ML20127K597

Summary of 670322 Staff Meeting in Bethesda,Md Re Util CP Application.Attendees List Encl.Acrs Subcommittee 670323 Meeting Minutes Also Encl

ML20127K597
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	03/27/1967
From:	Grimes B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 9211200445
Download: ML20127K597 (6)

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' UNITED STATES GOVERNMI NT [ g,'

PIemorandwn TI U R. Nuller, Chief r Reactor Projects Branch No.1, DRL yN" i  ;

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B. Grimes, Reactor Projects Branch No. 3,4 /

Division of Reactor Licensing ( dvWW '

selytci: NORTIDGtN STATES ICWr.R, DOCKET NO. 50 263, STAFF MErff1NG MARCH 22, 1967; ACRS SUB00)Oi1 TITE FEt: TING MARCH 23, 1967 A. Staff Meeting On March 22, 1967, a meeting was beld in the Bethesda offices to discuss the Northern States Pbver Construction Permit application. An attendance liet is attached.

Areas modes and discussed planned at the meeting)were research, (2 the present (1) present storage knowledge capacity and use of fuel failu rate of the Minneapolis and St. Paul water intakes and the 20 and 40 year

. forecasts for these nuncipalities, (3) the disposition of liquid vastas during an MCA, (4) the length of time for a slu6 of pollutant to pass the Minneapolis water intake at a riverflow of IK)0 cfs and (5) the ade-quacy of the single diesel generator for emergency on-site power. Satis-factory presentations on the first four points were made by the applicant.

These four points were transmitted to D. R. Nuller by the ACRS Subcommaittee and are delineated in bis February 14, 1967, memo to files.

The emergency on-site power was disenssed from the standpoint of (1) reli-ability of the Northern States Power network, 2) probability of the loss of offsite power caused by an accident ani (3)(reliability of the proposed diesel generator. The G. E. proposed critarion on reliability of off-site power was handed out and is attached to this meno. The staff restated its position that two on-site power sources are required.

B. Subcommittee Meeting The subcommittee meeting covered the same points 1 as the staff meeting -

with the result that the first four points were satisfactorily resolved (the analysis on the 400 cfs river flow will be submitted as an amend-ment to the application) and the fellowing guestions were raised on the diesel generator reliability (1) Is the on-site power truly iniependent of offsite power? That is, could a single failure take out both power sources?- (Theapplicant's -

answer was that they were independent.)

(2) Would the plant be sbu+down if the diesel van not operablet g For example, the technical specifications mi bt 6 require shutdown if the

/ > diesel were out for more than a few hours. (NSP stated that there vere s many considerations in the decision to take a plant off the line. )

i L But U.S, Satings Bands Regularly on flu Payollkings Plan 9211200445 670327 l PDR ADOCK 05000263 l A PDR m  ?

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(3) When vill adequate test and historical data on the proposed diesel (with modifications intended,to improve reliability) be available to confirm the 0 999 reliability as opposed to the present information which indicates a 0 99 reliability?

Brief presentations by the applicant on the following topies were requested: I i

(1) Differences from Quad-Cities. .

(2) Water supply and liquid vaste disposal.

(3) New research on fuel failure at G. E., blowdown forces on core '

internals and the resultant mechanical effects of cold water on the hot I core, and I (4) The above questions on the diesel generator should be answered.  !

i Attachments:

Attendance List .

Proposed Emergency Power Criterion i

Distribution:

DRL Reading RPB f3 Bending R. S. Boyd

, D. R. Nuller J. J. Shea B. Grimes D. Sullivan i

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ATTENDANCE LIST MARCH 222 1%7

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0. E. NSP J. Violette R. Revell (Eargo Engineering)

W. Gilbert A. Dienhart

- H. Hollingshouse A. Wani j A. P. Bray G. Neils i

L. Kisin R. Jensen i

I. Jacobs L. Schedin C. Concordia (Schenectady)

D. McElroy

S. Simolen j E. Beers i

DRL

! R. S. Boyd D. R. Nuller

! J. J. Shes i B. Grimes i

D. Sullivan i

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~l111. Cl. NIL \L LLlflRIC Cu ll%W CitlTl 1410N 1 ti; 1M1.RGLNW IW1 R lne General Liectric Company has established a safety criterion i uhich utili:es a numerical goal fer the acallability of ptn.er needs t  ;

to operate essential engineered safeguards for nudear plats. liii goal is e8tablish:d on the basis that the availability of pm.er :mt be w:ansurate hith, in fact better than, the availability of t.ie i

essential equipuent it se rves . 1he geal, which is considered to have adequate Inargin, is 4ct at 0.99t:99 for tRe reliability of 4

poter following a major accil'nt , such as loss of coolant.

4 lhe criterien can be a;' plied uniforuly acress all nuclear plant s for all sites anJ would anure that acceptable levels el poner integri ty are at tained, lhe total complex 01 power it derised fien; off-site networt sources, as hell as en site 3tandby sources. Pl an t .-

closely coupled to strong networhs are especially well enuewed with I

a reljable source of eff-site poher for use in emergencies. An evaluat ion of a particular nuclear plant on a particular- reactor site for purposes of satisfying this emergency power safety criterion '

I might indicate that , although a supplementary on-site power requirce.t l is required, it might only involve a conventional diesel source becam l

l of a very dependable off-site power network. On the other hand, tiie i

evaluation may indicate that since the off-site power network is not of the highest level of dependability, the on-site power source of diesel power must be designed for a higher level of availability, f

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Mast ~ dome.[t ic plants are favorably sited so inat tot m ailabili t, ff-site power, even following a lo8S-of-cuolat saccioent in i .nerator: has been gous As of 0.999, in such a case, a eenventional peaki ng plant div a reveal that they can !

cator with a startint; ,

' reliability of 0.99 is adequate supplement a: 1 of de>1gn, testing, t te power to rreet the e,oal.

In some cases where the availability >f performance records, f-site power fall 3 below 0.999, then extra measures to assure ,,1rst and most efficient ,

r starting reliability en ine diesel such as augmentede:- devic d come by the above tet tensified suneillance and maintenwice wouldyed betoemplo meet an t wu, t .

sal .

In unusual cases wht re a plant is rather isolated fium thedby pewei states that,

~ rid network, such that eff site power availability may be loufficient sources of alk , ,

ere the extra measures mentioned above o are not ability sufficient t t,er perfonning t y the reliability goal, a redundant diesel generatore would b fcguards. "

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trn not only meets the it

>11eation of the criterion requires a detailed analy s s of th. i ' point of requiring a dt

.etworh associated with each pl,'nt.

In addition, a thoiough of standby power never anding of the cause and effect relatienship existing between

.ccident conditions.

ident requiring the operation of an engineered safeguard mean .  ;

m d that two diesel gent power is evaluated under the hypothetical cenditions that the ovided for a single sited has occurred; no other assw:ptien is realistic or meaning .

such1ut an a,nterpretation a,s General Electric Company considers that when enthe criteri ,

terien, is not warranted, power availability is achieved by a combination of off oit< 21 increased overall safet J one on-site diesel generator, the further addition of a rac L,ompany plans to pursu t-site diesel generator is net the proper action t ,

o contithu.e evaluation and assessment ;

atly to plant safety, ,

ellability for all the est guided solely by a synthet

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i, An evaluation of the total pu..er couplex for the .Waticello fi Nuclear Generating P1; ult , Unit No.1 (Northem States Poher Co.)

i l ha8 been made. For the proposed reactor and site, a single diesel will provide a sufficient source of alternate power to assure a J.

capability for perfoming the functions required of the engineered j h safeguards. Perfemance of the NSP power network is covered in the l 1

l anther to Question 4 in Anend:acnt 6 and an analysis of the f

[ reliability of the power corplex 18 covered in the answer to i i Question 7 in Amendment 6.

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