ML20126D643
| ML20126D643 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07105450 |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1980 |
| From: | Dipiazza R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126D645 | List: |
| References | |
| 15959, NUDOCS 8005050100 | |
| Download: ML20126D643 (7) | |
Text
WRD-LA-87
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8005050 /g Westinghouse Water Reactor pQg Electric Corporation Divisions
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%I N.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission mud l.j.l'J -
Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety Washington, D.C.
'20555 Attention: Mr. C.
E. MacDonald, Chief Transportation Branch Gentlemen:
Subject:
Application for Revision of Certificate of Compliance No. 5450, Docket 71-5450, Additional Information.
Reference:
1)
WRD-LS&S-673, dated February 15, 1979 #
2)
WRD-LS&S-685, dated March 7, 1979 3)
WRD-LS&S-728, dated April 6, 1979 4)
WRD-LS&S-751, dated May 4, 1979 5)
WRD-LS&S-797, dated July 27, 1979 6)
WRD-LS&S-857, dated October 22, 1979.
The Westinghouse Electric Corporation hereby requests the revision of Certificate of Compliance No. 5450, Docket 71-5450, to include an RCC-4 type shioninc cackace in the series of packeges authorized by the certificate.
The RCC-4 package is described in the attaclunent which supersedes the information previously transmitted by references 1 through 6.
Its dis-tinguishing characteristic is the length of the packaging, which is 224" longer than the RCC-3 packaging.
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WRD-LA-87 Page 2.
Westinghouse requests that the following changes be made to the existing revision (7) of Certificate of Compliance No.
5450:
1)
Item 5 (a) (1) should be changed to read: "Model Nos.:
RCC, RCC-1, RCC-2, RCC-3, and RCC-4".
2)
Item 5 (a) (3) shoulc be revised to delete the word "and" after the word RCC-2.
The period after the word RCC-3 should be changed to a comma and add "and 1596E22, 1596E23 and 1548E55 for the RCC-4".
3)
Item 5 (a) (4) should be changed to read " Fuel rod container reinforced 13-gage steel box constructed in accordance with Westinghouse Electric Corporation Drawing No. C56J0055."
4)
Item 5 (b) (1) (ii) should be revised to include ano.ther column for 17x17 Zr clad:
17x17 Zr Clad Pellet Diameter 0.308-0.322 (Nom), In Rod Diameter 0.360-0.374 (Nom), In Maximum Fuel Length, In 168 Maximum Rods / Element 264*
)
Maximum Cross Section (Nom), in. sq.
8.4 Maximum U-235/ element, kgs.
19.0 i
Maximum U-235 enrichment, w/o 3.5 i
5)
Item ' 5 (b) (1) (iii) should be revised to include an additional column for Zr clad:
Zr Clad 1
Pellet Diameter (nom), in.
0.322 Rod Diameter (nom), in 0.374 Fuel Length (Max), in 168 Maximum U-235 3.5 l
Enrichemnt, w/o 6)
Item 5 (b) (2) (ii) should be revised to read"...not more than 80 kilograms..." instead of "...not more than 60 kilograms...".
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WRD-LA-87 Page 3.
Please note that previous transmittals indicated'that the assemblies (12 ft.,
17x17) were assumed to be of infinite length; i.e.,
an axial buckling of zero was used.
Since the effective multiplication factors for the various shipping container geometries for 17x17 fuel was calculated with zero axial leakage, the results previously transmitted may conservatively be applied to 14 feet, 17x17 (non-optimized) fuel assemblies enriched with up to 3.5 w/o 235 '
U Single Package Evaluation Normal conditions of transport - The RCC-4 fresh fuel shipping container has been evaluated with respect to those conditions outlined in 10CFR71, Appendix A.
Each of the normal conditions outlined in Appendix A and their effect on the RCC-4 container is outlined below:
1.
Heat - The specified temperature of 130*F will have no adverse effect on the container since it is composed of structural steel.
The shock mount system is designed to be effective up to 160*F.
2.
Cold - As the shock mount system is designed for temperatures as low as -40*F, the specified condition of cold will have no effect on the RCC-4 container.
3.
Pressure - The specified pressure of 0.5 times standard atmospheric pressure will not cause any harmful stress state within the package (See Attachment 5).
4.
Vibration - Due to the nature of the design and construction of the RCC-4 container, any vibrations observed during transport will have no adverse effect on the package.
5.
Water spray - Since the RCC-4 container is sealed from the environment, the water spray conditions described will have no effect on the RCC-4 shipping container, 6.
Free drop-As the RCC-4 container weighs less than 10,000 pounds loaded, it must withstand a free drop of 4 feet.
From Attachment 1, a similar container withstood a 30-foot drop without opening or reducing the spacing between fuel assemblies.
It can therefore be concluded that a drop of 4 feet will not damage the container sufficiently to reduce the spacing between fuel assemblies.
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7.
Corner drop - Not applicable to RCC-4 container.
8.
Penetration - For the conditions specified, the projectile does not possess sufficient energy to penetrate or deform the shell of the RCC-4 shipping container.
Therefore, the effect of this incident is negligible.
9.
Compression - For the conditions specified, the RCC-4 container shell will not experience any deformation which would serve to reduce the spacing between pairs of fuel assemblies.
Therefore, these conditions will have no adverse effect on the RCC-4 container.
(See Attachment 5).
The accident conditions specified in 10CFR71, Appendix B, will not credibly produce an arrangement more reactive than that analyzed under General Criticality Standards for the following
)
reasons:
The deformation of the container shell subsequent to the 30-foot drop for a similar type of container has been quantified by a series of tests, the results of which are documented in.
Due to the nature of the container shell design, the maximum shell deformation occurs when the container is dropped onto its lid.
This drop configuration resulted in the container lid sustaining a three-inch depression along its entire length.
The container shell fasteners remained intact and the container shell remained closed for the entire test sequence of 30-foot drops, including both flat and angular drops.
The number of container shell closure fasteners has been increased in the RCC-4 container design to provide the same number, size, and type of fasteners per unit length as in previously licensed containers.
Therefore, the loading on each fastener is the same for this container as for the' tested container.
This assures that the container shell,will remain closed following the 30-foot drop accident.
A comparison of design parameters for the tested container and the RCC-4 container is provided in Attachment 2.
It is apparent that while' the two container configurations are nearly identical, additional emphasis has been placed on container shell rigidity and strenath in the RCC-4 design.
The top closure and bottom support designs have been analyzed to assure that adequate strength exists under accident conditions.
These analyses are presented in Attachment 8.
l Conformance of the container tie down system with 10CFR71 requirements has been demonstrated by the analysis in Attachment 9.
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WRD-LA-87 Page 5.
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The ten percent increase in loaded container weight per unit length of shell has been more than adequately compensated for by the 17 percent increase in shell skin thickness in the RCC-4 design.
Additionally, heavy reinforcing members have been incorporated along the length of the container lid and in the container base that were not present in the tested container design.
Therefore, it is conservative to assume that the RCC-4 container design will experience the same magnitude of deformation subsequent to the 30 foot drop sequence as the tested container design.
The fuel assembly support frame (stongback) for the RCC-4 container is of the same design that is currently employed in the present series of RCC shipping containers.
(See Attach-ment 4). To maintain the structural rigidity of the longer support frame, additional support frame cross members have been added to maintain the same span between cross members along the length of the support frame.
Longitudinal members and support frame skins are of the same material and cross section as previous RCC containers.
Additional structural material and high strength bolts have been incorporated into the RCC 4 support frame at the pivot end to accomodate the additional weight of the longer support frame and fuel assemblies.
Twenty-four elastic shock mounts of the same type as is used on the present RCC containers are used to attach the support / shock mount frame to the container shell.
The present RCC containers use a maximum of eighteen of these shock mounts.
Thus, the load carried by each shock mount is less for the RCC 4 design than for previous designs.
This shock mount type was also used in the container which was subjected to the 30 foot drop test (Attachment 1). Of the eighteen shock mounts used in that container design, only one of the mounts at each end of the support frame was found to be broken following the 30 foot drop test sequence.
The support frame remained fully attached to the container shell subsequent to the tests.
The spacing between the container shell and the internals is similar for both the tested and RCC-4 containers.
Tests have demonstrated that the elastic material of the shock mounts may be deflected up to 24 inches before rupturing.
As the deflection envelope for the.RCC-4 container is much less than 24 inches, the internals will remain attached to the container shell through the shock mounts and much of the energy in the system at the time of impact will be absorbed in the shock mounts.
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WRD-LA-87 Page 6.
The methods of restraining the fuel assemblies in the support frame of the RCC 4 container is identical to that used on the current RCC containers.
Longitudinal movement of the fuel assemblies is prevented by the bottom support plate and top closure assemblies.
The bottom support plate is bolted and welded to the pivot end of the support frame while the top closure assembly is moveable to allow loading and unloading of the fuel assemblies.
When closed, the top closure is bolted and pinned into position with the jack screws bearing on the fuel assembly top nozzle.
This method of longitudinal fuel assembly restraint is of the same design as that employed on the current containers.
Materials and hardware have been strengthened where necessary to accomodate the heavier fuel assemblies.
A minimum of nine clamping frame assemblies of the same design as is used on the present containers will be used to hold the 14 foot active length fuel assemblies in place in the support frame.
The current containers use a minimum of seven clamping frame assemblies for the 12 foot fuel assembly designs.
The load per clamping frame assembly will be less for the RCC 4 design than for previous RCC containers.
The clamping frame assemblies together with the support frame also serve to limit the minimum spacing between pairs of fuel assemblies subsequent to the hypothetical accident conditions outlined in Appendix B of 10CFR71.
The methods and assumptions used to determine this minimum distance between pairs of assemblies is provided in Attachment 3.
From this analysis, the minimum distance between assembly pairs is 15.8 inches.
Therefore, the accident conditions specified in Appendix B of Part 71 will not credibly product an arrangement more reactive than that analyzed under General Criticality Standards.
Similarly, the puncture of the container shell by a six-inch diameter pin subsequent to a 40 inch drop also will not create a more reactive arrangement of the fuel assemblies than that which is analyzed.
Puncturing of the container shell is of no concern since the criticality analysis assumes a fully flooded container.
Due to the nature of the fuel assembly clamping frame system design, contact between the pin and a clamping frame will at most render only that clamping l
WRD-LA-87 Page 7.
frame inoperable.
The remaining clamping frame assemblies are more than adequate to maintain the position of the fuel assembly in the support frame.
Should the pin contact the fuel rods, the fuel. rod cladding is ductile enough to deform without rupturing, thus, containing the fuel pellets.
In the unlikely event that the fuel cladding should be severed, the amount of radioactive material released in the form of the fuel pellets is less than the release limits specified in 10CFR71.
The thermal exposure portion of the hypothetical accident sequence is conservatively assumed to heat the pressurized fuel rods to bursting, as for other RCC series containers.
Tests have substantiated that fuel pellets remain confined within the ruptured clad, so the nuclear analysis is, once again, unaffected.
Total exposure of all burst rods to water will allow only dispersion within allowable limits, Para. 71.36.a.
Full water immersion is assumed for the MCA criticality analysis.
The conservative assumptions and analyses applicable to earlier RCC series containers are, thus, directly applicable to the RCC-4 criticality analysis.
Please send the revision to me at the above address.
If you have any questions regarding this matter please write to me at the above address or telephone me~on 412-373-4652.
Ver.trul7 yougs,
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R nald P. DiPiazza, License Administration RPD/m I
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