ML20127M560
| ML20127M560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/09/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8505230302 | |
| Download: ML20127M560 (145) | |
Text
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i ORENAL 4
Uh11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
COMMISSION MEETING
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LOCATION:
WASHINGTON, D. C.
PAGES:
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DATE:
THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1985
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888'"?888!""
PT9.7 PDR ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
OfficialRtporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001
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(202)347-3700
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lanapn/r&t1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
i 4
BRIEFING ON BROOKHAVEN REPORT ON 5
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION 6
7 PUBLIC MEETING 8
Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.
9 Washington, D.C.
10 Thursday, May 9, 1985 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.
^
12 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
13 NUNZIO PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission
,i THOMAS ROBERTS, Commissioner 14 JAMES ASSELSTINE, Commissioner FREDERICK BERNTHAL, Commissioner 15 LANDO ZECH, Commissioner 16 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
17 M. CAREW E. WEINSTOCK 18 W. KATO W. DIRCKS 19 T.
IPPOLITO C. O. MILLER 20 H. PLAINE E. JORDAN 21 J. TAYLOR H. DENTON 22 s
23 l
l 24 Ace-Fedorol Reporters, Inc.
25 I
l l
l DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on May 9, 1985 in the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informa-tional purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part;of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to.any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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EESSEEEEEEE 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Good morning, ladies and 3
-gentlemen.
4 The Commission is meeting this morning to receive 5
a briefing on the February 15, 1985 report prepared for the 6
NRC by the Brookhaven National Laboratory on an Independent 7
Safety Organization.
8 The subject of an independent agency to investigate 9
incidents at NRC licensed facilities has been with us for many 10 years.
The Brookhaven Report evaluates the need for an 11 Independent Safety Organization and provides specific 12 conclusions and recommendations.
13 Subsequent to receipt of the report, this subject
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14 was discussed with the ACRS during the Commission's meeting 15 with the ACRS on April 11, 1985.
16 We have with us today the staff to give tui their 17 views on whether such an organizational change is, in their 18 opinion, warranted.
We also have Dr. Kato from Brookhaven 19 to answer questions and participate in the discussion.
20 The objective of today's meeting is to develop the 21 basis on which the Commission can decide whether further 22 consideration of the subject is appropriate.
If we decide s-23 it is appropriate, I think we ought to try to develop clear 24 direction to the staff.
If further evaluation, we decide, Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 is not appropriate, I believe then we should direct the staff
3 1
to prepare a response that advises Congress of the final 2
conclusions.
-3 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have any opening
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4 remarks at this time?
5 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
No.
6
' COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right, then let me turn the -
8 meeting over to Mr. Dircks.
'l 9
MR. DIRCKS:
The way we would like to proceed is 10 to have Tom Ippolito give a few introductory remarks and 11 put the matter into some perspective.
Then Dr. Kato would 12 spend about half an hour or so on his report.
Then we would 13 like to go back to Tom Ippolito to provide comments on the
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14 report.
L 15 I would also like to have the opportunity to have 16 Mr. Jim Taylor, who heads up our Office of Inspection and 17 Enforcement, supplement the comments by his remarks and 18 comments.
At the end of it, I would like to have a few words 19 to _ say on the matter, too.
20 If that is satisfactory, that is how we would like 21 to proceed.
By the way, I think you know Tom Ippolito.
Tom 22 is the Deputy Director of the Office of Analysis and i
23 Evaluation of Operating Data.
Jack is out ill, he had his operation and I think he is well on the way to recovery now.
24 Ace Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I had not known that.
I am i
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n.
6 -
4 I
pleased to hear that he is recovering.
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2 MR. IPPOLITO:
He expects to be back at work on 3
Monday.
I'm not sure, but that's what he said.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
5 MR. IPPOLITO:
To proceed now to the agenda.
The 6
responsibility for assuring that the study was made was assigned 7
to the AEOD, who then contracted with Brookhaven to perform 8
the study.
They completed the study in February and we 9
transmitted it both to the Commission and to Congress about 10 the 1st of March.
The ACRS provided you a letter on the 11 13th of March.
12 We, the EDO, then provided our comments on the 13 BNL report in our memo of the 28th of March, and you have met
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14 with the ACRS on this issue in April '85.
15 The way the agenda is set up is that we will 16 initially hear a summary of the BNL report from Dr. Kato, and 17 this will be followed by staff comments on the report, 18 including summary conclusions to follow.
19 Unless there are any questions, we could proceed 20 on with'Dr. Kato's presentation.
21 MR. KATO:
Members of the Commission, I am pleased 22 to have this opportunity to discuss our study of an 23 Independent Safety Organization.
24 I brought with me two of my colleagues from Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 Brookhaven, Dr. Gene Weinstock and John Carew who participated
5 j.
1 in the study to help me answer any questions you may have.
2 I would like to present a brief discussion of our I[
3 study and then be available for questions.
I have given you L,
4 handouts consisting of viewgraphs which outline the study.
5 I may not use all of the viewgraphs but they are provided for l
6 your information.
7 I would also like to add that since preparing our l
8 Presentation, I understand that you have had a memo which 9
summarizes our report and it has done a very nice job, a very I
i 10 ad. ich in summarizing our report.
So, instead of following l
11 my prepared text I will ad-lib to some extent in order to l
L-12 cut down time.
I will not repeat some of the things that I I
13 think you know already.
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14 This ISO -- Independent Safety Organization -. study l
15 was conducted by a NBL task force composed of scientists and 16 engineers having expertise in diverse nuclear engineering 17 disciplines.
18 The members of the task force are listed as authors 19 of the report and it's shown in the first viewgraph.
J. Mark 20 Elliott of International Energy Associates helped us with the 21 organizational structure and costs.
Mark Rowden and Sam 22 Fowler from the Firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
23 Kampelman studied the need for legislation for establishing 24 a Nuclear Safety Board or an Office of Nuclear Safety within Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the present Commission.
u.
6 l
1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Walt, did you make the' 2
decision to hire those people?
3 MR. KATO:
Yes, we did.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
5 MR. KATO:
Messrs Elliot, Rowden and Fowler although 6
listed as contributors to the report were used as consultants 7
in their fields of expertise.
Of course, the attorneys I
8 handling the legislative part of the report, they were not
)
9 involved in the determination of need for the ISO or the 10 recommendations of the report.
I want to make sure that is 1
11 clear.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Oksy.
13 MR. KATO:
The objectives of this study are shown in I
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14 the next slide, which was to determine the need for and 15 feasibility of establishing an independent organization 16 responsible for conducting investigations of significant 17 safety events, including signicant operational incidents 18 at nuclear power plants, at facilities licensed by the 19 Commicsion and for making reports of such investigations.
20 In conducting this study, we adopted some assumptions 21 based on our interpretation of the objectives.
The next slide 22 outlines those assumptions.
23 First of all, the investigation -- the study was 24 investigation of significant events at operating facilities.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 We excluded facilities under constructions.
7 1
Secondly, the study was limited to a study of how 2
investigations of events were being conducted for determination 3
of cause.
We excluded a study of how investigations or wrong-4 doing, or rule infractions by licensees were being conducted 5
by the NRC.
6 And thirdly, this study excluded from its consideratic n 7
the need for an organization to oversee the performance of 8
the NRC.
l 9
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On that last item, Walt, 10 by excluding that issue, to what extent does that limit your 11 consideration of something like an NTSB organization that 12 looks not only at the performance of the aircraft industry, 13 for example, but also the performance of the FAA?
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14 I guess what I am trying to get a feel for is, when 15 you made that conscious decision about what your objective 16 was, did that mean, for example, that you really did not give 17 full consideration to that option, an NTSB-type option?
18 MR. KATO:
No, we did consider an NTSB-type of 19' Board or that particular option; we did consider it.
And as 20 you will see, we rejected a completely independent Board for 21 various reasons.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
But I guess what 23 I am wondering is, how much did that third -- your interpre-24 tation of that third objective have a role in that --
l l Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
Obviously, if it's required, if you need l
l l
w 8
I an organization to oversee the NRC, obviously it should be 2
completely independent of the NRC.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
But you did not 4
look at all at the question of whether there was a need for 5
that kind of organization.
6 MR. KATO:
That's correct, we did not look at 7
how adequate the NRC's performance was, we felt that was not 8
within our charter.
We were dealing specifically with the 9
question of investigation of events.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
11 MR. KATO:
The study was divided into five components 12 A study of the --
I(-
13 MR. DIRCKS:
But Walt --
14 MR. KATO:
I'm sorry.
l 15 MR. DIRCKS:
-- I think maybe to clarify, in looking 16 at how the investigation of events takes place or is under-17 taken, or the investigation itself, you would look at not only 18 the licensees' activities in that event but you would also, 19 I would assume, look at NRC's, the regulatory --
20 MR. KATO:
Oh, sure.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, the sense I had was 22 that you did look at the quality of NRC investigations of 23 operating events.
24 MR. KATO:
Of operating events --
4ce Federtl Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
- . V 9
1 MR. KATO:
-- not of the question of whether --
2
~ COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Day-to-day performance of 3
'its job, you didn't~ look at, but at least in terms of tne N
4 investigation of operating events, you did.
MR. KATO:
We' did not look at how well NRC --
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Inspects the plants or --
7 MR. IGEN):
-- does licensing of plants and so forth.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
9 MR. DIRCKS:
I want to make sure you --
10 CHAIRMAN ~PALLADINO:
Of course, we don't lack for 11 oversight like other groups.
12 (Laughter) 13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Your understatement is mild.
s(.
14 (Laughter) 15 MR. KATO:
The study was divided in five components.
16
-The first, study of the current practices or in-depth 17
' investigation by the Commission staff; a detailed study of 18 the FAA/NTSB; organizational structure of the independent 19 safety organiation; legislative requirements, discussion 20 and recommendations.
21 The first two parts were intended to lay the basis 22 for the determination of need for and feasibility of 23 establishing an ISO.
Because we were under very severe time 24 constraints and limited resources, we approached the question Ace Federti Reporters, Inc.
25 of need.by interviewing over forty knowledgeable individuals
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10 I
such as former Commissioners, Commission officials, staff, J
2 FAA/NTSB officials, representatives of reactor vendors, 3
utilities, INPO, EPRI, and the public sector.
4 The opinions of these individuals have been considered 5
in the development of the recommendations of the study.
We 6
did study past investigations of a few selected significant 7
events on the basis of reports prepared by the NRC staff.
8 COMMISSIO'1ER BERNTHAL:
How many events were those?
9 MR. KATO:
Seven -- six, I'm sorry.
10 Again because of time constraints and limited 11 resources, we were unable to interview the principals involved 12 in these events, in other words, we used the reports that we-13 could get our hands on to look at how well the events were
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14 investigated.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You mentioned limited time and 16 limited resources twice.
What sorts of time constraints 17 were you under?
18 MR. KATO:
Well, our first -- we received the work-19 order roughly the end of August of '84,-and we had to have 20 a report, the first draft was required by November 15, I think 21 it was.
The reason for that was that I think Congress said --
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
23 MR. KATO:
-- they had to have a report within 24 six months?
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, that's right.
11 e
1 From the interviews and studies of selected events, 2
we arrived at the following findings:
3 The investigation of operational events by NRC as 4
well as by INPO had generally been conducted in a proficient 5
.and technically competent manner, with some exceptions.
6 We found that there were a number of improvements,
.7 however, which were identified and these include those that 8
are shown in the next viewgraph.
9 First, the separation of fact-finding from 10 determination of regulatory compliance.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Walt, are you going to come 12 back and talk about the exceptions?
13 MR. KATO:
I'm sorry?
.i 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You said that' generally 15 dhe NRC had done a good job in investigating operating 16 events, with some exceptions.
17 MR. KATO:
Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I'd like you to go back 19 at some point and talk about the exceptions.
20 MR. KATO:
Okay.
Well, we looked at six events.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
21 MR. KATO:
There are a couple of events, for 22 23 example, Salem is one which I think there were elements of 24 perhaps overlapping investigation.
Also, I think we are not Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
I mean, we 25 quite sure exactly what the cause of the event was.
l l
12 1
know, we know that 'it.was due to the circuit breakers.
2
~ COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:.Yes.
3 MR. KATO:
But because'of the fact that there were J
v 4
difficulties in' determining which circuit breakers were in 5
the~ circuit at the time, I think there is still somewhat l;
-6 uncertainty.
But that's an example.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Let me ask you about 8
. Salem because -- for two reasons.
First, as I recall, at the i
9 time our staff said they thought this was the most significant p
i 10 operating event since TMI.
And I remember when we met with 11 the ACRS recently to discuss this whole issue, Charlie Wylie t
'12 who worked for Duke and was heavily involved in the electrical
'13 systems work down~there as I recall, said, "You know, Salem is a good example of how the NRC staff does not do a~ good 14
. job of investigating operating events and identifying the
-15 16 root cause."
17 What he seemed to be saying was, the staff just 18 missed the boat.
That they said that the root-cause problem here is maintenance, and Wylie was saying, that's not the 19 20 problem at all.
The problem is.a bad design for this piece of equipment and what you need to do is have a better designed 21 i
P 22
_ piece of equipment.
He said,-everybody knows that, and the 23 staff went down the wrong route, wrong path, in looking at 24 the root cause of it.
IAce Fede,al Reporters, Inc.
I'd be interested to know, based upon your review, 25 4
4-
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whether you agree with that and, if so, doesn't this identify 2
a fundamental weakness in our investigation and review of 3
operating events?
4 What he seemed to be saying was, the staff doesn't 5
do a very good job in reviewing operating events, and that 6
was the example that he gave.
I would be interested in hearing 7
your reaction to what he said.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think we ought to also 9
give the staff a chance to defend themselves because with all 10 of the talk about backfitting in the last two and three years, 11 I can well imagine what might run through their minds, that if 12 you maintain one of the many rather antiquated and outdated 13 pieces of equipment that certainly exist in these plants, if 14 you maintain it properly, it will work right.
If you don't, 15 it won't work and you certainly would prefer that you have a 16 complete replacement for such equipment.
But we all know how hard and how difficult it has 17 18 been to do that.
I'm not sure that the staff is at fault for 19 that.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, that's a different 21 question.
If what you are saying is that the staff was 22 influenced not to require a change in equipment because of 23 all this pressure against backfitting, that raises a whole 24 different kind of concern.
Ace-Federzl Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The utilities are very
s 14 I
reluctant to because of the great difficulty to get the NRC 2
to approve new pieces of equipment.
I think everyone agrees
-3 that's part of the problem in getting updated and modernized 4
control rooms.
It's very simple, it's very, very difficult 5
.to get-the NRC to approve it.
It would-take forever to get 6
through this agency.
7 And that is one of the reasons it has been so 8
difficult to keep abreast of the technology.
That's sort of 9
everybody's fault, Jim, it's:not just our's; it'is not just 10 the industry's, it's just the way the system has been set up.
11 All I am saying is, I think I can understand why 12 the staff may have focused on maintenance rather than on yet 13 another order to replace some rack full'of equipment when s-14 they themselves would take some long period of time to review 15 that equipment, I would presume.
16 I'm sorry,.I didn't mean to interrupt, and you asked 17 for the response here.
18 MR. DIRCKS:
We can come back to Salem, but I t,hink 19 that was an over-simplification of the staff's findings.
Maybe 20 Wylie was taking a short-hand cut to make a point, but I think 21 we can address that issue.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
22 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And incidentally, both could 24 be root causes.
Given a particular design maintenance can be Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
a root cause and then you say, "If I had a better design, it 25
15 e
I would be better.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
But, of course, we 3
didn't require a better design.
4 MR. DIRCKS:
We touched on the design issue.
So, 5
saying that we ignore design is just absolutely false.
But I 6
don't want to get into it right now.
I think we can cover 7
that.
O COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
But I'd like to 9
hear Walt's assessment, too, of the Salem events since that 10 is one of the ones that they looked at, and perhaps it's the II most significant event since TMI.
MR. KATO:
I don't think we could go to the type of 12 13 generalization that Charlie Wylie made.
We just didn't have I4 the resources at the time to look into it that deeply.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So you are saying you 16 didn't have an opportunity to look deeply enough to decide I7 how effective the staff's review really was?
MR. KATO:
That's correct.
I mean, from what we have heard, we feel that that investigation could have been 20 improved.
But we were not able -- well, I mean in order to 21 really investigate an event like that, I mean, you really have 22 to go down and talk with the people involved and find out 23 exactly what took place, et cetera.
We were not able to do 2
that.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I don't want to criticize
e-16 l
what you'did or your report, but what that says to me then 2
is that we ought to not place very heavy reliance on your 3
conclusion that based upon your review of these six events, 4
the staff's response to these six operating events, that the 5
staff--does a good job in reviewing those.
6 It sounds like to me you didn't have the time to get 7
the information and to do the work to really reach a sound 8 ' judgment on 'that question, which leaves open the question
-9 of whether the staff really is doing a good job.
10 MR. KATO:
Well, our recommendations are based upon l
11 the comments that people have made to us, and we were not, 12 you know -- we have used that as a basis as well as our own 13 reading of the reports, as well as the testimony in hearings.
f 14 And to make a flat statement that the staff was not 15 doing a good job, I don't think we can do at this present 16 time.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
But on the other u
18 hand, you did make the statement that generally they. are doing 19 a good job.
And I guess what I'm wondering --
20 MR. KATO:
Well, if you --
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- how much confidence 22 can we place in that judgment, recognizing the limitations --
23 MR. KATO:
Again, this is based on what' people have 24 told us.
For example, if we had looked at six events and found be-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 there were some deficiencies in all of them, then one could i
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17 1
say, "Well, gee, there is something seriously wrong."
I don't 2
think we found that.
3 I mean, we selected events which we thought that 4
there would be_some deficiencies, or at least people indicated 5
that there were deficiencies.
6 COMM:1SIONER ASSELSTINE:
Did you talk to Charlie 7
Wylie?
8 MR. KATO:
I don't remember.
Wylie, we did not, 9
I think.
I don't remember.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Il MR. KATO:
I can look up my list, but I don't 12 remember whether he was one that we talked to.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I don't think we should 14 get hung up on that.
If they found that the staff is gener, ally 15 doing a good job, it's okay to prove or disprove whether they But the staff did identify this as a very important 16 are.
17 incident.
They did pursue it, they pursued it vigorously.
18 They brought in talented people to help them on it and that 19 to me says, there is as much basis for saying they did a good 20 job there as in many other things.
21 MR. KATO:
I think one of the things one questions 22 is the procedural part of the way in which the investigation 23 took place.
For example, one of the recommendations that we 24 made is that there should be the freezing of components --
Ace Federoi Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
Well, that was one L_ _
1' 18
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1 problem, nobody knew where the right parts were and they were 2
tampered with, and --
t.
3 MR. KATO:
But that's a procedural matter which, okay,
~ 4 I mean this is why we recommended that there be some group --
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
6 MR. KATO:
-- some organization which is responsible 7
for investigating of events.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And how would they ensure 10 that the components are left where they should be?
II COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Because presumably they 12 would be trained in doing that kind of work and they would know 13 that one of the first things you do -- I think the ACRS made 14 the same point to us -- one of the first things you do in an 15 investigation like that is, you freeze the evidence.
16 In fact, I think Glen Reed was the one that said 17 that.
You make sure that somebody doesn't tamper with the 18 components and the equipment or take them away, or you lose 19 sight of which ones they are --
20 MR. KATO:
Well, to the extent that you can, I 21 think it's worthwhile.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.'
23 MR. KATO:
Of course --
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And that also wasn't done ko Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 at Salem.
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19 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And the NTSB is smarter at 2
that than our people could be.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Well, the letter from one
'I 4
of the NTSB members, or one of the people who used to work 5
there,-as I recall, made that point.
Now, he also said there 6
are some problems with the way the NTSB works from time to 7
time as well.
8 But I thought he was making that same point, that 9
if you've got a group of people, a cadre of people, whose 10 job it is to go out and investigate these things, you can make 11 sure that those people are trained in the kinds of things 12 you have to do to do that job.
The investigating is different than the kind of normal routine work that your safety engineers 13 14 and scientists do.
15 MR. DIRCKS:
You know, we can rehash the Salem 16 case if you want to and we probably will.
You know, obviously 17 you are finding that you don't like one of the points that 18 Dr. Kato made.
But you ought to allow him to make some more 19 points.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No, but in fairness, isn't 21 this -- I mean, one of the key points is, is there a problem.
22 I mean, you make that point in your memo, Bill.
You say, " Gee, 23 there is no problem here."
And what I'm trying to do is understand what the basi s
24 Ace FWeal Reporters, lnc.
25 is for --
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20 I
MR. DIRCKS:
I didn't say there was no problem, Jim.
2 If I were a human being with any thought, I would never say 3
there 'is never a problem.
I'll say there are problems.
4 I am sure you, in your own life, may have a problem 5
once in a while.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I couldn't agree more.
7 I couldn't agree more.
8 MR. DIRCKS:
You don't say, "No problems."
You 9
say, "We can improve," and I think we did say we can improve.
10 After every investigation we go through the same thing, you Il could have done it better.
There isn't an investigation that 12 is conducted that on Monday morning you can re-quarterback 13 4
the whole thing.
\\
I4 But Dr. Kato spent a long time on this report --
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
16 MR. DIRCKS:
-- and we are rapidly running out of 17 time.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I would like to let him go 19 ahead.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I'd like to let him 21 go ahead.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Jim, you made your point and 23 while we don't necessarily agree with it, at least it's out 24 on the table.
le-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
All right.
But let me just
p 21 1
you know, in~ answer to what Bill said, read the first sentence 2
from the top of page 2 on his March 28 memo which says, 3
"Rather than correcting an existing deficiency, the need or 4
justification for a new office seems to rest almost entirely 5
upon the perceived need to minimize or eliminate any potential 6
conflict of interest in order to gain increased public media 7
and congressional confidence in the investigatory process and 8
in the performance of the nuclear industry."
9 MR. DIRCKS:
Right, okay.
~10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That seems to say --
11 MR. DIRCKS:
That seems to say --
l 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- there is no problem.
13 MR.-DIRCKS:
You know, you are dealing with 14 perception again, Jim.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
16 MR. DIRCKS:
Why don't you deal with some --
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
All right.
~13 MR. DIRCKS:
-- all the facts themselves?
19 MR. KATO:- Let's see, I think we stopped at No. 1 20 and --
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Every now and then we have 22 a meeting that convinces me that'the Sunshine Act might work, 23 Jim.
It doesn't happen often enough.
24 (Laughter)
%e-Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, let's go on and give Dr.
I i
i
22 1
Kato a chance to make his points.
If you have questions, try 2
to limit them while t*c.e ciscussion is going on to questions
'3 of understanding, and we'll come back to you.
4 MR. KATO:
These improvements include, first, the 5
separation of fact-finding from the regulatory compliance --
6 for two reasons.
To minimize the adversary relationship 7
between NRC and utility personnel and, secondly, to minimize 8
a potential conflict of interest on the part of NRC staff due 9
to its prior regulatory or enforcement actions or missions.
10 Secondly, a more structured and coordinated 11 approach to investigation of significant events to minimize 12 the number of overlapping investigations and to more strongly 13 focus on the fact-finding and determination of cause as the 14 primary goal.
15 Third, procedures to freeze plant conditions and 16 personnel as soon as possible after a significant event to 17 preserve the evidence for fact-finding.
18 Fourth, greater operating experience and practical 19 technical expertise and training in conducting investigations 20 on the part of the investigators.
21 More accurate and timely identification of significant.
22 events.
23 And finally, improved feedback in a more timely 24 manner of the results of the investigations to the utilities Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 and the public, and more timely consideration of the
23 I
recommendations.
2 Although many of the improvements which we have 3
' identified in the study could be implemented by the present i
4 organization, it is felt that they could be more easily brought 5
about by a new organization divorced entirely from the 6
regulatory and compliance arms of the NRC.
7 I'd like to go into next the recommendations and 8
then highlight those things which we believe we dif fer between 9
the staff and ourselves.
10 This study recommends the establishment of a 11 quasi independent statutory organization headed by a director, 12 reporting to the Commissioners.
13 The ONS would have the primary responsibility of
(
14 the conduct of the investigations of significant events at 15 NRC licensed facilities.
It would have three purposes:
16 To establish the facts, conditions and circumstances 17 of the events.
18 Second, to determine the cause of the events.
19 To recommend improvements designed to prevent 20 recurrence and enhance safety.
21 This office weeld adopt an investigatory system 22 patterned after that of the NTSB.
The ONS would also assume l
23 the current responsibilities and functions of the AEOD.
l 24 Now, let's ask ourselves what we mean by the NTSB Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 investigatory system.
First, there would be a "Go Team"
24 1
I consisting of parties responsible for fact-finding.
By 2
" parties" we mean representatives with pertinent technical 3
expertise from the NRC, utilities, reactor component manu-4 facturers, INPO, EPRI, et cetera.
It would exclude attorneys representatives from insurance companies or claimants.
5 cn:
6 The ONS would direct any investigation that takes 7
place.
It would also determine who becomes a member of 8
the party.
The ONS would be responsible for public hearings 9
if necessary for placing facts on record.
10 The ONS would be responsible for conducting the 11 analysis, evaluation, and determination of cause.
12
.Now, I want to make sure that it's clear that there
- 13 is a differentiation between the "Go Team" which does the 14 fact-finding and the people who do the analysis, evaluation, 15 and determination of cause.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Does the "Go Team" hold the 17 hearings?
18 MR. KATO:
Beg your pardon?
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Does the "Go Team" hold the 20 hearings?
21 MR. KATO:
The ONS -- in the case of the NTSB, 22 NTSB is responsible for holding hearings, they have the 23 judges and so forth.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Maybe I don't understand Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 the "Go Team. "
Is the "Go Team" the one that holds the I
t
7 3
25 I
hearings?
s 2
MR. KATO:
No.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
4 i
4 MR. KATO:
No, it's the ONS.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How do they get the facts if 6
they don't hold the hearings?
r 7 MR. KATO:
No, the "Go Team" is the team that goes 8
after, or does the fact-finding, the actual fact-finding.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But don't they interview 10 people?
11 MR. KATO:
Oh, yes.
But then, once you have gone 12 through the interview process and if you want to put things 13 on record in a public hearing, that is when ONS or the NTSB (r
14 would hold hearings.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I don't understand.
Facts are
-' - 16 facts, whether they are "On the~ record" or not.
If the "Go 17 Team" gets the facts, then why do you need a hearing?
18 MR. KATO:
Well, as we understand it, there are 19 instances where there may be differences of opinion or 20. differences in the way in which people approach looking at 21 facts where they would have hearings. 'Especially in the aviation industry, especially when you have a major accident 22 23 where you would like to have a certain amount of public 24 recognition that the investigation is taking place, they will
- w. P.d.<oi n.p mn, w.
25 have public hearings.
0 26 9
1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You say they are non-adjudicatory.
2 Does that mean no cross-examination?
3 MR. KATO:
Yes.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That's interesting.
Okay.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
We have to be sure we keep 6
these pronounciations clear, it sounds like the " Goat Team,"
7 and that is the Commission.
8 (Laughter) 9 MR. KATO:
The ONS would make then -- af ter the ONS 10 has done the evaluation and determination of cause, ONS would 11 make recommendations of that occurrence.
The ONS would issue 12 public reports with the facts, analyses, probable cause, 13 and recommendations of significant events to the regulatory 14 authorities.
15 The next slide defines how significant events -- or 16 the next slide tells how the significant event should be 17 defined.
One of our tasks was to come up with recommendations 18 as to a definition of "significant events."
19 To define a significant event is quite difficult.
20 So, we felt that we would leave it up to the independent 21 safety organization to make a definition as to when there 22 should be a full field investigation, or not.
23 We felt that as a minimum the alerts and higher 24 emergency action levels and abnormal occurrences should be Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 considered significant events.
~
27 1
In the next viewgraph we discuss the bases for these 2
recommendations.
First of all, we have itemized what we 3
considered the improvements which are needed in the investi-i 4
gation system for significant events.
5 Secondly, the investigatory body must be independent 6
of the licensing and compliance arm, the regulatory agency.
7 Third, the differences between the responsibilities 8
of the NRC and FAA and the smaller number of significant events lead us to the recommendation that ONS be within the 9
10 NRC.
We recommended a statutory office reporting to the 11 Commission because it provides greater visibility and stature.
12 Now, as we understand, as we read the comments which 13 the various office directors have provided you, as well as the comments from some of the regional administrators and by ja the OPE, we feel that there is generally agreement that there 15 16 is need for improvement in the way in which the investigations 17 should take place.
That is, at least from the lack of 18 comments regarding the need for the improvements, our judgment 19 is that we are pretty much in agreement that these improvements 20 that we have identified should be put in place.
Where we differ is on the question of to what 21 22 degree should there be independence of this organization to 23 do the investigating of events.
I would like to speak to that 24 subject on the next slide.
' Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 First, the point that we would like to make is that
28 I
we want to avoid a potential or actual conflict of interest 2
due to past regulatory or compliance actions.
In our review of 3
the events we did not find any bias although, again because j
4 of the constraints that we were under, we did not really do a 5
thorough search.
i 6
But the point is that there is always a potential 7
for conflict of interest when the investigating agency is the i
8 same as the agency which does the regulation.
9 The second point is that we feel that to enhance 10 public confidence in the objectivity of the investigation, that 11 there should be a separation between the investigatory agency 12 or investigative group and the regulation and compliance part.
13 And thirdly, to obtain greater visibility and hence 14 greater incentive for more timely resolution of technical 15 issues and acceptance of these recommendations is the last 16 reason why we believe that the investigatory agency should be 17 independent of the regulatory side.
18 On the next slide is a statement which --
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You say independent of the 20 regulatory -- you mean the licensing, or do you say even from 21 the inspection?
22 MR. KATO:
The licensing, yes.
Yes, licensing and 23 inspection --
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Bo th.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
-- parts of the,NRC.
That is licensing --
o 29 1
well, I&E is responsible for the compliance through inspecting 2
and so forth.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I don't see how that differs 4
from the Transportation Board concept because they are 5
inspecting and they find problems.
6 MR. KATO:
No, the NTSB does not -- the NTSB 7
investigates accidents.
The FAA has the inspectors to make 8
sure that the airlines are complying with regulations and so 9
forth.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, presumably one of the 11 things that the NTSB would look at is, did the FAA's licensing 12 process and licensing approvals, or did their inspection 13 programs break down and in some way contribute to the event.
14 MR. KATO:
That's correct, NTSB does that.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And you have an independent 16 check on not only what the industry did but also what the 17 FAA did, the government, carrying out its regulatory 18 responsibilities.
19 MR. KATO:
In the case of the aviation industry, 20 that is true.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
22 MR. DIRCES:
But it's a separate agency, it doesn't 23 report to the Administrator of the FAA.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
Ace rederof Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. DIRCKS:
It's separate from him.
30 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
It sends its 2
reports to him.
3 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But it functionally is 5
a separate entity.
6 MR. DIRCKS: But it's outside the agency completely.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
8 MR. KATO:
This philosophy of separating the 9
investigatory agency from the compliance and the licensing 10 side is embodied in the Preamble to the Independent Safety 11 Board Act of 1974 which created the NTSB.
And let me read it 12 for you so that you can see what the flavor of conversation --
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do we have a copy?
14 MR. KATO:
You do not have that.
I do have copies 15 which I will hand out in a moment.
These are not very good 16 copies.
I thought this would be worthwhile.
This is a 17 quote from the Independent Safety Board Act.
18
" Proper conduct of the responsibilities assigned to 19 this Board requires vigorous investigation of accidents 20 involving transportation modes regulated by other agencies of 21 government, demands continual review, appraisal, and assessment 22 of the operating practices and regulations of all such agencies 23 and calls for the making of conclusions and recommendations 24 that may be critical of or adverse to any such agency or its Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 officials.
No federal agency can properly perform such
31 6
_1 functions unless it is totally separate and independent from 2
any other department, bureau, commission, or agency of the 3
United States."
4 And it is based on this philosophy that we recommendec 5
that the investigatory body be separated from the licensing P ants part of the --
l 6
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Although preSQmably this 8
Philosphy takes it a step farther and says it ought to be 9
outside the agency as a whole, or at least not under even the 10 Commission's control.
11 MR. KATO:
Well, one of the reasons why in the case 12 of the NTSB/FAA separation is that FAA, for example, manages 13 the air traffic control system --
[
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
15 MR. KATO:
-- it disseminates weather information.
16 It also is responsible for the navigational aids.
And so, the FAA could be a cause of an accident, whereas the NRC does not 17 18 do --
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Some have argued that we 20 could, too.
21 MR. KATO:
Well, I think at the moment the NRC does 22 not do anything directly with the plants, and therefore we I
23 don't see a potential conflict of interest in that area.
l 24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But you know, one really Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 wonders where this whole' thing ends.
I mean, okay, so you broko I
g.
f~.
2*
32
'i I
apart the NRC because the NRC was supposed-to be responsible i
i 2
for public health and. safety, you didn't trust them to be with 3
the promoters.
p y..
i il
'4 Now you are not trusting the NRC which is responsible 5
for public health and safety, you want to trust a separate 6
national-type Board to oversee the overseers, and presumably the courts oversee the National Transportation Safety Board.
7 i
8 I. guess I'll have to ~ ask, who is overseeing the courts now?
9 I mean, it really gets to the, point where you are 10 not' trusting anybody.
I don't disagree with the fundamental
. 11 conclusions that you have reached here, the conceptual things.
12 But when it comes to organization and how this should be done, 13 I think the attitude embodied in National Transportation Safety 14 Boards and recommending then there be a specific Board for 15 this agency which has responsibility for public health and 16 safety, says something -- says quite a bit about th'e path's 17 that we have come to in this country.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But of course, that's 19 not what Walt is. recommending.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
No, I understand that.
I L
21 realize that.
But some people are recommending that.
22 MR. KATO:
We are not recommending that ONS or that 23 there be a Nuclear Safety Board which would oversee the NRC.
t 24 We are not saying that.
Awfdwd Rewwes, lnc.
25
. COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
1
-m.
- 12.
33 1
MR. KATO:
And I might mention, in the case of the 2
NTSB when we interviewed the managing director, I guess, his 3
title was, they do have the legal right to oversee FAA.
But I
4 because of their other responsibilities and because of 5
resource limitations, they don't do much of it.
6 But that's another issue.
We didn't -- again, I 7
want to make sure that it's clear that we did not address the 8
question, is there a need for an oversight over the NRC.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, that's a separate 10 question.
11 MR. KATO:
That's a totally different question.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
While you are right, other 13 people have raised that, that question turns on the credibility g
14 ad performance of this agency.
15 MR. KATO:
The other things -- well, that's one of.
16 the major differences in our recommendation and the staff's 17 position.
The other difference is in the question of how 18 large should this organization be, that is the ONS.
And I'd 19 like to spend the remaining minutes discussing that particular 20 point.
21 In your handouts I have outlined for you what the a
22 responsibilities of the FAA and the NTSB are.
I will not go 23 into them at the present time unless you have questions.
I 24 would like to discuss the number of people that are involved Ace Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 in the NTSB.
I
34
/
The NTSB has a total of 320 people.
Of this, the 1
2 division of their organization is divided, as you can see up above, on the order of 50 percent, or a little under 50 percent, 3
are devoted to accident investigation.
So, you can see that 4
the primary function of NTSB is accident investigation; 5
UP above, you can see that 115 people are devoted 6
7 strictly to aviation accidents.
They look at, or they produced on the order of 3,500 field accident reports in 198.4 8
and'll major accident investigations.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How many of those are --
10 11 oh, they are all s.viation, okay.
12 MR. KATO:
These are all aviation.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, 115 people do all of 13 7
14 that work.
15 MR. KATO:
Yes, roughly.
Well, you can add some 16 of the people in the intermodal category.
Our best guess is that on the order of 50 percent, give or take a few, are
}7 devoted to or involved with aviation accidents.
18 19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But don't these people, don't 20 they get augmented by other people?
21 MR. KATO:
Oh, yes.
Yes.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The implication here is that 22 all these reports are done with 115 people.
23 24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They do the reports, don't Ate-Fedorol Reporters, Inc.
25 they?
35 I
MR. KATO:" The reports themselves are done by the 2
NTSB, yes.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
By their staff.
5 MR. KATO:
By their staff.
The input to the reports 6
does come from -- well, if there is a major accident where 7
you have a "Go Team" et cetera, then cbviously there are 8
contributions from other people.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What's their total FTEs?
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The "Go Team," though --
11 excuse me.
The "Go Team," though, helps write the report; 12 doesn't it?
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Including consultants.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If it doesn't, then I don't 15 know --
16 MR. KATO:
It presents, it develops the facts of 17 the case.
It does not write the analysis, evaluation, and 18 determination of cause.
The NTSB does the writing of the 19 analysis, evaluation, and determination of cause and 20 recommendations.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How many -- what's the total 22 number of people that they have in terms of FTEs?
I mean, l
l 23 this says what is on their payroll, but as we heard last 24 time, they hire a lot of consultants.
(ke Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
Three-hundred and twenty is --
36 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
No, no, I am talking about, 2
what's the total FTE equivalent, f '; I can double the terms 1
3 here, for everything they do in the course of a year?
I was 4
told -- I thought we were told in the last meeting -- that 5
they don't nearly have the expertise in-house to do a lot of 6
the investigation.
Most of it is done by contract.
7 MR. KATO:
No.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Or by -- not contract but 9
by dipping into the resources of other organizations.
10 MR. KATO:
It's our impresion that -- well, for 11 major accidents, if you have like the 14th Street Bridge 12 accident, they had a lot of help from the aircraft manu-13 facturers, the airline industry --
,(
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Right.
15 MR. KATO:
-- and so forth.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That is paid help, and 17 how much of it is free help?
18 MR. KATO:
Let me ask Gene Weinstock.
19 MR. WEINSTOCK:
Typically, in a major accident 20 they will have on the order of a hundred people probably.
21 Only maybe ten percent of those are from the NTSB.
Through 22 this party system they can actually expand the resources, but i
23 anly during the fact-finding phase --
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
l'e s.
Ace Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 MR. WEINSTOCK:
-- by a factor of ten.
- e-37 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And they don't pay those 2
people.
3 MR. WEINSTOCK:
They don't pay those people.
They 4
are contributed by the various organizations that are parties 5
to the investigation.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Mostly other governmental 7
agencies, isn't it?
8 MR. WEINSTOCK:- The FAA is always included.
.9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But the airline manu-10 facturer and --
11 MR. WEINSTOCK:
The manufacturer, the carrier, the
~12 Airline Pilots' Association, anybody who has any. technical 13 expertise will be accepted, who has something to offer.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What-I'm asking, though is, 15 do you have any sense at all of the total human resources that 16 are expended per year beyond this 320?
17 MR. WEINSTOCK:
The FTEs is 320 for the entire f
18 agency.
t 19 MR. KATO:
For the agency.. Commissioner Bernthal is l'
20 asking,'well, how many consultAnti do-they havs,'how mAny.
21 cohtractors-do they-have.
I F 22 MR. WEINSTOCK:
They do not use consultants except 23 in rare cases.
I[
24 MR. KATO:
We are told that they don't have (Ace-Fedorol Reporters, Inc, 25 subcontractors.
m
38 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Who are those people that help 2
you --
3 MR. WEINSTOCK:
The parties, they are not paid.-
4 (Simultaneous conversation) 5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They contribute their 6
time and effort voluntarily.
7 MR. KATO:
Well, the companies, let's say if an 8
' accident involved a particular airline, that airline may 9
contribute people.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And they obviously have a 11 stake in it.
12 MR. KATO:
Sure.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, they are going to t
14 provide --
15 MR. KATO:
Let's say Boeing, Douglass, the 16 aircraft manufacturer; the Airline Pilots' Association will 17 send people.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I'm still not getting 19 an answer to my question.
That is the total manpower, person-power, if you will, equivalent of what these people do in.a 20 21 given year.
22 I realize they've got 320 employees.
But what's 23 the total effort?
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
He wants to know what Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the " freebies" are, too.
i
I.
39 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Freebies and everybody.
What' s 2
the total dimension of the effort that they put in?
3 MR. WEINSTOCK:
I don't think we ever --
4 MR. KATO:
We didn't get that number.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
May I ask a question while 6
you are on this line?
How do you define a " major aviation 7
accident?"
8 MR. KATO:
Well, it seems pretty obvious.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
No, not necessarily.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:- The question is more subtle.
Il You investigated six events that related to the NRC.
What 12 was the time frame that those six encompassed?
13 MR. KATO:
From 1980 through 1984 --
(
14 MR. WEINSTOCK:
From '79.
15 MR. KATO:
From '79 because we included TMI.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
From '79 through mid-847 17 MR. KATO:
Through '83.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It looks like it's defined 19 by loss of life, Tom.
I mean, it's --
20 MR. KATO:
Oh, to some extent it is.
21 (Simultaneous conversation) 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think Commissioner Roberts --
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
For fiscal years '83 and l!4
'84 you say there were ten and eleven major accidents.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
Right.
40 I
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
But yet, in your work you 2
came up with six events over a five-year period.
3 MR. KATO:
Oh, no, no.
We only were able to look 4
at six events.
We didn't look at all of the events which 5
happened in the five-year period.
We just selected events --
6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
How would you define a 7
" major accident investigation" that relates to the NRC?
8 MR. KATO:
Well, certainly things like TMI-2, for 9
example.
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No, that's not in dispute.
II Keep going.
12 (Laughter) 13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Salem.
r 14 MR. KATO:
Salem is one, Hatch-2.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
All right, what's next?
16 MR. KATO:
Let me get my slide out.
17 MR. CAREW:
Abnormal occurrence.
~
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Abnormal appearance.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So, you changed it.
It's 20 not " major accident."
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
An abnormal occurrence is 22 not a major accident, I would argue with that.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It is an event of safety 24 significance.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
When I walk across the street,
41 I
that's an event of " safety significance" to me.
2 (Laughter) 3 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
When I drive to work, that 4
is of " major safety significance" to me.
5 I think this whole reflection is -- I'm sorry.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
When I drive to work, it's 7
an " abnormal event."
8 (Laughter) 9 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Well said.
10 MR. KATO:
Commissioner Roberts, to answer you more Il specifically, the events that we looked at, and we selected 12 events where we thought or people indicated to us that there
{
may have been a problem in how the investigation took place.
13 14 So, we did not look at all the --
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
How the investigation took 16 place --
17 MR. KATO:
Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
-- that was the criteria, 19 not the significance of the event.
20 MR. KATO:
That's true.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you.
22 MR. KATO:
Although they were --
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
There is a difference.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The six events that you Ace FWwol Ryorkrs, ine.
]
25 looked at, Salem was one.
I
42 I
MR. KATO:
Salem was one; TMI-2; Quad Cities-1, 2
this was in '83; Brown's Ferry-3 in 1980.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Partial.
4 MR. KATO:
The failure of control rods to insert 5
fully.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Failure to scram, okay.
7 MR. KATO:
Hatch-2, the uncontrolled leeches of 8
reactor coolant into the pr1sary containment, and finally 9
one we looked at was the over-exposure radiation workers, 10 again to see what types of events were being investigated in 11 the non-power area.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And all of them were 13 abnormal occurrences that were required to be reported to N
14 Congress.
15 MR. KATO:
I believe so,-yes.
16 COMMISSIONER-BERNTHAL:
How many more could you have 17 found?
How many of these per year do we have?
18 MR. KATO:
You have on the order of eight abnormal 19 occurrences a year, from nuclear power plants.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
.Yes, I just looked at 21 the latest --
22 MR. KATO:
From nuclear power plants.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELGTINE:
-- report in there, there 24 were three of those in the last report and that's a what, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 quarterly or semiannual report?
4-
- 43 1
MR. KATO:
That's from nuclear power plants.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
There were-two 3
nuclear power plants, both of which I thought were fairly I
4 significant, the overhe~ad inje6tichr problem at McGuire and the MR. KATO:
Sequoyah.
5 6
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- to scram at 7
Susquehanna.
That wasn't in the most current one.
That will 8
be in the-next one, probably.
9 MR. KATO:
To give you a feeling as to where these 10 NTSB reports come from, the next few slides show you the 11 figures of the numbers of accidents.
12 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Before you go off that one, do
(-
13 all those major accidents you referred to in the aviation 14 incidents, accidents, I presume all the major accidents you
'15 are talking about result in deaths.
16 MR. KATO:
No, no.
Yes, I'm sorry.
The major 17 accidents, yes.
One of them was the L10ll where they lost 18 three engines.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
But the majority of them 20 resulted in deaths.
21 MR. KATO:
Yes.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
One death?
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Multiple deaths.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
One death, two deaths, three Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 deaths?
Do you have a thres' hold?
t Te e
y y
+g g
y p y
4y-e----%.--$-
9 ut' yy,r-
44 I
MR. WEINSTOCK:
A crash of any major -- of an 2
aircraft of any major carrier that results --
3 (Simultaneous conversation) 4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Oh, you are talking only 5
major carriers now, you are not talking about --
0 MR. WEINSTOCK:
They are usually accidents involving 7
major carriers.
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
How about private aircraft that 9
result in deaths?
10 MR. KATO:
No, those are not --
II (Simultaneous conversation)
I2 MR. WEINSTOCK:
Those are not classed as major 13 accidents.
(
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How about commuter airlines?
15 MR. WEINSTOCK:
Commuter rirlines, maybe.
16 MR. KATO:
Ma,be.
I7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What is a field accident 18 investigation as opposed to a major accident --
I9 MR. KATO:
A field accident could be just a one-man 20 or a two-man investigation and they write up a report.
2I CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But is it an investigation of 22 an accident?
23 MR. KATO:
Yes.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Does it have a different Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 threshold?
Is private aviation covered by field accidents?
45 I
MR. KATO:
Yes.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I see.
So, it could be any --
3 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Let me ask, perhaps a --
i 4
question.
You have spent a lot of time studying the aviation 5
industry.
There are figures in writing that 50,000 people a 6
year are killed on the highways.
How many people are killed 7
in aviation?
8 MR. KATO:
Can we get to that in a minute?
9 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Sure.
10 MR. KATO:
Let's have the next slide, please.
I air
'll just plotted here the numbers of accidents of U.S.
12 carriers as a function of fact.
Would you lif t the slide 13 up just a little bit so we can see the years?
[
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are these major carriers?
15 MR. KATO:
In U.S.
carriers are three categories, 16 the scheduled airlines --
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
18 MR. KATO:
-- the commuter airlines, and the 19 non-scheduled airlines.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Like charter services?
21 MR. KATO:
Charter services, air taxis, that sort of 22 thing.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, isn't a commuter airline 24 a scheduled airline?
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
Well, they for some reason, NTSB -- well,
x
-s 46 a
I the FAA separates --
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They break Ehem into the 3
categories.
4 MR. KATO:
-- into these various categories because 5
they fall under apparently different Code of Federal Regulatior t 6
rules.
So, you can see that there are on the order of 200 7
U.S. air carrier accidents in this time period.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is that per year?
9 MR. KATO:
Per year.
On the order of 50 accidents 10 involved fatalities.
11 The next slide should show you the --
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Wait, that's just a different 13 kettle of fish.
r
-14 MR. KATO:
Oh, yes, that's corrept.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And it's good that numbers 16 like that come up here.
17 MR. KATO:
May I have the next slide, please?
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Go ahead,. finish your point.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I was just going to say, in order for us to use the threshold that NTSB apparently 20 let alone uses, which is imminent risk of public -- to life, 21 public health, to life, a life-threatening circumstance or 22 23 loss of life, we would have to get into some kind of probability calculation that hinges on the number of abnormal 24 Ace-Feded Reporters, Inc.
occurrences and the probability of that resulting in imminent 25 L
47 I
risk to public health an'd safety, let alone life; and we could
.2 go back to our 50 percent core melt by the year.2000, I 3
suppose, and come _ up with some reasonable estimate of how 4
often a year we ought to make use of this kind of special --
5 it may be that it's ten times a year for every abnormal 6
occurrence, I don't know.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Fred, their threshold 8
must be much lower, though because they do 3500 and eleven 9
investigations.
What you were talking about is the ones 10 they classify as " major accident" investigations.
They also 11 do 3500 field accident investigations.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, okay.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So, obviously their threshold
(
14 is much lower.
In fact, it may be lower than the " abnormal 15 occurrence" Chreshold.
16 MR. KATO:
Well, but --
17 (Simultaneous conversation) 18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They kill people in these 19 accidents.
20 MR. KATO:
For example, the NTSB is also responsible 21 for general aviation accidents.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
23 MR. KATO:
And here you see on the order of 24 somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 general aviation accidents ke-Federal Reporters, Inc.
And of these you have around 600 that involve 25
.per year.
I
48 1
..otalities, and NTSB is responsible --
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
They are accidents.
What 3
are the total fatalities?
4 MR.KATO:
All right, the next slide gives you that 5
answer.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can I just ask you roughly --
7 I'm not trying to be cute, I just want to understand -- what 8
is included in an accident where somebody isn't killed, loss 9
of landing gear?
10 MR. KATO:
Loss of a safety system is considered 11 a reportable accident.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I see.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Any loss of a safety 34 system is a reportable accident.
15 MR. KATO:
I believe so.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's a lower threshold 17 than " abnormal occurrences. "
18 MR. WEINSTOCK:
The NTSB, they require reporting of 19 certain kinds of incidents, and the definitions of the 20 categories are somewhat similar to what the NRC has.
These 21 are incidents that in some way impair the safety systems of 22 the aircraft, and they have a number of criteria, then, for 23 whether they will investigate such incidents.
There is a 24 whole list of them in the report which I can read out to you, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 if you like.
I
49 C
1 They don't limit themselves to investigating fatal 2
accidents or accidents resulting in damage or injury.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
I 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
How many do they investigate 5
that one would say do not involve imminent risk to life, let's 6
say?
7 MR. WEINSTOCK:
I don't think we have a breakdown 8
like that, but you can subtract from the 3,500 that they 9
investigate per year the number of fatal accidents to get an 10 idea of how many involved just incidents.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's quite a gap between 12 deaths and something else.
13 MR. WEINSTOCK:
They will investigate things like 14 in-flight fires, whether or not they result in the crash of 15 the aircraft.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That sounds pretty serious 17 to me.
18 MR. WEINSTOCK:
They'll investigate inadvertent 19 flying into severe weather.
20 MR. KATO:
I think most of them are life-21 threatening.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's the point I am 23 trying to make.
Most of them are life-threatening, I would 24 think.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
And, you know, if you lose three engines
50 9
I on a three-engine plane, that's pretty serious.
2 (Laughter) 3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You have gone as far as you 4
can go.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
We might all agree on that.
6 MR. KATO:
Commissioner Roberts asked the question, 7
how many people were killed.
This slide gives you the 8
number of people that have been killed.
In the general 9
aviation area you are talking about a thousand people killed 10 per year.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is this general aviation?
12 MR. KATO:
This is general aviation.
The top curve 13 is general aviation.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Oh, I see.
15 MR. KATO:
The bottom curve is scheduled airlines.
16 And I want to make sure that it's understood that these 17 are scheduled airlines and not all U.S. carriers.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They had a bad year in '79.
19 (Simultaneous conversation) 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do I read that right, that 21 in '79 they had roughly 350 fatalities on scheduled airlines?
22 MR. KATO:
In scheduled airlines.
Now, this 23 excludes fatalities in the commuter and in the air taxi 24 non-scheduled.
Me-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. DIRCKS:
I think that was the big crash in
.J' 51
.1 Chicago when it killed about 264 people.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
You get one of those 3
every few years, yes.
4 MR. KATO:
Well, it's because of the --
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Don't fly in '85, is that 6
what you are saying?
7 (Laughter) 8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Random chance.
9 MR. KATO:
Well, let me conclude by giving you our 10 estimate of the number of professionals we believe would be 11 required in an Office of Nuclear Safety.
12 The next viewgraph -- oh, I'm sorry.
Before we to give you some statistics, we have listed 13 do that, approximately the number of unusual events that have occurred 14 15 in '84; the number of alerts; the number of licensee event 16 reports.
17 CHAIRMAN'PALLADINO:
Is that in our packet?
18 MR. KATO:
That's'in your packet, yes.
19 Our assumption is that we have assumed that there 20 would be something like eight to twelve significant events 21 which would require field investigations.
And it's based upon this that we have developed an estimate of the number of 22 23 people required in this ONS.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I haven't found it.
Ace FWwol Ryorters, inc.
~
I have to interrupt you, l
25 MR. IPPOLITO:
Excuse me, l
l L
52 1
The chart is in your supplement, Walt.
2 MR. KATO:
Oh, it was not in -- I'm sorry.
3 MR. IPPOLITO:
It's not in the original, so you are 4
going to have to pass it out.
5 MR. KATO:
All right, sorry.
This one is not?
6 MR. IPPOLITO:
No, it's in your supplement.
7 MR. KATO:
Okay, I'm sorry.
Were the supplements 8
given you, do you know?
9 MR. IPPOLITO:
No.
10 MR. KATO:
Okay, I'm sorry.
Il CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If you have one just to look 12 at, otherwise I can' t read that.
13 Thank you.
Go ahead.
g 14 MR. KATO:
These represent the sort of statistics 15 in the nuclear industry.
Now, the licensee event reports 16 are not -- certainly, I don't think you can compare them to 17 the accident reports of the NTSB.
I mean, they are far less 18 significant.
So, we are talking about, possibly, eight, 19 perhaps ten, twelve field investigations per year.
20 It is based on that number, that we have recommended 21 a staffing size for the Office of Nuclear. Safety.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Where was it, on the unusual 23 events, the alerts and abnormal --
24 MR. KATO:
Well, the abnormal occurrences basically Ace-Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 at power plants.
53 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You are saying this Board would 2
not look at alerts of unusual events?
3 MR. KATO:
Well, presumably the alerts -- you would 4
have to have some people who would screen the unusual events 5
to make sure that they were not significant ones.
That is, 6
somebody would have to screen the unusual events.
But you 7
would not necessarily have to have a full field investigation.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You have to go through them 9
deeply enough to know whether or not --
10 MR. KATO:
Well, as the report came in, or as a 11 particular unusual event was occurring, you would have to 12 make a decision, is it something that would require 13 investigation or not.
7 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, you would consolidate 15 those kinds of functions revealing unusual events and alerts, 16 reviewing LERs for significant gains or information that 17 could be derived from those --
18 MR. KATO:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- as well as investigating 20 these eight or so more significant occurrences a year.
21 MR. KATO:
Right.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You take those functions 23 from where they are now in the staff and consolidate them.
24 MR. KATO:
Right.
And that's why we recommended Ace-Federtl Reporters, Inc.
25 that this new office absorb the functions of AEOD --
e 54 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
2 MR. KATO:
-- since AEOD does the screening of LERs 3
as well as case studies and so forth.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Would this Board then also do 6
the trending analysis?
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
MR. KATO:
We hope it could.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Over AEOD.
9 10 MR. KATO:
Yes.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How many people do we have in 12 AEOD?
13 MR. KATO:
At the moment?
14 MR. IPPOLITO:
Go ahead.
MR. KATO:
The statistics that we have are that 15 16 they have a total of 42, but I'm sure Tom can --
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How many people are you asking j7 for in this office?
18 MR. KATO:
The next slide, viewgraph --
19 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How many people are.you 21 suggesting for this office?
MR. KATO:
A total of 80.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's the next viewgraph.
23 MR. KATO:
Can I have the next viewgraph, please?
24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's the last one in the
55 I
packet.
2 MR. KATO:
Yes.
We have suggested that there be 3
10 to 15 professionals at regional offices for screening, 4
fact-finding; 15 professionals at headquarters for fact-5 finding, analysis and evaluation, determination of cause, 6
and formulation of recommendations.
7 And we have also added to this the 42 professionals 8
currently.who do the case studies, patterns and trends 9
analyses, and other AEOD activities.
So, a total of about 80 10 people.
And based on the fact that the salaries and fringe 11 benefits for the support organization costs about $70,000 12 per year, we have estimated somewhere between $5 and $6 million 13 for the operating cost of that office.
It does not include 14 overhead costs, of course.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There would be some off-16 setting savings, I assume because some of these functions are 17 now performed by staff offices as.well.
18 MR. KATO:
Well, we did not mean to imply that this 19 was the additional cost because obviously, as we understand it, i
20 both in I&E there is a branch that does event investigations, i
21 and within NRR there is a branch that does event investigations
)
i 22 and each branch has somewhere between 6 and 12 people working 23 in it.
Some of the people from these branches could be 24 absorbed into this organization.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
So, the incremental l
56 9
1 cost in terms of FTEs and dollars would be somewhat less than 2
that.
3 MR. KATO:
We did not try to estimate what the 4
incremental cost would be.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What would happen, you take 6
the people away from I&E that do investigations and put them 7
over here?
8 MR. KATO:
Because they would --
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, why take any unless I&E's 10 function is going to be reduced?
You just told me earlier 11 I&E did not encompass any of the functions of this new 12 office, therefore taking people away from them means that 13 you are curtailing some other activities.
14 MR. KATO:
As we understand it, within the NTSB 15 mode of operation, the FAA -- which is a regulatory agency --
16 has --
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let's talk'about NRC.-
18 MR. KATO:
All right, or the NRC -- the rejulatory 19 components, the I&E and NRR do have the responsibility to 20 look for compliance or look for specific licensing issues 21 if there is an event.
So, they have to investigate events 22 from their point of view.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You may take people away 24 from them unless you are going to assume that function.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. KATO:
Well, I think it's possible that some of
s 57
'l
. tdue peoplei could be there, could be used for fact-finding.. In 2
other words, I'm sure that if you coo'rdinate the fact-finding l-3 aspect of the investigation, that the numbers of people could
,.y 1 -
-4
'be-reduced.
- 5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I don't follow that.
When I 6
pursued the fact that I&E might beLdoing some investigation 7
~ rums, it was denied that that was really pertinent to. looking 8
at accidents.
Now you are saying that they do look at some 9
accidents.
10 MR. KATO:
It's our impression that they do have
'll people who look at events.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So, now we are not talking 13 about fulfilling-a need, then, we are talking about.whether -
14
-I&E has enough people.
I don't understand the argument 15 because you say we need this Board because somebody apparently 16 is not doing the-job.
17 MR. KATO:
No.
What we are saying is, that --
^
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If I&E, for example, is doing 19 the job, then the question is, is that the right place for' it-20 to be; do they have enough resources and the like.
21
- MR. KATO:
What we' are suggesting is that the work of' investigating of events is done on a somewhat ad hoc. basis.
22 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, this would be ad hoc.
It's'only when you have a case that you go --
24 Aa4mboIR,=wn,im.
25 MR. KATO:
No, no, I meant in terms of who has the
58 I
real responsibility, who has the responsibility for investigatirtg 2
of events.
At least that's what we have arrived at, and that 3
is why we suggested that there be a structured, coordinated 4
effort in investigating of events.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me get back and stick 6
strictly to this.
It's not clear to me that your net is not 7
represented by all the 10 or 15 at the top and the 15 in 8
the middle, and the eight at the bottom.
I might give in on 9
the 42 because if you take in AEOD --
10 MR. KATO:
Well, we have added the 42 plus eight 11 is because --
12 CHAIRF9di PALLADINO:
I was adding 15 and 15, that's 13 38.
14 MR. KATO:
The 42 and eight, that number comes from 15 what we were told was the anticipated number that AEOD would 16 like to grow to.
In fact, before the present budget 17 situation we were told that AEOD was scheduled to go up to 18 about 50.
And so we have taken that number and --
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So, you are saying it only is 20 15 and 15.
21 MR. KATO:
And where those 30 people would come from 22 would be another question, but we didn't look at that.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Also, if you do want to 24 operate this with the kind of party systen that the NTSB uses, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 you may well want to leave those resources in the staff because
59 I
the staff may well be one of the parties that this group would 2
want to look to.
3 MR. KATO:
Oh, of course.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
In which case there may 5
really not-be an offset other than the 42 people in AEOD.
6 MR. KATO:
All we have said is-that there is, there 7
may be some of the resources committed.
But we did not 8
try to say, "Okay, I&E, a certain number of people should go 9
over there. "
I mean, we felt we just didn't have time to 10 look at I&E in detail, nor did we look at NRR in detail.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Although it certainly 12 looks like Mbout half of that 80 is an offset, the AEOD 13 portion.
(
14 MR. KATO:
Oh, certainly, the AEOD portion would be 15 an offset.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
When you use this party system, 18 one of the problems I could see in the NRC area or in the 19 nuclear area is that if we put a utility, or put a vendor on 20 the Board, on the "Go Team," the first criticism we would get 21 is. that they are biased therefore we can't put them on.
Our 22 perception problem is different in this industry than the 23 perception problem in aviation.
24 MR. DIRCKS:
You could get away with it if it were Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
j a separate agency.
I think that is the point of perception that 25
60 1
I raised in my memo.
The public really doesn't perceive the 2
difference too much between the Commission and the agency, you 3
are lumped in with us.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, but I was thinking, if 5
you put a Westinghouse representative to look into the 6
Westinghouse one, you get one sense of perception.
If you 7
put a Westinghouse representative looking at a CE situation, 8
you get another perception.
9 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes, that's a fact.
But I was just 10 commenting, if you try to set up this organization within the 11 agency -- even though it might report to the Commission --
12 you have the problem of party system because they are licensees 13 under the Commission and you can't use them as flexibly as a 14 separate agency could under the independent NTSB --
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Did you have the benefit of 16 the letter of March 13 from the ACRS?
17 MR. KATO:
Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Would you specifically respond 19 to the comments of Dr. Axtmann and Mr. Ebersole, and Dr.Kerr, 20 and Mr. Ward?
21 Here, did you read part of this?
This is the first 22 document, i t's the bottom of that paragraph.
23 MR. KATO:
Well, certainly there is a possibility of 24 the type of comment that three people give.
But the reason AceJederal Reporters, Inc.
25 that we have recommended the office within the Commission is
61 1
because the numbers of significant events are relatively low.
2 An organization of 80 people is difficult to maintain as a 3
viable agency, a separate agency.
from that point of view we recommended that it 4
So, 5
be within the Commission itself.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Much like the ACRS.
7 MR. KATO:
Yes.
But now, we might also look at it 8
historically that in the case of the NTSB/FAA, NTSB was a 9
part of the FAA and then they separated it.
10 Now, perhaps that may be the direction the Commission 11 might go eventually.
But at the moment because of the size 12 of the organization that we recommended, we don't believe it 13 is necessary to split it off independently.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You are saying that only 15 because of the size?
I'm just curious to know, Walt, what 16 do you make of the really damming comments that are made here i
17 by the former director of NTSB?
I 18 Now, even extracting whatever partisanship might 19 be involved in that letter --
20 MR. KATO:
I don't have that one.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, let me read you some 22 excerpts.
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
It's interesting reading.
24 MR. KATO:
Well, we were not given that.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONSR BERNTHAL:
I believe this is a letter M
.. ' =.
I to Mr.' Flack on the ACRS.
"I bslieve"they saw only the 2
blooming side of the rose and probably did not spot many of 3
the thorns that exist within the NTSB system.
Personnel 4
positions and funds have not kept up with increased complexity 5
and numbers.
The result has been a severe degradation of the 6
quality of the less visible cases," and he is talking about 7
the investigation, I guess, the quality of investigation.
8
" Morale is at a horrendous low at the NTSB's t
9 Washington headquarters today."
I'm just skipping over-10 things here.
"This internal adversarial atmosphere problem 11 has as its origin much of what affects all government agencies 12
- today, i.e.,
the nearly declared war between the administration 13
.(
and civil service."
I am not going to get into the politics 14 of it.
15 (Laughter) 16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
"NTSB is merely a dumping 1
17 ground for people to whom political spoils were to be i
18 allocated," and it goes on, and on, and on.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Those are the Board members 20 right, they are talking about?
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, it's clear --
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think the problem that 23 he is talking about is somewhat different.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
-- that not all is sweetness Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 and lig'ht at the NTSB.
Even if you extract the partisanship
63 I
from it, I think it tends to suggest that this may not be all 2
such a great idea after all as an independent agency.
3 MR. KATO:
Should we answer that?
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Certainly, go ahead.
5 MR. KATO:
Well, we didn't get a chance to talk 6
with that individual.
However, we did talk with representativer 7
of the Airline Pilots Association and also of --
8 MR. WEINSTOCK:
Consumers Group.
9 MR. KATO:
-- and they all felt that NTSB was doing 10 a good job.
I 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So, how do you account for a 12 letter from a former director, is this just sour grapes or 13 something?
14 MR. KATO:
I don' t know.
15 MR. WEINSTOCK:
He doesn't take issue with the 16 concept of the NTSB --
l 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
No, I understand.
I 18 understand.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
The fellow takes issue with l
20 the implementation.
21 MR. WEINSTOCK:
He takes issue with the recent 22 implementation in the last few years.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right, yes.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
A lot of people don't take MFedirol Reporters, Inc.
25 issue with the concept of other forms of government, either.
l l
64 1
It's a practicality.
2 MR. DIRCKS:
Mr. Miller is here today.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Pardon me?
4 MR. DIRCKS:
Mr. Miller is here in the audience.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, maybe we ought to hear 6
from him.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I think we should.
l 8
I think it 9: auld be useful to hear from him.
9 MR. MILLER:
You want me to come forward?
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Sure, come on up.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Sure.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Mr. Miller, for the record, would 13 you identify yourself so the recorder can get it down?
14 MR. MILLER:
Yes, sir.
My name is C. O. Miller.
I 15 am a resident of McLean, Virginia.
I am a safety professional 16 and I have no connection with your activity other than 17 somebody asked me what my thoughts were one time.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If we have specific questions --
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
We'd be interested in i
l l
29 hearing the basis for your concerns.
21 MR. MILLER:
Well, first of all, I would like to i
22 emphasize that what was said a moment ago, mainly that the l
l 23 concept of an independent investigatory body, I can't stress l
24 the importance of that high enough.
Ae>Federd Reporters, Inc.
l 25 My other comments which were related just a moment 1
65 1
ago were some real-world experiences which I perceived and 2
I think others have as well.
They are not problems that can't 3
be resolved, quite frankly.
4 I would feel, though, that there are some things 5
I have heard here today which are not accurate in terms of the 6
past NTSB activity, and perhaps you would like me to clarify 7
those because I have made notes of them.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, that would be very 9
helpful.
10 MR. MILLER:
One of the things is, and I think it's 11 an important point is, the NTSB did not start in 1974.
The 12 actual precepts that led to today's accident investigation 13
- .ethodology go back to 1938, and in fact there was a series of 14 accidents and things which I chronicled -- as other people l
15 have -- to show why the independent investigatory body became 16 necessary in the aviation world.
l 17 I won't bore you with the details, but I can certainly l
18 provide you with references to show that.
The NTSB was formed
{
19 in 1966, originally set under the Department of Transportation, l
f 20 and that is where the change took place in the Act of '74 I
l 21 because of certain influences of the dot applied to the 1
22 Safety Board..
j l
l 23 The Congress -- rightfully, I believe -- decided it I
24 should be totally separate from dot.
They were never part 22e Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 of the FAA.
I think that is a very important point that what
66 I
we are talking about the methodology of investigation is not 2
a recent product, that is something that has come up over 3
decades.
4 In terms of -- this is a little out of sequence, but 5
in terms of the reports that you have seen referred to here 6
today, they range in everything from telephone calle that are 7
made by an investigator who never does see the scene of the 8
accident or do anything more, to the large team investigations.
9 Now, this is something th't has changed markedly 10 over the years.
When I was director of the bureau back in 11 the late '60s and early '70s, if you had, say, four-thousand 12 accidents as an example, we would have what I would call a 13 team investigution on no more than 25 of 30.
Another half of
\\
14 those would be handled by the FAA completely on their own in 15 terms of fact-finding, and then that material would be given 16 to us to assess it, analyze it, and come up with a " report."
17 The other half of them, our field people would get 18 involved to one degree or another.
But there is a wide 19 variation in how many people actually get out in the field and 20 do anything, and it has changed markedly with time.
21 Today -- and my information I am about to give you 22 comes within, is accurate within the last ten days -- there 23 is still no defined agreement between the FAA and NTSB as to 24 how many accidents are allegedly delegated to the FAA.
The ke-Federal Reporters, Inc 25 NTSB is trying to cover three or four-thousand accidents with
~
67 I
their staff and it's obvious they cannot do that.
And that's 2
what led to my comment that you have referred to, sir, in terms 3
of the degradation of the quality of the investigations which 4
has been brought about by a well-meaning attempt by the Board peoP e to do all the things themselves.
l 5
6 So, I think you must recognize that any time you 7
interpret what NTSB did, you better look at 1974, or maybe
'78, 8
'80,
'85 and so forth, it's a big difference.
9 I do have some questions on the statistics you saw 10 because I'm not really sure my recollection of what they 11 call their " carrier" is really a carrier.
It's, again, a 12 huge spectrum of accidents you are talking about.
13 The same thing applies to NTSB personnel.
I have 14 seen those numbers that you saw in terms of how many are 15 aviation, how many are other modes.
I don't necessarily 16 believe them.
I won't give you the reasons why, but I 17 Personally studied this problem and wrote a paper on it that 18 I can provide to you that was accurate up to a few years ago.
19 It's a very difficult thing to assess.
20 Perhaps I ought to stop there and see if there are 21 any particular questions.
22 May I say one other thing, Mr. Chairman, for the 23 record?
I don't mean to get in here and sound like I am 24 complaining at anybody.
As I said, I am a safety professional, Ace-Federtl Reporters, Inc.
25 I am a member of a number of societ'ies.
I woth as a consultant
68 1
I am not working now and have not worked for you people since 2
TMI, as some of you know.
I was part of the Rogovan Commission.
3 Some of you may not know that I was asked originally to head 4
that thing, but I couldn't do it because I was in law school 5
at the time.
6 But in any case, I am here-because I am very 7
interested in what you are doing.
I think the project you 8
have in front of you merits very serious consideration.
I 9
think the work that Brookhaven has done is outstanding.
I 10 know it's a controversial area and I'm just here to answer any 11 questions or help any way I can.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay, thank you.
Any particular 13 questions at this time?
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Maybe just one or two.
15 It strikes me that one of the benefits of the NTSB approach 16 is the use of the party system, that you can bring in these PeoP e that are not part of the agency, you don't have to l
17 18 Pay directly.
That you bring in the best experts that are 19 available, even though they may have an interest or stake in 20 the particular item under investigation.
And then the Board does the independent review of 21 22 the information that is provided and reaches an independent 23 judgment.
24 Do you see any reason why that kind of an approach, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 Particularly given the fact that you worked on the Rogovan
69
+
1 Commission, Rogovan inquiry, any reason why that particular 2
kind of approach couldn't work here in this area?
3 MR. MILLER:
I don't know a reason why it couldn't.
4 It has its hazards, one of which was described earlier.
The
.5 statement was made there is no cross-examination at the 6
Public hearing.
There is no cross-examination in the legal 7
sense with the judge sitting up there with ultimate authority.
8 But I can assure you that the parties get at each other's 9
throats and it takes a strong chairman to keep it under 10 control.
11 But basically speaking, the staff at the Board has 12 to be sharp enough to not get snowed and be manipulated by 13 these parties.
Given that capability in the staff -- and I think we at least had it at one time, I don't know whether it 14 is still there now -- then I think the party system works 15 16 quite satisfactorily.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The reason I brought up cross-examination, because it said either non-adversarial or non-18 19 adjudicatory.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Non-adjudicatory.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Non-adjudicatory.
But I have 21 also heard statements that the National Safety Transportation 22 Board is non-adversarial, they work together.
I gather that 23 24 is not true in a hearing.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. MILLER:
Well, let's put it this way --
s.
70 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
There they become adversarial?
2 MR. MILLER:
Any time there are two people that have 3
differing views,~you have an adversarial relationship.
In 4
.the' introductory remarks of the chairman at NTSB hearings, he 5
will say, "This is a non-adversarial procedure," and the 6
snickers go throughout the audience.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
8 MR. MILLER:
He will say, "There will be no cross-9 examination in the legal sense."
Okay, that's the basic 10 Policy and the chairmen of the panels will try to follow it, 11 and those of us in the staff used to try to do it.
Sometimes 12 it-gets nasty, sometimes it doesn't, but that's the way the 13 game is played.
7 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But if the Board is 15 looking at a question like, what caused an airplane crash, 16 and you have the pilots in saying, "It wasn't us," and the 17 airline in saying, "It wasn't our maintenance program," and.
18 the airline designer and manufacturer saying, "The design 19 was fine," you are obviously going to have some differing 20 points of view and perspectives.
21 MR. KATO:
Could I ask a question for clarification?
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
MR. KATO:
As I understand it, the hearings are 23
~24 only for fact-finding.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. MILLER:
Yes and no.
Let me say that --
71 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I thought the "Go Team" was 2
for fact-finding.
3 MR. KATO:
No, no.
4 MR. MILLER:
Let me say that the hearing does really 5
'three things.
It presents the facts -- as I believe you said, 6
Dr. Kato -- to the public who have an urgent need to know in 7
a catastrophe like some you have seen.
8 Secondly, it allows you to collate these things in 9
an effective manner.
It demands that the investigators put 10 their thoughts together in some logical fashion and, as I 11 say, the third thing really is a matter of having a record for 12 everybody to see and use in any.way they want to, including 13
- attorneys and litigation, of course.
7 14 MR. KATO:
But it does not, I think Commissioner 15 Asselstine implied, that the hearings determine cause.
And 16 as I understand it, it does not do that.
17 MR. MILLER:
They are basically fact-finding, opinion-18 finding, if you will.
But at the completion of the hearing 19 the chairman of the panel will say, "If you have any ideas of 20 anything else we should look into, or what you think we should 21 find, or how you see it, you have 30 days or 60 days to get
.22 it in," and from that fact-finding portion, as you put it, 23 the analytical process and the determination of cause process 24 takes over, and that generally does not involve the parties.
ke-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 However, there have been some exceptions to that, too.
72
- =~
1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But it involves a lot of
+ne information generated as part of the hearing process.
3 MR. MILLER:
Absolutely.
And it is a relatively A-4 eff#elent manner of gathering in one place and getting the 5
people to speak their positions through witnesses.
Keep in 6
mind, the witnesses are determined by the Board to begin with, 7
but sometimes suggestions by the parties will be accepted as 8 ' to who is going to testify or provide words at the hearing.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
If I can just ask.one 10 question here.
There has been a good deal of dwelling, it 11 seems to me, on the parallels -- such as they are -- between 12 _our operations and safety responsibility and the operations 13 and safety responsibility of those agencies that are under 14 the. jurisdiction of the NTSB.
15 But not very much focus, I think, on the differences.
16 When you tell me that the-NTSB was taken out of dot and that 17 apparently was one of its principal responsibilities -- not "the 18 principal responsibility of FAA -- I am immediately reminded 19 that dot is a Cabinet level agency, it's headed by an officer 20 who is appointed by the President, can be removed by the 21
. President.
The FAA is not a commission at least, and the 22 EPA certainly has very significant responsibilities that 23 parallel ours in many respects and yet, nobody has seen fit 24 to suggest that they should come under NTSB or a similar-type Ace-Fedwal Reporters, Inc.
25 Board for reasons that seem less clear to me, frankly, than in-
-m
73.
j o
1
.the. case.of this' agency which is a Commission form and has E
2 a1special protection.
3 The EPA, again, a-single administrator serves at
' the pleasure of the President, can be removed at any-time.
4 5
I. almost wonder _ whether maybe the problem here isn't that!
'6 the Commission.itself has failed to take the proper view of 7
itself over the last many years in respect to this specific 8
- area of accident investigation.
9 I simply. don' t see.the parallel and the argument
. 10 for creating yet another external organization to oversee 11 the overseers, if you will.
You already have a Board here 12 in the Commission, and if the Commission carries out its
-13 investigatory responsibilities properly, then that, it seems 14 to me, is what we should focus on.
And-maybe that's in fact 15 what you are saying with your recommendation.
- 16 But I simply don't buy the parallel beyond.that-
- 17 that at some point you necessarily may'want to or need to
- 18
, remove these people from underneath the Commission.
That's 19
. where -I sort of get-off the boat on this whole thing.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
As I recall, the Brook-21 haven report did say -- and I think there was a slide in 22 here that we didn't touch on -- that if the wishes of our o1 23 other colleagues on the Commission came true and there would l
[
24 be a single administrator here, that indeed that would reinforco Ace Fedorol Reporters, Inc.
l 25 the need for an independent NTSB.
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74 9
j COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In fact, I had pulled that 2
particular page out here, and that's precisely the point.
I 3
mean, that's essentially an admission that this is a rather 4
different body from the bodies that NTSB currently oversees, 5
and it is supposed to be a far less political body, and I believe it is.
That's a very different kettle of fish that 6
7 you have -- I guess I shouldn't call us a " kettle of fish,"
8 but it's a very different organization that you have here 9
compared to all of the others.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I heard yesterday fish is 11 especially good for your health.
12 (Laughter)
COMMISSICNER ROBERTS:
I'm"sorry? -
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I heard yesterday that fish ja 15 is especially good for your health.
Let me remind the Commission, we still do want to 16 hear from the staff because I think their input is equally j7 important in trying to make a determination.
18 MR. MILLER:
Mr. Chairman, may I make one slight j9 comment on this?
My letter, you may recall, was in favor of 20 21 the approach of an ONS as opposed to a separate group --
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
22 for the very reasons you stated.
MR. MILLER:
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
MR. MILLER:
I think that's important from my 25
75 1
standpoint to be noticed.
MR. KATO:
Also, may I make one comment, that the 2
statistics that we showed came from the Annual Report of the 3
NTSB.
So, I mean, I cannot -- other than say that's my 4
reference -- I can't say whether they are right or wrong.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
Well, unless there is 6
Commission objection, I was going to propose that we turn to 7
the staff, unless you had any --
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thank you, Mr. Miller.
9 COMISSIONER ROBEMS:.Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
jj COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have one quick question 12 for Mr. Kato if I could.
I don' t think it will take very long.
It had to do with the draft --
y C At PA M D 0:
Ne11, & ore is not much time 15 left.
g COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- report as opposed to 97 the final version of the report.
And I noticed that on page 18 53 there was a footnote in the draft of the report and it j9 disappeared in the final report, and it was addressed by a 20 uple f
mment letters that you received.
It had to do 21 with --
MR. KATO:
That was regarding the Salem event?
g COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right, both the 24 staff's and, I gue.:s, INPO's investigation of the initial trip.
5
=. -
.w' U.,
76
~1
'MR. KATO:
As'I remember, during our conversations 2
with INPO ~it was implied that ~ they, that somebody there knew 3
- of the--- understood the first un-scram event.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
That's right,
?5 they picked up the first ATWS as opposed to --
6
.MRi KATO:
That was what was implied.
When we checke:1 7
.it out after the comments came in, we could not trace'any
'i P ece of paper which said that this is what they did, and-8 9
. this it why we removed that statement.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How much did you look at-11
-INPO's evaluations of operating events?
Did you talk to 12 People to get a sense for how effective the'INPO evaluation
-13 of operating events is?
14 MR. KATO:
Well, we talked to.the INPO people..They 15
,certainly felt that their evaluations were quite good.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Din you talk-to any.
17 former employees of INPO?-
18 MR. KATO:
No, we did not.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right --
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Was there any evidence at
- 22 all.in terms of, or any indications about a-lack of effective-23
. ness in terms of the INPO evaluations, or anything --
~
24 MR. KATO:
Well, the claim was made that a large Ace Fedorol Repm, Inc.
25 fraction of their recommendations in their SERs and SOERs that u
r q
77 C
q 1
they make, were being adopted by the utility.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
3 MR. KATO:
We have no way to check on whether that 4
is correct or not.
But that's certainly the assertion that 5
they made.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
7 MR. KATO:
I think they said about 80 percent of the recommendations that INPO has made in these reports have 8
9 been-implemented.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, let me say, I think we 11 ought to turn to the staff at this time.
I want to hear at 12 least the basic part of their input.
(-
13 MR. IPPOLITO:
Let me try to speed through.
What 14 I thought since the way we do our business seemed to be a 15 significant topic, I thought we could review quickly how we do our business as far as event investigation is 16 17 concerned.
18 If you will turn to the handout that I gave on 19 page 3.
Page 3 represents a flow diagram -- a very simplified flow diagram how the instant response program functions.
And i
20 21 I put that because that's the front end.
That's the way 22 we get to -- this is what has to be done.
In other words,
the reactor has to be placed in a safe configuration before 23 24 the investigation can start.
wF dwal n.ponn, tu.
By Pointing out here, you can see down at the bottom 25
78 e
1 of that page once all of this is done, we get to the 2
in7astigation phase.
Now, what you see on this page is well 3
documented in manual chapters and in NUREGs, everybody knows 4
what'they are doing, when they are supposed to do it, including 5
other agencies and whatever have you.
6 Now, if we citn turn to the next page.
And what I am about to describe is the practice that we have been following.
7 And what I use is Ginna and Salem, and I used those because 8
9 I am familiar with those two instances, events.
10 So, basically once the plants were -- well, Ginna 11 took some period of time to get stable.
12 COMMISSIONER-ASSELSTINE:
Right.
13 MR. IPPOLITO:
Okay.
Salem was stable real quickly.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.-
15 MR. IPPOLITO:
But in both instances the procedure that was followed was that the EDO established a fact-finding 16 17 task force.
The lead for the task force was assigned to the 18 region.
In addition to the region people, the task force 19 was provided with experts that we believe --
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are you working on No. 4?
21 MR. IPPOLITO:
Yes, I am.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But it says " Technical 22 23 Investigation," is that the same thing?
24 MR. IPPOLITO:
No.
What I provided -- I'm sorry, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 what I provided on page 3 was " Incident Response Program."
79 1
' CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
No, I am on page 4, and you 2
used the words " task force."
3 MR IPPOLITO:
That's correct.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And this says " Technical 5
Investigative Theme," they are the same thing?
6 MR. IPPOLITO:
These are the investigations.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
8 MR. IPPOLITO:
And if you follow what took place 9
on both the Ginna and on the Salem events was that we establishe d 10 a task force.
We supplemented them with not only headquarters 11 people but other regional people.
We also had the benefit 12 of consultants where needed.
13 The end result was a fact-finding report.
From the i
14 fact-finding report was prepared -- well, in the Ginna we 15 had c plant-specific report that followed that and then, much 16 leter, a generic report that included the resolution of 17 USIs 834 and 5.
18 The point -- what is not on this chart which is 19 equally important, especially when one wants to consider, ycu 20 know, does the public know what we are doing, as you recall, 21 in both those events we were before this committee, I mean, 22 this Commission, a number of times in both events.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
24 MR. IPPOLITO:
We also appeared before Congress in Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 both of these events.
So, obviously these are the significant
.=..
80
.1 1
' events or, you might say, the fatality type things, you know, 2
the equivalent to.
+
3 What I have on the next page, on page 5, are the J
4 less emergency, the non-emergency events, the less significant 5
events.
And these basically are the events that are reported 6
.through 50.72'and the LER, which is 50.73, which was recently 7
. changed.
8 (Commissioner Roberts leaves' meeting.)
9 MR. IPPOLITO:
If you look to see what happens, 10 if you look at the left-hand side of the flow diagram, these 11 events are screened, okay, by I&E and NRR; conference calls 112 are held, and the significance of these event's is assessed.
'There are times -- well, based on these assessments 13 j4 a mini.-team, if you will, is formed to.go ' examine a problem.
I think the one that I am most familiar with and most recent 15
.I is the small team that we put together to send to Fermi to 16 look at their diesel generator and new boiler problems that.
j7 18 we felt would have significance.
And there are other examples.
t But as we continue on down --
j9 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Did they send that kind of a team to Haddam Neck?
21 MR. IPPOLITO:
There was a regional, as I understand 22 it.
Jim?
23 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes.
You are talking about the cavity 24 Ac.f dwel Repersen, Inc.
seal --
25 I
l I
81 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
2 MR. TAYLOR:
We sent a regional group up.
Were they 3
supplemented with anybody from headquarters, Ed?
4 MR. JORDAN:
No.
3 MR. TAYLOR:
But we did send a team out of the 6
region.
They worked with the company and developed all the 7
design.
That was really a heavily design-oriented event.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, that's right.
9 MR. TAYLOR:
We got good cooperation out of the 10 compa7y.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: ~Okay.
12 MR. IPPOLITO:
As these assessments continue, they 13 are looked at for generic concerns and whether or not 14 information notices both in the generic letters should be 15 developed.
Also, the more significant of these events are 16 Presented at bi-weekly meetings with the division directors, 17 office directors and division directors available, and 18 periodically meet with the ACRS to brief them on it.
19 So, there is a great deal of exposure that we make 20 here.
Over on the right-hand side is the AEOD function which 21 is delayed in time, let's say, 60 days or so because of the 22 time of the reporting of the LER, and we are delayed, and this 23 is pretty much how we flow where the events are screened and f
24 the significance of them is identified.
Then, where appropriat a, ko-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 studies are made.
We issue a report and recommendations.
The
82-a: i..
- 1 reports'are sent to the appropriate program office for their 2
action.
3 MR. TAYLOR:- Tom, I'd like to interject, on the left-IV 4
hand side of the chart one element that I think the Commission 5
should recognize,'it's very important to us because this 6. system operates almost every day.
And the one factor that I
~
7.think you should appreciate'is the resident inspector system 8
provides us with an on-scene, hands-on-review.
The residents 9
are there.
And when there is an event, when there is a problem, 10 the residents get into it.
11 That is a very important part of trying to establish.
12 Now, that system isn't always perfect, mistakes are made,
- 13 something is missed.
But that system has given us something A
14 that is unique because part-of our whole-job is to.look at 15 what-happens.
It reflects on the performance of the utility
. 16 not just compliance but, you know, the whole performance 17 process, what has been happening; how many' times have you been
- 18 tripping;-why; what kinds of problems?
It is part of our 19 whole job.
20 So, the resident is a very important part of this, 21 in fact, plays in after the licensee report which comes in 22 to the Operations Center.
The resident is a very key player 2
23 in this thing.
- 24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
Ace-Peelerol Reporters, Inc.
- 25 MR. IPPOLITO:
From the chart on page 5, I have
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1 identified on the next page, 6, the significant results of that screening and evaluation.
They are listed here.
What's
~
2 n t listed here, though, are other things that we do, this 3
preliminary notifications, and I think that refers back to 4
I what Mr. Taylor is saying, where the resident reports significant findings that may not be only order but that could 6
have some public significant of the direct safety.
7 We uld also provide the daily staff notes and 8
the list doesn't include the technical review reports from 9
AEOD which are a real low-tier but are a work effort that 10 is of significance.
g COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just looking at these numbers for '84, has the ratio of information notices to bulletins changed rather dramatically in the past year or two?
My sense was -- is there a reason for that?
MR. JORDAN:
The reason is an emphasis on conveying the information to the licensees and trying to follow up to see that they are taking the actions rather than requiring
,g specific actions of them through a bulletin requirement.
39 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, information notices 20 just tell them about things, bulletins require them to do g
something.
MR. JORDAN:
That's correct.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do the bulletins have to Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
84 1
MR. JORDAN:
Yes, they do.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do information notices?
3 MR. JORDAN:
They do not.
4 COMMISSION",R ASSELSTINE:
Did that have anything to 5
do with the changing numbers?
6 MR. JORDAN:
That particular feature didn't.
The 7
fact that the NRC has become more conscious of backfit 8
considerations and a review carefully of requirements that we 9
are sending to licensees, have.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay, so this is part of 11 cutting down requiring licensees to do things.
12 MR. JORDAN:
It's a part of balancin~g the particular 13 tool that you use with the utilities in order to get the f
14 proper safety action.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do you get a sense from 16 the licensees that licensees treat these things differently, 17 bulletins as opposed to information notices?
I have to tell you, I have been asking licensees 18 19 that and I get a big sense of difference, and some of these 20 things are slipping through the cracks, the information notices 21 MR. JORDAN:
We have an inspection feature where we are looking at both INPO and NRC information-notice type 22 actions to try to measure and see their effectiveness compared 23 24 to the bulletin process.
Ace-Federal Reporters, lac.
25 MR. TAYLOR:
I think Ed is referring to the fact that fl
85 1
INPO, of course, has their system and they have issued SOERs, 2
which is their acronym, and they have issued some that we 3
have a particular interest in that may be hinged on the 4
threshold of becoming a bulletin or close to it.
We put out 5
information notices, chey put out SOERs, and we are following 6
up particularly where there is safety significance on a trial 7
basis to see, and INPO knows we are doing it.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So, you are letting INPO 9
take the lead in --
10 MR. TAYLOR:
Right.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: -- forcing the utilities 12 to do things, rather than us.
13 MR. TAYLOR:
Right, and we are going out to make 14 sure that the particular safety features of those SOERs are 15 carried out.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, the significant' questio )
17 Dere)*it 'seems to me, is what finally happens, Jim, not 18 the paperwork we send out --
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
-- but whether in the view of our staff who I hope follow up on these things and also 21 follow up on what INPO is doing, to see whether the various 22 licensees are taking necessary corrective action.
If that is 23 24 happening, then clearly this is a better way to do it, in my ke-Federal Reporters, Inc.
f 25 judgment, than for a few people in Washington to decide that i
86
+..
I they have all the answers.
2 Now, the question is, are those papers being _ addressecl 3
in the way that they should be.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Is it an effective system, is 5
it working?
6 MR. TAYLOR:
I'm trying to give you an answer on 7
that.
Part of what we are doing now is to follow up on --
8 MR. DIRCKS:
I think we talked about this quite 9
recently and what we found out is that there is good follow-up 10 for incidents that happen at that plant, and they do take 11 action on it.
12 And it came to light quite recently that we were 13 concerned about whether they were following up on events at 14 other facilities that may give them an alert.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
16 MR. DIRCKS:
And this is what Jim hr.s been referring 17 to, we are going to do a follow-up on that item to make sure 18 that that follow-up is occurring in these plants on events 19 that might have --
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think that is precisely 21 the thing you ought to be looking at.
Let me suggest that 22 you look in particular at the follow-up on the information 23 notice following the Susquehanna Station blackout because I have been to a couple of plants lately and I have been asking 24 Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 about that, and I get a blank look.
c 87
.. ~
L;;;
O
'I CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You may be asking the wrong L
2 person.
[
-3 MR.. TAYLOR:
You might.
You might be asking -- that
[i 4
was a peculiar valve problem and so forth.
Oh, on the black-5 out?
I'm sorry.
'6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On the blackout one, and
- 7 :the sense I get is that information notices don't necessarily 8
get the front-burner attention, particularly, as Bill said, 9
if it's not an event at that particular plant that you are not 10 getting the follow-up that I think you may want on some of
-11 those' things that are pretty obvious safety significant.
12
'MR. DIRCKS:,I'think we are looking into it.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And I think you got more 14 attention when they were bulletins because they had to be 15
_done, they were a requirement.
16 MR. DIRCKS:
But any time when in your plant visits
'17 you find out something like this, please-let us know --
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's what I am doing.
.19 MR. DIRCKS:
Well, on a real-time basis.
You said 20 two or three plants.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
22 MR. DIRCKS:
If you have more information, feed it 23 in, we would be happy to follow up on anything any of the 24 Commissioners find out there.
Wederal Repereers, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
In essence, that boils down l
~,.
88 I
to asking people, "Are you aware of this event, have you 2
looked at it?
Have you looked at the information notice?
3 What have you done to deal with this to make sure this isn't 4
a problem at your --
5 MR. DIRCKS:
And I think that was --
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
My very informal survey is 7
that these information notices may not be achieving, or the 8
INPO system, may not be achieving what you think they are 9
achieving.
10 MR. TAYLOR:
I'm not trying to judge it by reactions
.11 to that particular event.
But if you recall, that was an 12 event that occurred during a plan, a once-in-a-life-time 13 test --
14
. COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
15 MR. TAYLOR:
-- that you hope you don' t do.
You kind 16 of set yourself up for it.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, but that's a two-18 edged sword because they may have been better prepared to 19 deal with it because it was a test and under controlled 20 situations.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, let's see, we don't have 22 much time --
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I don't want to get 24 into it.
ke Federal Repe ters, Inc.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
-- and I would like to hear some
l 89 1
1 further staff positions one way or the other, and especially 2
what improvements you would be planning to make if we did go 3
one way or another.
4 (Commissioner Roberts rejoins meeting.)
5 MR. DIRCKS:
Jim, did you want to cover any more L
6 in your territory before we get to the --
7 MR. TAYLOR:
No.
I think I would like to join in 8
after Tom completes his because it supplements what he has to 9
say.
10 MR. DIRCKS:
Okay.
11 MR. IPPOLITO:
Basically, the remainder of the 12 Presentation pretty much echoes what --
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Excuse me, let me ask the 13 14 Commission how long it wants to continue the meeting, until 15 a quarter after?
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Sure, that's fine with me.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
All right.
13 MR. IPPOLITO:
I was about to say, the remainder of 19 the presentation pretty much echoes what we have said in the 20 March memorandum to you and that is, there are two major points 21 that we see after reviewing the report.
22 One is, what is the basis, why do we need to create 23 this, what is the problem?
When we read the report, we ask 24 ourselves do we find a conflict of interest?
And the answer hee Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 is -- we found no cases of bias or conflict.
90 1
What Maout, are there, you know, where have we 2
fallen down?
3 MR. DIRCKS:
But the perception could be there of 4
bias.
5 MR. IPPOLITO:
Yes, I'm sorry.
6 MR. DIRCKS:
Okay.
l 7
MR. IPPOLITO:
You know, what have we done wrong 8
in the inspections that we have performed?
And the report l
l 9
says there are some weaknesses, you know, but they really 10 couldn't find anything that would demand a major disruption 11 of the organization as we now see it.
12 So, then that leaves, you know, it seems to reduce l
13 the problem to a perception, and we maintain that by having 14 this quasi or this compromised position, we doubt that those 15 People who had this perception will not see this quasi 16 independent agency will solve that problem.
17 Then, if we continue to our next point --
I 18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Which is exactly what Dr.
19 Axtmann said is the ACRS letter.
20 MR. IPPOLITO:
Exactly.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Completely.
22 MR. IPPOLITO:
Completely -- if it's not broke, you 23 know, what is there to fix?
24 But when you look at the estimated BNL --
Ace-Federal Repoeers, Inc.
25 resources, if you look around, you find out that first of all
91 i
1 they are talking about all NRC licensed facilities.
So, when 2
you look at their numbers, their numbers really are for 3
reactor facilities, they do not include non-reactor, they do 4
not include material licensees in that because if you do that, 5
we are looking at relatively the same number of events as the 6
NTSB, around 3,000, 3,500, somewhere around that is what the 7
total staff reviews.
That's not only I&E/NRR, but NMSS.
But BNL and the report say, we are doing to draw 8
9 this line, we are only going to look at the more significant 10 items which are abnormal occurrences and alerts, and BNL 11 assumed, as you saw, eight to twelve and that major studies 12 based upon the AOs and alerts, and they also talk about they 13 are going to supplement this 25 or 30 people of which only 15 are here at headquarters with the party system that we just 14 15 completed discussing.
As I said, when you throw in these additional 16 events that have to be looked at, if you look at the 1984 17 18 abnormal occurrences plus alerts, the number is 27.
The thing that the report does not really, I think, 19 focus on is that in order to come up even with these 27 20 21 significant events, if you will, that require investigation, each one of these does not itself ring a bell and say, "I am 22 23 of significance."
It requires someone to go look.
And some of the six items or six events that Brookhaven looked at, a
24 Ace Feder:I Reporters, Inc.
25 number of them were subtle.
It took time, it took investigation,
92 1
it took someone to go out and make some visits in order to 2
really find out that we had something.
And many, many months 3
later we realized that it was significant and became an AOS, 4
speaking specifically now of the Hatch-2 event.
Okay, that's 5
the type of thing we are speaking of.
6 So, in other words -- but on the other hand, you 7
have to do, you have to screen and analyze where you think 8
there might be something, but there are times when you get 9
fossil arms or dry holes, if you will.
I mean, those are 10 expanded man-hours that have to be done that are currently 11 done by the staff, which includes the inspector, the regional staff, and the staffs as pointed out in the chart's that I 12 13 have just presented to you.
She party system is one to look at with a great 14 15 deal of question as to whether or not, one, you will get 16 cooperation from the industry.
A few phone calls that I made unofficially don't leave me much hope that people will 17 18 volunteer as one does with the NTSB, I don't expect it.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Won't they volunteer even if 20 they are involved in the accident?
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, why wouldn't they --
21 22 MR. IPPOLITO:
Please, understand --
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I'm just trying to extend your 23 24 survey.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
MR. IPPOLITO:
I almost hesitated -- when one picks 25
~
93
,,_p -..
-l up the phone and off the record says, "How do you feel about
~
2 something like that," you_get a feeling about something like 3
that.
I'm only trying to report to you that, you know, one 4
said, " Absolutely not."
Another said, "If I get paid, 5
obviously I'm a consultant to you and I'll do it."
Another.
6..said, "Well, you-better tell me what this organization is i
7 really like before I even say "aye,", "nay," or --
18 So, I'm saying, you know, none of the people I 9
talked to really expressed, you know, immediate --
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What level did you call, just 12
- to get a' feel?
13 MR. IPPOLITO:
It was, I'd say, at the manager of s
14 licensing level, not the CEO level.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay.
~16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But Tom, let's take 17 Salem, for instance.
Say you've got a group, an office with 18
- statutory authority and stature whose responsibility it is 19
.to make a call on what the cause of the event is.
You are 20 telling me~that Westinghouse and Public Service Electric and 21 Gas, and the operators in the. control room, and the maintenance 22 people are not going to be falling all over themselves to lL 23 make their case and to provide the information that they have 24 if that office is going to be making the call on whether it's
>= Fwnd ag.*n, ine.
25 a design problem by Westinghouse or an operational problems by j
94 I
the utility, or an operator error by the operators in the 2
control room, or a maintenance error by the maintenance 3
supervisor?
Come on, they are going to be participating.
F 4
MR. IPPOLITO:
I'm not --
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
If you've got an office --
6 MR. IPPOLITO:
I'm trying to say --
I'm.not trying 7
to say --
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Look, I think we are debating 9
on the methodology, and all I wanted was a level --
10 MR. IPPOLITO:
It's a caution, that's all we are 11 trying to give you.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let him go on, otherwise we 14 are going to debate that issue.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
16 MR. IPPOLITO:
And the thing that one wonders is 17 that if there is a problem with this perception of conflict, 18 how does'that perception go away when a part of your "Go Team" 19 is the staff that you say that you have to separate out 20 because for some reason they may not be as objective, you know, how could you make them a part of the "Go Team" that 21 is recommended here?
22 I'm saying, again it's a matter of this perception, 23 24 who is going to -- I mean, exactly what it is and who has it.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That would apply to all members
95
- y.
I of the "Go-Team" who were playing a part in the whole operation, 2
That would: apply to the vendor of the pumps, the vendor of 3
the nuclear steam supply system, the utility.
>{.
4 MR. DIRCKS:
Harold, do you --
5 MR. DENTON:
Not until he" finish 6si ~
6 MR. IPPOLITO:
I think-that I'm ready to summarize, 7
and that is, as we see it, the system seems to work to 8
satisfaction.
There is no substantive deficiency noted.
The deficiencies that have been noted can be corrected within 9
10 the present structure.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:.Weren't some of those 12 substantive?
i 13 MR. IPPOLITO:
I'm sorry?
j.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You say none of the.n were 15 substantive?
I thought there were some substantive.
I'm not 16 saying you can't correct them.
l 17 MR. IPPOLITO:
Substantive within the context that we would need to disrupt and re-organize to do them.
18 19 They could easily be done, the corrections could be made 20 within the existing organization.
It's within that context 21 that I'm speaking.
22 MR. DIRCKS:
I think your recommendations were on i
23 Page 120 of the report.
Some can be corrected, some may be 1
24 difficult to correct.
I think there is this need to separate Ace Federol Reporters, Inc.
I 25 fact-finding from searches for violations of rules and
96 j
regulations to minimize the potential for an adversarial 2
atmosphere in the investigation.
That's there.
3 I don't know how you are going to get away from it 4
as long as NRC moves in to do anything.
My point is, whether 5
you do it with the current structure or whether you do it 6
with an arm that reports to the Commission itself, there is 7
this mixture of an enforcer with an investigator, and I don't know how you are going to get around it except if 8
9 you want to go this route, then I would suggest you separate 10 it from the agency completely.
INPO indicated that it would be willing to partici-11 12 pate as a party.
However, INPO has informed me and it probably has informed the Commission, they don't want to get into our 13 la regulatory. free-for-alls.
They don't want to get involved when we get into our regulatory enforcement, muscle flexing; 15 16 they want to stay out of that room.
So, you've got that problem.
Whenever we investigate j7 there is going to be this cloud coming in of looking for 18 jp violations.
When Tom says we can correct some things, yes, 20 that's true.
But we can't correct everything, and I think this is the major one that we can't.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And I'm interested in what 22 corrective action --
23 MR. DIRCKS:
We'll get to that.
24 Ace-Federtl Reporters, Inc.
MR. IPPOLITO:
And basically the resources, we 25 l
~
97 e
I believe, are underestimated, and that the benefits that are 2 derived do not equal -- are not justified by the disruption 3
that will result from this reorganization.
4 So, I guess in conclusion, the establishment of 5
an Office of Nuclear Regulation would be, as I said, costly 6
and disruptive, would not result in unique improvements; provide 7
little or no benefits in terms of public perception.
Therefore, we recommend against the establishment 8
9 of such an office.
The staff will initiate action to formalize 10 its current practice of event investigation and take into 11 consideration the improvements that are identified in the BNL 12 report.
13 MR. TAYLOR:
I might pick up there to say, one of 14 the things that we have gotten out of this is, there was an old instruction a number of years ago that had the concepts of 15 16 a "Go Team" under the EDO.
Somehow, that fell into disuse, even though de facto we put these types of groups together.
17 18 We are going to dust that off and dress it up, so that we are -- now, who will be a member will depend upon the 19 20 type of problem.
All these problems are different, they can I
21 be design oriented; they can be electrical, mechanical.
But we are proceeding, which is the one part of our procedural l
22 23 aspect right now that I consider needs to be fixed up, so 24 that af ter, you know, -the initial responses that go on, if the Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 thing rises by the various review groups, including AEOD, we i
I 98 o..
I need a big, in-depth look.
It could happen in a matterof 2
an hour, some of these things do within NRR and so forth.
We'l:
3 get that "Go' Team," to go assist the region and to make sure 1
4 all the facts get out.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me tell you my problem.
6 I think regardless of how we come out, BNL has identified a 7
number of important and I think substantive points that need 8
to be addressed to resolve our handling of incidents, accidents 9
and so forth.
10 Now, I am trying to weigh both sides of this.
But 11 I don't want to come away from this and say, "Well, it's 12 going to be entirely business as usual," unless we really 13 addressed these points that need some corrective action or
(
14 improvement.
I would like, if we can't do it now, get a 15 submittal that says, "Here are the several important points 16 that were identified, here is what we think we prefer to do.
17 These are the improvements we would make based on those 18 comments, those findings."
That is what I was trying to get 19 at.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Good.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So, all you are going to have --
a "Go Team" structure and you are going to have one for 22 reactors, one for materials licenses or whatever, or one for 23 l
24 sabotage --
Ace Federal floporters, Inc.
25 MR. DIRCKS:
One for transportation.
i
99
~
l CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
-- one for transportation.
2 MR. DIRCKS:
One for medical.
It's a wide variety 3
of things you are facing.
We don't have the plane on the
'I 4
ground that identifies it as an acci. dent casualty.
We have 5
a series of events that if you define as losing safety systema, 6
there is a spectrum of events out there that we should 7
investigate.
8 Now, the recommendations of the Brookhaven report 9
are identified, I think, on pages 120, 121, 122 and 123, and 10 every one of those things we are addressing.
11 I wanted to make sure Harold got his say in before 12 the magic --
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Let me add just one quick 7
14 comment if I could, Joe, though, following up on what you just 15 said.
16 Whether or not we go forward with an office, or a 17 recommendation to the Congress for an outside group or whatever, 18 it seems to me that some of these items, including the ones 19 that Jim has just addressed, need to be addressed and s
20 addressed fairly soon.
21 And while I am encouraged to hear the things that 22 you and Jim are saying, it seems to me that we ought to have 23 that a little more formalized.
I'd like to see a paper from 24 the staff that outlines their response to those items that br.d.c.i n. port.ri inc.
25 Brookhaven identified and a plan for dealing with them.
100 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That's what I was getting at, yet 2
MR. DIRCKS:
We will submit that.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Because we are trying to weigh 4
this way or that way, and we ought to know what it is that --
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But I think either way, 6
that decision comes out, we still need to do this.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But still, before that decision 8
I would like to know what it is, what improvements we can make 9
that would address these issues, and that might contribute to 10 deciding whether or not all the objectives have been met.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There is one thing that 12 isn't going to change, though, and that's the fact that if you 13 have a truly significant event and if your threshold for that 14 is Salem or if it's Tt1I perhaps, whatever it is, and part of 15 the fault is us, part of the fault, if you will, is the staff, 16 unless there is some structure for a group like our group, 17 OIA for example, reporting directly to the Commission or the 18 other of fices report directly to the Commission, to take that overview and be critical of staff if in fact staff is 19 20 part of the problem, there is no way to escape that.
21 And that's why I think that though there is a real 22 question of threshold and exactly how you structure it and 23 the way you set this up, I think that that fundamental under-24 lying recommendation of the Brookhaven report is something we Acefederd Reporters, Inc.
25 ought to look at very seriously.
10 1 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I agree with that.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's a good recommendation.
3 MR. DIRCKS:
But you can't escape to'look at the 4
Commission itself, at.J I think that's the point I made too.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
If it's a significant 6
enough event, there will always be that.
7 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No question.
9 MR. DIRCKS:
But out of the investigations we 10 have done, where we have identified a staff malpractice, OIA 11 has been called in to look at where the fault may lie within 12 the staff.
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, no, no, you aro 13 14 talking about a different kind of malpractice now.
We are 13 talking about something quite different from that, that maybe there is something generically flawed about, or specifically 16 17 flawed in a particular case.
But nothing that you land on
';meone for over CIA's responsibility.
18 19 MR. DIRCKS:
But as long as the Commission is the 20 chief management body of the agency, you are thero, you are 21 there with the whole agency.
I don't think --
COMMISSIONER BERNTl!AL:
But you see, Bill, the 22 argument that I was making earlier about how wo differ from 23 the caso of NTSB in respect to their oversight whoro you havo 24 AteJederal Reporters, Inc.
25 single administrators or Secretarios that servo at the pleasure
= _ _ -
102 I
of the President, simply doesn't apply here.
I mean, you 2
already have a Board, and it's the Commission.
It seems to me there is some value in having in 3
lI 4
these select few cases where public perception is so important, 5
having a group report directly to the commission where the j
6 fault may be the staff's.
7 MR. DIRCKS:
If you can identify the select few 8
cases, it is fine.
I think what I am concerned Maout is in trying to deal with those select few cases you may go through 9
10 a reorganization here that would disburse resources out of 11 the very important operational day-to-day follow-up --
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's not at all what I i
13 have in mind.
I mean, I would have in mind a rather modest 7
14 function.
In fact', my suspicion is that for even a handful, of PeoP e at best it would be a full-time job barely.
But l
15 the technical expertise they would draw in the case of a 16 major event, of course, would have to be pulled up from the
{
i i
17 13 staff.
But they are the ones that finally make the judgment, i
19 they report directly to the Commission.
That's the difference, i
20 it seems to me.
21 MR. DIRCKS:
I wanted Harold to have a chance.
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Harold needs a chance to --
22 l
l 23 CHAIRMAM PALLADINO:
Let's give Harold a chance, then I want to make a couple of comments at the end.
24 bred.<. n. pere.ri, W.
25 MR. DENTON:
Well, just 30 noconds.
We have been i
103-I rather ad hoc in the past, and I think the Brookhaven i
2 recommendations are all good enhancements we should have 3
done -- not' have people on the team that were involved in 4
the inspection or review of that; freeze the evidence.
You 5
know, they are just good things to do, and we have done those 6
kinds of things partially.
7 As has been mentioned, a lot of our problem is 8
finding out originally how bad the problem is.
I mean, we 9
often get into it and it looks small, and then it unwinds.
10 Also, industry's view on these things, bear in mind, 11 is not always of one mind.
Often they don't see any problem l
12 in some of the things that we think are big problems, such 13 as Salem or Ginna.
7 14 So, this party system doesn't work as well, I think, i
15 in our process as it does in the airline industry where they 16 all have the same philosphy regarding safety and rollability 17 of equipment.
Our business is all over the map.
But I don't soo any reason we can't adopt tho kinds 18 19 of enhancements that have been mentioned by them and in 20 offect adopt the OPE recommendation, would be my suggestion.
21 CIIAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Lot mo make a couple of 22 comments.
I'll propose what I would liko to suo and then we 23 can discuss variations.
f It scoms to me that beforo I say "ayo" or "nay" 24 As w.c.tn.p.,,,,,,:=,
on the proposal by Brookhavon, I would liko to know what it 25
I 104 I
the staff would propose to do to overcome the problem areas l
2 identified in the report.
That should be done in some t
i 3
reasonable period of time and should be developed to the point l
4 where you can see a way out -- not all aspects of it have 5
to be fully implemented but the concepts ought to be e
developed.
7 I don't know what time frame in which that could a
be done.
Then I would like that to be submitted to the l
l 9
Commission so that it can become part of the basis for 10 a notation vote by the Commission as to whether we want to l
l 11 go forward with the Brookhaven recommendation.
OPE has a 12 recommendation, or the staff's modified version of the 13 present procedures.
Now', would this be a reasonable'way to j
r 14 proceed on this?-
1 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How long would it take to 16 develop that kind of a proposal because I think we do owe 8
17 the Congress an answer on what we think of the report and l
l 13 the Brookhaven recommendations.
(
19 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
Well, again at the risk of getting 20 into a debate, I think the Brookhaven report indicated that 21 there were no major things wrong found with our existing 22 Practice.
They did indicate there are areas of improvement, 23 and they deel with the need to freeze evidences the need to got l
l 24 less adversarial and less compliance-oriented in our j
a P.dwd h,=,wi, w.
25 investigations, i
i t
- ~., -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i 105 o
1 This, we can submit a report to, it is not going to 2
be a massive overturning of our current practice.
We are 3
going to show where we can improve based on some of these --
4 based on the points raised by Brookhaven.
I don't think it 5
should take us a.long time.
Give us a couple of weeks to do e
it and we'll get back to you, the Commission, say by the end 7
of the month.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Can we have a l
9 Commission staff paper by the end of the month?
We count on 10 that.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You know, the thing that 12 somehow is missing heropothough, is that I certainly don't l
13 have in. mind a $6 million, a $5.6 million effort with 75 to 14 80 people full time, somehow under the Commission, reporting l
15 to the Commission.
I think that is out of proportion to i
i le what the need is here.
j 17 I wish that at the gggg time the staff is preparing
)
13 its paper, we might have someone take a look at how we could 19 structure a small group that is credible that reports directly l
L 20 to the Commission just do some brainstorming about where that 21 might best be located.
If we are really talking about maybe l
22 three things a year that they look into seriously, what's the l
23 best way we might do that.
As a part of OPE as one person l
24 has suggested, or as a part of an extension of OIA if you ne.#.dw.i h,
=.
i 25 are looking for investigatory capability, technical j
i
106 1
investigatory capability?
I don't know.
2 But I wouldn't mind seeing something that is pared 3
down considerably from what the Brookhaven vision seems to be.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Well, I would suggest too that 5
the staff look carefully at the OPE paper which I thought was e
very thoughtfully prepared and worth serious consideration.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, shall we go forward with 8
expecting a staff paper by the and of the month from the 9
staff, indicating the improvements that you would plan to 10 make to deal with the problems that were identified, and what 11 changes if any you would make in the organization to accomodate 12 those changes.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, let me just make a 14 direct. request from OPE that they take a look at something 15 that is a bit less ambitious than what Brookhaven suggests.
16 I would like to see your thoughts on that, and you are free 17 to roam anywhere you would like.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I think that's -- I 19 would agree with that, Fred.
And maybe you and I can talk 20 about it a little bit more, too, and think about what --
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
How, wait a minuto, I'm 22 opposed to it.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes, I want to m'ako sure wo 24 got the bonofit of staff's thinking beforo wo start off trying 4..w.i n.p.=i, in.
25 to re-invent anothor way.
I'm not looking for now inventions.
\\
i
107
~
1 I'm looking for a decision, do we go off in a direction to 2
set up an independent body somewhere within the Commission or 3
outside the Commission --
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTIIAL:
Joo, I think you --
5 CliAIRMAN PALLADINO:
-- or do we go ahead with trying 6
to make improvements on our present structuro.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTilAL:
That's a separato issue, 6
Joo.
I think you are talking about responding to arons of 9
concern that have been raised in this report, which I cortainly 10 doubt anyone would disagroo with, versus what really is a 11 fundamental policy issue of whether at least in some 12 circumstancos for whatover threshold wo care to defino -- it 13 might be the TMI thronhold, I think that's a bit too high --
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yon.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTilAL:
-- you should begin to think 16 abc t a separato antity that is the Commission's investigatory 17 arm for accidents or unusual events.
18 CilAIR}Udl PALLADINO:
I would expect that to bo 19 includod in the staff report.
I would expect that somo 20 changon havo got to be mado in the way wo handlo invostigations 21 COMMISSIONER BERNT!!AL:
No, no, they aro not going 22 to recommend that wo not something up under the Comminnion.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No, they cortainly 24 aren't.
A<e r a...i n.n.,,.,i, i.e.
25 MR. DIRCKS:
They recommanded you not nomothing up
108 I
outside the agency.
t 2
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Or leave things the way i
3 they are and improve the staff's capability to look at these things.
4 5
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I think there are some 6
improvements needed in the staff capabilities, and I could i
7 begin to dwell on them, if you would like.
8 I expect you are going to come back and say, "Now, 9
with regard to what we are going to do in handing a "Go Team,".
i 10 that's what we are going to have."
Then you propose that.
11
.4The decision we've got to make so that we don't i
12 keep debating forever and ever all aspects of this approach.
i 13 The decision we've got to make is, do we want to accept the 14 Brookhaven report or not.
If we want to accept it, then that's 15 one thing.
If we say we don't want to accept it, then for le me, we would have to see at least minimum improvements in the 17 staff, and that is what I am trying to get to weigh.
1 Is If you would like to study other proposals, we could 19 go do it.
But it takes resources and we would just be found 20 not making a decision on this.
I would like to at least see, i
21 if we are not going to do the Brookhaven approach, that at
[
22 lenit the staff give serious attontion to the problem and 23 tatu the corrective action needed.
l 24 COMMIOSIONER ASSELSTEIN:
Well, we certainly ought i
nee f.d.e.1 s,etwo, In.
25 to do that.
But the other question, of whethor wo ought to
O 109 o
l 1
look at variations on the Brookhaven theme, I'd have to say 2
for myself I haven't made up my mind on that question yet, and 3
I would agree with Fred that it might be helpful to me to l
4 get some thinking from OPE on it.
I suspect they could l
5 afford to apply the resources to --
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But the problem is, first you've j
7 got to make the decision, then you can decide whether you want 3
a variation on that.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, I don't think we 10 are arguing about anything here.
I will expect something from r
11 OPE, and the staff is going to prepare a paper, and that's 12 its right?
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
We are finished then.
IS COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Fine.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Well, I would not task OPE l
17 to do that.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTifAL:
Well, but wo -- you know, 19 the way this place runs, I have a right to request OPE to 20 provide me with such analyses --
l 21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Exactly.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTilAL:
-- and I'm doing that, it's 1
23 as simple as that.
t 24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And I support you on that.
w ww.in.p.m W.
25 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
put me on the distribution lis t, l
l
r-110 c
I will you?
2 (Laughter) 3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think there has boon a past 4
misunderstanding on this point.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Excuse me, lot's discuss this 6
at another time.
7 Okay, wo are going to expect a staff report by the 8
and of the month.
You will have to identify for OPE what 9
you want them to do and when you want it dono, and then I 10 would liko to have a SECY paper developed so that we have a 11 document on which wo can take action.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Good.
13 CitAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay, anything more for this 14 afternoon?
15 Woll, thank you for your presentation, Walt and 16 your collonguos.
And with that, wo'll stand adjourned.
17 (Whorcupon, at 12:25 p.m.,
the mooting of the 18 Commission was adjourned.)
19 20 21 22 23 24 w e rw.,.i n.p.,,... sa..
2S
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter oft NAME OF PROCEEDING:
Briefing on Brookhaven Report on Independent Safety Organization Public Meeting DOCKET NO.:
PLACE:
Washington, D.C.
May 9, 1985 DATE:
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
s (eiat)
(!
h/d7All (TYPED)
H. E. llanson I
Official Reporter Reporter's Affiliation Aco-Podoral 3
I AN INDEPENbENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION W.Y. Kato, E.V. Weinstock, J.F. Carsw, R.J. Carbone, J.G. Guppy, R.E. Hall and J.H. Taylor '
With Contributions from J. Mark Elliott international Energy Associates 1.td.
Washington O.C.
and M.A. Rowden and S.E. Fowler Fried. Frank. Harris. Shriver & Xampelman Washingion. D.C.
O
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION STUDY OBJECTIVE' I
r TODETERM!NETHENEEDFORANDFEASIBILITYOFE$ TAB-LISHING AN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR t
CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EVENTS, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS, AT FACILITIES i
LICENSED BY THE C0ftllSS!0N AND FOR MAKING REPORTS OF SUCH l
INVESTIGATIONS.
I r
I BROOKHAVIN Natl 0NAL tA80RAf0RYhn A5500Afl0 UNMk5lfit$, INC (HbI l
i
INTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVE 1.
INVESTIGATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AT OPERATING FACILITIES (ige., EXCLUDED FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION).
2.
STUDYNASLIMITEDTOASTUDYOFHOWINVESTIGATIONSOF EVENTS WERE BEING CONDUCTED FOR DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.
EXCLUDED, STUDY OF HOW INVESTIGATIONS OF WRONGD0ING OR RULE INFRACTIONS BY LICENSEES WERE BEING CONDUCTED BY NRC.
3.
THIS STUDY EXCLUDED FROM ITS CONSIDERATION THE NEED FOR AN ORGANIZATION TO OVERSEE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NRC.
1 i
1 BR000tAvtN Nail 0NAL LA80RAf0RYl}
f A5500Al[0 UNIVER5lil[5, INC.(1 l
RECOMMENDATION THIS STUDY RECOMMENDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A QUASI-INDEPENDENT, STATUTORY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY (0NS) HEADED BY A DIRECTOR REPORTING TO THE COMMISSIONERS, ONS WOULD HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AT NRC-LICENSED FACILITIES:
A)
TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS, CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EVENTS; a)
TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF EVENTS; c)
TO RECOMMEND IMPROVEMENTS DESIGNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE AND ENHANCE SAFETY, ONS WOULD ADOPT AN INVESTIGATORY SYSTEM PATTERNED AFTER THAT OF i
THE NTSB.
ONS WOULD ASSUME THE CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD).
BROOKHAVIN Nail 0NAL LABORATORY l} g}
Ass 0clAtto UNivtR51Tl[5, INC.(1(u l
~
ONS INVESTIGATORY SYSTEM WITH PARTIES A.
"G0 TEAM", CONSISTING OF PARTIES, RESPONSIBLE FOR FACT FINDING.
PARTIES - REPRESENTATIVES WITH PERTINENT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FROM NRC (REGIONS, NRR, 18E, NMSS), UTILITIES, REACTOR AND COMPONENT MANUFACTURERS,' INP0, EPRI, AND OTHER TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS.' EXCLUDESATTORNEYSORREPRESENTATIV$5FROM INSURANCE COMPANIES OR CLAIMANTS.
ONS DETERMINES PARTY DESIGNATION.
B.
ONS CONDUCTS PUBLIC HEARING (NON-ADJUDICATORY), IF NECESSARY, FOR PLACING FACTS ON RECORD.
o C.
ONS CONDUCTS ANALYSIS, EVALUATION, AND DETERMINATION 0F CAUSE.
D.
CSS MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
E.
ONS ISSUES PUBLIC REPORT WITH FACTS, ANALYSIS, PROBABLE CAUSE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENT TO REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.
[
(
BROOKHAVIN NAll0NAL LABORATORY l} g)l A550CIAi!D UNIVERSITIES, INC.(Illl l
O SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 1.
EVENTS REQUIRING FULL FIELD INVESTIGATIONS TO BE DEFINED BY ISO 2.
AS A MINIMUM A)
ALERTS AND HIGHER EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS n)
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1
5 I
e BROOKHAVEN Nail 0NAL LABORATO A550CIAi[D llNIVER5lill5, INC. (1 tl I i
BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN INVESTIGATION SYSTEM 0F SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.
2.
INVESTIGATORY BODY MUST BE INDEPENDENT OF LICENSINGAND COMPLIANCE ARMS OF REGULATORY AGENCY TO MINIMIZE OR ELIMINATE POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
3.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITIES OF NRC AND FAA AND SMALLER NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS' LEAD TO AN ONS WITHIN
.THE NRC.
11.
STATUTORY OFFICE REPORTING TO COMMISSION PROVIDES GREATER VISIBILITY AND STATURE.
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g)]
A5500ATED ll!WERSITIES, INC.(illI
D NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN INVESTIGATING EVENTS NEED 1.
TO SEPARATE FACT FINDING AND DETERMINATION OF CAUSE FROM l
LICENSING REGULATION, AND COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE:
A)
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAUSED BY PREVIOUS ACTIONS OR INACTIONS; B)
THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ADVERSARIAL ATMOSPHERE IN AN INVESTIGATION.
2.
FOR A MORE STRUCTURED AND COORDINATED INVESTIGATION FOCUSED ON THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSE OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT.
3.
T0 " FREEZE" THE PLANT CONDITIONS AND PERSONNEL, IF PRACTIC-ABLE FROM THE SAFETY POINT OF VIEW, AS S00N AS POSSIBLE AFTER A SIGNIFICANT EVENT.
14.
FOR INVESTIGATORS WITH MORE OPERATING EXPERIENCE, APPROPRIATE PRACTICAL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND MORE TRAINING IN CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS.
5.
TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.
6.
TO IMPROVE THE TIMELINESS OF THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AN INVESTIGATION.
7.
TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIPS WITH UTILITIES OUTSIDE THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL DATA.
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} l)l A5500ATED (JNIVERSITIES, INC. (l ll !
INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION DEV0TED TO INVESTIGATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF REGULATORY AND COMPLIANCE ARMS 0F NRC, A)
TO AVOID POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST DUE TO PAST REGULATORY OR COMPLIANCE ACTIONS OR INACTIONS B)
TO ENHANCE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN OBJECTIVITY OF INVESTIGATION AND DETERMINATION OF CAUSE OF EVENTS
~~
c)
TO OBTAIN GREATER VISIBILITY AND HENCE GREATER INCENTIVE FOR MORE TIMELY RESOLUTION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES AND ACCEPTANCE OF RECOMMENDATIONS BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l}ljl ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(IllI
RECONSIDERATION OF AN INDEPENDENT NSB IF:
1.
NUMBEROFTECHNICALSTAFFREQUIREDINCREASESSk'G NIFICANTLY.
2.
NEED FOR OVERSIGHT OF NRC PERFORMANCE.
3.
COMMISSION IS REPLACED BY A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR.
3 BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY [}l)l A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(llll
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) 1.
REGULATES AND PROMOTES CIVIL AVIATION TO BEST FOSTER CIVIL AVIATION DEVELOPMENT AND SAFETY 2.
HEADED BY SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR REPORTING TO SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 3.
CERTIFIES AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS I4.
PRESCRIBES AND ENFORCES AIR TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 5.
OPERATES AIR TPAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 6.
OPERATES NAVIGATIONAL AIDS (RADAR, RADIO, BEACONS, ETC.)
7.
DISSEMINATES WEATHER INFORMATION 8.
DISBURSES FUNDS FOR AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT 9.
PARTICIPATES IN NTSB INVESTIGATIONS BUT NOT IN DETERMINATION OF CAUSE BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g) {
A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(1 ElI
--n.
,~...n
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
A.
RESPONSIBILITY PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATING ALL CIVIL AVIATION ACCIDENTS ALSO INVESTIGATES EVENTS INVOLVING FAILURE OF AI.RCRAFT SYSTEMS B.
INVESTIGATION PROCESS FACT FINDING PUBLIC HEARINGS DETERMINATION OF CAUSE AND RECOMMENDATIONS WRITTEN PUBLIC REPORT C.
USES "G0 TEAM" FOR FACT FINDING WITH PARTY SYSTEM (REPRESENTA-TIVES FROM AIRLINES, MANUFACTURERS, ALPA, FAA, NTSB, ETC.).
D.
FAA MUST PARTICIPATE BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g)l AS500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(llll
1 NTSB PERSONNEL BY TRANSPORTATION MODE AVIATION 115 INTERMODAL 139 BY'0RGANIZATION MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 66 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 153 TECHNOLOGY 69 SAFETY PROGRAMS 23 LAW JUDGES OFFICE 9
TOTAL STAFF 320 NTSB REPORTS AVIATION FY 83 FY 84 MAJOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 10 11 FIELD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS 4300 3500 BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l} g)l A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.ItiIl1
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- o 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY REPORTING TO COMMISSION STAFFING 10-15 PROFESSIONALS AT REGIONAL 0FFICES SCREENING FACT FINDING 15 PROFESSIONALS AT HEADQUARTERS FACT FINDING ANALYSIS AND EVALUAT. ION DETERMINATION OF CAUSE FORMULATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 21 2 PROFESSIONALS AT HEADQUARTERS 4
INVESTIGATIONS CASE STUDIES PATTERNS AND TREND ANALYSIS OTHER CURRENT AEOD ACTIVITIES 8
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT 75-80 TOTAL COST PER YEAR - ABOUT $5.6M BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY [} g)l A!500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC. (.I El 3
EXCERPTS FROM ACT OF CONGRESS PREAMBLE TO INDEPENDENT SAFETY BOARD ACT OF 1974
" PROPER CONDUCT OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO THIS BOARD (THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD) REQUIRES VIGOROUS INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING TRANSPORTATION MODES REGU-LATED BY OTHER AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT; DEMANDS CONTINUAL REVIEW, APPRAISAL, AND ASSESSMENT OF THE OPERATING PRACTICES AND REGULA-TIONS OF ALL SUCH AGENCIES; AND CALLS FOR Tile MAKING 0F CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT MAY BE CRITICAL OF OR ADVERSE TO ANY SUCH AGENCY OR ITS OFFICIALS.
NO FEDERAL AGENCY CAN PROPERLY PERFORM l
SUCH FUNCTIONS UNLESS IT IS TOTALLY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT FROM ANY OTHER DEPARTMENT, BUREAU, COMMISSION, OR AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES" (SEC. 302 (2) 0F THE CITED ACT).
4 l
+
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY l)l))
ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(llll
7 BRIEFING FOR THE COMMISSION ON l
NEED FOR INDEPENDENT SAFETY ORGANIZATION t
MAY 9, 1985 C. J. HELTEMES, JR., DIRECTOR, AE0D THOMAS A. IPPOLITO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AE0D l
l' i
I l
i T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985 l
BACKGROUND / HISTORY CONGRESS, DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE FY 1985 APPROPRIATIONS ACT, DIRECTED THAT NRC CONDUCT A STUDY.0F THE NEED FOR'SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STUDY WAS ASSIGNED TO AE0D, WHO CONTRACTED WITH BNL TO CONDUCT THE STUDY.
BNL'S STUDY WAS FORWARDED TO THE COMMISSION ON MARCH 5, 1985 (SECY-85-81).
ACRS COMMENTS ON THE STUDY WERE FORWARDED TO THE COMMISSION ON MARCH 13, 1985 l
EDO COMMENTS ON THE STUDY WERE FnRW,\\RDED To THE COMMISSION ON MARCH 28, 1985 l
l ACRS MET WITH THE COMMISSION TO DISCUSS THE STUDY ON APRIL 11, 1985 T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
~
1 i
t
5 1
AGENDA INTRODUCTION 5 MINUTES T. IPPOLITO CONTENT OF THE BNL REPORT 25 MINUTES DR. W. KATO STAFF COMMENTS ON THE BNL REPORT 30 MINUTES I. IPPOLITO PRESENT NRC INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM-WHAT IS THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT OFFICE 7 BNL ESTIMATE OF RESOURCES FOR INDEPENDENT SAFETY OFFICE WEAKNESSES IN BNL RESOURCE ESTIMATES
SUMMARY
CONctuSIONS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 30 MINUTES T. A. IPPOLITO, AEOD 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985 i
MRC INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM INCIDENT BEGINS 1.
v i
CALL TO NRC OPERATIONS CENTER (W/I ONE HOUR) v OPERATIONS CENTER ASSESSES INCIDENT AND CONTACTS REGIONAL DUTY OFFICER AND HQ MANAGEMENT TO INITIATE RESPONSE
[
j v
EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRC j
MANUAL CHAPTER 0502 (REGIONS, NRR, IE, NMSS) i
+
+
i RESPONSE CENTER ACTIVATED REGIONAL TEAM TO SITE COLLECT AND ASSESS INFORMATION REGARDING PLANT CONDITION
[
L RECOMMEND ACTIONS FOR PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC l
v l
l PLANT STABILITY ACHIEVED v
j DEACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE I
v INVESTIGATION PHASE T. A. IPPOLITO, AEOD i
49-24484 i
thy 6, 1985 l
~,
e FVENT SCREENING AND' EVALUATION NON-EMERGENCY EVENTS I
4,
,i PROMPT SCREENING BASED ON 50 72, WRITTEN LER RECEIVED 50.55E OR PART 21 NOTIFICATION f
SCREENED BY AEOD l
NRR/IE CONFERENCE CALL q
4, SIGNIFICANT NOT SIGNIFICANT sf ASSESSMENT OF SHORT TERM RESPONSE I
N/
I I
STUDY REGION IE/NRR s/
INSPECTION GENERIC CONCERNS ISSUE REPORT WITH ENFORCEMENT INFO NOTICE / BULLETIN /
RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW-UP GENERIC LETTERS
$/
NRR/IE EVALUATE AND IE/NRR/AE0D BIWEEKLY INITIATE APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS ACTION ACRS BRIEFING T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
9 TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION EMERGENCY EVENTS se DEACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE (NnN-EMERGENCY EVENTS) se EDO ESTABLISHES TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE TEAM se FACT FINDING s/
ASSESS INFORMATION sr PREPARE REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS se NRR/IE EVALUATE AND INITIATE APPROPRIATE ACTION T. A. IPPoLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
a RESULTS OF SCREENING AND EVALUATIONS IN 1984 AE0D - CASE STUDIES 4
AE0D - ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS 27 IE - INFORMATION NOTICES 94 i
IE - BULLETINS 3
NRR - GENERIC l.ETTERS 24 4
i, ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES 19 AE0D - POWER REACTOR EVENT REPORTS BI-MONTHLY T
l T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D i
49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
2.
1 WHAT IS THE BASIS (NEED) FOR A NEW 0FFICE?
PREVENT CONFLICk 0F INTEREST 7
- BNL FOUND NO CASES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR RIAS.
CORRECT DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING INVESTIGATIONS 7 DEFICIENCIES NOTED CAN BE CORRECTED WITHIN PRESENT STRUCTURE.
BNL CONCLUDED THAT NRC INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN A " PROFICIENT AND TECHNICALLY COMPETENT
- MANNER.
REDUCE THE PERCEPTION OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 7 THOSE WHO PERCEIVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WILL NOT VIEW A COMMISSION-LEVEL OFFICE AS BEING 7REE OF SUCH CONFLICT.
T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985-
e l
l i
BNL's ESTIMATE OF THE RESOURCES REQUIRED T0 l
l STAFF AN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY l
SCOPE INCLUDES ALL EVENTS AT NRC LICENSED FACILITIES.
BNL NOTED THAT THE NEW OFFICE SHOULD INVESTIGATE ALL AsNORMAL OCCURRENCES AND ALERTS.
l BNL ASSUMED THAT THE NEW OFFICE WOULD INVESTIGATE 8-12 EVENTS PER YEAR.
l BNL'S ESTIMATE OF RESOURCES RELIED HEAVILY ON RESOURCES FROM THE PARTY SYSTEM.
BNL CONCLUDED THAT 25-30 ADDITIONAL STAFF WOULD BE REQUIRED.
T. A. IPPOLITO, AEOD 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985 I
--g-l l
1 WEAKNESSES IN BNL RESOURCE ESTIMATES l
l BNL ESTIMATED RESOURCES:
00 NOT INCLUDE MON REACTOR EVENTS (APPROXIMATELY 600/ YEAR).
l l
UgDERESTIMATES NUMBER OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES / ALERTS PER YEAR (27 IN 1984).
DO NOT INCLUDE INVESTIGATION EFFORTS WHICH HAVE FINDINGS OF LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
1 DEPEND ON PARTY SYSTEM CONSISTING OF PROGRAM 0FFICES PLUS EXTERNAL SOURCES (INCONSISTENT WITH " INDEPENDENT *).
l l
l T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985 l
e
a i
i
SUMMARY
THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS GENERALLY WORKING SATISFACTORILY.
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE DEFICIENCY THAT WILL BE CORRECTED BY AN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY.
1 DEFICIENCIES NOTED CAN BE CORRECTED WITHIN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE.
l l
1 THE PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR BIAS IS NOT RESOLVED.
THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY MEET THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUCH AN.0FFICE ARE SUBSTANTIAL.
THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM SUCH AN OFFICE DO NOT JUSTIFY THE SUBSTANTIAL COST THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.
T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
W.
<?
CONCLUSIONS 1
~
0 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY WOULD:
l BE COSTLY AND DISRUPTIVE NOT RESULT IN UNIQUE IMPROVEMENTS PROVIDE LITTLE OR NO BENEFITS IN TERMS OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION O
THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY.
l 0
THE STAFF WILL IMITIATE ACTION TO FORMALIZE ITS CURRENT PRACTICE OF EVENT INVESTIGATION TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE IMPROVEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE BNL REPORT.
i
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)
T. A. IPPOLITO, AE0D 49-24484 MAY 6, 1985
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