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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20128L3001996-10-0202 October 1996 SER Supporting Dbnp IPE Process of Identifying Most Likely Severe Accidents & Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20058M9591993-09-28028 September 1993 SE Accepting Licensee Response to GL 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' ML20057A3791993-08-20020 August 1993 SE Concluding That Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan for Plant Has Unacceptable Exam Sample as Discussed in Encl Inel TER ML20056G4301993-08-18018 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Requests for Relief.Licensee Made Changes to Subj Program to Include Exercising & fail-safe Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater Valves AF-6451 & AF-6452,in Response to TER Anomaly 8 ML20056B2721990-08-20020 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code 3 Piping ML20248D8271989-09-29029 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 890228 & 0630 Submittals Presenting Proposed Designs to Comply w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Requirements ML20247E6901989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation of Audit of Facility Design for Resolution of IE Bulletin 79-27 Re Loss of non-Class IE Instrumentation & Control Power Sys Bus During Operation.Preventive Maint & Testing Program Should Be Developed for Bus Power Sources ML20247J8731989-05-18018 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License NPF-3 NUREG-0660, Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 840301 & 870420 Responses to NUREG-0737,Item 1.C.1,except Where Noted in Section 21989-05-0303 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 840301 & 870420 Responses to NUREG-0737,Item 1.C.1,except Where Noted in Section 2 ML20196D9601988-12-0808 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Util Response Concerning Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability Study.Util Should Ensure That Sys Mods Do Not Result in Net Reduction in Sys Reliability ML20207K7911988-10-0404 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Operation in Cycle 6 W/O Removing Flaws in Cracked HPI Nozzle ML20148D0391988-01-19019 January 1988 SER Accepting Util 831209 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip reliability-on-line Testing.Unit Designed to Permit on-line Functional Testing of Diverse Trip Features of Reactor Trip Breakers ML20147C2631988-01-12012 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Equipment Classification of Reactor Trip Sys Components ML20149F9621988-01-11011 January 1988 SER Accepting License Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for safety- Related Components ML20236U6531987-11-27027 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Effects of Errors in Util Analysis of Small Break Loca.Use of Incorrect Values in Analysis Results in Incomplete Compliance w/10CFR50,App K.Plant Poses No Risk to Public Health Due to Meeting 10CFR50.46 Requirements ML20236T3871987-11-25025 November 1987 SER Re Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97 Concerning post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation.Design Acceptable ML20211G8641987-02-11011 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 3.2.3, Post-Maint Testing & All Other Safety-Related Components ML20207Q6711987-01-0909 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Re Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20212C9231986-08-0404 August 1986 Sser Supporting Util Reanalyses of 74 Masonry Walls ML20212G6021986-08-0404 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Question 29 Concerning Training for Infrequent, Critical & Difficult Tasks ML20212R3421986-06-10010 June 1986 SER Re Progress Made by Licensee in Area of Plant Maint.New Maint Organization Functioning W/No Major Weaknesses.Region III Will Continue to Monitor Maint at Plant to Assure Continued Control & Progress ML20206F3041986-05-27027 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Review Re Cold Pressurization of Secondary Side of Steam Generator During Testing on 850906 ML20203N9141986-04-17017 April 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Mods to Safety Actuation Sys Re Shared Power Supply Returns as Result of 801205 Actuation NUREG-0103, Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Requiring Quarterly Stroke Testing of RCS Valves & Denying Relief from Code Requirements for Valve RC-11 Testing1986-03-0606 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Requiring Quarterly Stroke Testing of RCS Valves & Denying Relief from Code Requirements for Valve RC-11 Testing ML20137J6891986-01-0808 January 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Identification of Root Causes for Spurious 850609 Steam & Feedwater Line Rupture Control Sys Low Level Actuation,Closure of MSIVs & Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence.Plant Restart Acceptable ML20137J7031986-01-0808 January 1986 SER Supporting Util Identification of Root Causes for Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channels Inoperability During 850609 Steam & Feedwater Line Rupture Control Sys Low Level Actuation & Corrective Actions Taken.Plant Restart Approved ML20136B7841985-12-24024 December 1985 SER Re Util Development of Systematic & Thorough Troubleshooting Plans to Investigate 850609 Incident Leaving Redundant source-range Nuclear Instrumentation Channels Inoperable.Restart & Power Operation Now Acceptable ML20137R1611985-11-12012 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Preventive Maint & Trending of Parameters ML20138P0681985-10-30030 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 831107 & 850709 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,4.1 & 4.5.1 Re post-maint Testing & Reactor Trip Sys Reliability (vendor-related Mods & Sys Functional Test Description) ML20138P6391985-10-30030 October 1985 SER Re Proposed Mods to Maint Program.Licensee Should Identify Actions to Be Completed Prior to or After Restart. Region Should Actively Monitor Licensee Progress ML20133Q0441985-10-24024 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 3.1.3 Re post-maint Testing (Reactor Trip Sys Components).Eg&G Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20062E0871982-07-29029 July 1982 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Hydrostatic Test (Insp) Requirements ML20214J2801979-12-20020 December 1979 Safety Evaluation Re Preliminary Design for Upgrading Present control-grade Anticipatory Reactor Trip Sys for Loss of Main Feedwater & Turbine Trip to safety-grade ML20125B1331968-12-16016 December 1968 Safety Evaluation Re Piqua Nuclear Power Facility Retirement.T Hamrick to J Schlesinger Encl 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K1231999-10-14014 October 1999 Revised Positions for DBNPS & Pnpp QA Program ML20217D5441999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With ML20211R0811999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20210Q8541999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20209E6231999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20195F4871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20207E8011999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-981933, Design & Licensing Rept DBNPS Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project ML20207F4351999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504 ML20206M6341999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20205M2931999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With ML20207J1461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20199E2501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206B0101998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for Fiscal Yr Ending 981231,encl ML20205K5781998-12-31031 December 1998 Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss ML20197J3441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20195D0001998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20154H5801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20151W1611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Dbnps.With ML20237E3171998-08-21021 August 1998 ISI Summary Rept of Eleventh Refueling Outage Activities for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20237B1681998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236U5011998-07-23023 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980624,Unit 1 Site Damaged by Tornado & High Winds.Alert Declared by DBNPS Staff,Dbnps Emergency Response Facilities Activiated & Special Insp Team Deployed to Site by Nrc,As Result of Event ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236N7451998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998 Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ML20249A4121998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20196B5221998-05-23023 May 1998 10CFR50.59 Summary Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Dbnps,Unit 1 for 960602-980523 ML20236E7581998-05-19019 May 1998 Rev 0 to Davis-Besse Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20236N7501998-04-30030 April 1998 Rev 2 to Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit ML20247F6721998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Davis-Bess Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20249A4141998-04-30030 April 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20217P8041998-04-0707 April 1998 11RFO OTSG ECT Insp Scope ML20216B4041998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20216C5131998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20202D3721998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20199G6321998-01-26026 January 1998 Rev 1 to Davis-Besse Unit 1,Cycle 11,COLR ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198K7931997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20217K6401997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept First Energy ML20203A3931997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1 ML20198S5371997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20217H7701997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20216H3261997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for August 1997 for DBNPS ML20217K0241997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1997 for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 1999-09-30
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SATETY EVALUATION BY TRE DIVISION OF R ACTCR LICENSING
' DOCKET do. 115-2 THE CITY DF PIQUA .
PIQUA NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY RETIRI"ENT INTRODUCTION The Piqua Nuclear Power Facility (PNPF) is an organic-coderated and -cooled power deconstration reactor'which was operated by The City of ?iqua (COP) at its site in Piqua, Ohio. The nuclear steam generating part of the facility is evned by the Atomic Energy Co= mission and the cenventional facilities are evned by C,0P. As a Co==ission-owned facility,' construction and operation vere authorized in accordance with the Cc==ission's regulation, " Procedures for Review of Certain Nuclear Reactors Exempted frem Licensing Requirements,"
10 CTR Part 115. PNPF was shut dean in January 1966 when coke-like material, formed by dece= position of the reactor coolant, caused certain of the reactor ce=ponents to beceme distorted. After extensive review, the Co= mission determined that the PNPT technology had licited potential use for the adva'nced types of reactor concepts currently being developed by the Co= mission, and announced in December 1967 that it would terminate the contract for operation of the facility.
Following ter=ination of its operation, COP has unloaded the nuclear fuel
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.nd organic coolant 'from the reactor. The fuel has been returned to the
, Ce= mission. With the removal of this equipment, no highly radioactive equiprent remains in the plant except within the reactor ce= plex, i.e., the- -
reactor vessel, .its shielding, and various internal ce:ponents. COP was '
authorized by a Commission order dated August 7,1968, to perform partial
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v i dismantlement of the facility by the removal and disposal of those low-activity components not considered necessary for the continued maintenance cf the reactor building containment. This work is now in progress.
By letter dated September 3,1968, CDP submitted "PNPF' Retirement Plan" and "PNPF Safety, Analysis Report" and requested authorization to proc.eed with the re=aining dismantlement and final retirement of the facility.
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The proposed retirement plan consists of:
, 1. Intomtrent of the reactor complex in place, and
- 2. Decentamination and res toration of the buildings and grcunds to a conditien suitable for unrestricted occupancy and use as a vare'.;.ous e f acility.
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Since the dismantle =ent and removal of equipment external to the reactor cerplex has been previously evaluated and authorized by a Ce==ission order, these activities will not be discussed herein.
C*_SCUSSION As mentioned above, no highly- radioactive cateriad new remains within the plant.except for the reactor co= plex, i.e., the biolegical shield, the reactor vessel and internal components. COP has prcpcsed a detailed plan for permanently entomb'ing the complex in place to prevent access to the caterial enclosed and to prevent the escape of radioactivity to the surroundings.
All piping that penetrates the concrete biological shield vill be cut off and welded closed. The reactor vessel closure head will be bolted to the vessel and the vessel will be pressure-tested to verify leak-tightness. The tcp shield plug will be installed over the reactor vessel and welded in place. A waterp' roof. barrier vill then be placed over the entire main flor,r area with the exception of stairvells and hatches and will in turn be cesered by a layer of reinforced concrete which will form the new cain floor.
C:her below-grade volumes, such as instrument thichle pits, rail trenches, and the fuel. storage pool vill be filled with concrete or sand prior to installation of the new concrete floor slab.
The steel shell of the reactor building which extends 50 feet below grade level will provide a further ba'rrier to access to the ento = bed caterial or to leakage to the surroundings. An existing cathodic protection system vill be maintained by COP to prevent future corrosion of the shell by ground ccisture. In addition, the reactor buildin,g sump is provided with a pu=p and a high-water-level alarm which will continue to be caintained by COP personnel to preclude accumulation of water within the building.
The recaining. usable areas of the reactor and auxiliary buildings wi11 be decontaninated as required to meet the requirements of 10 CTR Part 20 for unres tricted areas. Building services, such as heating an8 ventilation, lighting, fire pro:ection, waste disposal, and drinking water will continue te he previded.
Frier to terninstion of the f acility authorizz: ion, a res trictive covenant v:?. be placed in the land records of Miami County, Ohio, describing the 4:ure ef the radicactive material lef: in place at the site, and prohib-1:ing any action which right disturb it or tend to impair its integrity.
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The :".:f reac:cr cenplex is estinated to cen:ain a :c:a1 of approxicately i: ^:: :::ies cf radicactivi:y at the present time. F.cw e v e r , since the l l
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facility was designed to contain the far greater radioactivity generated by En operating nuclear reactor, radiation levels in accessible areas of the plant will be within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 for unrestricted
, creas when the retirement plan is completed.
The radioactivity contained in the reactor complex is in the fer= of acti-vation products, produced during operation, in the reactor and shielding structure. No; fission products remain since all the fuel has been iemoved frem the facility. The activation products remaining, chiefly iron-55 and cebalt-60, are contained in their parent materials such that their rapid release is not possible. Moreover, since there is no energy source available within the reactor complex, there exists no means by which radioactive materials could be rapidly expelled to the environs. Thus , in the event of
- a. severe natural catas trophe, such as earthquake or flood, that could result in datage to the reactor' complex or building structure, suf ficient time would be available for remedial action before any of the contained radio-activi:y could escape. However, such damage is unlikely, since the facility was originally designed and censtructed to prevent' damage to an operating r.eacter under such conditions.
As dbscribed above, specific measures will be taken to prevent the long-t e r: corrosion of the activated materials and subsequent release of radio-activity to the surroundings. The radioactive materials will be below grade level, sealed in a n.assive concrete structure. The applicetion of a water-proofing material to the top surface of this structure and the laying of a new concrete floor, as proposed, will effectively prevent the entrance ci,wa ter from above. As noted previously, the steel shell of the reactor building will provide an additional barrier to water below grade. However, even if this barrier were to fail, we conclude that the provision of a water level alarm and pu=p in the reactor building sump, as proposed, will pe rmit the discovery and re= oval of any accumulated wa'ter before it reaches the level of the reactor complex.
I An analysis of the amounts of activation products present in the facility
' snd : heir rates ef decay indicates that all restrictiens en entering the
- ot c omplex could be removed in about 120 years withcut violating the a;; c;ria:e irti:s in 10 CTR Fart 20 for unrestricted areas. We have con- '
ciudcd : Sat the p rc pes ed re thod of entombrer.: of the reactor e c=p".ex will
- "ide adecut:e containment of the enclosed radioactivity for this length
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- tre.
- : ':~;AT:05 A:O F;.DCDUPIS The prc;esed retirerent plan fer the FNFT was develeped by C0p and the designer f ; c.e f acility, At emics internatienal . The procedures to be followed e
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during the course of the work already exist as approved operating or main-tenance procedures. Any additional procedures required or safety consid-ekatiens that arise will be reviewed by the exis t ing ?::.:7 S e.f e t;. Review Committee. Additional outside assistance will be provided by Eattelle
'"emorial Ins titute, which will act as consultant _to COP.
The issuance of an order authorizing dismantling of the facility will, in effect, supersede the Technical Specifications for cperatien of the facility and thus obviate the need for changes to the individual specifications as the dismantling progresses. In its application, the COP has proposed ad=in-istrative controls to be in ef fect during the time that the retirement plan
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is being carried out. We have determined that these centrols are adequate to assure the safety of the personnel and the public during the dismantling.
CONCLUSION On the basis of our review of the retirement plan proposed for the Piqua Suelear Power pacility, we have concluded that the. dismantling of the j "ec'lity and the disposal of its component parts as proposed will be per-f'rmed in acccidance xith the Co= mission's regulations and will not be l aimical to the co= mon defense and security or to the health and safety c.f the public. -
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Donald J. Skovholt Assistant Director for Reactor Operations Division of Reactor Licensing . cr
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Date: ^'svir
' v' December 16, 1968
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