ML20128A242
| ML20128A242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1985 |
| From: | Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GN-603, NUDOCS 8505240163 | |
| Download: ML20128A242 (18) | |
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- Georgit Power Comp ny '
Rout 3 2, Box 299A -
- Waynesboro, Georgia 30830
- Telephone 404 554-9961 404 724-8114 Southem Company Services,Inc
Post Office Box 2625 .2 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 - Vogtle Project c 'May 20, 1985 Director of-Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X7BC35 Attention:iMs. Elinor G. Adensam, Chief Log: GN-603 Licensing Branch #4 Division of Licensing. .U. S. -Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 NRC DOCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE EIECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: DSER OPEN ITEM 51 AND QUESTION 450.1
Dear Mr. Denton:
Attached is a revised response to NRC Que'stion 450.1 and a revised response to NRC questions pertaining to the VEGP control room - habitability evaluation (DSER Section 6.4, Open Item 51). The new .information is provided to address an NRC concern about the modeling approach used to analyze a postulated worst case onsite chlorine gas release accident. The model takes' credit for dilution of C12 gas within a portion of the control building before infiltrating into the
- control room. The revised response to Question 450.1 presents a tabulation of areas within the control building that directly adjoin the control room. For each area, information is provided about-the net free volume of tht zone; the amount of outside air makeup' supplied to that area by-the control building HVAC System; and the quantity of recirculated air within each zone. These data are utilized in the chlorine infiltration model to predict the amount of dilution that would occur as ' chlorine contaminated outside air passes through the control building prior to its entry in the control room. Dilution credit is only taken for those areas that i:amediately adjoin the control room.
During preparation of the revision to Table 450.1-2 it was discovered that the original' chlorine infiltration calculation had erroneously . included an equipment room as one of the rooms directly adjacent to the 8pf 8505240163 B50520 PDR ADOCK 05000424 F PDR , Ig I I1
~ ...m. y Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulaticn-Page 2 control room. The net effect of this error.was an overprediction of the concentration of C12 gas that would occur inside_the control room at the time.when control room operators are assumed to have completed the - donning of protective breathing equipment (120 seconds following'an alarm from the chlorine detector as per USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.78). Previous information ' supplied _ to the NRC reported a chlorine concentration of 14.8 ' ppa inside.the control room at 2 minutes following detection. Fifteen = (15) ppa by volume is the maximum chlorine concentration recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.78 for_a'2 minute: exposure duration.' The revised - calculation indicates that the 2 minute control room chlorine concentration-drops to approximate 1y'8 ppa when the equipment room in-leakage contribution is subtracted. Appropriate revisions have been made to' earlier written responses provided to the NRC to reflect this . change.- If you have any questions or comments regarding the. enclosed materials or any other aspects of the control room habitability evaluation please - contact me. - Sincerely, J.lA.' Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /cas-- Enclosure xc: D. O. Foster R.' A. Thomas J. E. Joiner, Esquire B. W. Churchill, Esquire M. A. Miller B. ' Jones, ~ Esquire (w/o enclosure) L. T. Gucwa G. Bockhold, Jr. T.. Johnson (w/o enclosure) D.-C. Teper (w/o enclosure) L. Fowler Vogtle Project File .L - 0205m'
kTTA* tihANT A, VEGP-FSAR-Q Qtestion 450.1 4 Sist the areas in the zone serviced by the control room emergency ventilation system and.show ventilation patterns within the control room emergency zones and adjacent areas.
Response
Table 450.1-1 lists areas served by the control room emergency ventilation system. This table identifies the quantity of outside air supplied, the recirculated air quantity, and the total quantity of air supplied to each area during emergency mode of operation. The total amount of makeup air supplied to the control room envelope is 1500 ft'/ min per filtration unit. Figures 6.4.2-1 and 9.4.1-1 (sheets 2 and 3) show the control room envelope layout and the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system g atterns, respectively. %er VC W EJ Table 450.1-2 lis com Jsajacent to the control room envelope and identifies thefquantity of outside air supplied, the recirculated air quantity, and the total quantity of air supplied to each area. g.3,1-l ($HEET5 27,28,2.9 ud Bo) FiguresA.0.2 1 and 9.4.1-1 (sheets 4, 9, and 10) show the 0 layout of the rooms adjacent to the control room envelope and the HVAC flow patterns, respectively. Q450.1-1 Amend. 8 7/84
e VEGP-FSAR-Q TABLE'450.1-1 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY ZONE AIR SUPPLY. PER FILTRATION UNIT Total Recir-Air Outside culated Quantity Air Air Supplied to Room Quantity Quantity Each Room No. Description (ft / min) (ft'/ min) (ft / min) 2 8 156 Janitor 0 0 0 157 Toilet 5 100 105 '158 Kitchen 14 211 225 160 Record storage files 10 145 155 161 ' Emergency storage 4 61 65 162 Conference. room 27 423 450 163 Control room Unit 1 720 11,280 12,000 164 Control room Unit 2 720 11,280 12,000 Total 1500 23,500 25,000 I Amend. 8 7/84
4 TAeus Aso t -2 (suceT I on) -s - SPACES ADJACENT TO CONTROL ROOM U LEVEL 1 ) ROOM l NAME I NET FREE I OSA IRECIRC. AIR I TOTAL AIRI NO. I I VOLUME l QUANTITY l QUANTITY l QUANTITY I b,) I i FT3 i CFM I CFM I CFM i _____I___________________I__________I__________I____________I__________I I I I I I i () 117 i LOBBY I 4336 1 230 1 350 1 580 1 118 i AIR. LOCK i 640 1 0 1 0 1 01 119 i CONF & LUNCH RM i 2250 1 500 1 750 1 1250 I I 120 1 CORRIDOR I 1750 1 500 1 735 1 1235 1 128 -1 CORRIDOR I 3600 1 0 ! O I O I 138 i CORRIDOR I 7280 1 600 1 900 1 1500 l I' 141 1 CORRIDOR I 1920 1 180 1 275 ! 455 1 142 i AIR LOCK I 320 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 143 i RADIO CHEM LAB I 7902 1 370 1 560 1 930 1 I 144 i SAMPLE ROOM i 1428 i 230 1 340 ! 570 1 147 i LOBBY I 800 1 530 1 785 ! 1315 l 149 l CORRIDOR I 3000 1 220 1 325 1 545 I I 155 I INST REPAIR I 5220 1 530 1 800 1 1330 1 159 i AIR LOCK I 280 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 175 i ELECTRICAL "A" I 1730 1 0 l 0 1 0 1 I 176 I ELECTRICAL-NORM i 2300 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 177 I ELECT-NORM i 2300 1 0 ! O I O I 178 I ELECTRICAL "A" l 1730 1 0 1 0 1 0 l I 180 i CORRIDOR I 2900 1 40 1 405 1 445 1 189 i CORRIDOR I 2000 i O I O I O I 199 I CORRIDOR I 480 1 O I O! O I I 199A I AIRLOCK I 240 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 LEVEL 1 TOTAL 1 544D6 1 3930 1 6225 1 10155 1 0 LEVEL A E ROOM l NAME I NET FREE I OSA IRECIRC. AIR I TOTAL AIRI NO. I I VOLUME I QUANTITY I QUANTITY I OUANTITY I ( l i FT3 I CFM i CFM I CFM i _____i___________________I__________i__________I__.._________I__________I A20 1 ELECTRICAL "A" l 4840 1 10 1 90 1 100 1 , I A21 i ELECTRICAL-NORM i 4640 1 10 1 90 1 100 l A23 i CABLE SPREADING I 70,000 1 275 1 2575 1 2850 l a A43 i SHUTDOWN RM TR "B"I 6960 1 13 1 112 1 125 I A44 i CABLE SPREADING 70,000 1 275 1 2575 1 2850 I i A45 l AUX RELAY l 7400 1 44 1 416 1 460 I i A46 I ELECTRICAL-NORM i 4640 1 10 1 90 1 100 l ( A47 I ELECTRICAL "A" 1 4840 1 10 1 90 1 100 l A82 i HVAC 1 3850 1 10 1 90 1 100 1 () LEVEL A TOTAL i 177170 1 657 1 6128 1 6785 I O
'f Taew Aso.t-2. (sw zog2.) SPACES ADJACENT TO CONTROL ROOM I LEVEL 2 ROOM i NAME I NET FREE I OSA IRECIRC. AIR I TOTAL AIRI I NO. I I VOLUME I OUANTITY l OUANTITY I QUANTITY I I I -FT3 i CFM i CFM l CFM i _____l___________________l__________I__________l____________l__________I ( 220 1 ELECTRICAL "A" l 3996 8 60 t 90 1 150 1 221 i ELECTRICAL-NORM i 4440 1 60 1 90 1 150 1 223 i ISOL AUX RELAY I 1850 1 12 I las i 200 1 I 224 i CABLE SPPEADING l 56,830 1 70 1 1130 1 1200 1 225 i CABLE SPREADING I 56,830 1 70 1 1130 1 1200 l 226 i ISOL AUX RELAY l 1850 1 12 1 188 1 200 l I 227 I ELECTRICAL-NORM i 4440 1 60 1 90 1 150 1 228 I ELECTRICAL "A" l 4000 1 16'O I 90 1 150 1 229 I INST CALIB LAB l 13,025 1 563 1 837 I 1400 1 I 230 i CORRIDOR I 11,200 1 563 1 837 1 1400 1 234 i VESTIBULE I 600 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 245 i LOBBY I 3840 1 302 1 448 1 750 I I 270 1 ELECTRICAL CABLE I 865 1 0 i O I O I 271 1 ELECTRICAL CABLE I 865 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 274 I CALIB SOURCE WELL i 900 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ( LEVEL 2 TOTAL i 165531 1 1832 1 5118 1 6950 1 4 ( I NET FREE I OSA I RECIRC. AIRI TOTAL AIRI I I VOLUME I QUANTITY l OUANTITY I QUANTITY l i FT3 I CFM l CFM l CFM i _________________________I _________I _________I____________l _________I I I I I I I I I I I I LEVEL 1 TOTAL I 54406 1 3930 1 6225 l 10155 I I LEVEL A TOTAL i 177170 1 657 1 6128 I 6785 i LEVEL 2 TOTAL i 165531 1 1832 1 5118 1 6950 i
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I TOTAL l 397107 1 6419 1 17471 1 23890 1 ( ( ( s
. ~.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ hTT1N1'_rtmAe*JT-B_ Vogtle.SER Section 6.4 Control Room Habitability (Open Item 51) Question 1: Provide basis for the control building inflow rata of 13,719#(CFM) shown in Table 2.2.3-19. Note that unless the control building is pressurized to at least 1/8" w.g.' relative to adjacent areas, addi-tional infiltration corresponding to 1/8" w.g should be assured in the analysis. d
Response
The reported flow of 13,719 cfm into the control building was derived by calculating the proportion of control building HVAC outside air make-up supplied to rooms immediately adjoining the control room. A 1/8" w.g.' differential pressure was assumed across all walls separating the control room from the adjoin-ing rooms, but not across the walls of the control building. While it is acknowleaged that predictieqM C1 concentrations could be higher if 1/8" w.g. dif-fe$ential pressure were assumed to exist across the outside walls of the control building, the FSAR analysis incorporates numerous conservatisms which should more than offset this possible nonconservatism. 1. C1 concentrations assumed to occur at all + ouk. side air intakes serving the control build-ing aref conservatively taken to be the same (peak, centerline) concentrations calculated for the control room HVAC outside air intake. In actuality the control building and control reos outside air intakes are physically sepa-rated. They could not all simultaneously experience maximum plume / puff centerline concentrations. -bse 2. It is conservatively assumed that only these., rooms immediately surrounding the control room comprise the control building volume. The actual volume is much larger, which would increase the dilution of chlorine gas prior to entry into the control room. 3. The analysis conservatively assumes that, prior to control room isolation, 3,000 cfm of contam-insted outside air is supplied directly to the control room via a single outside air intake. l Upon isolation, this flow is assumed to cease, being replaced by 1,500 cfm of contaminated i air inleaking from the adjacent rooms in the control building. i l l $In accordance with revised FSAR Table 450.1-2 (enclosed 9ith this j submittal), only 6,419 cfm of control building HVAC outside air makeup is supplied to rooms immediately adjoining the control See the explanatory note at the end of this response for room. zw'Wuths#tLA'WswnWL
Response Cont. Question 1 Page 2 This modeling assumption grossly overesti-mates the cl, concentration buildup that would actua1Iy occur inside the control room following the postulated castastrophic rupture of the closest 1-ton capacity onsite cl, cylinder. In actuclity, there are two outside air intakes providing 1,500 cfm each to the control room. These intakes are separated by a distance of 150 feet. A chlorine cloud aimed directly at one intake under worst case meteorological conditions would produce a cl concentration of essentially zero ppa (above nadural background) at the second intake. The isolation damper in the i: second intake does not automatically close with cl detection in the first intake unless Thds,s diso detected at the second intake. cl i a c1 puff aimed directly at one intake would unde $go an$rffective two fold dilution by 1,500 cfm of uncontaminated air supplied by the second intake. Additionally, after isolation dampers for the first intake have closed, the i second intake would continue to supply 1,500 cfm of uncontaminated outside air to the control room, providing an effective two-fold dilution of contaminated air infil-trating into the control room from adjoining areas within the control building. An analysis was also performed to determine maximum c1 concentrations inside the control room that dould occur if the C1, puff and plume were aimed directly between the two i I outside air intakes to the control room. For i this scenario the maximum outside air con-l centration at both intakes is 8.0 ppa. 2 :: A ~ fer, '" " ^-t: _ t ricity li-it ;f 15 ;;-- ' l - ;;-1 A =;;; M ::::t f f--if: '2 : ;;.r:1 m... l' -if ' " i let h e -f 1-cre r n ;r ci ::f. cl2 detectors in both intakes are designed to initiate isolation upon exposure to an outside air cl concentration of 2 ppa or higher. 2 4. Once isolation dampers in one or both outside air intakes to the control room have closed, all recirculated air within the control room l I (
Insert Since both intakes would isolate, this accident scenario is analogous to that evaluated in the FSAR C1, analysis (i.e., 3000 cfm of contaiminated outside air supplied to the control room prior to isolation; 1500 cfm inleakage from adjoining rooms within the control building after isolation), except that the di concentration entering the control room prior to isolation (8 ppk maximum) is much smaller than was assumed for the FSAR calculation. Consequently, the FSAR modeling approach conservatively bounds
- his scenario.
e t 5
. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ ~ - _ _ _. _ _ _ _... _ _ i t Response cont. Question 1 Page 3 i is passed through charcoal filters. No credit has been taken for the allsorption of C1 by the charcoal. c 2 l The foregoing conservatisms are intrinsic to the model used to estimate the increase in i the C1 concentration inside the control room follow $ng a postulated worst case C1 release [ under worst case meteorological cond,tions. I Concerning the recommendation that a 1/8" i w.g. differential pressure be assumed to j exist across all the external walls of the control building, the following additional l factors should be noted: i 1. The predicted worst case windspeed for t the C1 released at the closest distance 2 i to the control room is 0.5 meters /second. l This windepeed is incapable of producing i j a 1/8" w.g. differential pressure across external walls of the control building. 2. Neglecting the above consideration, wind tunnel tests on building scale models (Baturin, V.V., Fundamentals of Industrial ventilation (third edition). Pergamon Press, New York, l (C. 1972, pgs. 294, 295) demonstrate that when the wind direction is perpendicular (or within 4 15' of the perpendicular) to a wall facing i the wind flow, positive pressures occur only on that wall. All other walls (side and j rear) are under suction. When the wind i ) direction approaches at a 30* angle, positive j i pressures occur on part of the side wall against which the wind is blowing. At an incoming angle of 45* from the perpendicular, i both front and adjoining side wall experience l a positive pressure; the remaining side wall and rear wall are under euction. Flat roofs I are always under suction irrespective of the incoming wind direction. i From the above considerations, we conclude l that it is unrealistic to assume that 1/8" w.g. differential pressure exists across all wallsopecontrolbuilding. 4 M l
Vogtle SER Section 6.4 Control Room Habitability (Open Item 51) Question 2: Estimate the' isolation time of the control room following chlorine gas detection coincident with loss of offsite power.
Response
There are 12 isolation dampers required to operate and isolate the control room in the event of C1 gas detection in the outside air intakes. Ten $f these dampers are pneumatic and are controlled by power from the 125 V.D.C. bus, and therefore are unaffected by a loss of offsite power. Two are motor operated and controlled by power from normal A.C. sources. Upon loss of offsite power, diesel generators would restore power to control room isolation MOVs within 14 seconds after offsite power is lost. Assuming a loss of offsite powe concurrent with a catastrophic rupture of a 1 tontheclosestonsitestoragelocatod(ylinde 1 c 187 meters from the control room outside air intake and a 10 meter per second windspeed (worst casWd o)r this f scenario), the following sequence of events would occur: Time after Emergency power system C1 release and control room habit-and loss of ability system response offsite power 0 seconds Loss of offsite power. 2 seconds Signal to start diesel generators. 14 seconds Diesel generators restore power to control room iso-lation MOVs 17 seconds Cl detector in outside aiE intake is exposed to an activating concentration of C12 gas (2 ppm). 28 seconds C1 detector issues an al$rm inside the control room and issues a signal for isolation dampers to close. YY Worst case in the sense that a high windspeed would cause the C12 puff and plume to reach the outside air intakes in the shortest time - -potentially before power to the MOVs could be restored. However, as shown here, even a 10 meter per second windspeed, the cloud arrives, MOVs become operable before the C12 l
m-Response (cont.) Question 2 Page 2 34 seconds Control room isolation accomplished. 148 seconds control room operators have donned protective breathing equipment (C1,3 concentration inside the control room is +r+ ppa ). s.S 9 6
.p Vogtle SER 5ection 6.4 i Control Room Babitability (Open Item 51) Question 3: For each leakage path identified in Table 6.4.2-2, show the areas to which the leakage path could lead. outside atmosph,y leakage paths directly to the If there are an ere, your assumption that the contaminated outside air first flows into the control building where it is diluted with the control building air mass would have to be modified accordingly.
Response
Leak paths identified in Table 6.4.2-2, with the exception of one concrete wall in the control room forming the only direct barrier between the control room and outside air, all originate from internal rooms within the control building which directly l adjoin the control room. Inleakage flow of contaminated outside air through the outside concrete wall directly into the control room would occur at a rate of 0.25 cfa, which is clearly insignificant in comparison with 1,500 cfm entering the control room after dilution i within interior rooms within the control i building. l 4 i ( r
Vogtle SER Section 6.4 Control Room Habitability (open Item 51) Question 4: Consistent with assumptions and methods called or in SRP 6.4 and R.G. 1.78 and 1.95, provide the following figures for C1 ' "E and N 3. 2 3 24 (1) concentration at the control roor air intake vs. time (2) concentration in the control room vs. time (3) concentration in the control building vs. time.
Response
Toxic gas concentrations vs. ti g are plotted on the following graphs for chlorind', ammonia and hydrazine. The spill scenarios which result in the highest control room concentrations are listed below: Control Room Conc. 2 Min.AFTeC Chemical Container Size Distance Wind Speed Detection (M) (M/sec.) (PPM) Chlorine 1 ton cylinder 187 0.5 4$h Ammonia 12,789 gallons 117 5.0 254 Hydrazine 6,644 gallons 122 0.5 12.9 The control building model was only used for the chlorine runs. Control building concentrations vs. time are included for this case. gh, A new figure has been provided for chlorine showing predicted control building and control room chlorine concentrations versus time based on the revised control building room volumes and outside air makeup flow rates shown in revised Table 450.1-2 (enclosed). Additional data points have also been plotted for the outside air concentration curve to more accurately depict the predicted variation in the outside air chlorine concentration versus time. ( l
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t } EXFLANATORY NOTE In accordance with revised FSAR Table 450.1-2 (enclosed), the total l inflow rate of outside air into rooms immediately adjoining the control room is 6,419 cfh rather than 13,719 cfm as reported earlier. i The original evaluation of C1 concentrations inside the control room.following a postulated.d ret case onsite chlorine gas release i had inadvertently included an equipment room within the control l buildig as one of the rooms immediately adjoining the control room l Re-examination of the control building layout drawings revealed that the equipment room does not directly abut the control room. Therefore, the following modifications were made to the earlier l l control room habitability calculation for chlorine: (1) The not effectivetotalfreevolumeofroomsimagdiatelyadjoinjngthe l control room was reduced from 460,192 ft to 397,107 ft to exclude i the free volume of the equipment room; and, (2) the total inflow of l l outside air into the rooms adjoining the control room was reduced l l from 13,719 cfm to 6,419 cfh, again to exclude that portion of l control building outside air makeup supplied to the equipment room. The not effect of these changes is to reduce the predicted l C1, concentration inside the control room at the time operators are presumed to have donned protective breathing apparatus. Keeping other modeling assumptions constant, the control room chlorine l concentration at two minutes following an alarm from the chlorine detector declines from 14.8 ppm to 8.1 ppm when the equipment room j inleakage contribution is subtracted. l l i l l l l I p r I l i b i I l I}}