ML20127A017
| ML20127A017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1985 |
| From: | Romano F AIR AND WATER POLLUTION PATROL |
| To: | Cole R, Harbour J, Hoyte H Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#385-064, CON-#385-64 81-465-07-OL, 81-465-7-OL, OL, NUDOCS 8508050348 | |
| Download: ML20127A017 (6) | |
Text
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AIR and WATER Pollution Patrel T6?
BROAD AXE, PA.
July 26, 1985 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 85 AUG-1 P12:00 Washington, D.C.
20555 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD L U c. C ; 4'.
C00.IIM & F ~
- unCn BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES
~
Helen F.
Hoyte, Chairperson Dr. Richard F.
Cole Dr. Jerry Harbour In The Matter Of PHILADELPNIA ELECTRIC COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-352-OL (Limerick Generating Station, 50-353-OL Units 1 and 2)
ASLPB No. 81-465-07 OL NOITCE OF APPEAL BY AIR & WATER POLLUTION PATROL / ROMANO RE THE" FOURTH PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (On Offsite Emer-gency Planning Contentions Relating to Graterford)"
Hearings conducted in a manner, as perceived by the inmates, that could lead to non-co-operation so that time estimates based on prisioners doing what would make them safer cannot be counted upon.
It is unreasonable to assume, and therefore, does not give re-sonable assurance (as per 10CFR,@50.47) that the testimony given, namely, that when the sirens scream an accident at Limerick with the resulting panic and hysteria by some of the people surrounding Grat-erford,or on roads involved with Graterford, that there is a reson-able assurance that the Graterford secret plan will work and not re-sult in escapes and other serious effects that can result with lifers and those condemmed.to die.
It is unreasonable to assume, and, therefore, does not give reson-able assurance, that if radiological training given to bus drivers who are to evacuate the Graterford prosorers is less than that given to the school bus drivers, or not received. by Graterford bus drivers, that they will have the calm and care and freedon from distracting worry to do a job as proper and efficient as school bus drivers, and this could lead to a disogranized, obstructive, and/or accident sit-uation which could prevent a reasonable assurance of the plan working as per time estimates.
It is a situation of the chain being only as eBASRBB!RBi85llg2 O
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Appeal by AWPP/ Romano of 4th Partial Initial Decision continued:
l strong as its weakest link.
c 3 Even if the bus com;panies may in fact agree to furnish vehicles, the lack of response re training leaves a reasonable doubt, rather than assurance, that the drivers will be ready and willing and avail-able to drive such vehicles.
Because the six companies did not respond to letters sent regard-ing the use of their buses bnd drivers thereof)there is no reasonable assurance they will, as Mr. Taylor states, name ly, th er they in fact will agree to furnish vehicles upon request to assist in an evacua-tion of Graterford, as per ff.TR. 20856, at 2 While Mr. Taylor has made plans to visit each of the bus companies l
personally in an undetermined time of " late July or early August" (Tr.
20879-80), is Mr. Taylor's indication that training is necessary, (as l
against his statement that it really is not needed), or is it that the need to chase after the drivers to offer the training, an indication of l
reluctance which may end up as"No Show^at time of an accident?
No where in the hearings was there reasonable assurance that bus drivers who did not accept the offer, re radiation, will accept the further responsibility to concern themselves with decontamination mon-itoring procedures.
While Mr. Taylor at Tr. 20861 states the Appli-cant's Emergency Consultant instructors are qualified to. train bus drivers, the fact that the bus companies did not answer letters offer-ing such instruction creates a reasonable doubt as to the feeling of the bus companies and drivers that in the face of lethal radiation all around, there will not be a wall of resistance to co-operating in what l
they sense as an unworkable dangerus situation for their buses and their drivers.
The question of incentives to bus drivers was mentioned, but those incentives did not include possi.ble decontamination of buses and the responsibility of bus companies for exposure to unfound radia-active dust in buses to contaminate future users of the buses.
While Mr. Taylor at ff. Tr, 20856, ar 6 says "The only significant difference between this course and the EC program is that the latter t
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Appeal by AWPP/ Romano of 4th Partial Initial Decision continued:
provides for a "public relations" lesson, which explains how a nuclear generating plant operates and the saf21y of such a facility", the driv-ers aren't concerned with how safe the facility is, but how dangerous the facility readoactive releases are in an accident.
Mr. Taylor omitted that important part.
Further Mr. Taylor at Tr. 20860, 20868-69 states training in in-mate custody and control is unnecessary. Drivers will only be required to drive their buses or ambulances.
Mr. Taylor seems to think drivers are mechanical robots whose work will not be affected by fear, appre-hension for their families, or what might happen if there is an inmate revolt on the bus.
While Major Case expressed no basis for believing that civilian bus drivers
'.d not accept training (Case, ff, Tr. 20930, at 5; case, Tr. 20939),
Taylor did not, to any gapter extent, assume they would.
In such case, it would be better to err on the safe side as Major Case expresses.
While not permitted to attack the NRC regulation wh'ich only offers training of drivers and takes delight in jandng such fact into inter-venors, page 10 (23) (24) ; page 11 (24) (contd. ), page 11 (26) of Fourth Partial Initial Decesion of July 22/85, common sense indicates if training is only offered but not accepted or fulfilled, there is reason-able doubt that tTe evacuation plan for Graterford will be flawed, thus not fulfilling the " reasonable-assurance" requirement.
As it relates to Appendix 4, NUREG-0654 it does not intend evacua-tion time estimates for special facilities to include analysis of worst case scenarios (Urbanik, Tr. 20976, 20979-80).
It is only for evacu-ation time estimates to present representative evacuation times for fair and adverse weather conditions which can be used by decision-makers (Urbanick, Tr,20976-77,20979-80).
AWPP states that Urbanik's
" adverse weather" did not include the Limerick area where in the 1985 winter there were blizzard blocked roads which would prevent the Grat-erford evacuation plan so that t'he NUREG-0654 estimates are neither representative nor reasonable and do not provide the protective action
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Appeal by AWPP/ Romano of 4th Partial Initial Decision continued:
in such conditions that existed in the winter of 1985 in the Grater-ford area.
This, of course, was not considered as per statements of Zimmer-
' man ff.Tr. 20763 at 1-2,8; Tr.20763-9 which depends on fully passable roads, co-operation by prisioners who might bolt at any time, and which ignore panic and road blockage and that sheltering might in fact be used--at which point there could be a prison revolt with es-capes and death outside the prison.
Niether is this an attack on the NRC regulations which we are no:
permitted to do, but it is the very fact of the NRC regulations as exemplified by NUREG-0655 which gives no reasonable assurnnce at all as it does not attempt to perdict exact conditions during an evacua-tion or effectuating evacuations within a given time.
Rather, it attempts only to indicate the sensitivity of the analysis to a number of commonly occurring events, thus being a sterile manuver that does not concern itself with lives of people.
Page 16 of the July 22 Fourth Patrial Initial Decision at 35, dis-cusses the willingness of prisoners to co-operate in fire drills (
(Zimmerman.ff, Tr. 20765 at 3).
Mr. Zimmerman does not state which of the different types of prisoners readily co-operate.
This point mus:
be verified as it relates to " death-row" and " lifers" by independent penal psycologists before biased statements can be accdpted to meet the " reasonable assurance" criteria regarding the Graterford plan.
At page 17 item 37, Zimmerman states time estimates of off-duty personnel cuming to an emergency is based on the SCIG's experience over the past several years involving emergency situations where they have had to call in off-duty personnel (Id.) however, it has never been.
based on a nuclear accident which is a terror situation enough to cause panic by the public in which case roads would be blocked Further,the call of off-duty personnel has been by telephone.
The resent Burce Springsteen rock concert in Washington tied up telephone lines for over two hours, so tnat in a nuclear accident the time estimate for call-up
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Appeal by AWPP/ Romano of 4tn Partial Initial Decision continued:
with telephone lines tied up by frantic people the time estimates could be much over two hours more for call-up.
The Board and witnesses
- assume the prisoners will be calm and co-ope'rative, but they mest cun-sider the public will be in terror and in panic.
The Graterforc p] an has not considered this life and death fact.
As it relates to Prisoner Assembly and Vehicle Loading, page 17 at 38 and 39, there is likewise a biased, unrealistic version of how prisoners will calmly co-operate.
To have reasonable assurance, before a license is given, the public must know that steps have been taken to assure such assembly for loading does not, indeed become an assem-bly for riot and escape.
At page 20, item 41 corroborates that co-operation may not in fact be total, and the fact that Zimmerman admits a cell block can " refuse to lockdown or in some other way try to impede the evacuation of the insti-tution", may in itself, cause other cell blocks to refuse in a sudden gesture of commraderee with equally suffering inmates, thus distroy-ing all the parts needed for the evacuation plan tw work.
The absurdity of the thought process upon which Mr. Zimmerman's entire case is based is evident at Tr. 20803-05, 20815-16, 20844-45 (along with PEMA) that the simultaneous " ongoing evacuation of the genero al populace from the EPZ would not delay the arrival of buses and ambu-lances at Graterford, and that routes were selected such chat evacuat-ing traffic of the general public would not interfere with vehicles travelling to Graterford. For the Board.to attach substance to such an absuridity is to totally ignore human and animal behavior in a terror situation.
As per facts present in the forgoing,AWPP disagrees with the Board's finding that there is nothing in the Commission's emergency planning requirements or guidance that requires the estimated time for evacuating a special facility, such as the SCIG to be included in the radiological emergency response plan for that special facility as per 10CFR X 50.47; Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50; NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 Rev.1 (NOv. 1980).
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Appeal by AWPP/ Romano of-4th Partial Initial Decision continued:
Further AWPP states that the revised ETE for the SCIG has not adequately identified'the various sequential events necessary to accomplish an evacuation of Graterford.
AWPP also' states that the Board incorectly finds the revised ETE of eight-to-ten hours is consistent with the Commission's guidance established in NURG-0654, Appendix 4.
For all these reasons AWPP/ Romano, as per 10CFR 4 2.762, appeals the decision of the Board.
Respectfully submitted, AI
& WATER Op TION PATROL
" iib 7 C birman 7R d
61 Forest Ave.
Ambler, Pa. 19002 i
I certify the above has.been served on the latest Service List.
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