not clearly separated from other low level waste, adding this statement, along with the new proposed Appendix A. would have the net effect of defining all defense " tank waste" as HLW regardless of the level of radioactMty. The waste could only be classified as non-HLW after being treated by the approved method and meeting established criteria for each tank of defense waste. The procedures for determining " largest technically achievable amount" outlined in the proposed Appendix A would require, at least one year before a tank of defense reprocessing waste is treated, pre treated or blended, that DOE publish-in the Federal Register all data concerning that waste. Also, the NRC would be required to license DOE, under section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act 42 U.S'.C. 5842 (4), at least six months prior to any processing of any waste unless the NRC determines on a tank by tank basis the following: "l) The DOE has demonstrated that the largest technically achievable amount of activity from the tank will be isolated for vitrification prior to permanent disposal; and

2) That the use of permanent shallow land disposal for the tank waste will be limited to the incidental waste portion, which is the activity remaining after the largest technically achievable amount of activity has been removed; and

3) That the treatment, pretreatment and blending processes described in the DOE submittal will achieve the stated separation and/or recovery efficiencies: and

4) That the treatment, pretreatment and blending processes described in the DOE submittal are proven, cost effective, state of-the art processes, which are capable of removing the largest technically achievable amount of activirv."

2-

.-.L.L a . 7 1 D -- ;- This process of publishing data in the Federal Register and making treatment determinations on a tank-by-tank basis is not compatible with efficiently selecting, designing and constructing treatment facilities due to the extraordinary cost of these facilities arc.! the time required to implement any modifications or construct new facilities. In addition. many of the tanks of waste are scheduled to continue to receive waste for a number of years; consequently they are not presently ready for the proposed tank-by-tank evaluation process. Determining treatment required on a tank by-tank basis could require setting aside tank.s of waste for several years until treatment is presided and possibly requiring the construction of additional waste storage tanks which otherwise would not be necessary. Presently HLW is managed in tanks which are interconnected to minimize storage solumes by evaporation or calcination, thereby reducing the potential for migration of liquid wastes into the environment. These management practices would potentially have to be stopped until a detailed characterization of the waste is conducted and approval is obtained from the NRC because they could be considered blending or pre treatment of HLW. The definition of HLW and the subsequent classification of defense " tank waste" have been the subject of extensive rulemakings as well as correspondence with the NRC. As a result of comments received on an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal Register (51 FR 5992 and 53 FR 17709 respectively), the NRC rejected any attempt to define " sufficient concentrations" numerically or otherwise. This was based on the concern that a definition would be an invitation to dilute or fractionate waste solely to alter its classification. The NRC has already acted within its authority to determine which defense reprocessing tank wastes at the Savannah River site, the West Valley site and in the double shell tanks at Hanford are incidental wastes (not HLW) per the definition in 10 CFR 50 Appendix F, (54 FR 22581, May 25, 1989, and a letter from R. M. Bernero, NRC to A. J. Rizzo, DOE, dated September 16, 1989). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

a 2. - - --- a .a. .....-.~.. 1 Westinghouse supports the concept of a risk based quantitative detinition of HLW - since such a definition would distinguish HLW from non HLW. However, the o titioners' proposal to define " sufficient concentrations" in terms of the largest e technically achievable amount of radioactivity which may be removed from each tank is not a " concentration" definition and is not quantitative. It does not clarify the definition of HLW, nor does it provide an objective basis to distinguish HLW from non HLW. The Petitioner's proposal would also require that technology development and implementing processes be subject to regulatory evaluation by the NRC, the Petitioners and others. In fact, the Petitioners have stated that determinations of how specific wastes will be characterized under the standards proposed by them would be left to "... individual adjudicative proceedings." This process is neither technically feasible nor consistent with the statutory responsibilities and authorities of the NRC and the DOE. The Fetitioners also request that the public be given adequate opportunity to comment on the disposition of these wastes. Savannah River, West Valley and Hanford have prepared Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for these waste management programs. Also, an EIS is being prepared which will address changes proposed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. These EISs received extensive public review and comment before they were issued. Additional public review would be redundant and would unnecessarily delay waste treatment. As these programs proceed, large amounts of data and information on waste composition, treatment and disposal will continue to be made available to the public. Conclusions While Westinghouse appreciates and is fully aware of the concerns of the. Petitioners, the proposed rulemaking is inconsistent with the statutory responsibilities of the NRC and DOE, and the proposed change to the definitica of HLW and HLW Facility would not add any significant measure of protection of.,

,.. _ a _ _:.z.u. 2 w a :--..- m = - - public health and safety or the environment The proposed rule would instead delay waste treatment and disposal, increase costs and potentiar.y hamrr safe - management of tank wastes. The NRC has previously considered, through extensive rulemaking processes, the appropriate definition of HLW and concluded that its current definition of HLW is satisfactory for the purposes of 10 CFR 60.2. Public participation as to the final disposition of the waste has been facilitated through the various rulemakings as well as the EIS process. l 5-I p

.-.----..-.i..-...... .... -. ~. u bc: S.- R. Pitts J. L Gallagher J. S. Moore. WSRC T. M. Anderson. WHC J. J. Buggy. WVNS W. C. Moffitt. WINCO J. R. Bearden R.' J. Bliss - WHC C. L Dalcanton V. A. Franklin J. P. Hogan WINCO D. K. Ploctz - WVNS E. L Wilhite - WSRC B. D. Williamson WHC D. D. Wodrich - WHC 1 i I i ( .)

~ '4 @ HEAL ~pi;$ w Vi / ~ Hanford Education Acuon League

9) nAR 22 A 04

?. arch 15, 1991 Samel J. Chilk Secretary U S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Attn. Docketing and Services Branch Washington, DC 20555 Re: Decket No. PRM-60-4, Definition of High-Level Radioact.4ve Waste

Dear Secretary Chilk,

I have enclosed the comments of the H4 2 ford Education Action League on the Petia: ion for Rulemaking by the states of Washington and Oregon (Docket No. PRM-60-4 ). This concerns the creation of a new vaste category, " incidental waste," and has an important bearing on the cleanup of the contamination present at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Thank you _for your serious consideration of HEAL's comments. If you have any questions concerning them, please contact me directly (the address and telephone number'are printed below). I look forward to the Com:nission keeping HEAL informed as to the progress of your deliberations concerning this important matter. Sincerely, 7 M4D N James Thomas Research Director enclosure

Qfpl YY

~ 1720 N. Ash

• Spokane, Washington 99205 = (509) 326-3370
• FAX (509) 326-2932 M

- a ~_ w. a a aa. w - - ..-.- --. - -.._,..- - -.w. e Coments on Nuclear Regulatory Comission 10 CTR Part 60 Petition for Pulemaking [ Docket No. PPM-60-4) Definition of the Term "High-Level Radionotive Waste" by Hanford Education Action League l'120 North Ash Street 3pokane WA 99205 March 15, 1991 The Hanford Education Action League (HEAL) is a nonprofit, research and public education organization ooneerned with the Department of Energ'/'s operations at Hanford. Established in 1984, HEAL has approximately 400 members dedicated to public openness and a government whleh is accountable to its oltizens. As HEAL reviewed the petition for rulemaking submitted by Washington and Oregon, it was frustrating that the petitioners included scant information to support their many broad claims. Two of their claims caused HEAL particular concern. First, Washington and Oregon alleged in their petition to the Nmma slon that "the proposed amendment is essential to provide protection

f the future health and safety of the citizens of the Pacifio "Orthwest,"1 The states have failed to provide any soientific or

b]eotive rationale to support this claim.

More importantly, the states have failed to establish why their proposed procedure is any better than the current NRC licensing process. Given that the petitioners' proposed amendment is based on the ALARA prinolple (best technology that is cost effective), the public has no

• Ercloswe with letter free nmmia E. Grimsley, DC, to Terry Basseean, dated December 10,1990, p. 5.

_~_-w_._ u -. ___ ___sm uh d!.'.L 'T;tdint "- C::::et ::e F P.M - 6 0 -4. page f i.'t"!100e thi! thlt vill be in id;q"ite pr0t:0:100 Of their heilth ind

afety or of the environment The Commission must keep in mind that the=

Manterd grout is not a proven vaste form. Even if the grout facilit, as w:tified 1: seeting PCRA requirements, it is not at all clear whether it vill be able to suffiolently prevent the migration of radionuolides, trpeelally those which are water soluble (e.g. I-129 and Te-99). By only proposing best available technology and cost effectiveness as the ersteria, the public has no assurance that any comments it might Jubmit based on environmental or health criteria would have to be nridered by the C :=1ssion. Additionally, the states' petition is not 1: 111 elear en how the public should be involved nor af the public would 11"e any rights to appeal a decision by the Commission. While the tank-by-tank basis has some technical and practical _ merit, Sere is the danger that the publio will not be presented with suffiolent inf ormation to understand the total potential impact and risk associated vith the aggregate'imount of radiation (from all the tanks)_ disposed of to g: cut. In their petition, the states have failed to present any information to support their claim that the proposed amendment vill " provide protection of the future health and safety of the citizens of the Pacific Northwest "2 This information needs to be supplied before the publio will be able to evaluate whether.the proposed amendment or the existing licensing process is better at protecting the Northwest. The second claim about which-HEAL is concerned is that the. Commiesion's rulemaking procedure would be the best way to involve the public. Nowhere do the states offer any Justification that their proposal L

ibid., p. 5.

~ i

~... _. - .-a--..-...~.u.-..~-.... MEAL Conen:nto en Docket No. PRM-60-4 pago 3 vould grant the citi: ens of the Pacific Northwest a greater access to the decision-making process. The states only dismiss the current licensing

edure with the follcwing disparaging remark

"the rule amendment tuld all w the avoidance of the admittedly cumbersome licensing "3

3:? cess. HEAL regrets that the states of Washington and Oregon.contador

tective public involve =ent as " cumbersome.

• Upon this basis, HEAL is

-tremel'/ skeptical that the proposed amendment will lead to effective n.t'olvement by the publio in the decisions af f ecting Hanf ord tank wastes. HEAL finds it a gross defielency that the proposed amencaent only mentions the double-shell tanks at Hanford. If the Commission adopts the

etition, it would affect the high-level radioaotive wastes in Hanford's 11".gle-shell tanks.

It is quite possible that a significant propertion of these vastes will also be grouted in the future. The petitioners

• serve

nly the interests of the Department of Energy by not considering the impacts to public health and the envaronment from the possible grouting of all these other high-level radioactive vastes.

HEAL must also take exception to the petitioners' claim that NWPA, 12 USC 10101 (12)(A), enables the Commission to create an incidental waste category.4 HEAL contends that the NWPA is not applicable to Hanf ord's

situation.

The NWPA introduces the concept of a concentration-based definition. Whereas this is applicable to the deep-geologio repository ind the regulations governing the repository take it into account, the Cc= mission would be in direct contradiction with the Energy Reorganization .ict (EPA) of 1974 if it adopted this as a basis for " incidental vaste" concerning the Hanford grout vaults. 2 Petition for Rulees. king, July 27, 1990, p. 7. 4 ibid., p. 5.

r MEAL 0:=mante on Docket No. PPM-60-4 pago 4 'he petit:0ners' prop 0:31

00ntrary to the latent Of C00 gree: When

. ::afted the ERA in 1974.

The reason Congress adopted a source-based

efinition was to prevent the Department of Energy and others from W ting high-level rad 0ce::ve vastes so as to meet a concentration-based

e

inition.

Tne proposed grouting of tank wastes at Hanford will ilgnificantly dilute the tank wastes. At this point, it is important to state for the record that there is ?cce agreement between HEAL and the states of Washington and Oregon. HEAL igrees with the petitioners that "under existing law, defense reprocessing iste. Including Hanford double-shell tani vaste, is HLW Consequently, ' ng-ter= storage or disposal of such tank vasto is currently sub]ect to .:. censing by the Co=:nssion. "5 There are enormous complexities involved with this issue. More

nf er::ation is needed (perhaps the only point that all parties v knowledge).

More public involvement is a necessity. The current federal law does not provide a sufficient process to address the Hanford zituation. However, the petitioners' amendment is perhaps even more ,roblematio than the current situation. Therefore, HEAL urges in the strongest terms that the Comission seriously consider the following recommendAtlon. l nTAL* a Recomumendation to the ConsLission l In order to have an informed citi::enry effectively participate in

• he decision of how to properly dispose of the low-activity wastes from the Hanford underground high-level nuclear waste storage tanks, HEAL urges the Comission to undertake a public decision-making process that would include (at a min 2mm):

' 1 bid., p. 6. l

^ %- L _^..

r. :: _

^.:.r: 2 ;,: =a:= :.=:= =x -

=: :. = =.== :=:

HEAL Conunonts on Dook'ot No.'PRM-60-4 pago 5.

1) A series of public Information workshops to educate interested-

,ti:: ens as to the issues at stake;--including, but not limited to, the proper role of the Commission and other regulatory agencies, the limited

:wledge of the tank wastes, and' the possible saf ety, health, and environmental consequences of each of the options.

2) After a short amount of time to allow the public to reflect on the inf ermation presented at the workshops (2-4 veeks), the Comission zhould hold a series of of ficial hearings to receive.public comment on the preposal.

3) The series of informational workshops and offiolal hearings thould be held in at least the four magor metropolitan areas of the Paolfic Northwest (i.e. Seattle Portland, Spokane, and the Tri-Cities).

Conclusion Even though HEAL has numerous problems with the current petition, HEAL la retloent to recommend that the Commission totally reject it. This would leave the citizens of.the Pacifio Northwest right back where we were several years ago when the Comission's staff were meeting secretly with the Department of Energy and looking-for ways of skirting the law to allow the ' disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the ' grout. vaults at - Hanford. HEAL is willing to consider that good and-sufficient reasons do -n et for uniquely addressing the disposal of low-activity vastes to the Hanford grout. However, - such reasons have Lnot been presented in this petition. Therefore, HEAL urges the Commission to undertake our-recon:mendation for an extensive public process that would develop an-idequate basis upon whjob c vise decision can be based. .,,4.. c. w--v,..- -,r-m-

~.--...-n..,Lw.--.--.- -.i.w ~... -.. +. CCCXET " UMBER PRM40"/- FETiTION RULE (56FRS87B)) df March 15, 1991 . b r 4. COMMENTS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY, INC. ("OCRE" 'HIGH-LEVEL RADIC9ET5Vt25) P 2 :55 ON PRM-60-4, " DEFINITION OF THE TERM WASTE,'" 55 FED. REG. 51732 (DECEMBER 17, 1990) . e ...:v. OCRE is not taking a position in f avor of or in opposition" tu " PRM-60-4. With regard to the definition of "high-level radioactive waste," it is OCRE's position that the current definitions of "high-level" and " low-level" wastes are arbitrary and artificial. In particular, the term " low-level" waste implies " low-hazard," which may not be the case for many " low-level" waste streams. The protection of the public health and safety and the environment would be enhanced by abandoning the current te rnis "high-level" and " low-level" and devising different radioactive waste classification schemes which are commensurate with the risks posed by the waste materials. The goal of radioactive waste management must be the isolation of radioactive wastes from the biosphere for the duration of their hazardous lives. This can be done in the most cost-effective manner if waste streams are segregated, as they are generated, as much as possible. It is not clear that PRM-60-4 will achieve the goals stated above. It may be more appropriate to classify the entire contents of the tank wastes as "high-level" wastes than to declare a portion of them as " low-level." However, the waste characterization requirements in the petitioners' proposed Appendix A to Part 60 are essential for beginning to solve the legacy of poor waste management practices at the DOE's Hanford, Washington site. OCRE also believes that NRC oversight and regulation of the DOE facilities, both for their cleanup and operation, is essential. The lack of any independent regulation of the DOE facilities is the root cause of their vast environmental contamination-and general poor performance. Respectfully submitted, / Susan L. Hiatt OCRE Representative 8275 Munson Road Mentor, OH 44060 (216) 255-3158 L / j. A j j -- -g-- ""' ~ f -~ p n--

m 00CXET NUMBER ~ FETm0N RULE CRM 4@ Y (WR 5 a D) .~.'..n<. fD '91 MR 25 PJ 135 t'* . 8 . %%L ! ... N t - Secretary Nuclear Regulatory Comh.ission washington, DC 20555 Attn Docketing and Service Brance

taren 14, 1991

Dear Secretary:

This letter is in regard to Washington state trying to change' the definition of high-level radioactive waste around some of its disposal at Hanford. Basically, I feel this would be an injustice to the people of our state to label as " incidental waste" the waste going into the grout vaults if it included high-level radioactive waste. Liquid from high-level radioactive waste has to be treated differently from low-level radioactive waste. The DOE at Hanford is pernpas afraid or doesn't want to take the time to separate them for' proper treatment. Maybe if we hadn't spent and are continually spending so much money on our war in the Middle East we wouldn't even be considering this question. And, we do need to bc lisensing these processes (for example, grout vaults). The public has a right to know when and what is being dumped in their state.- Also, in this decision, we need to be considering the ef f ects of increased radioactive levels of cesium and other elements getting into the ground water around Hanford and contaminating it and the Columbia River. Please keep me on your mailing list. Sincerely, ./. n ( 'v ' - Pat Herbert P.O. Box 95966 Seattle, WA 98145 / f'

• '-** y-.p_;

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- u,...... FETii;OiRUi.i D 00 90%- (b6tW.5/9N) ~ /f UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY..r. I g A"' WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 ? i MA 91 +af -1 P 3 :38 . M i 5 1991 acmxggotiwm Mr. Michael T. Lesar Regulatory Publications Branch Office of the Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Lesar:

In accordance with Section 309 of the Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reviewed the petition for rulemaking-on the definition of the term "high level radioactive waste" and has no comments. Thank you for the opportunity to review the petition. - Should you have further need to contact EPA regarding this rulemaking, please have your staff contact Ms. Susan offerdal of my staff at (202) 382.5059.. Sincerely, f Richard E. Sanderson-Director Office of Federal Activities L 97TrigMML 1 I PrintalGet AtL*WItA fM

_3 T G-'7',653 n (,0 - pl ,/L, S .1 ~ / Department of Energy (5Sb 6/ 73f Washington, DC 20585 ( 6 '.hr t April 25, 1991 '91 t%Y -8 SU $rr i E Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (Attn.: Docketing and Service Branch)

Dear Secretary Chilk:

In a Federal Reaister notice dated December 17, 1990 (55 FR 51732), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced a petition from the States of Washington and Oregon requesting that NRC amend its regulations to establish a procedure for determining whether treated defense reprocessing tank waste is high-level radioactive waste (HLW) (Docket No. PRM-60-4). The proposed amendments would affect the Department of Energy's (DOE) environmental restoration and waste management programs. For the following reasons, we recommend that NRC deny the petition, which is contrary to law and impracticable:

1. The amendments would involve NRC in regulation of DOE's predisposal waste treatment and processing activities.

Therefore, we believe that the proposed amer.dments are inconsistent with NRC's limited authority to license specific DOE facilities under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA).

2. The proposed amendments neither constitute a definition of HLW nor provide useful guidance for determining if waste is high-level.

3. The requirement to remove the " largest technically achievable amount of radioactivity on a tank-by-tank basis" M-does not provide a means for balancing and optimizing N

considerations such as impacts from waste disposal, public k and worker exposures, and costs. Beyond the specific matter of the pet [ition, DOE recognizes the need to ensure that possible short-and long-term impacts from management of high-level and incidental wastes are reduced to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). To this end, DOE will ensure that plans for separation of tank waste into high-level and incidental waste are developed on the basis of an ALARA analysis that considers public health and safety, environmental impacts, worker exposures, technology, costs, and other factors. DOE will continue to provide information to the NRC, the + i _Y- -~-

2 petitioners, and others to ensure full public disclosure of its-activities involving the disposal of all radioactive waste. As the Department looks forward to future plans and decisions for other DOE wastes, we continue to believe that the best approach for establishing standards for waste management would be one that is based on risk. NRC development of a risk-based definition of HLW would assist DOE in developing. future programs.and procedures for managing wastes contair;1g wide ranges of radioactivity. We would be happy to provide more detailed comments if you require additional information about any of these issues. The contact on my staff is Mr. Gary Roles (202-586-0289). ~ / W E^::v Q Y (p$ Paul L. Ziemer, Ph.D. Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety and Health l~

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ma-.w w .-.a.u u..--w u.w.-._.-.... 's \\ a p Csa /, UNITED STATES NUCLEAN REGULATORY COMMISSION a er i I wasma tcN, p. c. rosss r \\, +'.../ l SEp 2 4 W l Mr. R. A. Holten U. S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office Waste Management Division Richland, WA 99352

Dear Mr. Holten:

i TheV.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)staffhasreviewedtheU.S. Department of Energy 5 (00E) draft environoantal impact statement (DEIS) entitled Disposal of Hanford Defense High-level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes, 00E/EIS-0113. On the basis of our review, the NRC offers the enclosed pneral and detailed comments. Although not part of our comments on the draf t bl5 the NRCalsowishestoexpressitsconcernsregardingotherlegalandinstitutIonal issues releted to the concept of in situ disposal of high-level wastes (HLW) at ~ Hanford. First, as you are aware, under Section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization . i Act of 1974, any facilities expresyty authorized for disposal of defense high-level wastes are subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority of the Commission. Whether the express authorization for particular facilities is legislative or administrative in our judgment has no bearing upon the concerns t, hat led Congress to provide for licensing by NRC. Also, it appears tnat the Hanford " tank wastes," which from the information presented in the draft EIS_would have been regarded as HLW when the Energy i Rerrganization Act was passed, remain HLW for purposes of determining whetherornotNRChassuchjurisdiction. If 00E believes that subsequent processing of the " tank wastes" may have altered the classification of some of the materials being stored, more detailed waste characterization information would be necessary to support that view. Second, licensing of Hanford waste tanks for HLW disposal will be-l procedurally complex because of the need to develop appropriate standards and procedures, the existing fait accompli status of the waste tanks, and the L difficulty in reasonably evaluating alternatives (e.g., alternative sites) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.- Other statutes would also need to be considered,_ including one provision (42 U.S.C. S 7272) which could be read to bar the expenditure of funds for purposes related to the.- p licensing of defense waste management activities such as those that might'be undertaken at Hanford. e c ~'- -a.ws. -M

.s COMMENTS OF THE U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0hMISSION ON THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ORAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT RELATED TO DISPOSAL OF HANFORO DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL, TRANSURANIC AND TANK WASTES (00E/EIS-0113) PUBLISHED MARCH 1986 (g'__t,,tf.jLQ-(0b$f*h" 1 1 pe pyp

5, 1

GENERAL COMMENT

S It is stated in the DEIS (p.1) that the purpose of the El$ is "to provide environmental input into the selection and implementation of the final disposal actions for high-level, transuranic and tank wastes located at the Hanford Site." The document goes on to state that the DEIS is "both a programmatic EIS intended to support broad decisions with respect to the disposal strategies for the Hanferd waste" and "an implementation EIS intended tu provide project specific environmental input for decisions on moving forward with certain disposal activities" (p. x111). The OEls further indicates that following publication of the Final Els, the 00E "will begin selection of a Hanford Def ense Waste final disposal strategy which will be documented in one or more Records of Decision. The DOE may decide to proceed with implementing certain parts of the strategy while delaying final decision on other parts pending further research and development" (p. xiii). This approach makes the review of the document dif ficult because it is unclear which areas will receive additional research and development and how the results of these research and development efforts will be factored into the decision-making process. The OEIS indicates that further NEPA review is anticipated to support certain other specific ac'iwities prior to their implementation but the document does not indicate wmch activities this would apply to, what the additional review would consist of, or when it would occur. The NRC staff recommends that the Final EIS clearly identify which decisions will be postponed pending completion of additional research and development, when these activities are likely to be completed, and the type of NEPA review that is anticipated. The NRC agrees with DOE that several areas require additional research and development prior to making decisions concerning the disposal of the Hanford wastes. These include: (1) characterization of the wastes in the single-shell tanks; (2) long-term performance of the protective barrier system; (3) geochemical characteristics of the site; and (4) development of analytical capabilities for projecting waste transport. Each of these is discussed below. Characterization of single-shell tank wastes The DEIS notes (p. 3.5), and the NRC staf f agrees, that additional characterization of wastes in the single-shell tanks will be necessary to provide more detailed information about waste inventories. -The NRC recommends that the wastes also be characterited, to the extent practicable, by their sources in fuel reprocessing operations. If, for example, certain tanks contain wastes from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, then these wastes woulo clearly be considered as high-level wastes.

However, if.ome of the tanks contain predominantly incidental wastes such as cladding removal wastes or organic wash wastes, and if the radionuclide concentrations in these wastes are comparable to other low-level wastes, these wastes might not be properly classified as high-level wastes.

4 ,, -. - -, ~,,.... -. -. v-r v. ~ ---i-,. --c

( l 2 After the completion of the waste characterization program, the NRC recommends that the selection of a disposal alternative be made on a tank-by-tank basis. Information presented in Appendix A (Tables A.4 and A.5) of the OEIS suggests that a large fraction of the total Curie inventory of single-shell tank wastes may be contained in only a few tanks. If this is accurate, a substantial fraction of the total radionuclide inventory could be retrieved at only a small fraction of the cost presented in the DEIS. Furtheruore, if some or all of the tanks with large inventories are in sound condition and do not leak, wastes could be retrieved by 5:uicing, further reducing the cost of waste retrieval. In sumaary, the NRC agrees that additional waste characterization should be completed in order to (1) properly classify wastes as high-level or non-high-level, and (2) permit selection of a disposal alternative which is most appropriate for each tank of waste. Long-term perfogginnce of protective barrier system As noted in the OEIS (p. 1.14), the protective barrier and marker system is the key to effectively isolating from the environment wastes that are disposed of near-surface. Two of the three disposal alternatives that are considered in the DEIS (i.e., the in place stabilization alternative and the reference alternative) rely heavily on the capability of the proposed protective barrier system to minimize water infiltration and to reduce the likelihood of plant, animal, and human intrusion. Indeed, it is the view of the NRC that near-surface disposal of many of the Hanford wastes would likely pose unacceptable risks to public haalth and safety unleis substantial protection is provided by such barriers. The DOE acknowledges (CEIS, p. M.2) that a specific barrier design has not yet been determined. The DEIS further notes that the DCE will conduct a NEPA review of the final specific barrier to evaluate its anticipated performance as designed and its performance under perturbed conditions. This review is to be based on actual laboratory and field data. The NRC encourages the DOE to conduct these further studies to resolve uncertainties with respect to the effectiveness of the barriers. Our detailed comments list some of the aspects of barrier design and performance which should be addressed in these studies.

3 s i 3 Geochemical characteristics of the site The DEIS is replete with statements that indicate a lack of geochemical data for the site. The 00E acknowledges (DEIS, p. 0.7) that the absence of this data precludes a more rigorous analysis of the environmental effects of the proposed alternatives, it is recommended that sufficient data be available to support the analyses of environmental impacts presented in the DEls before decisions are implemented. Development of analytical capabilities for projecting waste transport The DE recognizes that the linear distribution coefficient (Kd) modeling approach is a potential technical limitation in modeling efforts because it combines several geochemical processes into a single empirical parameter. The DOE indicates that additional development work is beir.g pursued on the models. As indicated above with regard to the geochemical characteristics of the site, it 15 recommended that aufficient model development be completed to support the estimates of environmental impai:ts set forth in the DEls before decisions are implemented. Finally, the NRC agrees with the position stated in the DEIS (p. 6.11) that to the extent that any decision based on the DEIS (and subsequnnt final environmental statement) requires defense high-level waste to be placed in a facility which is authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storaga, tuch a facility would have to comply with any applicable licensing requirements of the NRC. Notwithstanding any comments presented here, NRC may (1) incorporate into any license that may be issued at a later date conditions that may reflect a more restrictive position than that taken in those comme.s; or (2) deny a li:ense for activities at a proposed f acility, m ~ _ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4 4 DETA! LEO COMMF.NTS DISPOSAL OF TRU VASTES WITH CONCENTRATIONS BELOW 100 NCt/GM The NRC staff is concerned about disposal of wastes with TRU concentrations below 100 nC1/gm (e.g., Section 3.3.1.4, paragraph 1). Disposal of such wastes may require better protective measures than are evidenced in this DEIS. For example, NRC's analyses in support of 10 CFR Part 61 showed that Class C wastes, including wastes with TRU concentrations between 10 and 100 nC1/gm, must be disposed of using a stable waste form and the disposal facility must either permit emplacement at least 5 meters below the ground surface or must include an engineered intruder barrier. The staff encourages the DOE to consider the re: Ats of the Part 61 supporting analyses when developing disposal concepts for such wastes. (The staff notes that, for other projects, the C00 has committed itself to comply with the 10 CFR Part 61 performance objectives for disposal of low-level wastes. See, for example, the Proposed Finding of No Significant Impact, Disposal of Project Low-level Waste, West Valley Demonstration Project, West Valley, New York April 1986.) PROTECTIVE BARRIER AND MARKER SYSTEM A pendix M, Preliminary Analysis Of The Performance Of The Protective Barrier JAnd Marker System The NRC staff recognizes that substantial research and development of barrier concepts remains to be completed before a decision can be made to implement either the in place stabilization or the reference alternative. The following concerns regarding the design and performance of barriers should be considered during DOE's future barrier researcn and development efforts. Overall Barrier Design The barrier design shown in Figure M.3 of Appendix M is based on construction of a multilayer capillary (or " wick") barrier that is intended to reduce deep drainage. The key to this design is a layer of very coarse gravel or rock witn an overlying revegetated layer of fine-textured soil. Under ideal conditions this multilayer design can minimize infiltration rates by trapping fluids in the uppermost soil layer and subsequently removing soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Such a cover is only effective to the extent that hydraulic pressure within the wick is insufficient to cause a breakthrough into the pervious layer beneath the wick. If breakthrough occurs the pervious layer must direct water horizontally 50 that it will not migrate further down toward the waste. In order to do this, the base of the pervious layer must have adequate slope, probably greater than 5 percent. Such a slope is not apparent in the barrier design p A.*pendix M. It should be noted further that a wick design should be based on extreme precipitation events rather than average annual precipitation. Wetting fronts and subsequent breakthrough are likely to occur during storms with infrequent return periods. Given the time period during which this barrier must be <' 'ective, it is prudent to destyn it for a storm with a very low recurrence interval (e.g., 1000 yr, 24 hr storm).

_._._________m 4 5 The OEIS also states that the barrier would restrict penetration by piants and animals into the waste, because of the rock and absence of moisture beneath the wick. The staff is concerned, however, that even shallow burrowing within the upper soil layer (down to the rock) could impair the effectiveness of the wick. as a moisture barrier. The DOE should investigate means for preventing or minimizing burrowing within the barrier, potential for Erosion It appears that little or no consideration has been given to the potential for erosion of the soil cover of the protective barriers due to the occurrence of local intense precipitation. Several long-term stability investigations performed for the NRC staff indicated that the most disruptive natural i phenomena affecting long-term stabilization are likely to be wind and water erosion (Nelson et al.,1983; Young et al.,1982;. Lindsey et al.,1982; and Beedlow,1984). These studies also indicated that wind and water erosion can be mitigated by a rock cover of reasonable thickness and that the size of the-rock chosen for the protective cover will normally be controlled by a design precipitation or flood event. The NRC staff considers it very important that adequate erosion protection be provided to prevent the occurrence of sheet erosion and the initiation of gully r erosion. Gully eresion, once_ initiated, can cause extensive damage to any soil cover, such that previous assumptions regarding infiltration, bic, tic intrusion, erosion, and releases of radionuclides may no longer be valid. On the basis of NRC staff experience with long-term stabilization in arid regions of the western United States, it is very unlikely that the proposed vegetative cover will provide adequate protection to prevent the occurrence of gully erosion (Nelson et al., 1983). In general, a rock cover is usually needed to provide such protection.- A mixed rock / soil cover might provide similar protection while also allowing growth of a vegetative cover. The NRC staff recommends that such a protective cover be, considered. To address various uncertainties-and provide for a conservative design basis, it would be prudent for the DOE to design the rock covc for an occurrence of-localized intense-precipitation as previously discussed. Long-Term Stability ~i The performance of the barrier shown in Figure M.3 of Appendix M is dependent on the overall structural integrity of the barrier system and on the maintenance of interlayer textural differences. It is not known whether,these factors can realistically remain stable over a time scale of 10,000 years. Even if structural integrity of the barrier can be maintained over this time scale, downward infiltration of fine grained soil--materials--into voids of=the gravel layer could compromise the barrier effectiveness by altering textural differences in.the cao4'iary barrier.- This could occur through gradual settling or minor su:W:ence of t_he protective barrier after construction. (The structural stabi:y of-waste tanks =is of particular concern in this regard.) -Other mechanists for: altering textural differences would include biogenic activity l(ciscussed above), and. liquefaction of the_ base of the soll cover if it is near saturstion and experiences significant seismic - accelerations. 1 4 - ~ ,_..~.e

.. - ~ _ - -. 6 It is noted that overall deterioration of the capillary barrier would be accelerated by r.ny physical rupture of the barrier, as perhaps induced by vibratory ground motions or by the intrusion of man. Such a physical rupture would allow direct influx of runof f and precipitation through and beneath the barrier. In that event, contaminant transport within the vadose zone beneath the protective cover could be increased significantly. In summary, the NRC staff considers that many uncertainties remain unresolved regarding long-term performance of a capillary barrier. Substantial additional research and development of barrier concepts must be completed before a preferred alternative can be selected for actual disposal of wastes. Volume 2, Foreword, page xxxiv, paragraph 2 The assumption that the single-shell tanks remain integral for 165 years is both arbitrary and unsubstantiated. As stated in the OEIS: "an arbitrary assumption has been made that none of the tanks provides a barrier after the year 2150. This is equivalent to assuming the tanks provide a barrier to significant levels of vapor-phase transport of moisture for another 165 years." The DEIS goes on to state that there are "no data to suggest that significant releases from the solid waste form are currently occurring." This may indeed be correct. However, there are data which show that releases have occurred from these tanks in the past. Based on historical difficulties with the integrity of the single-wall tanks, the highly soluble waste form they contain, and the lack of data supporting the integral tank assumption, it would be prudent to assume that properly backfiliad tanks will provide only the structural stability necessary to inhibit slumping, collapse, or other failure of the disposal site. While the proper backfilling of tanks is necessary for structural stability, it will not significantly inhibit water infiltration or radionuclide release. Appendix M, Section M.4, Reduction in Risk of Inadvertent Intrusion Through Passive Institutional Controls, page M 12, paragraph 1 The Final Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61, " Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste" (NUREG-0945,1982), indicates intruder pathways dominate the potential health effects from-commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal. Appendix R (p. R.1) of the DEIS recognizes a similar effect, in that " scenarios involving contact with or intrusion into waste... predict significant adverse or fatal consequences to those ignoring warnings and intruding into the wastes." However, the DE!S puts considerable reliance in the passive institutional controls described in Appendix H to avoid the intruder problem. The arguments supporting reduction in the risk of inadvertent intrusion are very weak: "The risk reduction factors presented here are based solely on the author's judgment; at present there are neither empirical nor theoretical models upon which these risk reduction factors can be based." The Final EIS should provide a stronger br sis to support the effectiveness of the proposed barriers as a deterrent to inadvertent intrusions. e

7 Appendix M, Section M.4, Reduction In Risk of inadvertent intrusion Through Passive Institutional Controls, page H.11 This section presents factors by which the risk of human intrusion into wastes is estimated to be reduced by different protective merns. When more than one means is present, these factors are then multiplied together to obtain an overall risk reduction factor. The NRC staf f considers that f ailure of some of the protective means (e.g., boundary markers and monuments) might result from the same primary cause (e.g., evolution of the language so that the meaning of the markers and monuments would no longer be understood). The potential for such " common-mode failures" indicates that multiplication of the individual protective factors to obtain an overall risk reduction f actor is not appropriate. The method for combining the individual protective factors should accommodato the possibility that a single primary cause might render two or more of the protective mechanisms ineffective. REGULATORY Volume 1, Foreword, page v, paragraph 7 The NRC staff is concerned about the long-term cumulative effects of all ongoing and reasonably foreseeable waste disposal activities at the Hanford . Reservation. The defense wastes, which include high-level and transuranic wastes, are already present and in need of permanent disposal. As stated on page v of the Foreword, the scope of the OEIS excludes low-level radioactive wastes in liquid and solid disposal sites at Hanford. Also excluded are wastes generated by the decontamination and decommissioning of surplus or retired facilities (post-1983). It is stated that those operations will be the subject of other National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews. It is not clear why the DOE evaluated the environmental impacts of defense waste disposal alternatives without consideration of the cumulative effects of all existing and reasonably foreseeable activities. On page vii of the Foreword it is stated that, if the BWIP site were to be selected as a candidate site for repository development, a corresponding EIS would be written to support that site and to address cumulative impacts of that and other reasonably foreseeable activities on the Hanford $1te. Why does the Defense Waste DEIS differ in that cumulative effects of all current waste disposal activities at Hanford are not addressed? l

~ _.. 8 Section 3.4, Comparison of Impacts From Alternatives, pages 3.33-3.65 The DOE's proposals for permanent disposal of defense wastes at Hanford may + pose special problems with respect to the NRC's current and future reviews and licensing decisions involving BWIP as a candidate site for the high-level waste geologic repository. For example, the DOE is required to develop a Performance Confirmation Program for BWIP to provide data that indicate, where practicable, whether subsurface conditions encountered and changes resulting from construction and waste emplacement are within limits assumed in the licensing review and that natural and engineered systems and components are functioning as intended. Some of the actions proposed in this DEls could potentially make a BWIP Performance Confirmation Program more dif ficult to design and carry out. For example, the barriers proposed for in place stabilization of wastes may reduce infiltration to the unconfined aquifer system, potentially altering groundwater flow conditions. The Final Els should include, in the discussion of impacts, possible effects of the proposed alternatives on licensability of a high-level waste repository at the BWIP site. Section 6.6, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, pages 6.10 and 6.11 In this section the DOE suggests that all of the waste covered in the OEls is byproduct material and therefore not subject to subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Throughout the text, however, the DOE acknowledges in numerous instances that the waste contains materials that are considered hazardous, dangerous and/or toxic by the EPA. In section 6.6 the 00E appears to be relying on a legal interpretation of authority rather than a technical analysis of hazard to make the conclusion that RCRA does not apply. Since no final determination has been made concerning the EPA and/or primary state authority regarding the disposal of this material, it would seem prudent that the DOE at least consider the impacts of the prescriptive disposal and monitoring requirements that would be mandated by RCRA. HYOROLOGY _Section 4.4.1, Surface Waters, page 4.12, paragraph 2 The flood analyses and information provided in the DEls indicate that facilities may be exposed to a potential flood threat from Cold Creek, since portions of the site may be flooded by a 100 year flood. It therefore appears that the requirements of Executive Order (E. 0.) 11988, " Floodplain Management", have not oeen addressed. This E. O. requires, among other considerations, that tre nazards and impacts associated with siting in a floodplain be identifiec and evaluated. Accordingly, an outline of the procedures involved in this decision-making process should be provided, and compliance with E, O. 11988 should be discussed. 1

9 Section 4.4.1, Surf ace Waters, pace 4.12, paragraph 2 Results of flood studies in the Cold Creek watershed ($kaggs and Walters,1981) indicate that a potential for flooding of portions of the site exists. As proposed, it appears that several facilities may be placed in an area of the Cold Creek floodplain, which could be inundated by several feet of water. Based on an examination of the Skaggs and Walters report, it appears that the magnitude of flooding on Cold Creek may be underestimated. The Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) was estimated in the repo-t to have a magnitude of 55,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at the site where the drainage area is about 86 square miles. Review of historic flood data for arid regions of Washington and Oregon with similar clinates and weather patterns indicates that a flood of this magnitude has occurred on a stream with a drainage area of about 13 square miles, located less than 150 miles from the site, In recognition of the fact that the Cold Creek basin could have different flood-producing characteristics from the stream that produced the historic maximum discharge, it is nevertheless important that the PMF represent an upper bound of flood potential for a particular stream. It appears that this upper bound is not well-defined for Cold Creek. In addition, maximum water levels will be increased as a result of increased PMF discharge and may also be increased by site location in the flood plain. The amount of increase in water level due to flood plain constriction has not' been discussed in the DEIS. On the basis of topographic and cross-sectional examination of the site area, surface f acilities may be subject to flooding and may constrict the flow area in the flood plain. This may increase the water levels associated with major floods; this increased level and its potential impacts should be discussed in the Final EIS. Figure 4.8 Section 4.4.2, Groundwater, page 4.18f Isoheads indicate a potential for migration of waste from the 200-W area to the existing commercial low-level waste f acility situated near the southwest corner of the 200-E area. This may adversely impact groundwater monitoring activities associated with that facility. Appendix R Section R.7, Other Surf ace Flooding, page R.92, paragrapM Disposal alternative #2, and in some respects alternatives #_1 and #3 (page ix, Executive Summary), present disposal scenarios similar to the burial-of high-level waste in a shallow-land disposal site. All or some of the high-level andl low-level wastes would remain at shallow-depths' below the ground surface. Consequently, the waste may be subject to I. ear-surface natural phenomena. The draft EA for the' proposed disposal of high-level wastes at Hanford concluded, and the NRC agreed, that proglacial catastrophic flooding associated with the melting phase of glaciation would not likely occur during the 10,000 year isolation period; However, other constquences of either significantly warmer or cooler climatic trends-could result in adverse. r environmental conditions at the Hanford Site. For example, future climatic

10 variations may cause increased sediment loads in the Columbia River and its tributaries, resulting in possible channel migrations. These possible adverse conditions are discussed in majnr comment #2 of NRC's comments on thc draft EA i for Hanford (NRC, 1985a) and should be censidered in the defense waste Finai Els. Ay endix $, Section S.2, Radionuclide Releases to Accessible Environment, page 1 ~~~' S.6, paragraph 2 From discussions in the DEIS, it is urclear whether the drier-climate scenario is considered representative of either the Holocene (recent) climate at Hanford or of conditions drier than at present. Assumed log-normal probability density functions for annual groundwater recharge were described for both drier and wetter climate scenarios over the next 10,000 years. The drier climate scenario was assumed to have a median annual recharge of 1.5 cm, whereas the value for the wetter climate scenario was assumed to be 5.0 cm. If it is intended that the drier clinate scenario is representative of recent conditions, what is the basis for the assumed median annual recharge of 1.5 cm? On pages 4.19 and 4.20 it is stated that the annual average recharge from precipitation on the 200 Areas plateau has not been established to date, but two sets of lysimeter measurements are expected to resolvd this question within 4 to 5 years. It was also stated that DOE expects that the value will lie within the range of 0.5 to 5.0 cm/yr based on data to date. In summary, with regard to future climate scenarios, the Final EIS should contain a discussion that more clearly defines and differentiates between the terms " drier" versus " wetter." Also, more information should be included about uncertainties in assumed values for ranges and median values of future annual recharge for th6 HAnford Site. Appendix S, $ection 5.5 fj vits page S.24, paragraph _3 It is stated that the ccmpotite release-ratio / probability curves show that the in place stabiliTLtico and disposal alternative and the reference alternative r meet the EPA standant 4+. +he 99.9 percentile. This conclusion is not adequately supported. l Specifically, over the next 10,G)0 years, it is assumed that a drier climate stenario is nine times more probable than a wetter climate scenario (0.9 vs. 0.1; combined probability = 1.0). No basis for this assumption is given and no relevant references are cited in the appendix. This assumption biases the results of t!' composite release curves (Figure S.10) in f avor of a drier climate with its implications of reduced recharge, infiltration. and contaminant transport 'he rationale for assigning such a high probability to dryer climate seen.v es aould be explained in greater detail. l

11 GE0 CHEM!$TRY Appendices 0. P and Q, Transport and Attenuation Modeling The DOE recognizes that the total Kd (distribution coefficient) modeling approach is a "potentiel technical limitation" in modeling efforts (del $, Vol. 3, p. 0.15) which has "come under severe criticism recently" (DEIS, Vol. 2 p. xxxii) because it combines complex geochemical processes into a single empirical parametsr. This :nethodology is used, however, because of the " limited data base" as Hanford (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxit). It is the NRC staf f's position that the lack of data for more complex models and codes is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for using simplifying models and assumptions, Rather, the DOE should also demonstrate that the simplified models and assumptions are sufficiently realistic (or conservativo) to support the decisions to be made using them. The DE!S state 3 that the 00E is developing more corrplete and advanced transport and attenuation models (DEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.15,P.3). The 00E should use these new models to evaluate the accuracy of the simpler Kd modeling approach. Areas of concern pertaining to tne OEIS modeling methodology include the. following. The DOE does not show that the Delegard and Barney (1983) K V'I"'S d are directly applicable to the transport and attenuation models in the DEIS. The Delegard and Barney (1983) study illustrated the effects of certain vaste components on the sorption properties of Hanford soils under specific laboratory conditions, but did not attempt to duplicate the ambient and expected site ge) chemical conditions at the Hanford Site. Delegard and Barney (1983) state that their K values are valid only within the range of their test d conditions and that slight changes in waste composition can change migration rates by a factor of 13 to 40. Kelmers (1984) notes that in measuring laboratory K values it is " essential that test materials and conditions d duplicate those to be encountered in the field situation being evaluated." It appears that this criterion is not met. The contaminant transport assessment calculations do not account for all factors which can influence contaminant retardation. Changing site geochemical conditions due to spatial variation in groundwater or soil chemistry (OEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.35, 0.9, V.9) or to the introduction of contaminants (DEls, Vol. 3, p. 0.37) will change the sorption characteristics of the Hanford Site. Kinetics of sorption-desorption reactions are not accounted for3 nor is mass action competition for sorption sites. Additionally, the effect of naturally occurring organic material, which may be important in sorption and transport processes at Hanford (Toste and Myers, 1986), has not been examined. To perform a thorough transoort assessment at the Hanford Site, the DOE should examine the impact of cnanging geochemical conditions on contaminant retardation and assess the effect of those geochemical processes not accounted for by their current methodology. Limitations in the Hanford geochemical data base also limit the 00E to the use of contaminant release models that do not explicitly account for solubility limits as dictated by the current and expected site geochemical conditions

12 (OEIS, Vol. 2, pp. xxxt and xxxii; Vol. 3, pp. P.1, P.11). Release concentrations used in the DEIS are described by the DOE as being conservative estimates on the basis of data available in the literature (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxii). Future release models, which the DOE states will take into account waste form release characteristics (OEIS, Vol. 3, p. P.18), should be incorporated into future impact assessment calculations. Appendices 0 and U, Hanford Site Geochemical Conditions The OEIS does not demonstrate that the ambient geuchemical conditions and the composition of the tank waste have been adequately characterized to allow realistic transport assessments of contaminants at the Hanford site. To develop valid transport models and use accurate values _ for parameters in these models, the site geochemistry must be carefully examined and characterized. Since the DOE repeatedly cites the lack of site geochemical data (DEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.7, 0.8, 0.15, U.4, and others) and uncertainty as to the composition and speciation of the tank waste (OEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxv), the DOE should demonstrate that the site geochemical conditions are known well enough to ensure that the models and model parameters used in the impact assessment calculations are reasonable and conservative. gAendix p, Section p.1.4, Diffusion-Controlled Release Beneath a Protective Barrier, page p.7, bullet 4 The DOE states that prior releases of contaminants (e.g., tank leaks, crib disposals, well injection) are not included in transport simulations because "most are not categorized as high-level or transuranic (TRU) waste," and those that are high-level or TRU are of negligible quantity. The DOE should take into consideration prior releases of contaminants in the transport calculations since these wastes are components of the current site geochemical conditions. Because these wastes will continue to be transported, their effects on the transport and attenuation of other contaminants (i.e., future releases of defense wastes) and their contribution to waste concentrations at site boundaries should be assessed. Appendix V. Site-Monitoring Experience The OEIS includes a brief discussion of current and former environmental monitoring activities at Hanford. Examples of localized contamination problems (cribs, trenches, etc.) are discussed in detail, while larger-scale contaminant plumes receive little mention. The large-scale movement of these plumes has been studied at Hanford for decades, and much has been learned about contaminant migration in the unconfined aquifer system. Some of this valuable information should be incorporated in the Final EIS. At a minimum, additions to the Final EIS should include available maps that show, for various times, the shapes and movements of various contaminant plumes known to exist in the unconfined aquifer system. This would include constituents like nitrate, tritium, I-129, Ru-106, Co-60, and Tc-99. These types of mobile contaminants show considerable promise in the continued study of flow paths for contaminant migration in the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford. The Final EIS should include a discussion of the role of large-scale contaminant plume behavior in evaluating the environmental impacts of future defense waste disposal operations.

m. . 4. 1 13 Appendix V Section V.5, Reverse Wells, page V.29, paragraph 2 TheDEISstatesthat"thezoneof(radiologic]contaminationaroundthe216-B-5 reverse (injection] well appears to be (chemically) stable, with no apparent further migration of radionuclides." Results are shown for Cs-137, Sr-90, and Pu-239,240. However, a previous DOE investigation indicated that there was some evidence of contaminant migration beneath the well site, the source of which was uncertain. The following was reported by Smith (1980): Gamma logging showed that sediments distributed over a broad area and located just above the basalt surface were contaminated with low-level gamma contamination. Examination of previously collected gamma logs indicated that a possible source of this contamination could be the BY cribs located (approximately) 900 m north of the reverse well. This work also indicates that the contamination may be moving in a southeasterly direction. Smith (1980) also recommended that the broad contamination plume at the basalt surface should be investigated as to its distribution, source or sources, radionuclide identity and concentrations, and that a monitoring plan be developed if required. This study showed that the position of the water table and the type of sediment to which waste solutions are discharged are important factors for controlling radionuclide distributions. The study also recommended the use of stainless steel well screens for monitoring wells. Anomalous beta activity was present on rusted portions of corroded well casings and was believed to have produced some erroneous radionuclide analyses. This is the only reverse well for which contaminant migration has been characterized, and one could not thereby conclude that the results are statistically significant. Because of aquifer heterogene1 ties and the chemical variability of fluids originally injected into various reverse wells, it may not be reasonable to extrapolate these results to other reverse well locations. It is noted that zones of contamination appear to extend beyond the maximum t depth of penetration of the monitoring wells, it would be useful to know to what depth contaminants may have penetrated basalts at the base of the t unconfined aquifer. Previous researchers at Hanford have presented some j evidence for deeper contamination. Brauer and Rieck (1973) noted the presence of I-129 in groundwater obtained from well 699-10-E12 P. The sampled aquifer was believed to be confined, and it was suggested that there had been some contamination of the groundwater since the early 1940's. The presence of varying concentrations of contaminants that were released to the unconfined aquifer system over the last four decades provides a unique opportunity to better uncerstand in situ solute behavior and geochemical retardation processes. Given this unique opportunity, the DOE should plan additional in situ characterization studies of this type as a means of better supporting modeling studies of contaminant transport in the unconfined aquifer system. 1 s_ d

i 14 GEOLOGY Section 3.3.2.5, In-place Stabilization and Disposal Applied to Previously Disposed-of TRU-Contaminated Soil Sites, page 3.24, paragraph 1 This section states that a geophysical survey of the liquid waste sites with high subsidence potential will be completed to characterize them and to identify grout-injection points. Further discussion of the feasibility and adequacy of subsidence control should be provided in the Final EIS. Section 4.0, Affected Environment, page 4.2, Figure 4.1 Figure 4.1 provides the general locations of the defense high-level and transuranic wastes. Figure 4.1 indicates that waste disposal occurred in the 200-W, 200-E, and 300 Areas and in the Wye Burial Ground. The OEl$ should more precisely identify all waste locations at Hanford. It is further recommended that the Final EIS include additional information regarding the geohydrology, geochemistry, and geology (e.g., geomorphology, stratigraphy, and structure) of specific waste disposal areas to better characterize these sites. For example, the potential for contaminant migration in the vadose zone beneath a given disposal site cannot be reliably determined without an evaluation of actual, site-specific soil moisture characteristics and curves of pressure head versus hydraulic conductivity. Section 4.3, Seismicity, page 4.10, paragraph 4 The existence of faulting and the possibility of fault reactivation in the waste disposal areas has not been adequately addressed. The general guideline in 10 CFR 61.50(a)(9) may be of use in discussing the potential and significance of faulting in these areas. The referenced draf t EA for Hanford (DOE,1984) presented a generally favorable view of the tectonic setting and possible effects of tectonics on waste isolation. In the NRC's major comment #4 on the draft EA (NRC,1985a), this view was considered to be inadequately supported by the data and analyses presented. The statements made by the NRC staff regarding.the reference repository also apply to the waste disposal alternatives of this DEIS. Section 4.3, Seismicity, page 4.10, paragraph 4 A series of sub vertical clastic dikes has been observed (NRC, 19856) in the trench walls at the U.S. Ecology Low-Level Waste Disposal Area, which is located in close proximity to the 200-E Area. The dikes cut across, but do not appear to offset the sand and silt strata in the-trenches. They taper upward and extend from below the base of tne trench to within 8 to 10 feet of the surface. They are approximately 2 to 3 feet wide at the base and several inches wide where they are truncated or pinch out near the ground surface. The dikes, which occur in otner areas of the Hanford Reservation, may be related to fissuring caused by ground motion resulting from seismic activity. The

4 4 15 fissures were appar(ntly filled by movement of water-saturated sediments under hydrostatic pressere, which are susceptible to liquefaction. The presence of these clastic dikes may have significant implications for shallow land burial of low-level and high-level wastes, in the 500 to 10,000 year periods of isolattun required for low-level and high-level wastes, respectively, there is a possibility that fissuring may again occur or that existing fissures may be reopened as a result of seismic activity. Existing fissures may also provide avenues for groundwater migration. The probability of occurrence as well as the significance of these fissures should be addressed. Additionally, the possible existence of these dikes within the waste disposal areas should be determined. Section 4.7. Land Use. page 4.30 The DEIS does not address nor does it provide information on the pctential for the existence of natural resources in the defense waste areas. 10 CFR 61.50 (4) requires that, for the near-surface disposal of low-level wastes, areas known to contain natural resources should be avoided. While the disposal of defense wastes is not subject to 10 CFR Part 61, the reasons for avoiding such armas remain valid. The Final EIS should provide an evaluation of natural resources, including hydrocarbon and mineral resource potential at the proposed site. This is particularly relevant in view of a natural gas discovery within sediments underlying the basalts in the Saddle Mountains area of the Hanford Reservation by Shol) 011 Company (NRC, 1985a). Appendix 0. Section 0.1, Stratigraphy Beneath The Ha_nford 200 Are m pages 0.2-0.5 The principal units that comprise the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford are discussed in Appendix 0. Little information (. provided on the topic of paleogeomorphology at Hanford. This topic may be of importance in developing a l better understanding of flow and transport in the unconfined aquifer system. Brown et al. (1962) provided geologic interpretations that accounted for the apparently rapid dispersal of tritium in the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford. They noted that the contaminants appear to be following old Columbia River channels incised into the eroded upper surface of the low-permeability l Ringold Formation sediments. These channels are filled with more recent deposits (Hanfoed Formation) that have permeabilities approximately two orders l of magnitude greater than in the underlying Ringold strata. -It appears that the relative subcrop elevation of the Ringold Formation with respect to the water table thereby exerts considerable influence over groundwater flow paths. l This may account for the observed branchicg (anomalous macrodispersion) of l contaminant plumes migrating away from the 200 East Area. This information l should be considered ren interpreting the results of groundwater surveillance I at Hanford and in the :',ntinued development of a groundwater monitoring l program. l l = -e m ,-e<

~. 4 16 ENVIRONMENTAL. Several of the NRC's detailed environmental comrnents on the DOE's draft Environmental Assessment are applicable to the OEls. The comment numbers are E-1, 3-30, 4-3, 4-5. 5-10, 5-11 and 6-38. These comments should be considered in preparing the Final EIS. 4 j

e i 17 REFfRENCES Beedlow, P. A., 1984 Designing Vegetation Covers for Long-Term Stabilization of Uranium Mill Tailings, NUREG/CR-3674 (PNL-4698), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Brauer, F. P. and H. G. Rieck, Jr.,1973. 1-129, Co-60, and Ru-106 Measurements on Water Samples from the Hanford Project Environs, BNWL-SA-4478, Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, f Brown, D. J., R. E. Brown, and W. A. Haney,1962. Appraising Hanford Waste Disposal by Integration of Field Techniques, HW-SA-2707, General Electric Company, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, Richland, Washington. Delegard, C.H. and G. S. Barney, 1983. Effects of Hanford High Level waste Components on Sorption of Cobalt, Strontium, Neptunium, Plutonium, and Americium on Hanford Sediments, RHO-RE-ST-P, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington. 00E, 1984. Oraft Environmental Assessment: Reference Repository location, Hanford, Washington, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U. S. Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. Executive Order No.11988, " Floodplain Management", May 24, 1977, 42 F.R. 26951 Kelmers, A.D., 1984. Letter Report: Draf t Analysis of Conservatism of Radionuclide Information Measured by Batch Contact Sorption / Apparent Concentration Limit Isotherms, L-290-3, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Lindsey et al., 1982. Long-Term Survivability of Riprap for Armoring Uranium Mill Tailings and Covers, NUREG/CR 2642 (pNL-4225), U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O. C. l Design Considerations for long-Term Stabilization of l Nelson et al., 1983. Uranium Mill Tailings Impoundments, NUREG/CR-3397 (ORNL-5979), U. S. l Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Final _ Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61, " Licensing NRC, 1982. Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste " U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report NUREG-0945 Volumes 1-3 NRC Comments on 00E Oraf t Environmental Assessment for the Hanford NRC, 1985a. Site, Division of Waste Management, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. NRC, 1985b. Trip Report to Richland Low Level Vaste Disposal Facility and Hanford Reservation, Washington, June 25-26,1985 (memorandum f rom Jose J. Valdes to Malcolm R. Knapp, July 31,1985).

m. \\ e 18 Skaggs, R. L. and W. H. Walters,1981. Flood Risk Analysis of Cold Creek Near the Hanford Site, RHO-BWI-C-120, Rockwell Hanford Operations. Smith, R. H., 1980. 216-B-5 Reverse Well Characterization Study, RHO-ST-37, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington. Toste, A. P., and R. B. Myers,1986. The Relative Contributions of Natural and Waste-Derived Organics to the Subsurf ace Transport of Radionuclides, in The Effects of Natural Organic Compounds and of Microorganisms on Radionuclide Transport, proceedings of an NEA wonkshop, OCED Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris France. Young, J. K., L. W. Long, and J. W. Reils,1982. Environmental Factors Affecting Long-Term Stabilization of Radon Suppression Covers for Uranium Mill Tallings, NUREG/CR-2564 (PNL-4193), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 1 1 l /

0 t. ' 4 %d$ Mr. R. A. Holten U. S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office Waste Management Division Richland, WA 99352

Dear Mr. Holten:

TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)staffhasreviewedtheU.S. Department of Energy s (00E) draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) entitled Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes, 00E/EIS-0113. On the basis of our review, the NRC offers the enclosed general and detailed comments. Although not part of our comments on the draft EIS the NRC also wishes to express its concerns regarding other legal and institutional issues related to the concept of in situ disposal of high-level wastes (HLW) at

Hanford, First, as you are aware, under Section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization:

i Act of 1974, any facilities expressly authorized for disposal of defense high-level wastes are subject to the licensing and related regulatory authority I of the Commission, Whether the express authorization for particular facilities is legislative or administrative in our judgment has no bearing upon the= l concerns that led Congress to provide for licensing by NRC. Also, it appears that the Hanford " tank wastes," which from the information presented in the draft EIS would have been regarded as HLW when the Energy Reorganization Act was passed, remain HLW.for purposes of determining whether or not NRC has such jurisdiction. If 00E believes that subseouent processing of the " tank wastes" may have altered the classification of some of the materials being stored, more detailed waste characterization information would be necessary to support that view. Second, licensing of Hanford waste tanks for HLW disposal will be . procedurally complex because of the need to develop appropriate standards and procedures, the existing fait accompli status of the waste tanks, and the difficulty.in reasonably evaluating alternatives (e.g., alternative. sites) as required-by the National Environmental Policy Act. -Other statutes.would also need to be considered.. including one provision (42 U.S.C..S 7272) which-i could be read to bar the expenditure of funds for purposes related to the= licensing of defense waste management activities such as those that might be- -undertaken at Hanford. i. l 3.Sh)}fDh

g,P % 4 M CG/86/08/11 .g. Although NRC staff does not prejudge the disposal of HLW, in situ, in the Hanford tanks, we believe establishing the feasibility of such' disposal as technically adequate to protect the public health and the environment will be exceedingly difficult and may not be achievable. Consequently, nothing in our comments should be read as NRC agreement or endorsement of such disposal. In addition, our comments at this stage do not restrict NRC from making additional comments in the future, when or as appropriate. Thank you for providing the opportunity to comment on the Hanford Defense Waste DEIS. We hope that these comments will be of assistance in preparing the final environmental statement. We would oe pleased to discuss the comments with you and members of your staff if you desire. Sincerely, Robert E. Browning, Director Divisi:,n of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

NRC's General and Detailed Comments on the DEIS

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m .m __ _ CG/86/08/11 .g. Because the NRC is barred from expending funds for licensi of DOE defense waste management activities, no significant evaluation of censing issues related to the OEIS may be or has been undertaken. Neve theless, t consider the observations above to be important matters which D0 should take into account, in addition to our enclosed comments on the aft EIS, when evaluating the feasibility of 3 situ disposal of HLW at Hanfor. Although NRC staff does not prejudge the disposal f HLW, in situ, in the Hanford tanks, we believe establishing the feasib lity of I"ich-Hisposal as technically adequate to protect the public healt and the environment will be exceedingly difficult and may not be achievable Consequently, nothing in our comments should be read as NRC agreement or e orsement of such disposal, in addition,in the future, when or as appropri ".e.our comments at this stage do not comments Thank you for providing the opportunity comment on the Hanford Defense Waste DEIS. We hupe that these comments will, e of assistance in preparing the final environmental statement. We would be pleased to discuss the comments with you and members of your staff if you desi e. Sincerely, / Robert E. Browning, Director Division of Waste Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

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NRC's General and Oct led Comments on the DEIS I i (! A (l0 l q#>- tgy r j

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-. ~.. - COMMENTS OF THE U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT RELATED TO DISPOSAL OF HANFORD DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL, TRANSURANIC AND TANK WASTES (D0E/E15-0113) PUBLISHED MARCH 1986 I I f i jrf,7jf~( f' '

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GENERAL COMMENT

S It is stated in the DEIS (p. 1) that the purpose of the EIS '.s "to provide environmental input into the selection and implementation of the final disposal actions for high-level, transuranic and tank wastes located at the Hanford Site." The document goes on to state that the DEIS is "both a programmatic EIS intended to support broad decisions with respect to the disposal strategies for the Hanford waste" and "an implementation EIS intended to provide project specific environmental input for decisions on moving forward with certain disposal activities" (p. xiii). The DEIS further indicates that following publication of the Final EIS, the 00E "will begin selection of a Hanford Defense Waste final disposal strategy which will be documented in one or more Records of Decision. The 00E may decide to proceed with implementing certain parts of the strategy while delaying final decision on other parts pending further research and development" (p. x111). This approach makes the review of the document difficult because it is unclear which areas will receive additional research and development and how the results of these research and development efforts will be factored into the decision-making process. The OE15 indicates that further NEPA review is anticipated to support certain other specific activities prior to their implementation but the document does not indicate which activities this would apply to, what the additional review would consist of, or when it would occur. The NRC staff recommends that the Final EIS clearly identify which decisions will be postponed pending completion of additional research and development, when these activities are likely to be completed, and the type of NEPA review that is anticipated. The NRC agrees with 00E that several areas require additional research and development prior to making decisions concerning the disposal of the Hanford wastes. These include: (1) characterization of the wastes in the single-shell tanks; (2) long-term performance of the protective barrier system; (3) geochemical characteristics of the site; and (4) development of analytical capabilities for projecting waste transport. Each of these is discussed below. Characterization of single-shell tank wastes The OEl$ notes (p. 3.5), and the NRC staff agrees, that additional characterization of wastes in the single-shell tanks will be necessary to provide more detailed information about waste inventories. The NRC recommends that the wastes also be characterized, to the extent practicable, by their sources in fuel reprocessing operations. If, for example, certain tanks contain wastes from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction system, then these wastes would ciearly be considered as high-level wastes. However, if some of the tanks contain predominantly incidental wastes such as cladding removal wastes or organic wash wastes, and if the radionuclide concentrations in these wastes are comparable to other low-level wastes, these wastes might not be properly classified as high-level wastes.

z. l 2 After the completion of the waste characterization program, the NRC recommends that the selection of a disposal alternative be made on a tank-by-tank basis. Infortration presented in Appendix A (Tables A.4 and A.5) of the OEls suggests that a large fraction of the total c" ele inventory of single-shell tank wastes may be contained in only a few tanks. If this is accurate, a substantial fraction of the total radionuclide inventory could be retrieved at only a small fraction of the cost presented in the DEIS. Furthermore, if some er all of the tanks with large inventories are in sound condition and do not leak, wastes could be retrieved by sluicing, further reducing the cost of waste retrieval. In summary, the NRC agrees that additional waste characteriistion should be completed in order to (1) properly classify wastes as high-level or non-high-level, and (2) permit selection of a disposal alternative which is most appropriate for each tank of waste. Lo*g-term performance of protective barrier system As noted in the DEIS (p.1.14), the protective barrier and marker system is the key to effectively isolating from the environment wastes that are disposed of near-surface. Two of the three disposal alternatives that are considered in the DEls (i.e., the in-place stabilization alternative and the reference alternative) rely heavily on the capability of the proposed protective barrier system to minimize water infiltration and to reduce the likel.ihood of plant, animal, and human intrusion. Indeed, it is the view of the NRC that near-surface disposal of many of the Hanford wastes would likely pose unacceptable risks to public health and safety unless substantial protection is provided by tuch barriers. The DOE acknowledges (DEIS, p. H.2) that a specific barrier design ha not yet been determined. The OEl$ further notes that the 00E will conduct a NEPA review of the final specific barrier to evaluate its anticipated performance as designed and its performance under perturbed conditions. This review is to be based on actual laboratory and field data. The NRC encourages the 00E to conduct these further studies to resolve uncertainties with respect to the effectiveness of the barriers. Our detailed comments list some of the aspects of barrier design and performance which should be addressed in these studies.

e 3 Geochemical characteristics of the site The OEIS is replete with statements that indicate a lack of geochemical data for the site. The DOE acknowledges (DEIS, p. 0.7) that the absence of this data precludes a more rigorous analysis of the environmental effects of the pr:pe.ed alternatives. It is recommended that sufficient data be available to support the analyses of environmental impacts presented in the DEIS before decisions are inplemented. Development of analytical capabilities for projecting waste transport The DEIS recognizes that the linear distribution coefficient (Kd) modeling approach is a potential technical limitation in modeling efforts because it combines several geochemical processes into a single empirical parameter. The DOE indicates that additional development work is being pursued on the models. As indicated above with regard to the geochemical characteristics of the site, it is recommended that sufficient model development be completed to support the estimates of environmental impacts set forth in the DEIS before decisions are implemented. Finally, the NRC agrees with the position stated in the DEls (p. 6.11) that to the extent that any decision based on the DEIS (and subsequent final environmental statement) requires defense high-level waste to be placed in a facility which is authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage, such a facility would have to comply with any applicable licensing requirements of the NRC, Notwithstanding any comments presented here, NRC may (1) incorporate into any license that may be issued at a later date conditions that may reflect a more restrictive position than that taken in these comments; or (2) deny a license for activities at a proposed facility. l

e 4 DETAILEDCOMMEQS DISPOSAL OF TRU WASTES WITH CONC _ENTRATIONS BE;.0W 100 NC1/GM The NRC staff is concerned about disposal of wastes with TRU concentrations below 100 nCi/gm (e.g., Section 3.3.1.4, paragraph 1). Disposal of such wastes m6y require better protective measures than are evidenced in this DEIS. For example, NRC's analyses in support of 10 C/R Part 61 showed that Class C wastes, including wastes with TRU concentrations between 10 end 100 nC1/gm, must be disposed of using a stable waste form and the disposal facility must either perr.it emplacement at least 5 meters below the ground surf ace or must include an engineered intruder barrier. The staff encourages the DOE to consider the results of the Part 61 sup;orting analyses when developing disposal concepts for such wastes. (Ths staff notes that, for other projects, the DOE has committed itself to compiy with the 10 CFR Part 61 performance ot,jectives for disposal of low-level wastes. See, for examp'e, the Proposea Finding of No Significant Impact, Disposal of Project Low-level Waste. West Valley Demonstration Project, West Valley, New York, April 1986.) PROTECTIVE BARRIER AND MARKER SYSTEM Appendix M, Preliminary Analysis Of The Ferformance i Protective Barrier And Marker System The NRC staff recognizes that substantial research and development of barrier concepts remains in '. completed before a decision can be made to implement either the in place stabilization or the reference alternative. The following concerns regarding the design and performance of barriers should be considered during DOE's future barrier resea*ch and development efforts. Overall Barrier Nsign The barrier design shown ir Figure M.3 of Appendir M is based on construction of a multilayer capillary (or " wick") barrier that is intended to reduce deep c oinage. The key to this design is a layer of very coarse gravel or rock with e: overlying revegetated layer of fins-taxtureu soil. Under ideal conditions this multilayer design c.an minimize infiltration rates by trapping fluids in the uppermost soil layer and subsequently removing soil moisture through en potranspiration. Such a cover is only effective to the extent that [ hydraulic pressure within the wick is insufficient to cause a breakthr q h into the pervious layer beneath the wick. If breakthrough occurs the paluus layer ~q must direct water horizontally so that it will not migrate further down toward the waste. In order to do this, the base of the pervious layer must have adequate slope, probably greater than 5 percent. Such a slope is not apparent in the barrier design of Appendix M. It should be roted further that a wick design ch< uld be based on extreme precipitation events rather than average annual precipitatioil. Wetting fronts and subsequent breakthrough are likely to occur during storms with infrequent return periods. Given the time period durirg which this barrier must be effective, it is prudent to design it for a storm with a very low recurrence interval (e.g., 1000 yr, 24 hr storm). l l

r ,= 5 The DEIS also states that the barrier would restrict penetration by plants and animals into the waste, because of the rock and absence of moisture beneath the wick. The stsff it concerned, however, that even shallow burrowing wiu.in the upper soil layer (down to the rock) could impair the effectiveness of the wick-as a moisture barrier. The DOE should investigate means for preventing or minimizing burrowing within the barrier. Potential for Erosion It appears that little or no consideration ha-beer liven to the potential for erosion of the soil cover of the protective ' an s due to the occurrence of local intense precipitat' 1. Saveral long ten stability investigations performed for the NRC sta'f indicated that the most disruptive natural phenomena affecting long .rm stabilization are likely to be wind and water erosion (Nelson et al.,19b3; Young et al.,1982; Lindsey et al.,1982; and Beediow,1984). These studies also indicated that wind and water erosion can be taitigated by a rock cover of reasonable thicknes. and that the size of the rock chosen for the protective cover will normally be controlled by a design precipitation or flood event. The NRC staff considers it very important that adequate erosion protection be provided to prevent the occurrence of sheet erosion and the initiation of gully erosion. Gully erosion, once initiated, can cause extensive damage to any soil cover, such that previous assumptions regarding infiltration, biotic intrusion, erosion, and releases of radionuclides may no longer be valid. On the basis of NRC staff experience with long-term stabilization in arid regions of the western United States, it is very unlikely that the proposed vegetative cover will provide adequate protection to prevent the occurrence of gully erosion (Nelson et al., 1983). In general, a rock cover is usually needed to prog de such protection. A mixed rock / soil cover might provide similar protection while also allowing growth of a vegetative 0.. er. The NRC staff recommends that such a protective cover be considered. To address various uncertainties and provide for a conservative design ' is, it would be prudent for the 00E to design the rock cover for an c:currer. of localized intense orecipitation as previously discussed. Long-Term Stability The performance of the barrier shown in Figure M.3 of Appendix M is dependent on the overall structural integrity of the barrier system and on the maintenance of interlayer textural differences. It is not known whether these factors can realistically remain stable over a time scale of 10,000 years. Even if structural integrity of the barrier can be maintained over this time scale, downward 1;. filtration of fine grained soil materials into voids of the gravel layer could compromise the barrier effectiveness by altering textural differences in the capillary barrier. This could occur through gradual settling or minor subsidence of the protective barrier after construction. (The structural stability of waste tanks is of particular concern in_ this regard.) Other mechanisms for altering textural differences would include biogenic activity (discussed above), and liquefaction of the base of the-soil cover if it is near saturation and experiences significant seismic accelerations. s a

--n -~w .s 6-It is noted that overall deterioration of the capillary barrier would be accelerated by any physical rupture of the barrier, as perhaps induced by vibratory ground motions or by the intrusion of man. Such a physical rupture would allow direct influx of runoff and precipitation thro'Jgh and beneath the barrier. In that event, contaminant transport within the vadose zone beneath the protective cover could be increased significantly. In summary, the NRC staff considers that many uncertainties remain unresolved regarding long-term performance of a capillary barrier. Substantial additional research and development of barrier concepts must be completed before a preferred alternative can be selected for actual disposal of wastes. Volume 2 Foreword, page xxxiv, paragraph 2 The assumption that the single-shell tanks remain integral for 165 years is both arbitrary and unsubstantiated. As stated in the DEIS: "an arbitrary assumption has been made that none of the tanks provides a barrier after the year 2150. This is equivalent to assuming the tanks provide a barrier to significant levels of vapor phase transport of moisture for another 165 years," The OEIS goes on to state that there are "no data to suggest that significant releases from the solid waste form are currently occurring." This may indeed be correct. However there are data which show that releases have occurred from these tanks in the past. Based on historical difficulties with the integrity of the single-wall tanks, the highly soluble waste form they contain, and the lack of data supporting the integral tank assumption, it would be prudent to assume that properly backfilled tanks will provide only the structural stability necessary to inhibit slumping, collapse, or other failure of the disposal site. While the proper backfilling of tanks is 'necessary for structural stabilt+y, it will not significantly inhibit water infiltration or radionuclide release. Appendix M Section M.4, Reduction in Risk of Inadvertent Intrusion Through Passive Institutional Controls, page M.12, paragraph 1 The Final Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61, " Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste" (NUREG-0945, 1982), indicates intruder pathways dominate the potential health effects from commercial low-level radioactive waste oisposal. Appendix R (p. R.1) of the DEIS recognizes a similar effect, in that " scenarios involving contact with or intrusion into waste... predict significant adverse or fatal consequences to those ignoring warnings and intruding into the wastes." However, the DEIS puts considerable reliance in the passive institutional controls described in Appendix M to avoid the intruder problem. The arguments supporting reduction in the risk of inadvertent intrusion are very,caak: "The risk reduction factors presented here are based solely on the author's judgment; at present there are neither empirical nor theoretical models upon which these risk' reduction factors can be based." The Final EIS should provide a stronger basis to support the effectiveness of the proposed barriers as a deterrent to inadvertent intrusions.

. ~ -u w- ~.. - ~ .. ~. - v.s e 7 i Appendix M Section M.4, Reduction In Risk of Inadvertent Intrusion Through-Fassive Institutional Controls, page M.11 This section _ presents factors by which the risk of human intrusion _into wastes-is estimated to be reduced by'different protective means. When-more than one-means is present, these factors are then multiplied together to obtain_ an z, overall risk reduction factor. I The NRC staff considers that failure of some of the p?otective means (e.g., boundary markers and monuments) might result from the same_ primary cause (e.g., evolution of the language so that the meaning ofEthe_ markers and monuments would no longer be understood). The potential for such " common-mode failures" i indicates that multiplication of the individual. protective factors:to obtain an overall risk reduction factor is not appropriate. The method for combining the - individual protective factors shculd acenmmodate the possibility that a' single primary cause might render two or more or the protective mechanisms ineffective. REGULATORY Volume 1 Foreword, page v, paragraph 7 The NRC staff is concerned about the long-term cumulative effects of all-ongoing and reasonably foreseeable waste disposal activities' at the Hanford Reservation. The defense _wa'stes, which include high-level and transuranic' wastes, are already present and in need of permanent disposal. As stated on page y of the Foreword, the scope of the OEIS excludes-low-level radioactive wastes in liquidLand solid disposal sites-at Hanford. AlsoL excluded are wastes - generated by the decontamination and decommissioning.of surplus-or retired ; facilities (post-1983). It is stated that those operations will be the' subject - of other National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews. It is not clear why the DOE evaluated the environmental impacts of defanse waste disposal alternatives without consideration of the cumulative effects _off all existing'and reasonably foreseeable activities.- On page vii of the Foreword it is stated that, if the BWIP site were to be selected as a candidate-site for repository development, a corresponding EIS would be written to support _that site and to address cumulative impacts of that and other. reasonably foreseeable activities on.the Hanford Site. Why does.the Defense Waste DEIS differ in that cumulative effects of all current waste disposal activities at Hanford are not addressed? e w-e nnn e r v m--e ,-rwv m-i

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Section 3.4, Comparison of Impacts From Alternatives, pages 3.33-3.65 The DOE's proposals for permanent disposal of defense wastes at Hanford may pose special problems with respect to the NRC's current and future reviews and licensing decisions involving BWIP as a candidate site for the high-level waste geologic repository.. For example, the DOE is required to develop a Performance Confirmation Program for BWIP to provide data that indicate, where practicable, whether subsurface conditions encountered and changes resulting from construction and waste emplacement are within limits assumed in the licensing review and that natural and engineered systems and components are functioning .s intended. Some of the actions proposed in this DEIS could potentially make a BWIP Performance Confirmation Program more difficult to design and carry out. For example, the barriers proposed for in place stabilization of wastes Lay reduce infiltration to the unconfined aquifer system, potentially altering groundwater flow conditions. The Final EIS should include, in the discussion of impacts, possible effects of the proposed alternatives on licensability of a high-level waste repository at the BYlP site. Section 6.6, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, pages 6.10 and 6.11 In this section the DOE suggests that all of the waste covered in the DEIS is byproduct material and therefore not subject to subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Throughout the text, however, the DOE acknowledges in numerous instances that the waste contains materials that are considered hazardous, dangerous and/or toxic by the EPA. In section 6.6 the DOE appears to be relying on a legal interpretation of authority rather than a technical analysis of hazard to make the conclusion that RCRA does not apply. Since no final determination has been made concerning the EPA and/or primary state authority regarding the disposal of this material, it would seem prudent that the DOE at least consider the impacts of the prescriptive disposal and monitoring requirements that would be mandated by RCRA. HYOROLOGY Section 4.4.1, Surface Waters, page 4.12, paragraph 2 The flood analyses and information provided in the DEIS indicate that facilities may be axposed to a potential flood threat from Cold Creek, since portions of the site may be flooded by a 100 year flood. It therefore appears that the requirements of Executive Order (E. 0.) 11988. " Floodplain Management", have not been s' dressed. This E. O. requires, among other considerations, that the hazards and impacts 2ssociated with siting in a floodplain be identified and evaluated. Accordingly, an outline of the procedures involved in this decision-making process should be provided, and compliance with E. G. 11988 should be discussti. l

.. T v z m = =..;.a.= a x -.:a x a= u a.a. - - - n 9 Section 4.4.1, Surface Waters, page 4.12, paragraph 2 Results of flood studies in the Cold Creek watershed (Skaggs and Walters,1981) indicate that a potential for flooding of portions of the site exists. As proposed, it appears that several f acilities may be placed in an area of the Cold Creek floodplain, which could be inundated by several feet of water. Based on an examination of the Skaggs and Walters report, it appears that the magnitude of flooding on Cold Creek may be underestimated. The Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) was estimated in the report to have a magnitude of 55,000 cubic feet per second (cf s) at the site where the drainage area is about 86 square miles. Review of historic flood data for arid regions of Washington and Oregon with similar climates and weather patterns indicates that a flood of this magnitude has occurred on a stream with a drainage area of about 13 square miles, located less than 150 miles from the site. In recognition of the fact that the Cold Creak basin could have different flood producing characteristics from the stream that produced the historic maximum discharge, it is nevertheless important that the PMF represent an upper bound of flood potential for a particular stream. It appears that this upper bound is not well-defined for Cold Creek. In addition, maximum water levels will be increased as a result of increased PMF discharge and may also be increased by site location in the flood plain. The amount of increase in water level due to flood plain constriction has not been discussed in the DEIS. On the basis of topographic and cross-sectional examination of the site area, surface f acilities may be subject to flooding and may constrict the flow area in the fload plain. This may increase the water levels associated with major floods; tais increased level and its potential impacts should be discussed in the Final EIS. Section 4.4.2, Groundwater, page 4.18 figure 4.8 u !scheads indicate a potential for migration of waste from the 200-W area to the existing commercial low-level waste f acility situated near the southwest corner of the 200-E area. This may adversely impact groundwater monitoring activities associated with that facility. Appendix R, Section R.7, Other Surface Flooding, page R.92, para; Toh 1 Disposal alternative #2, and in some respects alternatives #1 and #3 (page ix, Executive Summary), present disposal scenarios similar to the burial of high-level waste in a shallow land disposal site. All or some of the high-lcvel and low-level wastes would remain at shallow depths below the ground surface. Consequently, the waste may be subject to near-surface natural phenomena. The der c EA for the proposed disposal of high-level wastes at Hanford concluded, and the NRC agreed, that proglacial catastrophic flooding associated with the melting phase of glaciation would not likely occur during the 10,000 year isolation period. However, ether consequences of either significantly warmer or cooler climatic tionds could result in adverse environmental conditions at the Hanford Si n. For example, future climatic i

.----..__,-.ww ~ ~. * ' e ~ 4 10 variations may cause increased sediment loads in the Columbia River and its tributaries, resulting in possible channel migrations. These possible adverse conditions are discussed in major comment #2 of.NRC's comments on the draft EA for Hanford (NRC,1985a) and should be considered in the defense waste Final EIS. Appendix S. Section S.2, Radionuclide Releases to Accessible Environment, page S.6, paragraph 2 From discussions in the OEIS, it is unclear whether the drier-climate scenar,a is considered representative of either the. Holocene (recent) climate at Hanford or of conditions drier than at present. Assumed log-normal. probability density functions for annual groundwater recharge were described for both drier and wetter climate scenarios over the next 10,000. years. The drier: climate scenario was assumed to have a median annual recharge of-1.5 cm, whereas the value for the wetter climate scenario was assumed to be 5.0 cm. If it is intended that the drier climate scenario is representative of recent conditions, what is the basis for the assumed median annual recharge of.1.5 cm? On pages 4.19 and 4.20 it is stated that the annual average recharge from precipitation on.Se 200 Areas-plateau has not been established to date, but I two sets of lysimeter measurements-are expected to resolve this question within 4 to 5 years. It was also stated that DOE expects that the value will' lie within the range of 0.5 to 5.0 cm/yr based on data to date. In summary, with regard to future climate scenarios, the Final EIS should centain a discussion that more clearly defines and differentiates between the terms " drier" versus " wetter." Also, more informatian should be included about uncertainties in assumed values for ranges'and median values of' future annual recharge for the Hanford Site. Appendix S, Section S.5 Results,'page 5.24, paragraph 3 It is stated that the composite release-ratio / probability curves show that the l in place stabilization and disposal alternative and the reference alternative. meet the EPA standard at the 99.9 percentile. This conclusion is not adequately upported. Specifically, over the next 10,000 years, it is assumed that a drier climate scenario is nine times more probable than a wetter climate scenario (0.9 vs. 0.1; combined probability = 1.0). No basis for'this assumption is given-and no relevant references are cited in the aopendix. This assumption biases the results of the composite release curves (Figure S.10) in favor of a drier climate with its implications of. reduced recharge, infiltration, and contaminant transport. The rationale for assigning such-a high probability to dryer climate scenarios should be (xplained in greater detail. N.

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, =. - 11 GE0 CHEMISTRY Appendices 0, P and Q, Transport and Attenuation Modeling The 00E recognizes that the total Kd (distribution coefficient) modeling approach is a " potential technical limitation" in modeling efforts (DEIS, Vol. 3, p. 0.15) which has "come under severe criticism recently" (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxii) because it combines complex geochemical processes into a single empirical parameter. This methodology is used, however, because of the- " limited data base" at Hanford (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxii). It is the NRC staff's position that the lack of data for more complex models and codes is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for using simplifying models and assumptions. Rather, the DOE should also demonstrate that the simplified models and assumptions are suf ficiently realistic (or conservative) to support the decisions to be made using them. The OEIS states that the DOE is developing more complete and advanced transport and attenuation models (DEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.15, P.3). The 00E should use these new models to evaluate the accuracy of the simpler Kd modeling approach. Areas of concern pertaining to the DEIS modeling methodology include the following. The 00E does not show that the Delegard and Barney (1983) K values d are directly applicable to the transport and attenuation models in the DEIS. The Delegard and Barney (1983) study illustrated the effects of certain waste components on the sorption properties of Hanford soils under specific laboratory conditions, but did not attempt to duplicate the ambient and expected site geochemical conditions at the Hanford Site. Delegard and Barney (1983) state that their K values are valid only within the range of their test d conditions and that slight changes in waste composition can change migration rates by a factor of 13 to 40. Kelmers (1984) notes that in measuring laboratory K values it is " essential that test materials and conditions d i duplicate those to be encountered in the field situation being evaluated." It appears that this criterion is not met. The contaminant transport assessment calculations do not account for all factors which can influance contaminant retardation. Changing site geochemical conditions due to spatial variation in groundwater or soil chemistry (DEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.35, Q.9, V.9) or to the introduction of contaminants (DEIS, Vol. 3, p. 0.37) will change the sorption characteristics of the Hanford Site. Kinetics of sorption-desorption reactions are not accounted for, nor is mass action competition for sorption sites. Additionally, the effect of naturally occurring organic material, which may be important in sorption and transport processes at Hanford (Toste and Myers, 1986), has not been examined. To perform a thorough transport assessment at the Hanford Site, the 00E should examine the impact of changing geochemical conditions on contaminant retardation and assess the effect of those geochemical processes not accounted for by their current methodology. Limitations in the Hanford geochemical data base also limit the DOE to the use of contaminant release models that do not explicitly account for solubility limits as dictated by the current and expected site geochemical conditions

. w a w.- -. _ 12 (DEIS, Vol. 2, pp. xxxi and xxxi t ; Vol. 3, pp. P.1, P.11). Release concentrations used in the DEIS are described by the DOE as being conservative estimates on the basis of data available in the literature (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxii). Future release models, which the DOE states will take into account waste form release characteristics (DEIS, Vol. 3, p. P.18), should be incorporated into future impact assessment calculations. Appendices 0 and U, Hanford Site Geochemical Conditions The DEIS does not demonstrate that the ambient geochewical conditions and the composition of the tank waste have been adequately characterized to allow realistic transport assessments of contaminants-at the Hanford-site. To develop valid transport models and use accurate values for parameters in these models, the site geochemistry must be carefully examined and characterized. Since the DOE repeatedly cites the lack of site geochemical data (DEIS, Vol. 3, pp. 0.7, 0.8, 0.15, U 4, and others) and uncertainty as to the composition and speciation of the tank waste (DEIS, Vol. 2, p. xxxv), the DOE should demonstrate that the site geochemical conditions are known well enough to ensure that the models and model parameters used in the impact assessment calculations are reasonable and conservative. Appendix P, Section P.1.4, Diffusion-Controlled Release Beneath a Protective Barrier, page P.7, bullet 4 The 00E states that prior releases of contaminants (e.g., tank leaks, crib disposals, well injection) are not included in transport simulations because "most are not categorized as high-level or transuranic (TRU) waste " and those that are high-level or TRU are of negligible quantity. The DOE should take into consideration prior releases of contaminants in the transport calculations since these wastes are components of the current site geochemical conditions. Because these wastes will continue to be transported, their effects on the transport and attenuation of other contaminants (i.e., future releases of defense wastes) and their contribution to waste concentrations at site boundaries should be assessed. Appendix V, Site-Monitoring Experience The DEIS includes a brief discussion of current and former environmental monitoring activities at Hanford. Examples of localized contamination problems (cribs, trenches, etc.) are discussed in detail, while larger-scale contaminant plumes receive little mention..The large-scale movement of these plumes has been studied at Hanford for decades, and much has been learneo about contaminant migration in the unconfined aquifer system. Some of this valuable information should be incorporated in the Final EIS. At a minimum, additions to the Final EIS should include available maps that show, for various times, the shapes and movements of various contaminant plumes known to exist in the unconfined aquifer system. This would include constituents like nitrate, tritium, I-129, Ru-106, Co-60, and Tc-99. These types of mobile contaminants show considerable promise in the continued study of flow paths for contaminant migration in the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford. The Final EIS should include a discussion of the role of large-scale contaminant plume behavior in evaluating the environmental impacts of future defense waste disposal operations.

-. a t 13 Appendix V, Section V.5, Reverse Wells, page V.29, paragraph 2 TheDEISstatesthat"thezoneof[ radiologic]contaminationaroundthe216-B-5 reverse [ injection] well appears to be [ chemically) stable, with no apparent further migration of radionuclides." Results are shown for Cs-137, Sr-90, and Pu-239,240. However, a previous 00E investigation indicated that there was some evidence of contaminant migration beneath the well site, the source of which was uncertain. The following was reported by Smith (1980): Gamma logging showed that sediments distributed over a broad area and located just above the basalt surface were contaminated with low-level gamma contamination. Examination of previously collected gamma logs indicated that a possible source of this contamination could be the BY cribs located [approximately] 900 m north of the reverse well. This work also indicates that the contamination may be moving in a southeasterly direction. Smith (1980) also recommended that the broad contamination plume at the basalt surface should be investigated as to its distribution, source or sources, radionuclide identity and concentrations, and that a monitoring plan be developed if required. This study showed that the position of the water table and the type of sediment to which waste solutions are discharged are important factors for controlling radionuclide distributions. The study also recommended the use of stainless steel well screens for monitoring wells. Anomalous beta activity was present on rusted portions of corroded well casings and was believed to have produced some erroneous radionuclide analyses. This is the only reverse well for which contaminant migration has been characterized, and one could not thereby conclude that the results are statistically rignificant. Because of aquifer heterogeneities and the chemical variability of fluids originally injected into vari.ous reverse wells, it may not be reasonable to extrapolate these results to other reverse well locations. It is noted that zones of contamination appear to extend beyond the maximum depth of penetration of the monitoring wells. It would be useful to know to what depth contaminants may have penetrated basalts at the base of the unconfined aquifer. Previous researchers at Hanford have presented some evidence for deeper contamination. Brauer and Rieck (1973) noted the presence of I-129 in groundwater obtained from well 699-10-E12 P. The sampled aquifer was believed to be confined, and it was suggested that there had been some contamination of the groundwater since the early 1940's. The presence of varying concentrations of contaminants that were released to the unconfined aquifer system over the last four decades provides a unique opportunity to better understand in situ solute behavior and geochemical retardation processes. Given this unique opportunity, the DOE should plan additional in situ characterization studies of this type as a means of better supporting modeling studies of contaminant transport in the unconfined aquifer system. l l

i 14 i GEOLOGY Section 3.3.2.5, In-place Stabilization and Disposal Applied to previously Disposed-of TRU-Contaminated Soil Sites, page 3.24, paragraph 1 This section states that a geophysical survey of the liquid waste sites with high subsidence potential will be completed to characterize them and to identify grout-injection points. Further discussion of the feasibility and adequacy of subsidence control should be provided in the Final EIS. Section 4.0, Affected Environment, page 4.2, Figure 4.1 Figure.4.1 provides the general locations of the defense high-leval and transuranic wastes. Figure 4.1 indicates that waste disposal occurred in the 200-W, 200-E, and 300 Areas and in the Wye Burial Ground. The DEIS should more precisely identify all waste locations at Hanford. It is further recommended that the Final EIS include additional informatiun regarding the geohydrology, geochemistry, and geology (e.g., geomorphology, stratigraphy, and structure) of specific waste disposal areas to better characterize these sites. For example, the potential for contaminant migration in the vadose zone beneath a given disposal site cannot be reliably determined without an evaluation of actual, site-specific soil moisture characteristics and curves of pressure head versus hydraulic conductivity. Section 4.3, Seismicity, page 4.10, paragraph 4 The existence of faulting and the possibility of fault reactivation in the waste disposal areas has not been adequately addressed. The general guideline in 10 CFR 61.50(a)(9) may be of use in discussing the potential and significance of f aulting in these areas. The referenced draft EA for Hanford (DOE,1984) presented a generally favorable view of the tectonic setting and possible effects of tectonics on waste isolation. In the NRC's major comment #4 on the draft EA (NRC,1985a), this view was considered to be inadequately supported by the data and analyses presented. The statements made by the NRC staf f regarding the reference repository also apply to the waste disposal alternatives of this DEIS, Section 4.3, Seismicity, page 4.10, paragraph 4 l A series of sub-vertical clastic dikes has been observed (NRC, 1985b) in the l l trench walls at the U.S. Ecology Low-Level Waste Disposal Area, which is located in close proximity to the 200-E Area. The dikes cut across, but do not appear to offset the sand and silt strata in the trenches. They taper upward 1 and extend from below the base of the trench to within 8 to 10 feet of the surface. They are approximately 2 to 3 feet wide at the base and several inches wide where they are truncated or pinch out near the ground surface. The dikes, which occur in other areas of the Hanford Reservation, may be related to fissuring caused by ground motion resulting from seismic activity. The

r** i { 15 fissures were apparently filled by movement of water-saturated sediments under hydrostatic pressure, which are susceptible to liquefaction. The presence of these clastic dikes may have significant implications for shallow land burial of low-level and high-level wastes. In the 500 to 10,000 year periods of isolation required for low-level and high-level wastes, respectively, there is a pessibility that fissuring may again occur or that existing fissures may be reopened as a result of seismic activity. Existing fissures may also provide avenues for groundwater migration. The probability of occurrence as well as the significance of these fissures should be addressed. Additionally, the possible exic'.ence of these dikes within the waste disposal areas should be determined, Section 4.7, Land Use, page 4.30 The OEIS does not address nor does it provide information on the potential for the existence of natural resources in the defense waste areas. 10 CFR 61.50 (4) requires that, for the near-surface disposal of low-level wastes, areas known to contain natural resources should be avoided. While the disposal of defense wastes is not subject to 10 CFR Part 61, the reasons for avoiding such areas remain valid. The Final EIS should provide an evaluation of natural resources, including hydrocarbon and mineral resource potential at the proposed site. This is particularly relevant in view of a natural gas discovery within sediments underlying the basalts in the Saddle Mountains area of the Hanford Reservation by Shell Oil Company (NRC,1985a). Appendix 0, Section 0.1, Stratigraphy Beneath The Hanford 200 Areas, pages 0.2-0.5 The principal units that comprise the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford are discussed in Appendix 0. Little information is provided on the topic of paleogeomorphology at Hanford. This topic may be of importance in developing a better understanding of flow and transport in the unconfined aquifer system. Brown et al. (1962) provided geologic interpretations that accounted for the apparently rapid dispersal of tritium in the unconfined aquifer system at Hanford. They noted that the contaminants appear to be following old Columbia River channels incised into the eroded upper surface of the low permeability Ringold Formation sediments. These channels are filled with more recent deposits (Hanford Formation) that have permeabilities approximately two orders of magnitude greater than in the underlying Ringold strata. It appears that-the relative subcrop elevation of the Ringold Formation with respect to the water table thereby exerts considerable influence over groundwater flow paths. This may account for the observed branching (anomalous macrodispersion) of contaminant plumes migrating away from the 200 East Area. This information should oe considered when interpreting the results of groundwater surveillance at Hanford and in the continued development of a groundwater monitoring program. ~. m.

I6 ENv!RONMENTAL Several of the NRC's detailed environmental comments on the DOE's draft Environmental Assessment are applicable to the DEIS. The comment numbers are E-1, 3-30, 4-3, 4-5, 5-10, 5-11 and 6-38. These comments should be considered in preparing the Final EIS. a J l .l I

17 REFERENCES Beedlow, P. A., 1984. Designing Vegetation Covers for Long-Tern Stabilization of Uranium Hill Tailings, NUREG/CR-3674 (PNL-4698), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Brauer, F. P. and H. G. Rieck, Jr.,1973. 1-129, Co-60, and Ru-106 Measurements on Water Samples from the Hanfoni Project Environs, BNWL-SA-4478, Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, Brown, D. J., R. E. Brown, and W. A. Haney, 1962. Appraising Hanford Waste Disposal by Integration of Field Techniques, HW-SA-2707, General Electric Company, Hanford Atomic Products Operation, Richland, Washington. Delegard, C.H, and G. S. Barney, 1983. Effects of Hanford High Level waste Components on Sorption of Cobalt, Strontium, Neptunium, Plutonium, and Americium on Hanford Sediments, RHO-RE-ST-P, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington. 00E, 1984. Draft Environmental Assessment: Reference Repository Location. Hanford, Washington, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. U. S. Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. Executive Order No.11988, " Floodplain Management", May 24,1977, 42 F.R. 26951 Kelmers, A.D., 1984. Letter Report: Draft Analysis of Conservatism of Radionuclide Information Measured by Batch Contact Sorption / Apparent Concentration Limit Isotherms, L-290-3, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Lindsey et al., 1982. Long-Term Survivability of Riprap for Armoring Uracium Mill Tailings and Covers, NUREG/CR-2642 (PNL-4225), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Nelson et al., 1983. Detign Considerations for Long-Term Stabilization of Uranium Mill Tailings Impoundments, NUREG/CR-3397 (0RNL-5979), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. NRC, 1982. Final Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61, " Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report NUREG-0945, Volumes 1-3 NRC, 1985a. NRC Comments on 00E Draft Environmental Assessment for the Hanford Site, Division of Waste Management, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. NRC, 1985b. Trip Report to Richland Low Level Waste Disposal Facility and Hanford Reservation, Washinaton, June 25-26, 1985 (memorandum from Jose J. Valdes to Malcolm R. Knapp, July 31,1985), 1

. ~ 18 Skaggs, R. L. and W. H. Walters,1981. Flood Risk Analysis of Cold Creek Near the Hanford Site, RHO-BWI-C-120, Rockwell Hanford Operations. Smith, R. M., 1980. 216-B-5 Reverse Well Characterization Study, RHO-ST-37, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington. Toste, A. P., and R. B. Myers,1986. The Relative Contributions of Natural and Waste-Derived Organics to the Subsurface Transport of Radionuclides, in The Effects of Natural Organic Compounds and of Microorganisms on Radionuclide Transport, proceedings of an NEA workshop, OCEO Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris France. Young, J. K., L. W. Long, and J. W. Reils,1982. Environmental Factors Affecting Long-Term Stabilization of Radon Suppression Covers for Uranium Mill Tailings, NUREG/CR-2564 (PNL-4193), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

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