ML20126E374
| ML20126E374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1971 |
| From: | Hargrove C AIR FORCE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Price H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101260270 | |
| Download: ML20126E374 (13) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:__. Y DEPARTMENT ~OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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WASHINGTON D.C. 14 JZ 13R Mr. Harold L. Price Director of Regulation U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington,'D. C. 20545 Dear Mr. Price Following the 6 April 1971 meeting concerning the Strategic Air Command proposed low altitude training route near'the nuclear power plant at Big Rock Point, Michigan, the Air Force prepared an analysis of flight statistics in order to assess the risks associated with operations over the proposed route. The analysis (Atch 1) is based on SAC experience in low level training operations on all low altitude routes during the period 1963-1970, including the 7 January 1971 B-52 crash in Lake Michigan. The analysis considers operations on the proposed eight nautical mile wide training bomb run corridor, the center-line of which will be approximately five and one-half nautical miles to the east of the Big Rock Point nuclear power plant. With the anticipation that approximately 2200 low altitude training flights will be conducted along this route during an operational year, the following key facts emerged from the analysis : The probability that a B-52 would stray from the a. bomb run corridor and overfly any part of an area enclosed bya1.5nauticalmileradiuscirclecentereg'ontheBig Rock Point Plant is calculated as 1.2 X 10 - or about one in a million, b. The probability that, during an operational year, any B-52 would deviate from the corridor,_ overfly a part of the three nautical mile diameter circle centered on the plant, and crash within that circle is less than 1.5 in ten billion.- The probability that such a crash within the circle would result in damage to the plant or injury to the employees is, of course, much smaller. l ROC'd Dft. Dir. Of Ef:3 Date Tirne R/? 313C
~ ~ The results of this analysis, as well as the Air Force 's plans to. initiate training flights on~the alternate route in the near future, were provided to the' Consumers Power Companys on 19 May 1971 (Atch 2) in response to'.their letter of 12 April 1971 (Atch 3). Mr. James H. Campbell,' President, Consumers. Power Company,.in his letter of 3 June 1971 (Atch 4),' indicated'his concurrence in.the Air Force's' proposal to conduct operations on the alternate route on1an interim basis. The necessary coordination and publication of the revised route in the appropriate flight planning documents are now-underway. .It is our estimate that SAC will be ready to initiate training on the revised route about l' July.1971. It is the Air Force's intent to approve the opening of the revised Bayshore route at that time. Sincerely 4 Atch /gp 1. Risk Analysis gr 2. Ltr, 19 May 71, to Consumers Power Co.
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] , = i a ~ AF/0A 26 April'.l'971 MEMOPANDUM FOR COLONEL CLARK
SUBJECT:
Bayshore " Temporary Route" B-52/FB-111 Risk Analysi's 1. Reference your request for an analysis of the proposed " temporary.rodt'o" at ihe Bayshore RBS si.te with respect to the chance of' endangering the' Big Rock Point: Nuclear Plant. . Major points of releva^nce and ca).culations are provided below . in a stiep by step sequence., Our uriderstanding is, that 'the'
- temporary track will be located about 5.5 miles from the plant at the closest point.
Further, there will be an 8-mile corridor (4 miles on each side o'f the ' desired track) with the corridor edge tangent to a one-and-one-half mile circle about the plant. Aircraf t will approach the corridor limits only if they are having difficulty locating the target (s) which are on or very near the center of the corridor. If this should happen, the " lost" aircraft will be directed back toward the center by the RBS site. Only in the case of a communicat-ions failure would-the RBS site fail to order a " lost" aircraft back to the center of the corridor, and a communication redundancy of three radios exists at both the RBS site and on each' air. craft. ~ Theanalysiswillp$oceedalongthefollowinglines: l 2. Step 1. Scoring data from'Bayshore low leve'l bomb runs for the year 1970 will be examined to determine the frequency of gross errors which could require a redirection by the RBS site. The data will be examined to see if it is reasonable to expect all aircraft with good communications to be kept within the new corridor limits. Step 2. Since off-track errors' could be simultaneously s accompanied by a communication breakdown which would prevent redirection of aircraft back to the~ center of the corridor, data on communications failure will be examined to determine a probability ci communications outage. Step 3. Data on navigation errors will next be examined ? to determine the probability of a navigation error of such 6 . magnitude to cause " overflight" of a one-and-one-half mile circic about the nuclear plant. s.
p-9 Step 4.i 1hc probability that both ' communications .crror and a navigation overflight ' error will occur on the ' same flig.ht will then be comput6d by combining the probabil-ities of Step 2 and Step 3. r ' Syy ~ 5. Data on all crashe's on similar low level missions will be examined and the probability of a crash on any low level bomb run will be computed. Step 6. Next the probability that a ' crash will occur l in any mile ~ of a low level bomb run will' bc computed. Spy 7. The probability that any individual bomb run will' end in a crash in the circle of concern will next be computed. Step 8.. Finally, the risk of a crash in the circle ~ sometime during the next year's operation will be computed using an estimated number of bomb runs of 2200 at the Bayshore RBS. 3. The analysis follows: Step 1. Based on 16 54 scored bomb runs at Bayshore during the period 1 January 19 70 to 31 December 19 70, tho' circular errors scored by radar indic' ate that the ave. rage off-track distance, that is.the distance from the desired. bomb track to the acteal a'ircraft track, was far less than one-half . mile. (The precise figure, while it was used in the analysis, is classified because it indicates SAC's bombing accuracy.) There: were no bombing errors outside of the . buffer zone, set at nine miles 'on the right of the track j and four miles to the left during 1970. Only three bomb scores showed a circular error. gr6ater than five miles, none were beyond six-and-one-half miles. Although actual off-track distances for these gross error bomb scores were not recorded, since both range and deflection errors are normally assumed equal, we can estimate that no ' of f-track distances were greater than four-and-one-half miles. Bombers are directed back toward the desired track and are given an " abort" score whenev'er they approach the corridor limits. There were 13 such aborts during 1970 at Dayshore. e e , (:. ? v e 4 2.' 4 4 e O N i
at q i 3 i s i Although the smaller, four. miles on both sides, corridor taay result in a slight increase in aborts it is r'easonabic, based on the abo' e data, to assume that no overflights of the one-v and-one-half mile circle will occur so long as bomber /RBS i,: communications are intact. f Step 2. ))uring 1970 with a total of 1834 soities, we experienced 1 communication outage of the type uhich could l have. result'ed in a. bomber.being outside the buffer zone had navigation also been faulty. In general, this situation would , be corr'ected because if the communication outage were discovered carly enough, as it most likely.would be, the bomber would break off the run and'not make the attack. However, assuming no such breakoff, the probability of a comadnica' tion outage is computed from the above: 1 ~ -^ =.0005556~n 5.556 x 10 ' P = 1 1834 I Step 3. In.the case of a communications failure, even if the B-52 did not break off, climb and leave the area, the C probability cif a navigational error of such a magnitude as to cause overflight of the,one-and-one half mfle circle is small. I Navigational errors are' assumed to be normally distributed about the desired bomb track. . Although navigational data, as such, are(not recorded for Bayshore missions, applicable data from Operational' Read'iness Inspections (ORIs) are available, On these inspections it is the usual practice to. check air-s, crews over unfamiliar terrain and against unfamiliar RBS sites. (Bayshore flights have a large repeatability' factor'and hence i navigation should be better). On 498 ORIs with flight profiles' .similar to those at Bayshore, two flights recorded navigational 4 errors of over four miles. This. suggests a normal distribution, e _(X-5.5)2~ N(X,o) 1 .w tih a = 1.399. Using this = 2 o / 27r 2c distribution to represent off-course navigation errors at i Ba)thel shore, the chance,P2, that an aircraft wil] overfly l circle, given a communication outage,.is gli. by: m. l 3 4 b
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~ 1 1.5 f5 N (X,c)dx P 2 1. j or -3 .00212 = 2.12 x 10 P2'= P a f Step 4. Thus, with the new buffe'r zone of four miles and operational ' procedures already c'sta'blished, the probability of overflight, P3, is given by: r P'3 P1*P2 ~ or (5.56 x 10~0) x (2.12 x 10-3) P = 3 -6 1.18 x 10 = H That is to say tha't the chance of an overflight for any bomb run at Bay' shore vill.be about one in a million. i _ Step 5. Assuming a communication outage and a navigational error of such magnitude that an overflight'of the one-and-one-half mile circic surrounding the. power plant does in fact occur it is possible to exemine the chances that on that flight. .i a c' rash in.the circle will. occur. Based on historical data of low level cra' hes for flights on tiiis type, we compute first s the probability.that a crash will occur while on a low level bomb run. The probability of a crash, P4,.is mput d simply by taking the ratio of the number of crashes on all low level bo'mb runs over several years,to the total number of bomb runs of the type being considered here. There have been six crashes e O ~ 4 d ^ +
including the recent unfortunate accident in Lake Michigan. There have been a total of 426,078 bomb runs giving a value of 6 1l4 x 10-5 P = m 4 _426,078 4 That is, there are only*about 14 chances out of one million that any, low level bomb run will in fact end in a crash. Step 6. The average range for this type of flight is 430 NM per low level run. Hence the probability, P5, that a rash uill occur in any given mile is P -8 4 3.275 x 10 P = = 5 430 _ Step 7. Assuming independence between navigation errors and probability of crash, the probability, P6, that, given no warning mechanism for redirection within the corridor, a crash will occur within the circle is 2 1.5 '/2.25 - x 2 x 3.275 x 10 '[1. 5 p 6 o /27 0 ~ _ fx - 5.5)2 - -exp dx dy 20 [1. 5 fx-5.5)2~ 2 ~ 1.8678 x 10 2.25 - x exp -= l.5 3.9144. 5 a e
e- .l-The integral in the aboy'e expression was evaluated by a , graphical method giv.ing the result: i -10 i-1.225 x 10 P. = 6 The total prpb~ ability, P7, that any' aircraft will crash in the circle is given then by, P P x P n 7 y 6 (5.556 x 10 ) x (1.225 x 10-10) ~ = -14 6.68 x 10 .= 1 C This calculaticx neglects the fact that many crashes could occur in the circle and not cause damage to the plant. In 4. addition, it is a conservative number since crews in trouble can be expecte, to take some evasive action'to avoid built-up areas or buildings. Using these conservative numbers we can predict'that there is less than one chance in ten trillion that any particular aircraf t will crash in the circle. _ Step 8. Since we ' estimate 2200 low level run's at Bayshore using the temporary route in the next year we can compute the i . total risk: ~ 3 -10 (6I.68 x 10-14) x (2.2 x 10 ) 1.47 x 10 Risk' = = i 3. Summary. i j a. Based.on data for the year-1970, the Air Force can assure that flights with communications inta6t will not approach closer to the power plant than one-and-one-half mil es. 6' ~ i o y e
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t > 4-b. Based on historical communication outages and naviga'- tional experience, the chance of an overflight'is conservatively estimated' to be about 1.18 x 10-6 or about one chance in one million. c.' For any given Bayshore low level bomb run ' the chance of crash in the one-and-one-half mile circle surrounding the f7' ' power plant is inuch less than one in ten trillion (.668 x 10-13), e d. Yne rd.sh for an.cntire year s operation should be o more than about one-and.-one-half in ten' billion (1.47 x 10 g0), 4. Although the data base from which these calculations are made is not large, there.is sufficient confidence in their accuracy to observe that even with the " temporary route" the chanec~ for damage to the nuclear plant from SAC low level training flights is extremely low. )._ / "/c i RICHARD J. CAfP Operations Analyst e f 1 9 _ s ] v f I a 8 l: I 'M g s *
[., -. ., w - .p, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR F CE g l' '.b y orrsce or Tec cescr or sr^rr $) /S$ fQ3 'jd M Q UNITco STArcs Am ronct ..}4 @% -M c../ / WAS H IN GTO N, D.C. 20330 ~ W, "r "J w i C l 1 9 U. M E n .i a r .b Mr. James H. Campbell, President 9 2.; Consumers Power Company q* 212 W. Michigan Avenue -l Jackson, Michigan 49201 q.. Dear Mr. Campbell i-70 Reference is made to your letter of 12 April 1971. We were 'n grateful for the opportunity to discuss with Consumers Power T! represent:1tives the Air Force proposals concerning low altitude training routes in the Bayshore area. We feel d that the 6 April 1971 conference resulted in a much bett.er f understanding of the Bayshore situation; we hope that it 4 increased your appreciation of the complex operations involved as well as the urgent requirement to reopen a 1[ training route in that area. s In response to your request for an analysis of the risks which would be involved in reopening the route based en the ^g~ proposed new bomb run corridor conterline, located approxi-mately 5.5 nautical miles east of the Big Rock Point Pcwer ") Plant, HQ USAF has performed an analysis of several factors. Y The analysis is based on Strategic Air Command experience in J. low altitude training operations on all low level routes dur-N ing the years 1963-1970, including the 7 January 1971 B-52 j crash in Lake Michigan. 'i.4 The following key facts emerged from this analysis (based en d the proposed interim corridor, a 4.0. nautical mile buffer i? zonc either side of centerline, and the number of Bayshore h low altitude bomb runs - about 2200 - anticipated during.,n ] one-year period): u J a. The probability that a B-52 will stray.from the 3 bc.mb run corridor and overfly any part of an area enclosed 6 by a 1.5 nautical mile radius circle contered on'the Big dj Rock Point Plant is calculated as 1.2 x 10-6, or about one in a million. a 3, b. The probability that, during an operational year, d;; any E-52 will deviate from the corridor, overfly a part ff.] of the three nautical mile diameter circle centered on the f.,g plant, and crash within that circle is less than 1. 5 in ten y s i ( s n t
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.e .s 7,. ' billion. The probability that such a crash within the circle ~9 would result in damage to _ the plant or injury to the employees is, of course, much smaller. .\\ The analysis indicates that the risks to the Big Rock Point Power Plant, based on resumption of training on the interim route, are extremely small. 1 J i As I am sure you appreciate, it is imperative that we provide .) low altitude training for our crews in order to insure that .] they are highly qualified at all times to accomplish their l4 wartime mi.ssion. The availability of a low altitude training n route in the Great Lakes area is vital to this preparedness 1 program; the use of Bayshore, for reasons briefed in detail li at the 6 April conference, is the most practical method of -{ meeting this urgent requirement. Until we can move the Bayshore scoring facility to a new location, the interim-y] route - which misses your plant by. 5.5 miles - is the only- ~ one in this area available to us. In view of our urrent 4 training requirement and the extremely small risk to your g power plant, we plan to initiate training flights on this alternate route in the near future. We trust our analysis ]v will reassure you of the minimal risk to your property and i.ll personnel and provide you a basis for reaching an agreement 3 'with your insurers. g.1 '/ Sincerely 7 ./ I c-L / 1 Atch j JLES M. CL'.73C,, COL, US/J Risk Analysis (AF/OA Memo, 2 dop. Chief, Strategic Division 26 April 1971) J . Directorato of Operations \\ Ny \\ g y N 3 . :. c g _v ' (,, ~
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~ - ~ ~ -. _ - > ~ --- - ~ ~. ~ ~, . ~. 4 .J .I o o. 3 t s' ?' f *~ T -Y James H, Campbell )) # {C f ~ r' ' Presgent t-4 o,- 4 I General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue. Jackson, Michigan 49201. Area Code 017 708 0005 r S June 3, 1971-4 ~ Col. James M. Campbell. Dep. Chief, Stratccic Division Directorate of Operations Dept. of the Air Force Washington, D. C. 20330 y Col. Campbell: / Your letter of May 19, 1971 has been addressed to a risk analysis of an accident which nicht involve one of your aircraft with our Big Rock Point nucles.r power plant near Charlevoix, Michigan. Based on date derived from operations similar to the Bayshore OB-9 low-level route, your analysis indicates, I understand, that the likelihood of such an accident is extremely-remote, to quote from your letter: "The prehability the.t a B-52 vill stray from.tho'bonb run corridor. and overfly any part of an area cnclosed by a 15 nautical mile ~ radiuscirc1gcenteredontheBigRockPointFlantiscalculated as 1.2 x 10~, or about one in a'million. "The probability that, during an operational year, any B-52 vill ~ deviate from the corridor, overfly a part of the three nautical nile ditseter circio centered on the plant, cnd crash within that' circic is 1 css than 1 5 in ten billion. The probability that. such a crash within the circle would result in damage to the plant or injury to the cmployees is, of courne, much smaller." i On the strength of these assessments and your plans to nove the route Consumers Power Company is willing, for its part, to agree to resump-tion of the Bayshoro low-altitude training route on an interim basis until the Dayshore scoring facility can be noved to a nev location, presumably at Empire, Michigan. It is our cicar understanding that you intend to sock to reroute the Inychore OB-9 low-level route'to Ihpire by the sume.er of 1972. This plan to move the route is important in our view. l Thank you for providing us with the risk analysis which vc requested. t Yours very truly, I ff')/lj{'ll{I -< fab $ pfY l* Y. JHC/ku C: Congressman Gerald R. Ford-W skkb
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