ML20126D077
| ML20126D077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/30/1985 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NACEP, NUDOCS 8506140629 | |
| Download: ML20126D077 (94) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ) II I I IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
.I ,. h ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF.
. f. ENFORCEMENT POLICY i. i LOCATION: BETHESDA, MARYLAND PAGES: 1 - 82 DATE: TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1985 . ~ E -
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ace-FEDER.',L REPORTERS, b:c. Official.47crtes . 444. North Caeitoi Street Washingten. D.C. 20001 (202)347 3700 8506140629 850430 PDR ADVCM NACEP NAUCNwtDE COVER. ACE PDR - .
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) 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 ; 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY
(?- 4 Room P-ll8, Phillips Building, L l; 5 7920 Norfolk Avenue, e k 6 Bethesda, Maryland. c-7 Tuesday, 30 Aeril 1985 9 8 The Advisory Committee on the Review of 9 Enforcement Policy was called to order, pursuant to notice, a 10 at 9:00 a.m. 11 IN ATTENDANCE 12 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Member (Presiding) 13 DR. COLIN S. DIVER, Member, e 14 DR. HOWARD L. PARRIS, Member, s , 3
^) 15 MICHAEL V. HASTEN, Member.
l l 16 KAREN CYR, NRC Staff Liaison. I i 17 l 18 l j 19 20
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m .. _ , . . - - _ - _ = . . . . _- .. ~ ... .. - 9370 01 01 2 2 WRDeb 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 DR. HENDRIE: Good morning, gentlemen. c; llo 3 We will begin today's meeting of the Advisory
'l r^; 4 Committee on Enforcement Policy. Our first speaker will be I (o 5 John Cassidy,. Assistant General Counsel of the Federal il 6 Aviation Administration.
-i
- j 7 Ue are very nieased te see you, sir, and Y 8 appreciate your agency's supplying you, on the one hand, and
[ 9 you personally for coming on the other. 10 We are probing into the enforcement policy of the
- 11 Nuclear Reculatory Commission, as I am sure Karen Cyr has 12 explained to you. And one of the questions which always 13 arises in these discussions is how come nuclear regulatory
, 14 enforcement is so noisy and contentious, and why.is the l '
15 regulation and enforcement on the air transport system so 16 well-mannered and culet, or it least it has,that nerception 17 from this side of the table. You can tell us whether that 18 in fact is a correct perception.
, 19 Please go ahead.
20 MR. CASSIDY: Well, that is not the perception of
, 21 the carrier that we occasionally take action against. Put I 22 think you're right, it does generally seem to have kind of a e
23 low profile, at least has for certain periods. It seems to 24 have gotten very active again in the last year and a half, in j (_j 25 probably as a result of airline deregulation. 9 f me ..m .--.v._w,+.- > - - - .n.+. - ---.n . - . - - . . ~ .-e~a-- --
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'J 9370 01 02- 3 ] 1' WRBeb 1 We have taken an unprecedented number of
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'l 2 certificate actions against new, fairly young, shcrt-lived
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3 air carriers under deregulation. ' Q r {} 4 MR. PARRIS: What is a certificate action? 5 MR. CASSIDY: Well, let me tell you just for a j, 6 moment about the regulatory structure. .
- 1
?- 7 We certificate virtually every activity within 8 the aviation industry from aircraft manufacturer to air ]D 9 carrier operations, pilot certificates, repair stations, i
,j 10 mechanics' certificates, airport operating certificates, and !1
- j 11 the whole statutory framewcrk is keyed to this certification i e 12 system.
13 We publish minimum standards which applicants for j 14 these certificates are reauired to meet. Then they are O *15 governed by the operating standards which govern the holders 16 of each of those certificates.
- h. 17 When they violate those regulations we have
.a [j 18 several enforcement toc 1s aaminst them, but the primary teci i 19 is to take action against their certificate, without which I 20 they cannot operate. "l. 21 MR. HASTEN: Is it fair to say, Mr. Cassidy, Il !j 22 that the thrust of FAA regulation is safety, and in the cid Li C ri' 23 days, pre-deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board's 24 primary regulatory initiatives were economic regulation of k) 25 the industry? ; 1 i !4. ll " i lh h c , _ = ___ . . . . . _ .
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'd 9370 01'03 4 1 WRBeb 1 MR. CASSIDY: Yes.
I j 2 MR. HASTEN: And CAD has stepped off the field 3 altogether, leaving arguable economic deregulation, but the
,; g.cs 4 safety thrust remains in full force and effect for the FAA?
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.j 5' MR. CASSIDY: Indeed, the Deregulation Act has an 1-l, 6 admonition in it that deregulation of the economic side is
- ,~
-{ 7 not-to result in any derogation of the hichest nossible i
,l0 8 degree of safety that was believed to exist
- t j 9 pre-deregulation.
10 MR. HASTEN: Are you at all familiar with the i l 1 11 mandate of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? 12 MR. CASSIDY: Only' generally. 'lj 13 MR. HASTEN: Analogously, we have a major 14 principal initiative which is safety regulation as opposed
-}
((~. )T 15 to economic considerations. 16 MR. CASSIDY: This is our focus also, and there 3 17 are occasional overlaps with the economic regulation of 18 which there still are vestiges that are now within the 19 Department of Transportation. I j 20 MR. HASTEN: Some of your critics have suggested
, 21 that in the allocation of airport space, you have simply 22 stepped into the shoes that economically regulated that 23 airline.
I 24 MR. CASSIDY: This is true. It is said by some () 25 that sunrise is going on. 1 i i I . . . . . . _ _ . _ - .. . _ _ _ _ . . .,
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.; 1 WRDeb 1 DR. HENDRIE: As a general propositicn under the
.j . 2 FAA's mandate, statutory mandate, is it purely safety? To j , .
3 what extent in the certificate standards and actions that , 4 y u take, the standards you promulgate, is the need, the d ., (~) 5 public need for a air transport system, a viable air ,1 4 6 transport system, a factor? ] 7 t;R. CASSIDYr Well, certainly safety is the 10 8 orimary touchstone of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. It 9 does include also declarations of Congressional policy that p 10 certain things are also to be considered as being in the a 11 public interest. 1 ] 12 Although all of our statutory authority to j 13 regulate is in terms solely of safety, that is, minimum
- (l 14 standards designed to assure that the levels of safety that j ('I i
15 Congress has mandated for various aviation activities, to 4
]- 16 take action against those certificates requires a finding
- 1 .
j 1 17 that safety in air commerce as well as the public interest j 18 recuires that action. 1 i 19 Congress wasn't any more specific about what the 20 public interest encompasses.
. 21 Dut clearly the agency in its regulation of
'l; 22 things like airports and its development of long-range plans 23 for certification of airports nationally certainly has the 24 public interest in things in addition to safety in mind. 25 f tR. !!ASTEti: Just picking up on what the Chairman 1 .1 il 7 .. 1 1 - ,1 lI
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'l WRBeb 1 suggested, in the certification process is an increment or
- J 2 an indicia of certification the financial viability of an i
4 1 ai 3 air carrier? 4
. (,rS,1 Subguestion: Do you examine the levels of ]1' 5 insurance available in the event of an accident?
6 MR. CASSIDY: We don't. As you may know, the CAD g 7 did.
] And to the extent that those kinds cf considerations 0 2 affect or did affect safety, or could reasonably be expected j.' 9 to affect safety, obviously we are interested in them.
, 10 We have always relied on the Board's regulations 11 as far as financial requirements are concerned, and those
; 12 requirements are being sifted into new Department of
[I j 13 Transportation regulations, as well as some of our 1 14 regulations.
^ ;j ; b.h ./ 15 There are some quirks in our regulations. For d
j 16 example, we have specific requirements for management
;)
,'. 17 centrol cositions reaarding operators like supplemental air
> 18 carriers and commuter coerators. We didn't have similar i
j 19 requirements for domestic and flag operators, the large air i 20 carriers, because the Board had an entire array of 4 , 21 requirements, and we simply leaned on the Board's findings 22 of financial fitness to satisfy any concerns the FAA had d c 23 about financial wherewithal. t )(d 24 MR. HASTEN: So it is arguable that the purists
, ()) 25 in the economic area would suggest that the economic 1
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i 1 9370 01 06 7 jj 1 URDeb 1 barriers to entry into the commercial airline industry have 7 yh , 2 been arguable removed? M h 3 MR. CASSIDY: "I think that is right. 19 4' Now there is no doubt, in our short history under J{} 5 deregulation, we have found carriers who, because they U 6 lacked._the financial wherewithal to maintain a good,- 7 continuine operation, have led to safety problems, and we've O 8 .taken action acainst them. In some cases we have taken 9 action which.has reouired them to recompose their 10 organization.
- 11 We have had operators who have simply not been
- x 12 able to carry out a consistently good operation, but whose 13~ fortunes changed when a group of new investors coming in 14 infused new money into the company. And if we are satisfied 1 # 15 that that chance will satisfy whatever safety deficiencies 1
t
- j 16 existed before, then we will continue to allow the carriers
] 17 to--
18 MR. MASTEN But a mandate by the FAA to infuse S 19 capital, for example, or to acauire a level of insurance 20 would be done under the aegis of the safety consideration T W . 21 and not some sort of concern about continued service, 22 regardless of the nuality of the service under the public h * ] 23 convenience and necessity standards that I assume were used a 3. 24 by the CAB 7 k) 25 MR. CASSIDY: Right. And we decided long ago n- , "I '
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t J!' j 9370 01 07 8 f 1 WRBeb 1 that within our safety mandate we did not have authority to ,3 2 compel minimum insurance requirements on a thing like that. L1 3 MR. HASTEN: I see. Thank you. 4 DR. HENDRIE: Okay. 5 Why don't you-- That's an interesting digression 6 but why don't you proceed in the direction you were going to 3 4 7 oc2-o 8 MR. CASSIDY: Okay. 9 As I said, we certificate all of these 10 operations, but when there are violations of the regulations 11 -- and I guess I should mention that FAA is basically a ] 12 decentralized agency. We have nine regions throughout the H) 13 country, and the day-to-day enforcement of cur regulations li
] 14 is handled regionally.
i* (Op~h 15 We also have a syst,em under which principal 1 16 operatiens inspectors and principal maintenance inspectors 1 17 are assigned to air carrier operators. .1 18 MR. HASTEN: On-site in the manufacturina j 19 process, and the maintenance process on-site fer these 4 20 carriers?
% 21 MR. CASSIDY: That's right-- Hell, in the case 22 of manufacturing, yes, they are on-site.
Io f' 23 In the case of operations and maintenance of air $ 24 carriers, no, they are located in district offices which D (, ) 25 hold the operating certificates for those carriers. 4
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! 1 WRBeb 1 MR. HASTEN: But your inspectors or whatever
; 2 would make on-site examination in the process o(--
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3 MR. CASSIDY: Oh, yes. I think they probably 4 spend as much time on-site as they do in their of fices.
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Lf 5 DR. HENDRIE: Did you say nine or ten regions? 1
- g. 6 MR. CAS3IDY: Nine regions.
'l 7 MR. DIVERT Can I ask a clarifying cuestion?
n" 8 When you say you have inspectors on-site at the j 9 manufacturers, do you mean something like a resident I 10 inspector? l 1 11 MR. CASSIDY: We have an assigned principal 12 manufacturing inspector who, for the sake of convenience, is 13 often located at the manufacturer's facility, has an offico 14 there. 15 MR. DIVER: Dut with regard to operation and 16 maintenance of aircraft, air carriers, sect inspections or 17 frecuent-- 10 MR. CASSIDY: Well, the principal inspectors in 19 both of those disciplines, maintenance and operations, are 20 responsible very often for more than one carrier. They will
'- 21 be assigned to several carriers. And they're resconsible 22 for general surveillance of the certificate holder.
o 23 Usually the home base of the certificate holder 24 happens to be where the certificate is held, so it is 25 convenient to do that. They do periodic spot checks, I . .. __ _ . .
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,j 1 WRBeb 1 system checks, checks of the carrier's own quality contro) 2 systems. And the rest of surveillance is done randomly w ,
3 throughout the country.
'i 4
j ({} We have what is called a geographic concept of V; 5 enforcement which has been in effect I guess for about seven 1). 6 years now. It was an outgrowth of some concern that J 7 inspectors tended to become too ecmfortable with the 8 carriers that they were assigned to,. and as a result, all 3 9 enforcement today is done geographically. That is, the 10 violations that occur are investigated and enforcement 11 action taken by the regions in which they occur. i j 12 MR. PARRIS: May I ask a question?
'1
; 13 This Committee has heard the allegation from i
14 certain witnesses that there are regional differences in the (," # q 15 NRC which could result in a penalty being levied in o.'e j 16 region for which no penalty was levied in another recion. 17 could you comment on the methods, the technioues, t 18 whether it's trainina and selection? I gather you have 1 19 standards. You talk about standards. But what are all the 20 technioues and methods used to assure consistency of 21 application of your policy from region to reolon?
- $ 22 MR. CASSIDY
- It's a timely ouestion for FAA
;o t 23 because we just finished a national enforcement eva;uation 24 of all nine regions. And one of the main focuses of the
,^
25 evaluation was inconsistency among the recions, particularly a e
C-- CUi.. i .. . # - _ . , A D 1 _ ".2 - [S. ' 9370 01 10 11 1 WRBab 1 inconsistency in sanctions sought. 2 I guess we have with the decentralized system, 3 some measure of at least facial inconsistency is {h 4 inevitable. We try to assure some consistency through, 5 first of all, agency directives. I will leave you a cony of 6 our compliance and enforcement program handbook, which is 7 kind of the bible for insnectors and attorneys in the 8 8 field. And you will see that the cuidance in it is not 'i
- ! 9 meticulous; it is not detailed. It leaves some judgment in l
l- 10 important areas. l' 11 For example, there are I think eight or nine i: l 12 factors listed in here to be considered in determining an i 13 appropriate sanction for violations, but they are all fairly i l 14 subjective and there is no guidance as to how much weight is (- 15, given to each factor. So there is some considerable roem p 16, for judgment left. h b 17 Ue try also to monitor at least significant L 18 enforcement actions in the regions in Washington in our 19 headquarters. It has been difficult to do for years because 20 we have not had much of an automated capability for o - 21 overseeing the day-to-day activities of the regions, but we u 22 are not in the process of automating that whole business and l 0 23 it should become easier. 24 I think there are always trade-offs involved in ( .' 25 trying to ensure some measure of consistency without l _f 4 _ e *w ee6 h * -w whowenemW - _e. + em _Wemw - _ e-=- + - - - nw ,- ~~~*W=e--*===e== - P er9tw W - A g
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7, ,, _. , _ , ,_ d, l: 9370 01 11 12 1 WRDeb 1 depriving people who, in our view, are in the best position
- 2 to decide what kind of a deterrent is appropriate for this.
'? 3 operator, and for the immediate community of operators whose 4 behavior will hopefully be influenced by it. j (X ~ 5 We also-- Although that is our organization 6 regionally, we get very involved in Washington in any 7 enforcement cases of what we consider to be national 0 8 significance or significance which cuts across regional
! 9 boundaries. We.have some specialized areas of violations 10 that we handle in Washington only, and we get involved in lI 1.1 major regional enforcement actions to the extent that they 12 appear to have high visibility, high exposure, just for this 13 reason, to try to ensure some consistency.
14 We do hove-- We used to have remething called a (, , 15 laundry list, an internal guide of sanctions for particular 16* kinds of violations. They were ranges, 30 to 90 days 17 suspension depending on mitigating or aagravating factors. 18 We got rid of that some years age, actually before my time, 19 and I'm not sure of all the reasons we got rid of it. {
- l -
20 He have been under a lot of pressure recently to 1
- 21 rejuvenate the laundry list. We have concerns about using 22 it, one of which is to the extent that we publish any kind 1o i 23 of a guide, it can only be a guide. I mean it cannot he 24 rigid penalties. If they were fixed penalties for
' ) 25 violations of fixed regulations, I think we would have to go l
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l 9370 01 12 13
; 2 WRDeb 1 through a full APA formal rule-making process, and that i 2 would be an enormous undertaking. We have three volumes of 3 CFR covering our regulations.
i l {') 4 So we are considering reestablishing the laundry j 5 list as an internal guide with ranges of sanctions, but even l 6 there you can't get too specific because there are i. 7 mitigating and aggravating factors that are going to arise e 8 in every case.
; 9 These violations are highly contextual, a minimum )
10 altitude over a congested area of 500 feet, or actually of
}
i 11 1,000 feet over any congested area, 500 feet over a i 12 non-congested area. You have to stay 500 feet above any 13 houses, structures, persons and vehicles. One persen
,; 14 violates that rule by flying at 400 feet, and another one
( ' 15 violates it by flying at 50 feet. That's just an , example of 16 the kind of thing that makes it difficult te prescribe a set 17 table of sanctions. But we are recensidering that new. 18 We do have-- 19 DR. IIE!TDRIE: I take it your recent survey across
, 20 the regions tried to look at this question and found that I
21 there was seme inconsistency frem reglen to region, at least I ! 22 as viewed en a sort of a summary, overall basis. 23 MR. CASSIDY: There was seme. Actually there 24 were-- In general, they were within range of each other,
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25 but the ones that were inconsistent, even though there were
- e s
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-.. . .u.- ... : a ~.: .. w . . -..L - . - . ..-. .. ..t.=.....-e-0370 01 13 14 2 WRDeb 1 relatively few of them, they stood out like a sore thumb 2 because in some cases they involved violation actions taken 3 against the pilots for the same air carrier, actions taken
{ f () 4 by two different regions for identical violations, and one
; 5 was a 30-day suspension of a pilot's certificate and the
, 6 other was a seven-day suspension, and the cases were 7 indistinguishable in material part. They were fer altitude 8 deviations, so they stand out. Particularly when it turns
, 9 out that the two pilots are represented by the same
- 10 attorney, it is brought home very quickly that we have done 11 something differently.
12 MR. PARRIS: I may be jumping ahead here, but 13 what performance criteria do you-all use or attempt to use 14 to determine the efficacy of the system as to fatalities, k- 15 accident-free miles flown, whatever7 1G MR. CASSIDY: We don't have standards f6r 17 evaluating the efficacy of the system. One of the purposes 1 i 18 of this national evaluation we did, which had not been done l 19 for 14 years, was to try to find some way to measure 20 efficacy of the system. 21 We do have statistics on those things, region by ]- 22 region, but I don't think thesagency has ever attempted to d O 23 correlate those statistics with enforcement efforts, so I 24 can't tell you anything about a relationship. 25 We take about 12,000 enforcement cases a year, a += q *+ _,o. t 9 _ _he -,**.%- .e., ,-- ..e 5 e ,--pg ww,- g
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'l 9370 01 14 15 1 WRDeb 1 but fully half of these are what we call administrative 2 actions. Under this handbook, if an inspector finds a 3 violation which meets certain criteria, it's a first-timo 4 violation, it didn't significantly affect safety, and j (l%
2 5 factors like that, the inspecter can issue a warning letter,
, 6 or a letter of correction, the latter cf which recuires an r .
l 7 cperator to correct scme deficiency seen. o 2 Those are not adjudications of violations. They I 9 don't establish violation histories that can be used later. 10 They are just reminders. 11 MR. PARRIS: You have your regional inspectors 12 and then you have this voluntary confidentiality-assured 13 reporting system in which you have an independent agency to 14 collect data. How does that system r. elate to the inspection (- 15 system? 16 One further question llave you dcne any analysis 17 that would indicate that the voluntary reporting system 18 affords you data that you otherwise are not getting through 19 the inspection process? 20 f tR. CAGSIDY: I'm not the best one to talk to you 21 on fruits of the aviation system reporting program. I know e 22 that it has yielded tons of information but I am not o 23 intimate with the analysis of the information or the real 24 salutary effects that it has had. 25 It must be perceived by those in the agency that 1 e
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Li f 9370 02 01 16 1 WRBeb 1 are responsible for it as efficacious because it has just 2 been extended for another five-year period. j 3 DR. HENDRIE: Do people send those things in to
- g. c 4 FAA, or to the Transportation Safety Board?
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- s i 6 5 MR. CASSIDY: I'm sorry?
j 6 DR. HENDRIE: Do they send those voluntary
,l 7 repcrts in to you people or to the Transportation Safety je O Deard? 't l 9 MR. CASSIDY: They send them to NASA. I am going i
l 10 to leave with you a copy of the Advisory Circular which
! 11 explains the program.
i
'f 12 MR. PARRIS: Under that program they hired NASA j 13 as an independent agency, Joe, and then NASA in turn 14 subcontracted with Battelle to do some of the analytical
) i 15 work, and the confidentiality of the report is ensured.
l.
.] 16 Once the analysis is complete and the identification 1
g 17 information is removed from the submittal, they can never go 1
'l*
18 back. 19 They leave the name of the submitter on there 20 until they've ha'd a chance to probe and feel that they i , 21 understand all there is to be gained by that interface.
, 22 once that has been satisfied, the name of the submitter is 23 deleted and then he can never be called upon.
24 We used to have a predecessdr of this years ago, (j 25 a program that was not formalized, called the Near Mid-Air 4
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t 9370 02 02 17 1 URDeb 1 Collision Program in which people who reported encountering 2 an airplane dangerously close to them reported it and could 3 be assured that no enforcement action would be taken against (j <> 4 them for having reported it, the idea being that we could ( ' 5 eventually improve the safety of the system with that L: >j 6 information. '1 q 7 MR. PARRIS This is a perscnal expression of my o 8 own philosophy.
'i i 9 I expressed very strongly at one of our first 10 meetings that the !!RC program is dependent entirely upon the i
l 11 residential inspector findings that we're in trouble. i ( 12 Unless the utilities are also identifying and correcting t 13 violations, we would have very little success in finding out 14 what the relative contribution -- and that was really what
; (% '
15 was behind my question here
.l o 16 What is the relative contrib6 tion of these two
.i i 17 ostensibly competing systems, the inspection system and the .i j 18 vcluntary reporting system? i 19 MR. CASSIDY I can tell you this, that the large 1 20 majority of aviation safety reports that are filed are filed
. 21 by commercial pilots. They are rarely filed by companies, 22 and almost just as rarely filed by private pilots.
e 23 But the program is as you described it. There , j 24 are exceptions. I mean basically it assures the reporter ,
. i 25 confidentiality. We can't get any identifying information I h
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9370 02 03 10 1 WRDeb 1 on these reports. He can only get statistical kinds of 3 'j 2 summaries of the incident reports that are made to NASA. i 3 MR. PARRIS: But ostensibly at least, going back 9 l f'5) 4 to the work of the now-deceased Dr. Paul Fitz, who did 1 %.' l 5 primary work in what is called the critical-incident 6 technioue, it is very difficult to interview a fatality, but ,
! 7 crew members who have survived a near accident he
- i
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8 interviewed those and came up with a body of these j 9 critical-incident technioues from which he could tease out i j 10 the cause-and-effect relationships to which remedial action 11 could be addressed. d
! 12 That was again kind of behind my question as to l ] 13 the impact, the total impact, of the voluntary reporting . ! 14 system. '4 4*
hg/ i 15 MR. CASSIDYs I wish I could tell-- I wish I was
.i 16 in a better position to give you an opinion on that but I'm Tl 17 not.
u l 18 The way this works of course is that if we find i i 19 out independently of this system, which is the only way we [ 20 can find out, really, of a violation, we won't take 21 enforcement acticn against the person who renorted the
],
i 22 violation. It has to be reported within five days of the
! 23 incident except in certain circumstances where there is an " i , 24 accident involved, or criminal activity, deliberate l t :/ 25 violations, or violations which demonstrate a lack cf basic i .
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2 So if we find out about incidents that fall in s i 3 those areas independently of any report filed with NASA, we f';]q ; (' 4 still take enforcement action. g' 5 It used to be you only got one bite at this u].; 6 program. If you filed a report and received enforcement, n 7 immunity in exchance,- you could not do it aaain. You could ; g a only do it once. You were enecuraced to keep reporting but 9 it wouldn't protect you. 10 This latest change in the program now lets you do s 11 it;at least once every five years. ij MR. PARRIS:
~
12 ,. You said that certainly this matter
\
13 of voluntary reporting has generated statistica. Is it an 14 inherent part of the contract responsibility of Dattelle to
) 15 attempt to do some analytic work with those statistics?
1
') 16 MR. CASSIDY: Yes.
.l 1 17 MR. PARRIS: When they do the analytic work and 1
18 they cenerate recommendations, what happens to the 1 9 19 recommendations? Are they forwarded to the FAA fer
-l 20 considerntion and possible implementation?
r 21 MR. CASSIDY: Right. I would recommend, if e, 22 anybody ever had the chance, to go out to -- I think it is 9* 23 Ames Research Facility out in Monterey or Palo Alto,
,1 24 somewhere up there,--
e () 25 MB . !!ASTEti We're going.
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/j 1 WRBeb 1 MR. CASSIDY: -- to get a demonstration of what j 2 their-- ,
,,: 3 MR. PARRIS: That's Ames at Sunneyville. Ju - r
%yg 4 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. I've been trying to get out w
j;- 5 there for two years, and I.just can't. q' si 6 MR. HASTEN: Join our Commission; you'll see the
- ) . ,
j 7 world, or at least Bethesda. s e 8 (Laughter.) i 9 MR. CASSIDY: I just have not been able to find y zi - 10 the time. I have an invitation. 11 11 Anyway, fully half of' our enforcement cases that 12 are brought -- and by " enforcement" cases I mean where an I, 13 inspector files a formal -- opens an investigative file on a 14 violation or perceived violation. Fully half of those bl ()
> 15 12,000 a year are handled by adminstrative action between 16 the inspector and the violator. The inspector has full 17 authority to do that as icng as he or she are applying the d
18 criteria in the handbook correctly. j 19 In the other 6,000 or so cases a year, it runs 20 about half and half. In half of those cases we are taking f f 21
, some kind of certificate action, either a punitive q
! 22 suspension of a certificate or a remedial revocation.
23 MR. PARRIS: So an administrative action would be
- 1 1 24 a non-certificate type of action? ;
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i (1.) 25 MR. CASSIDY: Richt. I don't want to say it's a 9' Jh 9 If ' ~ o e.+.,__
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!l 1 WRDeb 1 slap on the wrist because we hope it has more meaning to the 3
'l q 2 alleged violator than that. But they are designed mainly to 3 correct, without using a sledge hammer, a problem by someone
;k c 4 whose level of experience may be the cause of their--
(:rs) 5 MR. PARRIS: At least it is a strong advisory
} 6 suggestion?
j 7 MR. CASSIDY: Right ..
. 8 DR. HENDRIE: Let's see. About 3,000 then are of 9 a--
t
] .i 10 MR. CASSIDY: A certificate action, suspensicns ) 11 or revocations.
4 12 MR. DIVER: 3,000 actually involve suspensions or if j 13 revocations? a 14 MR. CASSIDY: Right. Remember, we are talking
) 15- about everything from private pilots, from student pilots . .
16 certificates, to type certificates for the DC-10. 17 DR. HENDRIE: Okay. 18 And the last quarter of these things? 19 MR. CASSIDY: I thought I had covered them all. 20 I was saying about half of half, so half of them 21 are administrative. Of the remaining half-- Hell, an 22 easier way is to say half administrative, one quarter civil "* 23 penalty, one quarter certificate action. I'm sorry, the 3 24 last quarter is civil penalties. l e !! U:' 25 We also have authority to issue orders-- 4 -l Il s
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i 3 9370 02 07 22 j : 1 WRBeb 1 DR. HENDRIE: What sort of civil penalties do you j 2 level in terms of amounts? i i 3 MR. CASSIDY: We've got a statutory maximum that d c
- l 4 dates back to 1938 of $1,000 per violation, or $1,000 a day 5 for a continuing violation. We approach that in enforcement 6 against manufacturers, commercial operators, industrial N* 7 certificate holders, and we enforce that strictly.
C1
- .2
- 8 Each violation of each regulation constitutes a 9 separate violation, so you may have an airline whose 1 10 magnetometer breaks down and they board 150 passengers
-l U
11 without screening them for security reasons. We view that 12 as 150 separate violations because the regulation prohibits ay 13 the boarding of a single passenger who hasn't been screened.
.. 14 If you do improper maintenance on an aircraft and "i] (:3 v 15 you thereafter operate it on 700 flights, you have a 16 potential of $700,000 dollars in civil penalty liability for Dj 17 each flight, because the regulation says no person shall 'A 18 operate an aircraft, and each takeoff and landing -l P,
19 constitutes an operation. 20 In cases of multiple violations that maximum has j,
. 21 we think served as an adequate maximum penalty that is i l]i 22 adequate to allow us to essess a penalty which is i
1 H, . 23 meaningful, which cannot simply be calculated as the cost of F 24 doing business. j N y () 25 Where it has proved inadequate is in the case of [I o 'j; Li
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sw&:m w - Mi. - i l 9370 02 08 23 j 1 WRBeb l' serious single violations. 1 2 MR. PARRIS: Do you have air-borne inspectors who []- .
;* 3 actually observe during an operational flight?
o j rq T ([u.v;) 4 MR. CASSIDY: On of the main functions of air 5 carrier operations inspectors and their assistants is to a. 6 conduct en route inspections, so they sit in the cockpit on h 7 random flights to monitor both the crew performance and the
- L:: *
[j y 8 company performance, 6: 9 MR. PARRIS: That blows that theory then. I was 10 going to theorize that perhaps the most inputs from g . 11 voluntary came from-- You said they mostly came from
- -(
l 12 pilots, that these were observations made during flight, a 13 whereas the inspector may concentrate on ground activities. H m 14 But you have blown that theory. g
-b 15 MR. CASSIDY: You have to remember I only see il j 16 this from the enforcement point of view so by definition, d'
j 17 every case that I see in which the pilot has filed an [ 18 Aviation Safety Report is one which, by definition, we knew 1 J1 19 about it from sources other than the pilot's report, in 20 which case you can guess that the report was filed not so 1 j
- 21 much for a vicarious interest in augmenting the data bank 3
j - 22 with safety information but in avoiding an enforcement hj . 23 sanction. d j 24 I'm sure that is not always true but certainly N 8b 25 sometimes. a u oi-T i I ,. , , _ --; c.
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'i 4 9370 02-09 24 1 WRDeb ~1 We also have authority to issue orders. We have j 2 authority to issue immediately effective orders.
j 3 I guess I should have mentioned in our () 4 certificate cases, ordinarily we proceed with a notice of
]i 5 proposed certificate action, suspension, or revocation,
;. 6 and an opportunity for an informal conference. If no
.y 7 acreement is reached or the violator cannot convince us that
- e 8 we are wrong-headed, an order is issued.
j 9 It is appealable to the National Transportation u,
! 10 Safety Board and the effectiveness of the order is stayed i (l 11 pending the outcome of the appeal.
j. 12 We do have authority to issue emergency orders. 3 1 13 MR. PARRIS: Do they always do this, er do they J
? - 14 usually do this? -I J
b 15 MR. CASSIDY: Appeal? a
.i 1 16 . MR. PARRIS: No, the issuance of a warning, and 17 fc11ow that up by whatever you call it, an enforcement U 1S conference?
?
// 19 HR. CASSIDY: Most of our certificate actions are .d F t 20 not emergencies so we issue a notice proposing to suspend, M] 21 affording the alleged violator an oppcrtunity for an 1;
, 22 informal conference with an FAA cttorney and an FAA d a
- 23 technical person.
p b 24 Then if the order is issued after that 0 DD
'# 25 conference, it is appealable to the NTSD and its 1
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i 9370 02 10 25 1 URBeb 1 effectiveness is stayed until it is resolved by the full 2 UTSR. 4 3 We issue, in emergencies, immediately effective t! I (}) 4 orders which are also appealable to the NTSB, but the
;r 5 effectiveness of which is not stayed pending appeal.
el - 11 j.q, 6 We also have authority, incident to our b
;j 7 civil-penalty authority, te seize aircraft. To enforce a M*
E 8 lien on the aircraft when an aircraft is involved in a 9 violation and the violation is by the owner of the aircraft
$ 10 or the person in command of the aircraft, we can seize the
) 11 aircraft as secur.ity for the payment of the civil penalties 9,
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12 for which the owner or pilot would be liable. 4 13 We also occasionally go to the District Courts to 14 obtain injunctive relief, or to obtain judicial orders
.., 15 enforcing our own orders like cease and desist orders.
16 In the case of dur civil-penalty enforcement a 4
.] 17 actions, unlike the certificate actions, the NTSB is not G !,i 18 involved. We don't have authority to collect civil 19 penaltiest we have authority to compromise them.
20 So the way that works is if we find an airline is ( ,r
> 21 in violation of the regulations we sent them a civil-penalty-T 4 22 -letter that says we have received a report of investigation A
- j. 23 from which it appears that you violated the regs. cn a
24 such-and-such a day. Under the statute you have -- you are o],
~I h) 25 subject to a civil penalty not to exceed, if they are saying a
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1 9370 02 11 26 1 WRBeb 1 there are ten violations, $10,000. We would be unwilling to jI 2 compromise this matter for less than -- and it may be i 3 anything from ten down to one, because we have authority to
) ()') 4 compromise civil penalties, and we do compromise about 95 t
l 5 percent of them. 4 1 , 6 If no agreement in compromise of the civil 7 penalties can be reached, our only avenue for enforcing a c)
- i 8 civil penalty is to forward the case to the United States 1
l 9 Attorney for filing of a civil complaint in the District 10 Court where the violator has a right to a jury trial. Very 11 few of our civil penalty cases are litigated. I, j 12 DR. HENDRIE: I would think the U. S. Attorneys
'l l 13 don't view those things with much joy. ]5
- p. 14 MR. CASSIDY: We do have some problems getting j
(~) 15 much priority for our civil penalty cases, particularly the
'l 16 nominal penalties. It is our only recourse in many. cases, .? 17 because we can't take certificate action unless it's a a
i a 18 certificate holder, and a lot of our regulations govern il } 19 non-certificate holders. 20 DR. HENDRIE: Like who? Y~ ~ 21 MR. CASSIDY: Hell, passengers on airlines who f 22 interfere with flight crew members during a flight; people 3* j 23 who fly without a license. We can only resort to civil 24 penalties. r3 n,, 3 N' 25 In the industrial-violation area-- l 1 1
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; 1 WRDbrb 1 DR. ITENDRIE: Wouldn't you get the owner of the i
{ 2 airplane? 3 MR. CASSIDY: It depends. You may be able to if et ' y n (g 4 you could prove that the owner actually operated the Mu 5 aircraft; and that recuires proof that the owner
?f Mf* 6 specifically authorized or caused this unlicensed person to
, operate the aircraft.
.. }
8 DR. HENDRIE: Did you ever smack an owner or ]q
- 1 9 suspend his license, his pilot's license or something, or
- (d
].j 10 owner's certificate, or whatever it is, for. failure to ] 11 exercise minimal, reasonable security precautions with n
9 12 regard to his aircraft, which can reasonably be regarded as
. ,I f 13 an attractive nuisance if it just sits out there, you know, i 14 without any protection and the keys in it, or whatever?
' ~
15 MR. CASSIDY: We don't have reculations recuirina r4 j 4 16 any security measures on the part of owners. We do have a
- 17 very broad statutory definition of " operate an aircraft",
a 1 la and you can certainly operate an aircraft without ever q
]
19 getting in it. And we do go after owners as vicarious 7 20 operators of aircraft if there is evidence that they
. 21 condoned or were actively involved in or somehow directly ; 22 connected with'the operation of the aircraft.
);; 23 We do have new anti-drug smuggling legislation, 24 which has just gone into effect recently, which does hold
'e 25 aircraft owners -- registered owners of aircraft -- more i c i
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1 2 We do have some problems getting priority for those cases in 4 3 the United States Attorneys' offices. Sometimes the (I ' 4 U.S. Attorneys will let us prosecute the cases ourselves 5 directly, because they just don't have the time or they j , 6 don't have the expertise; and when they don't have the 7 expertise, we get heavily involved in the trial of these 8 cases, even when they do agree to bring to bring -- to file 9 suit for us. 10 I think in the area of air carriers' opera *. ion
]i 11 and manufa.; tare, although the penalties can be stacked up 12 significantly in a multiple violation situation -- you may 13 recall in the wake of the DC-10 accident in Chicago in 1979, 14 that we collected half a million dollars in civil penalties
- 15 from American Airlines, S400,000 from continental Airlines, 1
1G grcwing out of their maintenance practices on the DC-lO, ,i 17 and, I think, F400,000 or $300,000 acainst McDcnnell Douglas 18 for cuality control deficiencies which weren't directly 19 related to the accident but which.were disclosed during an j 20 inspection that grew out of the accident. Clearly, to 21 those certificate holders, I don't think the money is nearly 22 as important as the adverse publicity that it carries with 23 it. 24 So I think we believe you have have to have a 3 ( 25 statutory maximum that is meaningful, that isn't like a 4 g._ = = -. a+ - i w -eg . m->
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a 9370 03 02 30 2 WRBbrb 1 parking ticket and can't simply be absorbed as an d 2 operational cost; but, at the same time, you have to be 3 mindful that the real punitive damage is done through public j ({' 4 exposure of the violations. 5 MR. PARRIS- This total fine of $300,000 was an sq 6 accumulation of days at $1000 a day? ._ 7 MR. CASSIDY: In the case of McDonnell Douglas, 8 it was the product of the number of nonconforming parts 9 which passed through their quality control inspection system 10 without being removed from the parts pool. You can see how, 1 11 on a per-bcit basis -- i 12 MR. PARRIS: It is a multiplier of some base, 13 whether it is McDonell Douglas, the manufacturer, or the 14 airline and the operation? 5 1
15 MR. CASSIDY: Right.
16 MR. DIVER: So your quality. control regulation 17 makes the item the violation rather than the system?
, 18 MR. CASSIDY: It's both.
1
!- 19 In fact, you could construct a civil penalty that t 'I 20 involved a number of airworthiness items on an airplane i
- } - 21 which simply had not been fixed. 'Each item would be a
.l 22 separate violation and each flight would be a separate J . 1 23 violation. So, because of the wording in the statute that 24 says for each violation" and the wording of our ((3>, 25 regulations, which focuses on individua) items or
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9370 03 03 31 2 WRBbrb 1 operations or flights, each of which constitutes a separate 2 v,iolation -- 3 MR. DIVER: It's a good thing NASA doesn't have 4 to pay civil penalties for this latest space shuttle. (73 w-4 5 (Laughter.) 6 MR. CASSIDY: We tried to cet a handle,
~
in our q 7 own recent enforcement evaluations that I mentioned, on the
. 8 deterrent value of enforcement sanctions. When we take 4
9 remedial action of revocation, certificate revocation, it 3 10 has -- we believe generally it has some deterrent value ] 11 because, to those not affected by it, it's only a possible 3 12 deterrent. It's not remedial. But we justify, really, 13 revocation actions not so much as a deterrent but as a 14 remedial action, to get an unqualified operator on the i ( 15 around. i 16 In surveying our inspectors in the field about 17 the effectiveness of the sanction system and in focusing 4 18 particularly on the civil penalty system, the sense we got
] 19 was that, you know, these penalties have a deterrent effect, l
1 20 .but it is often all but lost in the time that it takes the }:t a , 21 legal process to get it finalized. I j 22 MR. PARRIS: You are not alene.
- 23 MR. CASSIDY: I mean, it could take from six 24 months to six years to collect a civil penalty.
k_9 25 DR. HENDRIE: How about the suspensions? Are P l O t I
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mm. - , - - , . . - ., g__ y 3., _. g z.- s . _. f _ l , t 9370 03 04 32 2 WRBbrb 1 those much more quickly executed?
,1 2 MR. CASSIDY: Much quicker, because you're-3 dealing with some statutory time limits and some procedural 4 ,
(U) 4 time limits imposed on us by the NTSB, who adjudicates all { ,l 5 of those appeals of certificate action. i 6 MR. PARRIS: Where do the resources generated to NI i 7 carry out the FAA program -- obviously, you have 1000 i- 8 inspectors, and you have the contract with NASA, Battelle, 9 you have FAA staff members, and so forth: does each 10 operational entity pay a fee, for example, to support this 11 program, or is it right out of the government coffers? l 12 MR. CASSIDY: It is right out of the Treasury. 4 13 There have been movements, unsuccessful, over the years to
, , 14 make the users of the aviation system pay more of a share of i 15 it than they do, but there have been'no major changes in I 16 that area for years. There is some feeling, for example, j 17 that air carriers ought to pay for the air traffic contrcl 10 system, but I haven't seen any proposals in that area 19 lately.
fi 20 MR. PARRIS: Do I have to buy a registration
. 21 license in California for $3007 And it seems like the owner 22 of a private plane should -- ought to have some type of 23 registration license.
24 MR. CASSIDY: I think it is $12 to register an 25 airplane. e p- . . . - . _ . - - . . . , - . q
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L.} 9370 03 05 33 2 URBbrb 1 MR. DIVER: Have you made any other effort to 2 evaluate the effectiveness of the enforcement policy, , 3 besides sort of gathering impressions from inspectors? l (~) 4 MR. CASSIDY: Well, in the course of our
-t vn' i
5 evaluation, we not only gathered impressions, we looked at 6 cases, and we compared cases among regions. We do have scme 7 statistics, although we are in the -- sort of the advent of
. 8 doing any good statistical analysis at FAA in the 9 enforcement area.
10 We like to think we have an ongoing monitoring 11 program. We are in regular and close touch with our 12 regions. For example, the chief counsel in Washington, we 13 have weekly telecons with our regional counsels in which we 14 discuss these very subjects. Enforcement is a major part of
.i ka' 15 our weekly nationai telecons.
16 And our flight standards technical people do the 17 same thing, at their level, with inspectors. We have a
, 18 pretty good communications network. But, essentially, 19 that's it.
- i
- j 20 MR. DIVER: When you say you examined cases, do
, 21 you mean you examined enforcement cases, enforcement 22 actions?
23 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. 24 MR. DIVER: Looking for what?
\ ..L . 25 MR. CASSIDY: Looking for consistency, looking ^
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9370 03 06 34 2 WRBbrb 1 for adequacy of sanction, quality of investigation, quality
, 2 of legal analysis. .1 .
j) 3 MR. DIVER: Do you do followup investigation to A see what effect, if anything, it has had on the carrier or l ({} JJ 5 the licensee? M Ed 6 MR. CASSIDY: We don't have an institutionalized t.p
'j; 7 followup system. Inspectors who bring those cases and whc SI y, 8 are assigned responsibilities for those operators c; ? 9 undoubtedly follow them up.
jj. 10 DR. HENDRIE: Let me ask you, to kind of move d
.; 11 into another area, about the designated representative J
y 12 system. It occasionally gets cited to us as an enterprise 9
,l 13 that ought to be considered in the nuclear area. And I'd be 4 .. , 14 interested in four views on (a) what is it and how does it h 15 work, and (b) how well do you think it works, and what are ^! ] 16 its good points and bad points?
q fj 17 MR. CASSIDY: Well, again, you could do a lot u l} 1G better than me for views on this subject. 74 y s
- 19. We have authority under the statute --
j 20 DR. HENDRIE: Not in this room at the present 1 J..
, 21 time.
22 MR. CASSIDY: We have, under our statute, the 23 authority to designate private persons to carry out various 24 functions relating to our ' licensing activities, which t g ',
; \-- 25 includes examination, testing, necessary to the issuance of 1
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L~. - i$. - ~ 1 1 9370 03 07 35 2 WRBbrb 1 certificates, as well as the initial issuance of i 2 certificates. We're talking about certificates which range ! l
! 3 from a medical certificate for a pilot to an airworthiness I l 4 certificate for an aircraft.
{N I j 5 And we have designees in both of those areas, as ! M 6 well as other areas, who apply for and receive a designation a e i q .. 7 limited to whatever functions the Administrator desires them ' .) 8 to carry out, and they are actually carrying cut a delegated ]1 l' 9 1 function of the Administrator. 1 10 I think the experience -- and, again, I'm out of ] 11 my element a little here, but the Agency's experience has 4 y 12 been very good, at least in terms of efficient allocation of 13 resources. We just don't have the numbers of insoectors and i.{ 14 other employees whc can keep up with this industry without j h., j ,a 15 growing a lot more than we intend to. So there is a growing j 16 use of private designees. And I think it is helieved to 1 j 17 have worked very well. l la MR. DIVER: What sort of organizations do this J .) 19 work? 3 I 20 MR. CASSIDY: I'm sorry? 3
- 21 MR. DIVER: What sorts of organizations do this 22 work?
23 MR. CASSIDY: Well, they are, I think, primarily 24 -- entirely -- almost entirely, they are individuals. V_ 25 DR. ITENDRIE: Who work for their companies. e 1
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$ 3 WRBbrb 1 American Airlines will have some employees who are 1 2 designated, I think, by FAA to exercise certain inspection 3 functions.
l 4 MR. CASSIDY: Yes.
)
- ! . 5 For example, we have a rule that says that, in
~i 6 order to perform what are called major alterations or major 6;
recairs to an aircraft, you have to use data for the repair
]* 8 that's been approved by the Administrator, which means-the (l
9 Administrator or his delegate within the Agency. l 10 We have designated individuals, called designated
, 11 engineering representatives, or DERs, who may work for
- 12 an airline, but they have this designated approval to
.t 13 approve the data used for a major repair performed by that
')
. 14 airline in the course of keeping its fleet going. They
.i (7)
15 don't have to bring their data to an FAA district office or
.J
] I 16 get*an FAA inspector, because they've got a designated
,! 17 engineering representative who's authorized to do that.
q fi 18 MR. DIVER: And that would be, typically, an l' 19 engineer in the employ of the carrier? 1 20 MR. CASSIDY: An engineer in the employ of the
- i j-u 21 carrier who has got a designation which is limited to
,) I 22 whatever areas of expertise he or she has and with whatever 23 lim,itations the Administrator determines are appropriate. 24 And when that designee approved data, it is carrying out a
? ,
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, 9370 03 09 37 2 WRBbrb 1 MR. DIVER: And you have not been troubled by the 3 2 conflict of interest?
q 3 MR. CASSIDY: It has not produced any -- at least a
]j 4 any obvious problems. I'm not aware of them.
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5 A person so designated has the -- I mean, the
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N ej 6 obligation that they have to do things by the book is clear; M. 7 and if they don't, they lose their designation, and they may
, 9 lose their job with it because they have lost their value to 9 the company. They have to individually stand behind g 10 anything they approve. It has not resulted in any obvious % 11 conflict problems that I'm aware of.
1 M M 12 MR. DIVER: Well, they have to stand behind it, j 13 but what is the probability that an error will be detected?
] 14 4 That is to say, two questions: do they have discretionary D1 /"~ N .
1 kC) 15 power, or are they really just carrying out a ministerial
,1
- 16 function; and, secondly, is ,there a high or a low 17 probability that if they misapply the standards that it will a
j 18 be detected?
] 19 MR. CASSIDY: Their task is not merely l
Lj 20 ministerial. It involves, in the case of data approval, 21 some exercise of the engineering judgment expertise. They l Ej! 22 are tied by that, I guess, to the things that they know have 23 previously been approved by the Administrator. I don't see
-I '
j 24 much evidence that they go out on a limb and approve any I (m.) 25 kind of an engineering change which they know requires more 1 j 4 C 4 I I
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/i 2 I could not tell you -- I'm just not qualified to
,1 II 3 estimate what the chance is that an error that they might
; 4 make would be discovered. It's probably the same as the
}
[. 5 chance that an FAA inspector's approval of an item might 6 contain an error that would go undiscovered. 7 DR. HENDRIE: Do you have any sense as to what
]
4 S' extent the DER actions are audited by FAA? j 9 MR. CASSIDY: They are monitored. There is, I t 4 10 believe, a kind of quality control system, and -- you know, y 11 there is so much paperwork associated with maintenance t. hat i I 12 all copies of all end up at the FAA eventually, that it is 13 probably pretty hard for anything of significance to go
- 14 unnoticed.
I 15 I mentioned the major repair or the major i 16 alteration. Even when a DER approves the data for use in-17 that repair, whenever you de a major repair, major l 18 alteration, you have to fill out a Form 337, a ecpy of which A Ii 19 goes to the FAA district office, and which will show on it i
<t 1 20 where the data -- what data was used and who approved it. I t
- . 21 mean, it's a fairly redundant system.
! 22 MR. PARRIS: John, speaking of maintenance, I i +.
j 23 would to turn to your opening comments for a moment, if I q '
'.} 24 may. -2 <,
i '(2) 25 You said that all parts of the program were s; l I w.,- pm. ~,e -e swww.---,- ___m, . -
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,. 2 -WRDbrb 1 certificated, including maintenance. In the NRC, of cource, y
j 2 our SRO's and RO's have to be licensed as a function of the 3 training and evaluation process; but the same does not hold
,t . 4 for- the mechanics. I
)
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.t 5 What certification standards ~or methods are used
-j 6 to certify the maintenance aspects in FAA?
o 7 MR. CASSIDYr You mean, the technicians
), 8 themselves?
; 9 MR. PARRIS: Yes.
i i fj 10 MR. CASSIDY: Well, we issue basic airframe i
] 11 and power plant mechanic certificates, which authorize
; 12 people -- depending on what ratings they can get, which i
13 authorize them to perform maintenance, to perform 14 inspections, or to return aircraft or aircraft components to
- l. .; &w/ 15 service. These rance frcm the most basis mechanic's 16 certificate with an airframe rating on it, which may have
, 17 limited privileges, dependinc on what that person is
.4 l- 18 qualified for. L 19 MR. PARRIS: Does'he acquire this certificate as ] i 20 a function of some written or oral examining technique? 21 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. 22 There are written examinaticns for airframe and ]. 23 power plant certificates and for every rating that you can 1 24 earn in addition to that, which includes inspection () 25 authorizations to authorize or approve aircraft for return J 1 i l - _n-, .... -.,- . - - - - ,
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q i i 9370 03 12 40 2 WRDbrb 1 to service after they have undergone major repairs or f 2 alterations. x 3 We certificate repair stations who are authorized j 4 to perform unique functions that individual mechanics may (}}
- ] 5 not perform. We certificate propeller repair stations,
.3 q
; 6 engine repair stations; and, again, they must -- we have a d =
(' 7 system in which a repair station must demonstrate that it's a
~, 8 got a certain number of qualified personnel, how it
.f.
fi.2 9 supervises its maintenance, the adequacy of its facilities.
~l q 10 We don't have written tests for repair stations, but repair Ej 11 stations are composed of individuals who have taken written .1 i 12 tests.
- t 13 MR. PARRIS: Thank you.
1
! 14 DR. HENDRIE: Did you have other comments?
) O
- j 15 MR. CASSIDY
- Well , 'I don ' t know i f you ' re 16 interested, but we occasionally use something that exists in 17 this handbook called deferred suspensions, in which we may
@ 18 postpone the effectiveness of a suspension, pending good .c
- l 19 behavior.
II' il 20 DR. HENDRIE: And then revoke it, if the behavior 1 il L . 21 is good? 22 MR. CASSIDY: Then not take -- oh, you mean ?} revoke the order of suspension? Yes, terminate it, right. ]' y 23 l 24 Give them a one year period, and if no similar deficiencies y 25 are found during that one year period, the order is
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. 9370 03 13 41 2 WRBbrb l_ terminated. If there are similar deficiencies found, the
- j. 2 order is not only made effective, it may be changed to an
- ?
3 order of revocation. 4 Sometimes we use an indefinite suspension of a
)
i 5 certificate, pending some re-examination of the certificate 6 holder tg determine that they still meet the qualifications Li
- 7 for the issuance of a certificate. That is usually where
. 8 you have had some kind of incident that suggests that maybe .t
- .. 9 the certificate holder doesn't really have the basic a
[lj 10 competence to comply with the regulations.
.~.) ; 11 MR. PARRIS: What would happen if it were a C 12 comparable -- and I can't give an example -- not the same 1
d 13 offense, but one that's comparable to it? 3 1 14 MR. CASSIDY: You mean, during a -- Ji i g2 15 MR. PARRIS: During this deferred suspension: 1 16 "You did a great job on maintaining this quality assurance
'1 17 on the altimeter, but you didn't do a cood job maintaining ]
18 quality control on some other piece of equipment?" a 19 MR. CASSIDY: We would have to look at the 20 context.
, 21 MR. PARRIS: Take it on an individual. case basis?
l 22 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. ?
]* 23 Companies do often identify their own violations d
24 to us. This is not and never has been a basis for omitting
) 25 to take enforcement action; but it is a factor that's taken
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- l 9370 03 14 42 2 WRBbrb 1 into account in mitigation of sanctions.
j 2 As you can imagine, we have largely a paper
'l
- l 3 record system cf regulation of aviation. Everything has to J 4 be written down. If it's not, it doesn't exist. So
)
5 carriers have made it very simple for us to go in and spot j 6 check, for example, their maintenance operations. You can 1
- 7 get a computer run which will show you which cf these
, 8 aircraft got their required C-checks at 15,000 hours of
] 9 operation very quickly. c{ j) 10 MR. PARRIS: What happens to the funds collected? 1 j a 11 Do they go to the Treasury? 12 MR. CASSIDY: They go to the general Treasury. 't 13 MR. PARRIS: So there's no incentive for FAA to ] ] > &% 14 escalate this to get money? You don't get it anyway? i- il 15 MR. CASSIDY: We can't augment cur cwn 1 j 16 appropriations in this fashion. 17 Against companies like air carriers, who are j 18 required by statute to conduct their operations with the
- l 4
19 highest degree of safety, we do hold the company vicariously 20 responsible for violations by its employees, where the
. 21 violation suggests that it grew out of some company 22 inattention, some policy problem, some lack of supervision, I
23 some deficient system. If United Airlines has a pilot who 1 24 goes out and deliberately flies low over a mountaintop, () 25 we're not ordinarily going to hold the company responsible ; I e
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. 2 URBbrb 1 .for that because the pilot is violating the company's own s-f 2 policies and practices. However, if we see ten incidents of
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i 3 it, we begin to be concerned that maybe the company has 4 condoned it, and we'll proceed against them.
- 1
(}) ij 5 I think,~ technically, the ecmpanies are il 6 vicariously responsible and liable for penalties for any o 7 violations of the regulations by their employees. We almose
, 8 always go against the companies for maintenance violations, 9 because the maintenance systems that air carriers are / 10 required to have in order to be certificated require such L1 11 oversight and such double-checks that virtually every kind 12 of a mechanic's screw-up is a company screw-up.
n i 13 That's just some ideas of things that reading 2
]. 14 your notice suggested to me that you were looking at, that h ) 15 you might be' interested in.
1 16 I also will leave with you some copies of the 3-
]
j, 17 Agency's order on its enforcement policy. This is the l 18 Administrator's statement to the employees and to the public
?
19 in general of what the enforcement policy is. 20 DR. HENDRIE: That will be very useful.
. 21 Mike, do you have any questions?
w
- j 22 MR. HASTEN: No.
lk* k 23 MR. PARRIS: I've been asking them as we went. E 24 DR. HENDRIE: Colin?
$5)
As 25 MR. DIVER: I have one or two questions,. y h e. k1 _ m m .: '
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d j -9370 04 01 44 1 ;2 WRBbrb 1 Does the FAA formally rank or evaluate licensecc? Li
,f, 9 2- Let's take trunk line carriers. Does the FAA have any 7
3 mechanism for evaluating their performance? l j' h l 4 MR. CASSIDY: No.
^
,g J 5 If they are certificated by us, by definition 6 they have demonstrated an ability to comply with the minimum
$ 7 standards that are designed to ensure the highest possible 1
, O degree of safety. That's che philosopher.
9 MR. DIVER: The phrase " highest possible": is b 10 that a statutory phrase? g y 11 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. t ? 12 MR. DIVER: It is? ) l 13 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. It's in 49 USC 14. !!.3 \. 4 5 14 MR. DIVER: And there's nothing in the statute to 4 (h 15. suggest that cost considerations should be weighed in 16' determining what is the appropriate level of safety? o_ j 17 MR. CASSIDY: Well, I think it has been Il 3 18 unavoidable that the word " highest possible degree of b t 19 safety", or that phrase, has been read to mean the highest
; 20 practicable, because the highest possible would be to keep i
f' , 21 them all on the ground. fj 22 Certainly, economic and other public interest f i ti - 23 considerations are taken into account, both in certification i 24 and in regulation and in enforcement of the regulations. I g (;) 25 don't think the Agency has ever said or done anything that a s
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ma 7:vV y , n 1 9370 04 02 45 d 2 WRDbrb 1 eould suggest that if non-safety public interest 4 2 ' considerations are taken into account, that they are n . 3 anything other than secondary. l 4 For example, we have authority under our statute
).
5 to grant exemptions from the regulations if the -p H 6 Administrator determines that the public interest warrants 7 it. We have been reminded on more than one occasion by o4 V e E United States Courts of Appeals that public interest, in 9 that exemption, means the public safety, or the public
].;. 10 interest in safety; and that, although it may include other 11 considerations that are in the public interest, none of them
]; 12 displaces safety as the primary public interest
't 13 consideration. And I don't think that we administer that 4 14 any differently. (7. 15 MR. PARRIS: In all these data and statistics 16 that you have, do you have a feel for how our major airlines 17 measure up against some of the competing foreign airlines, l 18 with regard to safety?
)
19 MR. CASSIDY: They are head and shoulders above d 20 -- you mean our domestic carriers? d I .. 21 MR. PARRIS: Yes. 22 MR. CASSIDY: I don't think there is anything in j' 23 the world that approaches the systems and the safety 24 redundancy of the domestic air carriers.
- )- (, 25 MR. DIVDR: Considering the -- I assume the worst i
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q 9370 04 03 46 2 WRBbrb 1 thing that could happen in the FAA is a major jumbo jet j 2 crash, just as the worst thing that could happen at the NRC q Iij 3 is another TMI. Therefore, I assume that there's a lot of
.a
.]. i p p; , 4 redundancy to prevent that particular kind of accident or [ Na# 5 eventuality. il 6 Given all the redundancy, given all the different b* al t 7 systems in place to assure reliability of equipment, of f
, 8 operation and personnel, when violations are detected, I 9 assume they are violations that, by themselves, in most 10 cases would not actually cause an accident but would sort of 11 increase the risk of an accident if some other eventuality 3
i I 1 12 occurred or violation occurred. Is that a fair i 13 characterization?
~!
I i 14 MR. CASSIDY: Dy and large, that's true. We're (T5 NY 15 talking about a potential, if other factors contr'ibuted. 16 MR. DIVER: If other factors contributed in y 17 eencert. 1 1 18 MR. CASSIDY: By and large that's true. I l 19 Occasionally we see violations that seem, in retrospect, 20 that it's very fortunate that they did not lead to an .:] . 21 accident. 22 MR. DIVER: Although I suppose there's one kind 23 of event that single-handedly can cause a crash; and that's 24 if a pilot makes a grievous error of some sort in actual 1 (%j 25 operation of the aircraft. I suppose there's not a lot you e t k i
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9370 04 04 47 2 WRBbrb 1 can do about that, except more training and equipment, and 2 so forth, to minimize the likelihood of that. 3 MR. CASSIDY: That's right.
4 MR. DIVER: But in that environment, the sort of (t
5 redundancy protection against catastrophic loss environment, 6 do you really feel that sanctions such as civil fines play 7 any incremental role over the enormous incentives that the
- 8 carriers already have to prevent these kind of things?
9 MR. CASSIDY: Not demonstrably. I mean, I'm not 10 sure it is knewable. -l j 11 MR. DIVER: What about your intuition? f 12 MR. CASSIDY: My intuition is that it doesn't. I 13 think there's a common belief among all the members of the 14 aviation community that when semebody else does something 15 wrong and gets nailed for it, that that's their problem; 16 that that's never going to happen to me because I don't do
' 17 that. I don't make those kinds of mistakes. It's hard to r
18 deter those people when they don't see that as a possibility 19 for them. I guess I would say that those other forces are i 1 20 more compelling forces to ensure compliance.
- 21 Our statute contains the sense of Congress that a
.{ 22 penalty system, a sanction system, will contribute somehow i. 23 overall to a healthy respect for the regulations. Trying to 24 credify that or show instances of where that has happened, k 25 it seems to me, is almost impossible.
)
9
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9370 04 05 48 2 WRBbrb 1 You do get their attention, now. Inspectors tell Ji 2 me all the time that, you know, ever since we nailed XYZ n
-! 3 Airline, they have really changed around. And I guess they 4 have because they don't want that to happen again. Their
!? 5 passenger loads fell off 35 percent for six montns after
)
i 6 that.
] 7 MR. DIVER: After what? After an accident or a t , 8 penalty?
i 9 . MR. CASSIDY: A penalty'. ..] 10 MR. DIVER: A penalty has had that effect? j 11 MR. CASSIDY: Yes. o 12 MR. DIVER: On that same line, with regard, 13 again, looking just at that part of your program which is 14 aimed to prevent catastrophic events, crashes, is your rh n (s 15 penalty program basically aimed at generating a very small J 16 number of very large penalties for the really egregious i 17 violations, or de you end up producing a larger number of l 18 relatively small. penalties? 1 1 - 1 19 MR. CASSIDY: I would say the first one. We do, If j 20 just because of our own resource constraints, we use what I ?!
. 21 guess you could call an emphasis approach to enforcement.
22 We can't do everything. We can't keep up with -- there 23 aren't enough people within the government, either 'c 24 U.S. Attorneys or inspectors or civil agency lawyers to
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.O 9370 04 06 49 2 URBbrb 1 minor violation or a single violation of the regulations.
2 So what we try to do is devote our energies to 1 3 those areas which the Agency perceives as being terribly { 4 important ac a priority system. So you will see, if you j (VT'. J! 5 look at our civil penalties -- and we don't collect.that 6 much in total dollars; maybe, in an active year, maybe $1.5 7 million in civil penalties -- but you'll see the bulk of i e 8 them are against air carriers for maintenance violations. 9 With pilots, we rarely take civil penalty i J 10 action. We usually take certificate action. We may find 11 that there seems to be an increase in the number of private I 12 pilot low flights; people seem to be doing buzz jobs more
; 13 often today. We will try to bring a few cases to the fore 't 14 in which we seek higher sanctions: maybe a nine-month r,,s ,
15 suspension of a certificate rather than a ninety-day 16 suspension for a low #11ght.
)I .
j 17 So we do kind of an emphasis approach; and if you 1 j 18 look at the totals in any civen year, you'll see them aimed 19 at the kinds of recurring areas, the recurring violation si .
- ( 20 areas,. and the major industrial violations.
l 1 . 21 MR. PARRIS: What attendant publicity is given to
- l
~i 22 -- I knew about -- I guess everybcdy'did -- the catastrophic
- s _
23 event in Chicago that resulted in fines on the companies
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3 24 there. But how about routine fines across the board; are l../ 25 they all publicized? t 1 i I.
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9370 04 07 50 2 WRBbrb 1 MR. CASSIDY: You touch on a sensitive subject,
, ;, 2 because that was, again, another one of the focuses of our 3 national enforcement evaluation, and something that our j i
~
(G} 4 present Administrator is particularly interested in. 'l 5 .You will see in this Compliance and Enforcement
.i 6 Handbook I gave you, as well as in the statement of the 7 Agency's enforcement policy, statements about publicity i e 8 policy. There's, I guess, just kind of a minimum standard i
; 9 philosophy expressed in these documents, that the publicity i 10 that is accorded to any given enforcement action should be 11 done -- should be undertaken when there is determined to be 12 some beneficial effect; that is, either the public needs to 13 know.this, or other operators need to know this.
14 And there are a lot of caveats about protecting i kk 15 the right to fairness of alleged violators > particularly i j 16 since the publicity that' attends violation usually attends 17 them at the allocation stage, not at the final adjudication 1 18 stage. So the Administrator has asked us to be very careful
.I d 19 about issuing news releases -- press releases on allegations
, 20 -- that don't adequately protect the rights of alleged
. 21 violators.
il d 22 For' example, we're told to make sure that a press j f '- 23 release that FAA has issued a $50,000 civil penalty to 24 Braniff Airlines should show clearly that these are
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(' 25 allegations, that Braniff has an opportunity to come in and e
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e a y 9370 04 08 51 2 -NRBbrb. I discuss them in an informal conference; that it does not 2 represent a final adjudication, etc. It's expressed better 3 than I can here in these documents, and I invite you to take (T~,O 4 a look at it.
- p 5 MR. PARRIS: In the NRC, a single enforcement 6 violation can result in two negative press releases: at the 7 allocation and then the litigation. If I understand you I
8 correctly, there would be just one release? , .I 9 MR. CASSIDY: We don't always do a release. 10 MR. PARRIS: If there's a release at all? 2 11 MR. CASSIDY: If we do a release, we do it at the 12 time that we take the action, and we do it after the 13 violator has been well apprised of it, so that they can 14 respond to it. J' 15 MR. PARRIS: Have a conference and everything? 16 MR. CASSIDY: Well, we would like to wait until 5 17 after the conference. Somehow, these things manage to get t
- 18 out on their own very often, and then we'll issue a release l
; 19 to make sure that everything is out, to make sure that it is n
j.i -20 not reported incorrectly. Like you, we deal with FOIA and
, 21 we secm to be -- we have running reouests these days for 22 copies.of anything we do.
23 So it's very hard to manage the exposure of those 24 things, not that we want to manage them other than to make (' 25 sure we don't do an imbalanced kind of injury to the alleged T d w_ . - . .
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. 2 DR. HENDRIE: How many inspectors -- I forgot to V
i 3 ask how.many inspectors has FAA got, approximately?
); ?j /~1 4 MR.-CASSIDY: You're asking the wrong person. I ;f %.' ] 5 had better not even hazard a guess. I'll be happy to find jj , 6 out that information and get it to you.
1 7 DR. HENDRIE: Hundreds or thousands? h
- 8 MR. CASSIDY: Well, I think we're in the
. 9 neighborhood of about 1200 inspectors. But let me find that 9
10 out; I'll get you a better figure. ] 11 DR. HENDRIE: Okay. 12 The time has advanced to noon. We've kept you a
] 13 half an hour over our promises; and unless there are really a
j ,,
-m 14 pressing,further questions frcm the committee, I'll say 2.
* <v
.3 15 thank you very much, n
. .l q 16 MR. PARRIS: You have been a very patient witness t
j 17 with some of the questions we've asked. 4 d 18 DR. HENDRIE: It's very interesting to hear how 1: p 19 things are done in the other courts. r q . 20 MR. CASSIDY: Okay. Thank you. 21 DR. HENDRIE: And we'll be very greatful to have }. 22 those materials that you're leaving with us. 23 The committee has arrived at a point where, 24 rather than return us to the discussion we were having about 'i ,p. s (~ t/ 25 an outline of the report, I think it would be better for us 1 .. i
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u a ... . . . . . . v . _ Lj t 0370 04 10 53 3 WREbrb 1 'to take a noon break and gather again at one o' clock, and we 2 will hear Mr. McKendrick. And then, a fter that, we will 1 3 settle down and hack oct an outline. .
- (.]
4 (Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the Advisory Committee fj- 5 was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 a.m. that same day.) 6 r .1 7 8 .1 . .. !. 9 s
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.i 9370 05 01 54 1 WRBhrb 1 AFT'ERNOON SESS ION H, 2 ,
(1:00 p.m.) il 3 DR. HENDRIC: On the record.
;- j t-l,y w
%l 4 Mr. McKendrick, do you want to come up and join
; 5 us? We very much appreciate your coming. We hear a lot 6 about enforcement policy from a lot of people, remarkably 7 few of whcm occuny the sort of first front-line position in
. 8 the enforcement scheme that you do. So we're especially
.} 9 glad to hear from you this afternoon.
J l 10 I understand you are from McGuire.
> 11 MR. MC KENDRICK: Yes, sir.
I
'i-12 DR. HENDRIE: Assistant shift supervisor?
. 13 MR. MC KENDRICK: Correct.
^!
;l 14 DR. HENDRIE: Very good. -
d :Q "o
- i 15 You have seen our list of questions, and I auess i t
-[;' 16 people have sent you scme of the literature about what the j 17 committee is looking at, and so on; and if you have ecmments .i ;.) 18 .you would like to make, why, why don't you go ahead and make
- s q 19 them, and we'll ask questions both during and after, as 4
j 20 seems appropriate. u
- j . 21 MR. MC KENDRICK: Okay.
- 22 My name is Robert McKendrick, and I'd like to 1
23 express, first of all, my appreciation and the appreciation
' 24 on behalf of Duke Power Company for your efforts with this 4
! k-[) 25 committee to try to modify the policies, the enforcement s'l
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9370 05 02 55 ,Q l WRBbrb 1 policies, cf.the NRC; and also express my appreciation for jj 2 being invited to speak with.you today.
- l .
?. 3 My background in the nuclear field began in 1969
- ]. '
4
~
_ when I enlisted in the U.S. Navy. I served as a nuclear O[ 5 operator in the submarine service on the USS Thomas Edison h 6- and the USS Nathaniel Green. I qualified all engineering 1]h
- j 7 watch stations up through enaineerina watch sumervisor.
8 I joined Duke Power in 1975, and I'm presently a 3 j 9 licensed Senior Operator on Units 1 and 2 at McGuire Nuclear-0 10
~
Station. And my present title, as you know, is assistant 11 shift supervisor. h c 12 Although I'm here as a representative of Duke 13 Power, the prepared comments that I have are my own; and 1 I 14 believe they represent the feelings of onshift operations k (()
'~ 15 personnel.
fj 4 16 As is true in any management position, my job 17 entails getting the job done through other people. It is a 18 unique situation, in that I am responsible for safe 19 operation of a nuclear power plant, not only through my own 20 actions, but through the actions of others. It's my job to - . 21 motivate operators, instruct them in the job to be done, 4 }[ 22 coach them for' improved performance, and carry out any 23 disciplinary process that is necessary, if mistakes are j 24 made. It's from this position that I would like to talk to 1 -s
$hO 25 you today about NRC enforcement policy and from this 3 ]
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- d 2 could be made in the enforcement policy. This is, of a.
1 M. 3 course, in the reactor operations area. o.
-o 4 } (])
First of all, I feel that civil penalties should 5 not be levied in cases where violations are detected by the.
- ) . 6 licensee, promptly reported and corrected. After-the-fact i
- i 7 fines, in my opinion, serves no ourpose for promoting safe d
.q
[ .' 8 plant operation. l 9 In talkina with operators at McGuire in 1 10 preparation for coming here, everyone could remember ,4 11 specific violations that we had had, what we had done wrong, 12 how we had corrected the-problems, and what had been dene to 13 assure these problems did not reoccur. But not too many 14 people could remember if we had a fine, if a fine was ]U (5) '" . 7 , 15 proposed and later mitigated, or what the circumstances / 16 were. I think this is due to the enforcement policy d 17 dragging on for so long. I think this is an example of what. 18 we are trying to achieve at Duke Power, which is a highly 19 dedicated staff to detect and correct these problems, and I q 20 don't think that a fine will serve a constructive purpose in
. 21 this case.
22 I feel like the fine should be reserved for 23 repeat occurrences or severe situations which might be an }y' 24 indication of an unwillingness on the part of a utility to I 1 62w/) 25 to conduct safe plant operations. j ?! s N i i o
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'{ ~ l WRBbrb 1 Secondly, I feel the greatest impact on the
-l j 2 morale of the employees that I work directly with is caused e.j 73 3 by them reporting occurrences in the plant which are then
..j ..
] ({3 4 classified as Level IV or Level V offenses by our onsite 5 inspectors.
.I!
i./j 6 Appendix C states that a notice of violation will A* 7' generally not be issued for a pr=blem that is discovered if
- 9. 8 it meets several criteria. I'm sure you' re familiar with
-d 'f] 9 its if the problem is identified by the licenseer if it j
- )
- 10 falls into Severity Level IV or V; if it was reported t
. 11 promptly by the licensee; if it is or will be ccrrected, y
12 including some sort of outline for preventive measures where 13 it does not happen again; and last, but not least, if it was-14 not a violation,that could be reasonably expected to have t%"'" 15 been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a j
- 1 l 16 previous violation.
3 17 I think this is where we fall into difficulty in p 18 -- and this depends on who your onsite inspector is, how he 19 interprets that last statement, as to whether or not a 20 certain violation is similar or exact to one that has 21 occurred before can determine whether it is just an LER or a 22 Level IV or V violation. The way he carries out this 23 interpretation can lead to low morale and a lack of
- 4 24 willingness on the part of employees to report occu[rences 7
O 25 in the future.
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;j 9370 05 05 50 1 WRBbrb 1 I also feel that standardization of 2 interpretation, and maybe some guidelines nationally to 3 onsite inspectors might help alleviate some of these
.Qv 4 problems, 5 My third point is that I hope the trend continues s 6 toward interoretation of material false statements back
?A *
] 7 tcward its original intent, which I feel was that wilfull 8 deceit must have been involved in statements that were made fl 9 for it to fall into that category. I cannot think of any 10 greater deterrent to open communications in the pursuit of
${
11 safe plant operations than for a 60 Minutes-type atmosphere,
?] 12 one where phrases are taken out of context and word games 9 .I 13 are played. I can't see that being anything except
- k. 14 detrimental to our communications with the.NRC.
( 15 I feel the areas I have mentioned have a direct 16 effect on employee morale -- I'm talking about on the shift 17 level -- both due to on-the-job considerations and also the 18 interaction of these people with their neighbors and other a j 19 people in the community when they see the results of fines 20 levied by the NRC. 21 During my employment with Duke Power, we've had a 4 22 number of people leave the operations area for one reasen or
~
j.( 23 another. I don't think that NRC enforcement policy has ever 24 been the entire reason for people leaving, but always the 25 enforcement policy or the trickle-down pressures that result 5
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]' 9370 05 06 59 j 1 WRBbrb 1 from it are cited when people resign.
a 2 MR. PARRIS: If I could interrupt you there, ff[ :f l 3 we've had similar reports from other utilities like ,t j -) 4 ' Baltimore Gas & Electric -- and they even came up with a g (%.; lj 5 percentage; others don't have percentages attributable to q j 6 the frustration experienced from the regulatory process,
;i * ] 7 saying they want to do something else.
ll
. 8 This may be an impossible question: do you have
[ [ 9 any fee 1 for the magnitude of the problem in terms of the 10 numbers of people? Is it two percent or three percent? 11 And the second part of the question: are these
. 12 found out through exit interviews, or how are they 13 ascertained?
14 MR. MC KENDRICK: I think, in answer to the first s .O m') 4 15 part of your question, it is a percentage of everybody's
-i
- 4 16 reason for leaving. I think it is inversely proportional to
-l
- j 17 the person's -- proportional to the person's level of a
18 responsibility. The higher you go in the organizatien, the 19 more people that you have reporting to you who you are also 20 responsible for to make sure that they operate safely. The
. 21 pressure increases more and more. So those people who have a
j 22 resigned -- shift supervisors have probably felt these 23 pressures more, and it would be more of an impact on their hj 24 decision to leave. E. g .w 25 MR. HASTEN: I have a problem. I'm searching my b i
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.l' l- 9370 05 07 60 if 1 URBbrb 1 memory. I don't recall Baltimore Gas & Electric proposed
.,t 2 any quantification of employee, either termination or d. h!- 3 request for transfer to another area outside the nuclear p 63) su 4 process. g g;7 5 MR. PARRIS: I might have the witnesses -- from - n1 t.j - 6 reading the transcript, somebody talked about 15 pecple, and hi f
- 7 they said two or three. The questions were designed to say V
g - 8 whether it was two or three pecple, or two or three percent, 9 which makes quite a bit of' difference. V( [ 10 MR. HASTEN: As I recall that discussion,-it was V 11- my line of questioning; I was trying to.get some {!
,y 12. qu' anti fication . And, although I am not an industrial O
q
- 13 psychologist, nor do I intend to be, your analysis of why M
- ' 14 - people choose to leave a particular job that has so-called N.; O..m .
~
N 15 stress factors may be attributable to a lot of things. I M hj 16 don't know that we have got any data that justifies the fl. } 17 assertion that NRC enforcement is quantifiably a reason for O U 18 that. U 19 MS. CYR: Didn't the one BG&E guy, so he said, 20 they took him to an enforcement conference and he resigned
. 21 the next day? That was the one example -- where you might 22 say it was directly attributable to that.
s 23 MR. PARRIS: Yes. He went down, and it was a 24 two-hour session. It was part of that whole line of f
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i1 i q-9370 05 08 61 1 WRBbrb 1 MR. HASTEN: The reason I raise it at this point E 2 is that I had heard that; that assertion is one that is made p i 3 with a great deal of strength from industry witnesses and in hl - {p 4 written testimony. And I am just wondering: is there any y 5 data collection by the industry's research arms that could y, 6 give us some -- fj o E'; 7 MR. PARRIS: Your c.uestion is well taken: that V , 8 is the intent of the second ouestion, is whether this is 9 just anecdotal reporting or -- a number of companies have 10 formal exit interviews and they try to establish rapport j
- 1 11 with the individual -- he's leaving -- the rationale being
]a 12 he has nothing to gain or lese by falsifying his reasons.
n 13 That was the intent of the second question, q 14 The first question is the number, and the second 7, j O@ 15 question is designed to -- if we can establish the A
.1 16 credibility which we can attach to the first number.
i
'lj 17 MR. MC KENDRICK: In answer to your second s!
ld A 18 question, I believe it is discovered in two different ways. M 19 Naturally, when people decide to leave, all their
} 20 coworkers wil'1 talk to them about why they're coing to
. 21 leave, and it usually comes out there. And we do have 22 formal exit interviews for employees that voluntarily 23 resign.
; 24 MR. IIASTEN: Is it a matter of practice in the (h 25 industry, if you know? Are those exit interviews that are f
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0370 05 09 62 j 1 MRDbrb 1 conducted of those licensed operators compiled at some place j 2 or places so that we can get some industry-wide data on this ( l i 3 subject -- because what we're getting is, perhaps, Baltimore
;a.; ;j
{} 4 Gas' views, Duke Power's views, which I don't suggest to 5 denigrate your awareness of the problem. But it is somewhat l] 6 , limited to Duke Power unless you've had experience on an
=
i industry-wide basis. A S. 8 MR. MC KENDRICK: That's richt.~ 1
. 9 I would suppose that there's probably not any one ;' 10 central point where things like that are collected, since I d_
11 feel like our exit interviews are strictly a company 12 managerial function and not related to the license at all.
'1
,j 13 They just want to find out why a person is leaving Duke
! 14 Power Company.
- /__
15 MR. HASTEN: It's a perfectly valid exercise. I 4 16 just didn't know whether it was avai'lable anywhere.
. . 17 MR. DIVER: If I may follow that line of 18 questioning, what level personnel are ycu talking about?
n 19 MR. MC KENDRICK: I'm talking all the way frcm ,i j 20 equipment operators all the way up to shift supervisors. 1- 21 MR. DIVER: Okay. Do you have any estimate of
'i j 22 the turnover rate in your ccmpany, or among the people that 23 you supervise?
24 MR. MC KENDRICK: I think it is -- I don't have i (~ 25 an exact per.-entage. Usually, due to the nature of the job, i
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i 4 9370 05 10 63 i 1 WRDbrb 1 we lose quite a few people initially. Over the years, our
- j 2 training program has been revamped to where, out of all the h
d 3 people that apply for a job in operations, by the time they u fj .. 4 get into the plant and out of a learner status, we don't PJ 1# ij 5 lose too many after that. d !g 6 MR. PARRIS: I try to make a distinction between .g . IQ 7 attrition-and turnover -- like at TVA, they had a terrific b
, 8 attriticn oroblem in the training program. The longer they p:
9 carried them in the training program, the more they trained Ki f3 10 them, the more it cost. But they literally took them as far s 11 as they would go. L cl 12 I'm using turnover in the context, now, that they d ]j 13 are bona fide employees and they're on the job on a 14 permanent basis, and they leave of their own volition,
'! > 15 whereas attritien is induced by corporate policy -- they i
"!. 16 failed to pass the course or whatever. 1
! 17 MR. MC KENDRICK: Richt.
1
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.it 18 I can say I don't have any exact numbers. h 19 MR. DIVER: Let me ask you a different question: i l; 20 Can you give me an estimate of how many licensed SRO's and
- t , 21 RO's there are in your plant?
5. 22 MR. MC KENDRICK: GRO's and RO's: probably in L;,
' - 23 the neighborhood of 50.
g E' 24 MR. DIVER: 507 ( (. ) 25 MR. MC KENDRICK: SRO's and RO's. l: pt T 3 1 il 1 .
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9370 05 11 64
-l: 2 WRBbrb 1 MR. DIVER: And about how many of those in each n
gj 2 category? y fj 3 MR. MC KENDRICK: Just about a 50-50 split. 4 MR. DIVER: Okay. b.
/s 5 Do you have any notion about how frequently a JJ h 6 licensed SRO or RO resigns? Do you recall any insta,nce R
- l e 7 where that's happened?
-fh, 8 MR. MC KENDRICKt In recent times, in the last 9 year, we've lost two SRO's, and I don't believe we've lost 10 any RO's in the last year. And it probably runs about two e 11 to three SRO's a year. 12 MR. DIVER: Do you have any idea of where they j 13 go? Do they leave the industry? l
?
14 MR. MC KENDRICK: A variety of places. As a
. r~,
"/ 15 matter of fact, there's one fellow -- today's his last day; 1
16 he's leaving the industry altogether. We've had people 17 transfer to training organizations. We've had people j 18 transfer to other utilities, and we've had people transfer il j 19 to consulting-type firms. 1 1 20 MR. PARRIS: Again, this is strictly at the 21 anecdotal level, but I interact with an industry task force, I 22 engineering operation task force, and they're comprised of
= 23 scmething like 21 or 22 -- I had a number of them say that a y
j 24 lot of people want to stay in the industry, but they want to
) 25 convert from nuclear to fossil because the regulatory O
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9370 05 12 65 1 WREbrb 1 pressures in the fossil, apparently, are less. 2 MR. MC KEtJDRICK: I hear that same statement a 3 lot, because a lot of our operators came from fossil plants (. 4 into nuclear the training program. 5 I have one last statement. Ity last point is I 6 feel that the NRC should not impose sanctions on 7 individuals, except in.the most flaorant cases. I believe
'l
. E that discipline of employees should be left up to company
[ 9 management unless the operator has violated a portion of his t. j 10 license or the law.
'.i
, 11 In conclusion, I feel like too many times 12 problems that are directly inflicted on people at the 13 operating level and caused by people at the operating level
_. 14 are never discussed with the first-line management or with 15 the operators. 16 So, again, I appreciate you having me come to 17 ] talk to you today. 18 MR. EASTEN: Will you describe for me -- you may l 19 or may not no this; I'm going to assume that you do, though L 1 20 -- the general reporting relationships at Duke Power with
, 21 respect to its nuclear operations? In other words, the 22 person who is overall in charge of the nuclear operations at >
23 Duke Power is at what level of the corporate structure? l 24 MR. MC KENDRICK: Vice president. t
- 25 11R . IIASTEN: A vice president.
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9370 05 13 G6 1 URBbrb 1 MR. MC KENDRICK: Yes, sir, n
] 2 MR. HASTEN: And, as between the vice president j 3 and the chief executive officer of the company, how many 4 layers, if any, are there?
{ j. i 5 MR MC KENDRICK: I believe all that has recently G been revamped at Duke, but my understanding is.that our 7 executive vice president.in charce of nuclear cperations can
. 8 report right to the president and the chief executive.
9 MR. HASTEN: So the person who is in charge of i 10 nuclear operations in the company, the person to whom the l j 11 chief executive officer would look or the board of directors 12 would look is a senior manager who reports directly to the 13 chairman; is that correct -- or the CEO? 14 MR. MC KENDRICK: I think -- like I said, I don't
, 15 recall exactly how the management tree is set up, but I.know 16 as a matter of fact that he has access to the chief 17 executive. 'I 18 DR. HENDRIE: The arrangement you outlined wculd L 19 be typical.
4 20 MR. HASTEN: The senior manager in charge of
, 21 nuclear operations of a particular electric utility would 22 report to the CEO?
- 3 i '
23 DR. HENDRIE: Yes. 24 MR. HASTEN And betwee, for example, you and the
)
) 25 person in charge of the company-wide nuclear operations?
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! 9370 05 14 67 > 1 WRDbrb 1 MR. MC KENDRICK: We have a general manager of 2- nuclear stations, who is under the vice president.
I 3 Reporting to him are all the station managers. Reporting to X. j (^] 4 the station manager would be the superintendent of a
, 5 operations. -Reporting to the superintendent of operations 1 '? .6 would be operating engineers. And reporting to them would j 7: be second-line supervision,-shift supervisors.
I1 8 MR. MASTEN And you are an assistant shift i 19 supervisor? , 4 10 MR. MC KENDRICK: Correct. 11 MR. HASTEN: And you, in turn, report to your
-} 12 shift supervisor, who reports to the operating engineer, who I~
13 reports to the station manager, who reports to the --
, 14 MR. MC KENDRICK: The operating engineer reports l 15 to the. superintendent.
l i 16 MR. EASTEN: So there are at least five levels. ,j 17 Your hands-on activities -- I assume you. oversee
! 18 the operations of a facility for a fixed period of time over 19 a given work month?
20 MR. MC KENDRICK: Correct. 't ,i. 21 MR. HASTEN: And you are at least five reporting l .i 22 levels away from the person who is in charge of the overall 23 operations of Duke Power nuclear? j 24 MR. MC KENDRICK: That's true. S I l) C 25 MR. HASTEN: Do you have any problems, from an t i
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- 9370 05 15 68 1 WRBbrb 1 internal management standpoint, with respect to your l 2 functioning consistent with the Duke Company's policy?
3 MR. MC KENDRICK: No, I don't. That might be
} {) 4 peculiar to my company, but I feel I could leave here this j 5 afternoon if I.had -- I assume that you're talking about a
?
d 6 problem that I don't feel I could get to the vice president 7 with. I feel I could leave here this afternoon and ec to i . 8 Mr. Tucker's office and be seen by him. J j 9 MR. HASTEN: In a situation in which there is a I
.l1 10 violation, or at least an alleged violation, who of those i
i 11 five levels of management are involved in the so-called 12 resolution of the alleged violation? j 13 MR. MC KENDRICK: I'm not real familiar with the
?
14 process, but I would think that Level IV's and V's would be (7 e 1 s 15 solved by station management; and anything that went above t { 16 that, it would be my guess that the vice president would be j:t 17 involved in those. lj 18 MR. RASTEN: There are no enforcement conferences l 19 or interaction with Nuclear Regulatory enforcement staff Il 20 when we're dealing with Level IV or V violations? i.( (( . !' 21 MR. MC KENDRICK: I can't speak to that. I've
. 22 never been to one, so I don't know.
23 MS. CYR: There can be for IV's, if they think 24 it's a particularly unusual problem, or it is repetitive or (,
\_) 25 something like that. They can have an enforcement f
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,f-9370 05 16 69 3 .1 WRBbrb 1 conference for Severity Level IV. ; 2 MR. DIVER: Have any higher level violations been j 3 detected on any of your shifts?
a j ('] - 4 MR. MC KENDRICK: Never on my shift. d.. 5 MR. DIVER: That's the right answer. M G DR. HENDRIE: How about McGuire? 7 MR. MC KENDRICK: In the last calendar year, we j, 8 have had some problems. We have had a number of Level IV
. 9 and Level V violations. We've had, I believe, three Level 1 10 III violations -- that might spill over back in to late 1
11 1983 -- and I believe we were assessed a civil penalty for 12 one of those Level III's. 13 MR. PARRIS: My question was directed in regard 14 to civil penalties. The Commission has been interested in
* \' 15 the past in the respective contributions of the residential 16 inspectors, NRC inspectors, versus your own inspectors. ]
17 This goes back to your point that civil penalties should not 10 be levied when the problem is self-identified and timely i 19 corrected by the utility.
- i Lt 20 Okay. Duke Power knowingly has been the fj
; . 21 recipient of some civil penalties. Of those civil i
22 penalties, would you say fifty percent were identified by 23 Duke and fifty percent by the residential inspectors, or 24 what?
- k. / 25 MR. MC KENDRICK: The three that I mentioned were
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i 9370 06 01 70 1 WRBbrb 1 all identified by Duke. They were all corrected by Duke,
; 2 some within a matter of minutes or hours. I don't believe
.i
- g. 3 our resident inspector had any function in that other than
- s '
4 to forward on the paperwork. They were obviously what could (
'1 3 5 be classified as Level III's.
h 6 MR. HASTEN: Do you consider the presence of a 4* l 7 resident inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission an
- j. 8 intrusion on the protective operations of your project?
1 11 N , 9 MR. MC KENDRICK: No. 10 MR. HASTEN: Would you suggest that we recommend
'; 11 removal of the.onsite. inspector?
'a j 12 MR. MC KENDRICK: Absolutely not. J 13 MR.' HASTEN: Then what positive influence,
] ,
14 assuming there are no negative ones -- or at least you b 15 haven't observed any -- what positive contributions do they
- j 16 make? -
i ti 17 MR. MC KENDRICK: Let's back up. I never said d j 18 that there weren't any negative influences of having them. 19 MR. !!ASTEN: Well, your recitation, your answer (. 20 to my question, did not indicate any negatives, so I'm going
'l
. 21 to assume, given the opportunity to respond to them l
; 22 negatively, that you would have. So I'm going to assume 1
l* 23 there aren't any, unless you tell me there are. j 24 MR. MC KENDRICK: I'd be glad to tell you, b_), I did not mean to imply that, just
) 25 because there ars. .]
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- w/
- d. 5 MR. MC KENDRICK: Good.
j' 6 On the positive side, there have been a number of it bi 7 cases where we have needed a person that we could talk te d 8 concerning interpretation of tech specs, someone that we h M 9 could use as a liaison with Region II, to say, "Here's the 4 lq j 10 way we see the spec. This is what we would like to do. Do f 11 you have any problem with that?"
- ) 12 Sometimes it goes no further than the site 0 13 inspector level because it's a case that he's familiar with j'
g 14 where some sort of precedent that's been set, and he said, b,, 15 "Yes, you can do that. It's been done in the past." ] 16 Sometimes it goes on to Region II. . 1 l 17 , Also, I think that there's a positive side to NRC n j 18 enforcement. It's necessary for the purpose that it was set si 'j 19 up for, which is safe operation of nuclear power plants. I a 20 think that the resident inspector's job is to aid the d* 21 utility in identifying problems and, if for whatever reason 22 they are straying away from the way things should be done, i 23 he's there to bring them back.
, 24 Now, the position has all these positive merits.
t 3 kil 25 I think you get into problems with personalities sometimes.
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9370 06 03 72 1 WRDbrb 1 We have had three or four different onsite inspectors while y 2 I've been at Duke. Some of them have been excellent. Some 9 3 of them have established a very good working relationship, 1 (h 4 and some of them haven't. Some of them have civen the F
%1 - ] 5 impression that any license events, LERs, that we report,
( 6 that it's their purpose there to try to turn that into a We
, .7 ' violation, to do everything they can to turn it into a O .[. S violation. ] 9' And those are the kind of things that just, 10 whether it's actual or just an implied attitude of the I
j' 11 people who work there, that's what causes a lot of morale .4 } l 12 problems. You feel like anything you bring up, the guy is LI [ 13 going to figure a way to steer it around into a Level IV or
-i 14 a Level V.
1 Q 15' MR. HASTEN: Is that a function of the rotation
'l 16 of onsite inspectors?
17 MR. MC KENDRICK: I don't know why they come and .
,! 18 ao. I don't know at all.
- t
'l j ~19 The one that we have now was at Oconee Nuclear 20 Station, which is another Duke station, prior to coming to F
j'. 21 McGuire. 22 , MR. PARRIS: Are you privy to any. enforcement j-* 23 conferences at Duke? The reason I ask the ouestion --
.l 24 MR. MC KENDRICK: No.
( 25 MR. PARRIS: There's a feelina that accd, honest, 1 s
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,, I WRBbrb 1 two-way communication would be an effective mechanism to j 2 address and resolve some of these problems. But the c.!
j 3 allegation has been made by some witnesses that those Ll ' 4 [sI (~h s :j e conferences sometimes deteriorate into a unilateral type of N 5 presentation, that the NRC's interrogator is the 4
]
U' 6 interrogator and offers no information, and you sit there l 7 and answer the question.
^]
r
. 8 Would you care to address the validity of that 9 allegation?
g 10 MR. MC KENDRICK: I have never attended an j 11 enforcement conference. I don't know that it would not be P 12 appropriate for first- or second'line management involved in
._]
1 13 a particular violation to be at that conference. d
,j ,
14 A lot of times, anything that is transferred by Ib 15 report or word of mouth gets distorted as it goes on up.
;t .
lI 16 And sometimes the final report and the reports that we j
] 1 17 receive back on an actual occurrence aren't anything like 4 18 what happened.
i
.j 19 MR. IIASTEN: How, you said you never had a 4
1 20 problem on your shift. But is a lack of attendance of
, 21 first- and second-line management, and I'm going to assume 5 22 that those hands-on people are first-line management --
23 their not being at enforcement conferences, is that a a 3 24 function of the NRC's invitations of who goes, or is it a
) 25 company policy as to who goes? How does one get invited to t
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c370 06 01 74 i 3 WRBeb 1 company policy as to who goes? How does one get invited to q 2 or attend an enforcement conference?
~?
d 3 MR. MC KENDRICK: Never having been invited, I d
~!
i (TT xy 4 really don't know. I would assume that the NRC asks for who i 3 5 they want to be at the conference. I don't know. 0 6 MR. HASTEN: Is that true?
.a 1"
; 7 MS AXCLRAD: We ask for a certain level of l
t i, 8 management but we don't say that we dcn't want the people fj 9 under them who are directly related to the viclation. In 4 10 some cases the actual operator or shift supervisor or 11 whoever it was that was involved in the violation will be 12 asked to attend. But the licensee can always bring whoever
?
l 13 they want. 14 MR. HASTEN: .There's no restrictions on who can c, i 15 attend? - i 16 MS. AXELRAD: No, not from the licensee. I~ 17 MR. HASTEUr Nor NRC policy. l
' 10 MR. MC KENDRICK: By way of example, one of the l
i 19 Level 3s that we had in the last year or so involved what 20 could be called a technical inoperability of the system. 4 21 The situation was the nuclear service water system, one .{. - 22 train was deenergized and red-tagged for maintenance. / . 23 Somebody came up to do some testing on the other i 24 train. The SRO in the control room declared the train that d .l. - (c%3/ 25 was going to be tested inoperable and placed it in the tech a i i t i i L .. . _ . . - . . . _ _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ . _
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7 a370 06 02 75 fj - 1 WREeb 1 spec. log, .and it was later discovered. I don't remember if
- i 2 it was a OA audit or what, but they saw at one time we had
{ , 3 both trains of nuclear service water declared inoperable. 4 Now if you go back to what you're actually trying (}} 5 to do, which is to protect-- And the problem there I
.1 Sl 6 believe was lack of cooling water for the diesel generators 4
ji
- 7 which would have been supplied by that-
-1 a
,. 8 If'you say well, what would have happened had you 9 had a blackout and needed that diesel generater, we would
-10 have had the diesel generator and cooling water within a 11 matter of minutes. The pump was running; it was just in a 12 test mode, so it was not set up to start in standby y
4 13 readiness like the operability statement says that it I 14 shculd. w . 15 f fR. NASTEN: I'm beginning to think that we had 16 better get the station blackout issue resolved. This is the 17 -third time we've heard.about station blackout problems. 3[l . y 18 MR. MC KENDRICKr My point is-- Aj DR. HENDRIEr 19 Dut the thing that is being
-20 described is characteristic of a broad run of tech. spec.
21- non-conformance incidents somd of which -- and then, i l 22 depending on how the thing get's driven and what people's 1 j'. 23 inclinations are, the resident, the people in the region, as 1 24 well as on the licensee's side, it may become the subject of
' ( 25 a significant violation or not.
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1 WRBeb 1 Mr. McKenrick's point is that if you needed -- j 2, that the point of the thing is plant safety; fundamentally 3 it's plant safety you're concerned with. If they had needed 4 the service water they could have had it from that train in
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g 5 a timely fashion. Sc, you knew, where was plant safety
.; 6 notably enhanced by running around making a bic deal out of 3*
J 7 this?
'l1, 8 Well, I don't kncw-- You knew, you could arcue 9 the merits. You could argue the other-side and say ecme on, 10 you know, we set up these definitions and everybody knows
; 11 about them. It isn't a secret. Everybody knows you are 12 supposed to have service water available.
13 MR. MC KENDRICK: The' point I was trying to make 14 by bringing that up was that by the time that thing -- that i (q i/ 15 incident had been written up and all the final reports 16 issued, it came out that we had two trains of nuclear 17 service water inoperable at the same time. If you look at 1 18 strictly that then it was a Level 3. bi $ 19 But had somebody that was actually there been at U l 20 the enforcement conference to offer an exp'lanation as to why j
, 21 it appeared that way in our tech, spec. action log, that b-22 might have had some bearing on the final determination.
)L 9
- 23 MR. HASTEN: Going back to my question of a 1.
- 3 24 moment ago, the lack of a person to make that explanation K
(f) 25 was not a product of the enforcement policy, as I i.
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r i . a370 06 04 77 j 1 WRBeb 1 understand. q j 2 MR. MC KENDRICK: I would agree with that.
- i
,1 3 MR. DIVER: You are licensed by the NRC as a
~
,.j .ca. 4 senior reactor operator?
- p. @
[]-; 5 MR. MC KENDRICK: Correct. l 6 MR. DIVER: Is that a lifetime license or is it a
,, a 7 periodically renewed license?
R] , 8 MR. MC KENDRICK: It is periodically renewed 9 every two years. The method of renewa'l is to have attended 10 consistently and on a regular basis an approved . r 11 requalification program. Every two years the NRC has the 12 right, I guess you would say, to reexamine you. ll 13 It is my understanding that region by region they 14 sort of rotate between the plants, constantly looking at I 15 their training programs to ensure that what we're getting.in 3 l 16 cur requal. training is enough to maintain the license. And i j 17 periodically they will.come on-site for -- annually. We q 18 have an annual review test that covers all the training 4 j i 19 we've had for the previous year. d 20 Periodically they will come and audit or give
;j j ,
21- that annual review. n . j n 22 MR. PARRIS: Does the requal. go the whole q.; d* 23 works, the written and oral examination? i 'l 9 24 MR. MC KENDRICK: That's my understanding. 11 N (h) 25 Normally we have net really an oral, we have the I
- t l
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- ak a370 06 05 78 j .1 WRDeb 1 simulator exam, and the written. That's our normal--
2 MR. PARRIS: They are introducing simulators
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3 where simulators are available. Some utilities don't have 4 simulators. { fi 5 MR. MC KENDRICK: Right. I was saying that is
.a.
6 what we have at Duke Power for our annual exam, whether the ( ,. 7 n g NRC is there or not.. If they come . it might involve an oral 8 exam also. y 9 MR. DIVER: Is the license specific to the plant, d 10 or do you carry the license with you as an individual? f 11 MR. MC KENDRICK: It is specific to the plant, il "i 12 and to the unit. We had to be reexamined for Unit 2 before il lj 13 it came on-1ine. 14 DR. HENDRIE: In order to carry a license on both
- r V 'G{E 15 units at a stat' ion, you train on both and you license on i
; 16 both individually. ;} 17 MR. DIVER: And you are examined by the company 18 avery two years, or by the NRC every two years?
v 19 MR. MC KENDRICK: So far we have not had an NRC y 20 audit of our annual exam. I think that is done on a i(i4 0 21 rotating basis. They don't go to every utility every year. Y ' 22 We anticipate they are coming to see us this year. 4
- d. 23 MR. DIVER: Okay. ,,
-} f y 24 And are your superiors, any of your superiors, ks' 25 licensed? t
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- j 3 MR. MC KENDRICK:
Yes. M;; - 4 MR. DIVER: And anyone above that level?
}
- 1
- - d 5 MR..MC KENDRICK: The assistant operating 6 engineer and the operating engineer, and the qualifications A.
7 for superintendent of operaticns are to hold or to have held k kl. H 8 a senior reactor operator's license.
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9 MR. DIVER: Thank you. u s 10 MR. PARRIS: The reason that it has to be k.f c. P 11 plant-specific is this is one of the prices we pay for not V
$} 12 having standardization of plants.
13 MR. DIVER: Yes, I assumed that.
,.t i 14 DR. HENDRIE: Are there other questions?
1 -v
', b 15 (No response.)
r! L 16 DR. HENDRIE: Thank you very much.
'l$
j 17 MR. MC KENDRICK: Thanks for havine me. t.-j y! 18 DR. HENDRIE: And our thanks to Duke for being 9 19 willing to let you out and send you down. 4 20 MR. MC KENDRICK: I will convey that. H . 21 MR. DIVER: I hope this wasn't your shift. a
, 22 MR. MC KENDRICK: No, it wasn't.
y
$ ' 23 MR. PARRIS: I identified Duke earlier as one of
%jj k 24 the examples of the very progressive companies. I think () 25 most of the utilities accept the fact that they are a
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-l ij c370 06 07 80 2 WRBeb 1 regulated industry. Then, depending on the management and ' .aj q 2 attitude, there are some plants that take progressive action n
7.l . 3 without waiting to be mandated to do it, and there are d - 3 4 others who don' t. [1 Lu y 5 And I think unfortunately scme of our better I j- 6 companies are paying for the sins of some of the less j, J 7 cooperative companies. 8 DR. HENDRIE: By the way, before you go, Howard f 9 reminds me of sort of a general question. I 10 I presumed from your comments you're talking in i)l 9 11 general about the NRC residents, that there is a positive D 12 side to that. I took it that you do feel that there ought a jk 13 to be an NRC enforcement program, bl 'l 14 MR. MC KENDRICK: Absolutely. k2 15 DR. HENDRIE: What we're talking about here is [1 16 how to make it work better.
}
17- MR. MC KENDRICK: Yes. I don't think there is e, h 18 any way you can just dissolve the whole system. I think the I. 19 guidelines that are set up by 10 CFR 2 right now are 20 probably pretty close to adequate. There might be scme
, 21 changes that need to be made, but I think the problem is 3s 22 interpretation in vague areas.
kf- 23 If you go in there and read the descriptions of 24 Category 1 through 5 violations and take your violation and (1, 25 try to figure out where it fits in there, it is awfully I a
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- j 2 WRBab 1 vague, especially the different between 4 and 5.
3
- ) 2 MR. PARRIS: I did think of one other question.
v ' 3 In the area of tech. specs., I think even NRC y j e, 4 agrees that some of the tech. specs. were practically 1 (3
, :, 5 unintelligible and they are in need of update and they are n
l] g 6 hoping to do that, but it is a time-consuming process. N* 7 But do you feel that any of the Violation 5s, in f i
, 8 particular violations of tech. specs., are
- s
- 9 non-safety-related? We have heard that judgment expressed, 10 that some of these things are not safety-significant. Do 11 you have any feel for that?
f, 12 MR. MC KENDRICK: Tech. spec. violations that are i ti 13 not-- t 14 MR. PARRIS: Well, just tech. specs. themselves, ud 15 that some of the tech. specs. are not really safety-related. j 16 - MR. MC KENDRICK: Yes, I think we've got quite a 17 few of those. Let me put it this way:
-}
j 18 I have thought that over the years as I would 2 j 19 flip through there and see some of them. Right off-hand
'j 20 none of them really come to mind, but I have had that o
21 feeling in looking at some of them.
- i. I 22 MR. PARRIS: Thank you.
. 23 MR. HASTEN: Who drafts the tech. specs.
24 originally? () 25 MS. CYN: The utility proposes tech. specs. based' .o <J '.j t . . _ - . ,__ _ _
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a370 06 09 82 3 WRDeb 1 cn the plant design. However, the NRC reviews them and may
; 2 change them around, and it becomes sort of a negotiation 3 process I think.
4 Also there are now standardized tech specs. 2 (~ . . 5 which we have published as a reg. guide for particular 6 plants which they sort of start with as the framewcrk for
; 7 what areas need to be covered, and then the utility changes ri
, 8 those to fit their particular plant configurations.
,i
. 9 DR. HENDRIE: But ultimately they are issued by 10 the NRC as part of the license. They are Appendix A to the 4
e 11 license. 12 MR. HASTEN: But in their initial form they are 13 drafted by the utility, assuming the process of 14 modifications? k i- 15 DR. HENDRIE: Yes. 16 MS. AXELRADs, For new plants, essentially it i 17 follows the standard tech, spec., which is a document we 18 have drafted. 19 DR. HENDRIE: Okay, sir. Thank you very much. jt 20 MR. MC KENDRICK: Thanks again. .]
.- 21 DR. HENDRIE: The Committee will return to its ; 22 discussions of the utline of the report.
23 (Whereupen, at 1:47 p.m., the Committee recessed t 24 to executive session.) i ^' s t' 25 e t 'I q _ .. - -
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. . . . . - :-- w :2: .:: : . ux CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
,7 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before d k j, the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF .i ,4 ENFORCEMENT POLICY d ' I s ,1
- t i 4
DOCKET NO.: . PLACE: BETHESDA, MARYLAND
. DATE: TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1985 i
- l were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
t 2
- j
- (sigt) _
j (TYPED) 2 . WILLIAM R. BLOOM Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. j' Reporter's Affiliation J .
- .. a i
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. .i . m , . u . -. m :__.___._. _______. . :_._-_ . _ _ _ _ _
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ~
}}
J' l}
- lJ] =J1 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 1000.9D 10/18/82 3
88 SUBJ: ENFORCEMENT POLICY s' l. PURPOSE. This order dets forth the agency's policy concerning enforcement of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, the Federal Aviation Regulations, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and the regulations issued thereunder as they apply to the transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by air.
- 2. DISTRIBUTION. This order is distributed to the Office of the Associate Administrator for Airports, to the branch level in the Office of Flight Operations, Office of Airworthiness, Office of Civil Aviation Security, Office of Airport Standards, and the Air Traffic Service; to the branch level in the regional Flight Standards, Air Traffic, Airports, Aircraft Certification, and Civil Aviation Security Divisions; to the director level in the overseas area offices; to all Airports District Offices, Air
( Traffic Field Offices, International Aviation Field Offices, Civil Aviation Security Field Offices; and to all General Aviation, Air Carrier, Manufacturing Inspection, and Flight Standards District Offices, and International Field Offices.
- 3. CANCELLATION. Order 1000.9C is cancelled.
- 4. STATUTORY BACKGROUND.
- a. Under the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary of Transportation is charged with broad responsibility for ragulating safety in air commerce. The Secretary's powers and duties in this regard, as well as the functions vested in the i
Secretary by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act insofar as it governs transportation of hazardous materials by air, are exercised by the Administrator pursuant to Section 6(c)(1) of the Department of Transportation Act and Sections 1.47(a) and (k) of the Regulations of the Office of the Secretary. l j l I 1 Distribution: A-WRP-1; A-W (F0/AT/AS/CS/WS)-3 A-X (FS/AT/AS/CS)-3fnitiated By: AGC-200 A-FAS-0; A-E-1; A-FAS-1; A-FAT-0; A-FIA-0; A-FCS-1 (Ltd); A-FFS-1, 2, 3, 5, 7 (Ltd); ZGC-343;FAC-0(Ltd)
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-i 10/18/82 j 1000.9D i
- b. In carrying out his responsibilities under the Federal 1: Aviation Act, the Administrator is required under Section 103 to 5
consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest: i (.1 ) The regulation of air commerce in such a manner as
]
to best promote its development and safety. [(,1 (2) The promotion, encouragement, and development of
~
civil aeronautics.
^
- c. Statutory methods provided for enforcing the requirements of the Act and the regulations prescribed
.! thereunder include: amendment, suspension, and revocation of -
lj certificates (section 609); civil and criminal penalties ij4 (sections 901, 902); aircraft seizures (Section 903); judicially enforceable orders (section 1007); and investigations and other ol ' acts deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act (Section 313). Regulations governing the transportation of hazardous materials by air are enforceable by means of civil and criminal penalties, orders directing compliance, and equitable
?. judicial relief (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, d Sections 109, 110 and 111).
5I
. d. The Federal Aviation Act (Section 601) recognizes the
'd duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with ej the highest possible degree of safety. In enacting the Airline il Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress declared as being in the public interest:
"the prevention of any deterioration in established 5))
safety procedure, recognizing the clear intent, encturagement, and dedication of the Congress to the V:.;1 futtherance of the highest degree of safety in air a transportation and air commerce, and the maintenance of
, the safety vigilance that has evolved within air Lj transportation and air commerce and has come to be expected by the travelling and shipping public."
j Federal Aviation Act, Section 102(a)(2). 'l gi 5. GENERAL POLICIES.
~
il g a. The central mission of the agency is the promotion of ,. ; safety in air commerce. Its accomplishment requires that all - .2 members of the aviation community have the highest possible
$i awareness of the Federal Aviation Regulations and r'espect for
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10/18/82 1000.9D
, b. In carrying out his responsibilities under the Federal Aviation Act, the Administrator is required under Section 103 to consider the following, among other things, as being in the d public interest:
1 y (el) The regulation of air commerce'in such a manner as to best promote its development and safety.
.i (2) The promotion, encouragement, and development of P> ,
civil aeronautics.
- c. Statutory methods provided for enforcing the
?'
requirements of the Act and the regulations prescribed Y* thereunder include: amendment, suspension, and revocation of 1
" certificates (section 609); civil and criminal penalties (Sections 901, 902); aircraft seizures (Section 903); judicially enforceable orders (section 1007); and investigations and other acts deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act (Section 313). Regulations governing the transportation of hazardous materials by air are enforceable by means of civil and criminal penalties, orders directing compliance, and equitable judicial relief (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Sections 109, 110 and 111).
- d. The Federal Aviation Act (Section 601) recognizes the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety. In enacting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress declared as being in the public interest:
o "the prevention of any deterioration in established safety procedure, recognizing the clear intent, '1 encouragement, and dedication of the Congress to the cj. furtherance of the highest degree of safety in air
~j transportation and air commerce, and the maintenance of
- j the safety vigilance that has evolved within air F+- transportation and air commerce and has come to be fd expected by the travelling and shipping public."
j- Federal Aviation Act, Section 102(a)(2). i e
- 5. GENERAL POLICIES.
- a. The central mission of the agency is the promotion of q ,. safety in air commerce. Its accomplishment requires that all 1
members of the aviation community have the highest possible awareness of the Federal Aviation Regulations and respect for l-l l l, JE g o, p Page 2 Par 4 l g... __ .. _ _ . . ~ _ __ _,_ __ _,___.s ,
p:. .a.. . : .. ~w - .. a w a a .. .a . . . :, - 10/18/82 1000.9D the system by which they are enforced. The ultimate goal of the ( Administrator's enforcement policy is to prevent the occurrence of violat. ions, a goal that is primarily achieved through education compliance. and counselling designed to encourage voluntary j b.:. Where methods for achieving voluntary compliance f ail, I violations must be addressed consistently, fairly, and in a manner that reasonably serves the purpose of deterring future g; . violations. Toward those ends, the following policies shall be followed:
.1 j* (1) All reports of violations shall be promptly and L. i d thoroughly investigated.
d* j (2) All stages of enforcement investigations and legal or administrative actions shall be completed in a timely manner. l
-3 .
(3) Surveillance of regulated activities shall be
.j conducted as needed and appropriate to assure compliance with 4 the regulations, with particular vigilance over commercial 1 operations in accordance with the Congressional mandate to q maintain the highest degree of safety in air transportation and n air commerce.
l (4) Agency personnel responsible for investigation or enforcement shall, in their relations with other members of the 3 y (- aviation community, strive to be fair, objective, and courteous and shall carry out their responsibilities in a professional j A manner without favoritism or officiousness.
) (5) Enforcement investigative reports shall contain
't complete accounts of known circumstances surrounding the violations alleged, including all known mitigating or aggravating factors. (6) Enforcement sanctions, both administrative and legal, are to be applied as evenhandedly as possible and shall be consistent with the provisions of this order.
- c. Sanctions. The enforcement program is to be j , administered firmly, fairly, and consistently. No violation should go unredressed. Nor, however, should enforcement action be taken for the sake of punishment alone. Where a violation is e inadvertent or a first offense by a relatively inexperienced Par 5 Page 3 e w, 5 r- 4 --e-
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2 1000.9D 10/18/82 individual and no serious compromise of safety is involved, administrative action (Warning Notice or Letter of Correction)
; is usually appropriate, as discussed in paragraph 5d. On the 2
other hand,'~ repetitive or deliberate violations and violations which significantly compromise safety should be addressed a swiftly with the full force of appropriate legal enforcement 1 action, taking into account the applicable factors enumerated in d paragraph Se. In short, the sanction should fit the offense. J
- d. Administrative Action. Where a violation does not require legal enforcement action, a Warning Notice or Letter of e Correction may be issued as provided in FAR S 13.11. .
.i
- j; Administrative action is not to be taken solely as a matter of convenience or where evidence to support a finding of a
- violation is lacking. Administrative action may be taken in
- lieu of legal action only when all of the following elements are .
j present: n' - (1) No significant unsafe condition existed. l t (2) Lack of competency or qualification was not d involved. 4
}3 (3) The violation was not deliberate.
j (4) The alleged violator has a constructive attitude
} toward complying with the regulations.
l
- e. Legal Action. Appropriate legal action will be taken in 4
cases which do not meet all of the criteria for administrative action. In determining the appropriate type and measure of sanction to be applied, the following factors shall be taken
- d. into account, as applicable:
i
- j (1) The nature of the violation and whether deliberate.
1 1 (2) The potential or actual hazard to the safety of e 1 others created by the violation. H 1 (3) The certificate holder's level of experience and responsibility. !I ' l (4) The violator's history of previous violation *s.
-1 4:
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1000.9D 10/18/82 individual and no serious compromise of safety is involved,
' administrative action (Warning Notice or Letter of Correction) is usually appropriate, as discussed in paragraph 5d. On the other hand,'~ repetitive or deliberate violations and violations which significantly compromise safety should be addressed swiftly with the full force of appropriate legal enforcement t
action, taking into account the applicable factors enumerated in paragraph 5e. In short, the sanction should fit the offense.
- d. Administrative Action. Where a violation does not
'! ' require legal enforcement action, a Warning Notice or Letter of i j, Correction may be issued as provided in FAR S 13.11.
' Administrative action is not to be taken solely as a matter of convenience or where evidence to support a finding of a
~ violation is lacking. Administrative action may be taken in lieu of legal action only when all of the following elements are
; present:
l (1) No significant unsafe condition existed. (2) Lack of competency or qualification was not
! involved.
4 (3) The violation was not deliberate. (4) The alleged violator has a constructive attitude
, toward complying with the regulations.
- e. Legal Action. Appropriate legal action will be taken in
; cases which do not meet all of the criteria for administrative ! action. In determining the appropriate type and measure of j sanction to be applied, the following factors shall be taken
] into account, as applicable: j' . (1) The nature of the violation and whether deliberate. (2) The potential or actual hazard to the safety of others created by the violation. l'i (3) The certificate holder's level of experience and responsibility. (4) The violator's history of previous violations, a i 8) i Page 4 Par 5 2
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l_"^'~' .m. " " . .- .iE ' J ., . . . 10/18/82 1000.9D (5) The violator's attitude. t (6) 7he certificate holder's use of the certificate. J (71 The need for special deterrent action in a
.] particular regulatory area or segment of industry. ;l (8) Action taken by the certificate holder's employer.
(9) The impact of a proposed sanction on the violator and its value as a deterrent to others similarly situated. (10) The range of sanctions previously upheld for 3 4 similar violations in NTSB and court cases. I< f. Publicity. Individual enforcement cases may be i publicized only when such publicity will significantly serve the goals of the enforcement program and only in a manner that will reasonably protect an alleged violator's right to due process and fair treatment. News releases disclosing such cases shall be made in accordance with paragraph 1301 of Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program.
- 6. RESPONSIBILITY.
i
- a. Cooperation and Communication Within FAA.
-1
( (1) All offices and services, including those which do not have primary responsibility in the enforcement program, shall assist in the execution of the program. Any agency employee who becomes aware of an apparent violation, or an fj i apparent lack of qualification on the part of any person subject 't to the regulations, must provide the responsible agency element with information concerning the violation or lack of qualification. All agency personnel should also cooperate with any further investigation and provide testimony as required.
; (2) Air traffic control personnel at centers, towers, and flight service stations are in a unique position to observe
~
apparent violations or lack of qualification of airmen. i; Therefore, air traffic personnel shall provide the appropriate L. ' FAA element with factual information concerning such incidents as soon as permitted by their air traffic control responsibilities but, in any event, not later than 24 hours after becoming aware
, of the incident.
I' _v t' l. l? v b
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1000.9D . 10/18/82 (3) To assure the highest possible degree of coordination and consistency in carrying out the enforcement program, elements of the agency engaged in investigation or prosecution.of enforcement cases shall maintain communication with other af fected :by' elements such cases. whose responsibilities are or may be 3
- b. Surveillance. It is the responsibility of Aviation i
Safety Inspectors, Airport Certification Safety Inspectors, and Civil Aviation Security Inspectors to conduct surveillance 1 inspections of persons, aircraft, or operations subject to the 'a regulations lack to determine compliance with the regulations and any of qualifications. 3 c. Investigations. It is the responsibility of Aviation Safety Inspectors, Airport Certification Safety Inspectors, and - Civil Aviation Security Inspectors to conduct appropriate q 1 investigations of all known or reported violations of the regulations.
- d. Determination of Type of Enforcement Action.
'l The supervisor of the lowest operational field office of Flight ' Standards, Aircraft Certification, Airports, or Civil Aviation i Security, appropriate to the violation involved, will decide tl whether, subject to the criteria set out in paragraph 6, compliance may best be obtained through administrative action or through legal enforcement action. h e. Determination of Legal Enforcement Action.
; The determination of the specific type of action to be initiated will be the product of a joint determination by Flight Standards, Aircraft Certification, Airports, or Civil Aviation Security personnel and legal counsel. When agreement cannot be reached, the matter will be referred to the regional director for decision. Where appropriate, the regional director shall - consult with the Chief Counsel and the appropriate service director. -
Legal Handling.
, f.
It is the responsibility of the legal counsel to undertake all handling of legal enforcement actions. Regional counsel shall apprise the office of the Chief Counsel
- of all significant or.potentially significant enforcement cases as early as possible and, in any event, prior'to taking formal legal action.
- l o
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- Page 6 Par 6 a .
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.1000.9D '
10/18/82 (3) To assure the highest possible degree of coordination and consistency in carrying out the enforcement program, elements of the agency engaged in investigation or
- i' prosecution.of enforcement cases shall maintain communication
- j with other affected :by' elements such cases. whose responsibilities are or may be
? '
u
- b. Surveillance. It is the responsibility of Aviation i
. Safety Inspectors, Airport Certification Safety Inspectors, and Li Civil Aviation Security Inspectors to conduct surveillance inspections of persons, aircraft, or operations subject to the
] regulations to determine compliance with the regulations and any
?
lack of qualifications.
- c. Investigations.
It is the responsibility of Aviation
" Safety Inspectors, Airport Certification Safety Inspectors, and Civil Aviation Security Inspectors to conduct appropriate 1 investigations of all known or reported violations of the 1 regulations.
1 -
] .
- d. Determination of Type of Enforcement Action. The supervisor of the lowest operational field office of Flight '
a Standards, Aircraft Certification, Airports, or Civil Aviation ej Security, appropriate to the violation involved, will decide 1 whether, subject to the criteria set out in paragraph 6, j~ compliance through legal may best be obtained enforcement action. through administrative action or '~ .q' e. Determination of Legal Enforcement Action.
, The
, determination of the specific type of action to be initiated 4: . will be the product of a joint determination by Flight Standards, Aircraft Certification, Airports, or Civil Aviation Security personnel and legal counsel. When agreement cannot be
, j! i reached, for decision. the matter will be referred to the regional director j Where appropriate, the regional director shall j consult with the Chief Counsel and the appropriate service director. -
-- i . f. Legal Handling. .I It is the responsibility of the legal counsel to undertake all handling of legal enforcement actions. ] :
Regional counsel shall apprise the Office of the Chief Counsel 'I of all significant or potentially significant enforcement cases J5 as legal early action.as possible and, in any event, prior to taking formal
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. 10/18/82 1000.9D
- g. Sanctions. Flight Standards, Aircraft Certification,
( Airports, Civil Aviation Security, and Legal Counsel are responsible for the selection of sanctions. Sanctions should be as uniform as possible but of paramount importance is the 1 tl requireme.nt'that the sanction selected in each case be sufficient to. serve as a deterrent. Settlement may be entered into by legal counsel when, in his or her judgment, such action ill
.1 willavo{dunnecessarylitigationandiswarrantedbythefacts.
i h. Review by Regional Offices. All actions taken by field
! personnel will be reviewed by appropriate regional division y managers or their designees to ensure fair and equal treatment e
and provide assurance that action taken will serve to promote safety and protect the public interest. The regional division
'l manager will ensure that their enforcement program, as well as d
1- any individual enforcement action, is handled in accordance with
~i this order and will periodically provide the investigating
? office with the status of enforcement actions investigated by that office. Regional offices will advise their counterparts in Washington of significant, enforcement activities.
- i. Review by Washington Headquarters. The Offices of the l Chief Counsel, Airport Standards, Flight Operations, j
' Airworthiness, and Civil Aviation Security will monitor and evaluate regional enforcement procedures to ensure adherence to -; this policy and consistent enforcement nationally. They will advise me of any deficiencies or discrepancies and will
( undertake any special investigative or enforcement action that I direct.
- 7. REGIONAL DIRECTORS' PARTICIPATION. The enforcement program l is of such importance and sensitivity that regional directors are to be personally informed of the progress of the program in Dj their regions and shall review all major cases.
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N YW ij J. Lynn Helms ' !] Administrator i , 6 i ,. r N d(L i Par 7 Page 7 (and 8) 1 u,_ _ _ _ _ __ _.. - _ ._
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