ML20114D662

Forwards Info on Advanced BWR Fuel Storage & Handling. Advises That Proposed Rev to Section 9.1 & That Significant Changes Re Sections 9.1.2.1.3 & 9.1.2.1.4,recognizing Fuel Storage Racks Are Purchase Equipment

ML20114D662
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	08/06/1992
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C NRC
References
NUDOCS 9209090238
Download: ML20114D662 (13)

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176 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Phone (408)925 4 8'2 4 FAX (408) 925-1193 or (408) 925A 687 Subject ABWR Fucl S4m% o.e d Man ch e s

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Shutda td_I$ Ult wn 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND IfANDLING (3) The beses between the calculated results and experimental results, as well as the uncertainty The ocw-fuel storage vault r, tores a 40% core load involved in the calculatious, are taken into of new fuel au:mblies. The fuel is stored in the new account as part of the calculational nrocedure to fuel storage racks in the vault which are located as assure that the specific k limit is met g

close as practi;able to the spent fuel storage p ol work area to facilitate handling during fuel The new fuel storage racks are purchasco picparation. The new-fuel inspection stand is close equipment. The purchase specification for these to (bc ne.ofuel storage vault to minimize fuct racks will require th: vendor to provide the 2

transport distance.

W "("

information requested in Ouestion 430.1Ts0 on critic slity analysis and the inadvertent pacemen' of a D

Spent f uel removed from the reabor vessel must fuel rssembly in other than preseibed locations. See

-. C C L-be stored underwater wMh awaitingpfMtene dce.

Subsection 9.1.61 for i*b "'f=:qn" " ]'*"# '

" c" 3

• Spent fuel storage racks, whic! are used for this purpcse, are located at the bottom of the fuel storage 9.1.1.12 Storage Design pool ander sufficient water to pavide radioloF cal i

shielding. 'Ihis pool water is processed through the The new fuel storage racia povided in the new fuel l fuel pool cooling and fuel poc! and cleanup FPC storage vault provide reorage for 40% of one full core system to provide cooling to the spent fuel in storage foel load.

and for maintenance of fuel pool water quality. The spent fuel pool storage capacity is 270% of the 9.1.1.1.3 Mechanicaland Stnictural Desigu teactor core.

The new fuel storage racks contain storage $ pace The new fu4 and spent fuel storage r?cks are the for (Let assemblies (with ebannels) or bundles same high density design. The new fuel racks can be (without channels). They are designed to withstand used for either dry or submerged storage of fuel, all credibi. static and seismic loadings. The racks are The design of the spent fuel racks will be described.

designed to protect Qc fuel assemblies and bundles information on the new fuel racks will only be from excessive physical daune.e which may cause the presented when the design is different. The 'c: "M release of radioactive materials in excr_ss of 10CFR20 1molyM41m4-eledg:r%wai.uJabbc.4ot ten. nd 10CFR100 requirements, under normal and abnormal conditions caused by impacting from eithe g~el assemblies, bundles or other eqmpment.

9M~

4 9.11 New fuel Storage Tim.och em q=d e3 Scc, aCakyj L 9.1.1.1 Design ihoes See Subsection 9.1.2.1.3.W-el6tieneWiwan o-ef-A f E m 3 a.d enely.m 9 L1.1.1 Nncicar Dc. sign 9.1.1.1.4 Thermal.flydraulic Design A full array of Icaded new fuel racks is designed to be suberitical, by at least 5% Ak.

See Subsection 9.L2.1.4.

(1) Monte Carlo techniques are er2plo,ced in the 9.1.1.1.5 Material Considerations calculations performed to assure that k does df not exceed 0.95 unde all norma! and abacinial See Subsection 9.1.2.1.1

. onditiont 9.1.1.1.6 Dynamic and impact Analysis (2) The assumption is made that the storage array is infiche in all directious. Since no credit is The new fuel storage racks are purchased taken for ni.utm ileakage. the values reported equipment. The purchase specification for the new as effective neuuvo multiplication factors are, fuel storage racks will require.he vendor to perferm n

in reality, infinite neutron multiplication confirmatory dynamic analyses. The input excitation j

faaors for these analyses will utilize the horizontal ar?

vertical response spectra provided in new Figures Amu. ament 17 914 i

fcK, 06 % 07: 12id1 G E I AXtDF 5LM J P.3'12 MN 23A6t%A.l!

bhlld.illd_!.NfUll hv Q l9.115 and 9.126. (The SSE response is two tinies normal and abnormal storage conditions equal to or S

' the OllE resportsc).

less than 0.05 in the new fuel storage racks. To ensure design criteria ate met, the following norrual Verticalimpact analysis is required because the aua sbnormal new fuel storage cotiditions e.wM b C fuel assembly is held in the storage rack by its own analyzed:

weight without any racchanical holddowo devices.

R Therefore, when ib~ downward acceleration of the (1) normal positioning in the new fuel array, and storage rack exceeds Ig, contact between the fuel asser%Iy and the storate rack is lost. Horizontal (2) eccentric positiculog in tne oew fuel array impact analysis is required because a clearance exists between,he fuel assembly and the storage rack walls.

The new fuci sprage area will accommodate fuel Col tws gJedu (kid < 135 at 20 Cio standard core geometry) with See Subsection 9.1.6.2 fog;eefaes reqmrements, no safety implications, f 9.1,1,1.7 (Deleted) 9.1.13.2 Structur31 Design 9.1.1.2 racilities Description (New Fuct (1) The new fuel vault contains one or me:c fuel Storage) storage racks which provides storage for fuel a maximum of 40% of one full core fuelload.

(1) The location of the new fuel storage vault in the reactor building as shown in Section 1.2.

(2) The new fuel storage racks are designed to be frecstanding (i.e., no supaorts above the base).

G) The new fuel storage racks are top entry racks desiped to preclude the possibility of criticality (3) The racks include individual solid tube storage under normal and abnormal conditions. The cainpartments which provide lateral restraiots upper tkplate of the fuel clernent rests against over the entire length of the fuel assembly.

the module to provide lateral support. The lower ti: plate sits in the bottom of the rack, (4) The weight of the fuel assembly or bundle..,

which supports the weight of the fur.l.

supported axially by the rack lower support.

(3) The rack arrangement is designed to prevent (5) The racks are fabric:aed from materials used for accidentalinsertion of fuel assemblies or construction are specified in accordance with the bundles betwecri adjacent racks The storage latest issue of applicable ASTM specifications.

rack is designed to provide accessibility to the fuel bail for grappling purposes.

(6) Lead in guides at the top of the storage spaces provide guidance of the fuel during in>crtion.

(4) The floor of new fuel storage vault is sloped to a drain located at the low point. This drain (7) The racks are designed to withstand, while temoves any water that may be accid:ntally and maintaining :he nuclear safety design basis, the unknowinglyintroduced into the vault. The impact force generated bv the vertical free fall drain is part of the floor drain subsystem of th; drop of a fuel assembly from a height ofMese M M' liquid radwaste system.

/ Wl4 kj (8) The rack k designed to withstand a pullup force (5) The radiation monitoring equipment for the of R7 y @XC iirrand a horizontal force of new fuel storage areas is described in Section 454 kg (1000 lb)"There are no readily deGnable horizontal forces in excess of temHtraidl, in th'e~

b-7.1.

. vent a fuel assembly should jam, the maximum 9.L1J Safety Evaluation lifting force of the fuel handling platform grapple (assumes limit switches fall) is 300Htr i % 1 Kj

• 9.1.13.1 Criticality Control (9) The new fuel storage rads require no perimlic The design of the new tuel storege racks provides n,cial testing or inspection for nuclear safety for ao effective multiplication fauor (kd) r both purposes.

9.111 Amendment 16

,a o, w on wm c, e nacw tua s

r. n ABWR mmwi Sjariditrd Plant.

bD 9.1.1.33 Prvtection Features of the New f uel Stnenge fa<llities The new fuel storage vault is housed in the reactor building. The vault and reactor building are Seismic Category I natural ybenomena such as tornadoes, tornado missiles, floods and high winds. Fire protection features are described in Subsection 9.5.1 and Appendix 9A.

T he storage rack structure is designed to withstand the impact re ulting from a falling weight. Tests using a simulated fuel bundie have been conducted to Orify that the rack casting can withstand the impact form a bundle dropped frorn a mantnum allowable height above the array, Procedural fuel. handling requirements and equipment desigu

'ee th ; e mere than oue bundle at a time car. - L. led over the storage racks and at a maximum heighi -4 6 feet above the upper rack. Therefore, the racks cannos Le displaced in a manner causing critical spacing as a result ofimpact from a falling object.

The auxibary hook on the reactor building crane can 'eaverse the fulllength of the refueling Ocor.

This hook is used to move new fuci from the entry point into the reactor building, up the main equipment batch to tbc refueling floor and from there it, the new fuel storage vault, This book can move fuel to (bc new fuel inspection stand and rechanneling area at the end of the spent fuel storage pool.

New fuel can also be carried from the new fuel vault to the inspection stand or spent fuel pool using the fuel b lling platform. Duricg positioning of new fuelirw the new feel racks with either the main crane auxiliary book or the refueling platform, the fuel grapple is always above the upper fuel rack casting and the grapple interfaces only with the fuel bundle bail and can not engage the fuel rack. Thus, the transfer devices used for new fuel bancling to the new fuel vault cannot impose uplift loads oc the rack castings.

Should it become necessary to move major loads along or over the pools, administrative controls-require that the load be moved uver the empty portion of the spent fuel pool and avoid the area of the new fuel storage vault. The shipping cask will not be lifted or moved above the new fuel vault because of their relative locations on the refuel 5g floor.

o 9l-32 Anwndment 16

AIM i),

f c t l W1 G r t yLUp Jug y p,t 3

AllWR

-ru Standant thL w

9.1.2 Spent Fud Storage assemblies, handles or orher equipment.

9.1.2.1 tksign llawa The spent fuel pool is a reiu ced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner..ae bottoms of 9.1.2.1.1 Nuclear !bign all pool gates are sufficiently hig.h to maintain the water level over the spent fuel storage racks form (1) A full *riay in the loaded spent fuel rack is adequate shielding and cooling. All pool fill and drain designed to be subcritical, by at least $7v Ak.

lines enter the pool above the safe shielding water Neutron absorbing material, as an integral part level. Redundant anti siphon vacuum breakers are of the design,is employed to assure that the located at the high point of the pool circulation lines calculated k including biases and to preclude a pipe break from siphoninp the vtater uncettainties, wk,not exceed 0.95 uuder all from the pool and jeopardiziug the safe wat !cvel.

ll uorn&l and abr.. ~ial condi6ons.

Tlii77cTritut1TTiiiiiiGual solid tubcWrd g

_( a.__-.--Monte Carlo techniquu are employed iu\\

compartments, which provide late: restraints over J)

I

)

the calculations performed to assure that the entire: length of the fuci awmbly or bundle. Tbc t

I does not exceed 0.95 under all normal weight of the fuel auembly r oundle is suppar cd !

M abnormal conditions.

axially by the ra(k fuel support. lead-in guides at the top of the storage spaces provide guidance of the fuel (b) ~Ihc assumption is made that the storage durmg' insertion.

s\\

array is infinite in all directions. Since no crcdit is taken for neutron leakage, the The rack 3 aic fabr.ated from materials used fcr f

values reported as effective neutron construction are specified ia acenrdance wit)h h multiplication factors are, in teility, latest issue of applicable ASTM specifications) The infinite ucutron multiplication factors.

racks are constructed m accordance witEquality assurance program that ensures the design, (c) The biases between the calculated results construction and testing requirements are met.

and experimental results, as well as th; nacertainty invola.i in the calculations, are de racks are duigned to withstand, while taken into account as part of the

'Imaintaining the nuclear safety design basis, the

(

calculational procedure to assure that ;he impact force generated by the vertical free-fall drop specific kg* limit is met, of a fuel assembly from n height of 6 feet. The rack is s

designed to withstand a pullup force of #100 pounds 9.1.2.1.2 Storag Design i and a horizontal force of 1000 pounds. There are no readily definable horizontal forces in excess of 1000 The fuel storage racks provided in the spent fuel pcunds, and in the event a fact assetably should jam, storage pool provide storage for 270% of one full the maximum lif ting force "I the fuelhandling core fuelload.

platform grapple (ussumes limit switches fail) is 3000

' pounds.

~ ~ ~

The fuel storage pool liner seismic clawification is prmided in Table 3.2-1.

The fuel stosage racks are designed to handle irradiated fuct assemblics. The expected radiation 9.1.2.1.3 Mechanleal and Structurul Dmign levels are well below the design levels, tM b C The spern furt storage rach in the reactor boilding in accordance vt Regulatory Guide 1.29, the fuel contain storage space for fuel assemblies (with storage racks are esignated Safety Class 2 and channels) or bundles (without chani ch). They are Seismic Category The structuralintegrity of the dcai;;ned to withstand all credinte static and seistuic rack heh de ionstrated for the load loadings. i'he racks are designed to prottet the fuel combinations described below using !inear clastic assemblics and bondics from excessive physicai design meshods.

datuage which may cause the sclease of radioactive snaterials in excess of 10CFR20 and 10CFR100 The applied loads to the rack are:

requirements. under nor:nal and abnormal conditions cat :d by impacting from either fuel O) dead loads, which are weight of rack and fuel

.usemblics, and hydrostatic loads; 914 Amendmcot 21 s

a;w.1 ma a c t ow ax >

p.m ABWR mumi StandarGlut

_ma wt..

(2) live inads effect of lif ting an empty rack The loacts in the three orthogoual directionstme d uring installation; considered to be acting simultaneously and wm rombined using the SRSS melbod suggested in (3) tht rmalloads the uniform thermal expat sion Regulatory Guide 1.92. The loads due to the OBE due to pool tec?perature cbanges; evcot are arproximately 90% of those due to as SSE event, and allowable stress levels for OBE are 50% of (4) seismic forces of OHE and SSE; SSE, tberefore making the OBE event the limling load cotidition except for stability, where SSti (5) accidental drop of fuel assembly from acceptance critet a of 6~F7e of critical buckling maximum possible heightph above rack; strength is limiting.

and

( y Me vJ IJnder fuel drop loading conditions, the acceptance criterion is that, although deformation may occu (5) postulated stuck fuel assembly r.ausing ao must remain <0.95. The rack is designed such g*77 upwird force of a000r.nn k,- t161 y.

that, should the drop of a fuel assemt>ly damage the The lead combinations considered in the ra k tubes and dislodge a plate of poison material, the[f design are; would still be <0.95 as required

,4 ts (1) live loads The diect of the g/p between the fu I and the storage tube herbewftakcu into accoun on a local (2) Jead ?,ds plus OBE effect basis. Dynamic response analysis

. that the fuel contacts the tube over a large p rtion of its (3) dead loads plus SSE; and lengtL, thus preventing an overloaded condition of both fuel and tube.

(4) dead loatt plus fuel drop, ovt j o es The vertical impact load of the fuel onto its seat-ha+ t 5 Thermal loads weteonot incpded iu the ahave h sensidered conservatively as being slowly v combinatiora because tbey myer.ligible

<.e to the applied without any benefit for strain rate effects. S

• el design of the ra-k (i.e., the rack is afkJ J "yh Syyf@gh G 7 f a< Cot htesc w ha"'

6e- % free to expand /coc Nt under pool 9.13.l A ncrmal4Iydtvulle Design temperature change.),

g, 4

mg\\

The fuel storage racfie designed to provide Thc loads ex erielced unde 2a stuck fuel assembly

+6,60; LjM/Laf d decay heagW( I c o

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condition are ! css than (nose calculatd "fo h

• w is s M"

• r4%

seismic conditions and, therefore, M induded a3 a load combination.

( The support structure must be designed to provide' {

an adequate flow rate to pyvent water reaching ga, The storage racks arepun - d 4o-t'. sg:

excessive ternperatures 212 F. The flow rate is 5%.m y bvhm.m41wn+ to counteract the dependent on the decay heat load, the AP losses tendency to ovcrturn from horimatalloads and to lift through the structure and the losses throuch the rack from vertical loads. The analysi.4 of the rack (and bundle,J assumed an adequate supporting structure, and loads were generated accordingly, in the spent fuel storage pool, the bundle decay heat

\\\\ W

& vaMo"*39 is removed by recirculauon flow to the fuel pool Stiess analysesy perfortned by[claaical cooling heat exchanger to maintain the pud unpera-methods based upon shears and moments developed ture. Although the design pool exit temperature (I, by the dynamic method. Using the given loads,lg' induced bundle now which carries conditions and analytical methods, stresses %te-calculated at eritical sections of the rack and

i. cat generated by the spetgue f he rat,e4 naturally circulated f'ow andgmaximum rack temperature E : b mS**d. 5-u. S M"gexit compared to acceptance criteria referenced in b *' M M ASME Sgon ill subsection NF. Compressive bN b "' 54

' *

• T^

stabihtyIrno c$1culated accordin6 to the AISI code for light gage structures.

The parameters which will affect the water flow *

\\ es e kh R n% *f ' ' '

p" z y k 1; w p,, M M M "

d H, W. e.

f

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(

Amtmiment 21 v

A

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% v a n. 4. p rAv h W A A -)d r A "

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f

$ y a.

- y a s e. & M l

u m m: ome c c oxuw tus 1 e.n is

%BWR.

namo Stqndard Plant sn N

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through he fuel stooge rack and consequ ntly tbc f

)

j' water ter :erature criting the top of the.torage Driving Force = h { 1 e jx

/

space are: \\

'4 2p 4

(1) hole si2c ugh the fitting; N

h MQ

\\

(2) flow area throu e base plite; vb g

[

2C (3) !bw resistance throu'pp the bundle;

(

p 144 c

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(4) height of the module abok the poolliner;

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This force if equal to the v ious pressure drops the

-(5) support structure restriction to horizontal flow water encounters in movin up through the bundle, or l under module; and V r II,where Z H.

the sum of these pn su:e b

I drops given below.-

(0) leading pattern of fuel in pool (e.g., fresh fuel loaded in center of array would result in higher Bundle Head 1.oss-cooling water exit temperatures).

The analysis was performed with the bundle dw "b '

h y

channelin place, since this is the most restrictive 0 Ogi iA/

k bundle cooling Cow must enter through the lowest tieplate orifice). Also, heat is generated in (be water c.p. 'initions of the above terms are given space betwee, the channel and the tube by gamma

~

capture in the water and roctal, thus creating a need for additional now opening into this space. Heat res s quadrar.ts and the Dow rate to the quindtant generstion rates for the BWR bundle irradiated 44 in ques 'on. A quadrant in this case U one-fourth of GWd/Mt and cooled 7 days were calculated usin the bundt in a raodule, A quadrant of a module is the ORIGEN computer code. These rates are:

used, since ic support structures essentially divide the module to four equal areas. Assume the Bundle 68,000 Utu/hr module quadra t in question is four quadrants from the edge of the p( l array, The cooling water to this Zr Channel 752 Bru/hr quadrant must flow orizontally under the four other module quadrants an supply c: clng water to these II,O Space 2,510 Bt hr modu!es. If the heat I d in caen quadrant is equa',

then the Gow to the oute quadrant is five times the Stainless Bora! Tube 256,u/hr now to the quadrant in q tion, and a - 5. As we 5

q\\uestion, a, becornes move closer to the quadrant t in no case does the coolin ater exit temperature 5,4,3,2 and finally, L at the top of th-rack app ach boiling. With exit

'\\

water at 115 F,a n d he pool return water i

temperjure at 100 F, e cladding temperature will Thus, I is the sum of the five p ure Ic.,s be 122 7:pd the Bo 41 Tube centerline temperature i

will be if 3 F, factors given above. These rela'ionshi may be The followin relationships, are used to solve the summed up as a cubic equation having the owing cooling wa r temperature increase as it Gows form:

s upward t ough the bund!c. The driving force to

\\

generatyflow through the hundle is given by:

n,,.,v,2 e v,. o. 0 p,

/

Amendtnent 7 UD

1

. ro", C6 "M 07:!N1 G E 18XtIm itt6 J P,8 12 ABWR-umma

• SIARdAEd_dillit Rn B

~~ -

/~~

0354h + 1.129 x 10 V 4'l v '3 =0

\\i b

b d.a Q H;;

For a coeflicient of 035*

0.23' "- ' c and the N

temperature inctease of tL dmg wat is 1230 F.

It can be noted that the min' um temperature y

y - 0, since there ar no b terrns:

increase will be duertuined wh a = 0.257, which is the pressure dicp J. rough e bundle anne, and this I

b l Mt +

+p c'

and a e

/

2r" The effects of char ing the design parameters can be quickly deter.r.ed using the abeve relationships.

Tbc results obt ned will be conservative due to the b MO high bundlefeu loads assumed and assumptions l

A=

N made as to module location in the pml.

g

,Cpk._.

p[

Des' u of the storage module is fixed. tiowever, I

g3 t 's of the module support structure will probably between facihties.

v For a given geometry of fuel, 'utet water temperature and beat from the bundle a and B will If it is sumed that the module is 10 inches above be constants and B is the only coefficient tha) the floor d with all other parameters as given changes. Thus, unde,- the conditiws above, definj/g above, then th emperature increase is determined as

1. wil. set the value of V.

e c was solved ra foHows:

b series of arbitrary values for S. Knowing th value for e permits rapid determination of V and the i

temperature mcrease ac oss the bundle.. '3 Area Under Module 0.00966 A solution is presented for the e c where the Area Reduction Under Modul 0 0301 mo$tle is supported 8 inches above e floor and the Base Plate 0.0137 suppu t structures occupy 25% of e area under the lloles in Castings 0.0127 module. Using the relationship above and the other Bundle 1$7_

factors as defined, the uount each f actor contributes to 8 is as follow Total 03-f.;!smr i

Using this value of1 Vb - 0.238 ft/ser and ternperature increase is 11.80 F.

13undle IIcad L.oss 0.257 Base Plate 0.0137 9.1.2.1.5 Material Considerations -

Holes in Castiry 0.0127 A,ca Unde: Module 0.0188 All structural material used in the fabrication of the Reduction ' Area under Module 0.0$

fuel storage racks is in accordance with the latest

. issue of the applicable ASTM specifica+,n at tbc time Total 0354 of equipn.ent order. This materi31is c-en due to its corrosion resistance and its abilly to' formed and l

1.129 x 10'3 welded with consistent sc:.iety. Tt-sormal pool 2 a water operating temperatures is (W to W*M 6 6 *C.

,3 0 - -4 M x 10

(*

The storage tube materialis permanently marked and the equation to be solved is:

with identification traceable to the material j' N certi&ations. The fuel stcrage tube assembly is Amendme.nt 7 9 I-2t

fo; oc w On i!m G E loltre it.tG J '

P.% 12 j

AMM 234sionmi StandardPlant wn 1

compatible with the environment of treated water above the base), the support structure also and ;.rovides a design life of N) years, provides the required dynamic stability.

9.1.2.2 Facilitics Description (Spent Fuel (3) The racks include individual solid tube storage Storage) compartments, which provide lateral restraints ever the entire length of the fuel assembly or (1) Tbc spent fuel stcragt tacks prodde storage in bundle.

the reactor building spent fuel pool for spent fuel received from the teactor vetsel during the (4) The racks are fabricated frer.: naterials used for refueling operation. The spent fuel storage construction and are specified in accordance racks are top entry racks designed to preclude with the latest issue of applicable ASTM the possibility of criticality under normal and specifications at the time of equipment order, abnormal conditions. The upper rieplate of the fuel elements rests against the rack to provide (5) 12ad.in guides at the top of the storage spaces lateral support. The lower tieplate sits in the provide guidance of tbc fuel during insertion, bottom of the rack, which supports the weight of the fuel.

(6) The racks are designed to withstand, while maintaining the nuclear safety design basis, the (2) The rack arrangement is designed to prevent impact force generated by the vertical free. fall accidental insertion of fuel assemblies or drop of a fuel assembly from a beight of 44e4,1,8" * #

bundles between adjaccot modules. The pH V..)

storage rack is designed to provide accessibility (7) The ta -is designed to withstand a pullup force to the fuel bail for grappling purposes.

of

.f hand a horizontal force of +0004bW D There are no readily definable horizontal forces (3) The location of the spent fuel poolis shown in in ex

1. f-4H04b and in the event a fuel Section L2 assembly should jam, the maximum lifting force

/

of the fuel. handling platform grapple (assumes 454 R$

timit swiiches fail)is 3mm \\ m g 9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation (8) The fuel storage racks are designed to handle 9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Control irradiated fuel assemblies. The expected radiation levels are well below the design les els.

The spent fuel storage racks are purchased equipment. The purchase specification for the spent The fuel storage facilities will be designed to fuel storage racks will requite the vendor to provide Seismic Category I requirements to prevent R

the information requested in Question 430.190 om carthquake damage to the stored fuel.

E eriticality analysis of the spect fuel storage including the uncertalairy value and ajociated probability and The fuel torage pools have adequate water s

confidence level for theg value. See Subsection shielding for the stored spent fuel. Adequate g

9.L6.3 for interface requircrr':nts, shiciding for transporting (be fuel is also provided.

Liquid level sensors are installed to detect a low pool 9.1.2.3.2 Structural Design and Material water level, and adequate makeup water is available Compntitality Requirtments to assure that the fuel will not be uncovered should a leak occur.

(1)~ The spent fuel pool r mks provide storage for 270% of the reactor ecte.

Since tL, fuel storage racks are made of noncombustible material and are stored under svater, (2) The fuel storage racks are designed to be there is no potential fire hazard. The large water supported above the pool floor by a support volume also protects the spent fuel storage racks from structure. The support structure allows potential pipe 1.reaks and associated jet impingement sufficient pool water flow for nattual con.

loads, vection cooling cf the stored fuel. Since the modules are freestsiding (i.e., no supports Fuel storage racks are made in accordance with the latest issue of the applicable ASTM specification at I-Amendenem 16 9 lad

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1 i

P. !O - 1c.

fOi 06 't 07:1Ud1 G E Isy,tyrp Itt6 J L

. ABWR 6.lilD dlR d lull the time of equipment order. The storage tubes are permanently marked with identification traceabic to the material certifications. The fael storage tube assembly is compatible with the environment of treated water and provides a design life of 60 years, intjuding allowancca for cortusion.

Regulatory Guide 1.13 is applicable to spent fuel l Stotage facilities. The :cactor building contains the fuel storage facilities,inc!vding the t,torage racks and pool,is designed to protect the fuel from damage caused by.

(1) natuni eventi such as earthquake, high winds and flooding, and (2) mechanical damage caused by droppmg of fuel assemblier, bundles, or other objects onto st nred fuel.

9.1.2A Summary of fladiologicalConsiderutions By adequate design and careful op: rational procedures, the safety design bases of the spent fuel stor age ar rangement are satisfied. Thus, the exposure of plant personnel to radiation is maintained weil below published guide %e values.

Furtber details of radiological considerations, including those for the sp.;nt fuel storage arrangement, are presented in Chapter 12.

The poolliner leakage detection system and water Icvel monitoring systein are discussed in Subsection A

C 9.13. The corrective action for loss of heat removal i

3 capability is in Subsection 9.1.3. The radiation monitoring system and the corrective action for excessive radiation levels are discussed in Subsections 11.511.' and 1! 5.2.13.

912e Amendnnat 17

u m. w animic c 01cm tu.;.i

e. n u

. ABWR moi StandelEhmt

,.w n 9.1.6 COL License Inforniation 9,1.7 References 9.1.6.t New Fuct Ssoruge Racks Criticality Analysis L

General Electric Standard Application jur Reactor furt, (NEDE.24011.P. A, latest l

The COL applicant referencing the ABWR approved revision) design shall provide the NRC confirmatory criticality analysis as iequired by Subsection 9.1.1.1.1.

9.1.6) Dynamic and Irnpact Analyses of New Fuct Storage Raels l

The COL applicant refereocing the ABWR design shall provide the NRC confirmatory dy, mic and irnpact analyses of the new fuel storage : eks.

See subsection 9.1,1,1.6.

9.1.6J Spent 1 uel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis -

l The COL spplicant referencing the ABWR design shall provide the NRC confirmatory critically analysis as required by Subsection 9.1.23.1.

9.1.6A Spent 6 uel Racks Load Drop Analysi<

9.\\4T 3 P 4A' I" "I R " < 33 b"

d 6ved w cN e-tow The COL applicant referencing the ABWR k * "4 " 'g f '

g

'T N C O L-4fP design shall provide the Nnc confirmatory load drop Ccwb M4*

1. b hNCC evcd wo3 % c.,F + b. ]3 p % -

C-al analysis as required by Subsection 9.1.43.

1 o M %d \\ n 9.1.6.6 Overhead Load Handling System

%ds cs t Information 5 d, te.k \\ o n 9, t. 2.. \\. 3.

l The Col applicant shall provide the NRC for pg gM T%d.

2 P

cout,u matory review: (1) heavy load handhng system

• (Ds\\J and equipment maintenance procedures,(2) heavy D cl Co C

b m J g\\lprovsck load hndling system and equipment raaintenance 7g*

gPP procedurcund/or manuals, (3) heavy load handling CWp' " E4O 4'

{

system and equipment inspection and test plans;

-M N C' C Jmys c %d 3 yy,

wk NDE, Visual, etc., (4) heavy load handling safe load g) dw D

paths and routing plans,(5) QA pregram to monitor bt N O

euc o

and assure implementation and compliance of heavy mM u v.c.w \\, ch.)

N Ic d handling operations and coutrols,(6) operator w

md qualifications, trammg and control program.

W5 r' 9.t.6.5 New FuelInspection Stand Seismic h k %gve

^-

Capability g

M,pch

9. L Z.L d

The COL applicant referencing the ABWR I design will install the ocw fuel inspection stand firmly to the wall so that it does not fall into or dump k (personnel into the spent fuel pool during an SSE.

See Subsection 9.1.4.23.2.)

.g.

9.1-t3 Arnendnwnt 21

(O) 06 'K: 07:17idi G E IIXLEiR Et.I6 J P,12 12

]

' AllWR nuimm Sum!antl%nt u.o Table 9.1 1 (p<khd)

DEFINITION OF TEllMS A

Flow arca through bundles

• 15.353 in ).

b A

Arbitrary area med in bundle friction correlation = 10in

\\~~

C Specific heat of water = 1.0 Blu/ltw F.

P Gravitatiooal constant 32.2 ft/sec?^

g

\\

li Head loss through bundle (ft H O).

b 2

h Effective depth of cold water over entraoce point into bundle = 13.5 ft in this example 1

Intercept in p versus t correlation - 63.45 lb/ft.

M Slope of p versus t correlation = -0.0145 lb/ft p

Density of water = 62.00 lb/ft (at 100 F),

1 O

Heat evolution rate from bundle = 68,00()/3,600 Btu /see.

t inlet water temperature (100 F).

\\'b

\\'elocity I water through bundle (ft/sec).

m __

11-ID Amcmiment 6 L

j

=.

~ -... -..-. - ~...... ~.....

- ~ ~ - - ~.. - ~.....

... ~..

1 t TRANSACTION REPORT >

09-06-1992 ( THJ) 09:14 E-RECEIVE 3

to.

DATE TIME.

DESTINATION STATION PO.

DURATION t10DE RESULT 5241 8-06 09:07 408 9251607 12 O'06'33' NORt1. E OK 12 O*OG'33*

P i..

4 t

I' l-l-

l l

l

,