ML20116F749

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Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept PRD-82/34 Re Incorrect Wipe Setting on Closed GE Contacts on Hfa Relays Which May Not Activate During Seismic Event.Initially Reported on 820802. Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21
ML20116F749
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/22/1985
From: Dale L
MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-85, REF-PT21-85-248-000 AECM-85-2-0006, AECM-85-2-6, PT21-85-248, PT21-85-248-000, NUDOCS 8505010209
Download: ML20116F749 (4)


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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi NI P. O. B O X 164 0, J A C K S O N, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 92 05 15 IG%Ltc@5,3[3,g3 NUCLEAR LICENSING & SAFETY DEPARTMENT U. S. N'iclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attention:

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

Dear Dr. Grace:

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-417 File:

0260/0511/0512 PRD-82/34, Final Report for Unit 2, HFA Relay Contact Settings AECM-85/2-0006

References:

(1) AECM-82/372, 9/1/82 (2) AECM-82/544, 11/12/82 (3) AECM-83/117, 2/24/83 (4) AECM-83/0385, 7/1/83 On August 2, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R.

Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS). The deficiency concerned the incorrect

" wipe" setting of normally closed contacts which had been converted from normally open contacts on some HFA relays.

The deficiency was determined reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 21 for Unit I and 10 CFR 50.55(e) for Unit 2.

Notification of this determination was made to Mr. R. Butcher, NRC Region II on August 31, 1982.

Written reports have been provided on the subject deficiency in References (1) thru (4). Reference (4) was provided as a final report for Unit I and as an interim report for Unit 2 with an expected submittal date for a final report of January 30, 1985. MP&L notified Mr. Robert Carroll of your office on March 18, 1985 that the subject final report was expected to be submitted by March 22, 1985.

It has been determined that the provisions of 10 CFR 21 are not applicable for Unit 2 since the relays were not received components. Attached is our final 10 CFR 50.55(e) report for Unit 2.

Yours truly, 8505010209 850322 g

PDR ADOCK 05000417 S

PDR g-L. F. Dale Director EBS/SHH:rw Attachment cc:

(See Next Page)

Member Middle South Utilities System j-J0P14AECM85032003 - 1

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AECM-85/2-0006 Page 2

' cc:

Mr..J. B. Richard (w/o)

Mr. O. D. Kingsley, Jr. (w/a)

Mr. R. B.'McGehee (w/o)

Mr. N. S. Reynolds_(w/o)

Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o).

Mr. James M. Taylor, Director (w/o)

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 9

J0P14AECM85032003 - 2

I o

Attachmtnt to AECM-85/2-0006 Page 1 FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 2 FOR PRD-82/34 1.

Name and address of the individual informing the Commission:

J. B. Richard Senior Vice-President, Nuclear P. O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Notification of Part 21 applicability to Unit 1 and Part 50.55(e) applicability to Unit 2 was made to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, NRC Region II, by telephone on August 31, 1982. This deficiency was also reported under 10 CFR 21 by General Electric to the NRC in their letter dated July 27, 1982.

2.

Identification of the facility which contains a deficiency:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Units 1 and 2 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 NOTE:

10 CFR 21 applies only to Unit 1.

3.

Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which contains a deficiency:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by General Electric Company, San Jose, California.

4.

Nature of the deficiency and the safety hazard which could be created by such a deficiency:

A.

Description of the Deficiency The deficiency concerns the incorrect " wipe" setting of normally closed (NC) contacts on some HFA relays which have been converted from normally open (NO) contacts.

Seismic qualification was performed by General Electric with correct contact " wipe" settings; therefore, a relay with less than a minimum wipe setting does not fall within the component qualification limits.

B.

Analysis of Safety Implications The potential exists for a NC contact in the HFA relay to fail to properly activate engineered safety systems during a seismic event.

The failure of NC contacts to trip the reactor recirculation pumps, per design, due to a turbine stop valve closure or a turbine control valve fast closure, might create thermal transients which may lead to fuel cladding failure.

5.

The date on which the information of such deficiency was obtained.

Mississippi Power and Light received information of the deficiency on July 30, 1982. We reported the deficiency to Mr. R. Butcher of your office, as a Potentially Reportable Deficiency for Unit 2 on August 2, 1982 and J0P14ATTC85032101 - 1

Attach =2nt to AECM-85/2-0006 Page 2 stated that an evaluation would be performed to determine applicability of Part 21 for Unit 1.

An evaluation for Part 21 was completed and the MP&L Responsible Officer, Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr., was notified. This deficiency is also applicable to Unit 2 under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

10 CFR 21 is not applicable to this Unit 2 equipment.

6.

In the case of the basic component the number and location of all such components.

The relays are located at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.

Locations of other plants which may have defective relays were given by General Electric in their July 27, 1982 letter to the NRC.

7.

The corrective action which has been taken, the name of the individual responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been taken to complete the action.

A.

Corrective Actions Taken MP&L has performed an inspection and corrected any defective safety-related relays in both the NSSS and BOP scope of supply for Unit 1.

Our Architect / Engineer has issued Nonconformance Report (NCR) 6508 and Quality Action Request (QAR) 354 for Unit 2.

The subject relays will be replaced by the disposition of the NCR.

B.

Responsible Individual Unit 1 Unit 2 J. E. Cross T. H. Cloninger, Director l

GGNS General Manager Nuclear Engineering &

l Mississippi Power & Light Co.

Construction Mississippi Power & Light Co.

C.

Length of Time to Complete Actions

(

The required inspections and corrective actions for Unit I have been completed. A projected completion date for Unit 2 is not available at this time due to the limited ongoing construction effort; however, the subject relays will he replaced after resumption of

(

normal construction activities on Unit 2.

I 8.

Any advice related to the deficiency... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to offer.

J0P14ATTC85032101 - 2

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