ML20126K558
| ML20126K558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1979 |
| From: | Rogers L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Geoffrey Miller METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105180473 | |
| Download: ML20126K558 (4) | |
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Power Generation Group P.O. Box 1260. Lynchburg. va. 2.:505 1
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Telephone: (804) 384 5111 l
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April 15,1979 gg
-s Mr. G. P. Miller-Station Superintendent Metropolitan Edison Cc=pany Post 0ffice.Bor. h80
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Middletown, PA 17057 Jar
Subject:
Review of. Unit II's March 28, 1979 Transient
Dear Gary:
As a6 reed in the Saturday, April 14, 1979, set-together in the Superintendents s
Conference Roo=, I submit a few of the thou6 hts that have passed through my mind during and since those review dischssions.
I believe ve all get a lot of =e=ory recall benefit out of that session, plus a feeling of being together on so many other thcughts.
Personally, I believe that we all really have to pull together more than ve ever may have before in order to acco=plish an enlighten =ent of Investige.tive Groups and the Public in g,eneral. Met-Ed and n!I, including in no small bit i
B&W, have re' ally taken severe shots' by the sedia and the D.C in the public forus. We must also exercise cu rights in the same public forum to correct and educate the rest of the vorld.
I know what we did,and I also, know that our collective aesiens and Me:-Ed's real (not imagined) irnge is of a very high technical and moral standard. Our bigges: task, as I see it, is to bring out the facts without confusion and er.bellishment in such a manner (not very technical) that =oct people vill ' understand what we are saying and thereby change all of the negative impressions. Itaturally,
the anti-nukes von't listen bece.use their cinds are not allowed to be open but.there is a very large seg=ent of the general public that, vill listen because the'/ really do vant to know the truth. Any one of us involved
.must keep it in our mir.ds that the real end of the tunnel is to have both Unit I and II back on the line, a little safer and we operations people a lot s=arter because of March 28, 1979; but really in thst node of operation with a lot of the general public really backing us up.
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POOR QUAUTY PAGES
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G. P. Miller i
e If you have any furth.r questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
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L. C. Ro6ers j
Site Operations Mana6:r
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_0THER BI'TLECTIO!!S AI*D RECO:0!E%DATIONS 1.
(a)
During significant occurrences as Station Energency and General
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Emerdency at the TMI Station, Met-Ed should have a designated
- individual on the E:ergency 3111, that is " qualified" and
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"recogni:ed" by management, to perfors the ec==unication linkup 4
r with Met-Ed, GFU, 2&V, PA Stat 6, URC, EPA, off-site officials, etc., throughout the energency ti=e.
He should provide status, data, and expected evolutions to all of these outside parties until such time as they are able.to provide their own on-site linkups.
3 (b)
An I observed events in the communications systen during the long day and several days subsequently, it was apparent that several of the outside parties were given necessary information but apparently..
in different sections of their orsanizatic'ns; and they were not talking to each other, thereby, creating additional qr:stions coming from several sources within the sa=e organizations. EXNGLE:
Tbe NRC people on site vere on an open ' telephone line to a " situation room," I believe at the Region #1 office (not sure), and information vas floving in a generous fashion.
Yet the URC headquarters was in turn generating questions to the site independent of their own on< site inspectors.
In fact, they were not even talking to the=
(the NRC people) but in turn asking for plant personnel to provide
' the ansvers and also directing questions and demands to E&W Lynchburg.
(The Lynchburg source for any ansvers during any developing. crisis is not an acceptable flow path for outside organizations since B&W is by nature and geography not able to be on top of rapidly changing conditions.) Another example vas that the co=sissioner of the URC, as quoted in the media, was in the darZ and thoroughly confused.
I sub=it that he and his deputies have technical advisors closely at hand during significant events to interpret the infor=ation already in the NRC at other
, areas which need a central tie-in mechanism to allev the top
' decision makers the chance to make good ultimate procla=ations.
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- 2. In other taped interviews, the Shift Supervisor identified two B&W people, that were assisting Unit I in their startup program, as arriving in'the Unit II Control Room. Subsequent questioning. shows that these people vere not B&W people.
In fact vere Scott Wilkerson (Met-Ed Nuclear Engineer) and another Met-Ed employee.
There vere no ItW personnel on site until I arrived approxinately 0710 hours0.00822 days <br />0.197 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.70155e-4 months <br /> on 28, March 1979 (point of clarification).
3.
Respecting the normal human concern and also training towards that concern to not aggravate plant operatin6 conditions or cause dansse to plant equipment, any action si=ilar to securing "all" reactor coolant flov during transients cust be drilled into the operators and supervisors as an action that should not be automatic but tailored as a case basis.
This type of suggestion is goins to be difficult to implement since in one transient as exacple, securins punpa vould be absolutely correct and in another it vould be an action that vould tend to acgravate the prob 1ces.
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/ REFLECTIONS & REC 0K!E :DATIOUS 1
, 4, A need is identified now to evaluate all possible system co==unication,.
connections bet /een the reac';or building and the outside environ = ente, such as the auxiliary building, fuel buildic;, direct outside, etc.
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.f These evaluations need to look at nor=al pumping syste=s, D/P driven syste=s (press in reactor buildir.g and not other places), D/P. following pumping actions and =erely stopping of the pu. ping (siphoning actions) air-borne paths, and all of this could be a major undertaking.
Needs high canagement type emphasis because of the auxiliary building contam-iration problem on this transient, although the installed normal systems vere not supposedly lineiup to allov such flov between buildings. This needs attention and corrective action follow-up.
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5 The Site Emergency Plan / General Plan needs review. My personal experience
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was that when I arrived at the North Bridge Gate, your plan was in effect -
ent:/ vas being denied to traffic.
I was recognized by yoiii 1;;uards as I
being*needed for the problems. They gave no =y 002 " red" badge and opened the gate allowing me entry. I arrived at the area of the' Unit II turbine building access. Steve Drabick vas on duty.
I vent into the Catalytic Building and left my briefcase, picked up my hard hat and valked across the street. Steve Drabick said., " Lee, you cannot go in."
I asked him to call the Unit II Control Room on his radio.
He did'and gave me my " green 025 security entry badge." I vent in.
However, Steve Drabick vas very busy at that time turning back all of the normal day shift craft workers that had entered through the South Eridge entry.
In fact, I think I remember a bus being there.
I talked to Jim Elanton (Catalytic supervisor) and told him that the plant had tripped and had experienced "co=plications."
The point,is,that a lot of personnel were coming onto the site frem the South Bridge and the "3rass Gate Entry",at a time when the North 1 ridge vas tight and controlled.
Heeds a serious look at effective closing both bricges and the brass gate.vith the emergency, condition announcement and follow up accountability at some e=ergency designated area.
6.
Need to provide continuous recordable (retrievalbe) instrumentation of 4
the vital nature; incore T/C's is an exa=ple of very valuable data not retrievable now and vould have solved =any of the advertised concerns.
A survey of. vital, needed instruments is certainly in order.
These do
~ not necessarily need to be displayed in an area of the CRO but should j
be able to be recovered post transient.
1 7.
A thought about corrective maintenance needs on the CR0 available instru-mentation. Met-Ed needs to establish a procedure for identifying priority of corrective n'aintenance on critical instru=cntation, i.e.,
pressurizer level instrunent, one channel was unreliable due to known panel svitch j
problems. This problem and others like it should have a required repair j
j date and mechanism for repair if plant operations are to continue.
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I have been infor cd that EW Lyachturg has incorporated the CII-2 transient I
n, into the Simulator Prograns. Other Utilitics are cycling'their operators thrcuch the simulatien en a crash basis durin;; the nicht shif ts.
I submit i
that' Met-Ed seriously consider a similar ptocram for their licensed operaters i
acquainting everyone vith the indications and actions that can be taken j
to 1cssen a reoccurrence. This 'is in preparation for,the Unit I return 8
to operations that we all are looking forward to within a short-time frame.
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