ML20127E894
| ML20127E894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1985 |
| From: | Cline W, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127E724 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1113-84-18, NUDOCS 8505200248 | |
| Download: ML20127E894 (5) | |
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JAH 311985 Report No.:.70-1113/84-18
. Licensee: General Electric Company,
Wilmington,'NC 28401 Docket No.: 70-1113 License No.:
SNM-1097 Facility Name: General Electric Company 9
Inspection Conducted.
D ember 17-21, 1984 Inspector A
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' Date Signe Approved by:
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Y W.'E. Cline, Section Chief
'Dr te Signed a
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of emergency preparedness, fire protection and investigation of worker concerns.
Results:
Of the areas inspected one violation was identified in the area of protective action recommendations.
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2 REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees Contacted
- W. W. McMahon, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. H. Bradberry, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. L. Harmon, Manager, Manufacturing Technology and Engineering Operations
- B. F. Bentley, Acting Manager, Manufacturing
- R. G. Patterson, Manager, Fuel Fabrication
- F. G. Welfare, Acting Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- S. P. Murray, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer R. Folek, Senior Specialist, Licensing Engineering A. Hobbs, Site Supervisor for Security R. Lennon Chief, Training P. Zorick, Fire Seargent/ Burns Security Other licensee employees contacted included operators, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations M. Murray, Emergency Room, Supervisor New Hanover Memorial Hospital
- Attended exit interview 2.
. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 21, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Offsite Support Agencies (88050)
The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives regarding the coordination of emergency planning with offsite agencies.
Written agreements with those offsite support organizations specified in the Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RCEP) had been renewed as required and appropriate. The inspector determined through discussions with licensee representatives that the licensee was periodically contacting local and State support organizations for purposes of offering training and maintaining mutual familiarization with emergency response ' coles and site orientation.
The inspector visited the New Hanover Memorial Hospital and interviewed cognizant staff there regarding plans to provide medical treatment for radioactively contaminated individuals as specified in the formal agreement between the hospital and the licensee.
Hospital staff appeared to have an
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3 acceptable working knowledge of their emergency response role with respect to the licensee's facility. The inspector was given a tour of the emergency treatment facilities.
Hospital personnel used the facilities during the period of the inspection to treat a contaminated worker who was injured during an accident at the plant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Plan, Procedures, Facilities, and Equipment (88050)
Based on discussions with a licensee representative and a review of documents, the inspector determined that there had been no significant changes in the RCEP other than the appointment of a new emergency director, since the.last emergency preparedness inspection (March 1984).
The licensee's emergency call list was reviewed and found to be current (11/19/84).
The list is updated on approximately a six month frequency.
Emergency telephone numbers are conspicuously incorporated into the plant telephone book.
The inspector; selectively examined emergency supplies and found them to be properly maintained.
Inspection and inventory check lists were reviewed and an independen't survey of the supplies listed for the emergency truck was performed. Survey meters were recently calibrated and operational and air tanks on respiratory equipment were full.
The inspector toured the Emergency Control Center and onsite medical facility and determined that the equipment was appropriate and in place.
The inspector reviewed the plant evacuation routes and assembly points, and found no unusual impediments.
The inspector, discussed the types of sampling and other actions to be taken during emergencies involving effluent releases and accidental criticality with a licensee representative.
Several of the licensee's onsite air sampling stations were examined and found to be operating.
The RCEP requires that "the Emergency Director will provide projected dose information and recommendations to off-site organizations for implementing effective emergency action".
A review of the RCEP and procedures as well as discussions with licensee rapresentatives disclosed that procedures for providing prompt protective action recoramendations for the protection of the public were inadequate in that they were lacking in content and specificity.
As written the procedures were vague as to the actions to be taken and priority and responsibility for such action.
Licensee representatives were unable to provide implementing procedures describing appropriate licensee actions for promptly notifying offsite agencies and providing protective action recommendations. Any procedures which addressed notifying offsite agencies and providing the recommendations appeared to place those actions on a relatively low priority.
The issue was discussed with licensee representatives during which the inspector oescribed the benefit of more prescriptive procedures in order to promptly assess the situation, determine appropriate protective
4 action recommendations, notify the cognizant authorities, and make appropriate protective action recommendations to offsite authorities. The need for predetermined communications pathways which include a message format agreed upon by appropriate respondents was also discussed.
The failure to provide for appropriate procedures to identify and communicate protective action recommendations to offsite authorities is a violation of 10 CFR 70.23(11) av 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
4.
Test and Drills (83050)
The inspector.. reviewed a schedule for emergency preparedness training exercises.
Seven exercises included events such as bomb threat, confrontation, fire and explosion, radiological, severe weather, criticality and chemical hazards. Records of previously held drills were reviewed. The inspector noted that critique comments were evaluated and tracked.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Onsite Fire Protection Equipment and Procedures (88050)
The inspector lnoted that the local fire department does not participate in onsite drills.
This non participation is at the request of the fire 4
department due to its small, all volunteer nature.
Facility orientations are provided for the fire company and rescue squad annually.
Computer records for periodic surveillance testing of the diesel fire pump were reviewed and found acceptable. The inspector had no further questions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspector Follow-up (92701) a.
(Closed), Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 70-1113/81-11-03: Wind speed and direction recorder installation.
The equipment has been installed, b.
(Closed) IFI 70-1113/83-08-02:
Determine stability index from local meteorological data.
Same as (a) above.
c.
(Closed) IFI 70-1113/82-03-01:
No maintenance inspection and test procedure for fire pump. Maintenance and test records were reviewed and found acceptable.
d.
(Closed) IFI 70-1113/82-03-03:
Completion of fire brigade initial training and improved documentation of fire brigade training. Training records for the fire brigade were reviewed and found acceptable.
7.
Investigation of Worker Concerns An individual contacted the NRC Region II office expressing concern with regard to emergency preparedness related issues at the General Electric's Nuclear Fuel Manuf acturing Department, Wilmington, North Carolina. As a
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result, a Region II inspector investigated the following worker concerns during a routine inspection:
a.
People on crutches and in casts were allowed to work in the FM0
.I building, where at times, during drills and criticality tests, they were required to evacuate quickly.
b.
In the case of criticality evacuation there might be a problem of
. workers getting out of the plant. Reference was specifically made to one area 'of the plant where " Fat Albert" and the fuel bundles hang.
Here the corridors are blocked by bundle carriers.
The investigation took place during the December 17-21, 1984, inspection.
The investigation consisted of observations, review of procedures, and interviews.
The specific worker concerns were not discussed during the December 21, exit meeting with licensee management.
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Conclusions Neither of the allegations was substantiated.
The first allegation stated that: people on crutches were allowed to work in the FM0 building where' at times, during drills and criticality tests, they were required to evacuate quickly. A review of licensee documents indicated that it is plant policy to require medical verification of a workers ability to run prior to allowing that worker to return to duty in the FM0 facility following an illness or injury which may affect that ability.
Standing orders for the guard r
force state that no one using cane, crutches or wheel chair is allowed to enter the controlled access area unless they get a medical release from Dr. Schmidt in the medical unit. The inspector reviewed several medical orders, some of which t
allowed and some restricted access to the controlled access area. The inspector r
noticed no one in the area with apparent disabilities which would hinder running.
Further, a guard was approached and asked to repeat his orders on the subject which he did appropriately. A licensee representative stated that there is a strong Company commitment to strict adherence to established requirements for evacuation capability, i
The second allegation stated that:
in the case of criticality evacuation there might be a problem of workers getting out of the plant.
The alleger referred specifically to one area of the plant where " Fat Albert" and fuel bundles hang.
Here, the corridors are blocked by bundle carriers.
The inspector inspected the area noting the posted evacuation routes as well as the structures mentioned above. It was determined that these structures were, in fact, impediments to a clear egress but not unreasonably or unusually so. Any machine, large tool, desk etc., in the path of flight could be considered as blocking the evacuation. It is generally not reasonable (or possible) to provide an absolutely clear path for evacuation in the work place.
Rapid egress could l
still be accomplished. Licensee representatives stated that evacuation routes in L
the area were designed to avoid routing workers through the most congested r
locations in the area and actions are taken at appropriate times to assure free
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l egress.
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