ML20116E637
| ML20116E637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1992 |
| From: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| WM-92-0179, WM-92-179, NUDOCS 9211090304 | |
| Download: ML20116E637 (2) | |
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Bart O Witheirs President and Ch - Secut.ve Ofhter November 3, 1992 VM 92-0179 U. S. Nuclear Regu'.atory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555
Reference:
Letter dated Septemb:, 30, 1992 from A. B. Beach, NRC, to B. D. Withers, WCNOC
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: Response to Exercise Weaknesses 482/9214-01 Centlement This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOC).
response to Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01.
Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01 involved delays in making initial notifications to the State and County and in activating the Technical Support Center and Operat3ons Support Center.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (316) 366-3831, extension 4000 or K.
J.
Moles of my staff at extension 4565.
Ve.y truly yours, Bart D. Withers President and Chief Executive Officer BDW/jad Attachment cc A. T. Howell (NRC), w!a J. L. Milhoan (NRC), w/a G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a V. D. Reckley (NRC), w/a D. B. Spitzberg (NRC), w/a s
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Attachment to VM 92-0179 Page 1 of.2 Exercise Weakness (482/9214-01):
Delay in Makinn Initial Notifications to the State-and County and Subseauent Delay in Activating Group Paning System to Activate the-Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center
Response
On September'1, 1992, the_ day of the Exercise,-
'at approximately 1900 CDT, Electrical Maintenance personnel wer e completing _
the performance of Mai.ntenanc Procedure - MPE BA-006, '5-Year Battery Ca pacity Test,* on Battery CF.16, the battery back-up system for the hub Computerized Branch Excb 7 (CBX).
Following completion of the-test, Electrical Maintenance rsonnel reconnected the battery to the battery charger while the b..
ay charger was loaded.
.It is believed that a spike was generated when Electrical Maintenance ' personnel were reconnecting-the leads to the battery which - caused a transient to the Central Processing Unit for-the CEX.
It is believed that this spike caused the corruption of some of the data files'in the CBX database, specifically a portion of the'long distance dialing files, which made it-difficult to complete long : distance calling through the CBX.
The-problem then became evident on September 1, 1992, at 2038 CDT, at the start of the Exercise when the Of f site Communicator could not complete the long distance notification call to the State of Kansas.
The Offsite Communicator, who did not refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPP 01-2.1, "Immediate Notifications,' was not sure of the methods available for accessing an outside line following the failure-of.the.CBX.
In addition, at the start of the Exercise, the Offsite Communicator notified Security of the Alert and requested initiation of the call-out of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). When the Security Officer also failed at getting an outside li.te through the - CBX, he - tried the direct outside line in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).--
Because this-line included a rotary phone, which precludes its use in activating the Automatic Dialing System, this method was also; unsuccessful.
The Offsite Communicator contr,cted the State of Kansas at apprcximately-2059 "9T when an outside telephone operator was reached who assisted in
.ompleting the call.
Security personnel using tbe microwave - link to Wichita activated the call-out' via the Automatic Dialing. System at approximately 2100 CDT.
The CBX was restored r.t approximately 2115-CDT.
To prevent recurrence _ procedure revisions have been issued instructing Electrical Maintenance personnel to contact Communications personnel before starting the test and before reconnecting :the batteries.
Incorporating steps into the Maintenance procedures =.to contact Communications personnel during their work on the _CBX will. 9110w-Communications personnel _ to _ perform diagnostic tests to - ensure the-operability of the system.
Revisions to Emergency Plan _ Procedures-EPP 01'-1.0,
" Control Room Organization,"
~EPP 01-3.1,-
"Immediate I
Notifications," and EPP 01-3.2,
" Follow-up Notifications," ' will be made to incorporate a reference on the notification forms to refer to the
' Phone Use Instructions," contained in - Section O of' the Radiological Emergency Telephone Directory when telephone system-problems are encountered.
This reference to alternate methods for accessing long distance lines to the Communicators will enhance their ability to notify-nffsite authorities.
These procedure revisions-will be issued by_
1)ecember 1, 1992, and required reading for Communicators will be.
L completed within 60 days of Required Reading Notices issuance.
The rotary phone in SAS was replaced with a
touch-tone phone' on --
September 2, 1992.
A touch-tone phone in SAS as a direct outside line-will enable - Security personnel to activate _ the call-out system in case of a CSX failure.
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Attachment to VM 92-0179 Page.2 of 2 4
i Additionally, the activation checklists for the Technical Support Center
-(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) contain steps which require the completion of tasks by.or require input from ERO positions **hich are not required t.o be staffed for facility activation.
This caused additional delays in activating the facilities.
The appropriate activation checklists for the.TSC, OSC'and EOF will be revised to restructure the assignment of responsibilities by December 18, 1992.
Even though the majority of the TSC and OSC s
positions were staffed within 60 minutes of the Alert declaration, activation was delayed because of the checklist requirements.
Revising these checklists as described above will result in the activation of the facilities in a more timely manner.
The actions taken and to be taken in response to this Exercise Weakness should preclude recurrence of the delays associated.with the CBX system and activation of the facilities.
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