ML20127J804
| ML20127J804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1985 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85, REF-PT21-85-311-000 2NRC-5-088, 2NRC-5-88, PT21-85-311, PT21-85-311-000, SDR-85-03, SDR-85-3, NUDOCS 8506270099 | |
| Download: ML20127J804 (4) | |
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'Af 412 87 8141 (412) 923 t960 Nuclear Construction Divesoon Telecopy (412) TsT 2629 l
Robinson Plata Building 2, Suite 210 l
June 10, 1985 Pittsburgh, PA 15206 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comistselon Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussla, PA 19406 l
l ATTENTION:
Dr. Thomas E. Murley Administrator
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Potentially Significant Deficiency Report No. 85-03 "EQ of Core Exit T/C System," Interim Report
REFERENCE:
Westinghouse Letter NS-NRC-85-1325, dated May 1985 Centlement on May 10, 1985, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) made a telephone report to the NRC Region 1 of fices.
This interim report, SDR 85-03, "EQ of Core Exit T/C System" provides the written follow-up required by 10CFR$0.55(e).
Westinghouse (W) is reviewing this situation as part of a 10CFR21 report (see reference)~~ When the W evaluation is completed, and a corrective act ion is recommended by W. DLC will submit an additional 10CFR50.55(e) report to the NRC.
DUQUESNE LICI COMPANY i
By
/
.J/)'. Carey Vice President RW/wje Attachmont Mr. R. DeYoung, Director (3) (w/a) cc:
Mr. B. K. Singh, Project Manager (w/a)
Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident inspector (w/a)
INP0 Records Center (w/a)
NRC Document Control Desk (w/a)
SU IBED AND,S RN TO)BEFORE ME Tills
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Untted States Nuc1ccr R:gulctory C:nualssion Dr. Thomas E. Murley Potentlally Significant Deflelency Report P 85-03, Interim Page 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
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COUNTY OF REAVER
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Notary Public in and for said Chmonwealth and County, personally appeared J. J. Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he la duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
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o BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT No. 2 DUQUESNE LIGHT C)MPANY Potential Significant Deficiency Report No. 85-03 "EQ of Core Exit T/C System" t
i 1.
SUMMARY
Westinghouse (W) Nuclear Safety Department reports that, during the courso of Envilonment Quallfication (EQ) testing, pot ent ial errors in excess of those previously assumed were discovered in the safety grade i
core exit thermocouple system.
W reports that this type system has been supplied to Reavor Valley Power !Ttation Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2).
2.
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN W h ad reported this concern, under 10CFR21, to the NRC on May 9,1985.
On May 10,1985, af ter receipt of a copy of the W 10CFR21 report, Mr. S.
D.
Hall, Ac t ing Manager of Duquesne Light Company's (DLC) Regulatory Af fairs Department, nottfled Mr. Lowell Trlpp at the NRC's Region 1 office, that DLC considered this concern to be potentially reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(c).
3.
DESCRIPTION OF Tile DEF1CIENCY t
During EQ testing, W determined that total core exit thermocouple system errors could exceed previously assumed values during High Energy Line Break (HELR) condltions.
W reports that the signal would remain func-tional In splte of total system errors larger than those on which the W j
Emergency Responso Culdelines were based (approximately 75'r and 30*r7 respectively.
4.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Potentist consequences of exceeding the assumed temperature channel accuracy requirements include the following:
(1) delay in terminating S1 followlng a secondary high energy line rupture or small LOCA which could potent tally result in water relief through the pressuriser safety and/or relief valves; (2) (nappropriate si termination following a small LOCA necessitating operator action to reinitiate S1; and (3) f atture of the operator to trip the RCPs following a small LOCA (f subcooling margin is '
utilized as the criterlon.
Occurrence of any of the above consequences due to increased temperature uncertalnty in the RCS subcooling margin could result in consequences more suvere than currently described in the Flnal Safety Analysle Report (PSAR) accident analyses.
2-S.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REMEDY DEFICIENCIES W has recommended several procedure changes as interim cor rect ive actions.
The procedures apply only during post-accident conditions at operating plants.
When W has conple t ed the determination of the cause and magnitude of the potent tal problem DLC will evaluate the W proposed corrective actlone.
6.
ADDITIONAL REPORTS DLC will issue an additional report on this issue af ter publicatlon and review of the W proposed corrective actlon to the W 10CFR21 report.
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