ML20116G464
| ML20116G464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1985 |
| From: | Weiss E UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | Baxter T SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| References | |
| CON-#285-765 OLA, NUDOCS 8505010505 | |
| Download: ML20116G464 (1) | |
Text
M E.7"JO%.5.=d94924 UNION OF F*"' "p CONCERNED SCIENTISTS im ce._,e..u..... s.w.. s. iioi. w.,hi...... oc 2oo.g.g2 gee.5soo USNRC April 26, 1985
'Ihcznas A. Baxter, Esq.
g 30 40:53 Shaw, Pittman, Ibtts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 CFFICf Of SECsTAM 00CHETING & SERvict.
BRANCH
Dear Mr. Baxter:
You called me earlier this week in response to Chairman Palladino's suggestion to Mr. Clark that GPU ascertain what UCS believes is necessary for a safety evaluation of the design basis steam generator tube rupture accident for 'IMI-1.
In particular, you asked if page five of the hand-out which UCS gave to the Commission on April 18, 1985, constituted our view of what such a safety evaluation would consist of and I answered in the affirmative. That page contains a simplified description of the process described in the Stan-dard Review Plan for analysis of the steam generator tube rupture accident.
I think that the only part of page five of the handout that may need clarification is itan number 1: " Assume plant operation in accordance with technical specifications, i.e., some safety equipnent~ inoperable." What is-meant is that the analysis should assume the availability of only that safety equignent which is required to be operable under the 'IMI-1 license for unre-stricted operation of the plant, i.e., only that safety equipnent necessary to satisfy the limiting conditions for operation. 'Ihe single failure criterion would then be applied.
In other words, the beginning assumption is that only safety equipment required to be operable is operable and a single random failure (in addition to the tube rupture) is then postulated.
GPU might also wish to give some thought to whether, given the current condition of the 'IMI-1 steam generators, the design basis accident for 'IMI-1 T
should go beyond the single-tube rupture applicable to all other plants and include postulating multiple tube ruptures. Note that the GPU technical data report for the revised 'IMI-l tube rupture procedures states: "Since xtensive circunferential cracking was discovered in approximately 1200 of the 31,000 tubes, it became clear that a revised set of procedures for dealing with both single and multiple SG' irs should be developed." TIR-406, Rev. 3, p. 14, em @ asis addea.
c l
In sum, the Standard Beview Plan establishes a procedure for evaluating a design-basis steam generator tube rupture accident. Such an evaluation has not been done for 'IMI-1 and trS believes it should be.
l Ver truly yours, l
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General Counsel cc: 'IMI-1 Service List j
5010505 850426 h
OCK 05000289
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O PDR Main Office: 26 Church Sorcet. Cambridge Ma,sachusetts o2238. (617) 517 5532
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