ML20127B845
| ML20127B845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/08/1993 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-93-002, SECY-93-2, NUDOCS 9301130160 | |
| Download: ML20127B845 (18) | |
Text
.
RELEASED TOTHE POR e
,p' "%,
h
//pLfq$
C(,
k
,3' l
'dato '
in!th e.
- e....... ooeeeeeoa$ ~ I i
3
!,y ceoot g
=.
%...../
POLICY ISSUE January 8, 1993 SECY-93-002 (InfOrmatiOn) l I;
m:
The Commissioners
=
(l From:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations Subiect:
REPORT ON THE JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP 8 MEETING, DECEMBER 7 - 12, 1992 Puroose:
To inform the Commission of working group activities under the U.S.-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).
I
- [
Discussion: This meeting of Working Group 8, " Exchange of Operational Experience," was part of a series of meetings approved in
=d protocols between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
The U.S. delegation arrived in Moscow on December 5, 1992, for a e
week of working sessions spending two days at the VNIIAES office s
in Moscow, and four days at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant.
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continue effective dialogue on items of mutual interest, even though this is the last meeting under the JCCCNRS.
E l
. T' or
/ E cutive irector for Operations
Attachment:
12/28/92 Memorandum TMNovak to JMTaylor
" Report of Visit to the USSR, December 7-12, 1992," w/ enclosures
Contact:
tiQII: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN Gordon Fowler, OIP 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF 504-2329 THIS PAPER DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OPP g
OCAA ACRf P~- w
'l
.l.
aun
/
o UNITED STATES g
I 8
NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
WASHINGTON D. C. 20555
%,... p December 28, 1992 HEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor, Chairman, JCCCNRS FRON:
Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
REPORT ON THE JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP 8 MEETING, DECEMBER 7 - 12, 1992 I.
Backaround This meeting of Working Group 8, " Exchange of Operational Experience," was part of a series of meetings approved in protocols between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
The U.S. delegation arrived in Moscow on December 5,1992, for a week of working sessions spending two days at the VNIIAES office in Moscow, and four days at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant. The Russian side of the Working Group was headed by Vladimir Vitkov, Deputy Director, Nuclear Information Center, All-Union Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES).
The U.S. side was headed by Thomas M. Novak.
II.
Sumary The agenda and location for Working Group 8 meetings were planned so as to encourage attendance by operating plant personnel. With VNIIAES support, we were successful in having representatives from the Zaporozhe, Novovoronezh, 3
Smolensk, Kalinin, and Kola power stations participate for the entire week of meetings.
The memorandum of the last meeting is enclosed.
I would note the following particular interest.
1.
It was agreed by both parties that Working Group 8 had fulfilled its commitment and while there was a need for continued exchange of information regarding operational experience, it should be considered under the " Lisbon Initiative." Dr. Vitkov was fully aware that it would be his Country's responsibility to set the priority for any future discussions under this initiative.
2.
The attendance of several operating plant personnel contributed to the meeting.
I had asked for their attendance to provide an opportunity for them to participate in discussion involving operating experience. They were particularly vocal in their view that all too often errors made by control room. operators were used
r.
James M. Taylor
--2 as the cause for an event. 'They arglied that design weaknesses were a major contributor to incidents.
3.
The Russians have a development program undenray intended to be an improvement to our Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program.
They expect to have this program ready for use in about one year.
We indicated out interest in staying informed on the progress of these efforts.
4.
During the previous two years, VNIIAES has distributed 468 operational event reports from Russian plants as well as IAEA-IRS reports to all of their operating plants.
Based on feedback from the plants, about 30 percent of the information was considered important information and about 60 percent of the information was used by the plants.
It was noted that those plants that were active participants in the reporting program appeared to have fewer failures.
As a final note, I would recomend a several day meeting with the Russians and Ukrainians about every two years to discuss operating experience and lessons learned, operator response to abnormal events, and developments in assessing risk from operational incidents.
The memorandum will be forwarded to the Commission as a SECY paper.
/S/
Thomas M. Novak, Director
-Division of Safety Programs Office-for Analysis and Evaluation-of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As stated ce v/ enclosure Distribution:
H. Deaton, IP DSP R/F J. Sniezek, DEDO J. Rosenthal T. Murley, NRR P. Baranowsky F.-Miraglia, NRR V. Benaroya E. Beckjord, RES S. Israel T. Spels, RES E. Jordan -AE00 D. Ross, AE00 S. Rosen, DOE-M. Schulman, DOE R. Brady, SEC/ADM-A. Kenneke, IP
-J. Wechselberger, OED0 DSP TNovak
^ ' //492
/'
4 MEMORANDUM OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF WORKING GROUP NO. 8 OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COORDINATING COMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY December 7-12, 1992 The fifth meeting of Wor. ting Group No.
8.
" Exchange of Operational Experience", of ' the U.S.-Russia Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS was held in Moscow, at the All Union Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation and in Novovorore:h, at the nuclear oower station.
The Russian side of the Working Group was headed by Vladimir Vitkov, Deputy.
Director, Nuclear Information Center, All lklion Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation. - The U.S. side was headed by Thomas M. Novak, Director, Division of Safety Programs,- Office - for Analysis - and_ Evaluation of Operational Data U.S. NRC. A list of the participants in the Worting Group sessions, as well as invited plant personnel, is provided in Appendix L The invitees to the meetings included personnel from several nuclear power stations including Zaporo:hje, Novovorone:h, Smolensk, Kalinin," and Kola.
The documents exchanged during the sessions are listed in Appendix II.
Tnis Memorandum of Meeting reports the recommendations for ' proposed future actions.
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continue effective dialogue on items of mutual interest, even thougn this is the last meeting under the JCCCNRS.
COTCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTNITIES The agenda for the mee:Ing was followed with the follcWing conclusions:
a.
Use of Markovian hethoos.
No firm conclusions were. drawn with regard to possible benefits to - ce gained frcm use - of Markovian cethods to assess system rellaDility.-
It - - was agreed that Ine-discussions icentified cifferences between U.S.. methods as usec in NJREG-1150 and the Russian methocs using Markovlan mooels. It was concluded that tness _. meetings nave : providec. a good -- forum for -
cascussion, but, it would not be useful to-incluae this subject in any1 future agenda.-
b.
Accident Sequence Precursor Prog-am. IThere was agreement _that tnese. discussions ; provided -useful. insights into-a better understanding of risk from operating events. Each country described the developrent work in progress to improve _ the Insignts that coulc -
bs. gained from the = ASP. analyses.
It' was agreed that. future.
ciscussions (either as part of Working Group 8 o in some other Jorue) should be held to excnange informar. ion on improvecents in ASP-type methodology.
- c. Shutcown Risk. Eacn wiry previoco a ciscussion of events whicn cccurred during -- snutdts <
The U.S. erchasized the importance of outage planning, tne neec for reliable cecay -heat removal systems, anc. additional instrumantation to assist.tne operators - during reduced inventory oceratic6G It was ag-eed that these discussions hipnlighted the incertary e c: rengnizing the risks curing shutdown '
..:.: - =..... -..
k i
and that any future discussions of operating experience should include events while in shutdown. ~
d.
Performance Indicators (PD. Each country described uses made of P1 to trend plant performance. Both countries described development effcH:s underway to better utilire PI data. It wt s agreed that these discussions covered the expected uses of PIs and that there was no i
nee:: for further discussions on this topic. However, in the event that new indicators are developed which pecvide useful information regarding operating performance, they should be included in 1
i discussions covered by operating experience.
e.
Human Facters. The discussions regarding human factors offered an opportunity for all participants to exchange views based on operational experience.
Representatives from several operating plants in Russia and the Ukraine offered views on difficulties l
confronting operating crews when responding to abnormal events. It j
was agreed that any future discussions should be considered as part -
of the " Lisbon Initiative."
l f.
Common Cause Failures.
Each country provided a discussion of-operating events involving common cause failures. It was agreed that j
these discussi,ons were beneficial and that any future discussion of operational encerience should include common cause failures.
It was acreed that Worting Group B had fulfilled its ccmmitment and while there was a need for continued exchange of information regarding operational enperience.
it should be considered under the " Lisbon Initiative." Specific subjects for further discussion include:
Exchange of views between experts (including possible consultent meetings to o" ovide directions fce future develcoments) regarding the analytical methods and applications in the Accident Seouence Precursor (ASP) program.
I i
Insights gained from evaluation of operator response (human f actors and the trending of human error rates) to abnormal events.
Excnange of operational experience and lessons learned.
The fellowing topics were discussed at the Moscow meeting:
i i
Topic 1.
Application of Markovian Processes in Plant System Reliability Estimation The Russian are using a computer coce based on the hartov prccess to examine the reliability of nuclear plants. Specifically, they are examining
- strategies fcr performing plent maintenance by varylrrg the frecrJency of j
surveillance tests and the allowed time for recovering inoperable safety j
i trains.
Results were presented for the analysis of the boron injection system for the Khmelnitskaya plant wnich has a tnree train system.
The Ltrains are tested on a staggerco monthly basis. If one train is inocerable, the otner trains are tested to insure their coerabihty. They want to i
1
.I
e edeno the allowable recovery time from 72 to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
The analysis provices a cynamic picture of the system reliabihty over the monthly surveillance cycle.
The Russians analyzed the aw:iliary feedwater-system for the Surry plant based on the system description and component failure data provided in NJREG-1150 cocuments.
The available Surry data were not sufficiently oetailed for the full utill:ation of Markov metnods which consioer the timing of specific actions associated with the system. However, results of the analysis based on available data were provioed. This is a more refined analysis conpared to the traditional fault tree analysts used in the U.S.
where average failure values are used. An analysis was presented showing the impact of various testing and outage strategies for the Surry auxiliar y feedwater system.
The Russians have performed level 1 probabilistic analyses of several plants including Rostov, Kalinin, and Loviisa.
The dominant accident sequences noted in the Rostov (new plant design) analysis are small break LCCA, loss of feedwater, and loss of offsite power. These sequences are similar to those noted in analyses of U.S. plants.
The Russians plan to perform level 1 and level 2 probabilistic walyses of the Zaporo:nje and Balacovo plants.
The U. S.
described the evolution of the prooabilistic analysis of the euniliary feeowater system in American pressuri:ed water reactors from WASH-1400 to a recent evaluation based on operational cata, it was noted tnst the major centributor to system unavailability was estimated common ccuse failures.
The evaluation of recent data shows that the unavailability associated with indecencent failures of the three trains is higher than previously estimated, but still within the overall estimated system unavailability.
Topic 2.
Severe Accident Sequence Frecursor Program The U.S.
described the results of the evaluation of tr.e 1991 review of operating events at American plants.
The Accident Secuence Precursce program identified 27 events that hao a conditional core camage procability greater than IE-6 ano 14 events that had a conostional core camage probaDility greater than lE-4.
Tne most severe event was tne delayed observation of stuci: open relief valves in the high pressure injection system.
The importance of this event was not recognized until the ASP enalysis indicated a concitional core damage probability of 6E-3.
A alscussion of the 14 most significant events was providea.
Future activities in the Accident Sequence Precursor program include examination of the uncertainties associatec with the evaluations and use of more detailec models to evaluate the events. Licensee review of tne analyce for their plant s, creation of an oversight group, anu some st a i.istitc1 analysis will be used to reduce the uncertainties in the conclusions drawn from the results. Component level fault trees will be usec in the future to perform the ASP analyses.
The Russians described an accident severity analysis program that they are coveloping using the Markov process and event trees.
Tncy De11 eve tnat this approach will provide adoea insight to degraing plant ccocitions and their imoact en the dynamic severity of an event. The output from such
a 0
a program will show the degree of severity and the length of time the plant is exposed to these conditions. Three indicators are being considered: an instantaneous conditional probability of tore damage, an integrated value, and a rate of change in the value.
E<ecause of-the extensive effort recuirec to analyze all potential core damage at each point in the path, an interactive program is being developed so the analyst can direct the scope of the arulysis as it progresses They expect to have a production version ready in one year.
Topic 3.
Shutdown Risk i
The Russians described 19 events that occurred during shutdown in 1992.
~
Althougtt none of these events posed significant risk, they did inoicate a i
need for improved administrative control under these conditions. At one plant, they observed swelling and cracking in variot.s guide tubes in the upper head region. Extensive investigations ultimately hypothesi:ed that these failures were caused by an earlier hydrogen detonation in the upper head when the plant was started up a year earlier. The explosive mixture was attributed to radiolysis, the use of ammonia anti 'dro:ine for water chemistry, and inopportune venting of the upper hc 0 This event has received wide dissemination in Russia and has been pewided to IAEA and i
WANO.
The U.S.
gave an overview of the risk associated with events during shutdown and low power operations at U.S. nuclear power plants. The need for improved cutage management (better maintenance planning),
the necessity to have adectuate procedures to cover loss of cecay heat during trad-loop operation (Diablo Canyon event), and risk associated with reactivity addition for a pressuri:ed water reacter was emohasized. The Accident Secuence Precursor program was extended-to incluce events that occur curing shutdown. Several plants have extended their probabilistic risk assessments to include shutdown.
The U.S.
is. also reviewing tne adeauacy of D. fire protection, 2) operating procecures and training, 3) available instrumentation, 4) emergency planning, and 5) limiting conditions fo* operation in the techn: cal specifications for shutdown conditions.
The following topics were d:scussed at Novovoronenh:
Topic 4.
Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicators
\\
i The U.S. described how AEOD regularly perform independent assessments of 1
the current seven performance indicators plus cause codes to identify plants wnose performance trends warrant in-depth analyses. The results of these analyses are compared with the results of special inspection teams. Abnormal Occurrence reports, Acciaent Secuence Precursce events, and SALP scores to ostain an overall understancing of licensee strengths and weaknesses. These plant evaluations are then used by AEOD management in preparation for the NRC senser management meetings.
NRC has oeveloped short term enhancements which include the division of the nuclear power plants into nine peer groups (by reactor vendo, vintage of tne reactor, the licensing date anc the number in that group). Thus,each plant can be compared to a peer grcup. enhancing tne interpretation of
)
coserved trends.
_.. _._. _ _.~..._ __.._ _._,_ _..
I-L
- a L
The U.S. also discussed the long-term plans that would ccmpletely overhaul the performance indicator program.-
The Russians described their annual reporting system for each piant and j.
for all plants considered together.
These reports focus on several i
parameters related to plant chemistry and radiation exposures. There are.
j; internal disagreements concerning the inferences d awn from - these i
parameters because they impose an unfavorable bias on cer-tain types of i
olants.
There is an ongoing evolution in this area to obtain a useful j
indicators.
ussian plants using the present indicators An evaluation of all' the r I
concluded that their perforrance is acceptable. However, it was noted that there we're a large number of forced power reductions or shutdowns and a large number of. personnel errors.
l Technical personnel from the Kola power plant described the extensive.
l review of equipment failures that has-been performec. at the plant since l1 1980. These data are analyzed by plant personnel and the results used to l
initiate = corrective action on those components showing an increase in unavailability. It was ac) reed that this was a good practice. In discussion
{
with management from the Novovorone:h plant it was also stated that l
similar analysis is performed.
These data will also be used in a future l-probabilistic assessment of the plant.
i Another Russian paper proposed using the variance associated with core l
. camage probabilities calculated for sequential events at a given plant as a
{
performance indicator. Tnree examoles were presented that showed stable, unstable, and self-correcting plant performance.-
l
' Based on operating exoerience and new safety.. requirements with more
(
stringent safety limits, the Russians described the design limits for their i
new WER-1100NP series reactor - that is -currently being designed. It will l-nave a - double containment and passive safety systems. among other r-features. The new regulatory guides have a core melt limitation of IE-5.
l l
[
Topic 5.
Human Factors.
[
The U.S. described the human factors studies initiated in 1990 to evaluate the imoact of human performance during selected power reactor events.' To
{
cate, AEOD has conducted 16 such studies, which represent a' wide variety l
of situations.at both pressurized and boiling water reactors, for events jz that occurred at power as well as r*; ring shutdown.,
l These studies have identified positive and negative aspects of important
[
issues, such - as: control room staffing and organization: the role of the.
shift technical adviser; use o# ' shif t resources. ouring an emergency:-
l coerator. control of engineered safety features: simulator training: crew teamwcd: during. stressful situations; task awareness: knowledge-oased t.
- operator performance: use of procecures: and licensee followup of events.
t I~
- Tne fincings of tnese stud 2es provide many examples of good inaustry practices which could be applied tc nelp human Derfcrmance.
r i
e
,e_
ym,
,,,m
,3
,e-,7y gy,y,y, y3,,-
y - w y.
,m-g,r,,
<~
w
1 f
t The GAN representative from its research center presentec a paper regarding monitoring was useful and prQvided insights into the safety 4
aspects of plant operation.
The Russians described a simple operator error performance indicator that sums the observations for each plant type.
Within the limitation of the reporting system, for each plant type within the former Soviet Union 50 events were associated with human errors.
There appeared to be differences in the types of errors and frequency of errors among the three types of reactors.
j The operator training center at Novovorone:h is engaged in training operators in the new symptom oriented procedures The Novovorone:h plant l
will be the first to implement these procedures.
An extensive training program is underway with the usual diHiculties associated with totally revamping the Way the c,N ators respond to plant scrams, with or without complications.
Previously the operators committed the event oriented procedures to memory, instead of following a text step-by-step. There is a significant commitment of operator involvement in removing the defects in the procedures, i
The working getrap toured the training center at Novovorone:h. They have simulators for the WER 440 and 1000 mW plants which are used for training russian operators as well as those from other countries using these model i
plant s.
Tne training center issues four year operator certificates after the applicants conglete the classroom and simulator training and pass the l
qualifying exams. The center is also active in cisseminating information on nuclear power to the public.
l l
Another paper, preparoc jointly by VNIIAES and Zaporonnje power plant personnel, oiscussed a review o+' the control room layout in the V230 series plants. It was noted that the instrumentation coes not f acilitate operator response to plant transients. As a ' result of thiE reVlew, they are considering using computers to monitor the plant parameters during all modes of operation and aid the shif t supervisor in maxing timely decisions.
l The lack of adequate feedback in the control room was noted by several of tne operating personnel-at the meeting. The Novovorone:n representative j
provided separate comments on the subject.
i l
Topic 6.
Analysis of Separate Events. Common Cause Failures.
l The U.S. described a review of potential or actual common cause failures at i
Ameri:an plants in 1990. The results show that a majority of the situations cosetwed are associated with cesign, fabrication, and installation errors that occurred wnen the plant was built. Potential corrective actions for eliminating these types of flaws are comprenensive system tests which cover the potential operating regions of the system and component reolacement with equipment naving larger casign margins.
Exposure to those situations causea by maintenance erro-s may be partially recated by staggered surveillance testing.
The Russians described 13 actual c** potential cococo cause failure events that cccurred in the past year.
Tne failures involvec valve erosion, flooding, poor maintenance, biofouling of service water systems
condensation in electrical cabinets, corrosion in an syttems, and bloci: age of irrpulse lines. Corrective actions wsFe recommenoec for each of these events.
At one plant, the Russians exoerienced diesel failures because of resin ceposits in the turbocharger from low load operatien.
These deposits caused excessive vibrations and ultimate failure of the turbochargers.
Test programs were revised to ensure that the resins will be burned off during testing.
During the previous two years, VNIIAES has distributed 468 operational event geports from Russian plants as well as IAEA-IRS reports to all of i
their plants.
Based on feedoack from these plants, about 30% of the 8
reports were considered important information ano about 60% of the information was used by the plants. It was noted that those plants that were active participants in the reporting program appeared to have fewer failures.
4 I
FOR THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE FOR FOR THE US NUCLEAR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION h%
Vladimir M. Vitkov Thomas M. Novak 12 December,1992 12 December,1992 1
=
W 4
4..._
j.
i-j.
APPENDIX I
' LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 4
i
[-
RUSSIA l-All Union Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES)
}
Vladimir M.
- Vitkov, Deputy Director, Nuclear Information Center i
M. A. Altshouller
?
A. I. Kolesnik S. M. Zhukavina L. V. Podkolzina V. V. Gonchukov M. A.-Belozershev State Nuclear Inspectorate I.
Z. Aronov G.
I. Grosovsky N. F. Biryukova A. L. Khazanov Atomenergoproject G. V. Tokmachev Gidropress Podshibyakin Novovoronesh NPP V. A. Vikin, Director V. S.
Zarubaev, Chief Engineer V.
I.-Smutnev V.=S. Bodrov
.V..A.-Pisenkov N. P. Sisoev V.-M. Vasip'eva A. N. Rundenko P.-S.
Drobisheva-I. M.'Sherbakov G.-A..Kupakov T.~P. Shachkich A..N. Shemeryanken Novovoronesh Training Center N. K. L'vov Zaporozhje NPP Ju. A.
Zinchenko
1 l
44'
- l smolensk NPP
^
^
M. N. Ahmetkereev Kola NPP j
4 L. P. Naumov V.
I. Shutov i -
l:
Kalinin NPP s
F. S. Khasanshin I
l GAN Don Region 4
Rekuch P.
P.
i A. P. Plotnikov l
V. N. Kucherenko i
l U.S.
i
[
Nuclear ~ Regulatory Commission i
l Thomas.M. Novak, Directori-Division of Safety Programs, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data-F l
- [
Sanford Israel t.
?
5
{
I' i-I' i.
i q
i:
j F
l i
k w
-,,r--
.vy,--
w
-w-
-s.,-
i APPENDIX II
' LIST OF PRESENTATIONS l_
RUSSIA Estimation of Reliability Indicators for Auxiliary Feedwater System (based on US plant system example) 'Using Markovian Models.
Estimation of Integrated Reliability Indicators for HPSI System.
Development of a Program to Identify Severe Accident Sequence Precursors.
l Analysis of NPP Events that Occurred During Planned Shutdowns.
Damage to Reactor Internals While Planned Shutdown.
Corrective Actions.
Work Practice to Assess the Status which Describes NPP Operational j
Safety.
Indicators Describing Balakovo Operational Safety.
In-service Monitoring of Balakovo NPP Safety.
L Human Factor Impact on NPP Operational Event Origination and' Progression.
Major Corrective Actions.
Problems of Operator Training While Introducing Symptom Based Procedures.
Plant Layout and Analysis and Proposals to Modify VVER-1000 Control
-Rooms Resulting from Operational Experience.
l l
Analysis of NPP Operational Events Due to Common Cause Failures, i
~
L
- Analysis of Kola NPP Safety System Reliability While in operation, j
Corrective Actions.
- Design Limits for_ VVER-1100 NG New Generation Nuclear Steam Supply System l
Some Results of Using IAEA-IRS Reports in Russia's Nuclear Power Industry.
- U'. S.
l Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability.
Accident Sequence Precursor Program, 1991 Events.
Performance Indicators.-
Trending of Individual Plant Performance Indicators.
l l
Human Factor-Analysis of 17 Events at U.S.
Plants During 1990 i
1991.
f 4
Insights from Common Cause Failure Events.
4 Y
4 1
i e
4 f
i P
4 4
6 i
f I
I e
(
4 4
i e
a
,i JOINT RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COORDINATION COMMISSION FOR SAFETY OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS (JCCSCNR)
VNIIAES
+
I i
l 4
PROGRAMME of WG-8 meeting " Exchange of Operational Experience" 4
JCCSCNR Moscow, Novovoronezh 7-14 December 1992 i
2 4
4 WG-8 Co-Chairman from Russian Side: V.Vitkov (VNIIAES)
WG-8 Co-Chairman from US Side: T.Novak (NRC)
J
, 7 December VNIIAES
~
9-30 Opening of the meeting Topic:
Application "of 10-00 Markovian Processes in Plant System Reliability Estimation.
VNIIAES paper:
t
" Estimation of Reliability Indicators for Auxiliary Feedwater System (based on US plant system example)
Using-Markovian Model's.
Estimation of Integrat6d Reliability Indicators for HPSI system."
i 12-00 NRC paper:
"Use of Markovian Process to Measure System Reliability Compared to the US Approach on Example of Surry NPP Auxiliary Feedwater System,"
Topic summing up.
Topic: Severe Accident Precursor Programme 14-30 NRC paper: " Severe Accident Sequence Precursor Programme":
f_
- review-of significant precursors
- changes to the programme.
8 December VNIIAES VNIIAES paper: " Development of a Programme to Identify Severe Accident Sequence Precursors".
Topic summing up.
Topic: Shutdown risk.
"Rosenergoatom" papers:
" Analysis of NPP Even'ts That Occurred During Planned Shutdowns".
Kalinin NPP paper:
" Damage to Reactor Internals While Planned Shutdown. Corrective Actions..."
i NRC paper:
" Discussion of Actions Being Considered to Heduce Risk During Shutdown".
Topic summing up.
Evening: Departure to Nov.voronezh.
1 1
1 ia =
9 December NV NPP l
14-00
. Topic: WPP Performance Indicators e
4 i
NRC papers:
" Review of Current Effectivenos of US -PIs
!j.
Considering Recent Changes in Method of l
Presentation".
Planned Short-Term Development to Improve-.Usefulness of Current PIs.
i Long-term-Plans for Complete Overhauling of l
the PI Programme.
l 1
i 16-00 Balakovo-plant-and VNIIAES paper:
'" Work Practice to-Assess the Status which I[
Describes NPP-Operational Safety.
Indicators f
Describing Balakovo NPP Operational. Safety".
l Paper by Russian Nuclear Power.Indpectorate's Research Centre:
"In-Service -Monitoring of l-l~
Balakovo NPP Sefety".
3 f
18-00 NRC paper:
i j
" Programs for Trending Individual Plant Perfor-mance to Identify Declining Plant Performance" l
j Topic summing up, i
a 10 December NV NPP j
l 9-00
_ Topic: Human-factor NRC paper:
" Human _ Factor ' Analysis of
- 17. Events at US s
Plants During: 1990-1991".
p i-13-00 VNIIAES paper:
{
" Human' Factor Impact on NPP Operational-Event OriginationJand Progression.
Major Corrective l
Actions."
~ NV NPP Training -Centre:
l Paper by
" Problems of Operator Training While-Introducing Symptom-Based Procedures".
Paper by VNIIAES and Zaporozhye'NPP:
[
" Plant Layout Analysis and Proposals to Modify VVER-1000 Control Rooms-Resulting from Operational Experience".
_4 11 December
'NV NPP 9-00 Topic: Analysis of Separate Events. Common 4
Cause Failures NRC paper!
l
" Discussion of Significant Events Which-Occurred at US Operating NPPs as a Result of I
Common Cause Failures in Redundant Trains of Safety-Related Equipment".
11-00 Paper by Nuclear Inspectorate's Research Centre:
l
" Analysis of NPP Operational Events Due to Common Cause Failure".
Kola NPP paper:
" Analysis of Kcla NPP Safety System l
Reliability While in Operation.
Corrective
{
Actions".
Paper by "Hydropress" Design Bureau:
"Use of NPP Oparational Experience to Improve l
VVER Type Plant Reliability".
Topic sumaing l
up.
I 15-00 Tour of the NV NPP Training Centre.
I l
12 December NV NPP l
9-00 Visit to NV NPP.
l 13-00 Concuding remarks.on the meeting. Preparation and signing of the Minutes.
Evening: departure to Moscow.
i r
~