ML20127M467
| ML20127M467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301280210 | |
| Download: ML20127M467 (20) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:....... ) ~ GE NucIcar Energy -4 I i! ' I / 9 i[a q _a' r. S i. <r3 e January 19,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet l'osiusny, Senior l'roject Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced 1(cactors and License 1(enewal Ollice of the Nuclear Itcactor llegulation
Subject:
Subinittal Supporting Accelerated AllWit lleview Schedule
Dear Chet:
Attached is the revised proposed closure of AllWit DFSIIlt open item 17.3.51. Please provide Mr. l'olich with a copy of these responses. Sincerely, C.dh (- Jack Fox Advanced Iteacrer Programs cc: Jack Duncan (Gil) Norman Fletcher (doi!) 2000M JI M&> f9 ZZ? L'
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ABWR uman Standard Plant RIV B 17.3 RELIABILITY ASSURANCE aspec ts of plant operauon. maintenance. and performance m nit ring of plant nsk-significant SSCs. ne FRA for PROGRAM DURING DESIGN the ABWR and other industry sources will be used to PilASE idenhty and pnorinze those SSCs that are imponant to prevent or midgate plant transients or other events that This secuan presents the ABWR Design Rehability could present a nsk to the public. Assurance Program (D-RAP). 17.3.3 Purpose 17.3.1 Introducilon The purpose of the D RAP is to assure that the plant The ABWR Design Reliability Assurance Program (D i!AP) is a program that will be performedt' CP safetyasesumatedbytheprobabilisucriskan s maintamed as the detailed design evolves through the ? W!=; Nu (GE+Et during detailed design and impleinentadon and procurtnwnt phases and that peninent specific equipment selecdon phases to assure that the mi rmau nupm nthedesigndocumentadontothe important ABWR reliability assumptions of the u ure p ne an s that equiprnent reliabilny, as it probabilistic nsk assessment (PRA) will be considered a s pWety.can be maintained through operanon throughout the plant life. The plant owner / operator will and maintenance dunng the enute plant life, (ornpM also have an operational RAP (0-RAP) that tracks f4e D4V equipment reliability to demonstrate that the plant is being 17.3.4 Objecthe esnd esH/ operated and mamtamed consistent with PRA assumpnons so that overall nsk is not unknowingly degraded. The PRA evaluates the plant response to initiating events to The cbjective of the D RAP is to identify those plant assure that plant damage has a very low probability and SSCs that are signifcant contnbutors to risk, as shown by the PRA or other sources, and to assure that, dunng the nsk to the public is very low. Input to the PRA includes details of the plant design and assurnptions acout the impkmentation phase,the plantdesign continues to uultze risk signifcant SSCs whose reliability is commensurate vgfR reliability of the plant risk signifcant structures, rystems with the PRA assumpoons. The D RAP will also idenufy hg and components (SSCs) throughout plant life. 7 key assumptions regarding any operadon, maintenance t %.D q/ The D-RAP will include the design evaluanon of the and monitonng activities that the owner / operator should % q. consider in developing its O-RAP to assure that suc h SS Cs
- 4 g d yi AB WR. It willidentify relevant aspects of plant operanon, can be expected to operate throughout plant life with maintenance, and performance monitoring of important reliability consistent with that assumed in the PRA.
5 9,o V u 9 plant SSCs for owner / operator consideration in assuring yA saiety of the equipment and limited risk to the public. The A major factor in plant reliability assurance is risk- @ w*9 policy and implementation procedures will be specified focused maintenance, by which mainienance resources Q -[ 5 [ by the owner / operator, art focused on those SSCs that enable the ABWR systems yQ to fulfill their c:.sential safety functions and on SSCs i \\ Also included in this explanation of the D RAP is a whose failure may dimetly initiate challenges to safety e s D4$o desenptive example of how the D RAP will apply to one All plant modes are considered, including systems. " k.{ potentially imponent plant systun the standby liquid equipment directly relied upon in Emergency Operaung control system (SLCS). De SLCS example shows how Ptucedures (EOPs). Such a focus of mainienance wtli yt 9 g the principles of D RAP will be applied to other sysaems help to mamtain an acceptably low level of risk, consistent 4 identified by the PRA as being signifcant with respect to 6' % (% . ith the PRA. w nsk. mt 4 l -is 17.3.5 GE NE Organization for D. RAP t l.x ' ~ 4 W ' 17.3.2 Scope -q st i %tmo, nn,6nn ot ihe ntm,_.._ s
- The ABWR D-RAP will irclude the future design b d evaluation of the ABWR, and it will identify relevant
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ABWR naimw Standard Plant avs yf Man' agers of the Nuclear Services and Projec ts Departtpent Nuclear Operadons Department.
portsibility forh and of' e Nuclear Operauons Department reppfo the reliability review of desi BWR systems and Vice Pre ent and General Manager of GE Nuclear components also falls e Reliability Engineenng Energy. Two tions involved with an ifWR D. RAP (ServicesUrut.underand PerformanetIng f
nonfromtheSysterns!ntegration are the Advan Rextor Pro Secuoa arJ the Engmeenng Servie
BY HCHER FAILURE THOSE IN PRA?
RATE?
NO NO 1
V DOES SSC FAILURE HAVE YES RE E N
- BLE, A LARGE IMPACT ON PRACTICAL AND COST SYSTEM UM AVAILABILITY?
EFFECTIVE? NO NO 4 V SSCs FOR O-RAP b / Figure 17. . Design Evaluations for SSCs Amendmet 21 17 bl2 i
l' ABWR uoion Standard Plant aty., RISK-SIGNIFICANT SSCs FOR O-RAP V ASSESSMENT PATH A YES DOES FAILURE HISTORY IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE MODES AND PIECEPARTS? NO 1V ASSESSMENT PATH B y IDENTIFY EXISTING IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE MAINTENANCE-RELATED MODES AND PIECEPARTS ACTIVITIES AND USING ANALYTICAL METHODS REQUIREMENTS V V 9 DEFINE DOMHANT IDENTIFY MAINTENANCE FAILURE MODES TO REQUIREMENTS DEFEND AGAINST 9-Figure 17.3.: Process for Determining Dominant Failure Mc<les of Risk-Significant SSCs 17.3-13 Amendrnant 21
m. ABWR 23olmo Standard Plant xyy, INFCAMATION MEDED ASSESSMEMT PATH A w DATA ASSESWENTTO INPUT FROM AOCEFTED ESTABLISH FAWRE HISTORY INDUSTRY DATA BASES CONSULTATON WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE ENGIEERING. OPE RATIONS 1y AND MMNTEPANE PE RSONNEL DETEFWINE THE ANALYSS
- ROOT CALSE ANALYSIS BOUtCARY(INOMOLAL
- DESIGN REVIEWS COMPOENT COMPONENT TYPE
- SYSTEM WALKDOWNS IN SIMILAR APPLICATONS.ETC) 1 V
FROM FAlWRE HISTORV, CONSTRUCT LIST OF FAlLURE MODES /CAUSES AT PIECEPART LEVEL II IF APPFCPRIATE.0EVELOP FMLURE MODE CATEGOR6ES AND ASSIGN EACH PIECEPART FMLURETO ACATEGORY lI 06TMN OCClARENCE FREOLENCY OF EACH CATEGORY (OR PIECEPART FAILtRE) l' OEFINE THE DOM NANT FMLURE MODE UST FRCM OATA CONS DERATCNS S l-Figure 17. . Use of Failure History to Define Failure Modes Ammbners 21 !?.3 14 . ~., - - ~,
i ABWR Standard Plant RIV B ASSESSMENT PATH B INFORMATON NEEDED u OUALITATIVE ANALYTICAL ENGINEERING DIAGRAMS OF ASSESSMENT CRITICAL COMPONENT UNDER ASSESSMENT V PERFORM A F AULT TREE OR FMEA ANALYSIS ON COMPONENTS TO PIECEPART LEVEL V IDENTIFY: . SINGLE PIECEPART FAILURES THAT FAllTHE COMPONENT'S FUNCTION (AND THAT ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR), LATENT PIECEPART FAILURES NOT DETECTED THROUGH ORDINARY DEMAND
- TESTING, PIECEPART FAILURES THAT HAVE COMMON CAUSE POTENTIAL, INCLUDING BY AGING OR
- WEAR, PIECEPART FAILURES THAT COULD CASCADE TO MORE SERCUS FAILURES.
V DEFINE THE DOMINANT FAILURE MODE LIST FROM ANALYSIS CONSIDERATONS I Figure 17. . Analytical Assessment to Define Failure Modes Amendment 21 171-l $ i
ABWR 234.imo Standard Plant rey, INFORMATION NEEDED ASSESSMENT PATH C IDENTIFY PLANNED . ASME SECTION XI REQUIREMENTS ND . VENDORRECOMMENDAT10NS E T . EQ REQL1REMENTS . TECHNICALSPECIF1 CATION FOR TESTING & CAljBRATION V . OTHER REGULATORY-MANDATED UST ALL MAINTENANCE REQUIREMEhTS AND REQUIREMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS FROM ALL SOURCES V PARTTTION UST INTO THOS E MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS ACTUALLY PLANNED AND THOSE THAT ARE NOT V V MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE RE MM UT ACTUALLY PLANNED l V T RECORD RATIONALE F 8 CORD RATIONALE FOR PERFORMING THE lon NOT PERTORMING MAINTENANCE THE MAINTENANCE V V IDENTITY FAILURE IDENTTTY FAILURE MODES AFFECTED AND MODES NOT PROTECTED FREQUENCY OF BY MAINTENANCE MAL'TENANCE (IF ANY) Y DEFINE THE DOMINANT FAILURE MODES Figure 17.h Inclusion of Maintenance Reg.frementS in the Definition of Failure Mod 17.3-16 Amendment 21
ABWR uui o Standard Plant ,, y, COMINANT FAILURE MODES OF RISK-SIGNIFICANT $$CS V YES DOES SSC REQUIRE PERIODIC SPECIFY REOUIRED TESTING? TrE S NO 4 V DOES SSC R UIRE SPECIFY m PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE G7 MONTIORINO NO 4 Y YES SPECIFY PERIODIC PM PE E7 NO 4 Y DOCUMENT.FOR OWNEROPERATOR. MADfTENANCE ACTIVTTIES AND BASES PLUS UNCERTAD(TIES, FOR THE RISK-SIGNIFICANT SSCS. b Figure 17.h. Identification of Risk-Significant SSC O-RAP Activities Amendment 21 17117
l ABWR 2 ai=4o Standard Plant arv a var CONTA MDiT M 2 7g H L "E dbe-Y j n ..._ w 7 q __ _ _ T.. g... _ _ _ __ mer r i i sucri v.tsu t--8 8 - t m!!! r a - I Ew g,1[ 4-------p_ --.w_ [m'se--] ^ 1 i, !'-l V war. 1 I LJ L _I 1 - f - 8 B --I L-- M r-u- J Wg i i l i '1 -- - r - Coos cuss 3 P - -{ I g u_____________a 2__ TAhK 1 Figure 17 Standby Liquid Control System (Standby Mode) I7'3*II t21
h, - ABWR uiuman-l Strndard Plant aEv., - l SLC FAILS TO DEUVER$0GPM BOR ATED WATER FALURE OF BOTH SLC goyH p(pp 30TH PUMP - BORATED PUWPS TO SUCTION - DSCHARGE WATER NOT f)ELNM VALWS FAL VALWS FAL AV4LA8LEAT soRATE CLo SED CLOSE) PUMP WATER TO SUCTION OtSCH. G2 07 G10 G13 FAILURETo NTIATE AutouATIC FALURE MANUAL FAILURE TO M N TE NTIATE f .b-k G as 4 OPERA 10M SIGNAL 10 FAILS TO NTIATE NTuTE FALURE O A SLCOOtHE G23 1 A0E-01 Figure 17 . Standby Liquid Control System Top Level Fault Tree ' 17.3 19 w2 P m 5}}