ML20128B391

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Summary of 691002 Meeting W/Nsp Re Updating TSs Proposed by Util & to Clarify Number of Responses to Drl Questions in Amends 16 & 17.List of Attendees Encl
ML20128B391
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1969
From: Vassallo D
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Boyd R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 9212030643
Download: ML20128B391 (5)


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W# , UNITED STATES f0d

[dh\ ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION l

IE)' W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20545 October 15, 1969

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R. S. Boyd, Assistant Director for Reactor Projects, DRL f)

THRU: D. R. Muller, Chief, Reactor Project Branch #1, DRL POL REVIEW MEETING WITH NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, DOCKET NO. 50-263 A meeting was held with Northern States Power Company (NSP) on October 2, 1969 to discuss the updating of the technical specifica-tions proposed by NSP and to clarify a number of the responses to DRL's questions submitted in Amendments 16 and 17. A summary of the salient points discussed at the meeting is presented below.

A list of attendees is attached.

A. DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS In regard to revising NSP's proposed technical specifications, several approaches were discussed. Because of the similarity between Dresden 2 and Monticello, NSP indicated it intends to follow as closely as possible the format and content of the Dresden 2 technical specifica-tions. NSP hopes to have a revised draf t of the Monticello technicel specifications submitted to us by October 21, 1969.

A. Brauner discussed in detail the section on administrative controls.

In light of our current views, we indicated that this section as submitted in the early draf t of the proposed technical specifications would require extensive revision.

We also discussed a number of areas of potential disagreement. These areas included the allevable leakage rate from the primary coolant system, the containment leakage rate, the closure time of the main I

steam line isolation valves, and the stack limits. However, we told NSP that we had not completed our review in these areas.

E. DISC 1'SSION OF AMENDMENTS 16 AN'D 17

1. The non-destructive testing requirements for the primary coolant system pressure boundary of Monticello (Table A prepared by R. Maccary) was discussed with NSP. The applicant was somewhat f amiliar with the requirements of this table and stated that its evaluation to determine the extent of compliance would be completed within two weeks. NSP stated that it would be prepared to discuss this area with the Compliance inspectors at the next inspection scheduled for October 17, 1969.

9212030643 691015 PDR ADOCK 05000263 A pyg r

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F R. S. Boyd ,

2. L. Porse asked for clarification of a number of-areas related to the design and fabrication of the reactor pressure vessel. To indicate the influence which cold work had on material properties of the reactor vessel plate, the applicant agreed to provide a summary of the tensile and impact test results. ,

, In regard to the operational-transients to which the reactor 4 vessel is designed, the FSAR states that the vessel -is designed to take 50,000 temperature transients associated with the control-rod worth tests throughout the life time of the reactor. This appeared to be at variance with other BWR'c for which 400 tempera-ture transients associated with the control rod worth tests were i

specified. GE stated that the 50,000 number is related to a 10 F-transient, whereas the 400 number is related to a 30 F transient.

. 3. In regard to leakage detection from the primary coolant system i ve asked NSP to clarify what it meant by stating that provisions .

are made for determining the' source of leakage., NSP said 1t l . primarily would use visual means to determine the source of leakage. However, portable sonic and radiation instruments will be used to aid visual inspection when the drywell becomes accessible.

In addition, radiochemical analysis of either air or water.

i samples can be used to establish whether: a leak source is steam or reactor water.

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4. The applicant has agreed to place two area type radiation monitors l above and to the side of the spent fuel pool. In the event of an activity release these monitors will be capable of-detecting l

and isolating the reactor building and' initiate action of the standby gas treatment system f aster than. the action f rom the monitors located in the building ventilation exhaust plenum.

5. In Amendment 16 NSP stated-that the intake of airborne particulate or gaseous radioactivity into the control room is not a radio-logical problem and_therefore no. instrumentation or controls are provided for the design basis accident situations. NSP stated-that this was incorrect, and that radiation monitors are located in the control room. .

i The control room ventilation system is designed to normally draw fresh air from a port located on the outside wall of the control l room and the amount of air can be modulated from 0 to 100%  :

recirculation of the conditioned air. The system is manually. I operated. Our concern is that in the' event of a steam-line' break- j i

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4 R. S. Boyd -3 j accident in the turbine building, activity may be drawn into the control room before the inlet dampers could be closed. OE contends that any personnel dose associated with this event would be so small as to be unimportant. Nevertheless, we asked the 4

applicant to perform an analysis to justify this conclusion.

NSP agreed to perform this analysis.

! 6. T. Ippolito asked how it -will be observed that one channel of-l a trip system has indeed tripped. NSP said that the tripping of an instrument system is alarmed in the control room; however, to

know whether a single channel has tripped one must actually check j their relays. T. Ippolito said he thought that Dresden 2 would 4

provide indication for a single channel trip. NSP said that if

Dresden provides this feature it would also. Subsequent to the meeting, we learned that indication of a single channel trip of the ECCS will be provided in Dresden 2.
7. In Amendment No. 17 it states that generally all quality assurance records will be maintained at their present storage location i.e.,

General Electric, Bechtel, NSP, or vendor where applicable. A check-list, which lists the quality assurance records available and their storage location, will be maintained by NSP. NSP will be notified prior to disposal of any quality assurance document.

We asked NSP to clarify _the last statement. NSP said it would correct the FSAR to make it clear that upon notif1 cation'of

the intention to dispose of any records pertaining to safety items it will take possession of these records and maintain them
at the site.
8. We questioned the simplified manner in which tor.1 mixing was assumed in- the river in the analysis predicting the concentration of liquid effluents at the Minneapolis and St. Paul water intakes.

-NSP~said it had made extensive thermal studies of the river to justify this mixing. We requested therefore, that they supply _

sufficient information to show this justification.

9. It appears that in the analysis of the potential radioactivity levels in the river resulting from the release of the contents of the radwaste tanks into the river that the dilution afforded by Leixing in the river was taken into account twice. NSP said that

, -it would recheck its analysis.

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i R. S. Boyd -4 1

10. In regard to airborne effluent release limits, we asked NSP to clarify the bases, the monitor set points, and method of arriving at the joint effluent limit.
11. The offsite doses resulting from a primary system pipe rupture in the reactor clean-up system or RHR system was discussed. We noted that in the Easton application this same type of analysis was done assuming that the break occurred eight hours after shutdown of the reactor clean-up system. This assumption resulted in a more severe dose. NSP said it would recheck its analysis using this assumption.

l Af D. B. Vassallo, Project Leader Reactor Projects Branch #1 Division of Reactor Licensing 1

Enclosure:

Attendance list Distribution:

Docket File RL Reading RPB-1 Reading D. J. Skovholt S. Levine R. C. DeYoung RP Branch Chiefs CO (2)

N. Blunt D. B. Vassallo R. S. Lee

C. J. DeBevec A.-Brauner T. Ippolito L. Forse I. Spickler i

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-ATTENDANCE LIST 1 V l

3 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY AEC/DRL

] E. Ward D. Muller j C. Ross -R. Lee

! M. Clarity D. Vassallo i

4 G. Jacobson C. DeBevec 1

A. Brauner-4 T. Ippolito*

L..Porse*

l 1. Spickler*

i GENERAL-ELECTRIC COMPANY l

L. Wolf i R. Vassar j J. Power

{ P. Poe 5 i

!- CO, REGION III l

C. Feierabend t

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