ML20126A709

Forwards Listed ABWR ITAAC Sections & Response to NRC Questions & Comments on Sys

ML20126A709
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	12/08/1992
From:	Louison R GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C NRC
References
NUDOCS 9212210192
Download: ML20126A709 (107)

Text

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2.5.6 Fuel Storage F::"'t; EAcxs _/1 V Storage racks are required for the temporary and long term stomge of fuel and associated equipment. S:cmgc .;y he ch'T wet r-drf, +p-!!ag up - S T

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Q n\\ctl($ Et(MWALENf " Design Descriptfor: F::l ::::; R::!:: Te> 13s4 COLLS Racks provide storage for spent fuelin the Spent Fuel Storage Poo 'n the Reactor Building. The ocks are top loading, with fuel bail extende above the -rd # rack, crd :hdf have a minidYim/apacity of 270% of the reactor cort. The rack design precludes the possibility of criticality under nonnal or abnormal conditions and maintains a subcriticality of at least 5% Ak. The rack arrangement and design prevents accidentalinsertion of fuel between aujacent racks and provides adegt 100t !" 2T. The racks are a _m,e wgtgflow to prevent the water from exceeding .. _..j.1 :: n - c9:7 *~ 2 r_d Seismic Category I. The mcks are r- '" componen/p*H"; 2 p%e efety E :.ci _ WAAD AAG bE.s(GUG.D TO &fFET6 A'GMT&b As ME CDDE, Gm;g,, ?.'.. r.. :::::;; ?::!: The new fuel and spent fuel stomge racks are the same type rack in desi (3 construction and height. The new fuel storage racks are loca a vmit. The U . vault is a pit in the refueling floor that is fitted .cial cover which is in place when ever fuelis not being r e depth of the pit is such that, when fuelis racked, the b ' '. ow the cover's plane. The pit is constmcted the same as the s - e pool except that it contains a Nu and is maintained dry. uel storage racks store approximately 40% of one full core fuel load. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.6 provides a definition of the inspection, tests, and/or analyses and associated acceptance criteria.which will be undertaken for the fuel storage racks. m 2.5.6 1-6/1/92

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documents and the Code sta s on the Seismic Catego uality Group on the components.' components confirms the structure require commensurate with its y g ygf5 gftc gg pgjfopfep p and components ve.been designed, scation. 1GT6ftst46 ftfG Af4KIMLf H 76M/E44N8ZC analyzed, f cated and examined in - 7 'f WATGiltAl Tt+G s(G4 fqGL fool. accof ce with the applicable unrements. h of usy rust sT:>oce. pustno,33, . as,asrecyc_o, c a paci r f E ris 75, ] a I f l u 4

ABWR oulun 0:cument 2.10 Power Cycle - 2.10.1 Turbine Main Steam System Design Description The Main Steam (MS) System (Figure 2.10.1) supplies steam generated in the reactor to the turbine. This Tier 1 entry addresses that portion of the MS System that ranges between, Imt41oemm+t4neh:de, the antermouemtainment4*4atim+- whmd-the-tmbi r +:p v.4ves but does not include. the seismic restmint downsittam or the outermost containment isolation valves and the turbine stop_ vah es, The MS System is not required to effect or support safe shutdown of the reactor or to perform in the operation of rector safety features; however, the MS System is designed: (1) To a*np!y ith applisch'e reder and r n-d^rd humler-to-accommodate operational stresses such as internal pressure and dynamic loads without sk-of fielures, and consequ-ia! eksv,e+of-nWoasevi:y m exces efibe e :nb!!"'ei regu'c:arydimiw (2) Te ccc:nmodate nenr n! rnd abno. a! er iranmer:21"r+. Provide a leakage path to the main condensers under seismic conditions. Te assure :b-> r ih:re cf non Se! mic O:rgerj ! equipr'en: c-G) n un:r =, or pipe.e:ucb c-breah : : 'dgb c; r:cdem: piping 4n4he-MF 4" ~'t prec'ude-func:!cr ng ef ca e:y r+:ed equ:pmentw-i r an:cn.:n in tbe @: 1 (3) With suitable access to permit in-service testing and inspections. The MS System main steam piping consists of four lines from the seismic restraint _outh ard ain ::er-!!ne i c! :!cr Ae: to the main turbine stop vahes. The header arrangement upstream of the turbine stop valves allows them to be tested on-line with minimum load reduction and also supplies steam to the power cycle auxiliaries, as required. - The MS System is cuality croup D not safety related. Inspections, Tests,. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria. Table 2.10.1 pro,.U ; a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with assoaated acceptance criteria which sill be undertaken for the MS - System. I 2.10 -1 11/23/92 .-.-.-,-s-..

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a ABWR D: sign 0: cum:nt wac4er-buiklings,-T4d+pm4knw.f-t h*pipi ng4uo ial yml4aral yna ndc-effee trJron e (g) p+stulatedevents-andwifety/rWief."r diw4uuges v Thewahwsygenyd;dng4wnalymd4m-watw ha nmie+-hwluhat-exiki-ydentially4esult-hom-antidpatwl4ketmm4ents, Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.2a provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, ) together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the CF System. I Main Condenser Evacuation System Design Description Emwulem.ab!e ga er ':e :#mowd4emiethe-power +yde4+y-tIhe Main Condenser Evacuation (MCE) System (Figure 2.10.2b). The MGFrSygem removes the hydrogen and oxygen produced by the radiolysis of water in the reactor, and other power cycle noncondensable gases, and exhausts them to the offgas system during plant power operation, and to the turbine building compartment exhaust system at the beginning of each startup. O) (y The MCE System does not serve er support any safety function and has no safety design basis. The MCE System is designed to Quality Group D, Noneaf ty Related t The MCE System consists of-two !MW capaci:y, double +tage of redundant r steamjet air ejectors (SJAE) units (comp'ete with4nteremdense$ for power plant operation, and a mechanical vacuum pump for use during startup. The-kv+ stage of the SJAE unit-imormally-impmtica andahwaher I : : candby, Steam supply to the =cend nage ejer cr SIAE is maintained at a minimum specified flow rate to ensure adequate dilution of the hydrogen and prevent the offgas from reaching the flammable limit of hydrogen. Steam pressure and Sc c. :: cc:rthueoue4y-moistored e :d contro!!ed in the ejector steandsupply 'ir Redundant-preuaueemtre!! r: re ne c.teangweware-at-the-seso wi+tage4alet and medu' ate the-steanesupply-cc-tre! =h= upstmm ef the at: ejector:. 'he ::eam Oc-tensmitters precide :nputs-te !cgic deviserAThese- !cgit devics-provide for %:ing the e rgas gs.r7 _.i:e 757 egec 3,,m;;_,n_a. r two em: cf three !cgic, c.Should the steam flow drop below acceptable limits for g offgas-stream dilution,-the Off-cas Svstem will be isolated. '~] The vacuum pump exhaust stream is discharged to the turbine building compartment exhaust system which provides for radiation monitoring of the 2.10.2 12/4/92

x ABWR 0: sign Documcat ,x - 2.10.2 Condensate Feedwater and Condansate Air Extraction System The Condensate Feedwater and Condensate Air Extraction System (CEFM consists of two subsystems, the Condensate and FeedwaterICF) System and the . Main Condenser Evacuation System (MCES).- Condensate and Feedwater System Design Description The function of the Goudemassmi-Feedwate 46F) (Figure 2.10.2a) System is to receive condensate from the condenser hotwells, supply condensate to the cleanup system, and deliver high-purky feedwater to the reactor at the :equ::ed. n h m e, pwmac,ami-tempemtmw Condensate is pumped from the main condenser hotwell by the condensate pumps, passes through the feedwater heaters to the feedwater pumps, and then is pumped through the high piessure heaters to the nuclear Steam Supply System. The CF System boundaries cmklemi-here extend from the main condenser outlet to (but not including) the e+eomt.iudatimwvalve seismic restraint outside the containment and downstream of the currmost isolation valve. The CF System consists of the piping, valves, heat exchangers, controls and - instrumentation, and the associated equipment and subsystems which supply the reactor with heated feedwater in a closed steam cycle utilizing regenerative feedwater heating. The CF System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety design basis. System analyses show that failure of this system cannot compromise any safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown.- The CF System is desivned to cuality Group D non-safety related. htiens of the tyder. that are mdicactive-durk:g ope = tier me 6:e'!ed v%- acce= cent:c' fc nspestions Irakage 1: r'ir:-!:ed with 9?ed cor-t- :cde:. =ed +erever p acticable. -Relief discharges and operating vents are channeled through closed systems. Opemtional system redundancy is provided with respect to feedwater heaters, pumps, or control valves by using multi 4tring arrangements and provisions' for isolating and bypassing equipment and sections of the system. The majority of the condensate and feedwater piping crnsidered !" th! cecdcr is located within the turbine building which contains no safety-related 2 equipment or systems. The-ponier Ma cornec : to !he secomi-i+:. + m:tade t' cc:aaimnent ' 'eca:ed-in-tim, team-tmme! bewee:v+he turb:ne and 2.10.2-1 12/4/92

.e i ABWR D: sign occument rm system effluents prior to their release to the monitored vent stack and the 'd atmosphere. l i The vacuum pump is tripped and its discharge valve is closed upon receiving a main steam high-high mdiation signal. ] Inspections, Tests, Analyses anc: Acceptance Criteda l Table 2.10.2b provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the AfCE System. d i l l-l l l' ('} I i i 2.10.2 12/4/92

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U V Table 2.10.2b: Main Condenser Evacuation System P u Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria & The-off-gas-wihprevented from- & Te ::: "! be condeoted ucing time! ted A Confirmation that the cyctem !:c!:::: - reaching +45ammab! !!mit of hydrogen, signalste4hc SJ.^ E f!cre co-trotsystenw before U mmeSiity "-ite erweashed, 1 On low steam flow Off-aas System 1 Tests will be conducted usina simulated

1. Isolation valve closes on receiot of

( ispigigs signals for low steam flow simulated sional. A Rad +oastwweleace v " be-maintained-1 Testsw+11-be4onduc+ed using4knt* lated-A Confkmstion4hei *he cyc+r - ice!:te: :: 3 withimestablished44mits. segnais-to-the venuum pump 4 solation-requiredw4+mit4:! :::c. cyctem. L One hiah radiation sianal vacuum oumo 1 Tests will be conducted usina simulated

1. Vacuum oumo trios and discharae valve trios and discharoe valve closes, sianals for hiah radiation closes.

1 A.sunplifichonfiguration for the MCE

1. Construction records will be reviewed and 1 The as-built confiouration of the MCE-System _is described in Section 2.10.2.

Visual inspections will be conducted for the System is in accordance with the_ configuration of the MCE System. descriotion in Section 2.101 h E hd u u

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_---w,-- s Pu MAIN CONDENSER i-g i CONDENSATE PUMPS S TO REACTOR SEISMIC ~~~~" RESTRAINT HIGH FEEDWATER LOW CONDENSATE PRESSURE PUMPS PRESSURE PURIFICATION HEATERS HEATERS SYSTEM (2.10.4) j Figure 2.10.2a Condensate and Feedwater System 2-

N o io VACUUM PUMP TURBINE H X > BUILDING EXHAUST STEAM JET TO OFF GAS AIR SYSTEM ~M FROM MAIN EJECTOR A CONDENSER g y q' DILUTION STEAM STEAM JET TO OFF GAS y 4 AIR SYSTEM N EJEC' TOR B DILUTION STEAM e Figure 2.10.2b Main Condenser Evacuation System , o;

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s. ABWR 0:sion 0:cument 2.10,4 Condensate Purification System Design Description The Condensate Punfication (CP) System purifies and treats the condensate m-requ: red to maintain reactor feedwater purity, using filtration to remove insoluble solids comw4cn p cd=t, ion exchange to remove soluble solids frorr. condenser leakage and other impurities, and water treatment additions to maimiae reduce corrosion / erosion releases in the power cycle. The CP System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety design basis. The CP System is designed to Quality Group D non-safety-related standards. The CP System consists of full flow high efliciency paniculate filters followtd by full flow deep bed demineralizers. Shie! ding ! p:e ded fer 6: CP Sy-:::n, Vent gases and other wastes from the CP Systen, are collected in radiation controlled areas and sent to the radwaste system for treatment and/or disposal. The CP System is located in the 4Iurbine bBuildingn a-d piping c equipmmi-fa!!=-- d!! nc: a" :: p!=: de:y. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.4 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the CP System. f 2.10.4- -1 11/20S 2 t w _...-..r y-2.-

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l ABWR oosign Docum:nt 2.10,7 Main Turbine -s N-Design Description The main Turbine Genemtor (TG) System converts the energy in steam from the nuclear steam supply system into electrical energy. The TG System does not sene nor support any safety function and has no safety design basis. However, the TG System is a potential source of high energy missiles that could damage safety related equipment or structures. The TG Sptem is designed to prevent overspeed and thus mhnndre Irdusing. the pouibility of high energy missile generation from TG System moving parts. The following comtent ittilnuntniation. conitsluindralying redundancies .ue employed to guard against overspeed: (1) Main stop valvec (MSWControl valves (CW DISVs trip l;Cys_ Inodulatet (2) Intermediate stop valves / Intercept valves (CIVs) ICIVs tript (3) Primary speed control / Backup speed control. L ) ' 4) Fast acting solenoid valves / Emergency trip fluid system (ETS). (5) Speed control /Overspeed trip / Backup overspeed trip. Temr>erature. pressure andapeed indications, as well as overspeed alarm arr_ provided in the main control room. The TG System is enclosed within the (Iurbine bBuilding, which contains no safety-related equipment or structures. The turbine genemtor is onentated within the turbine building to be inline with the rEeactor and eControl bBuildings to minimin reduce the potential for any high energy TG System generated missiles from damaging any safety-related equipment or structures. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.7 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the TG System. g] iv 2.10.7 -1 11/23/92

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.4 i -s ABWR ossion Docum:nt 2.10.9 Turbine Gland Steam System Design Description The Turbine Ghmd Scaling (TGS) System (Ficure 2.10.9) prevents the escape of radioactive steam from the turbine shaft / casing penetrations and valve stems and prevents air inleakage through subatmospheric turbine glands. The TGS System consists of a sealing steam pressure regulator, sealing steam header, a gland steam condenser, with two full capacity exhaust blowers, and the. associated piping, valves and instrumentation. The TGS System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety des.ign bas.is. _3 The TGS System is designed to Quality Group D standards pon-safetv-relatcIL The cute portier of a!! g!ande ef the :mMre -d main : ra-.che:ir.conrec:ed. to4he gla-d -: a, mrd-- er, vehi<-h imaintained-a: a !!gb:,n ru-by the. u er Du %g p5-: opera:!cn, th glam! ceam conde=rr and ene-exhaur:er c ef t'- e se ir-:a!!ed !T% capacity-motorwiriven bk <;e::, are in ep ra:im>,-T4*e-e*hauster bleveer te the :mbine4mildinpunpanment e &a=::yce, enh:er: strear' is continucedy r'erhered pic- :o-b?ng diccFerged. During noma! cprn> tion 4he stea-' e^! heade: i : app!ied frc:r Pe'nain: ea:' r pa:F ne aux!!: cry tran : yen provide e IM% -*eam rupp!y backup v;be-high redicticn 'e"r% are detected in :he b!cteer e:d a=: cr the -'21,::ea ; peth source ( ). re unavailable, A cite spec!Ec rdic!cgica!*nalysis-will4+e-m;uired :c de: ermine vte* actier aml+: v;'e: level :Ihe TGSS steam supply shouM will be switched to the auxiliary source,if the discharge steam radiation level exceeds setnoint. Relief valves on the seal steam header prevent excessive seal steam pressure. Inspections, Tests, Analyaos and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.9 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the TGS System. 1 i l l 2.10.9 11/23/92

. f" : ,F% I ( (. v i v U Table 2.10.9: Turbine Gland Steam System o e inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria & Radiolo< foal-releases 'ed!! be maintained-A Wsual-inspeeon cf the inste!!cd & Syctem critchec to ce=:!!:r/ de:m-es-withm-esteblished4imite, equipment-coupled-withe-specifis-required te !!mit-redie!^g:ce! : !:::er. radic!cgice! analy !: end dmulated- ' 1 A simotified confiauration for the TGS !;ne!:te ver!F that the TGS Syc+em 1 The as-built confiouration of the TGS / System is described in Section 2.10.9 switchesto4u*iliar/ steem en high System in accordance with the descriotion red!:!!cn !cre!. in Section 2.10,3 L Construction records will be reviewed and visual insoections will be conducted for the confiouration of the TGS System. ~ Cbu ta m .M

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( ] ABWR 0: sign Docum:nt 2.10.13 Turbine Bypass System .C'\\ G Design Description The Turbine Bypass (TB) System provides capability to discharge main steam from the reactor directly to the condenser to minimize step load reduction transients effects on the reactor coolant system. The system is also used to discharge main steam during reactor hot standby and cooldown operations. The TB System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety design basis. The TB System is designed to Ouality Group D non-safety related. There-isumfety-relate (Mpigmwnt-itslMnhy-of-the TE Sptenw-All4dgh-energy-line+ef-tIhe TB System am is located in the turbine building ami-no-failum4-inglwnergy-lhus4n-4 he-TIkSyst e m i!! affeer-safety-related+pngnent. The TE Sptem corrhts cf ('.) a4hree -:!ve clu+t-that-is-#enneeted-to-the4tu+in-steamlines-upstream-of-the-turbhwop mhes, and-(4)-th+ee-dump 4inewhat-toimec ceparately earh regulathpuve-outlet-toetwemdenser-sher-The-T4b Sysiemislesigned to bypa= nomhml!y 33% of the rated-nudiateam4km-dhe+41y. to the condenser, c The El Spten, i:womination-widahe-reactor +ystems, prmides4he-eapaldihy-(v) to-shed 40% of the-tur4dne ~er.erator r^:ed ! cad dthout reac4er-trip o inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.13 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the TB System. C x 2.10.13 11/23S 2

'i~j 0 0, N y Table 2.10.13: Turbine Bypass System inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria J & Failureof#gh-energy "nec in-the-TB-A Vicuc!incpeetien of the insta4ed-TB-t Confirmatiernhat4aghamergy4ir+ breaks-System ed!! not effect-safety-related-Systemwit! be conduc+ed, ee " nc+ jeopardwe-eny4afety-re:ated-equipment. , equipment, L Construction records will be reviewed and 1 A simotified confiauration for the TB visual inspections will be conducted for the 1 The as-built confiauration of the TB Systerrt System is described in Section 2.10.13. configuration of the TB System. is in accordance with the descriotion in Section 2.10.13. 1 i l 9 bY d - i ..y I

-4 1 ABWR c:sion Docum:nt 2.10.21 Main Condenser Design Description The main condenser is designed to condense and deaemte the exhaust steam from the main tusbine and provide a heat sink for the Turbine Bypass (TB) System. The main condenser does not serve or support any safety function and has no safe ty d e sign basis. n. '_, '..~..... A. "o-...A. ^. ^.... ., '.:. '. A. '. .".ad-t umm41ed mee to pm:ect p -t pewmm4.fammhtkm, The condenser is desicned to Ouality Group D non. safety related. The main condenser is desiened to be supported under seismic conditens. . 1. . L.. n....m. A,. h 79.pg.m.:. m.,, m. A...... :.,.m. 'I r' '-' --'.:34y84"g . 4. L,, L n 1, A, gjg.g et.t. L. -,r p.1.'m ' r -- -- ' 'gg g' -- - - -' -- ).. L o n L m. r m.. ... L L.... g- . m m.... m .m. ' - - - ~ - ' - - - ' - - - - - - ... L.1.., L.., :..,. 1,. :.....,... n. m....-.3...... ....'r.t.. - m A.. . m....,..3,. ..:,,m11 . 4. g.4}g, g},..,. h. ...3 madeMe "... ',.', '. ~,~,.,.'.. " 7,,..."....,, '.. - '., ' .4. A. -.-,sme.t W.

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.,A..........-..7.._ .7 Since the main condenser operates at a vacuum, any leakage is into the shell side of the main condenser. Tubeside or circulating water inleakage is detected by measuring the conductivity of sample water extracted beneath the tube bundles. In addition, conductivity is cc-8. cely monitored at the discharge of the condensate pumps and alarms provided in the main control room. /Laienal is provided to the reactor protection system on loss of vacuum.

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3 ABWR oesin Document q eperating he:viel! v. :er !:=!, and4*ennaMd!! cad condensate Rev G/ nue, the rende=er pre.4de: : :vec minute-minkmmv.holdu}simeJor-N4& decay, (4 Gendenser-Precu e by c==!! pedermance-indisater-thatinitiates-alannsend4dps,wprece: le=!c.. (4 1**,@ressure-Turbine Exha=t Hecd Tempenume-,\\utomatwally-initiate 64urbineexha=: -eter :p=y- :c protee44he-unbine, (4) Inle: and Oudet Circulating-Water-Temperature ' haitors. perfmmance.only 1 44 Ganducth9 dthin theemenser-aml-at4he4i6c-herge of ee i f condensate-pump- ' ""'+~ d' - mit prece le.e!* The main condenser potential for Gooding is less than the Circulating Water (CW) System and, consequently flooding protection is the same as the CW-System (2.10.23). Condenser pressure indicators are located above deium basis any potential Good level. Spray pipe: and bafPe: are de !gned :c prn::c: Se maisendent,er inte= ale. (m from-high energy 00 inpu. ,u Hydrogen buildup during cpe=:!cn 1:predded by continumwevase"- ^% main-sende=er Hyd cgen4,oureeeere-ext-luded4uring chutde en. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.21 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyws, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the main condenser. l f3V) t 2.10.21 11/23,92

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ABWR 0:sipoocum:nt 2.10.25 Circulating Water System Design Description The Circulating Water (CW) System IEigum.2J 0.23) provides a omwimu*a supply of cooling water to the main condenser to remove the heat rejected by the turbine cycle and auxiliary systems. The CW System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety design basis. To prevent flooding of the turbine building, the CW System is designed to automatically isolate in the event of gnes system leakage. The circulating water pumps are tripped and the pump and condenser valves are closed in the event of a system isolation signal from the condenser area high-high level switches. A ' condenser area high level alann is provided in the main control room. A44ial4*-legic :! e":e !!! he th+pted-usninimice-}nareth' fr :pmime. islathm-ui e (e.g., 24nu44 3-k+gic-), t The CW System is designed to mulenstmeted-h: ercerda :ce with Quality Group D 9eeiF.ca'ione non-safety related. T4:e C yrs pae:nemes of-theJolkming+nnpere ::: (Figure 2.!^.23): 44 1r'ake sc4ee::: hen:rd !.: :creen-haw,e M Psaps W Ce:-dever =:er !**** (4) Piping and -dce: 44 Tube -ide of t': r-en cerde cer @ W: er hex f!" -d41:9r ub:y: er: ^ Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.10.23 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, i together with associated acceptance criteria wit':h will be undertaken for the CW System. 2.10.23 1 12/3/92 a.

\\ Y Table 2.10.23: Circulating Water System .o N inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria & Whe4erbine bui!d:ng. '! be 1. Testino of theiMeu:!inspe! n cf the 1. GW Sy-t- !:e!st c epen ree$ ef en pe cented by Cw Syne- ?:^!:tien in the ince!!ed qu p ent crep5ed sh the ice'::!cn !gn:!. Pumos trio and condenser i cuent of gree: cyc-!:e:ge..Upon en 'ycec cf the !:2:ge5!= ding valves close. t receiot of an isolation sional.the cher:cerich cf the as-built CW System circulatino water numos will trio and the will be performed using simulated signals condenser valves close. to verify system isolates on high level. L A simolified confiouration for the CW L Construction records will be reviewed and 2 The as-built confiouration cf the CW System is described in Section 2.10.23. visual insoections will be conducted for the System is in accordance with the confiouration of the CW System. discriotion in Section 2.10.23. 1 Control room sensors are orovided for CW L Insoections will be cerformed to verify the 1 Instn2menta+ ion is cresent in the Control System carameters defined in Section oresence of control room indicators for the room as defined in Section 2.10.23. 2.10.23. 2.10.23 System. I h t g bg u

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i i'RWR 0:sion Document 2.11.13 High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System

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can Ja.:n: fe:i: f:"nh;:ppre: : (!) n !k i n..; d e u :.c w a. d im.. u f n. J u,m. us fmi7.,16f. ' c3. / !r:g;; cpx=:d d:: .d '. . n :: * "& ;; rSm:at. (2) M (S) icak dctccdea.7 ca. 2di dea ;;;d;e. - " Yin, i m (TJ (1 Lusus. asun, &#vys s swisa amuv1A eJ7wsCon (t%A/J) EME3huusa 500umu15Wri Of ' "_;i QL 1 + - c :-- f=;/ ":'n;u = ; _ k l ^w* &

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k, A p q Px,{ .t _ m e e._ __., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l_. _ _ .u m a 7,-_ r p'hd ':7 g ' co;nsists of two redundant divisioi; ' q n' ra !TN - *, = The safetya subsystem q --Itad from high nitrogen gas Q storage bottles.Each divisic,n is de separated from the I other. One division supplies nitrogen to half of the S d==l==*=d safety / relief f valves and the other division for the re==3= tag half 3. __e nitrogen storage bottles _.__u_,_i.____..__.___2 ..__m__ . m._, _ - _.. __J_ tz _ _ _. _ __ _ _ _ t _ a _ _ _ _ __ _a _ __ _ _ i _ _ __ _ _ L L _ _ _ _ __ _ t !.L J .A L. L. ,.g__ ____f - ___, by. t.: supply valve a9,-.hny opens in response to low pressure eendimien i in the ADS accumulatorsupplyline p.merfoW/afetyalated HPIN h.T- - -"- --,,_ r; - M: c' :p _;-i;. ' E - " "7i ' :d c m sa %./ _4 n,,,.,a a,es nm, ym j 5 -~**f 5N 5 E X6 V 5 IM i p u ur.) & w -C4 + k %. , p 'l ! Separatious between the safetynlated and the non. safety telated portions of the HPIN System are provided by motor opersted shutoff valves that automatically l }g[, close on low pressure --- ~:: la the ADS and non. ADS SRV accumulator NPP T unes. Ag9 p I A 6e non-safety rel=**d portion is dpi.ned to adon4ei==ite '- - On-Hey Group D. wheielhe safetyalated portion Esp Class 3, Seismic' Category I, Q ";7 Crg . '" ' ' --- IE. The shutoff valves separating safety related from L the non safety-related portions ismic Category I, Q- " 7 rg C design. C l -Alijrimary containment pene ons mee Seismic CategoryI, Q- " 7,Orsup C l design requirements. 4 4Q-pizCa g ug SS S ]' i 2.11.13 - 1 6/1/92

if a ABWR D: sign Document From the nitrogen gas bottles up to the pressure reducing valve is designed to 2 200 kg/cm g (SS M 2g). This is true for both dhisions of the HPIN safety. 7 l related subsystem. The remainder of the HPIN System including safety-related bjg) l and non safety-related portions is rated at 18 kg/,cm?g (0?M p:!;). ggM l ,. k,Ilssq f fo*~ He HPIN System is provided withinstrum' ntation and control #to monitor the l e system des:g: Si operation! T!@r :=!ud: high.nd i presIure d....... indications, valve position status lights, nd ed=9 dua is 6 tar.s.//,/> 3 WN'Attf^%"l slog (kg& N Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.11.13 provides definition ofinspections, tests, and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undenaien for the HPIN System. T 3 O t r p l 2.11.13 2 ' 6/t92 -1

• ?

i

p) Q f) ~ t v V Table 2.11.13: High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply Cystem Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment Inspections, Toots Analyses Acceptanus Criteria Tbconfigure f ystem 1. I'nspection oT Syste 1. erification as conformance 1. j configur A...ed, with the stlon {Figur shown in FI 2.11.1 The basic configuration Visual inspection of the as-built The as-built conf guration of the of HPIN System is system configuration will be HPIN System is in accordance with shown in Figure conducted. Figure 2.11.13. 2.11.13.

2. [The nitrogen bottles supply vel 2.

U simulated high and low press

2. Automatic opening and closing of the automatically ope i

re a'nd '

signals, onaltesting of stem nitrogen gas bottles supply valve.

eutomstically cl Igh pressurs logic shall be strate ~ conditions ADS etor supply automatic openi closing cepebHity line goe stipply volve V. (of the nitr iroi

nin

, node. ~ 3 Y W The nitrogen gas Using simulated high and low Nitro 5en gas bottles supply valve bottles supply valve Pressure signals, functional automatically opens and closes on automatically opens on testing of the automatic actuation simulated low and high pressure low pressure signal and logic of the nitrogen gas bottles signals respectively. automatically closes on supply valve will be performed. high pressurs signal from pressure instrument in the ADS accumulator supply line.

Table 2.11.13: High Prenews Nkrogen Gas Supply System inspections, Tests, Analyses and.*:::,__:e Crherie I i Certined Design Commitment W TesesAnotyees Asespennes Cdearle t 3.f ' _ _ Ise 3. emote men , Q=-p 3. nitrogen g from the mein

r. ley. No velve - ^~" 9_ _le not

=m-i volve ' the ; -the nitrogeng" toom remote mee -8, _. _ _ l D ...n key Q/ ( [ 'The nitrogen gas Testing for remote manual actuation Nitrogen gas bottles supply valve [ i bottles supply valve of the nitrogen gas bottles supply remote manually opens and closes. can be remote manually valve wilk be performed. l actuated from'the main l control room. j 4./ 6sefety-t reisted 4. utINdng simulated

4. Auto closure

"^f -"^ - [ shutoff volves out. "; - _--- on leer l signale shell be ; _." ...d ea "di: Interface shutoff l l pressure and non-auto renmaars of the nn _" ^f ADS or supplylines. Interface volwee on pressure / et the ADS and supply unes. I. 1 Safety-to-non-safety interface Using simulated ow pressure shutoff valves automatically close i 'Ihe safety-to-non. signals functional testing of the on simulated low pressure signal. safety related interface shutoff safety-to-non-safety interface valves automatically shutoff valves will be performed. r close on low pressure signal from pressure instrument on the ADS or non-ADS accumulator-supply lines. 4 l-c i / ~ ~, _. _. _. ~., _..

~ E Table 2.11.13: High Preneure IWeregen Gee Supply Systent inspections,Tesse. Analyses and Aeoeptaneo cdeerie I certmed oeelea ce==*m== e Teene.madve== Aeospe=== cdes se j i i p

U ' : ~-- % -

[

5. T se ed System 5.

automatijc; _f_:1 ; ( 5. HPIN . automaticeHy power to end HPIN S,_ _ -- M when Systems opor emergency AC i emerg on lose power suppiled bD,."." -- - m %cah g(g % sue qg % s-r,<gg HPIN outboard co(nt.. 7=^ Won 6. manuelcl

6. Velves remot nuel

. e from the i 6. e capablHty. I capablEy outboerd main control r volves remot looletion from the I w 5. HPIN System outboard 5. Testing for r te manual 5. HPIN System containment isolation containment isolation actuation of the containment valves remote manually open and valves can be remote isolation valves will be close. manually actuated from-Performed. f i the main control room. 7 i (

7. Q.. J :-- -

r ~ The w andI l 7. Provision for contr

7. Inspection to op.c.ed in1reccon 2.

g W. ^.. sierme end e inac. tion. -econ. oen S*# 7 l Sm?y Sg#7 i 6 E I ~

O O O~ ~ Table 2.11.13 HIGH PRESSURE NITROGEN GAS SUFFLT SYSTEM Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6. The ASME portions of 6. A pressure test will be conducted 6. The results of the pressure test the HPIN System retair, on those portions of the HPIN of the ASME portions of the HFIN their integrity under System required to be pressure System conform with the internal pressures that tested by the ASNE Code. requirements in the ASME Code. - will be' experienced. Section III. during service. 7. Control room features' 7. Inspection will be performed 7. Features are available in the provided for HPIN on the Control Room features Control Room as defined in Section System are defined in for the HPIN System.. 2.11.13. Section 2.11.13. _. _. _. _ =. _.

O O O~i Table 2.11.13 HIGH PRESSURE NITROGEN GAS SUFFLY SYSTEM i i Inspections. Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitmeat-Inspections, Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

8. ' Safety related' 8.

A tsst of the power availability 8. Safety related components described components described in to the components described in the in the Design Description for the the Design Description Design Description in Section HPIN System receive electrical for.the HFIN System are 2.11.13 will be conducted with power power from Class IE busses only. powered from Class 1E supplied from the permanently busses. installed electric power busses. 9. Non safety related

9. - A test of the power availability 9.

Non safety related components componen*s described in to the components described in the described in the Design Description -the Design Description Design Description in Section for the HFIN System receive for the HFIN System are 2.11.13 will be conducted with power electrical power from Non Class IE powered from Non-Class supplied from the permanently busses only. lE busses. Installed electric power busses. 8

i O n JL jL IL JL d ' g l5k n m k 3 11 1 1 I I I 1 I N si i e . e ) ~ g M w_ 4k n i k 2 O N d*, i e h I i \\ hb h\\ Y "@$ \\_ + 3 + } k -(___) O -{ )C 3-- u d ~< 7 CD-ll -CD C} gj hg -CD CD-gg -CD D la -c, m e -c] co-g O -L_) L_)- -c3 C__> 2.11.13 4 6/1/92

4 4 ABWR oasign occumznt 2.11.6 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System Design Description The HVAC Emergency Cooling Water (HECW) System deliverghilleg wgerg g. the eemreMmi! ding essential electrical equipment room coolery, dUe 8iesef generator zone coolers, and the main control room coolers,during shutdown of the reactor normal opemting modes, and abnonnal reactor conditions including LOCA. The HECW System consists of three mechanically separated divisions (Figure 2.11.6). Each dhision provides cooling to one control building essential electrical equipment room and one diesel generator zone. Either dhision "B" or "C" also provides coolin to the main control room. Power is supplied to each dhision from independ nt Class IE sources. HECW division "A" consists f one pump, one refrigention unit, instrumentatio(En' d'dh hip ltng and valves to the cooling coils. i Dh isions ",B" and "C" are-st ar-exce tJhattwo arall pumps _ ann C U ?' PA'L LA p (o. a < 4 , Mit.rg eta izhor s eas t,>anfr a rgnt L t refrigeration,untts-are-usc i urge oo w are provided by the corresponding division of the stem.'A$hemicatadMuon tank is shared by all HECW divisions. Makeup water is suppligfrgmpe mgkgpgr (gigd)los[e,egthe grges sformore t sy t 3 tanks. The surge tankgar+capabledreplacmgsystem water 100< lays during-arremergency. t % %tA, M gc u A uscht. c c m ?cw e ur$ TiMT + R 15 DGsIcu p 7O geranon and pump un,ts are designed-to meet the follownDng A SM e-e m._ The refn. i S d m c., c Arec,ci24 -'t A& '#9d""*"* 416n R Eces o=. M s o T<> 4RE s c aj u P,6 L cw> ; K) R hi era or cithNYU/hr}f^' rY b.3.d d k- ,h A p Pump Cwpeekh< d'rerd-45& 9(,9 L/,, '.)dt'gajor system components are located in t e control building except for the2iLC ?f h diesel generator zone cooling coils, which are in the reactor building. Jhere are ra' ddition, the system layout is designed to permit pe no primary or secondary containment penetrations h tlyin the systemt In '" i (of-all system componenu,ta r.=rc the i..%.;rf. ar.dcap2bWty mr,n,7,,m / Piping and valves for the HECW System, as well as the cooling water lines from the RCW System, are designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code, Section III. Class 3 and Quality Group C requirements. The classification extends up to and including the block valves for the chemical addition tank. The only non-l safety-related portion of the system is the chemical addition tank and the piping I l from the tank to the block valves. l 2.11.6 1 6/1/92

4 ABWR oesign Document The HECW System is capable of remoning ee heat loads with one of the four pump and refrigerator units from 6hisio:{"ll" and "C"in standby. The standby ichigerator is equipped with an interlock which automaticalh starts the unit upon failure of the operat ng refrigerator.' Flow siitches prohibit IE ~ i /seftigerators from operatirig unless tliere is water flow through the evaporator and condenser. The refrigerator units can be controlled indhidually from the ' - main control room by a remote manual suitch. ~ j / ~~- ,- x,. g'/,/ Tiie HECW System is designed to perform its required safe r cooling function following a postulated lossof coolant accident / loss of offsite 'z' f power (LOCA/ LOOP), assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical dhision. In case of a failure which disables any one of the three HECW visions, the other two divisions meet plant safe shutdown requirements. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.11.6 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the { HECW System. Fz. c w rc ma ceeu o u c et L is AvTcMmcw1 v A hW S T E D T59 A F lcm c c owe e t v 4 Lgf s, w ui Lut RE C.i EW: S A S 16 N 9 L F2 CM A T W E i?. M O $ T % T THE i Lcw cc N T e et_ V A L U 'E. It Pee viD E L l'U P4f2A LLO L WiTH THC C e c L I U LT LC A D. ~ 7ME ( A LV E i5 c e oT pcrt te b T34 A D i F M 'd~ 4 r !t P it E SS U R E IkJ T)t c. A % R, p h t M T A l N o M L t COL'> % ^ T PIM $$U R G. D E.C P A U~D cc M,6T A(,ri-pjj W /4 c.itoS S t M G-SHSTT5M. I [ 2.11.6 2 6/1/92.

o Table 2.11.6: HVAC Emergency Cooling Water (HECW) System m inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cuteria The syetam cen'ig-ationla* de her -1. 'n pec;ca Of wouw uudun e cuv. 'M be-

1. -The system configurdna -f~~r 9 componergs-endflow ped.s as cher:n im p-4^<--A. V euel...apn.Jun fiij om be W11A S ri eTti < 4 3A Rgurc 2.??fr-SEE. 1. U. CM-pe?rm^d 50 ed cn I!g&e.^ 11.G.

m --% 2. The HEr'W dMeinne arm marh=a:c3'ty-d 3 Te e+ --A V' cf th; d:;::!cn 94 incigde 2. p cat * - ; end y' - r;<m n<eno, j e! ctrica!!y 'ndependent. it'depeadant nd cohcidcrt spe,eSenof independence of :::h "EO?! d'ci;!an. V4-th-thr-- dir :Isaster dm eerwii eie c^n&- C;;s

• C pc..e r evw u s fer eJr Th= MW dMc?a.3 are pc=

d bj oe p'->e AMeica =%:r;L.. Viwill H E ^.'I d F;?;! n. 5 t96-2 r+4MM indepe-de-t C;;; it seu.ce;. cheek fer iad pende-t C;ea 1E vv-o. DC C-T--tthib j 5GRF1---2rhde -bb sogrses. A FA s w.tr* > # b N & t_ Rem f, f. The standby refrigerator aygbun t miierh,i{s /, 7. Tests simulatingigh temperature cooling /,J. Refrigerator and pump units acting as pu y gn automaticallygart i ture water and operating pump f ailure will be standby units start upon a high cooling water or failure of the operating conducted for each refrigerator and pump temperature cooling water or operating pump fai[UJesg!: fre-main control roomaj Refri y units. unit in divisions *B* and "C*. Tests simulating main control room switch units.. - mre_ The refrigerator units can be controlled signals will be conducted for the signals. individually from the main control room. refrigerator units.

2. I. The HECW cooling capacity is capable of 2 /. Inspections of vendor documentation will 7 M. Each refrigeration unit sha!! have an removing the heat loads on the system.

include refrigeration and pump capaciti __ effective h e oval capac;ty of 2.3 m iG e .fSch pump is capable of ggw, tests will confirm that adequate f o/ag 94w4w at 2 l .+egvaNable to the system. delivering $ 4L9 f+w 2M p-to the system. obS2275'. $iin % t36 p i g W ;e r =rt ( : OPERATE LPOAl REGEPT CF w ~z: gwy-ussr 2%HCUAl-e

== e M e i I. i

T.,. ABWR oesian occument RCW/HECW A SURGE TANK IL D/G ZONE (A) COOLING ColLS (Reactor Building) ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM (A) COOLING COlLS (Control Building) N, HECW HECW HECW O O b ~ {g ki DDI T# (8) (C) CHEMICAL ^ Jh Jk TANK ,/ f 7 4W - ~ Y V HECW N REFRIGERATOR l l O. (Contros nuisoing) HECW lk. PUMP RCW & RCW (Control Building) Figure 2.11.6a HECW Division A 2.11.6 6/1/92 i .. ~. -.

t ABWR oesign occument RCW/HECW 8 SURGE TANK b D/O ZONE (8) COOUNG ColLS (Reactor Building) MAIN CONTROL ROOM COOUNO ColLS (Control Sullding) ESSENTIAL ELECTRIC AL EQUIPMENT ROOM (8)COOUNO ColLS (Control Building) ~...... HECW L2 CHEMICAL m ~~ F' ADDITION TANK V HECW N REPRIGERATOR l l O (Controf sueldine) iECW n PUMP RCW 4-- RCW (Control Su# ding) HECW nEFRIGERATOR l l C (Control Building) HECW u PUMP RCW 4 RCW (Control Building) Figure 2.11.6b HECW Division - 8 6/1/92 2.11.6 -5

,.4 e ABWR onsten Document j e RCW/HECW. C SURGETANK IL D/O ZONE!C) COOUNO CC.tLS i (Reactor BulPing) MAIN CONTROL ROOM COOUNG CO:LS (Control Building) ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM (C)COOUNO ColLS (Control Buildng) ~ HECW u __ CHEMICAL i m 'r, ADDmON TANK If _e ,,,W

• N REPMORRATOR l l O

(Control Buteng) HSCW JL PUMP RCW 4-RCW (control susens) Th F N REFNGERATOR l l O (Contel Building) HECW JL l-PUMP RCW 4--- = RC'i. '6 (Control Bu#dng) 1 Figure 2.11.6c HECW Division _ C 6/1/92 - 2.11.6 - 4

s +- X. 2, / / (g Inspect %ns Tests, Analyses and icesptance Criteria g. ~ Certified Design Commitment Inspections Tests, Analyses k eeptance Criteria yg h,.),. A' basic configuration ).g. Visual inspections of the as-built 1 I. The. as-built configuration of th5 ~.. ~. - Q g.for the H Ec-wr system configuration v.11 be conducted. FtEc or System is i'n secordancs a with EL3ure y r.On o n System-is shown on Figure , 7 ff O n - c. (frr F -t ) e. - { f. The ASME portions of" k/. A hydrostatic test will be conducted IN. The resulto of the hydrostatic test l the tEC1+! w$getain their on those portions of the L46CVf of the ASMS portions of the NEC tti integrity under inte:.nal system required to be hydrostatically conform with the r*quirements in the pressures that will be tested by the ASME Code. See Note 1. ASME Code, Section III. experienced during service. d J. Featucts are available in the b34. Control'Roomfeatures Inspections vill be performad on the provided for NE(_h/.. System Control Room features for the '

• t?C h/

Control R m as defined in Sectice i ~ 2 !/. L. 'are defined in Section ~ systea. N"i ? Il G. 3b. Remote Shutdo 3b. Inspections will be performed _.pn the 3L. Features are available'on the RSS -(RSS) features % gas-System ovided for RSS featuresL.I ystem. as defityd.in % I lon k the-System are defi'ned in Section- ' Note 1:. Modify to call. out pressure test for pneumatic / gas and oil systems, ~ if that is what is proposed. Note 2: If" appropriate.. use the Section smeber as a reference, f

h .i . t. ),fi. I Inspections, Tests Analyses and Acceptance Criteria 7..y i, I Certified Design Commitment Inspections, Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria - i d ,f. Safety-related.compo-(j. A test'of the power availability to d /+. Sefety-related components described nents described in the the compocent:s. described in the Design in the Design Description for the ' = Design Description for the Description in Section 2 e !! (c will be LMW System receive electrical l. N Rhl . System are conducted with power supplied from the power from Class IE busses only. powered from Class IE permanently installed electric power busses. (?-- h = L) busses. i Q,'n. Each loop (or train, if 7[. Visual ir.spections of the as-built f[..Aroomoutsidethecontrolroomand that is appropriate) of the - system will be performed. primary containment does not contain 4 G d System (Imops A.B.C) mechanical components from more than { is mechanica11y' separated. one loop of the fiC-C t4 System. 6. The have 6. An analysis for NPSH will be prepared 6. De analyzed NPG ::;;;j, pump NPSH NP V based upon as-Luilt data and vendoppump required-endor for the pump. Ib jj records. This analysis will be based /N upon M pressure losses for inlet piping i g and components suction from dupprassion pool , 21 l with' water le 1 at the minimum value f - SGI blocka of pump suction straine,r l - ' desigpVbasis fluid temperature (1. C) t 1-- - e tainment at atmospheric pressure. l See Note 4. l i i Note 3: This entry also to.'be used for non-lE power h i. . ' sources (modify to suit). [ i Note.4: This list requires system unique modification. .~ .m. .m.

6 ABWR oosign occument 2.11.3 Reactor Building Cooling Water System Design Description , w a s The Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) Svstem distributes cooling water,, dudng-various plant operating modes, as well as during shutdown, and during post 1DCA operation of the v.uious safety systems. The system removes heat from plant auxiliaries and transfeis it to the Ultimate Heat Sink (t*HS) via the g g13 Reactor Service Water (RSW) System. The RCW Ssstem removes heat from thc c c.M (ECCS) equipment im4udnktite emergency diesel generat8is diiring a safeM.M I I 3 t reactor shutdown cooling function. RCN %5 TEM c e m F/o ceA7ecw 3 W= SHLNIC ou F/ (s tM E S 2. / /. L L, 6, 4; b c'.. The RCW system iwiesign*44o perforni itwwtuired safe reactor shutdown cooling function following a postulated loss of coolant accident /lossof of fsite power (LOCA/ LOOP), assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical RCW subsystem or RCW support system. In case of a failure which disables any one of the three RCW divisions, the other two divisions meceplant mfe-shutdowrrrequirements, including a LOCA or a LOOPror both. PENe RM M r c rNa ci t R vieTDCuA; cC6L.eub, qpg p ps t 4T r5 D Redundant isolation valves bembloto separate the eeentiahwaruous of4he RCW-cooled components from the nonsafety related RCW<ooled components during s a LOCA towure4hc integritnndufetyfunctionsof-th fetprelated parts of tsolation valves so the non.er-,w-8 - nt the+yuem, The. ev, nua ystem are n automatically or remote manually operated, and their positions are indicated in the main control room, cecuw w vi ra Each RCW dhision includes two pumps which circulate RCW through the 3 .various equipment cooled by the RCW System and through three heat exchangers which tnmsfer the RCW heat to the UHS via the RSW System. tb N(t.D6o Ft A C@ 'h u i b' o Each41EWdivision Main Control Room (diItion aMikHRM CRyns3rument indicatign tEan main 4oop sI5kge tank level, inNMy[MOVsuntFAOVsshownon g temperature. MGReentrel4nchulesell-mrN cem m D Nonnal sucIc tank 44UWP makeupis automatic-ora!CRcontrolled amt.v n t R N V4ves AtcVM Aud Pu2u u A t ic.w y e P e RNrq 4R* co AJ T rac t't. -Thc Esc RGW-train?D F2CM vu r >c4hown o gnfigure111.3 The RCW Mc <on System [d4Pellhldsi* aYlhrrPyMehnh A, B and C) which are Q w wmn.c9hhhanically and electrically sggrpth The RGW-pmngwandvalves for,eacTi RCW dhision ar44upplied electnca power from a different divuisn of-the-ESF power-syaem. s. c ia s d m ees, The RCW ASME Code classifications for different portions of the system are areg,cp,tt gigures 2.11.3a<. The safety related portions of the RCW indi d engned to keismic Category I and Quality Group C, and are located Seismic Category I structures. 2.11.3 6/1/9? ~ I

jS ~ a ABWR oesign Document e PE MracM During wmous plantjywwuingagge RCW water pump and two heat exchangers m+4numelly-olwutingm each division. F4cmMancing.}umbions .ue-inehrdehithin ca< h RCW dhidon. Pump design parameters aie: O asv.o ,> vi's>c n MCW A/B ROW C Design pressure pg4 ( "0/cmQ M &,Sw i4 =0 t%j U/ Design temperature (IR ( eL) Ms 7 o .se. 7 c Discharge flow rate (dt'E/ pump) 2 55002I,7cc 2 tw /'3,2 c c t ro.w r, Pump total head (pig) ( k'j/c.uW 26069 2 7s G < 3 'Yl0$ Heat exchanger capacities are each. E 2 OE B:tr/h 2 42Eintu& // 3 a/(? '5L, e! r C. (c 's /c & W S 1, 1-Connections to a radiation monitor are prosided in each division to detect radioactive contamination resulting from a tube leak in[n#!Ne8M*'#'#- enehange rnal pnel exchangerwr-other-exchangers. The RCW pumps and heat exchangers are located in the lower floors of the .. control _huilding. The equipment cooled by the ROV divisions are located in thefcArract [cactorhilding._ turbine huilding, and_radwaste_b_uilding, (Figures 2.11.3a<). /* ' *

• Yables 2.11 Spku,'d show dhich ecu' men receives RCW flow during various-c t

ucv b s plant operanngand se eemergencygmw es.T ie tables also indicate how many heat c exchangers are in service in-e-ach mode. U A> DE R ti A L H c c c Di T/ cw During normal plant operation, ROV flows thr u }} equig,t,wi iglgs 3,,,, g m 4 awmmally operating and requiggool[ng - eqmpmentrexcept RHR Ccctm heat exchangers and ESF d;cx. generaq, asThown by open or closed valves in Egure 2.11.3a - C. n anis w c i if a LOCA occurs, a second ROV pump and third heat exchanger in each loop.n are placed in service Automatic nr remoteeperatedisolationvalvet will ieparate the RCW f*the LOCA required-safetyequinment fram.thenonsafety-related equinmen, tr1muge mnt. Inw wear levelsignal-occurs. The pdmary containment RCW isolation valves automatically close if a LOCA occurs. IF A RCW 5e26 r5 t A AJ K Lcw Nevre R LEVGL st G C4 L 15 RG C 'E VE b, A U TC MA TI L. c ol R E AI C T/2 OPE R ATE 6 V A L V'E 5 S E P.4 /MT/." TH E /2C W CC O L8 0 0 CE M SA FETS-s?EL4TED i=_ G C P M G A.N F2cM T M 'E Uc A]- % 7 F:'T tt - R EL.A'T E b lE G C

• PM G A T l

2.11.3 2 6n/92 l

z. i ABWR oesign occum:nt i ,s Ahci a 1.OG, the following sequence wiM c followed: (li If the noijafety portion of the RCW System is available to the instrument air /senice ah (IA/SA) compressors, the CRD pmnps and CUhp> umps, RCW Gow to these norijafety components is maintained 4(Figure 2.11.3), Flow is automatically shutoff to other nonMM'NM d equipment after the LOG. AFr00 TH4 l hC A. ' ': M Frit9-*N L%TGD (2) 4 the operator determines efK i ihrLO(M. from w.enti4RCW 4 instrumentation, that the integrity of the non safety RCW System to the above mentioned compressors and pumps has been lost, he can shut the iemote operated non essentialisolation valves shown in Figure / 2.1 1.3 a.- c. m,c. . srwe, u T 11 the sur ge tank water level reaches glow leve( with or without LOCA, i.dk;dng. 14w.uwout+f-the-RGW System, isolation valves in the supply and return piping to the non-essential equipment will automatically close, including the compressors and pumps m tione.t,v icd above. Without a LOCA and with low surge CW pump a w' ' For post LOCA, both wo tank standpi >e water level I mum RCW pumps continue r=A.p;u.h low surge tank standpipe water level. s u "u;wa The RCW/RSW heat exchanger design basis condition occurs during post. - f LOCA cooling of the containment via the RHR heat exchangers. The RCW pumps have the flow capacity to deliver required now to the ECCS equipment in each division and the above-mentioned compressors and pumps if the isolation valves cannot be closed. ) \\ / After a LOOP, the RCW pumps isolation valves and their controllogic are / automatically powered by the emers;cncy diesel generators. f' g A3

1. esstr = 8g A sepamte surge tank is provided for each RCW divisiong%r c.;'y -"per seur e.w =q;: 'ma E Ge Strup De sen! bed W:eer/ML""! Sysm

&r LON end%m, gie Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPCU) System provides a - backup surge tank water supply. .-r>l e ERT 3 G Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.11.3a provides a definition of the inspecdons, tests, and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria which will be and undertaken for the RCW System. L 2.11.3 - -3 6/1/92 l. ril. ..m.

Table 2.11.3a: Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System \\ u m ' Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certilied Design Commitment inspections. Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria \\ 1. System configuration, including key 1. Inspection of construction records will be 1. The system configuration conforms with components and flo'w aths, is shown in performed. Visual inspection (VI) will be Figure 2.113. i Figure 2.11.3. performed based on Figure 2.11.3. 2. Three RCW trains are mechanically and 2 Tests and VI of the three independent trains 2. Plant tests and VI confirm proper } . electrically independent, will be conducted which will include independence of three RCW divisions. independent and coincident operation of the three trains to demonstrate complete divisional separation. j 3. During various modes of operation. the 3. L ited system hydraulic tests will be

3. The results confirm that the RCW has the RCW System has adequate hydraulic conducted according to available water flow capability specified by the capability for plant auxiliaries and the nonnuckr heat plant conditions.The tests certified design commitment, including primary containment required for safe will demoristrate a safe plant shutdown safe shutdown operation with 1 RCW b

shutdown following a design accident or with one RCW ivision out of service. division out of service. transient.These safe shutdown requirements are satisfied with only any 2 of 3 RCW divisions operating. \\ VI of the installed RCW Sy) tem and RCW 4. Isolation valves are properly located as 4. Isolation valves as shown in Figure 2.11.3 4. can automatically or remote manually preoperational tests ss follows will be shown in Figure 2.11.3 and are separate the RCW for the essential , completed: \\ demonstrated to operate automatically or remote manually to isolate RCW for non- ] equipment from the RCW for the non- ,f l_ essential equipment. / a. Remote-manual operation of the ' essential from RCW for essential isolation valves from the main control equipment cooled by the RCW System.

room, b.

During simulated LOCA conditions, a simulated LOCA condition will be i combined with a simulated RCW surge tank water level signal to automatically close the isolation valves. O C c. A LOCA signal will shut RCW isolation valves which will shut off RCW flow to l all non-essential equipment except the j, IA/SA compressors, CfjD pumps and CUW pumps. s 3

IAls 212 Y #ll T420 UbM TUREE AIELRAlt?['llL Y kWD EL GC TRIC/FLL't 6 5 PAl2&TE'b DXf5. /D I VI b / 0 AIS. /NsoEl2Y

• 2 " REsiDU4L MG4T 25A/CVN_ (dWK')

k24Y EX C 4A/v6 EK FLO kt RA I e. /^! S 6e T #5' ~14 G CoC7*4/ Ald/GA/ T' i scuvero,fEXCEPT v+t.vs.s lt\\/5r:RT # V.' '? k F E T 't - R E L. & T 5 b don /R%BLI75 6F lNS EeT '5~' Ence sveGE TAtVK /S 64RRED is)i T H THE cofEEES PC Albi At(2 DIVIb/oit) Of~ 'TH e H VAC. c~sieet,excti (* c702.10 C, WA-T&iz SV 57 (MECtAl) s 4 STE M. /W4kEUP WA-TBR 15 Pi2CV i D SD F-o R TH E S o re.6 E TAC K iS't THE. M 4 KSOP nJA-TER. ( PpR Wi eD) ( A4U NP) R 5't5T E h fs 't A^l A UT~o M A TiL. OR A1C,l s/4A/AL /Nsser *Io l Tuc Ec M ev sre ut i3 PJ.'401D8D t/o rrH cotoT (2ct., i ?06 M LUklG Nt10M FOR 95 TEM Floats, ~~ TEM PER A-TUR E5 A <J D press uiE'E Sf Ab tasLL kb V&L.V6 OPE 10 /ct ose kh)b PoM P oM/e PF IMDic A-noA) fek' TH0SG iUST20MEWr3 kND 40MPaA/ U73 $HCNN 6Al FILtUR.E$

2. //. $g - C.,

TNG d4.(t/ $Y 5>F5t1 coNP&N6/t/TS w ITH STk'rU$ INbt C&TICAI it/VD /C R Cchl1~o? OL. tUTER F;4CES s uiT~N 7Hi? 26Mc TG SquT.ceasu sy $res (.RsS5 &az sscwA ,c FiuoREs 2 i i. 3 a - c., l

b T Q 7,\\\\.h' f Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria y Certified Design Comitment Inspections. Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria {I5 1. A basi configuration 1. Visual inspections of the as-built 1. The as-built configuration of the for the C.k/ systee configuration will be conducted. 8C.LeJ System is in accordance b Systee is shown on Figurog with Figure 5__2-II IG-C- .I 2.ll.3e-c.:__ 1x ?? 2. Thg ASME tions of 2. A hydrostatic test will p conducted 2. The resuits of the hydrostatic test the-KC YE their on those portions of the KC-\\) of the ASME portions of the f(L]n d h integrity under internal system required to be hydrostatically confere with the requirements in thin pressures that will-be tested by the ASME Code. C. ^^.. 1. ASME Code, Section III. experienced during service. -3a. Control Roof features 3a. Inspections will be performed on the 3a. Features are available in the i provided for M C V System Contrcl Room features for the RCW Control Room as defined in Section 4 are defined in Section system. 2.fl.3. p 2.II.3. t 3b. Remote Shutdown System 3b. Inspections will be p tformed on the 3b. Features are available on the RSS (RSS) feetures provided for RSS features for the F.W Systee. as defined in Section 7.#. 3. the NCW System are defined in Section 2JI-3 h '- Modify: to cal test for pneumatic / gas and et if that is what is proposed. m

• inn number as a reference.,

Note 2-ppropriate, u ..al

Ib s Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment' Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4. Scfety-related compo-4. A test of the power availability to 4 Safety-related components described nento described in the the components described in the Design in the Design Description for the Design Description for the Description in Section 7. O 3 will be f2Ch[ System receive electrical IR C \\t! System are conducted with power supplied from the power from Class IE busses only. powered from Class IE permanently installed electric power busses. (See Note 3.)- busses. Tui2 GVer-RGl.itrED iTRTitAi cF i"ACH Dvi & M8 5. A room outside the control room and

5. A M 6 p (oc_trainr-if-5.

Visual inspections of the as-built primary containment does not contain,'5 M W -'2'M O O that-is-eppropriate)- of the system will be performed. sechanical components from more than Ditd System (Loops A,5,C) one loop of the GC(C System. to mechanically separated.. 6. h hafei

6. % analysis for NPSH will be prepared 6.

e analyzed NPSH,e2ceeds pump NPSH CPSH. based as-built data and vendor pump required by-the~ vendor for the pump. ~ J records. is analysis will -based upon pressure egses for pamp inlet piping and componeng,/ f - suction from, suppression pool with water level the minimum value - 501 blockage of pump. crion strainers j - design basis fluid tempera e (100*C) -, containment at atmospheric pressure. See Note 4. I Noto 3: This entry also to be used for non-lE power sources (modify to. suit). Note 4-This list requires system unique modification. b a -

s g Table 2.11.3a: Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System (Continued) Inspections Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria (c,5. Without LOCA and with low surge tank (c Ja. RCW System preoperational tests will be

g. The RCW pumps will trip or operate as stamipipe wa,tglevel, both RCW pumps in performed as follows:

follows: 3 that divisiony Eor post LOCA. both RCW gp pumpsweill operate with low surge tank a. Simulatqf sgr e tank standpipe low a. The running pump (s) wi44 rip on surge standpipe water level. water leve(in..c standpipe-end tank standp'pe low water leveh,MN41 confirm the running pump (s) trip. Ar

b. With-e LOCA condition s49aal.poth b.

Dormg e gimulated LOCA condition RCW pumps wincong..jg,peratg and L.dsted su,rge tank standpipe with e simulated,hrg' tank stanMpe e low water level signa %#m that low water level signalf both44Cu! pumps operate.- 7 / c. Both HGW pumps start on simulated [c. During low surge tank standpipe water LOCA signal. level condition, a simulated LOCA signal starts both divisional RCW y \\s mps.- ~, _ _ _ _ _ pu cc A:D. rsc g 5. f(OCA/ LOOP signal successfully starts 'g 1[. A LOCAptresul{in the automatic start of $. Qsgryulating LOCA/ LOOP condi*!c t#- 6 the second RCW Jump in each division an<1 hws!) be conducted for the RCW System / second RCW pump and initiates RCW/RSW, start]Ilow through the third RCW/RSW Hx winch cmJngtheflCW and its support j Hx flow in each division including the,,' in each division. systemywill perform its function under g ( followingconfirmatiqns _ troid conditions. Tests will be conducted j ^ boring LOCA/ LOOP (loss-of-coolarit for the RCW, which confirm that after the f a.Megardless of which RCW purnp was I accident / loss of off site power) conditions, LOOP, each division of RCW pumps and ) { operating during normal operation, \\ RCW pumps and valvas are powered by valves operates with the same division of l (before the LOCA/efterthe4.OACAOOP the ernergency diesel generators (D/G). emergency D/G power and associated DCJ simulat+on occurs.1be firetend second . control po_wer 60VIC6s._ ____p RCW pump winstahbutomatically, pc recred bythe emergency diesel generator. LMC M l c L A/Lc t ? '*>tls NALS, d'% C' $ e M v c Ar.i b n - ~ b. egardless of which two RCWfRS Hx's were operating before the 1,0C 0 aftnihe LOQA/.l.OOP occurs.kbe RCW g g e pgugotor-operated valve on the thirdh , dischargewill operhet~nWe"/- . p. r R nu.:.PT CP q $, p uwr :> c c u+ / a c c ? J4 NAQ

i ABWR oesign occument Table 2,11.3b: Reactor _ Building Cooling Water Consumers Division A s_.__- Not - Emergency Op m.m3 .Normel Shutdown Shutdown Stoney (LOCA). S' *

• Y Mode /

Operating et 20 hours (u kos M E is I '* *'g Components Conditions

• - ' ^ " * "

AC) ,w RCW,HSW Heat 2 3 l 3 -2 3 3 Exchangers in 1 Service j ESSENTIAL X X Emergency Die. sel Generetor A t X X X X RHR Heat Exchanger A FPC Heat X X X X i X X Exchanger A j I I Others (essen. X X X X l X X tieUS ( NON. ESSENTIAL \\ RWCU Heat X X X X X Exchanger inside Drywell* X X X X-X 1 Otheri (non. X X i X X .X X W \\ essentia0 d Q4 _s 49 (X) - Equipment receives RCW in this mode, ~ ~ ' ~ (.) = Equiprnent daes,not receive RCW in this mode.- 3 (2) HECW refrigerator, room coolers (FPC pump, RHR, RCIC, SGTS, FCS, CAMS), RHH motor and seal coolers. (3) Drywell (A & C) and RIP coolers. Instruments and service air coolers: RWCU pump cooler, CRD pump oil, and RIP M to. k L - 2.11.3 6. 6/V92 .e,

9 dl ) I 7 ~ ~ - Gu q 4T N / a A g s v tI M t T N h @g, o o V}$9 g k-le ' 4 4g I h' YJ uw o g? Jvx 5, t3 s 6'T c sh fj 4 sj k f] t' ti 4 y k Q'> h N s tt) 2 ul rl k I g (3 2 v@ f7.h?GW fm g v g$amm S '5 dRC h b)}\\gvi to e Jk b$ it ye 2o{P 4 Id rA s sM d @ 't -2 tu 1 g 2d NJ -Qd obh@d a s 2 12 f de gsi lu ty._ P N s I C3 gS* 0 m h ki d a r 40 Wa r .a (U ~ @ynofkl id.S'i h.~ 21 ~ rY s d d D "s h d g r fg I Ilk 9D ~ U, N @a c u ? u mo d Q 0, 2 $Ah, 4 ,4 4 ~ N ja h kY t h 6832y330 Su a w - nia J L Est?*u* u *~ ~* O -aa>F % q) '> M N 3 h O tu7Cg 4 hcl Fi lf 2 '6 d

E --

Il $ $ F r5 [I 4l y F le.s, b ' $ h $ 2 wi 0 S rD 32WA M 3d 4$ Qif Jea N & e I$ !) ' [uS**2 it 4 ModCL$ar e $d3 ~~

~ ... _ _. _ + 1 ABWR oesign Document i Table 2,11-3c: Reactor Building Cooling Water Consumers Division B 1, m"' Operating Normal ~ Hot " "8'"*Y

• " Y Mode /

Operating Stoney et 20 hours (no loss of (loss of AC

J "217_'f Components Condrtions i

AC) pg ... n u y RCW/RSW 2 3 3 2 3 3 HeatExchangers in Service ESSENTIAL X X Emergency Die. sel Generator B X X X X RHR Heat Exchanger 8 FPC HeatEx. X X X X l X X changer 0 l Othere (essen. X X X X f X X tiallt2 NON.ESSEN11AL RWCU Heat X X X X X Exchanger t8 inside Drywell ) X X X X X Othere (non-X X X X X X essentiall'0 . -- J MCTE fJ1 (X) - Equipment receives RCW in this mode. .(.) - Equipment does not receive RCWJn.this mode k' .h). HECW refrigerator, rooidcoolers, (FPC pump, RHR. RCIC, SGTS, FCS, CAMS), RHR motor and M'x l (3) coolers. Drywell(B) and F

• coolers.

+ Reactor Building sampling coolers; LCW eump co<>lere (in drywell and reactor building), RIP MG sete k(4) and RWCU pump coolere. l l ~ 2.11.3 7 6/1/92 ll

a3,-- ' ABWR oesign occumont v Table 2.11.3d: Reactor Building Cooling Water Consumers - Division C b, d Emergency Operating

Normel Shutdown I ' Shutdown

- Stoney (LOCA) - I S**" Y- '*------t-- mom %eting g et 20 houre - (no lose of !('g"*'g Components - " Conditione

• 1 ^^^ -

AC1 .---,w-RCW/RSW 2 3 3 2 3 '3 HeatExchangere in Service f ESSENTIAL I X X Emergency Die-set Generator 8 X X X X RHR Heat ExchangerB \\ Others (eseen-X X j X X X X tial)(2i \\ NON. ESSENTIAL Others (non-X X i X X X essential)W j J XCTSo 'bt1 (X). Equipment receives RCW in this mode. h .,..(-) - Equipment does not receive RC_W in this mode.__ - - --. u___ y HECW refrigerator, ro' m cooters, motor coolers, and mechanical eeel coolers for RHR and HPC (2) o (3) Instrument and service air coolers, CRD pump oil cooler, redweste componente, HSCR condeneer, and turbine building sempling coolere. l 1 .2.11.3 = - 6/1/92 l

~ ^^ ^ ^ ^ w. u. e -I ABWR Design Document -l P MI h SURGE TANK %b RM Hz (Resetor Buildre) U '7 ^ (Reactor Building) h L 4s* EMERGENCYDXI (Reactor Building) g il FPC HX r SPCU f T (Reector Building) b OTHEnS (ESSENTIAL) (Reactor ard Control Bundng) i @ P. CowauM-M s J '""*' aunang) - h--- ggRS MSSEN) u (Reactor. Redweste and Turtnne Bunding) Ij aMR { n J DRYWER EQU5' MENT 2 4 bya qua N#$ ns CONTA CONTADeMNT V n c .u O' l--* new (controltuMne)( nCw PUMP g. fc.nw ) O' O nSw. , nCg g O' L-> nsw nCW PUMP k r,6w (conw sm) EN 4 k4uid $y5'W Figure 2.'11.3b RBCW Division - B 2.11.3 10-6/1/92

_3= ABWR Design Document r F M SURGE TANK 1 RHR Hz T f Reactor Building) 1P 'TP ' (Reactor Building) e M L w EW2 -5MERGENOV-CNG 4 (Reactor Build 6ng) g 2. A p itlh SYU / OTHERS(&' ) (Reactor and Control BuMng) P CRD PUMP ""N (Reactor Building) l3 3 ______a a l L ___ __________y oTweas o<mEasum) l (Reactor. Redweedand Turbine Bunding) l________. iA/sA COMPRESSORS __] rrurein.suadingi 4 P RCW HK rc.nw W C ss., m' L-> Rsw RCW PUMP (coreid ihmiding) gg (conw aumsna) RS A RSW "ED ree ?' L-* nsw RCW PUMP Rsw (cen w su uns) l Figure 2.11.3c RBCW Division - C 2.11.3 11 6/1/92

_7 3 1 ABWR Design Document ""?g -f [ M4Wf SURGE TA (R*.cw suuna) U ,y 5 ' d5 ~9 pCu s i I ,J ( L W - e ,4o N @ q, e kl4ecW siGu'U-L V _^ y ~ ? O'K s cno a cuw pumps q q (Reactor 8%) 3-m___ _ _ __ _ q gme= <=**=emAt> l__ _ __ _ e @eactor, Radneses and Turtnne GuMng) e wsA compnessons (Tusenne suune) u U g, J omuu.sous usur gla . 4m #Mf 2 ns cowf cowrAsemper ,, " M. C .x O' l----> new - new puur R g -= new> w.=.. O nSW ,,. wr %e => _p-W om) 4thh0Ldn hy3' M .b: kG.W t Figure 2'.11.3a RBCW Division A 2.11.3- -9 6/1fJ2

t 1 ABWR oesign oncument i 2 2.15.6 Firo Protection System

3 7

Design Description The Fire Protection System is a non-safety system designed to detect, alarm and extinguish fires. Major buildings are equipped with a minimum of two types of fire extinguishing systems consisting of sprinkler systems, standpipes and hose reels, and portable extinguishers. The fire suppressior, systems are designed such that there are two suppression systems available to a lire area. Areas covered by sprinklers or foam systems are also covered by the manual hose system. Areas covered by the manual hose system only can be reached from at least two hose stations. A hose reel and fire extinguisher are located no greater than 30.5 m from any location within the buildings. The sprinkler systems and the standpipe systems in the reactor and control buildings are analyzed and designed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. As shown on Figure 2.15.6, the water supply system including a tank, a pump and part of the yard supply main are designed to these m requirements also, The seismically designed system and the non-seismically (d designed system are separated by closed valves and a parallel check valve. The water supply system is required to be a fresh water system. Two sources with 3 a minimum capacity of 1140 m for each source is provided. A minimum of 456 3 m is reserved for use by the scismically designed portion of the suppression system. A motor driven pump supplits the non-seismic designed train and its power is supplied from a non-Class 1E bus. The seismic train is powered by a diesel driven pump. Ajockey pump is provided to keep the system pressurized. The fire water requirement for the reactor and control building is a minimum 2 flow of 1890 liters / min at a pressure 24.57 kg/cm g at the most hydraulically remote hose connection. A fire water supply connection to the RHR system piping is provided for backup water injection into the reactor vessel and into the drywell spray header from the seismically analyzed component train. The main power, unit auxiliary, and reserve transformers are provided with automatic deluge water spray suppression systems. Automatic foam water extinguishing systems are provided for the diesel r3 generator rooms and dav tank rooms. t ) 2.15.6 10/21/92

ABWR Design Document Fire detection and alarm systems are prosided in all fire areas. Fire detection and (ij alarm systems are supplied with power from the non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply. Control room indicators and alanns are prosided for monitoring the fire protection system status of the detection systems, the suppression systems and the motor driven and diesel driven fire pumps. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.6 prosides a definition of the inspections, tests and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Fire Protection System. A I%./ 2.15.6 2-10/21S 2

r ~ ( (o) L v Table 2.15.6: Fire Protection System inspections, Tests, Analyses ano Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspewtions, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1. A basic configuration for the Fire 1. Visualinspections of the as-built system 1. The as-built configuration of the Fire Protection System is shown on Figure configuration will be conducted. Protection System is in accordance with 2.15.6. Figure 2.15.6. 2. The motor driven pump described in the 2. A test of the power availability to the motor 2. The motor driven pump described in the Design Description for the Fire Protection driven pump described in the Design Design Description for the Fire Protection System is powered from the non-Class 1E Description in Section 2.15.6 will be System receives electrical power from non-bus. conducted with power supplied from the Class 1E busses only. permanently installed electric power busses. 3. Two water supply tanks with a minimum 3. Visualinspection of the as-built water 3. As-built water supply tanks meet the 3 capacity of 1140 m each are provided, supply tanks and volumetric calculations capacity requirements specified in the with one having a minimum dedicated using as-built dimensions will be CDC. 3 volume of 456 m in the seismically performed. .9 designed component train. 4. Two fire water supply system pumps 4. A test of the flow rate and pressure from 4. The fire water supply system pumps independently provide a minimum flow of each pump will be conducted. independently provide the flow and 1890 Liters / min. at a pressure 2.57 kg/ pressure si ecified in the CDC. 4 2 cm g at the most hydraulically remote hose connection in the reactor and control buildings. 5. Two fire suppression systems are available 5. A visualinspection of the as-built plant fire 5. Each fire area has at least two independent to a fire area. suppression systems will be ccNucted. means of fire suppression. 6. No location within a fire area is more than 6. A visualinspection of as-built hose reel 6. Standpipe and hose reel stations are 30.5m from a hose station. Two hose locations will be performed. located as specified in the CDC. coverage is provided to areas covered by the hose system only. 7. Portable fire extinguishers are provided 7. A visual inspection of the as-built 7. Location of portable fire extinguishers is as throughcut the plant buildings with no extinguisher locations will be conducted. specified in the CDC. more than 30.5m distance to any one. 8. A fire water supply connection to the RHR 8. Visualinspection of the as-built piping 8. The fire water supply piping is in e system is provided. layout will be performed. accordance with the CDP s,

,3 , -s .x + N} \\J O t Table 2.15.6: Fire Piotection System = Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9. The main power, unit auxiliary and reserve 9. Visualinspection of as-built systems and 9. Automatic deluge water spray systems are transformers are provided with automatic testing under simulated fire conditions will present and provide water spray to each deluge water spray systems. be performed. transformer.

10. Automatic foam-water extinguishing

10. Visual inspection of as-built systems and

10. The automatic foam sater suppression systems are provided for the diesel testing of automatic logic under simulated systems are present and initiation logic is generator and day tank rooms.

fire conditions will be conducted. actuated under simulated fire conditions.

11. Control room indicators and alarms are

11. Inspections will be performed on the

11. Features are available in the control Room prowded for the Fire Protection System control room features for the Fire as defined in the CDC.

indicating operatbn of suppression Protection System. systems, local alarms and pump status. 4 5 w s

U O O4 N T. in ALT &A A/ ATE I NORMAL SUPPLY I I+0 M} RwTO4, M D cOMc0 L__ i ^^.^^^ C '.LL C? 0 w rur-ai e a cr Tv g l CL".TEO ~ e l I BUILDINGS - I COMPO4GdT5 W THir4 PH MTo*16 or ~_ ANALYZED FOR SEISMIC ("^tE ?; CAras/LiTV ZL 3 g I E i g u__' [d ' I-biss s L44GTG8+ DRIVEN puM P gg9 P-f P_g g n __J J =_ cr P F o "V k JOCKEY PUMP - V StfD w A Ps96%& i q a urSTHtit b Z aoN o Nuu4L No7M 4HEsa-GNGe6 1M4EfHe TE-SUPPLY DRIVEN PUMP r N / u/6/m,fM'>1TG T IsV o n33 M CEALMcG-AAID 4ws++ss-ordat K44T BUILDSINGS @ POST INDICATOR VALVE .oAL Grin l/4Lc4 m k Figure 2.15.4/ Fire Protection Water Supply Systerb ...~.

O O O~' t' 7 cn )d v jg NO. FACILITY 7N 1 REACTOR CONTAINMENT E4 2 REACTOR BUILDING 3 CONTROL BUILDING 4 MAIN STEAM /FEEDWATER TUNNEL 5 TURBINE BUILDING 6 SERVICE BUILDING 8 7 RADWASTE BUILDING -Q d-- 8 HOUSE BOlLER 9 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK >d Dd Qi 10 MAIN TRANSFORMER n 11 NORMAL SWITCHGEAR 12 DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK (3) N @Y 13 STACK N V -- 14 EQUIPMENT ENTRY LOCK 1s FIRE PROTECTION WATER gl STORAGE TANK (2) 9 2 - 4 / 16 FIRE PROTECTION PUMPHOUSE N 7 an 3 4 3 6 I 3 @4-wm O4 < O i2 is 13[ -D G -D4 M D <l POST INDICATOR VALVE og y r i o is N _Q4 FIRE HYDRANT & SHUTOFF 12 SA y NE O o 22 1s Q SA SEIS ANALYSIS FOR SAFE S DOWN I mm EARTHOU i g E>4 ' SAl ^-f x e ~ j Figure 2.15.6b Fire Protection Yard Main Piping

12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS 2.5.6 FUEL STORAGE RACKS COMMENT ID: S P L B-2.5.6-1 Identify need for criticality and load drop analyses to be provided GE RESPONSE: ITAAC rewritten to cover criticality but load-drop analyses not Tier I 'g material. COMMENT Ip_: SPLB-2.5.6 2 Provide more information and inspection requirement regarding the pool design (e.g. concrete with steel liner) GE RESPONSE: No action taken - covered by another ITAAC. This ITAAC only covers fuel pool racks. COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.5.6 3 Provide information on how the racks will be supported in the spent fuel pool and the new fuel pool vault GE RESPONSE: No action taken - Not Tier 1 material. This ITAAC only covers fuel pool racks. 9 M J

x f .12/8/92-PLANTSYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS - 2.10.1 - -TURBINE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM 1QQMMENT ID: _ SPLB 2.10.1-1 List all. loads' served _by the MS system (e.g. SJAE) and system layout (e.g.- flow restrictors-and-MSIVs) GE RESPONSE: Comment rejected. Beyond the scope of TIER 1/ ITAAC. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.1-2 Discuss MSIV's ability to shut during maximum DP_ and flow conditions _ GE RESPONSE: Comment rejected. Not practical to-test MSIVs for closure speed against maximum.' differential pressure and maximum flow Closure times are expected-to be faster under-maximum dP and flow because upstream. pressure tends - to seat the valve _. (i.e. the disk is on the upstream side of the valve seat). The stroke time of the valves' will be tested. However, stroke rate testing of MSIVs against high pressure steam cannot occur until start-up. COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.10.1 Identify seismic interface restraint GE RESPONSE: Comment - accepted. The seismic interface restraint is shown on Figure 2.1.2b "Steamline" in thel - NBS ITAAC. COMMENT ID: S P L B-2.10.1 13 ..-.= =. -

k,. 12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS Identify-seismic class and quality group (including nitrogen accumulators for MSIVs and safety / relief valves and system branch lines) GE RESPONSE: Comment partially accepted. The Seismic Class and Quality Group of the of the MSLs within the reactor building is discussed in the " Design Description" section of the NBS ITAAC. The Seismic Class and Quality Group of the pneumatic supply lines for the MSIVs and SRVs is not discussed in the NBS ITAAC. COMMENT ID: S PL B-2.10.1-5 Discuss features to protect MS line from water entrainment GE RESPONSE: Comment rejected. No changes will be made to the NBS ITAAC as a result of this comment. The MSLs have drain lines to drain the MSLs during startup, before full power operation. The steam separator / steam dryer inside the RPV prevent moisture carryover during normal power operation. Also, the MSLs are insulated to limit the generation of condensate. Closure of the turbine stop valves on RPV high water level 8 initiates a reactor scram. This -limits moisture carryover when the steam separators are Gooded. COMMENT ID: S PL B-2,10.1-6 State that the shutoff valves will close in 2 seconds GE RESPONSE: 14

12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS 2.10.2 CONDENSATE FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE AIR EXTRACTION SYSTEMS This section discusses 2 systems; the Condensate and Feedwater System (CFS) and the Main Condenser Evacuation System (MCES). i CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMMENT ID: S PL B-2.10.2-1 Provide drawing GE RESPONSE: Not appropriate for Tier 1 material. COMMENT ID: S PLB-2.10.2-2 Identify all cooling loads (e.g. offgas, SJAE, gland steam) GE RESPONSE: Not appropriate for Tier 1 material. COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.10.2-3 Discuss isolation provisions and supporting instrumentation GE RESPONSE: This topic applicable to Nuclear Boiler System, Section 2.1.2. COMMENT ID: S PL B-2.10.2-4 Discuss power supply for remote shutoff valve GE RESPONSE: This topic applicable to Nuclear Boiler System, Section 2.1.2. COMMENT ID: S PLB-2.10.2-5 15

.c '12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCll COMMENTS Identify _ ~ selsmic. Interfac'e restraint GE RESPONSE:. 4 This topic applicable to Nuclear Boiler System, Section 2.1.2., - MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM COMMENT ID: S Plf-2.10.2-6 State that the system is designed for. hydrogen GE RESPONSE: This will be included in Design Description. COMMENT ID: S P L B-2.10.2-7 it is not clear that the flow instrument shown on the diagram is what-is used for isolation of offgas on low flow b GE RESPONSE: Flow element is shown -at-inlet to 2d stage ejector and discussed in Design Description, COMMENT ID: S P L B-2.10.2-8 ' Identify functions of the pressure instrumentation GE RESPONSE: t Will clarify Design Description to show that pressure indicator ' indicates operability. ' COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.10.2-9 I : L Indicate that the mechanical ~ vacuum pump trips on high main steam line - radiatio n ' GE RESPONSE: 'This is discussed in Design Description and ITAAC. -16

l 12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCll COMMENTS COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.2-10 Include the fact that hy* ogen in the dHution stream is kept below 4% by volume GE RESPONSE: Too detailed for Tier 1. No action taken. COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.10.2-11 Show the hydrogen analyzers on the drawing GE RESPONSE: This level of detail is not appropriate for Tier 1 material. 2.10.4 CONDENSATE PURIFICATION SYSTEM L COMMENT ID: SPLB-2,10.4-1 SPLB has no responsibility for this system and should be removed as the primary review branch GE RESPONSE No GE action. 2.10.7 MAIN TURBINE COMMENT ID: S P L B-2.10.7-1 Clarify which valves trip and which modulate GE RESPONSE: Will add to Design Description "MSVs and CIVs trip and CVs modulate". COMMENT ID: S PL B-2.10.7-2 Discuss hydrogen-protection features on the generator 17

) t 12/8/92. PLANTSYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS'

GE RESPONSE

Not appropriate.for-Tier 1 material. 2.10.9-TURBINE GLAND STEAM SYSTEM COMMENT ID: - SPLB-2.10.9-1 l Provide a drawing GE RESPONSE: A simplified SSAR _ drawing (10.4.2) will be -provided. - COMMENT ID:- SPLB 2.10.9-2 Include the blower exhaust rad monitor' on the drawing 1 GE RESPONSE: This will be included on simplified SSAR drawing provided for comment SPLB-2.10.9-2. COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.10.9-3 Clarify steam sources (auxiliary steam, main steam, process steam from high pressure -heater drain tank vent header) GE RESPONSE: This will be clarified on simplified SSAR drawing provided -for comment S P L B-2.10,9-2. COMMENT -ID: SPLB-2.10.9-4 Identify the cooling source _for the condenser GE RESPONSE: This will be included on simplified SSAR drawing provided for comment SPLB 2.10.9 2. COMMENT-ID: S PLB-2.10.9-5 18 l-

12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS Clarify how the steam source is changed on high radiation, is it done manually or automatically? GE RESPONSE: Too detailed for Tier 1 material and site specific. COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.10.9-6 include the fact that the system provides sealing steam for the turbine stop and control valves and the combined intermediate valves GE RESPONSE: This will be included on simplified SSAR drawing provided for comment S P L B-2.10.9-2. 2.10.13 TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.13-1 Include statement that system can accommodate a full-load rejection without lifting main steam safety / relief valves GE RESPONSE: No. SRVs will lift on full load rejection. 1 COMMENT ID: SPLB-2.10.13-2 Identify that turbine bypass valves (TBVs) close on loss of vacuum, LOSP, and loss of hydraulic pressure GE RESPONSE: This will be added to Design Description. s COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.13-3 State in description (and test) that valves open when steam pressure exceeds preset pressure 19 l I

12/8/92' 'f-PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS GE RESPONSE: This will be added to Design Description. COMMENT ID:. - SPLB-2.10.13-4 -r include drawing GERESPONSE: Not necessary - refer to -2.10.1 schematic, COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.13-5 Ensure that all the high-energy lines associated with this system are located in the-Turbine Bldg _(Turbine Bldg ITAAC) GE RESPONSE: OK - in Turbine Building ITAAC. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2,10.13-6 State that piping up to and including the TBVs are seismic. Category 1-and Safety Class 2 and that remainder of piping up to the condenser can withstand an SSE ~ GE RESPONSE: No - This: piping'is not safety-related. 2.10,21 MAIN CONDENSER COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.21-1 include drawing GE RESPONSE: ~ Too-detailed Not required in any SSAR (or Tier 1 material), COMMENT 'ID: S P L B-2,10.21 20

12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS Include important instrumentation on drawing (conductivity, vacuum monitor, rad monitor) GE RESPONSE: - No - This in in Design Description. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.21-3 I List all connections to condenser GE RESPONSE: This is not appropriate for Tier 1 material. COMMENT IQ: S P LB-2,10.21-4 include fact that system receives and collects condensate flows, removes air and noncondensables, and removes hydrogen and oxygen GE RESPONSE: This is included in Design Description. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2,10.21-5 Include 4 minute condensate retention capability GE RESPONSE: This is in Design Description. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.21-6 Include fact that maximum flood level is less than grade if condensate system should fail. GE RESPONSE: The CWS System, 2.10.23, is flood limiting - clarify. 2.10.23 CIRCULATING WATER i 21 l a

..~ .12/8/92) ~ - PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH COMMENTS ' COMMENT 10:.- S P LB-2.10.23-1 ~ ilndicate:that system dumps heat to the power cycle heat sink. GE RESPONSE: 1 COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.23-2 Where will the level switches be shown (the Turbine-Bldg lTAAC)? y GE RESPONSE:- -l COMMENT I D_ :. S P LB-2.10.23-3 Indicate and show th'at th'e logic scheme minimizes potential.for spurious- "high level system" isolation trips GE RESPONSE:

q Not Tier 1.

This level of detail not ' appropriate for Tier 1 material. ) COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.23-4 State that there will be features provided. to preventLorganic.' fouling: 1 GE RESPONSE: Not Tier 1.. This level of detail not: appropriate for Tier:1 ' material..

COMMENT ID:

S P LB-2.10.23 < identify that the system will function onflow level in theLpower cycle heat:; -sink y GE RESPONSE: Not Tier 1. This ~ level of detail not-appropriate:for; Tier 1 material.I 22 1 .) .A

j-12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCll COMMENTS COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.23-6 Include the fact that features are provided to maintain a minimum circulating water temperature GE RESPONSE: Not Tier 1. This level of detail not appropriate for Tier 1 material. COMMENT ID: S P LB-2.10.23-7 Ensure that all Turbine Building flooding will be confined to the condenser pit (Turbine Building ITAAC) GE RESPONSE: See Turbine Building Section 2.15.11. 23 1

Division of Engineering Technology Comments Comment ID Comment /GE Response CON 1M ENT ID: D ET-2.10.1 1 2.10.1 Turbine Main Steam System The ABWR plant design has eliminated the main steam isolation valve leakage control system. Instead, GE proposes to rely on the use of an alternate leakage path which takes advantage of the large volume and surface area in the main steam piping, by-pass line, and condenser to hold up and-plate out the release of fission products following core damage. Therefore, these components are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident and are required to remain functional during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. The commitments that GE has made relative to this issue are in Section 3.2 of the SSAR and are summarized in Section 3.2.1 of the staff's Final Safety Evaluation Report for the ABWR. The discussion in Section 2.10.1 and the ITAAC in Table 2.10.1 should be revised to reflect this information and to confirm that it has been implemented in accordance with the SSAR commitments. GE RESPONSE: See response to Radiation Protection Branch comment R PB -2.10.1 - 1. CONINTENT ID: D ET-2,10.4 - 1 2.10.4 Condensate Purification System The proposed Certified Design Commitment and ITAAC do not address the primary function of the system and how to verify its operability. GE should revise the ITAAC accordingly. See comments on attached marked-up page. GE RESPONSE: GE will delete reference to water treatment additions since there may be several, depending on final detailed material selection, e.g. 02, H2, Fe, etc. 32

12/8/92 RADIATION PROTECTION BRANCH COMMENTS RADIATION PROTECTION BRANCH COMMENTS

1. Section 2.10.1 Turbing Main Steam S.ystem COMMENT ID: R P B -2.10.1 -1 The staff has reviewed Section 2.10.1 Turbine Main Steam System in the Tier 1 Design Certification Material (TDCM) and finds that the design description and its related ITAAC (Table 2.10.1) should include (1) the operability requirement of main steam drain valve from main control room via essential power supply (Class IE), (2) the structural integrity requirement for main steam lines, drain lines, and main condenser for their leak-tightness following a postulated LOCA.

GE RESPONSE: Q_OMMENT 10: R P B -2.10.1 -2 The main steam lines from MSIV to the inain condenser, including the drain linea, should be analyzed, and (3) using a seismic analysis to demonstrate appropriate structural integrity for leak-tightness under SSE loading conditions. The staff has provided a credit for iodine removal in the main steam lines, drain lines, and condenser following a postulated LOCA and accepted the ABWR design without a MSIV leakage control system. This is Open item 2.3.6-1. GE RESPONSE: 1

L* 1 12/8/92 R ADIATION PROTECTION BRANCil COMMENTS 3,0 Sectio 0. 2.10.1. Torbine Idain Slaam Svstem COldfdENT ID: RPB 2.10.13 3.1 Add the following two certified design commitments in Table 2.10.1 as ITAAC items. (1) the main steam drain valves are operable from the main control room via essential power supply (class IE). (2) the main steam piping from MSIV to the condenser inlet including the main steam drain pipe is analyzed to demonstrate appropriate leaktightness under SSE loading conditions. 3.2 The basis for adding the above ITAAC items are that (I) the staff has provided a credit for airborne radioactive lodine removal in the main steam (and drain) piping and in the main condenser following a postulated LOCA, and (2) the staff accepted the ABWR design without a MSIV leakage control system. 3.3 A marked up copy of Section 2.10.1 is enclosed. Incorporates comment 3.1 GE RESPONSE: Agree to addi l -l 8 L 1 m Imit i

~._- 12/8/92 ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT IDj ACRS 2.10.2-1 Section 2.10.2, page -1 thru +5 (6/1/92) Condensate and Feedwater System, Design Description, Page 2.10.2-1, Paragraph, Last Sentence, states: This portion of the piping is analyzed for dynamic effects from postulated events and safety / relief valve discharges. Table 2.10.2a, inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria, Page 2.10.2-4, doesn't explicitly provide verification that this analysis has baen performed. (Perhaps Certified Design Commitment number 1 was intended to imply this verification; however, that commitment could be met without coverage of the analysis mentioned here.) l GE RESPONSE: This sentence deleted. The referenced piping applies to NBS. COMMENT IDJ ACRS 2.10.2-2 Section 2.10.2, page -1 thru -5 (6/1/92) Main Condenser Evacuation System, Design Description, Page 2.10.2-2, Third Paragraph, states: The MCE System is designed to Quality Group D. Table 3.0, Page -5, the entry for 2.10.2 shows 3.3 Piping Design as not applicable. Quality Group D requires piping designed to 1131.1. GE RESPONSE: Section 3.3 Piping Design is not applicable to non-safuy-related Quality Group D. No change. 45 ,-.c...,m, ,,,y- .e e, y .--s, e-,, v.- .w., ,,---.-.r--,

j 12/8f)2 ACRS COMMENTS CQ. MhiENT ID: ACRS 2.10.4-1 Section 2.10.4, page -1 and -2 (6/1/92) Des /gn Descr/ption. P,1ge 210.4 -1. Third Paragraph, states: The CP System is designed to Quality Group D. Table 3.0, Page -5. the entry for 2.10.4 shows 3.3 Piping Design as not applicable. Quality Group D requires piping designed to B31.1. GE RESPONSE: Section 3.3 Piping Design is not applicable to non safety-related QJiality Group D. No change. l l i i l 46 l-

12/8/92 ACRS COMMENTS _ COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.10.7-1 Section 2.10.7, page -1 and -2 (6/1/92) Page 2.10.7-2, Table 2.10.7, ITAAC doesn't include any coverage of veriffcation that LP rotors have been center bored. See David A. Ward's letter to James M. Taylor of April 13,1992, item 6 on page 4. GE RESPONSE: Too detailed for Tier 1. Center boring LP rotors is dependent on available technology and should be at the discretion of vendor and customer. No action i taken. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.10.7-2 Section 2.10.7, page -1 and -2 (6/1/92) Section 2,10.7 barely mentioned the Turbine Controls. Yet Section 10.2.8, Turbine Controls, says that the topic is covered in Section 2.10.7. Figure 2.2.7a Reactor Protection System, on Page 2.2.7-8, provides a block ("C71 RPS") of four (4) input signal from turbine 1&C. The RPS ITAAC don't include verification of the 1&C for these turbine inputs. Coverage is required somewhere. GE RESPONSE: The RPS ITAAC includes input signals from Turbine Controls. ITAAC 2.2.7, item 3, simulation testing will verify that I&C provides signal to RPS. 47

12/8F)2 ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT ID: ACRS i 2.10.9-1 Section 2.10.9, page -1 and -2 (6/1/92) Design Description, Page 2.10.9-1, Fourth Paragraph, states: The TGS System is designed to quality Group D. Table 3.0, Page -5, the entry for 2.10.9 shows 3.3 Piping Design as not applicable. Quality Group D requires piping designed to B31.1. Further, Design Description, Page 2.10.9-1, Last Paragraph, states: Relief valves on the seal steam header prevent excessive seal steam pressure. This also involves " piping design." j GB RESPONSE: ^ Section 3.3 Piping Design is not applicable to non afety-related Quality Group D. No change. 48

12/3/92 ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.10.13-1 Section 2.10.13, page -1 and -2 (6/1/92) The failure or malfunction of the Turbine Bypass System has the potential to cause severe transients effects on the Reactor Coolant System. The coverage in Section 2.10.13 doesn't appear consistent with that importance. Design Descrlprion, Page 2.10.13-1, Fourth Paragraph, Last Sentence, and last Paragraph, state respectively: 1 The TB System is designed to bypass nominally 33% of the rated main steam flow to the condenser. i The TB System in conjunction with the reactor systems, provides the capability to shed 40% of the turbine-generator rated load without reactor trip. These important capabilities are no doubt assumed in various transient analyses and should be confirmed by the ITAAC. GB RESPONSB: Too detailed for Tier 1. In addition the TBS is not safety related. b i 49 i

T 12/8/92 l'LANT SYS'111 hts HRANCll COhthtENTS 2.11.13 HIGH PRESSURE NITROGEN GAS SUPPLY SYSTEM QQldMENT ID: SPLB 2.11.131 Ensure system filters out particulates greater than or equal to 3 (or 5) microns (this is currently an open item) GE RESPONSE: Five micron iilters are adequate. No action taken. This is not a Tier 1 material. COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.11.13 2 Provide seismic and safety classification and performance requirements for ADS accumulators GE RESPONSE: No action taken. Seismic and safety Classifications will be verified by normal QA program. This is not an ITAAC material. The ADS accumulator performance requirement is part of the Nuclear Boiler System ITAAC (Section 2.1.2). 33

4 ACitS COMMIiNTS COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.13-1 Section 2.11.13, page -1 thru 4 (6/1/92) Design Description, page 2.11.13-1, Third Paragraph, states: Separations between the safety-relat< d and the non-safety-related portions are provided by motor-operated shutoff valves that automatically close on low pressure condition in the ADS and non-ADS SRV accumulator supply lines. Figure 2.11.13 (mislabeled as Figure 2.11.12) shows no pressure instrumentation on the "non-ADS SRV accumulator supply line" as is provided on the " ADS SRV accumulator supply line." GE RESPONSE: Comment accepted. Figure 2.11.13 has been corrected to reflect the correct figure number and the pressure instrument on the non-ADS SRV accumulator supply line. 70

s 12/8/92-PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCil COMMENTS 2.11.0 HVAC EMERGENCY COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.11.61 -State that system can accommodate 100 days of leakage without makeup. GE RESPONSE: Surge tank capacity has been added to the Design Description. C_OMMENT ID: SPLB 2.11.6 2 Identify sources of makeup water GE RESPONSE: The makeup water source has been added to the Design Description. COMMENT-ID: SPLB 2.11.6 3 Show the surge tank, its level indication, and the_ chemical addition tank on the drawing GE RESPONSE: This system shares a surge tank with the PCW system as shown in _ figures 2.11.a-c. The' surge tank is discussed in section 2.11.3. The chemical addition tank is not Tier 1. COMMENT ID: spi.3 2.11.6-4 Discuss system response to high 'and low surge tank level GE RESPONSE: This. is-discussed in section 2.11.3. l 29-

12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEhtS HitANCll COhiMENTS COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.11,6 5 When is system initiated? GE RESPONSE: System is in continuous operation. COMhtEHT (Q: SPLB-2.11.6 6 Are there two different flow meters for the evaporator and condenser? GE RESPONSE: No, there is only one flow meter. 30 .l

12/8/92 ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.6-1 Section 2.11.6, page -1 thru -6 (6/1/92) Design Description, Page 2.11.6-1, Third Paragraph, Third Sentence, and Fourth Paragraph, Second Sentence, respectively, state: Surge tanks and condenser coolant flow are provided by the corresponding division of the RCW System. The surge tanks are capable of replacing system water losses for more than 100 days during an emergency. Note that the surge tanks are part of RCW and not IIECW. Neither the Design Description for RCW (Section 2.11.3) nor Figures 2.11.3a thru 2.11.3c covers the sharing of each RCW division's surge tank with the corresponding division of IIECW. The capacity of those surge tanks or the verification of that capacity is not covered in the RCW Design Description or ITAAC. See Comment 2.11.3-4. GE RESPONSE: The RCW design description has been revised to mention that the surge tanks are shared by RCW and HECW. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.6-2 Section 2.11.6, page -1 thru -6 (6/1/92) Design Description. Page 2.11.6-2, First Paragraph, Third Sentence, states: Flow switches prohibit the refrigerators from operating unless there is water flow through the evaporator and condenser. Table 2.11.6. Page 2.11.6-3, doesn't provide an ITAAC to confirm this. GE RESPONSE: Not Tier 1. Deleted. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.6-3 Section 2.11.6, page -1 thru -6 (6/1/92) 4S

= 4, ACRS COMMENTS Figures 2.11.6a-c, Pages 2.11.6-4 thru - One of these figures should contain the llECW Chemical Addition Tank, the block valves, and the code class interface. GB RESPONSE: Not Tier 1. f ) i t k i -49 -l -l ~

1 12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCil COMMENTS 2.11.3 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMMENT IQ: S P L B-2.11.3 1 State that sur00 tank can accommodate 30 days of leakage without makeup. GE RESPONSE: Surge tank capacity has been added to Design Description. COMMENT IQ: SPLB 2.11.3-2 identify features to prevent water hammer GE RESPONSE: Not TIER 1. 26 1

4 12/8/92 ItEGIONAL llEVIEW Gl(OUP COhih1ENTS REACTOR BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMMENT ID: R R G-2,11.3 1 The ITAAC system description references Figures 2.11.3 and Figures 2.11.3a-c. It is not clear if Figure 2.11.3 is a separate drawing or if it means Figures 2.11.3a c. GE RESPONSE: Numbering of the figures has been changed. _Q_0_MMENT ID: R R G -2.11.3-2 _ Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW) ITAAC #4, isolation valve testing, does not include the non LOCA automatic isolation of the non-safety-related portions of the system on a low RCW surge tank level condition, although it is discussed in the RCW ITAAC design description. GE RESPONSE: This issue is discussed in ITAAC 5 on Table 2.11.13a. COMMENT ID: R R G-2.11.3-3 The level of detail varies between different system ITAACs. In the case of the RCW ITAAC, it varies within the same ITAAC For example, the RCW ITAAC #3 for flow testing should be at least as detailed as the RCW ITA4,0

1. 4, isolation valve testing. The isolation valve ITAAC tests the valves under various plant conditions, while the flow testing ITAAC has a global requirement for hydraulic testing of the system. Specifically, heat exchanger flow testing / performance testing is not required. The normal system configuration is one pump /two heat exchangers per train. Under LOCA conditions, the system automatically shifts to two pumps /three heat exchan;;ers. The RCW ITAAC does not require flow testing under these conditions (see General Comment #5).

GE RESPONSE: This. testing will be performed under ITAAC #6. COMMENT ID: RRG-2,11.3 4 16

12/8/92 Rl!GIONAL REViliW GitOUP COMMI!NTS _ The Failure Analysis as described in the SSAR appears to be inadequate in that it does not provide a comprehensive discussion of component failures. For example, it does not address loss of instrument air system or failure of individual components (see General Comment #2). GE RESPONSE: This is not an ITAAC issue. Q_OMMENT ID: R RG-2.11.3 5 _ Table 9.2.4c does not state what the assumed reactor service water temperature / ultimate heat sink temperature is under LOCA conditions. There is also a difference in scope between SSAR and ITAAC for the system design requirement following a LOCA (active / passive vs. active), GE RESPONSE: This is not an ITAAC issue. COMMENT ID: R R G-2.11.3-6 _ Table 9.2-4d does not agree with design requirements in the TIER 1 document. Discharge flow rate in the SSAR table for pumps in the A/B trains is 5720 gpm versus 2 5700 in the TIER 1 requirements; pump total head for pumps in the A/B train in the SSAR is 82 psig versus 2 80 psig in the TIER 1 requirements. GE RESPONSE: The rounded values in the TIER 1 requirement will be replaced with the values in the SSAR. 17

12/8/92 ACRS COMMENTS T COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.3-1 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru -11 (6/1/92) See Comment 2.11.9 8 concerning the lack of a coordinated design and ITAAC basis between RCW, RSW, and UllS. GE RESPONSE: See appropriate response. COMMENT IDI ACRS 2.11.3-2 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru -11 (6/1/92) Design Description, Page 2.11.3-1, Third Paragraph,12tst Sentence, states: The isolation valves to the non-essential RCW System are automatically or remote-manually operated.... Page 2.11.3-4, Table 2.11.3a, Certified Design Commitment number 4, states: Isolation valves as shown in Figure 2.11.3 can automatically or remote manually separate the RCW for the essential equipment from the RCW for the non essential equipment. Ilow does one determine which valves are required to be " automatically operated" and which are only required to be " remote-manually operated"? Presumably, GE analysis shows that the time response for some valves requires automatic actuation. GE RESPONSE: Figure revised to denote remote-operated valves. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.3-3 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru -11 (6/1/92) Neither the Design Description nor Table 2.11.3a covers the capability of the valve to isolate the RCW from MUWP or the verification of that capability. See Comment 2,11.1-1. 55

l 12/8/92-ACRS COMMENTS GB PESPONSE: ) i COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.3-4 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru 11 (6/1/92) Design Description, Page 2.11.3-3, I;tst Paragraph, First Sentence, states: A separate surge tank is provided for each RCW division. Neither the Design Descr/ prion nor Figures 2.11.3a thru 2.11.3c covers the sharing of each division's surge tank with the corresponding division of IIECW. The capacity of those surge tanks or the verification of that capacity is not covered in the RCW Design Description or ITAAC. See Comment 2.11.6-1. GE RESPONSE: The RCW Design Description is revised to show the surge tanks are shared by the RCW and IIECW. The surge tank capacity has been added to the IIECW Design Description. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.3-5 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru -11 (6/1/92) See the attached Exhibit 2.11.3 - ACRS. Page 28a. concerning the lack of a coordinated design and ITAAC basis between RCW and the systems-for which RCW provides cooling. GB RESPONSE:- The heat removal capability of these three systems cannot be tested before fuel load because sufficient heat will not be available prior to that-time. As a result, only water flow capability can be tested in an ITAAC. '56 . 2 .. c.a.u -... _,. _ _. ~ _. m u. . u -...

- d 12/8/92 ACRS COMMENTS Exhibit 2.11.3 - ACRS, Page 28a Ileat loads Allocated to the RCW System Tier 1 Document Divhions A 11 C 28-Aug 92 RCW lleat Exchanger Capacity as shown in Section 2.11.3. 4.50E+07 4.50E407 4.20E+07 Each RCW lix (p. 2.11.3-2 [6/1/92]) 1.35 E+ 08 1.35 E+ 08 1.26 E+ 08 Total /Div. 3 Served Equipment as shown in ngures 2.11.3a-c Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 RllR lix Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 D/G 6.55 E+ 06 6.55 E+06 N/A FPC lix Note 3 Others (Essential) Note 7 1 2 2 IIECW Refrig.(Figures 2.11.6a c) 2.30E+06 4.60E+ 06 4.60E+06 load @ 2.3E+ 06/Refrig. (Page 2.11.6-1 [6/1/92]) Note S&6 Note S&6 Note S&6 CRD Pumps (A&C only) & CUW Pumps (A&ll only) Note 7 Note 7 Note 7 Others (Non Essential) Note 7 N/A Note 7 IA/SA Compressors ote 4 Note 4 N/A Drywell Equipment Note 1 -- No load / capacity is specified in Section 2.4.1. Note 2 -- No load / capacity is specified in Section 2.12.13. Note 3 - Each lix is specified in Section 2.6.2 to have a capacity of 1.65E6 kcal/hr. This is equal to 1.82E3 BTU /sec or 6.55E6 IITU/hr. Note 4 -- Section 2.11.5 specilles 4/5 pump-chiller units operate during normal plant operation. Each unit has a load / capacity of 8.93E6 BTU /hr. Ilow 5 units are allotted to 2 RCW trains is not specified.' Note 5 -- Section 2.2.2 specifles no heat load for the CRD pumps. Note that neither Section 2.2.2 nor Figure 2.2.2b shows any provisions for cooling c f the CRD pump by RCW or by any other system. Note 6 - Figure 2.6.1 shows RCW providing cooling for the NRilX and not for the CUW Pumps as shown on Figures 2.11.3a and Figure 2.11.3b. Figure 2.6.1 is correct; however, Section 2.6.1 specifies no heat load for the NiulX on RCW. Note 7 - I was either (1) unable to specific heat loads for this service, or (2) the heat - l load shown for the category is all I could identify, 57 t

_ _ ~. ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.11.3 6 Section 2.11.3, page -1 thru -11 (6/1/92) Figures 2.11.3a and 2.11.3b show RCW A&B providing cooling for CUW Pumps. Tables 2.11.3a and 2.11.3b show RCW A&B providing cooling for-CUW lleat Exchangers. Figure 2.6.1 shows the NRIlXs to be the items cooled. GB RESPONSE: The figures are correct. The CUW heat exchangers are also referred to as NRHXs. 58

i 12/8/92 8 PLANT SYSTEMS IIRANCil COMMENTS 2.15.6 ElRE PROTECTION SYSTEM .CO MM ENT ID: SPLB 2,15.61 State that fire water can be used to supply makeup to the spent fuel pool throur;h a spool piece and have inspection to ensure fire water can be dumped to pool within 30 minutes of an indication of loss of FPC GE RESPONSE: Tills IS NOT A REQUIRED MODE OF OPERATION PE'IWEEN Tile FIRE WATER SYSTEM AND Tile FUEL POOL MAKEUP SYSTEM (TilROUGil Tile RilR CONNECTION). Tile ALTERNATE MAKEUP WN111R SOURCE FOR Tile FUEL POOL IS IlY USE OF Tile WATER SUPPLY STANDPIPES AND FIRE IlOSES LOCATED WITillN Tile REACTOR llUILDING NEAR Tile FUEL POOL (REFERENCE AllWR SSAR SECTION 9.1.3.3). QQ,MMENT ID: SPLB 2.15.6 2 Discuss and demonstrate how electrical panels and MCC will be protected from fires GE RESPONSE: TilESE ARE COVERED llY SEPARATION CRITERIA UTILIZED IN Tile DESIGN OF TrilS IIARDWARE AND IS COVERED IN Tile RELATED ELECTRIC SYSTEM ITAACs (REFERENCE 2.7.1, 2.7.3 AND 2.12.1). COMMENT ID: SPLB 2.15.6 3 Design description states that all ECCS systems are three trains. This is not true (e.g. HPCF) Modify discussion to reflect actual design of ECCS systems GE RESPONSE: Tills DESCRIPTION IIAS 13EEN DELETED FROM Tile FPS ITAAC WRITE UP. THIS DESIGN ASPECT OF SEPARATION OF Tile SAFE SilVTDOWN DIVISIONS IIAS IlEEN INCORPORATED INTO TILE REACTOR 54

i 12/8/92 PLANT SYSTEMS 1111ANCll COMMl!NTS IlUILDING AND CONTROL llUILDING ITAACs (IREFlillENCl! 2.15.lG AND 2.15.12). COMMENT ID: SPLD-2.15.6 4 Ensure areas covered only by manual hose systems can be reached by at least two hose stations GE RESPONSE: AGREE ITAAC TAllLl! WILL 13E MODIFil!D TO CLARIFY Tills UNDER ITEM NO. 6 ( ALREADY IDliNTIFil!D IN DESIGN DESCRIPTION). 55

n l t i 12/M/92 ACRS COMMENTS COMMENT ID: ACRS j i 2.15.6-1 Section 2.15.6, page 2.15.6-1 thru -9 (6/1/92) Design Descr/ption, page 2.15.6-4, First Paragraph, First through Third Sentences, describes the "three independent mechanical and electrical i safety-related divisions," their location and their capabilities. The Fourth and Fifth Sentences take up the topic of four channels of " system initiation logic" withoutaiy transition. The four are referred to both as l_ " divisions" and as " logic" (e.g., "is made up of four logic," and "if one I-division becomes disabled... the system initiation logic reverts to two - out of the three logic") Four channels of logic is certainly consistent with the overall ABWR design; however, some introduction to the logic would be helpful. In r addition, a more consistent use of the terms (" divisions" and " logic") would be helpful. GE RESPONSE: This is not a Tier 1 item. Deleted from Fire Protection System (FPS) ITAAC. l No action taken - not Tier 1 material. Covered by Electrical / distribution' ITAAC. COMMENT ID; ACRS 2.15.6-2 Section 2.15.6, page 2.15.6-1 thru -9 (6/1/92) Design Description, page 2.15.6 4, item (1) following the First Paragraph, states: The remote shutdown panel is located in a fire zone different from the main control room fire zone. This commitment isn't covered by an ITAAC. GB RESPONSE: Removed from FPS ITAAC. No action taken. Covered by Reactor Building ITAAC. COMMENT ID: ACRS 2.15,6-3 Section 2.15.6, page 2.15.6-1 thru -9 (6/1/92) 5 103 e-- .---..~..,m....e- ,--,n,mr.,-,--.-w.m-,--- iirm--,- , - +,, --,,.---c,c- ,.7. ..-w-,ve.,r.r--a, ,e y-w-v----,-,

r 9 ACRS COMMENTS Design Description, page 2.15.6 5, in the first line on the page describes a " room-by-room, system-by-system basis" for the fire hazards analysis. In the seventh line on the page the fire hazards analysis is described as a " fire area by fire area treatment." While probably just a difference in wording,it is confusing to someone not a fire protection engineer who wonders if those different terms mean something special to the fire protection engineers. GB RESPONSE: Deleted from the FPS ITAAC. No action taken - not Tier 1 material. SAR issue (Fire llazard Analysis). I 104 evm s-a,- ,e ,w v ,,,,v,A' c--,, ev e, - ~ ~ -, e----- -,a- ---von.-- ,4+., ---,,n~ - --,-r-- -n,n p}}