ML20115J100
| ML20115J100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1996 |
| From: | Long A AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REN-I-GANE-026, REN-I-GANE-26, NUDOCS 9607230457 | |
| Download: ML20115J100 (5) | |
Text
1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
~
g Docket No.
Sc -/(o 0- 82 M EXHIBIT NO.
E6
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In thz matter of $, d-O y Applict.nt Gylntrrvinor O Other y,
ied O Received O Rejected Re orter (.sJc h.)
1 D h/zs/ f (,
Witness [/ _
(.AJ 4M.e..>t dr4w M ~
n s.. r, c
Jonatn,n a mr.na '96 JUL 10 me:22
~
%roa To e MMTED 00RIESPONDENCE 0FFICr & Wm% i y
Dear Jonathan:
COCSUN i rp l %,
The ioformsLicn in this letter documents what we discussed DV telephone regercing rn y i n v o l vernen t with NRC i nspec ti ons at Georgia
- Tech, specifically the violations I issued which were later de'eted from NRC records wi thout my knowledge or j
concurrerme Early i n 'rebruary 1988 I wrote a rnemorandum to Albert F.
- Gibson, though nw Branch Chief, Caudle Julian.
This memo documented the the specifics as to the violations being dropped, as well as sor e n
addi t.i onal i nf ormation related Georgia Tech's enforcement history Several of the managers involved in responding to my j
n e;no rande
%ve i ndi c a ted to me that the violations were indeed valid ano should not have been dropped.
Several of the viol +tient:
contributed in part to the recently publicized c on t ami na t.10n incident Addi ti ona l ly, it has been acknowledged by management that the, manner in which the violations were
- deleted, wi thcut noti f vi ng the i nspec tor, was highly irnproper.
I have ciao erbally providec I nf orruation to NRC investigators regarctng things 1
witnessed during my i nspec ti on at Georgia
- Tech, incluolng the apparent release of confidential NRC documents.
Inspection Report 50-160/87-01 cited six violations with multiple examples.
The cited violations had the concurrence of all applicable cognizant managers.
Georgia Tech responded to the NOV and their first response was deemed unacceptable by the NRC.
A revised response was received by the NRC on July 22, 1987.
I was requested to provide input to the NRC's response to the Georgia Tech
- document, and the input I provided was that the violation shoulc stand as written.
The l
licensee has provided no additional inf ormation which was not considered during the inspection.
I was later informed that the denied violations would be reinspecte.d by Paul Burnett and the decision on whether to accept the licensee's denial would be based on Burnett's reinspection.
The reason for the reinspection was not revealed to me.
Several weeks ago, by accident. 1 discovered that the denied violations had not been reinspected, but had been deleted from the records.
I was not inf ormed when this action was taken, and was o
Jg given no opportunity to further defend or to escalate my professional Noa opinion through appropriate channels.
no 00 g
The specifics as to why I believe the various violations should not have been deleted from the records are as follows:
mu i
og 1.
Item A.2.B-Inadequate Procedure (9
J N<
g This example concerned a procedure in use for over a year and i
48 a
half which required data to be logged on a
piece of DLo equipment which was out of service indefinitely.
The Procedure as written was impossible to follow.
Usually the w.
.-e
1 I
op:rctors entered a handwritten procedure change saying what they did instead of following the procedure, but there were
=
examples where the completed procedure indicated that data had been taken on inoperable equipment.
The licensee stated in their denial of the violation, "The changes that the IR refers to are not changes to but are limited to the phrase 'out of commission'." procedures The NRC accepted the denial on this basis, although inspection report 87-01 documents that additional precedure changes were also being made. Describing these particular procedural changes as
" comments" indicates a
failure to understand regulatory concepts.
As stated in Section 3.a of 87-01, this violation resulted.
in
- part, from failure to perform the corrective action commitments for a very similar violation a year and a
half earlier.
That violation, 85-02-01, involved inadequate procedures or f ailures to follow procedures because they were inadequate.
Georgia Tech committed to specific actions to identify and upgrade inadequate procedures.
After a year and a half, no actions had been taken to fulfill their commitment to the NRC.
Violation 85-02-01 was closed or. the basis that the incomplete corrective action commitments would be tracked as part of the new similar violation.
Dropping the new violation. decreased the chance of these particular corrective actions everibeing taken, and removed them from the tracking
- system, not to mention conveying the idea that what the licensee was doing was acceptable.
2.
1 Item B.1-Dose Calculations on Experiment Approval Form This item involved the failure to attach dose rate calculations to the Experiment Approval Form.
Facility Technical Specifications require procedures for control of experiments.
There are also req 11rements that experiments be preapproved to ensure compliance with i
specified limits and conditions. The Experiment Approval Form
{
serves as the procedure to approve experiments.
The form j
documents the information used to preapprove experiments. The form requires an entry for expected dose rate and states
" Attach calculations."
Calculated dose rates are necessary for a meaningf ul evaluation of whether or not an expe riment should be approved.
Expected dose rates are necessary to i
ensure
- safety, ensure compliance with the Technical Specifications on control of experiments.
and to arrange for special health physics precuations to be taken when necessary.
The licensee states in the denial of the j
violation, "Ve do not treat this (expected dose rates) as a l
re qu i re me nt. "
I contend that they were not following the procedure which they established, per Technical i
Specifications, to control experiment approval. I continue to 1
believe that the calculations of +he dose rates must be documented to determine if special heelth physics precautions 2
4 should be taken.
That action in this area is warrantad is evidenced by some of the violations in the health physics 3g area.
3.
Item E - Documentation of Control Manipulations and Emergency Drills 4
This violation involved the failure to meet 10 CFR 55 Appendix A licensed operator requalification requirements to
- 1) maintain reactivity manipulation summaries in the training i
records and
- 2) conduct an emergency drill and document the operator's performance.
i l
The control manipulation summaries are required to be i
in.the training files by 10 CFR 55 Appendix A to document proper operator requalification training.
At the time of the l
inspection. the required summaries could not be produced, and all responsible managers acknowledged that the records had never been prepared.
The reason given was that they did not think it was necessary to document something they all knew.
The licensee's response denied the violation because.
" Annual summaries of control manipulations do exist in our files."
The violation should not have been dropped on the basis of 4
j the licensee's statement without first inspecting, because j
the records did not exist at the time of the inspection.
l The licenseq's response to the violation for not performing
{
the emerge ncy drill stated that the required annual eveluations "were not done since 1983."
Yet this portion of the violation was dropped also.
The NRC acceptance of the denial stated that other operational records were
]
4 available, I
and that "Perf ormance can be inferred from these records." !
l see no j ustif ication for dropping this violation if a
required drill and evaluation were not pe r f ormed. " I nf err ing" 4
an operator's perf ormance instead of conducting the required
]
drill is unacceptable.
This identical item was cited in Inspection report 81-03. The previously cited violation supports the fact that this is a
valid violation.
4.
Item F - Inadequate NSC Audits 1
i This item involved the failure of the Nuclear Safeguards Committee to perf orm various f unctions required by Technical Specif ications.
I consider this particular deleted violation to be perhaps the nest significant violation of the inspection, as it directly addressed the management breakdown at the facility.
4 The violation was dropped in agreement with the licensee's contention that "The Committee does this work on a voluntary basis and realistic expectations of how much they can do would be useful to all
. Technical Specifications require 3
I n
i*
- ~
that ths Committee perf orm audito.
.but does not specify at what frequency.
. Ve agree however that expanded audits i
lg necessary to meet the spirit and letter of Technical are Specifications."
NRC acceptance of the denial stated "We agree.with your view on the role and function of the Nuclear Safety Committee.
Compliance with the NSC charter is a
i subjective matter. "
i s
j I
strongly disagree that the Technical Specifications i
1-pertaining to the NSC are totally subjective.
I even more l
strongly disagree with the implication in Georgia Tech's denial that time and f unding restrictions j ustify not meeting this
_ Technical Specification.
The Technical Specifications clearly assign the responsibility for the safe operation of i
the facility to the NSC, and specify functions which are I
required to be performed.
i Some of the cited audits had never been performed.
Although the Technical Specifications do not specif y a frequency. for the required audits, a frequency of-zero was certainly the intent.
not I
1 Item F.1 concerned the apparent failure of the NSC to have j
ever reviewed written j ob plans.
Technical Specifications 4
required maintenance to be performed by written procedures.
1 Ah4 T*;4%T*4 IhA WEQ T A T**i4*U ThA pr4A84MTpA prior to i
implementation.
Rather-than doing this, the licensee simply issued procedure 4901 saying that job plans shouldL be written i
for maintenance.
Because the NSC had approved
- 4901, they taking credit for satisfying the Tech Spec were requirement for approving all maintenance procedures even though. they were not actually doing so. Without the NSC at least auditing the job plans, there was absolutely no assurance that the job plans were meeting regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR 50.59.
Item F.2 concerned the lack of required NSC approval and NSC-approved procedures for laboratory experiments conducted by
~ Nuclear Engineering classes.
Procedures were being performed which had never been approved by the NSC. The licensee stated in the reply to the violation that " All experiments involving students have previously been performed many times.
I consider this. to mean that the violation had been going on for years.
Performing the sa me ' test frequently is no justification for non-compliance.
This violation shoult not have been dropped.
Item F.3 related to audits of equipment functions.
Again. I do not feel that'zero. is an acceptable frequency for such an audit.
The inspection report documented that concerns regarding ' equi pmen t safety had been identified to the NSC with no evidence that the concerns were pursued or resolved.
The. licensee finally did initiate an equipment audit after a power excursion which exposed some students working at a beam
- port, and only after-the NRC arrived on site to investigate 4
. -. - -=
4 9
l l
o this incident.
1 Example F.4 stated that NSC audits were inadequate in scope and failed to ever address control of experiments.
For
- example, control of experiments had never been audited yet experiments are the facility's primary activity and p obably the likeliest source of inadvertent personnel exposure.
An audit of the file drawer on experiments indicated that many of the files were missing one or more of the required forms.
I still emphatically contend that lack of management action is the root cause of Georgia Tech's poor enforcement history and that this Violation I should have stood as written in its entirety.
(M W
l