ML20116C108
| ML20116C108 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1992 |
| From: | Horn G NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9211030213 | |
| Download: ML20116C108 (3) | |
Text
e Gf td D AL OF F ICf b Ah7 j-Nebraska Public Power District "TEMEM"
'l P O tor 4W COLR8 BUS. tdlikASKA (MG.Od99 V@
wa, October 27,1992 U. S. Nuclear llegulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
NPPD Response to inspection Report 50 298/92-15 (iteply to a Notice of Violation)
Durirm a NRC inspection conducted oa July 12 through August 22,1992, a violation of NRC requiwants was identified in that state and local notifications were not completed within 15 minutes of the declaration of a Notification of Unusual livent (NOUII). Following is a statement of the violation and our response in accordance with 10CFR2.201.
SalemenLDLYinlation 10CFR Part 50.47, paragraph (b)(5) requires, in part, that the emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must establish procedures for notification, by the licensee, of state and hxal response organizations.
The timergency Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station, Revision 16, Section 5.4.5, requires that notincation to state and/or local agencies be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency.
Cooper Nuclear Station limergency Plan implementing Procedure 5.7.6, " Notification," Revision 18, Section 6.1, requires that state and local initial notifications be completed within 15 minutes of an emergency.
Contrary to the above, on July 30,1992, state and local notifications were not completed within 15 minutes of the declaration of the Notice of Unusual Event The Notice of Unusual livent was declared at 5:50 p.m., (logged as of 5:30 p.m.), and the..oti6 cations to state and local agencies were completed at 6:22 p.m.
This is a Severity 1 evel IV violation. (298/9215-01) (Supplement Vill)
Rest 1A1 Violation The reason for the delay in making the emergency classi6 cation was: (1) inadequate communications between the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) ad the Shift Supervisor, and (2) a poorly designed communication process with the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEM A).
SORC convened on July 30, 1992, to review a design basis issue that affected the operability of multiple Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). It was agreed that the desien basis issue was vahd and, as a result, the ECCS should be considered inoperable. In addition, since
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t U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 27,1992 Page 2 multiple safety systems were affected, SORC agreed that the requirements of Technical Specincatio.is Sectio,1.0.J would a) ply, which requires achieving a hot shutdown condition within six hours. Since SORC initial y reached this conclusion at 1710 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.50655e-4 months <br />, it was agreed by i
the committee that the first power drop should occur at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />.
j At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, the Operations hianager was dispatched to the Control Room to brief the Shift Supervisor on the results of SORC's deliberations. Upon his arrival in the Control Room, the Operations hianager began briefing the Shift Supervisor. Ilowever, with his understanding of the planned first power drop and the complexity of the design basis issue, he directed that the power drop occur at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />, and then contmued explaining the plant condition to the Shift Supervisor.
At approximately 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br />, the Shif t Supervisor had gained a full understanding of the i
situation and he then declared the Notification of Unusual livent (NOUli) at 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br />.
Ilowever, after discussion with management, the declaration was logged as having been made at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />, since the condition requiring the declaration (first power droi for a Technical Specifications required shutdown) had been initiated at that time. It should ac noted that this decision was not proper and the declaration should have been logged when it was made (i.e.,
at 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br />).
Therefore, due to poor communications between SORC and the Shift Sui'.rvisor, the nrst power drop, declaration of the NOUll, and initiation of the state and kical notifications were not performed in an orderly fashion.
State and local notincations were then not completed within 15 minutes of the declaration of the NOUE due to a poorly designed notification process. Operations personnel, f. the time, were not aware that Silh1A was utillring an answering service. This resulted in a delay in Slih1A returning the phone call, and the notifications not being completed until 1822 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.93271e-4 months <br />.
Correctirp_Skps Taken And The Rmults Achieved The Not3e of Violation, the inadequate communicatiorr between SORC and the Shift l
Supervisor, and a proposed revision to Procedure 0.3, Station Operations Review Committee, l
were subsequently discussed during a SORC ' meeting. The discussion focused on the importance of keeping the Shift Supervisor informed of SORC activities that may affect the operational status of the plant. For future events of this nature, it was a Shift Supervisor would be included in the SORC discussions. greed by the committie tha
' In regard to the htissouri State Ilmegency hianagement Agency's answering ' service, the -
company was changed, new pagers were procured, a backup SiihtA duty officer was added to the scheme, a revision was made to the duty officer's response manual concernirg power plant emergency notification, and training for the duty officers was instituted. The previous scheme -
where the duty officer provided a return call to the answering service prior to contacting the' t
Control Room was shortened by requiring that he contact the Control Room directly.
The Atchison County (htissouri) Sheriffs Dispatcher received remedial training from the Atchison County Ilmergency hianagement Coordinator on August 3,1992.
The system was successfull and September 1 at 0800. y tested on August 19 at 0800, August 20 at 2000, l
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 27,1992 Page 3 Conective Steps Which WilLJk Taken To Aygid Further Violations Procedure 0.3, Station ogrations Review Con.mittee, is being revised to ensure that the Shift i
Supervisor is appropriate)y involved when S014C is reviewing specific issues which may affect the operational status of the plant.
A revision to Emergency plan implementing Procedure 5.7.6, Notification, has been initiated to inform the Shift Communicator that an answering service is being called and to ensure that the Shift Communicator requests to speak to the SEMA duty officer, Date_When Full Conpliance Will Be Achieved NPPD has taken action to ensure compliance with the requirements stated in the violation. The-follow-up action identified above will be completed by December 1992.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.
Sin rely, N(MtihrI uclear Power Group Manager GRil:VWS:cml-22D cc:
Regional Administrator U. S. NRC - Region IV NRC Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station I
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