ML20127M109
| ML20127M109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/14/1992 |
| From: | Barrett R, Jocelyn Craig, Jerome Murphy Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Sniezek J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127M067 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301280111 | |
| Download: ML20127M109 (8) | |
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! A, 'L .i NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASWNG T ON. D. C. 20555 3
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I AUG 14 092 MEMORANDUM FOR: James H. Sniezek, Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research fROM: Joseph A. Murphy, Deputy Director Division of Systems Research Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Richard J. Barrett, Director Project Directorate !!!-2 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation -.
John W. Craig, Chief License Renewal Project Directorate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
THOMAS G. DUNNING'S DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION As requested by your memorandum dated June 12, 1992, we have reviewed the '
Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) submitted to the EDO by Thomas G.
Dunning. We met as a panel on June 30, July 16, August 4, and August 11, 1992, and met with Mr. Dunning on July 23, 1992. J. M. Cutchin, IV, OGC, D attended our meeting with Mr. Dunning and the last two panel meetings. He has provided counsel, as needed. Our report follows.
BACKGROUND Mr. Dunning initially filed a Diffe,ing Professional View (DPV) with Dr. T.
Murley, NRR, on June 27, 1991. In that DPV, Mr. Dunning stated, "I wish to bring to your attention a matter for which I believe the Commission is negligent in its duty to adequately clarify technical specification (15).
requi rer..ent s . The requirements of concern are those for residual heat removal (RiiR) systems that apply when plants are in cold shutdown and during refueling ,
conditions when the water level is less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. As a consequence, I believe that the Commission is failing to carry out its responsibilities to protect the public health and safety. He '
explained his views in some detail.
Dr. Murley responded to Mr. Dunning by memorandum dated August 29, 1991, stating the existing Technical Specification requirements "... are not clear..." and that "... current staff actions to resolve safety concerns with shutdown and low p. er operations address the tecnnical suncerns raised in your DPV." Subsequently, Mr. Dunning filed a formal DP0 on this matter i>y memorandum to the EDO dated June 10, 1992.
Enclosure 7 9301280111 921228 PDR HISC 9301200098 ,
,PDR
2 Based on our reading of the formal DP0 submittal and on our meeting with Mr.
Dunnir,g, we interpret Mr. Dunning's contention to be that the NRC has failed to enforce our regulations in cortain areas where there appear to be differences between Mr. Dunning's interpretation of the requirements as stated in the General Design Criteria (Appendix A,10CFR50) and established Technical Specifications. He also contends that we have not always enforced Technical
. Specifications already in place. Mr. Dunning has offered, as an example, situations involving onsite electric power requirements and residual heat removal requirements during plant shutdown conditions and points to differences in interpretation of the meaning of " operable" in different versions of the Standard Technical Specifications.
In our deliberations, we have relied primarily on Mr. Dunning's formal DP0, our meeting with him on July 23, 1992, and on a summary of his DP0 positions which he provided to us at that meeting. A copy of that summary is attached.
There are some dif ferences between the material Mr. Dunning provided to the DP0 process and that provided to us, i'hile we note that Directive 10.159 requires that new items should not be considered by the DP0 process but referred back to the originat'ing office for consideration as a new DPV, we have considered all the material presented to us, believing the differences do not introduce materially new issues but, rather, illuminate Mr. Dunning's original concerns.
LVBlLAJT10J While much of Mr. Dunning's DP0 focuses on his example regarding AC power requirements for RHR trains during refueling outages, we believe his fundamental concern deals with the relationship between the General Design Criteria (GDC) and the Technical Specifications and that the GDC design criteria define the operability requirements of the system. We address this policy consideration first and then return to his specific example.
The General Design Criteria consist of criteria imposed on the desian, in the introduction to Appendix A, it is stated they "...establi<h the necessary ,
design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requiremants for structures, systems, and components important to safety. . . .
The Tect iical Specifications, among other things, develop operational criteria or speci fications, The requirements for Technical Specifications are defined in 10CFR50.36. The Technical Specifications, through the limiting Conditions -
for Operation (LCO), define
...the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of tne facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met,
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the licensee shall shut down the r 2 actor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met. (50.36(c)(2)).
When a system or component, required by the LCO, can be out of service for some period of time without imposing an undue risk on tha public, operation in such a condition can be allowed, under the " remedial action" referenced in 50.36'c)(2), through the concept of an allowed outage time (A0T) with attendant remedial action. Using A0Ts of varying duraticn, depending on the perceived risk associated with the various systerrs and components, plants have been permitted to continue operation, even though the operational configuration was less than that required of the desian by the GDCs.
Continued operation under the constraints of one or more A0Ts is not unusual, and has been permitted by Technical Specifications since the first set was issued to San Onofre 1 over 20 years ago.
The Limiting Conditions for Operation are usually coherent with the General Design Criteria, but, in our view, there is no requirement that they be so.
The GDC impose minimum requirements on the design. These may be in excess of
..the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the f acility", and, thus, the LCOs can be established to allow continued operation with less equipment than required by the GDCs, provided an explicit finding is made that there continues to be reasonable assurance that there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. This finding should be made in the staff Safety Evaluation issued at the time the plant is licensed or when the Technical Specifications are amended. (An example of such a situation is the reduction of redundancy requirements in the LC0 for the RHR system of a PWR during refueling when there is ample water above the core.)
Regarding Mr. Dunning's specific example, we agree with the statement in Dr.
Murley's memorandum to Mr. Dunning dated August 29, 1991, that "... the existing Technical Specificaticn requirements regarding the need for both -
normal and emergency AC power for RHR train operability during cold shutdown and refueling are not clear and are subject to differing interpretations. The NRC has not yet clearly communicatrd *o licensees or the staff its position on this issue." We believe that statemen' is equally applicable at the present time. As noted in Mr. Dunning's :1P0 memorandum to the EDO, the Technical Specifications for 56 plants define " operable" as requiring both onsite arLd offsite power. This definition is consistent with GDCs 17 and ^4. The remaining 55 p' ants define " operable" as requiring electric power, and this has been interpreted as requiring either onsite or offsite power. This departs from the General Design Criteria. As noted above, we believe the LCOs can differ from the GDCs grovidtd this departure is justified by a staff Safety Evaluation, and <_he requisite findings are made. It is not clear to us, however, that an adequate Safety Evaluation has been isst ' to support this departure from the design requirements in the GDCs for the 55 plants with the "or" definition
4 RECOMLEEDAHQU We recommend that the staff clarify its position with respect to how the GDCs apply to the RHR system during cold shutdown and refueling and to the relationship or connection between the General Design Criteria and the Technical Specifications. (0GC concurrence in that position should be obtained.) This clarification should be communicated to both the staff and licensees. Our views on this subject are presented above.
The Technical Specifications for shutdown cooling should be reviewed for consistency with that position, and where trbiguous or inconsistent, the Technical Specifications should be amended to eliminate the ambic'ities and inconsistencies. The backfit procedures, under 10CFR50.109, as appropriate, should be followed. We note that for those 55 plants which define " operable" -
as eitner onsite or offsite electrical power, this may be a compliance backfit under 10CFR50.109(a)(4)(1), depending on the ader,uacy of the Safety Evaluations which supported the departure from the GDCs.
We note that NRR Sas had a major ef fort underway to consider the regulatory improvements necessary to maintain configuration control during low power and shutdown conditions in light of recent risk evaluations. We understand that this effort is nearing completion and that proposed modifications to the regulatory process will be submitted to CRGR in the near future. This may provide an appropriate vehicle to implement the recommendations we make above.
It may also serve to provide the necessary technical analyses to support any
departure from the General Design Criteria.
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sep A. Murphy, Depusy Director Richar J. Barrett, Director Division of Systems Research Project Directorate 111-2 ~
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Office of Nuclear Reactor ~
r N Regulation
/cohn W. Craig, Chief License Renewal Project Directorate g Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation d
- STATED DP0 POSITIONS
'. 1. NRC is not enforcing the regulatory requirements of GDC-17 & -34 with respect to:
- (1) the availability of EITHER the ONSITE or OFFSITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS, and (2) the capability to perform the residual heat removal (RiiR) safety function assuming a SINGLE FAILURE for those plants which were licensed to operate based upon compliance with the GDC.
- 2. NRC is not enforcing technical specification (TS) requirements that include explicit requirements for the operability of redundant RHR systems and associated electrical power systems.
- 3. Draft NUREG-1449, " Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," has not addressed existing regulatory requirements (GDC 17 & 34), current STS requirements, or inconsistencies of past TS guidance and plant TS with current requirements.
- 5. The lack of consistency in plant TS should be addressed as the first step to the broader issue of shutdown and low power risks.
SVMHARY:
NRC IS NOT ENFORCING REGULATORY AND TS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILABillTY/
OPERABILITY OF ONSITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - FOR THE OPERATING NUCLEAR PLANTS - THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH:
A. THE GDC B. STATEMENTS IN OPERATING LICENSES THAT FACILIT': WILL OPERATE IN CONF 0RMANCE TO COMMISSION'S P,ULES AND REGULA110NS C. THE PLANT TS CONSEQUENTLY, NRC IS NOT TAKING ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE TS REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR ALL PLANTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE GDC.
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MLATID POSITIONS SET FORTH M.DP0 ENCLOSURE 1
- 1. The NRC should clearly state its position on the proper application of I
the regulatory requirements of the GDC. (Specific.lly GDC 17 & 34)
- 2. The NRC should clearly state its position on compliance to GDC and the operating license statement that "the facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission."
- 3. The NRC should c*early state its posit'lon on the proper application of the TS definition of the term " operable' with respect to electrical support systems, namely diesel generators.
- 4. The NRC should clearly state that the TS definition of operability is not changed by the identification of support systems as " electrical power" or " normal and emergency electrical power sources.* .
- 5. If exceptions to TS or regulatory requirements are to be granted by NRC, such actions should be in accordance with NRC policy or regulatory requirements that do not exclude public notice of the exceptions.
- 6. The NRC should clearly state the TS requirements for the operability of support systems other than electrical, such as component cooling and service water, that apply based on the definition of operability.
- 7. The NRC should clearly state when it is appropriate for licensees to voluntarily remove diesel generators from service for preventive maintenance.
- 8. The NRC should take action, including backfit considerations, to have licensees propose TS changes to remove footnotes that indicate that either the onsite or offsite power system may be inoperable for any RHR train that is required to be operable.
- 9. The HRC should take action, including backfit c,.siderations, to have BWR licensees propose TS changes for RHR systems that are consistent with GDC 34.
- 10. The NRC should take action to verify that PWR licensees have requested TS changes for RHR systems that are consistent with GDC 34 as requested by generic letter 80-53.
b 1,
! ;.- . Definitions-1,1
' I" .1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE b. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE (continued)
LEAKAGE (except SG tube LEAKAGE) th, rough a non isolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall;
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All LEAKAGE that is not iaentified LEAKAGE or controlled LEAKAGE.
H0DE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition,. power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and-reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning.
-- specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor ,
vessen.
NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT The NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR is the CHANNEL FACTOR Fg(Z) maximum local linear power density in the core divided by the core average fuel rod linear power density, assuming nominal fuel pellet and fuel rod dimensions.
, NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE The NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR is HOTCHANNELFACTOR(FL) the ratio of the integrai of linear power along-the fuel- rod on which minimum departure from nucleat doiling ratio occurs to the average fuel rod power OPERABLE-UPERABILITY A system, subsystem,- train, component,'or device shall be OPERABLE when it is capable of performing its specified safety function (s) and when all necessary attendant-instrumentation, controls,
-nomal or emergency. electrical >ower, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and otler auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).
PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be tho'se tests perfomed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation.
(continued)
BWOG STS 1.1-5 P&R 06/15/92 m
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LEGALAVESTIONS 4 +
- 1. Is NRC obligated. to enforce its rules and regulations?
-2. Is NRC obligated to inform the public when it decides to waive compliance with its rules?
- 3. Is there an issue about what the regulations require?
- a. What GDC 17 e ans?
- b. What GDC 34 means?
- 4. Is there an issue about what operating licenses require of licensees on compliance with the rules and regulations of the Comission?
- 5. Is there an issue about there being a difference between design require-ments and operating requirements when the NRC determines whether a "
licensee complies with the rules and regulations of the Comission?
- 6. Is there an issue about what is the intent of the technical specification (TS) definition of operability and the requirements that are placed upon the capability of support systems, such as cooling water and electrical power - both onsite a: d offsite, when TS specify that a system shall be operable?
- 7. Is there a statue of limitations.such that the NRC's failure to enforce a particular rule or regulation for some period of time will render that rule or regulation null and void?
- 8. Does the Backfit Rule (950.109) providt a valid basis for not enforcing the requirements of the GDC, TS, or operating license?
WHILE THE PROCESS MAY LABEL THE ISSUE AS A " DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION,"
IT REALLY IS A REQUEST FOR A LEGAL POINT OF ORDER ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
- 1. WHAT ARE THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMISSION, NAMELY, GDC-17 AND -347 2 WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATING LICENSES, NAMELY, "THE NRC HAS FOUND THAT THE FACILITY L'ILL OPERATE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE COMMISSION?"
- 3. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS), NAMELY, THE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR DIESEL GENERATORS WHEN THE TS REQUIRE '
REDUNDANT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS TO BE OPERABLE?
- 4. WHAT BASIS DOES THE NRC HAVE FOR NOT ENFORCING THESE REQUIREMENTS AND WHAT IS IT OBLIGATED TO D0 TO NOTIFY THE PUBLIC OF ITS ACTIONS?
THE ISSUE IS NOT WHAT IS TOM DUNNING'S (OR SOMEONE ELSE'S, INCLUDING THE DP0 PANEL) PROFESSIONAL .lVDGEMENT OR OPINION OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FROM THE STAND-POINT OF OPERABLE ELECTRICAL POWER SOURCES, NAMELY DIESEL GENERATORS, TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC; BUT RATHER WHAT REGULATORY, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION, AND OPERATING LICENSE REQUIREMENTS ALREADY EXIST AND WHAT IS THE NRC'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE REQUIREMENTS OR FOR PUBLICLY JUSTIFYING ITS FAILURE TO DO S0.
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