ML20116D197

Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TS 5.3.1 Re Design Features,Reactor Core & Fuel Assemblies,To Reflect Recommendation of GL 90-02

ML20116D197
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	10/29/1992
From:	Shelton D CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20116D196	List: ML20116D193 ML20116D197 ML20116D208
References
GL-90-02, GL-90-2, NUDOCS 9211050253
Download: ML20116D197 (7)

Text

- - -

Dock t Number 50-346'

. , Lic nsa Numb 2r NPF .

Serial Number'2094

-a Enclosure M , Page 1:

a_

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT

[

. ,.1 TO

-FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NUMP % NPF-3 4

-DAVIS-BESSE '!UCLEAR POWER STATION A

UNIT NUMBER 1 ti ,

' Attached are reqeasted changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1 Fac311ty Operating License Number NPF-3. fino Lincluded is the. Safety Ascetisment and Significant Hazards Consideration.

The proposed changes (submitted under. cover letter Serial Number 2094) conc e rn s .-

. Appendix A. Technical Specification 5.3.1, Design Feat';res, Reactor -

Core.; Fuel Assemblies p '1 . N

- By s'

~

./N D. C..Shelton, Vice Pres' dent, Nuclear

--Davis-Besse

' Sworn and stabscribed before me this 29th day.of October, 1992.

r 3

~

diatM.1 Notary 14blic, Stato of Ohio

,s UW EVELYN L ORESS DD,PUOuC.STATEOFmo WEM# 28,IEN f

9211050253 9'21029'-

4 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P>, PDR

e -

l q 412 Docket Numbar 50-346 b . ,;Liesnso Humbar.NPF-3

., -C Serial Himber 2094;-

? LEnclosure

- Paget2 (7 g Thezfollowing information is provided to support inauance of the of- requestedLchanges to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS),

. Unit Number 1 ' Operating--License Number NPF-3, Appendix A. Technical LSpecification (TS) $.3.1, Design Features, Reactor Coro, Fuel

-Assemblies.

, A. Time Required to Implement: This change is to be implemented within 90 days after the NRC-issuance of the License Amendment.

<. -B. Reason for Change (License Amendment Request Number 92-0011):

This request proposes that Technical Specification (TS) 5.3.1 be revised to me'e the description of the design features of fuel assemblies mo- -tea nt with-tlue model TS wording as recommended _ by - sment 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 90 02,

' Alternative _ Reg:" me.va for Fuel Assemblies in the Design Features Section of Technical Specifications", dated July 31, 1992. . The model1TS wording in the Supplement to GL 90-02 is, furthermore..also reflected in the Standard Technical t Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox type plants, as recently

~

issued by the NRC (NUREG-1430).

-These changes-are required in support of the upcoming eighth refueling cutage (BRFO).

C. Safety A sessment and Significant Hazards Consideration See

-Attachment.

V lN s

y JN$

~_. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

['{ , Dock 3tNuhkr,50-346' f~ aLic;nsa Nu;bsr NPF-3' 3 ,

Siris1 Nunb:r 2094 f . 'Attechient

• ~

Page 1

_=

SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS-CONSIDERATION n~

TITLE:

Revision to Technical: Spec'ification (TS) 5.3.1, Fuel _ Assemblies (FAs).

LESCRIPTION -

y The: purpose of the proposed change.is to modify the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station-(DBhPS), Unit Numter 1, Operating License NPF-3,

' Appendix A Technical Specifications. This License Amendment Request (LAFs) proposes that TS 5.3.1 (see attached marked-up Technical Specifications) be revised to make the description of the Design

? Features of Fuel Assemblies more consistent with the model TS vording as' recommended by Supplement-1-to Generic' Letter (GL) 00-02,

" Alternative Requirements for Fuel Assemblies.in the.Pesign Features L Section of Technical Specifications", dated July 31,_1992. The model TS vording 1.n the Supplemen trt GL.90-02 is, furthermore, also reflected in the Standard Techr.. cal Lpecifications (STS) for Babcock and Vilcox (B&V) type plants, as_recently proposed by the-NRC (NUREG-1430).

'Specifically, this LAR proposes to delete the present TS 5.3.1 references to a " nominal active fuel length ot 144 inches...a maximum

total veight of 2500 grams uranium" and'"a maximum enrichment of 3.8 veight-percent U 235". -This LAR also proposes to change "Zircaloy Eclad" to " zirconium alloy clad", to allow the use of zirconium alloy rods-in addition to stainless steel-filler rods, ard.to add a provision for the use of a. limited number of lead test assemblies.

SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND ACTIVITIES AFFECTED:

Description of the FAs-in TS 5.3.1.

-SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES:

.TheLfunction of the reactor core,-i.e. the FAs it contains, is.to

generate power forjan analyzed period. .The design of the FAs assures-the safe operation of the core vithin operating and_ safety limits.

i:

A:FA is normally' composed of two hundred and eight fuel rods, sixteen control ~ rod-guide tubes, one instrumentation l tube, eight spacer grids,

' and- two end fittings._ The guide: tubes, spticer grids, and end fitt.ngs form a structural.csge to arranga the rods and tubes into a 15x15 array, designated as~the B&W Fuel'Ccmpany's' Mark-B f'.iel assembly design. Fuel rods are supported at each spacer grid by contact points.

The guide-tunes are attached to the upper and lover _end fittings. The-

.use.of similar' material in the guide tubes and fuel rods results in minimal thermal expansion differences. The design assures maintenance

~

of a:coolable geometry and the. capability of control rod insertions into the guide tubas'during Design ~ Basis Accidents.

4 1

' P. 6

fx Dockat Nu:ber 50-346 i y Lic:nsa Nu;btr NPF-3 k . ,S: rial Nunb;r 2094 b Attadment- =

k- Page 2 The fuel rods consist of e zirconium alloy cladding which contains fuel pellets in a columnar r.rrangement.- The length of the fuel pellet column is defined as the active fuel length. The fuel column is constrained under compression by upper and lo'rer plenum springs. Each fuel pellet consists of a high density, lov enrichment, uranium dioxide material. The safety function of the fuel rods' cladding is to provide a primary barrier to the release of fission produi.ts.

Technical Specification 3.3.1 ensures that the fuel assemblies' configurations, for a specific operating cycle, have been analyzed with NRC staff approved methodologies and that the safety limits and General Design Criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix A are maintained.

EFFECTS ON SAFETY:

Active fuel lengths vary slightly between different versions of the B&V Mark-B fuel t.ssembly design. The specific active fuel length and the total uranium loading for the DBNPS are modeled by the fuel verador using NRC staff-approved codes.

Active fuel length variations may have an effect on the linear heat rating of the fuel. Thet effect is analyzed with the vendor's fuel rod design code (TACO-3), which has been topically approved by the NRC with no restriction on active fuel length (References NRC bafo y Evaluution Report of TACO ! Code, dated August 14, 1989). The preposed requirements of 'S 5.3.1 vill no longer state a specific nominal active y fuel length. Um aver, use of NRC staf f-approved codes for f t.el design vill still be req- red and vill provide adequate regulatory controls.

Total uranium loading and enrichment variations between reload batches to accommodate cycle energy and operating requirements are also analyzed each fuel cycle with NRC staff-approved codes and methodologies. The limit on maximum enrichment is based upon the criticality analyses for the storage of fuel in the new feel storage area and in_the spent fuel pool. This limit is defined and controlled by the Technical Specifications for fuel storage (TS 3/4.').13 and 5.6),

i.e., the design and use of the spent fuel and new fuel storage racks.

The total uranium loading is dependent on active fuel lengths and fuel t pellet characteristics which are analyzed with K.; staff-approved cedes and methodologies. The proposed requirements of TS 5.3.1 vill no longer state a maximum uranium loading or enrichment. Hovevt.r, use of NRC staff-approved codes for fuel design vill still be required and vill provide _ adequate regulatory controls.

The reference in existing DBNPS TS 5.3.1 to "Zircaloy clad fuel rods" is pigosei to be replaced by " zirconium alloy clad fuel rods" which vill reflect the type of alloy and not the trade-name. The actual use of zirconium alloys other than zirealoy for fuel rod cladding would require a 10CFR50.59 safety review and evaluation.

~.

' Dockat Nurb:r 50-346 N

n.

i Lic nsa Nu bar NPF-3 y

( . ,Sarial Nu b:r 2094 , j

?' 's >

Attachment sJ, ,,

Page 3

+ -

s -

>1 In addition, it is proposed that the provision to allow limited Q- "

substitutions of stainless steel filler rods for fuel rods be changed P ,

to also allow limited use of " zirconium alloy filler rods" consistent '!

with the recommendations of the NRC's model TS for:TS 5.3.1. - The '

actual use of the rirconium alloy filler rods vould require'that.their use be analyzed using applicable NRC staff-approved codes and' h,s -

methodologies.

[.; '

The proposed revision of TS 5.3.1 vould also allow the use of lead test -

i

_h assemblies, which have not completed representative. testing,,in .

nonlimiting core regions. Such use vould.be first subiect to c safety.

'M review and evaluation in accordance with the:requirennts of

, (10CFR50.59. Therefore.-adequate requirements for evalueting proposed J J- :uses of lead.. test assemblies would-be in effect.-

. :, n + . .

E LIn cor.clusion, there vill: be no adverse effects on safety- caused by the iproposed revisions::to TS 5.3.1. . Fuel nssemblies, including those-

~

Leontainingl filler rods, vill continue to be limited to those fuel

designsJand1 configurations tha_t.have.been analyzed with applicable NRC-G " staff 2 approved cpdes and; methodologies.-

i_ , s

+ '

, . SICt.lf1 CANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

~

i The.Nuc1aar Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided standards in 10CFR

~

~

50.92(c) forfdcte'rmining whether a:significant hazard exists due to a l proposed amendmantito.an Operating License for a facility. A proposed 4

amendment 1:to an Operating License fur ai facili.ty involves no

,~

falgnificant hazardsfconsideration_if operaticn of the facility la-

~

.accordance vith(the3proposedJchanges voulds.(1) Not; involve a

?significantyincrease;in the probability;or consequences of an accident

+@ 'pr1viously;evaluatedf(2)1Not' create =the possibility of a nev_or W + odifferentikind of accident 5from any previo'usly: evaluated; or (3) Not-linvolvefa significant reduction in a_ margin offsafety. Toledo Edison 4' shas rev'leved;the proposed l change:and determine

• that=a significant

- hazards consideration ~~does.not exist because; operation of the

^

5 Davis-Besse Nuclear' Power Station,.-Unit. Number 1, in accordance with:

{thefproposed/ changes,vould:

y ,

'M Liai TNotLinvolve a4significant increase in the probability of an 4  ; accident prev!ou ly_' evaluated because the probability of any saccident which'la presently ~ evaluated is not based on the-fuel 4*; .N_

1 assembly!r active fuel length, uranlura loading, .and enrichment.-

LT he use of lead: test-assemblies in non-limiting. core regions c 4

and/or,the_use of~ zirconium alloys other thantzircaloy would be subjectito::a safety review /evaluatica in accordance with 1F 110CFR50.59. ~No accident initiators or assumb ions are affected by r

ythe proposed cha.nges.s .

W -

4 t-

[ ?{

Y

+

- Y ,

( @ 7p- LDock t Nu:bfr 50-346 g

. 1Licctc2 Nu:b r NpF-3

, a .5:ricl:Nu:b r 2094 i g LAttachment l

' ~

hge -4  ;

lb'. :Not involve a signiticaat increase in the consequences of an- i accident previously evaluated because the core's performance and 2 the accident responsc of fuel assemblies, as affected by their active: length, uranium loading, and enrichment, vill be evaluated with the cycle-specific reload analyses to ve u'y that they are bounded by existing accident analyses. The m ichn.ent limit for 3 storage of fuel vill be established using NRC approved codes and vill'ba implemented by TS 3.9.13. ihis vill assure fuel storage accioent conseq;ences are not affected. Thu use of lead test assemblies in non-limiting core regions and/or the use of- '

zirconium alloys other than zircaloy would be subject to a safety reviev/ evaluation in accordance with iOCFR50.59. These controls, assure that there is no effect on the radiological consequences of-previously evaluated accidents.

2a. .Not create the possibility of a new kind of accident from any accident-previously eval %ted. Restrictions on active fuel lengths, , total uranium '.oading, and maximum enrieb:nent are implemented in other T$s and/or are determined using NRC approved methodologies. Appropriate controls vill not be eliminated.- The use of lead test assemblies in non-limiting core regions and/or ,

the use of zirconium alloys other than zircaloy would be subject 1 to a safety review / evaluation in accordance with 10CFR50.59. None of_-the parameters afIected are accident initiators, therefore, no new accident initiators are introduced by the proposed changes.

2b. . Not. create the possibility of a different kind of t.ccident from any ar.cident previously evaluated. Restrictions on active fuel lengths, total uranium loading, and maximum enrithment, are implemented in other TSs and/or are determined through NRC approved. methodology. -Appropriate controls vill not be eliminated.: The use of lead test assemblies in non-limiting core regions?and/or the use of_ zirconium alleys other'than zircaloy would be subject to a sr.fety review / evaluation in accordanco with 10CFR50.59. None of the parameters affected are accident initiators..therefore, no different accident initiators are introduced by theLproposed changes.

3. -Not involve a significant_ reduction in a margin of safety becau:e

. variations.in active fuel length, total uranium loading, and fuel enrichment vill still be restricted by other TSs and/or analyzed

-vith NRC approved methodologies. The use of lead test assemblies

- An non-limiting core regions and/or the use of zirconium alloys other than zircaloy_vould be subject-to a safety review / evaluation in accordance with 10CFR50.59. These controls vill' ensure that no changes are niado which vill significantly reduce margins of

- sa_f e ty.

EE _

p

N .. Dockot Numbar 50-346 ,

. License Number NPP-S

, Serial Number 2094 Attachment

( .. ' ' page 3 CONCLUSION:

On the basis of the above, Toledo Edison has determined that the License Amendment Request does not involve a .aignificant hazards consideration. As this License Amendment Request concerns a proposed change to the Technicat Specifications that must be reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this License Amendment Request does not constitute so unrevieved safety question.

ATTAC!! MENT:

Attached are the proposed marked-up changes to the Operating License.

m i

1 2_--_a.___--_---_-___-_--___--. . - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ - _ - - - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ . --_-__ -