ML20113E260
| ML20113E260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1996 |
| From: | NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20113E249 | List: |
| References | |
| PI-2, NUDOCS 9607050195 | |
| Download: ML20113E260 (195) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:I l l l 1 l l MILLSTONE UNIT 3 PROJECT INSTRUCTION 2 (PI 2) MP 3-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT REPORT TO MP 3 UPM AND MQC ON PI 2 TEAM FINDINGS REVISION 2 Prepared by: s 4 47 M /m ,cu W L A ' ,- w t Date:[('C (' C1996 7887 as MMu P PDR ,
SUMMARY
OF MP3 PI 2 REVISION 1 CHANGES The PI 2 Team has completed the added scope of activities delineated in Revision 0 to our report. These additional activities include the following:
- 1) A sample of Plant Incident Reports (PIRs) dating back to just before initial commercial operation of the unit (January 1,1986) was reviewed, and the relevant data extracted and added to the matrix. The Team randomly selected approximately one-third of those PIRs relating to Design and License Basis issues for each of the years,1986 through December 31, 1993. This sample, together with the previously completed one hundred percent review of relevant PIRs and ACRs for the period January 1,1994 through May 15,1996, results in the entire operating lifetime of MP3 having been assessed relative to docmnented adverse conditions.
- 2) The impact of FSAR Volume 15 and 16 Questions and Answers (Q&As) on work which is dependent on the FSAR has been funher considered, and the Team has concluded that there is a vulnerability in this area. Specifically, the pre-startup initiative to roll all Answers having impact on FSAR descriptions into the body of the FSAR was not consistently thorough. Thus, the potential exist that ;
those using the FSAR in the conduct of their work activities may not have considered all relevant infonnation if they did not refer to Volumes 15 and 16. We have recommended added scope as detailed in Section VII, MP3-Specific Assessment, Issue No.11.
- 3) Finally, contrary to our initial recommendation to the Unit Director to waive a root cause analysis, the Team decided that, since all of the background research that would be required to support the root cause analysis of an organizational (human) performance failure had been completed, it was logical that a formal analysis be completed. That I analysis is included as Section VIII to the Report.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
- 1. Introduction A. Overall Conclusion Relative to ACR 7007 Impact on MP3 B. Background and Key Documents C. MP3 Unit-Specific Assessment Objectives l
- 11. Summary of Assessment Findings l III. Sharing of Report with Other Units
, IV. ACR # 13302 Initiation l V. Administration of PI 2 Team A. Team Composition B. Training C. Database Selection VI. Team Approach j A. Time Frame and Scope of Documentation Selection & Approval l B. Database Matrix Guide C. "Binning" Process D. Key Personnel Interviews l E Evaluation of Gathered Data l F. Formation of Preliminary Conclusions G. Comparison of Preliminary Conclusions with MP3 CMP Scope H. Development of Recommendations I. Key Measures of Performance l VII. MP3-Specific Assessment: l A. Review of Data, Observations and Recommendations B. Key Measures of Performance Assessment l VIII. Root Cause Analysis IX. Attachments A. PI 2 Evaluation Material Selection B. Database Matrix Coding Guide ' C. Matrix Observations and Printout D. Unit-Specific Assessment Qualification Records E. Personnel Interview Package F. MP3 ACRNo.13302 i G. MP2 ACR No. 8761 H. Root Cause Analysis ERT (PI 2 Team) Report 1
1 Table of Contents (continued) X. References , A Configuration Management Plan, Rev. I B. NUC PI 2, Unit-Specific Assessments, Rev. O C. NUC Pl l4, Project Process Administration, Rev. O D. MP1 ACR 7007, Event Review Team Report i f I 4
)
I. Introduction:
l l A. Overall Conclusion Relative to ACR 7007 Impact on MP3 The PI 2 Team has concluded that MP3 has been impacted by many of l l the generic issues identified in the ACR 7007-Event Review Team i Report. Both the MP3 Unit-Specific Assessment and the Root Cause
- Analysis ' completed as part of MP3 ACR No.13302 have confirmed I this to be the case. While improving in recent years, management l expectations in many areas having impact on compliance with the 2 design and license bases of the unit still fall short. This condition will l require correction as part of the restart program. Generic elements of
- the Configuration Management and Nuclear Excellence Plans can be l expected to provide the corrective actions for " soft" issues such as ;
Management Expectations, Training and Culture. 2 l l ! Tlus sigmficant shortfall in the area of configuration management has j extended, to varying degrees, over the entire operating life of the unit 2 i
- including startup, and will necessitate a comprehensive evaluation of
- MP3's " current configuration". The PI 2 Team has considered that
! scope mandated by the MP3-specific CMP Implementation Plan, and i can endorse that Plan conditional upon the inclusion of certain scope additions. These can be found in Section VII of this report. In summary, MP3 was built on a more solid design and documentation foundation than the remaining Millstone units but was also subjected to 2. ; less than acceptable configuration management practices. Given the ! shorter period of exposure occurring in the later time frame of NU's ; nuclear experience, it is reasonable to have judged (as evidenced by MP3's CMP Implementation Plan) that the scope of evaluations requiring completion prior to the unit's return to service could be less than that of the adjacent units. The Team's review as presented in this < report supports that conclusion. t { f I 5
B. Background and Key Documents This report was prepared consistent with the requirements of Section i 3.2.1.b of the Configuration Management Plan, Revision 1, dated May 17,1996, (Reference A) and, more specifically, NUC Project Instruction 2, Unit-Specific Assessments, Revision 0, dated May 17, 1996,'(Reference B). The following is a brief discussion of the background of events and key docmnents leading to the requirement to ; prepare this report: 1
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ACR 7007-EVENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT Millstone Unit 1 (MPl), while completing extensive reviews in support , of preparation of a response to the unit's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, j initiated Adverse Condition Report (ACR) 7007 (Reference D) to ! document and have investigated an apparent high level of inaccuracy within the unit's UFSAR. On February 22, 1996, the ACR 7007 Event Response Team (ERT) published the ACR 7007 - EVENT RESPONSE TEAM REPORT. In their report, the Team identified l several fundamental causes for the MP1 UFSAR inaccuracies, and l noted that "Due to the nature of the causes identified in this report, the potential exists for the presence of similar configuration management conditions at Connecticut Yankee and the other Millstone units." Further noted was the fact that, "The team cannot ascertain thefidi extent ofthe implications without a sample similar to the set of 50.54(f) initiatives currently in progressfor Unit 1." MP3 PROJECT COMPLETION PLAN As a direct result of the ACR 7007-ERT Report, the MP3 staff prepared a unit-specific Project Completion Plan for the purpose of j defining the scope of MP3 activities to be completed to " ascertain the full extent ofthe implications" of the ACR 7007 ERT Repost. NRC'S MARCH 7.1996.10 CFR 50.54(f) MP3 LETTER By way of this letter, the NRC requested, within 30 days ofits receipt, NNECO's plans and schedules for completion of reviews precipitated 4 by the Report, and noted that "...we did not have a recent inspection 6
l history orfindings with regard to Millstone 3 that revealed design deficiencies similar in number and nature to those ofMillstone 1 and 2....". At this point in time the NRC had not imposed any limitations on the continued operation of MP3. NRC'S APRIL 4.1996.10 CFR 50.54(f) LETTER At the time ofissuance of this letter, MP3 was in a shutdown condition to correct self-identified deficiencies. Additionally, a special inspection team dispatched to the unit had, by this time, " identified programmatic issues and design deficiencies at Millstone Unit 3 that l are similar in nature to those at Millstone Units 1 and 2." Thus, the NRC amended their March 7,1996 instructions to specify the requirement for additional information to be submitted "no later , than 7 days prior to Millstone Unit 3 restart (prior to criticality)from \ its current outage...". Em1her, the NRC noted that "Your submittal should describe actions taken to ensure that design and configuration control deficiencies at Millstone Unit 3 have been identified and have 1 been evaluated with regard to plant operability, the existence of unreviewed safety questions, and reportability. Your submittal should also address corrective actions........ .Further, prior to restart of Millstone Unit 3, you must resolve, to the NRC's satisfaction, the issues raised in the examples described in the enclosure, the Auxiliary : Feedwater valve issues, and the recirculation spray system matter. " NU'S CONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTPLAN A management decision was made to replace the above-described l Project Completion Plan with a new document called the Configuration Management Plan (CMP), together with a set of Project i Instructions (PIs). This action was taken in recognition of the growth in magnitude of the Project and the need for a greater degree of implementation formality and management involvement. Attachment l # 3 to the CMP is the Millstone unit 3 CMP Implementation Plan, wherein MP3-specific plans to satisfy the intent of the overall CMP are l presented. Project Instruction 2, Unit-Specific Assessments is part of the CMP and is the document governing the conduct of the MP3 assessment, the results of which are contained in this report. 7 i
NUC PI 2. UNIT-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS l This PI specifies the following:
- Complete an in-depth assessment to detennine the reasons for issues identified over the last 2 years (at a minimum) by the NU Connecticut units, Regulators, and other industry organizations,
. . Initiate PI activities via the initiation of a Category "B" ACR to address Licensing and Design Bases issues for the unit,
- Compile a matrix of identified issues against the appropriate ACR 7007 categories and others as necessary,
- Compile and review key indicators of engineering perfonnance, and
. Provide a comprehensive final report containing conclusions and recommendations relating to concurrence with or appropriate modifications to the CMP scope.
1 C. MP3 Unit-Specific Assessment Objectives Since several of the ACR 7007 ERT findings relate to issues that are common to the Connecticut nuclear units, the PI 2 Team (The Team) P,. had, as its primary objective, the determination of reasons for issues of a repetitive or " common theme" nature identified on MP3 over the last two and one-half years (1/1/94 through 5/15/96). This information was then used to quantify the extent to which MP3 has been impacted by the conditions identified in the 7007 Report. Using the infonnation developed in making this detennination, The Team then assessed the appropriateness of scope of the MP3 CMP, in panicular, with respect to that portion of the plan to be completed as Phase I activities leading to return of the unit to service. The Team approached this task with the understanding that MP3 had, to some degree, been impacted by the l issues of ACR 7007. Also, The Team had a fundamental need to detennine how the " current configuration" of MP3 had, as a result, been affected. Having then determined the impact on the unit via the l 4
evaluation of considerable data, the Team was able to assess whether the CMP-described scope of activities are of proper focus, breadth and depth. This caused the Team to be focused most heavily on " current configuration" issues to facilitate the validation and completion of a properly directed CMP scope of activities. While the reasons for flaws in MP3's " current configuration" were useful inputs to, in a qualitative sense, the assessment of acceptability of the unit's CMP scope, these are " previous state" reasons which are undergoing correction for the
" future state" needed to retain configuration management, once re-established to an acceptable degree of assurance. Thus, The Team approached this assignment with an acceptance that " future state" improvements would be in place to support the high quality lifetime management of unit configuration as a result of other CMP generic elements and initiatives such as the Nuclear Excellence Plan.
Additionally, a qualitative assessment of these improvements relative to their effectiveness as corrective actions for the causal factors identified in our Root Cause Analysis was to be completed. II. Summary of Assessment Findings: Detailed scope modification reconunendations are presented in Section V11, MP3-Specific Assessment. '
- 1) The ACR 7007 ERT-identified generic issues have had impact on
)
MP3, and specifically, MP3's FSAR. NU's failure to treat the unit's FSAR as a document with which verbatim compliance is required is the 2 primary causal factor for that document containing numerous discrepancies. Thus, the need for the MP3 CMP is established.
- 2) The Team concludes that the MP3 CMP is sound in its approach, method, scope and timing of Project Phases, and will, with the scope additions described in Section VII.A., provide the reasonable assurance required to respond to the NRC's letter of April 4,1996. The personnel interviews we conducted confinn this conclusion and were l 2 important inputs to the recommended scope changes.
- 3) There is a need for improved knowledge of, and respect for, the FSAR within some unit departments that currently view the document 9
as one of historical interest (an ACR 7007 finding). This is evidenced by both documented conditions (ACRs, PIRs etc.) and the personnel interviews we. conducted. (Attaclunent F of Section VIII is a stunmary ofinterview discussions and evaluation results.) Note that there are interviewee comments that go beyond the scope of PI 2 that should not be ignored. These comments are highlighted and included with Attaclunent E for your review and disposition.
- 4) The "As-Built" condition of the unit as depicted on the unit's drawings of record appears to be acceptable. This is evidenced by the g relatively low number of ACRs and PIRs written against discrepant conditions in this area. Additionally, the safety significance of docmnented drawing deficiencies is, in ahnost all cases, very low.
- 5) A significant nmnber of the issues detected and documented in the past two and one-half years relate to issues that have existed since unit startup. In almost all instances, issues having safety significance fall into this category. The Team's expanded review of PIRs dating back to initial commercial operation of the unit reveals that for the first half of the units oper.iting lifetime, " grooming" issues prevailed, based on experienced problems or inability to pass specific tests. The last half of the unit's current lifetime has witnessed a more probing approach which has brought to the forefront, the "what if" son of questions that have revealed deficiencies that would negatively impact system l perfonnance under postulated (versus having already occurred) '
scenarios.
- 6) The threshold for docmnenting problems has been and continues to be lowered over the course of the period studied. This is particularly the case since initiation of the current ACR process. As a result, more discrepant conditions are being detected, documented and dealt with.
This does give rise to the appearance of a higher rate ofincidence of l problems, but can be interpreted, in part, as a positive indicator of staff l perfonnance. l III. Sharing of Report with Other Connecticut Unit Staffs: l I Note that PI 2 requires the sharing of this report with the staffs of the remaining Connecticut units. Please ensure that the repon is appro-10
priately distributed upon your acceptance of the document and is fonvarded to Nuclear Records for future reference. IV. ACR # 13302 Initiation: PI 2 requires that the Unit-Specific Assessment be initiated by the generation of a Category "B" ACR. ACR # 13302 was submitted to l unit management on May 7,1996. This report will serve as the vehicle for closure of the ACR. Attachment F is a copy of ACR # 13302. V. Administration of PI 2 Process: A. Team Composition George R. Pitman -- Team Leader Ken L. Burton Mark J. Whitney B. Training The PI 2 specified training was completed and is documented on the qualification cards of Attachment VIII.D. C. Database Selection l The Microsoft ACCESS Database was selected for compiling the PI 2-required data in matrix fonn. VI. Team Approach: A. Time Frame and Scope of Documentation Selection & Approval The Team selected the period January 1,1994, through May 15,1996, as the period of consideration for review of PI 2-specified
- documentation. As noted earlier, a sample of PIRs dating back to 1986 ;
was also selected. Attachment A in Section IX lists the field of lZ documentation obtained, screened and evaluated. Also included as 11
part of that attaclunent is the UPM's approval of the Team's proposal for the PI 2-specified review time frame and scope. J It is worthy to note that the review period selected for one-hundred j percent review of applicable specified documents, while relatively J short when compared to MP3's current age, provides a significant sampling of unit life-related issues identified during this penod. Many of these issues are related to actions taken before the unit went into i conunercial operation. This near-term (approximately two and one-half years) documentation review covers the period when NNECO's ; threshold for doctunenting problems was very low and a probing culture prevailed. This provides a basis for the Team's decision to ! complete an assessment ofless than one-hundred percent (one-third) of older PIRs. Employee interviews were conducted as one element of the Team's information gathering process. The interviews drew, in part, on key ! members of MP3's engineeriag, operations, maintenance and I&C l technical and management staff who were assigned to the unit during the tmit construction period and, in most cases, are still on board the MP3 Team. B. Database Matrix Development . Attaclunent B is the key'to cell definition and ACR 7007 coding that ; was used in entering data into the database presented as Attaclunent C. l The matrix fields were selected on the basis of their usefulness to the Team's understanding of such issues as " original design" versus ,
" modifications to design" or " test procedure" deficiency etc., and are supportive of ACR 7007-related categoy segregation. :
C. "Binning" Process t l Having developed a suitable spread sheet (matrix), gathered . l documentation was distributed among team members for purposes of j l screening for applicability, review of selected doctunents and enty of i ( data in accordance with PI 2 Section 1.4.2. This process supported the l later " query" process wherein specific " key words" (or codes) were searched. This provided an understanding of the contents of specific 12
bins to be developed. Attaclunent C is the matrix printout by system number. D. Key PersonnelInterviews Twenty-four (24) current NU employees were selected for interviews with one or more of the Team members. Individuals were selected on the basis of their past and current positions and the relationship of their job assignments to the concept of configuration management. Those
- interviewed are listed in Attachment E. A sample questionnaire and a
! smmnary ofinterview results are also included. As noted earlier, some l interviewee comments are outside the scope of the PI 2 effort and will l- be tumed over to others on the MP3 CMP Team. E. Evaluation of Gathered Data A composite of ACCESS database queries was run to generate the l2 desired bins ofinfonnation. Those bins having potential value to the identification of vulnerable areas were then qualitatively compared to the results of employee interviews. Where correlation was strong in a particular area, the area or issue was designated as one that requires comparison with the CMP scope of activity. Of particular interest was the question "Does current scope already cover this type of issue or should additional scope be considered?". F. Formation of Preliminary Conclusions Based on the above, the Team developed a listing of key areas, issues etc. which require investigation in support of determining NNECO's level of confidence with respect to MP3's current level of configuration l management integrity. i G. Comparison of Preliminary Conclusions with MP3 CMP Scope
! This was the first point in time when the Team, in a detailed manner,
{ set about to fully understand the scope of the MP3-specific CMP. This j-strategy resulted in an absence of " mind-set" which could subconsciously result in attempts to support reasons why the CMP is , j appropriate. Thus, the Team attempted to match Team-identified I-i 13
- a. -. .-. .
i
l vulnerable areas with CMP-described activities. In instances where no CMP scope item would have found the type ofissue being evaluated, a scope addition was defined for consideration for inclusion with the Team's final recommendations. H. Development of Recommendations i i Based on the above, the Team assessed which of the scope additions were appropriate to the provision of a high level of confidence in the current configuration of MP3 upon completion of the CMP Phase I , scope of activities. The selected additions are presented in Section Vll.A, entitled, MP3-Specific Assessment. I. Key Measures of Performance Information taken from the Measures of Performance year-end reports for 1994, and 1995, and from the same year's Level II Reports up to the date of discontinuation of that report (11/95) was reviewed. A qualitative assessment of the meaning of these indicators to the issues at hand was made and is presented in Section VII.B. VII. MP3-Specific Assessment: A. Review of Data, Observations and Recommendations Based on the method described above, The Team compiled a listing of vulnerable areas that could potentially impact the license and design bases of the unit. The discussion of each of these areas is followed by a brief explanation as to where in the MP3 CMP scope the concern would be addressed or, if not addressed, a recommended change to that scope. Our recommendations are in boldface print. The listing follows: Issue No.1: Open Bypass Jumpers (BJs) Outstanding BJs stand out as particularly vulnerable since the work done under a BJ can, on occasion, represent the installation of a " work-around" of a designed feature. Further, that design feature is likely described in the FSAR. Also included in this category is, for example, temporary filter material and in the extreme case, such equipment as 14
f instrumentation installed tmder an AWO versus a BJ. In the case of the instrmnentation example, this equipment could be used to monitor a system or systems not currently perfonning up to standard, for which the temporary added equipment is needed to guide operators in the conduct of compensatory measures. ! Assessment No.1: Page 10 of 30 of PI 5 describes a Jumper Bypass (should be Bypass Jumper) Review as an integral part of the System Readiness Review. l This satisfies the above-stated concern so long as one part of the l review ensures that any Jumper Bypasses remaining in place upon ! unit startup have been considered relative to compatibility with the l FSAR and have a written safety evaluation. Additionally, l temporary features such as filters, monitors, sump pumps etc., l which have been installed without use of the BJ process should be evaluated for need for a BJ and for FSAR compatibility. Issue No. 2: PDCEs The Team fotmd, via the interview process, some concem for that subset of modifications completed by the Unit Engineering Staff during the period beginningjust before unit startup until mid-1991. This work was completed using the E&DCR and PDCE processes. The PDCE process is a short form version of the PDCR process. As acknowledged during our interview of the unit's first Engineering Manager, this engineering staff was not consistently knowledgeable of the full cycle of design and documentation considerations. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that some errors could have been incorporated into the unit design via this activity. It is useful to note that PDCEs, when properly selected for use, are involved in making minor changes to low safety significance systems; however, there was a period , wherein PDCE use wandered outside the intended bounds resulting in I that process being eliminated. Assessment No 2: l Beginning on Page 7 of 30 of PI 5, a comprehensive review of AWOs for association with such items as PDCRs, PDCEs etc. is described. I 15 l
]
J i i 1 .
- Subsequent PI 5 pages detail steps meluding " Identify those PDCRs !
- that may affect the FSAR...." It is assumed that this includes PDCEs
! and E&DCRs as noted on Page 7, since these are the more vulnerable ;
j subset of design change packages. A thorough review of early , vintage (1983 through 1991) PDCEs and E&DCRs is recommended during the conduct of already specified reviews. l Please add this clarification if the Team's assumption is incorrect or ; otherwise ensure our recommendation is included in the scope of j activities. l Issue No. 3: QA Calculations
- There are two areas of potential vulnerability relating to calculations,
- as follows:
! 1) Assumptions used as the bases for calculations may have been too ! i narrow in their interpretation; i.e., the " worst case" may have been defined with a singular emphasis on safety function accomplislunent ;
- versus the combination of that functional accomplishment and the !
[ i "what ifs" associated with other failures or related design sequences. j The RSS and QSS piping and anchor issues are examples of this type l ! of error m assumption, and, ; i .
- 2) Calculation tracking integrity necessary to guide engmeers mvolved l l in modifying a system to the last revision of the appropriate calculation l
- was not always present. As a result, the " basis calculation" from which the revision was made may not have been the correct basis. In !
- some cases,' individuals may have generated an entirely new ;
calculation, not knowing that one already existed that should have represented the starting point.- One calculation assumption may conflict with or invalidate another one, without either being compared to each other or to the FSAR. Assessment No. 3: The vertical slice reviews of PI 15 provide a good sampling of critical
- system calculation status. The' Team's discussions with MPR l Associates, Inc. personnel, revealed that the recently identified stress calculation issues will cause a vertical slice " bulge" to occur to 16
l l l L l facilitate further exploration of this issue. The Team judges this scope to be sufficient for the vulnerability identified. Additionally, the Configuration Management PI will correct processes and procedures so that, on a " Going Fonvard" basis, similar tracking issues will not be forthcoming. The Team does, however, recommend the generation of l a Master Listing of all calculations generated to date so that a proper foundation for future work is established. While no scope i changer are proposed, The Team chose to note this item due to its importance to the overall Project. l Issue No. 4: FSAR Correlation to Operating Procedures ! There are several distinct categories of potential vulnerability in this area, as follows: l
- 1) During MP3's startup phase, some systems, when subjected to the l planned startup series of tests, did not perform as expected. The ,
( corrective action in some cases was to change the manner in which the : system operated to "make it work". While this may be acceptable in l most instances, without a thorough re-visitation of the FSAR-described l design and system function, the trap is set for the potential to wander away from the functional characteristics described in the FSAR. The - SLCRS system is an example of a system having experienced this form of startup problem.
- 2) This category of procedural issue has to do with systems first put into service supporting on-line operation of the unit with procedures in place that are consistent with the FSAR. Some time later, however, l due to complexity or difficulty experienced with operation per the l procedure, changes were made without a full understanding of the impact of that change on unit' design confonnance. An example is the P Reactor Vessel Head Lift evolution, initially completed in concert with and at the same vertical lift rate as refueling cavity pool level increase.
( Without a proper understanding of the basis for the original procedure, l that procedure was changed, invalidating or, at a minimum, making less
- conservative, head drop calculation assumptions.
- 3) This next category has to do with the incorporation of " work-arounds" for purposes of making systems work that otherwise work 17 l
poorly or not at all. Again, as above, this cannot be done without a clear understanding of FSAR-described function. The now bypassed automatic boration feature of the CVCS is a good example which, while not one which has resulted in tmacceptable system function, has been a nuisance and has contributed to several reactivity excursions.
- 4) This category deals with those systems originally operated in accordance with the FSAR description, which, due to inadequate preventive maintenance, suffered perfonnance degradation to the point where they were simply taken out of service. An example is that of the emergency diesel generator air dryers which were removed from service for an extended period. Another is the DAS P-10 RCS Leakage Monitoring Pump which was defeated for six years before realizing that the sensitivity it affords is required by Technical Specifications.
- 5) This last category has to do with systems abandoned in place which may still be described in the FSAR as though they were still utilized.
Additionally, the means of abandomnent or isolation from other active systems may create a situation different from that described in the FSAR. NOTE: (The NRC's Inspection Team, in their May, 23,1996, exit meeting, also noted the MP3 vulnerability regarding operation of FSAR-described systems.) Assessment No. 4: The Team feels strongly that scope be added in the area of translation of FSAR-described operating features to Operating Procedures. We therefore recommend that the Operations Department complete a review of all Group II systems for FSAR-to-Operating Procedure compatibility. Group II is reconunended since, historically, many of MP3's problems have occurred in these types of systems (SLCRS, HVAC, Radwaste etc.). 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations need to be completed if the unit returns to service with systems operated at odds with the FSAR described method of operation. In the long term (Phase II), The Team recommends that all system operating procedures be checked for potential conflict with the FSAR. 18
1 I Issue No. 5: Original Plant Startup Punchlist Items i Based on feedback from the interviews we conducted, The Team has ! detennined that some relatively significant work releases issued during the year before initial commercial operation as well as shortly thereafter may reveal vulnerabilities relating to non-compliance with ; FSAR-described features and functions. A recently identified example j has to do with the assumed loss of one train of Service Water, its ; impact on the RSS contaimnent sump water temperature and subsequent impact on RSS piping stresses. This problem was identified ; by the A/E shortly before unit startup and a decision was made to solve l l the problem with operator actions. The appropriate procedures were never changed, however. Assessment No. 5: ; l While not described in a PI,. Action Item II.I of the MP3 Restart l2 l l Criteria describes a review of Engineering Backlog including startup j punchlist scope. This is judged to be sufficient to cover this issue. -It is j worthy to note in Section VII.B., the Team's observation that Backlog ! level is a very good indicator of a unit's susceptibility to configuration l problems, i l I l Issue No. 6: Missed Commitments i A theme commonly encountered during the interview phase of this assessment was that commitment tracking has not been optimal. The
- process of understanding conunitments that were made and the way in which they were closed out has been cumbersome. In particular, it is difficult to tie license commitments to the actions which closed them out. It is also difficult to ensure that future fixes do not unknowingly invalidate past commitments.
Assessment No. 6: i The License Basis reviews of PI 6 sample the integrity of commitment l tracking on MP3. While this is sufficient MP3-specific action, as part i of our five-unit initiatives, however, the Team recommends that a l l i l l 19 4
l l means be established to ensure commitments are tracked and traceable so that the impact of future commitments is readily known. Issue No. 7: A/E Interfaces with Major Supplier Packages . l 1 The ESAS Load Sequencer and some of the major Westingimuse i supplied NSSS Systems were identified as being worthy of ! examination relative to the manner in which the A/E, Stone and Webster, interfaced with this equipment. There were early indicators of interface compatibility problems in the ESAS Load Sequencer packages. l 2. Assessment No. 7: The Vertical Slice scope includes systems with major interfaces and should, as a result, be sufficient to cover this issue. However, the 1 Team reconunends that reviewers be alerted to be particularly mindful of the major AE/ Vendor interfaces. Issue No. 8: FSAR Familiarity and Use The Team has concluded that there is a segment of MP3's staff that is close to the surveillance test writing and test perfonnance process that has insufficient knowledge of FSAR impact potentially resulting from 2 their work activities. The Team came to this realization as part of the personnel interview process. Rather than to single out particular organizations, it is sufficient to say that any organization involved in the writing and/or conduct of surveillance tests need to be knowledgeable of the FSAR. Assessment No. 8: l The Team reconunends that the MP3 UPM ensure that the Training l element of ACR 7007 corrective actions is inclusive of this employee population for each of the Connecticut Units, as this is likely to be a common weakness. Details are provided in the Attachment E summary ofinterview results. I l 20
l l l Issue No. 9: FSAR Changes without 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations l The recent NRC Inspection Team docmnented a problem that was not i and could not have been detected by methods used by the PI 2 Team. 1 This relates to FSAR changes made without the benefit of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. Assessment No. 9: No currently specified MP3 CMP activity deals with this concern. Thus, The Team reconunends that all FSAR changes made for reasons other than plant design changes (covered by PDCRs, PDCEs etc.) be reviewed to ensure that either a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation exists or a clear and acceptable rationale is in place justifying the lack of need for an evaluation. Issue No.10: DCN Use Vulnerability Millstone 2 ACR No. 8761 was initiated to address a high level of l configuration management-ACR generation (87 ACRs) on the unit during the last year. The draft of MP2's response document (report) is included as Attaclunent G. In their report, the MP2 reviewers note that "Use of DCNs for drawing update without a parent document or 10CFR 50.59 evaluation should cease except for purely administrative , changes." It is not clear to the MP3 PI 2 Team, that MP3 has not been impacted by the issue that gave rise to this comment. l Assessment No.10: MP3's Design organization should complete a review of DCNs falling into this category (Category 8, Administrative DCNs) to ensure that drawings have not been changed to reflect field conditions without first ensuring that the field condition is in accordance with the intended design. Further, the requirement to cease the use of Category 8 DCNs for purposes other than " purely administratively changes" must be mandated on MP3, similar to actions taken by MP2 and subsequently, MPl. 21
i 1 Issue No.11: l Volumes 15 and 16 of the MP3 FSAR contain the NRC's questions relative to the design underg.oing their review and NNECOs answers to these questions. A pre-startup decision to incorporate any answers of substance to descriptions contained in the FSAR body into the body of the document was not consistently and thoroughly implemented. It is ! also apparent that those using the FSAR do not dependably refer to Volumes 15 and 16 to detennine if their work is impacted. Thus, the intent of the FSAR description, as augmented by the answer to NRC's ! question, may not be clear to those now using the FSAR for assurance l of maintenance of the design basis. Assessment No.11: An evaluation of need for a more complete incorporation of NU's l responses to NRC's questions into the body of the FSAR is recommended. The Team acknowledges that, in the short term, I training of relevant sectors of the organization in the need to consider l the Question and Answer volumes whenever they are using the FSAR l as the source of design basis information may be a suitable alternative l to revising the FSAR if that is deemed necessary. Additionally, the extent to which the already completed CMP reviews may have been impacted by reviewers not familiar with Volumes 15 and 16 needs to be assessed to determine if a re-visitation of certain FSAR sections may be required. l B. Key Measures of Performance Assessment l The Team had planned to complete an objective review of these measures, only to find that their real value lies in the area of " tone l setting". Thus, a simple qualitative assessment of the Key Measures of 1 Perfonnance (MOPS) for MP3 was made, i The Team's review of the MP3 MOPS revealed an interesting overall , indicator that seems to be consistent with what we are now learning from those in the industry who have previously been involved in Restart Programs. This has to do with the ability of a particular unit to 22
perfonn well, when measured by one set of factors related to unit output and system availability, only to have a vulnerable condition lurking in the background that ultimately affects good performance. That condition is one of having significant levels of Backlog in many process areas. These include, but are not limited to status of Design Drawings, PDCRs, NCRs, Bypass / Jumpers, NRC Open Items and A W Os. This observation led The Team to conclude that a critical element of the CMP must be that of close scrutiny of existing backlog, reduction of backlog in areas deemed appropriate and a commitment to eventual elimination of backlog. The MP3 CMP is judged to have a good mix of activity in this area. As a result, The Team proposes no Phase I scope changes, but places a heavy emphasis on the requirement for a long term continual reduction program, ultimately taken to the point of backlog elimination, together with a commitment to prevent new growth. l In stunmary, for the period evaluated, MP3 had very good performance-oriented MOPS while, at the same time, those measures of outstanding workload (backlog) can now be seen as indicators of the problems we are experiencing today. VIII. Root Cause Analysis: Attaclunent H is the Root Cause Analysis ERT Report. Our summary conclusion as to the primary causal factor for configuration management deficiencies at MP3 relates to the unit'sfailure to treat the FSAR as a document with which verbatim compliance is required. Management expectations in this area were not clear, resulting in a wide diversity in the quality of work affecting or affected by the FSAR. The Report concludes that the corrective actions planned or ongoing as part of the generic " fixes"(configuration management process changes, Nuclear Excellence Plan etc.) are appropriate for correction of the conditions which have prevailed over the unit's lifetime. As noted in l several sections of the PI 2 assessment report, " current configuration" issues will be corrected by tmit-specific CMP scope completion. l 23
ATTACHMENT A PI 2 EVALUATION MATERIAL SELECTION PI 2 Minimum Requirement Subset: o NRC Inspection Reports related to LB or DB issues and internal notes, matrices, and findings ofrecent NRC LB or DB team inspections (Used NOVs dating back to January 1,1994, and matrix prepared to collect Virgilio Team findings as ofend of first two week visit -- this proved to be useful input, generally validating conclusions already reached using intemally generated ACRs and PIRs) o Last two (2) INPO assessment Reports . . ( These were most usefulin terms ofcapturing symptoms such as large backlogs, lack of key measures, but :n other respects, duplicated our own identified issues) o ISEG Reports relating to process and LB and DB issues (Generally useful in a validauon capacity with nothing new presented) o Relevant QAS Reports (audits, surveillances, etc.) (Generally useful in reiterating self-identified issues) 1 I o NU internal self-assessments o Applicable unit-specific assessments and audits o ACR 7007 Event Review Team Report (Found only the generic issues to be applicable with no unit-unique observations) o ACRs (and PIRs) selected based on key word (license, design, process, etc.) searches (This was the most useful source ofinformation with 400++ entries selected forimputing to the matrix) o PORC Subcommittee and Committee reviews ofLB and DB-related issues (We were able to identify none of these) o NSAB reviews ofLB and DB related issues ) o NS&O communications on areas to be covered by CMP (Reviewed these and found them to be useful to the generation of the CMP and PIs (specifically PI 2), but not a source ofinformation useful to implementation of PI 2 -- Note that Oversights comments led to the expansion ofRevision I scope to cover PIRs dating back to startup of the unit.) l l
ATTACHMENTA i j From: GEORGE R. PITMAN JR l To: brothmh, lyonstw I Dates 5/7/96 3:22pm ! Cubjects Configuration Management Plan (CMP), PI 2 - Recommendations for Your Approval Project Instruction 2, Section 1.1.1, requires the generation of a unit-specific Category "B" ACR as the means to initiate actions on the PI. Further, the PI recognizes, in accordance with NGP 2.40, that there may be reasons to waive the normal requirement for a formal root cause analysis to be completed. In this case, we propose to defer to the ACR 7007 Event Review Team Report-identified root causes as the basis for not completing another cnalysis. Our deliverable to the MP3 UPM will be a comprehensive report, y containing an assessment of adequacy of the MP3-specif,tc CMP and-recommended l modifications to that plan, as appropriate. V i Ken Burton and I will be writing the ACR this afternoon for delivery to unit l management by the MP3 UPM. The Unit Director's approval of our recommendation or alternative instruction relative to the waiver of a root cause analysis is needed for our PI 2 file. Ken will provide, on request, any background , information leading to our recommendation. l In accordance with Sections 1. and 1.3.2 of the PI, we will be compiling for i review, specific process, licenso basis and design basis information covering the period from the present back to January 3, 1996. This covers a period olightly greater than the minimum specified by the PI. We further propose to , include SLCRS and Service Water System issues that had their roots and l resolutions dealt with prior to 1994. We request the UPM's documented j concurrence with our proposal or alternative instructions for our PI 2 file. Note that the PI and MCP are in Draft form and we are simply getting a head start on data gathering. For your information, members of the PI 2 Team are Ken Burton, Mark Whitney, Bob Veklund and George Pitman. WD intend to provide to the MP3 UPM by Friday, May 17, 1996, the final report no specified in Section 1.6.2 of the PI. l e CC: usa 3,debarea NOTE THAT, PER THE COVER MEMORANDUM AND PAGE 2 OF THIS REPORT, THE PI 2 TEAM WILL BE EXTENDING THE INTERVAL OF REVIEW FOR PIRs BACK TO DATE OF COMMERCIAL OPERATION.
i Items selected above and beyond basic minimum requirement of PI 2: i o Final Report - Generic Implications of Recent MP1 Design Issues (Found this to be specific to MP1 and overall generic design related l issues being handled by 5-unit 7007 Corrective Action Teams) ! o SLCRS PIRs (Provided good insight to original construction issues and attempts to correct these) o Service Water System Fouling PIRs (Useful to operational / monitoring understanding of otherwise acceptable system) Major scope addition made by FI 2 Team for MP3: o The Team decided in the early going that it would be meaningful to gain the thoughts and opinions of personnel close to the unit staff over the long mn; i.e., throughout construction and operation ofMP3. (This turned out to be a useful tool resulting in good correlation between people's recollections / experiences and actual incurred events and findings on the unit) Revision one PIR IntervalIncrease : o Based on input of the Oversight organization, a decision was made to expand the period of review for PIRs back to the date ofinitial commercial operation of the unit. The results of this expansion will be reported on in Revision 1 to The Team's report. l l l I i 1 1
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r ATTACIIMENT B DATABASE MATRIX CODING GUIDE CELL DEFTNITIONS Source: ACR, PIR, LER ISEG Report, Interview etc. (Text Field) Deficiency: Short description of deficiency from source doc. (Text Field) System #: From Attachment 1 (Text Field) -' Group: Either 1,2 or 3, from Attachment 2 (3 sheets) Org Design: Deficiency as a result of an original design error (bad assumption, cale etc.) Mod: Deficiency as a result of a mod to the original design Field: Deficiency. resulted from installation of mod or designed by field . Vend: Deficiency as a result of vendor error (MSIVs, skid problems et'c.) Other: Design deficiency having other source of problem (Text Field) DP: Operational or Departmental procedure was the cause of deficiency TS: The Technical Specification was in error or not complied with Test: Error was in test conduct or inadequate test procedure (surveillances etc.) Other Ops: Operational deficiency having other source of problem (Text Field) BL: Deficiency could have been avoided by completion of a Backlog activity PPP: Deficiency due to configuration mgmt. process, procedure or program (NGP, EQ etc.) - includes mistakes made while using these, as well ACR 7007 Deficiency tied to one of ACR 7007 causal factors (use codes below (Text Field)) Notes: Any notes useful for key word search to zero in on trend (s) BASIS FOR N/A SOURCE DOCUMENT
- 1) Deficiency not due to Config. Mgmt. Admin. Process, procedure or program, and,
- 2) Deficiency not related to Design Basis issue, and,
- 3) Deficiency not related to License Basis issue.
ACR 7007-RELATED CODES (VOIDED THIS CM ADMIN PP&P FAILURE TO CATEGORY AS IT INADEQUATE FOLLOW CM WAS NOT USED) "B" ADMIN PP&P "C" PDCR/PDCF/BJ l 1 DCN/DCR 2 2 CALCS/SCRS 3 3 SAF. EVAL (50.59) 4 4 SPECIFICATIONS S 5 _ MEPL 6 6 RIE 7 7 TSCH 8 8' FSARCR 9 9 l NCR 10 10 l OTHER N/A 11 ,g (Please note that the Tearn selected the above codes as ones that would be indicativ the types ofproblerns that can result in loss ofcontrol ofunit configuration.)
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c/qs wg .g ATTACHMENT C MATRIX OBSERVATIONS Facts: o 481 unique lines of data were entered o 120 entries relate to modifications to the original design; (24% of entries) o 164 entries relate to the original design of the unit; (34% of entries) o 23 entries relate to Group 1 systems having FSAR discrepancies . o 38 entries relate to all Groups having FSAR discrepancies , o Of 120 entries related to modifications,46 entries relate to Group 1 systmh o Of 164 entries related to original design, 86 entries relate to Group'l systems , Observations: j
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o The 481 entries were screened from several thousand documents as bemg p6tentially relevant to gaining an understanding of MP3's current configuration. o Over the last 29 months,34% of the issues falling into this category are related to original unit deficiencies while 24% of the issues have to do with changes made since startup of the unit. Original unit conditions are found by a combination of ongoing reviews and as a result of operational anomalies, while the majority of modi 5 cation-related issues are identiSed at the time of incorporation and/or placement into service of the modification. o Query (or Sort) 1 is a sort oforiginal unit / Group 1 system issues. Rose issues having functional significance are highlighted. Son 2 is a sort ofmodification related/ Group 1 system issues, again highlighted to depict those of functional significance. These sorts serve to validates many of The Team's recommendations relating to a need for a greater review focus on the period immediately surrounding unit stanup. o Son 2 noted above, has a proliferation of process, procedure and program issues identified. This is consistent with ACR 7007 findings and makes a case for the Administrative Processes and Procedures generic element of the overall CMP. Attention to detail problems are common in this grouping and have remained a problem up to the time ofinitiation of the current outage. o Sort 3 is a sort of all Group 1 systems having deficiencies related to modifications and, specifically, to the modification process (PDCR, BJ etc.). Of the twenty " hits", six have potential functional significance. o Sons 4 and 5 are sorted on the keyword (s) "FSAR" (Son 4) and "FSAR and Group 1 (Son 5). l nese sons are indicative of the array of FSAR detail issues we have to deal with and the need for j stronger culture, management expectation, training and personnel performance; all parts of either the Nuclear Excellence Plan and/or the CMP.
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{ y c;. _ w . - p -- i l 91 6/4/96 Deficency l RSS PIPING OPERATING BEYOND ANALYSIS 8/4-
; RSS TEMP. TRANSIENT BEYOND DESIGN BASIS CTMT EOT HATCH COMPONENTS NOT SHOWN AS CAT I SEQUENCER TIMING DISCREPANCY "A" MSIV FAILURE TO OPEN #/4.
j PIPE SUPPORT LOADS EXCEED DESIGN BASIS LIMITS
- MOV MOTOR TERMINAL BLOCKS NOT EO QUALIFIED l SOCKET WELD LEAK DUE TO FATIGUE FSAR DB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE j FEED WATER CHECK VALVE BACK LEAKACE j BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP FAILED TO STOP
- CHECK VLV BACK LEAKAGE"'
OPS CRIT DRAWINGS DOESNT REFLECT AS BUILT STATUS CONTROLLER SETPOINTS ,DNTER FROM CALC SETPOINTS j" SIT PIDING DIFFERS FROPt-DRAWING i QA DESIGNATION ON VALVE LABELS MSIV TEST SOLENOID 4A FAILED ON SURVEILLANCE TEST
- OPERATING FATIGUE FAILURE MSIV ZERO CLOSED POSIT 20N INDICATION OUESTIONED CONTAINMENT FOUNDATION PEAK LOADING MAY BE EXCEEDED 1 NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES DROP POTENTIAL HIGHER THAN ASSUMED i D RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKING DRAWING DISCREPANCY RES. AB CONDITION FOR RC STAMP ELEMENTS INSTRUMENT SET POINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE DUE TO CALCULATION ERROR I
CCP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR DAMAGE BREAKER LABLES AT ODDS WITH ONE-LINE DRAAWING DAGRAMS l . CCP PIPING TEMPERATURES LIMIT EXCEEDED ' j FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. FUNCTIONS j SETPOINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINT DRAWING AS BUILT ERROR j POTENTIAL CLOGGING OF BCCS THROTTLE VALVES i DISCREPANCY BETWEEN DBTP AND TECHNINCAL SPECIFICATION HEAD VALUE ; l MINOR DRAWING ERROR i j MINOR DRAWING DISCREPANCIES I i CALCULATION USED WRONG CALCULATION I i WIRE IN MOV CIRCUIT NOT 4 GAGED t AmorO f LOOP ISOLATION TIME LIMIT EXCEEDED MINOR P&ID DRAWING PHYSICAL LOCATION DESCRIPTION DISCREPANCY RSS TEMPERATURE ISSUE PIPING STRESS AFW FCV ISOLATION CAPABILITY DEFICIENCY . FSAR DESCRIPTION HAS NO TOLORENCE ON JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE j TERRY TURBINE AFW VALVE SHEET TO TEST MDAFWP 4 CALCUALTION DIDNT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A PREVIOUS MODIFICATION j :samf* arTERRY TURBINE & MDAFW PUMP PRE-LUBE NOT PERFORMED OER VENDOR REQUIREMENY t# # DRAWING DISCREPANCIES STATION BATTERY OUALIFIED LIFE EXPIRED EO l MOV THRUST CALCULATION REVIEW INCREASED RSS TEMP l RHR PUMP TRIP ON LONG TERM RECIRC i MSIV STROKE TIME PROBLEM ! TERRY TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVES i MSIV STROKE TIME PROBLEMS i TERRY TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVES 1 AUX FEED PIPE SUPPORTS:HELB ISSUE l ] BABT HEATER DESIGN INADEQUATE l 4 CAT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE I J DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH
> FW ISOL. VALVE STROKE TIME RWST TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE SSPS LOGIC CARDS USED AS A SWITCH l
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l l Deficency VOLTAGE REGULATOR POTENTIOMETER OPERATION MSIV PARTIAL STROKE TIME FW ISOL MAY HAVE DEGRADED WITHOUT BEING DETECTED I RX TRIP SETPOINTS WITH INOP SPRS SAFETIME NONCONSERVATIVE AFW PIPING NOT SUPPORTED FOR HIGH ENERGY "C" MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PIPE HANGER IMPROPERLY ANALYZED
'C' MSIV FAILED CLOSED RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE -
'C' MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE RSS HX NOT ANALYZED FOR 100 PSI (SUPPO_RTJ RSS HX OUTLET PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS TEMP TO LOW -
APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV130 VALVES INTAKE __ STRUCTURE SUMP PUMP PLUGGED INTO VITAL RECEPTACLE --
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_.1-2 CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA MDAFWP PRE-LUBE CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS SWP DISCHARG5 VALVE NOT IN TECH SPEC i DRAWING DISCREPANCY ON SERVICE WATER BACKWASH FEATURE ELECTRICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA NERMS AND FIELD SETTINGS EDG SETPOINTS WliAT LIMITS RCS-02 VALVE TO 27 PSI DELTA IN CLOSING DIRECTION CCP SYSTEM WALKDOWN ITEMS - TECH SPEC INTERPRETATION OF WHETHER 3FWA*AOV36A,B,C AND D CAN BE CLOSED A CCP SYSTEM TEMPERATURE ISSUES Sc rh s NOCH $M MW 0/0 6 f- //ITs & Soesi,avr,ese ason l l Page 6
M /h. i J. Il 91 6/4/96 Deficency INADEQUATE WORK SCOPE IDENT. BY PDCR (A d2Dws msoed BJ ATTACHED TO OPS CRIT DRAWINGS & NOT INSTALLED ' NEW OPS CRIT DWGAWINGS NOT REDLINED PLANT CHANGE INITIATED VIA DCN VS PDCR DCNS NOT PROCESSED PROPERLY DCNS SIGNED OFF WITHOUT MOV ENGINEER REVIEW DCN ON DWST DID NOT LIST DOING AS OPS CRIT DRAWINGS PRESSURE ALARM SWITCH DIFFERS FROM DRAWING I_XCOMPLETE INCORP OF CHANGES ON OPS FORM NEW VALVE LABELS INCONSISTENT WITH P&ID DRAWING SP TESTING INCONSISTENT W/1ST PROG. ~ EDG ALARM SETPOINT NOT CHANGED ON TIME QUESTION ON FLEX TUBING EVALUATION ON STWR LEVEL INTRO. LINE MINOR FSAR ERRORS NOT AFFECTING FUNCTION !_ a PDCR FAILED TO SPECIFY MCC LABELING UPDATES-i MOV OPERATOR INSTALLED BACKWORDS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND CALCULATION i THERMAL RELIEF CALCULATION ERROR BJ REQUIRES OPERATOR ACTION YET NO PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR THIS CABLES NOT IN BJ DEFEATED AUTO START FEATURES FAILURE TO DERIVE PROPER SURVEILLANCE LIMITS BASED ON CALCULATIONS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OPS CRIT DRAWING AND FIELD CONDITION CABLE DOESN'T MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT OF FSAR BABT HEATER DESIGN INADEQUATE MOV CONTROL MOD NOT VERIFIED RCS RTD TEMP HIGHER THAN ASSUMED IN OUALIFIED LIFE EO RCP TVCS-SEABROOK INFO PIPE HANGER IMPROPERLY ANALYZED IST SURVEILLANCE NOT CONSERVATIVE WITH SUPPORT TO CORPORATE ENG 3 CORE ANALYSIS USED NON CONSERVATIVE RWST MINIMUM VOLUME 3 DRAWING ERROR / LACK OF VERI __FICATION HOOK VENTS INSTALLED ON UNSPECIFIFO LINES 4 INADEQUATE DIRECTION IN AWO j AWOS NOT REVIEWED PROPERLY NONCONFORMING MATERIAL INSTALLED CONTROLOTRON CABLE FIRE RATING APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV130 VALVES 4 INTAKE STRUCTURE SUMP PUMP PLUGGED INTO VITAL RECEPTACLE
- K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA SI RELIEF VALVES AND IMPACT OF RAISED SETPOINT CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS ELECTRICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA NERMS AND FIELD SETTINGS EDG SETPOINTS WAS DIAPHRAGM COMPLETELY REMOVED FROM DWST CCP SYSTEM WALKDOWN ITEMS kl.tnOS7~ AL.t WIT 3 NG Pcfk (?&QSf G 4
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l gg. .8 ..2.- - 1 g1 }g 6/4/96 l l Deficency l BJ ATTACHED TO OPS CRIT DRAWINGS & NOT INSTALLED ! NEW OPS CRIT DWGAWINGS NOT REDLINED PLANT CHANGE INITIATED VIA DCN VS PDCR INCAMPLETE INCORP OF CHANGES ON OPS FORM PDCR FAILED TO SPECIFY MCC LABELING UPDATES MOV OPERATOR INSTALLED BACKWORDS BJ REQUIRES OPERATOR ACTION YET NO PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR THIS CABLES NOT IN FAILURE TO DERIVE PROPER SURVEILLANCE LIMITS BASED ON CALCULATIONS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OPS CRIT DRAWING AND FIELD CONDITION CABLE DOESN'T MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT OF FSAR MOV CONTROL MOD NOT VERIFIED -- HOOK VENTS INSTALLED ON UNSPECIFIED LINES INADEQUATE DIRECTION IN AWO ", NONCONFORMING MATERIAL INSTALLED - APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV130 VALVES K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA l SI RELIEF VALVES AND IMPACT OF RAISED SETPOINT l CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS
- ELECTRICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA NERMS AND FIELD SETTINGS 1
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W7/:MFemp l g1 6/4/96 l l i Deficency l AFW CK VLV NOT IN IST PROGRAM INCORRECT MEPL EVAL FOR CAT 1 SEISMIC STRUCTURE I FSAR DOESN'T REFLECT NEW SITE BLDGS FSAR CHANGE APPD W/O SAFETY EVALUATION BJ VIOLATED REG GUIDE 1.143 FSAR DB ISSUE; EDG JTARTING AIR PRESSURE
.F_S_AR COMMITMENT NOT MET DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DRAWINGS & FSAR FSAR DOES NOT CORRECTLY DESCRIBE REEL MONITOR FUNCTION MINOR FSAR ERRORS NOT AFFECTING FUNCTION FSAR DOES NOT REFLECT MODIFICATION CHANGES FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. FUNCTIONS -
FSAR ERROR IN RESPONSE TIME TESTING - CONFLICT WITH TECH SPEC l BACKLOG RE8ULTS IN FSAR AND OTHER PROGRAMS NOT BEING TIMELY UPDATED .:1. FSAR NOT PROPERLY TRANSLATED INTO CHEMISTRY TABLE - FSAR & TECH SPEC FLOW RATE NOT IN AGREEMENT FSAR DOES NOT AGREE WITH NETM DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND CALCULATION FSAR AND.P&ID DRAWING OUT OF DATE PER LATEST TSCR Zr RV HEAD LIFT LOAD PATH UNSPECIFIED HISTORICAL CONCERN FOR FSAR DEFICIENCIES SIMILAR TO MP1 FSAR SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION DISCREPENCY LPM AS-BUILT DRAWING CONDITION NOT ACCURATELY REFLECTED IN FSAR FSAR PROTECTION SETTINGS NOT SAME AS FIELD SETTINGS ~- CABLE TRAY FILL NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR DESCRIPTION FSAR NOT UPDATED PER PDCR FSAR DESCRIPTION HAS NO TOLORENCE ON JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE CABLE DOESN'T MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT OF FSAR DIESEL STARTING AIR DEGREDATION CONTAINMENT SUMP PP OPERATION NOT PER FSAR AFW PIPING NOT SUPPORTED FOR HIGH ENERGY NOT TESTING PER FSAR CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA HOW DOES ACR PROCESS ENSURE FSAR UPDATE CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS SWP CUBICLE VENTILATION SYSTEM DIESEL _ STARTING AIR STUCK OPEN RUST DIFFERENT EDG START TIMES: FSAR VS TS 3% NtTS l l 1 Page 2
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hu**17 25:5 &tG- +: GR9 1.,.,. i 1 f g1 6/4/96 I l Deficency AFW CK VLV NOT IN IST PROGRAM INCORRECT MEPL EVAL FOR CAT 1 SEISMIC STRUCTURE BJ VIOLATED REG GUIDE 1.143 FSAR DB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE l DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DRAWINGS & FSAR FSAR DOES NOT CORRECTLY DESCRIBE REEL MONITOR FUNCTION MINOR FSAR ERRORS NOT AFFECTING FUNCTION FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. FUNCTIONS FSAR ERROR IN RESPONSE TIME TESTING - CONFLICT WITH TECH SPEC DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND CALCULATION RV HEAD LIFT LOAD PATH UNSPECIFIED FSAR DESCRIPTION HAS NO 'POLORENCE ON JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE i CABLE DOESN'T MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT OF FSAR l _ .. DIESEL STARTING AIR DEGREDATION CONTAINMENT SUMP PP OPERATION NOT PER FSAR , AFW PIPING NOT SUPPORTED FOR HIGH ENERGY l N_OT TESTING PER FSAR
, CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT
, K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA HOW DOES ACR PROCESS ENSURE FSAR UPDATE CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS SWP CUBICLE VENTILATION SYSTEM l DIESEL STARTING AIR STUCK OPEN RUST d3 Ners i l
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sw ( l l snit Specific Assesment Matrix -Unit 3 21-Jun-96 l Source Sy_3. Group Qtg- Mad Einld Y_end Other DE IS Inst Other BL EE ACE. Design Hn np_s Z002 Deficenev Notes I l ACR 00128 No Yes Yes No No No No No No B1,C l INADEQUATE WORK SCCPE IDENT. BY PDCR WORK DONE WITHOUT A DCN ACR 00286 Yes No No No No No No No Yes CS BTP 9.5-1 NOT PROPERLY CONTROLLED .- OLD CONTROLLED COPIES NOT DES ACR 00311 No No No No DOC C No No No No Yes DOCUMENT CONTROL PROBLEMS USE OF MOST CURRENT PROCEDU ACR 00633 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C1 90 JECT CLOSE-OUT DEFICIENCIES PDCR RELEASE TO l f ACR 00871 No Yes No No No No No No nob 2 I BREAKER MIS-LABELING ISSUE SPARE ON OPS CRIT DRAWING; GIV ACR 01148 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B3 l FSAR DOESNT REFLECT NEW SITE BLDGS BLDGS 433,703,328 AND PART OF 3 i ACR 01174 No Yes No No No No No No No C1 BJ INSTALLED WITHOUT AWO INTERPRETATION OF WC-10 ISSUE ACR 01179 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C1 l GENERATOR PHASE IMBALANCE RELAY REMOVAL BJ NOT APPROVED PRIOR TO REMO l ACR 01195 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C3 SETPOINT DlDNT CONSIDER RELAY INACCURACY FOUND VIA NRC 1EN-92-77 REVIEW
':n m*pgnm e y 2.EM.;Mp; pig-Arca Rya _ Group .QIg. MpA Einld Yand Other DE IS Ts11 Other Bl P2 g Nn Deslan Qas Igg Deficency Notes ACR 01540 No No No No es No No No Yes DIFFICULTY IDENTIFYING AWO PKG REQUIREMENTS NEEDED PROCEDUR.ES HARD TO DE l
ACR 02167 No Yes No No NGPC No No No No ves C9 ; FSAR CHANGE APPD W/O SAFETY EVALUATION NGP 4.03 VIOLATION , i ACR 02304 No No No No BJ No No No No Ycs C1 BJ VIOLATED REG GUIDE 1.143 ? ALSO VIOLATES FSAR SECTION 11.2.
)
ACR 02405 No No No No PROC No No No No Yes OPS FORM 3672.1-1 REV 17 INCORRECT _ MISSING REV 16 DATA ON INSTRUM ACR 02691 No No No Yes No No No No Yes C5 ALVE PACKING NOT 1 AW DESIGN SPEC- ORDERED GRAPHOIL, REC'D TEFLO ACR 02861 Yes No No No No No No No No STORAGE CABINET NOT RESTRAINED FIRE EQUIPMENT LOCKERS ACR 02879 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C5 CONTROLLED VENDOR MANUAL NOT LATEST REVISION ENSURE WE HAVE LATEST VENDOR ACR 03004 No No No Yes No No No No Yes TEST EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED W/O A PO RECEIPT INSP NOT PERFORMED ACR 03010 Yes No No No No No No Yes No RELAYS NOT INSTALLED PER DESIGN DIAGRAMS IDENTICAL @ STARTUP AND LATER ACR 03012 No No No No BIENN No No No No Yes PROCEDURE BIENNIAL REVIEW MISSED 2
1 w.Q.gg@@#c4 e s '7W:# T ' l
.ource Syn, r;;aun QI9. Mad field Y.and Other DE IS Ifuil 91h2L Bl. EE ACR i Ng Deslan QRE 10.02 Deficency Notes ACR 03218 No No No No No No No ISSUE No Yes PRESSURE GAUGES NOT TEMPERATURE COMPENSATED SELF ASEESSMENT HEARD ON SUR ACR 03272 No No No No SETPO No No No No Yes ROD MONITOR SETPOINTS IMPROPER CAUSE UNKOWN ACR 04507 No Yes ,No No No No No No Yes C2 l
EtECTRICAL SCHEMATIC DRAWINGS INEFFECTIVELY CONTR OLD DWNGS RETAINED IN ERROR ACR 04559 No No No No FSARI No No No No Yes B9 FSAR COMMITMENT NOT MET SHIFT TURNOVER EFFECTIVENESS ACR 05196 Yes No No No No No Yes No No IRE RATED ASSEMBLIES SP AND EM60 SERIES DRAWINGS DI ACR 05276 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 CAUTION TAGS NOT REMNED FROM HEATERS HEATERS WERE REMOVED IN 1992 ACR 06519 No No No No es No No No Yes C2 OPERATION DEPT. DOES NOT USE GRITS TO VERIFY LATEST NO SPECIFIC PHEPRIAL PROBLEM A l l ACR 06529 No No No No. No No No No Yes C2 2 OVER 1 SIESMIC CONC IDENTIFIED TEMP EQUIP, FTF PROGRAM REQ l ACR 07337 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C5 LOSS OF CENTRAL OF EQ MASTER LIST INSTALLATION /QUAllFICATION OKA i j ACR 07730 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 OUT OF DATE PROCEDURE USED BY TECH SUPPORT FTFP 3
1 l
- 4. .:,, .g: . v n .1::%^ 0:
l
. ;urce 6. Group dig _ Mod Eield Vand Other DE IS Inst Other B_L EE ACE. l No Deslan QRs ZaDI l Deficenev Notes l
1 ACR 07746 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 ' APPENDIX R (BTP 9.5.1) NOT UPDATED TO F(EFLECT PDCR PDCR DIDNT GO FAR ENOUGH WITH l ACR 08429 No No No No No No No YES No No l SCAFOLDING NOT INSTALLED PER SPECIFICATION SEO. 6 MAINTENANCE FTFP ACR 08442 No No No No No No No MAINT No No SCAFFOLDING INSTALLATION DOESNT MEET SPECIFICATION MAINTENANCE FTFP l l ACR 08452 No Yes No No No No No No No INCORRECT CABLE NUMNBER SPECIFIED IN BJ ISOLATED MISTAKE ACR 08566 Yes No No No No No No YES No Mo RONG CIRCUlT CARD INSTALLED IN PROTECTION SYSTEM lac ERROR ACR 08830 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C9 BACKLOG RESULTS IN FSAR AND OTHER PROGRAMS NOT BE NOT AN EVENT ACR O'8880 No Yes No No No No No No No CWP LUBE WATER REQUIRED CONTRARY TO DESIGN INTENT ASSUMPTION ERROR -ISOLATED ACR 08903 Yes No No No No No No No No FSAR DOES NOT AGREE WITH NETM EQ PAPER ISSUF - NO FUNCTIONAL i ACR 09157 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 DCM NOT PROPERLY INTEGRATED WITH WP&C ADMINISTRATIVE FIND ACR 09321 No Yes No No No No No No No FSAR AND P&lD OUT OF DATE PER LATEST TSC" ~ 4
- 6%yypqr@: n
_utc2 Sys. Group QIg_ N2 Mad Eleid Vlad Other DE IS Ical Other. EL EE ACR. D1119D QRS ZO.02 Deficency Notes E94-009 No No No No SEPR No No No No No SE MANUAL INADEQUATE R & f; DEFINITION EXEC
SUMMARY
OF REPORT I MA2.1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 THROTTLE PRESSURE LIMITS BYPASSED SINCE 92 19 3 4 No No No No No Na No No Yes B* - RCP STANDPlPE LEVEL CONTROLED BY CTMT ISOL UNCORRECTED MATERIAL COND S -*- 193 No No No No No No No No No PLANT ENGINEERS DID NOT PURSUE EQUIP PROBLEMS, QUE LACK OF RESOURCES - FEEDWATE 193 No No No No No No No Yes No O GOAL FOR REDUCTION OF BACKLOG GENERAL OBSERVATION IES.1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 SOME SYSTEM ENGINEER NOT AWARE OF STATUS OF BJS A lES.2 No No No No No Yes No No Yes C* SOME SYSTEMS HAD ACTIVITIES PERFORMED PRIOR TO TES NO AS FOUND INFO AVAILABLE IES.3-1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 BJS INCOMPLETE MODS AND A FEW CONTROLLED EQUIP IN
GENERAL COMMENT
CANNOT MAIN IMA2 No Yes No No No No No Yes No EQUlPMENT PROBLEMS REQUIRE OPERATES COMPENSATO GENERAL - BUT SLCRS MENTIONED l IPE-95-011 No No No No No No No No Yes C* Ni1SOPERATION OF EQUIP INCLUDED SlH THROTTLE VLS 6
i i
-q.jym ,4 v - p.psgygg.yjg.;$$,ggg.3 m st- efyts:r:S l
l l l Ource Sy.s. Group Qtg. Mad Eleid Y_end Other DE IS Icit Other BL EE ACR l Ng Design Qas ZqQI l Deficency Notes l IPE-95-011 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 TEMPORARY MODS DATING BACK TO 1986 GENERAL OBSERVATION IPE-95-011 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 1 BA MODS RESULTED IN INASILITY TO AUTO fNU SOMETIMES -- N95-07 No No Yes No No No No No Yes SCAFFOLD INSTALLED IMPROPERLY VARIOUS JOBS l N95-09 No No No No No No No INSP No Yes BG MEPL DOWNGRADE PROCESS GENERIC UNIT 2 ISSUE NA 12540 No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes C1 P 1 'EST PLAN MISSING FROM PDCR POCR 3-94-162 NRB1 No Yes No No No No No Yes No i i DELYED IMPLEMENTATION OF PDCRS Delays in insta!!ing approved PDCRs NRB2 No No No No IST No No Yes No Yes B3 SAFETY EVALS NOT UNIFORMLY DONE FOR ISTS Safety evals, are nconsistently performe l NRB3 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 l ANALYSIS VS SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY ON SECURING SI Safety injection recovery time by operato NRB4 No No No No PIR No No No No Yes C11 l PlRS CLOSED OUT BEFORE NCRS ARE CLOSED ON SAME ISS NCR not yet written l NRB5 No No No No EOP No No No EOP No Yes B11 EOP CHANGES DONE VATHOUT V&v DOCUMENTED r 7 i i 1
, :%M Rgax :; '"+
apg Jurce Sys_ Group _QIg_ Mo.d EJald Yand Other DE IS les.1 Other BL P_E ACR Hn Daslen Das ZQQI Deficency Notes NRBS No No No No No No No No Yes B4 PROCEDURE OMITTED AN ALARM CREDITED IN A BJ Safety evaluation issue NRB7 No No No No No No Yes No Yes B11 USE OF IST PROCS VS SPECIAL PROCS Direction on what to use when unclear NRB8 No No No No No No No No Yes Bio INEFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE action trend noted -- NRB9 No No No No es No No No Yes C11 SYSTEM NOT OPERATED AS INTENDED CCP system NSAB1 No No No No PROG No No No No Yes C11 VEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED IN REVIEW OF OPERATING EXPERI Internal and external info: Mrule identifie NSAB10 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 l PDCR SAFETY EVAL DOESNT ADDRESS USQ Potential USQ NSAB11 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C3 DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS NOT IAW DESIGN BASIS , 1 NSAB12 No No No No- ACR No No No No Yes C11 ACRS NOT LINKED FOR SIMILAR EVWENTS Coding issue NSAB13 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NOT MONITORED PROPERLY Tracking issue NSAB14 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 UNTIMELY RESOLUTION OF ISSUES Delayed close out: culture issue B L
f 1 l t$ $ l dartdt Sys_ Group OIs. l Mnd Eleid Vand Other DE IS Its1 Other EL EE ACR ) No Dasbn QRS. ZaQI Deficenev Notes NSAB15 No No No No No No No No 1 Yes C11 INTERNAL INFORMATIONEXCHANGE IS INADEQUATE Culture issue l NSAB16 No No No No SURV No Yes No No Yes B11 - SURVEILLANCE CLOCK TRIGGERS ARE INADEQUATE Avoid rnissing surveillances with proper t --- l NSAB17 No No No No No No No TAG No Yes C11 ' TAGGING ERRORS: INADEQUATE USE OF STAR Culture NSAB18 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 l NON STANDARD DESIGN PRACTICES USED Revised Design Control Manual NSAB19 No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes B3 1 ADEQUATE CONTROL OF VENDOR CALCS NU procedure deficiencies NSAB2 No No No No QA No No No No Yes C11 - QA AUDITS NOT HIGH QUA;LITY PIR/LER corrective action issues NSAB20 No No No No LER No No No No Yes B11 INADEQUATE DETAllINLERS NSAB21 No No No No PROG No No No No Yes B11 INTEGRATING PROCESSES TO SUPPORT PROGRAM IMPLEM IGSCC example NSAB22 No No No No No Yes No No Yes B9 DIFFERENT EDG START TIMES: FSAR VS TS NSAB3 No No No No AUDIT No No No No Yes C11 1990 INPO AUDIT FINDINGS NOT INCORPORATED MP2 identified issue l i i 9
{ l _ Tr'y.i5Gy mc.c Sys. Group Org. M2d E1cid Vend Other DE IS les! Other. BL P2 ACR M2 Design Op_s ZagI Dencenev Notes NSAB4 No No No No CA No No No No Yes C11 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INEFFECTIVE NSABS No No No No es No No No Yes C11 POST OUTAGE STARTUP TEST PROGRAM INADEQUATE Program inadequate or missing i NSAB6 No No No No es Yes No No Yes C11 RETEST PROGRAM DEFICIENCIES g. I MSAB7 No No No No No No Yes No Yes C11 FAILURE TO FOLLOW AWOPROGRAM Procedures were too hard to comply wit NSABB No No No No es No No No Yes C11 l %GGING EXPECTATIONS UNCLEAR OR INADEQUATE Procedures and management direction NSAB9 No No No No ACR No No No No Yes C11 l ACR BACKLOG-UNTIMELY CLOSE OUT Slow ACR close out NSABE1 No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes C8 l INADEQUATE DETAIL PTSCR,PLAR Add backup info to these documents NSABE10 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B1 CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON CMF OF PDCRS CMF impact reviewed individually,not cu I NSABE11 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B1 USE OF PDCR VS DCN MOV modifications NSABE12 No No No No No Yes No No Yes C8 OUTDATED INFO IN PSTCR PROCESS Review may use wrong info 10 1 I
. . y>&A-jtw:. t .. mn . .y .
l _ surce h Group QIg. hd Eleid Y_end Other DE IS Int Other BL EE ACR
& Desian Qg 1932 Deficency Notes NSABE13 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 GENERIC VS SPECIFIC PDCR USAGE MOVs treated generically vs individually NSABE14 No No No No No No No No Yes C9 IMPROPER USE OF PLAAR VS TSCR ~
NSABE2 No Yes No No TSCR No No No No Yes C1 INADEQUATE DETAIL, PDCRS Add backup info to these docurnents "
-E NSABE3 No No No No No No No No Yes C4 INADEQUATE DETAIL, SAFETY EVALUATIONS Add backup info to these documents -
NSABE4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C3 4ANGING DESIGNASSUMPTIONS Clearly state the process used l NSABE5 No No No No TSC No Yes No No Yes B8 OVERUSE OF TSCR V
S. PROCEDURE
CGS NSABE6 No No No No No Yes No No Yes C3 IDENTIFY IN5 0 f OR TRM VS TS Put this info in th ecorrect document l l l NSABE7 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B4 24 MONTH FUEL CYCLE IMPACT j NSABE8 No No No No No Yes No No Yes C11 EXTENDING SURV USING INADEQUATE HISTORICAL INFO NSABE9 No No No No PRA NoNo No No Yes C11 USE OF PRA TO SOLVE PROBLEMS 11
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l l l source Sy.E_ Group Org_ M931 Einld Mand Other DE IS T.eit other Bl. EE ACR i Ng Deslan Opa ZD_QZ l l Dencency Notes PIR 3-87-054 No No No No No Yes No No No LOCAL TE-77 CTMT EQ TEMP >TS LIMIT 30 DAY LER PIR 3-88-060 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C5 VARIOUS SWITCHES NOT EQ QUAllFIED INTERNAL EQ REVIEW LILTON-VEAM PIR 3-88-087 No Yes No No es No No WC No Yes TEMPORARY PUMP INSTALLED WITHOUT PAPER QSSBJ OUT BUT NOT SIGNED PIR 3-90-110 No No No No es No No No No H2 MONITOR OVERHEATED VENTILATION SYSTEM OP. IMPROP PIR 3-94-070 No No No No es No No No No B1
'J REVIEW NOT CONDUCTED PIR 3-94-130 No No No Yes No No No No nob 1 NUCLEAR FUEL ANALYSIS ERROR ROTATED GRIDS l
PIR 3-94-244 1 No No No No No No No No No C* MOV BOLTING DISCREPANCIES FOLLOW UP TO PIR 3-94-139 PIR 3-94-295 No No No No No No No MGT No Yes C* TYGON HOSES LEFT ATTACHED FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE PIR 3-94-299 4 No No No No No No No PE No Yes C* FIRE SEAL MISSING , QA-93-5224 No Yes No No DESIG No No No Yes Yes C3 l l PDDS BACKLOG REGARDING SORT UPDATES BACKLOG l 12
-tL%;c ep & ,9 y Fn->e.w +5 9 % % % w -Q
_aittcn SyL Group _QIg. Mad Elmld Vand Q1 tint DE IS Init Other BL P_E Ap3, Ng Desian Qpa ZQQI Deficenev Notes QA-94-4020 No No No No es Yes Yes ACP-Q No Yes NEED MORE FREQUENT UPDATES TO SURV. MASTER TEST C CORRELATION ISSUES QA-94-4322 No No No No No No Yes ACP 9. No Yes P-7 ANALOG CHANNEL OP TEST NOT DONE PER REQQUIREME NO PROCEDURE FOR THIS QA-95-4043 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 BJs NOT EVALUATED AGAINST BTP 9.5.1 COMPATIBitlTY PROCESS CHECK FCR COMPATIBILI QA-A23070 No No No No NL No No No No Yes CONFUSION REGARDING NOV COMMITMENTS VERSUS INFO COMMITMENT TRACKING /BINNING iS i OS-93-022 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C10 HANGE IN AWO WITHOUT PROPER REVIEWS OSD SURVEILLANCE QS-93-023 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 l l WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QSD SURVEILLANCE l I QS-93-028 No Yes Yes No No No Na No Yes C1 WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QSD E JRVEILLANCE QS-93-034 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QSD SURVEILLANCE QS-93-119 No No Yes No No No No No No ! VOTES TESTING SURVEILLANCE QSD SURVEILLANCE 1 QS-93-131 No No No No SPECi No No No No Yes B5 PROCEDURE AND HILTI SPEC CONFLICT QSD SURVEILLANCE F 13
1
..:z .;att::L Jurce Sys. Group Qtg_ M94 Elaid Y_cRd Other DE IS Icjlil Other BL EE &Q_B.
Ng Deslan Ops ZD.QZ l Deficency Notes QS-93-148 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C5 IMPROPER WELD MATERIAL USED QSD SURVEILLANCE I QS-94-076 No No Yes No NEO6. No No No No Yes l WORKING WITHOUT PURCHASE ORDER QAS SURVEILLANCE ,. QS-94-086 No No Yes No No No No No No NCR NOT PROCESSED CORRECTLY QAS SURVEILLANCE =";- OS-94-086 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C1 FAILED RETEST: CLOSURE NOT SHOWN ON AWO QAS SURVEILLANCE c OS-94-120 No No Yes No NoNo No No No APROPER SIGN OFF OF AWO QAS SURVEILLANCE OS-94-124 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C5 l WRONG WELD WIRE USED QAS SURVEILLANCE l SIP-MP3-P-9 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 l PDCR GENERATION FROM BJ'S NOT TIMELY OSD SURVElLLANCE 1 SIP-MP3-P-9 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes AWO DEFICIENCIES (VARIOUS) QSD SURVEILLANCE 1 SIP-MP3-P-9 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes l AWO DEFICIENCIES (VARIOUS) QSD SURVEILLANCE SIP-MP3-P-9 No No No No No No No DRAW 1No Yes OPS NOT USING GRITS FOR DRAWING REVS OSD SURVEILLANCE l 14
z., m4$~.MM(h%% s. 4gp l l t l m arce Sys_ Group _ Qts _ Mnd Eleid YgDd Other DE IS 1911 Other BL EE ADE. Nn Deslan Das I@l Deficenev Hates S!P-MP3-P-9 No No No No No No No DRAWINo Yes OPS NOT USING GRITS FOR DWNG REVS QSD SURVEILLANCE
- SIP-MP3-P-9 No No Yes No No No No No Yes -
SEISMIC PROGRAM NOT IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY QSD SURVEILLANCE , SIP-MP3-P-9 No No Yes No No No No No Yes SEISMIC PROGRAM NOT IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY QSD SURVEILLANCE -. l l SIP-MP3-P-9 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 l BJ RESTORATION NOT PER PROCEDURE QSD SURVE!LLANCE l SIP-MP3-P-9 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 RESTORATION NOT PER PROCEDURE QSD SURVEILLANCE SIP-MP3'-QA No No No No No Yes No No Yes B8 l TRACKING & IMPLEMENTS TS SURVEILLANCE OSD SURVEILLANCE l ACR 03304 1 Yes No No No No No No LABEL No No j LABEL DISCREPANCY ON CVCS MOV MB2 SHOWS "CLOSE-AUTO-OPEN" V ACR 06323 2212A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No C3 i ! CONTAINMENT PEAK LOADING MAY BE EXCEEDED MOCK-UP TEST ONGOING - OPERA ACR 01173 3301 2 No No No No NCR No No No No Yes C10 RCP TO GASKETS NCR 393-1113 NOT ADDRESSED BY l I ACR 02645 3301 1 No No No Yes No No No No No VALVE STEM / DISC SEPARATION BACKSEATING VLVS AND POSSIBLE 15
l l l
.-iss?4.brnfek%%MQ,Wysgq9.. W:%BQry& - -
l l I surce sy_a_ Grang Qts. Ng Design Med field Y_end Other DE IS Ifit Other. EL EE ACE. Qas Z@Z Qeficenev Notes ACR 03007 3301 2 Yes No No No No No No No No BOLT FAILURE DUE TO CORROSION POSSIBLE WRONG MATERIAL FOR A ACR 04128 3301 1 No No No No INPUT No No No INPUT No No INCORRECT RCS FLOW RATE SURV. TIME 2 INPUT SURV. TIME FOR 4 (VS. REQ'D ACR 04886 3301 1 No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes 88 SP TESTING INCONSISTENT W/IST PROG. .L TECH SPEC AMENDMENT ACR 06336 3301 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No D RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKING VENDOR JOINT DESIGN PROBLEM ACR 06349 3301 1 No No No No NoNo No No Yes C2 FFERENCE BETWEEN DESIGN AND FIELD SPLICE TYPE FO - PAPER PROBLEM - SPLICE FUNCTIO ACR 06602 3301 1 No No No No No No Yes No No SURVEILLNCE FOR PORV BLOCK VALVE WRONG COULD HAVE RESULTED IN FLOW P ACR 06604 3301 1 Yes No No No No No No No No DRAWING DISCREPANCY RES. AS-BUILT CONDITION FOR RC NO FUNCTION INPACT ACR 07266 3301 2 Yes No No Yes HISTO No No No No No RCP SEAL BOLT DEGREDATION HISTORY OF THESE PROBLEMS - EC ACR 07729 3301 2 No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes C1 A DCR RETEST REVISED BY SNORK PLANNING WITHOUT ENGl PROCESS ISSUE NO IMPACT ON PH l l ACR 08838 3301 2 No No No No es No No No Yes C11 FSAR NOT PROPERLY TRANSLATED INOT CHEMISTRY CABLE RESULTED IN INSUFFICIENT TESTIN l 16 l l l t
a .J . . .2 s . n ...- 37 _,, , Fj M jpgpWh D M - -
.ource Syji_ Group QIg. Med Elpld _Vsnd Other DE IS Ier' Other BJ. EE ACR Hn DJuilgn Qas ZD_QI Deficency Notes ACR 10351 3301 1&2 Yes No No No es No No No No LOOP ISOLATION TIME LIMIT EXCEEDED REQUIRED CLARIFYING TRM AND TS PlR 3-86-148 3301 1 No No No . No es No No ERROR No No RX TRIP: LOW S/G LEVEL +- 30 DAY LER PIR 3-87-059 3301 1 Yes No No - Yes No No No No No PZR SAFETY VALVE SETPOINTS LOW _=_- HISTORICAL DRIFT ISSUE PIR 3-88-007 3301 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B3 RCP OIL COLLECTION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION.lNADEQUA SEISMIC DESIGN ISSUE PIR 3-88-021 3301 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No VEST. ANALYSIS - SG TUBE RUPTURE POTENTIAL USO PIR 3-88-094 3301 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No RCP TURNING VANE BOLTS CRACKED PIR 3-88-88 3301 No No No No CYCLE No No No No No RX DIDNT GO CRITICAL AS CALCULATED CALCULATION ERROR BY ENGR.
PIR 3-88-89 3301 No No No No es No No ADMIN No No 2 BJS REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM PIR 3-90-091 3301 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 COPPS ALARM DESIGN INCORRECT DOESNT FUNCTION AS INTENDED PlR 3-92-171 3301 1 No No No Yes No No No No Yes C11 WRONG MATERIAL FOR PORV GASKETS EQ ISSUE 'O. 17
- M y s S % #p &J kfjM e 'Ndh oource Sys. Group QIg_ Mad field V_ cad Other D2 IS 1911 Other BL P2 ACR. l Hg Declan Ops 7_qqZ Deficency Notes PIR 3-93-217 3301 1 No Yes No No No No No No No FOREIGN OBJECT IN CORE SUPPORT PLATE LOCKING CUPS LOOSE PIR 3-93-242 3301 1 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 RCP INTENALS: PAPERWORK MISSING VIOLATED ACP 5.01 9 PIR 3-93-308 3301 1 No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes B11 RCS FLOW LIMITS OUT OF SPEC REPLACED RCPS E PlR 3-93-349 3301 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 IST PERFORMED WITHOUT SIGN-OFF PIR 3-94-005 3301 1 No Yes No Yes No No No No No
'CS RTD TEMP HIGHER THAN ASSUMED IN EQ LIFE ILNDUSTRY PROBLEM
~
j PIR 3-94-118 3301 1 No No No No No No Yes No No* RX HEAD VENT VALVES TEST INADEQUATE PROCEDURE CHANGED TO PERFOR l PlR 3-94-137 3301 1 No Yes No Yes No No No No No l RCP TVCS-SEABROOK INFO DROVE NEW JCO 1 PIR 3-94-192 3301 1 Yes No No No No No No No No . RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE CONSTRUCT!ON WELD l PIR 3-94-193 3301 1 No No No No es No No No No RCP #3 SEAL LEAKOFF INSTALLED IMPROPERLY AWO/ MATE POOR PROBLEM OS-93-130 3301 2 No No Yes No NoNo No No No AWO PKG CONTAINED WRONG PROCEDURE QSD SURVEILLANCE 18 J
y,gg g, , - ,: > ; ~ ,- _,,,,,p. . i ..ource Sys. Group Org Bd Elfti Y_end Other DE IS Ie11 Other Bl. EE C AC.H. No Deslan Qgn IQ.QI Deficency Notes UNKNOWN 1 3301 1 No No No No No No No No Yes FAILED TO GET SIGNATURE ON AWD FOR RCP SEAL HOUSIN ISI FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDUR UNKNOWN 1 3301 1 No No No No- No No No No Yes F4JLED TO GET ANTI SIGNATURE ON AWD FOR RCP SEAL HO ISI FAILURE TO FOLLOW PRACEDUR VG-87 3301 1 Yes No No No BASIS No No No No No VtWAT LIMITS RCS-02 VALVE TO 27 PSI DELTA IN CLOSING DlR BASIS QUESTION PER DESIGN ASSU VG-92 3301 1 Yes Yes No No DESIG No No No DESIG No No CCP SYSTEM WALKDOWN ITEMS TEMPERATURE ISSUE AND EXCURSI VG-94 3301 1 Yes No No No DESIG No No No DESIG No No ICP SYSTEM TEMPERATURE ISSUES ESSENTIALLY SAME ISSUE AS VG-92 ACR 06331 3301A 1 Yes No No No es No No No No NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES DROP POTENTIAL HIGHER THAN ASS DEP
T. PROCEDURE
NOT COMPLIAN ACR 09329 3301A 1 No No No No PROC es No No No No RV HEAD LIFT LOAD PATH UNSPECIFIED PROC NOT COMPARED AGAINST FS ACR 09330 3301A 1 No No No No PROC es No No No No RV HEAD LIFT LOAD PATH UNSPECIFIED SAME AS ACR 09329 l AR 9502483 3301A 1 No No No Yes No No No No No PZR BUBBLE COLLAPSE TEMPERATURE ISEG REPORT , 1 AR 9502484 3301A 1 No No No Yes NoNo No No No THERMAL STRESS ON PZR SURGE LINE NOZZLE ISEG REPORT 19
I I
.qqqg g ygdypatiW# M *. +< 6 ggg g i
l l l _ource Sy_s_ GIo.ug dig _ Mod Einld Venri Other QE IS Icit Other B1 EE ACR l Ng Deslan Qas 20p1 l Deficency Ngiga 1 1 PIR 3-91-206 3301A Yes No No Yes No No No No No l PZR SAFETY VLV SETPOINT DRIFT HISTORIC ISSUE l PIR 3-91-224 3301A 1 No No No No - No Yes No No Yes B11 "B" RHR PUMP OPERATED WITHOUT VAllD SURVEILLANCE SURV. NOT PERFORMED PIR 3-93-240 3301A 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 MISSED RECEIPT INSPECTICN RCP MOTOR 2.r. : OWNERSHIP UNCLEAR PIR 3-94-253 3301A 1 No No No Yes No No No No No IMCORRECT BURNUP ASSUMPTIONS VENDOR ERROR ! PIR 3-88-188 3302 3 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11
'OD DRIVES WOULDNT RESET EQUIPMENT MISALIGNMENT PIR 3-88-203 3302 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes B11 POTENTIAL CONTROL ROD FAILURE HAFNIUM HYDRIDING !
AR 9500906 3303 4 Yes No No No No No No No No IMPROVE REFUEL EQUIPMENT OPERATION ISEG REPORT PlR 3-88-211 3303 4 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 l l AWO WORKED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PERSONNEL ERROR l PIR 3-89-069 3303A 4 No No Yes No No No No No No SFP BRIDGE CRANE CABLE BREAK POOR CABLE ROUTING ACR 00223 3304 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C1 BJ ATTACHED TO OPS CRIT DRAWINGS & NOT INSTALLED BJ LOG SHOULD NOT INSTALLED BU 20
6Wy/$t#49dMk %5 ' source Syn. Group Drs- Mod Eleid Vand Other DE IS Inst Qtttet B_L P_E ACR . En Deslan Qps ZaQZ ) Deficency Notes ACR 00261 3304 1 No No No No UNK No No No No No BORIC ACID PUMP FAILED TO STOP ACR 04216 3304 1 Yes No - No No No No No SYSTE No Yes BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP FAILED TO-STOP NOTE NOT FOLLOWED IN OPS PROC PIR 3-141-88 3304 No Yes No No No No No No Yes NEW RECORDERS INSTALLED PRIOR TO APPROVAL OF PDCE 3-129-88 PlR 3-86-214 3304 1 No No No No es No No VLV FA No No INADVERTENT BORATION @ 100% POWER. VLV CLOSED TOO EAP,LY PIR 3-94-025 3304 2 No No No Yes No No No No No
'ORIC ACID PPS SUPPORT PLATES BOLTS WRONG ORG SHIPMENT FROM VENDOR INC PIR 3-94-259 3304 1 No No Yes No es No No No Yes C*
CHS FLOW ORIFICES BACKWARDS S/U INSTALLATION AFTER FLUSH PlR 3-94-289 3304 1 No No No No DESIG No No No No No AUTO M/U SYSTEM MALFUNCTION REPETITIVE LOGIC PROBLEMS PIR 3-95-007 3304 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No No C1 HOOK VENTS INSTALLED ON UNSPECIFIED LINES PDCR NOT CLEAR, NOT A PROBLEM ACR 03440 3304A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No l l SOCKET WELD LEAK DUE TO FAT 8GUE RESONANCE CAUSE ISSUE ACR 05231 3304A 2 No No No No UNK NoNo No No No ALTERNATE DILUTE VALVE VENT OPEN WHEN PUT INTO AUT s .. 21
l Cfh'Ne ~ -- y yg._ ..Y*~ Ud% t".'k.Wf*& l
.)urce Sya_ Group O_rg_ Mnd Einld Vand Other DE IS Inst Other BL EE ACR l Hn Deslon QpS IqgI l l
Deficency Notes ACR 07214 3304A 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C9 MINOR FSAR ERRORS NOT AFFECTING FUNCTION FSAR DETAIL ACCURACY E94-004 3304A 1 Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes B3 , BABT HEATER DESIGN INADEQUATE ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.9 - NA 12529 3304A 1 No No No No No Yes No No No l SURVEILLANCE ALLOWED TO LAPSE 1 PIR 3-88-209 3304A 1 No No No No es No No No Yes B11 l lNADEQUATE TESTING - PROC. DEFICIENCY 30 DAY LER I PIR 3-93-058 3304A No No No No es No No No Yes C11 4 ADVERTENT OP CHANGE AWAITING ENGINEERING EVAL l PIR 3-93-232 3304A 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 INCORRECT SPARE WIRE HEAD VENT VALVES ACR 00261 3304C 2 No No No No No No No No No . l BORIC ACID PUMP FAILED TO STOP ISOLATOR FAILURE - BURNED OUT 1 ACR 00675 3304C 2 Yes No No No No No No No No l BORIC ACID PUMP 3CHS*PZASTART W/O CAUSE SPURIOUS START ACR 00834 3304C 2 No No No Yes No No No No No BORIC ACID PUMP FAILURE TO STOP SPRING PRECLUDES PROPER OPER i ACR 01743 3304C 2 No No Yes No No No No CAL No Yes BS BORIC ACID MAKEUP INCORRECT VALVE STROKE ISSUE 22 l l l i
- -kMsiy9 asst.+. : 'N ' I cs9@rin.p.g ource Sys_ Group Olg. Mad Eleid Vand Other DE IS Inst Other B_L EE ACE.
82 D2119B .QD1 ZMZ Dencency Notes ACR 01743 3304C 2 No No No No No No No CAL No No BORIC ACID MAKEUP INCORRECT VALVE STROKE SET IMPROPERLY ACR 02868 3304C 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C1 - FLANGE "A" SW TRAIN INSTALLED W/O BJ MODIFIED EXISTING AWO WITHOUT PIR 3-91-153 3304C 2 No No No Yes No No No No Yes C11 OVERLOAD HEATERS NOT REINSTALLED AFTER MAINT. PERSONNEL ERRORT ACR 02860 3305 2 No No No No INST E No No No No Yes I . PIPE SULPPORT IMPROPERLY LOCATED DISCOVERED DURING SYSTEM WAL l ACR 05029 3305 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B9
'UEL STORAGE IN SFP FULL CORE OFF LOAD ISSUE ON MP l
ACR 06102 3305 2 Yes No No No No No No No No SFP ANTI-SYPHON HOLE SIZE SUSPECT BASED ON JUDGEMENT- DID CALC; PIR 3-95-028 3305 2 No No No No No No No MEPL No YesB6 C INSTALLED NON QA SEAL QA LISTED APPLICATION MEPL WRONG l 3306 1 Yes No No Yes es No No PROC No No C3 OPS PROCEDURE NOT REVISED ACR 00159 3306 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes B3 RSS TEMP. TRANSIENT BEYOND DESIGN BASIS RSS PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILUR ACR 06627 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No No INSTRUMENT SET POINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE DUE TO CAL ISOLATED CALCULATION ERROR-NO 1-23
. ;gggs n.t > ~ : 4 Qrks# cpu -
% aygg,g.
l Jurce Sys_ Group QIg. Mo.d Einld Yand Other DE IS . Tant Other. Si EP. /LQH. Nn Deslan Qna IQDZ Dencency Notes ACR 09496 3306 1 Yes No No No MOV G es No No No Yes C3 l l CALCULATION USED WRONG ACR 10561 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No No - RSS TEMPERATURE ISSUE PlPING STRESS --. 50.54 ISSUE - PARTLY CALCULATION ACR 10781 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No No CALCUALTION DIDNT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A PREVIOUS MOD NO FUNCTION IMPACT START-UP RE ACR 12862 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 MOV THRUST CALC REVIEW INCREASED RSS TEMP CHANGE IN CALC ASSUMPTIONS I PIR 3-86-140 3306 1 No No No No PM No No No No No 4 PROPER VALVE POSITION INDICATION LIMIT SWITCH PROBLEM PlR 3-88-054 3306 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No No NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EQ REQUIREMENTS INCORRECT MODEL XMTRS INSTALL PIR 3-92-036 3306 1 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 l AWOS WORKED WITHOUT OPS AUTHORIZATION PERSONNEL ERROR ! PIR 3-94-290 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No No RSS HX NOT ANALYZED FOR 100 PSI (SUPPORT) (NEED TO CHECK OD) l l PIR 3-95-034 3306 1 Yes No No No No No No No No l RSS HX OUTLET PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS TEMP TO LOW MAY HAVE BEEN S/U RELATED l ACR 03013 3307A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes B5 MOV MOTOR TERMINAL BLOCKS NOT EQ QUALIFIED LIMITORQUE TERMINAL BLOCKS 24 l l
i
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i
.,ource SyS_ G rei!D DJ.9- Mad Eleid Y_cnd Other DE IS Ins] Other Bl. EE AqB,
} Ng Deslan Qpa IQQI Deficency Notes ACR 04899 3307A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes SIT PIPlNG DIFFERS FROM DRAWING ISOMETRIC DIFFERS FROM ACTUAL
- E94-004 3307A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 RWST TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.3.4 PlR 3-87-007 3307A 1 Yes No No No No Yes No LOCK No Yes B5 INCORRECT SI ACCUMULATOR SETPOINTS PROCEDURE REVIEW '-
4 PIR 3-91-225 3307A 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 UNQUALIFIED VALVE IN Clf.SG !I SYSTEM PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 13217 3307B 1 Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes 83
'.HR PUMP TRIP ON LONG TERM RECIRC HIGH SUMP TEMP FOUND VIA SIMUL F ACR 09477 3307C 1 No No No No No No No No Yes BJ CLOSE-OUT DID NOT CHANGE OP OPERATION ADMINISTRATION ERRO ACR 08897 3308 1 Yes No No No No No No No No POTENTIAL CLOGGING OF BCCS THROTTLE VALVES ANALYZED TO BE OKAY - ORIGINAL ACR 09357 3308 1 Yes No No No No No No No No MINOR DRAWING ERROR NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ACR 10356 3308 1 Yes No No No No No Yes No No MINOR P&lD DRAWING PHYSICAL LOCATION DESCRIPTION Di NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ;
i ACR 10776 3308 1 No Yes No No No No No No No THERMAL REllEF CALCULATION ERROR FAILED TO REVISE CALCULATION 25
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i l l oource Sy.s. Group ,Qtg_ Mad Eteld Muld Other DE IS 7_ tit Other BL EP_ A_QB. 1 N.o Deslan _QRE ZO_QI Deficency Notes PIR 3-88-097 3308 No No No No No No No WORK No No BLANK FLANGE REMOVED WITHOUT BJ AUTHORIZATION ISOLATED PERSONNEL ERROR l PlR 3-89-042 3308 1 No No No No~ No Yes No -- No Yes 88 I TORQUE SWITCH SETTING CHANGED , NO ISI CONCURRENCE PlR 3-91-146 3308 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C1
~
VOTES RETEST NOT PERFORMED ; PERSONNEL ERROR PlR 3-94-075 3308 1 No No No No No No Yes No No* ESF RESPONSE TIME NOT ALL INCLUDED VG-12 3308 1 No Yes No No- DESIG No No No No Yes C1 RELIEF VALVES AND IMPACT OF RAISED SETPOINT, QUESTION ON ACCEPTABILITY OF C 'o ACR 04525 3309 1 No No No No No No Yes No No VALVE SLAMMED SHUT DURING SURVEILLANCE WATER HAMMER PROBLEM ACR 04897 3309 1 No No No No No No Yes No No USE OF PROPER VLVS TO THROTTLE OSS WRONG VLVS USED - PROCEDURE ACR 07743 3309 1 No Yes No No No No No No No C1 PDCR FAILED TO SPECIFY MCC LABELING UPDATES'- PDCR DIDNT GO FAR ENOUGH WITH E94-004 3309 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B5 CAT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.7 PlR 3-91-114 3309 No No No No es No Yes ADMIN No No MlSSED LLRT AFTER MOV TOROUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT ADMIN PROCESS PROBLEM 26 l l
1 I l lJYH%mpsyk - y<0 l l source Sya. Group DIS. Mad Einld Vand _Q1har DE IS _T_ cal Other B_L PE /LQR, l Mn Deslan Ops IqQI l i Deficenev Notes PlR 3-94-128 3309 No No No No No No Yes No No* NOT TESTING PER FSAR PROCEDURE NOT WRITTEN PER ORI PIR 3-94-301 3309 1 No Yes No Yes No No No No No -3 l CORE ANALYSIS USED NON CONSERVATIVE RWST ING VOLU VENDOR ERROR INTERPERTING TA PIR 3-93-060 3310A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes B11 CCP VALVE EXCEEDED STROKE TIME LIMITS ACTUATORS @ END OF LIFE PIR 3-94-139 3310A 1 No No No No es No No No Yes B* WRONG MATERIAL USED FOR YOKE BOLTS PROCEDURE MADE WRONG ASSUM ACR 07344 3311A 4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 i 'DCR RELEASED TO OPS NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED MINOR MINUS OF DELETION OF ANN a' PlR 3-92-192 3311A 4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 EQ CONDUlT SEAL INSTALLATION INVALID PDCR USED WRONG SEALS ACR 10864 3311B 4 Yes No No No No No No No No DRAWING DISCREPANCY NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ACR 07188 3311C 2 Yes No Yes No No No No No No INDICATOR LIGHT WlRING WRONG AS BUILT ORIGINAL CONDITION; DR I ACR 08601 3311C 4 No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes ! VENDOR CAL!BRATION SPECIFICATION NOT MET CONTROL OF VENDOR OlM REQUIR ! ACR 12857 3311C 2 Yes No No No No No No No No H2 TESTS GAS BOTTLES IN H1 RAD AREA NOT ACCESSIBLE POST ACCIDENT l G 27 1
l
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_.ntics Sya. Group QIg_ Mod Eleid Yend R1her DE IS Ies.1 Other. EL EE AGE. N2 Deslan Qas ZD_QI Deficency N_olen PIR 3-94-267 3311C 2 No No No No No No No PE No Yes C* RETAINING CLIPS NOT REPLACED PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 02228 3311E No Ntt Yes No No No No No Yes C2 VIOLATED DCN REQUIREMENT RE: CABLE SUPPORT SUPPORTED MULTIPLE CABLES VIA l PIR 3-88-061 3311E 4 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes C5 INCOMPLETE EQ QUAL PACKAGES NRC EQ AUDIT DISCOVERED PIR 3-88-091 3311E No No No No No No No No No CONTAINMENT EQ TEMP HIGH FOLLOWING UNIT STARTUP FAILED TEMP MONITOR PIR 3-88-117 3311E Yes No No No No No No No No ONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE >120 FOR 8 HOURS PGS CUBICLE LICENSE AMENDMENT i l PlR 3-88-129 3311E l' Yes No No No No No No No No l CONTAINMENT TEMP ABOVE EQ LIMIT PGS CUBICLE LICENSE AMENDMENT PIR 3-88-153 3311E Yes No No No No No No No No l CONTAINMENT EQ TEMP PROFILE WAS TOO CONSERVATIVE SUBMITTED LICENSE AMENDMENT PIR 3-90-088 3311E 4 No No No No No Yes No No Yes C11 EQ TEMPS NOT RECORDED ON ROUNDS PERSONNEL ERROR l ACR 01149 3312A 1 Yes No No Yes AE No No No No Yes B6 CTMT EQT HATCH COMPONENTS NOT SHOWN AS CAT I ORIGINAL MEPL EVAL SHOWS SOME ACR 01725 3312A 1 No No No No No Yes No No Yes 88 CTMTTS REQUIREMENTS CONFLICT TS SUBSECTIONS CONFLICT WITH E r.- 28
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~ource Sys. Grang Olg_ Mod Eleid Yand Other DE IS Ics1 Other BL EE ACR l Ng Deslan Qpa ZQQZ
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Deficency Notes ACR 06569 3312A 1 No No No No No No No No Yes CS INCONSISTENT VALVE STROKE TIME ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA INCOMPLETE OF ISI PROGRAM PIR 3-86-151 3312C 2 Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No RAD MONITOR SETPOINT DATA BASE CHANGE ERROR SETPOINTS NOT IAW SP l l ACR 04580 3313A 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes l DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EE AND ESK DRAWINGS LAMP CAME ON PEST-RELAMPlNG; ACR 04877 3313A 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C9 DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DRAWINGS & FSAR ADDRESS RG 1.47 ISSUES AS FSAR ACR 12339 3313A 2 No No No No EQ No No No No Yes
!Q 10 YEAR EQUIPMENT INSPECTION MISSED EO PROGRAM / MAINTENANCE / WORK 8'
PIR 3-91-101 3313A Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No TECH SPEC FLOW SURVEILLANCE TEST PENDING TEOH SPEC CHANGE ADM PlR 3-94-065 3313A 2 No No No Yes No No No No No SHEAR PIN MISSING ON RECOMBINER FLANGE NEVER INSTALLED; PROCEDURE FO ; PlR 3-88-159 3314 No No No No No No No No Yes BJ REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION BJ COMPLICATED BY MULTIPLE FUN ACR 00237 3314A 2 No No No Yes No No No No No i FAN TRIP DUE TO Dr.MPER FAILURE FAILED DUE TO HYDRAMOTOR PLAT ACR 04195 3314A 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B1 l TRM ISSUE ON AUX BLDG HEATER AVAILABLE WHAT SURVEILLANCE INSURES AVA l 29
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i l l _ ource Sy_s_ Group .QIg_ Med Einld Mend Other DE IS T.ent .Q1har. BL EE ACR. l , No Desian _Qan ID_QI ! Deficenev Notes l ACR 05272 3314A 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B5 l DISCREPANCY BETVidEN CALC & AIR FLOWTEST FAN SP CALLS FOR LOWER FLOWW E94-004 3314A 2 No Yes No No SLCRS No No No No No OPERATION OF AUX BLDG FANS: SLCRS ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.2 PIR 3-86-156 3314A Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No FAN FAILED TO START BREAKER TRIP RESET BUTTON FA'L PIR 3-86-160 3314A No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 INTERMITTENT GROUND WIRE CUT INADVERTENTLY PDCR l PIR 3-91-166 3314A 2 No No Yes No No Yes No No No OTH SLCRS FILTERS OOS: FIRE DAMPER REPAIR 30 DAY LER !* PIR 3-91-211 3314A 2 No No No No EEQ No No No No Yes C11 l EO: FIC FLOW SWITCH CAL DONE LATE PERSONNEL ERROR l NA 12012 3314C 2 No No No No No No No No No FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENT SYSTEM TEST INCORRECT FAILED TO TEST SYSTEM IN ACCIDE ACR 00161 3314D 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C1 FAN CIRCUITRY NOT CONSISTENT WITH LOGIC DRAWINGS POTENTIAL IEEE-279-1971 NON-COM l ACR 10532 3314D 4 Yes No No No No No No No No 1 l WIRE LANDED ON INCORRECT TERMINAL DRAWING ERROR PIR 3-95-041 3314D .es No No No No No Yes No No FAN CIRCUlT DID NOT REQUIRE STEP AT EQUIP LEVEL NOT PICKED UP IN S/U PROGRAM 30
v:WV9Q p:r-:- l l l Jurce syg, Group Qtg_ Mod Eltid Yend Other DE IS Iest Other D_L EE AC_E. Ng Deslan Qp_g IqqZ Deficency Notes ACR 04970 3314F 2 No No No No No Yes No No Yes 88 TECH SPEC INTERPRETATION: CONTROL BLDG AC HVK CHILLER OPERABILITY ISSUE ACR 05207 3314F 2 Yes No No No No No No LABEL No No EXCUTCHEON ON CONTROL SWITCH NOT SAME AS DRAWIN MB2 SHOWS CLOSE " AUTO""OPEN" ACR 07363 3314F 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 FSAR DOES NOT REFLECT MODIFICATION CHANGES DCW CLOSURE PROBLEMS ACR 08843 3314F 2 Yes No No No No No No No No FSAR & TECH SPEC FLOW RATE NOT IN AGREEMENT MINIMUM & MAXIMUM FLOWS NOT S ACR 10585 3314F 2 No No No No es No No MAINT. No No CAFFOLDING HAS POTENTIAL PROBLEM ANALYZED OKAY - UPGRADED LATE ACR 63630 3314F 2 Yes No No No No No No No No DESIGN DRAWING DISCREPENCY NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT - DRAWIN PIR 3-86-158 3314F 2 Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes C11 PARTITION PLATE BOLT FAILURE PlR 3-86-165 3314F 2 No No No Yes PM No No No No No CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION CBI HIGH CHLORINE PROBE FAILED PlR 3-86-190 3314F 2 No No Yes No No No No No No l CONTROL ROOM PRESURE ENVELOPE BREACHED INFO UNAVAILABLE FAILURE CAUSE PlR 3-89-002 3314F 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 VALVE WIRED INCORRECTLY 31
I 1 LQWa~:c4 . n
-: egg l
t l surce Sy1 Group .QIg Mo.d Eleid Ynnd Other DE IS Ins _t Other BL P_E Ng AGA Deslan Qpg Iggy Deficency Notes PIR 3-91-123 3314F 2 No No No Yes No No No No No SPURIOUS CONTRL BLDG ISOLATION SIGNAL POWER SUPPLY FAILURE l PIR 3-91-162 3314F Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 1 HX FOULED WITH MUSSELS INOR CHLORINATION SYSTEM DEFICIENCI i PIR 3-92-343 3314F 2 No- Yes No No No No No No Yes C11 l AWO RELEASED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PERSONNEL ERROR l ACR 05193 3314H 1 No Yes No No No No No No No EDG ALARM SETPOINT NOT CHANGED ON TIME SETPOINT CHANGED @ DIFFERENT i ! ACR 00224 33141 2 No No No Yes No No No No Yes IPROPER FUSE IN RAD MONITOR APPEARS WRONG FUSE INSTALLED ACR 01727 33141 2 No- No No No No No Yes No Yes WRONG SAMPLE FLOW CONVERSION FACTOR DATA ENTERED INCORRECTLY-EQT. 1 i 192 33141 2 Yes No No No No No No Yes No I I ENGINEERING TIMELINESS, NOTES SLCRS DEFICIENCY NOTE CAUSE OF S/D 193 33141 2 Yes No No No No No No No No SLCRS WORK AROUND ON FAN STARTS REDUCING AVAILABI LONG TERM EQUIP PROBLEMS i N9507 33141 2 No No No No No No No MAINT No No l SLCRS INOP ROOF PLUG REMOVED RCP MOTOR REPLACEMENT PIR 3-86-155 33141 2 Yes No No No No No Yes No No SLCRS BACKDRAFT DAMPER FAILURE DAMPER NOT FULLY OPEN 32
, ,> r +rGW luICA Syn. Group Qts. Mod Eteld Vand .Q1 hat D.E IS Inst Other D1 EE /LQR, Nn Design .Q91 2.0.QI Dencency Notes PlR 3-86-195 33141 2 No Yes Yes No No No No No No BREACH OF SLCRS BOUNDARY CABLE LACKING SEAL 'PIR 3-86-246 33141 _2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 _
SLCRS FAILED SURVEJLLANCE INADEQUATE DESIGN .
+
PIR 3-88-013 33141 -2 No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes C11 BJ INSTALLED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION VIOLATED TS FIRE BOUNDARY : PlR 3-91-108 33141 No No No No es No No ADMIN No No SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACHED WITHOUT AWO ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM PIR 3-91-151 33141 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11
'OTH TRAINS INOP: ACCESS COVER REMOVED PERSONNEL ERROR r PIR 3-91-158 33141 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B5 "A" SLCRS FILTER FAILS FLOW TEST FUSIBLE LINK FAILED DESIGN DEFIC l PIR 3-92-052 33141 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH SLCRS BOOTS MISSING PIR 3-94-291 3315B 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C* j STEM BUSHING MISSING ON MOD LOOKS LIKE WARD ISSUE -
ACR 04887 3315E 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B2 OPS CRIT DRAWING DOESNT REFLECT AS BUILT STATUS AUX BOILER VENTILATION: IVS 2 AO ACR 01821 3316A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No "A" MSIV FAILURE TO OPEN PART STROKE TEST FAILURE 33
I I l G5 v p.y 7 7. . - 1 J2HIEe Syn. Group QIg_ Mo.d Eleid Y_cnd _Q1her DE IS Inst Other. BL P.e Agg_ Ii2 Deslan QRE IDDZ Deficency Ngta,.g
)
ACR 02854 3316A 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 DCN'S NOT PROCESSED PROPERLY SIGNED OFF SYSTEM NOT TURNED l ACR 05742 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No MSIV TEST SOLENOID 4A FAILED ON SURVEILLANCE TEST RELATES TO VENDOR APPLICATION l ACR 06322 3316A 1 Yes *Wo No No es No No No Yes MSIV ZERO CLOSED POSITION INDICATION QUESTIONED CAllBRATION PROCEDURE DEFICIE ACR 08777 3316A 1 No No No No PROC es No No No Yes PROCEDURE OMITTED VENDOR INFO . INFO LOST IN PROCEDURE REWRIT ACR 09377 3316A 1 Yes -No No No No No No No No 11NOR DRAWING DISCREPANCIES _. NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT I ACR 10325 3316A 1 Yes No Yes No No No No No No WIRE IN MOV CIRCUlT NOT LANDED WlRE NOT LANDED-GL 89-10 FLOW PlR 3-86-139 3316A 1 No No Yes No No No Yes CAL No No i MSS VALVE TRIP LEVEL SWITCH CAllBRATION { PIR 3-86-222 3316A 1 No No No No CARD No No No No No ' STEAM FLOW INDICATOR MISMATCH POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE DRIFT PlR 3-86-239 3316A 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 INSUFFICIENT TAGGING - EQUIPMENT CYCLED AWO CONTROL PIR 3-87-072 3316A 1 No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No l MSIV STROKE TIME EXCEEDS TS LIMITS N2 ASSIST NOT CREDITED IN MODE l i I 34
- n estJr(A Wine?:#Ri:UWNeEEsi?M:%'? :
Jurce Sys_ _Gf.nug .QIg_ Mod field y_end .Q1hnr DE IS Inst Other BJ, P2 Ag_g, En Deslan Qas 2002 Deficency Notes PIR 3-90-047 3316A Yes Yes No No No No No No No MAIN ETEAM RELIEF VALVES NOT ASME SEC XI INSTALLED CODE RECONCILIATION IN ERROR PIR 3-92-033 3316A 1 No No No No es Yes No No Yes C11 S/G FED WITH LOW TEMPERATURE WATER PERSONNEL ERROR PIR 3-93-244 3316A 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 0;tREMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION IMF ERROR: SCAFFOLD REMOVAL PlR 3-94-010 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No* , l MSIV PARTIAL STROKE TIME GL91-18 OUESTION l PlR 3-94-038 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No X TRIP SETPOINTS WITH INOP SPRS SAFETIME NONCONSE INDUSTRY ISSUE - PIR 3-94-115 3316A 1 No No No No No No Yes No No l
"C:" MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PlR 3-94-157 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No "C" MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PIR 3-94-185 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
'C' MSIV FAILED CLOSED RX TRIP PIR 3-94-207 3316A 1 No No No No No Yes Yes No No B*
l MSIV TS INADEQUATE TO SUPPURT MODE CHANGE VALVES PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED PIR 3-94-282 3316A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No
'C' MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE REPETITIVE PROBLEM 35
.gp y cv9p% 7 3;f$gdyftVidyminhp -ource SyS_ Group QIg_ Mad Elmld Y_end Q1tler DE IS Ins] Other B_1. EE ACR j Mn Deslan Ops ZaQI Deficenev Notes PlR 3-94-284 3316A 1 No No No No es No No No Yes C*
MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE ADMIN CONTROL QS-93-110 3316A 1 No No No No es No No - No No SNUBBER INSPECTION PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY QSD SURVEILVf4CE VG-100 3316A 1 No Yes Yes Yes 383 FL No No No VENDO No No CONTROLOTRON CABLE FIRE RATING RELATES TO USE OF NON-383 QUAll PIR 3-91-106 3316C No No No No No No No No No GENERATOR PlPE ACCIDENTALLY BENT ISOLATED WORKER ERROR ACR 07493 3317 4 No Yes Yes No No No No - No Yes C2 eCN NOT OPERATED PROPERLY FOR VENT LINE WORK PROVENFAILURE E94-004 3317 4 Yes No No No No No No ' No No MSR PCV VALVE TRIM INADEQUATE ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.3.1 PlR 3-86-167 3317 3 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 INSTRUMENT CABLE INSULATION FAILURE EXCESSIVE HEAT PIR 3-88-090 3317 Yes No No No No No No No No DSM WELD CRACK HIGH STRESS DUE TO ORIG. DESIG ACR 06286 5318 4 Yes No No No No No No No No WIRES NOT LANDED ON NON RETURN VALVE FIELD ERROR IN HECONNECTION O PlR 3-91-191 3318 4 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 PURGE BAG SMOKING BORING PIPE WELDING PERSONNEL ERROR 36
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wp- - I , ource Sy.s_ Group QIG. Mad Elsid Vand Other DE IS Ie.Et Other B_L EE AQfl. I ga Deslan pga IQgI Deficency Notes ACR 00806 3319A 3 No No No No I&C CA No No Yes No Yes COMPENSATING WIRE IMPROPERLY LANDED ERROR CAUSED TEMPERATURE FL ACR 03171 3319A 3 Yes No ..No No No No - No No Yes TEMPORARY HANGERS LEFT ON CONDENSATE PIPING LEFT IN SINCE ORIGINAL CONSTRU ACR 00677 3319C 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C4 CNO EFFICIENT RM:TS VS SAFETY EVAL ~E- TS SURV AND SAFETY EVAL DISCRE PIR 3-94-161 3319C 4 No No No No es No No No Yes B5 WRONG FUSES IN NOT VITIAL MCC . PROGRAM DID NOT COVER VG-158 3319C 1 No Yes No No BASIS No No No DESIG No No IAS DIAPHRAGM COMPLETELY REMOVED FROM DWST QUESTION ON CERTAINTY OF REMO ACR 05755 3320 1 Yes No No No No No No No No OPERATING FATIGUE FAILURE NOT DESIGN RELATED PIR 3-92-025 3320 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 AWO CANCELLED, TAGS CLEARED: JOB STILL WORKING PERSONNEL ERROR l PIR 3-88-228 3321 2 Yes No No No MEPL No No No No Yes B11 NON QA PARTS IN QA SYSTEM MEPL EVAC REVISED PIR 3-92-187 3321 1 Yes No No No No No No No No FEEDWATER HEATER OSCILLATION DOWNPOWER PIR 3-93-238 3321 1 No No No No es No No No Yes C11 RED AND BLUE TAGS ON SAME COMPONENTS TAGGING ON SAME EQUIPMENT l< 37
l l v
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'r9 9 99 1
l l source Sya, Group QIg_ Nn Design Med Eteld Mand Other DE IS 1911DasOther BL EE AGE. ZDRZ Deficency Notes PlR 3-94-024 3321 1 Yes No No No No No No No No FW ISOL MAY HAVE DEGRADED WITHOUT BEING DETECTED S/U TESTING (FOUND IN 1989) ACR 02862 3321A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 PIPE SUPPORT LOADS EXCEED DB LIMITS FOUND DURING CK VLV LEAKAGE E ACR 03022 3321A 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C7 PRESSURE ALARM SWITCH DIFFERS FROM DRAWING SRIE PROCEDURE NOT FOLLOWED ACR 03631 3321A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No FEED WATER CHECK VALVE BACK LEAKAGE PENETRATION COOLING ISSUE ACR 04499 3321A 1 No Yes No No No No No io YesB1
/ALVE LABELS INCONSISTENTWITH P&lD DRAWINGS FEEDWATER LEAK INSTRUMENTS l ACR 04524 3321A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No CHECK VLV BACK LEAKAGE PENETRATION COOLING ISSUE I ACR 06348 3321A 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 QUESTION ON FLEX TUBING EVALUATION ON STWR LEVEL IN COMFUSION ONLY - DOCUMENT CLA ACR 12502 3321A 1 No Yes No No' No No No No No C1 CABLE DOESNT MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT ACCEPTED VENDOR CABLE WITHOU AR 9500515 3321A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No MSIV STROKE TIME PROBLEMS ISEG REPORT E94-004 3321A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No FWISOL. VALVE STROKE TIME ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.5 38
ew, y . , 2.% ya.4 .
,ource Sy.g_ Group _QIg-Mod Eleid Mend Q1hnt DE IS Iest O_ttler_ BL EE Hn Design /LCR op_s zgz '
Deficency Notes PIR 3-86-171 3321A 1 No No No No es No No No Yes B11 WATER HAMMER LCV FAILURE OPS PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY PIR 3-92-026 3321A 1 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 AWO ACCEP2D WITHOUT RETEST AND TAG CLEARANCE PERSONNEL ERRRR/ PROC NOT CLR ACR 00294 3322 1 No No No No CK VL No Yes No No No AFW CK VLV NOT IN IST PROGRAM FSAR VS TS INCONSISTENCY ACR 02858 3322 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C3 DCN ON DWST DID NOT LIST DOING AS OPS CRIT REMOVED DIAPHRAGHM FROM DWS ACR 03264 3322 1 No No No No No No No CK VLV No No OK VLV BACKLEAKAGE OVERHEATS AFW LINE l ACR 03265 3322 1 No No No No No No No No No LEAKING AFWCKVLVS HISTORICAL BACK LEAKAGE - CTMT ACR 05287 3322 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B6 QA DESIGNATION ON VALVE LABELS WALK DOWN SHOVED VALVES AS O ACR 06945 3322 1 No No No No No No Yes No No SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE NOT CONSERVATIVE TRM REQUIREMENT NOT SATISFIED 1 ACR 07737 3322 7 Yes No No No No No No No No DESIGN LEADING EXCEEDED ON PIPE SUPPORT OPERABLE- CUMMULATIVE EFFECT ACR 08907 3322 1 No Yes No No No No No No No C8 DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND CALCULATION l 39
l , M ;.y:p l e m 2 3 5@ $ $ K p %eJ 4 1 l l , mource Eys_ Group Dr.g. Med Elaid Y.end .Qther DE IS IAsl Other BL EE g
- l. Na Deslan .Qas IQgI 1 l Deficency Notes ACR 08912 3322 1 Yes No No No es No No No No C2 DISCREPANCY BtiTWEEN DBTP AND TECHNINCAL SPECIFICA IST OKAY PAPER ISSUE - C9 ALSO A t
ACR 10774 3322 1 Yes No No No No No No No No AFW FCV ISOLATION CAPAE;UTY DEFICIENCY 50.54 ISS.lE- ORIGINAL DESIGN _ ) i ACR 10780 3322 1 Yes No No No No Yes No No No l TTAFW VALVE SHEET TO TEST MDAFWP 50.54 ISSUE i ACR 10790 3322 1 Yes No No No No No Yes S/E No Yes C11 U & MDAFW PUMP PRE-LUBE NOT PERFORMED OER VENDO NO COORDINATOR BETWEEN SURV i ACR 10803 3322 1 No No No No No No No 1&C TS No Yes 10CEDURE CHANGE RESULTS IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI LACK OF OVERLAP IN TP REVIEWS l l AR 9500515 3322 1 Yes No No No No No No No No i TERRY TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVES ISEG REPORT E94-004 3322 1 Yes No No No No No No No No AUX FEED PIPE SUPPORTS:HELB ISSUE ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.6 PIR 3-86-136 3322 1 No No No Yes No No No No No AUX FEED FLOW CAL FAILURE MANUFACTURING DEFECT l l PlR 3-88-057 3322 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes C5 l CABLE SEPARATION CRITERIA VIOLATION NRC EQ AUDIT DISCOVERED PIR 3-88-105 3322 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No VENDOR NOTICE ON SCC ON AFW PUMPS NO IMPACT ON MP3 40 i l
i 1 l mw, E4&s:n+ ,mgz -wm j j ocurce Sys. Group _QIg_ Mod Elfid _V_end Other D2 IS TRat Other BL EE agg, l No Desian .Q. as IQ_qr ! Deficency Notes PIR 3-88-213 3323C 3 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 l BJ REMOVAL WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION TEMPORARY GAUGES REMOVED l PIR 3-91-139 3323C 3 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 ; IST RESET MALFUNCTIONS SHEARED EHC CAMSHAFT PIN ACR 10384 3323D No No No No es No No No Yes C9 l FSAR SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION DISCREPENCY NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT . PIR 3-86-147 3324A 4 No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes C11 MAIN GENERATOR OVER VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM RESET- BJ IS PIR 3-92-324 3324C 4 No No No No No No No YES No Yes C11 ALVE FOUND CLOSED PROC. VIOLATED ACR 08612 3325A 2 No Yes No Yes No No No No No Cift!P BEARING TEMPARUTURE ELEMENT CABLES LANDED IN DOCUMENTATION CLARIFIED l I ACR 08642 3325A 2 No No No No START No No No No Yes ' SHIPPING SLEEVE LEFT ON RTD ORIGINAL STARTUP CONFIGURATIO AR 9502672 3325A 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B9 CIRC WATER TEMPERING LINE USE ISEG REPORT AR 9504769 3325A 2 No Yes No No es Yes No No Yes B9 INCREASE IN UHS TEMPERATURE ISEG REPORT PIR 3-86-146 3325A 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 l MULTIPLE CIRC WATER PUMP TRIPS INADEQUATE LUBE WATER 42
.g g p g y;q . @ n ,,
_ surce Sys. Grqua Qtg_ Nn Mad Eleid VfJid Other DE IS IfJ11 Other DJ,EE ACE. Deslan Das ZDAI Deficency Notes PlR 3-86-229 3325A 2 Yes No No No No No No No No CIRC PUMP TRIP LOW LUBE WATER PDCR WRITTEN TO REMOVE TRIP ACR 01849 3325C 4 Yes No~ No Yes No No No - No No 3CCPXP1 A OUTBOARD AIR DEFLECTOR LOOSE ORIGINAL GEA10 TOR DESIGN PROB ACR 03293 3325C 4 Yes No No Yes No No No No No AIR DEFLECTOR LOOSE:CCP MOTOR SEE ALSO ACR 01809 ACR 00831 3326 1 No No No No RFO M No No No No No AO FLOWIN "C" CCP HX SW LINE VALVE OPERATOR MISPOSITIONED ACR 01201 3326 1 No No No No No No Yes - No Yes ED WRONG AWO FOR VE-2 INSPECTION VIOLATED C-WPC-2 REQUIREMENT ACR 02279 3326 1 No No No No PMMS No No Yes No Yes USED WRONG VALVE MFGR FOR TEST INFO PMMS DID NOT REFLECT LATEST VA ACR 02635 3326 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 PLANT CHANGE INITIATED VIA DCN VS PDCR ACR 02855 3326 i No No Yes No No No No No Yes C10 STRUCTURAL QUAllF OF EXPANSION JOINTS LACKS DETAIL TIE ROD QUALIFICATIONS SUSPECT ACR 02990 3326 1 No No Yes No No No No No No SW PUMP VALVE WOULD NOT STROKE OPEN AWO PERFORMED; MISLANDED LEA ACR 05292 3326 i No No Yes No No No No No Yes DAMAGED SW FL.ANGE NUTS 43
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- e. d ed W '
ource Sys_ Group .QIg. Mo_d Eleid Y_end Other DE IS Ie_at Other B1 EE &QB_ gg peslan .Qas Ingz Deficency Notes l ACR 08317 3326 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No No C1 1 , l HOV OPERATOR INSTALLED BACKWORDS FIELD ERROR IN BJ INVESTIGATION l I ACR 10782 3326 1 No Yes No No es No No No Yes C1 BJ REQUIRES OPERATOR ACTION YET NO PROCEDURES IN P 4 1 l ACR 10787 3326 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 CABLES NOTIN 151 ENGINEER DIDNT COMMUNICATE ACR 10795 3326 1 No Yes No No No No No No No BJ DEFEATED AUTO START FEATURES ISOLATED DESIGN ERROR ACR 11321 3326 i No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes C1 l TAILURE TO DERIVE PROPER SURVEILLANCE LIMITS BASED PDCR SHOULD HAVE ATTEND PROC N95-11 3326 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 l MOV CONTROL MOD NOT VERIFIED INADEQUATE PDCR PIR 3-86-153 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No No l FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN CCPHX RUBBER SW LINER MATERIAL PIR 3-88-152 3326 No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No TUBE LEAK ON CCP; INCORRECT RELIEF VALVE TEMP. VLV. INST. WRONG CONSTR. PIR 3-90-097 3326 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 HX EROSION DIVIDER PLATE HOLE PIR 3-90-139 3326 No No No No es No No ADMIN No No l WRONG WELD WIRE USED ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS e 44 i
i \ . .r . nexw l
,ource Syl Group 019. Mad Eleid Vend Q1hnt DE IS Ifuit Other HL EE AqB.
En Deslan Qas ZaQI Deficency Notes PIR 3-91-090 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No No SWP DISCHARGE EXPANSION JOINT POOR APPLICATIONS OF MATERIAL PIR 3-91-171 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No No SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MUSSEL FOULING UNIT SHUTDOWN PlR 3-91-209 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B5 CORROSION OF SERVICE WATER VALVES RUBBER LINING SEPARATED PlR 3-91-220 3326 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B11 i SW PUMP SUPPORT BOLTS OVER TORQUED MAINT PROC ISSUE PIR 3-92-037 3326 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C11 10 ASME XIINSP PLAN ON AWOS PERSONNEL ERROR PIR 3-92-168 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No No MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX INADEQUATE CHLORINATION PIR 3-92-179 3326 1 Yes No No No No No No No No "A" EDG EXPANSION JOINT FAILURE WELD SEAM PITTING - MONEL PIR 3-93-057 3326 1 No No No No No No No YES No No MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX OLD RESIDUE SUSPECTED PlR 3-93-066 3326 1 No No No No No No No No No RED TAG HUNG ON WRONG EQUIPMENT PERSONNEL ERROR l PIR 3-94-066 3326 1 No No Yes No No No No No No BOLT MISSING ON BASE PLATE NO WORK HAD BEEN PERFORMED S l 45
;5e $?Q.%%);ffib,?pyl;q&r n ;:'i - * * "' ;' +% %
i l i
,ource Sya_ Group QIg. MQd Eleid Vand Other DE IS T_ejil Qthat Bl. EE ACR. '
MQ Deslan Qpa ZQQZ Denconcv Notes PIR 3-94-067 3326 1 No No No No es No No No No* PIPE NIPPLE & CAP USED IN LIEU OF PLUG ON OIL DRAIN CONG CHANGE BY ERROR. PROCE PIR 3-94-182 3326 1 Yes Yes No Yes No No No No nob 3 -. PlPE HANGER IMPROPERLY ANALYZED CODE WRONG DUE TO PERSONNEL P!R 3-94-234 3326 1 No Yes No No No Yes No No No C* - IST SURVEILLANCE NOT CONSERVATIVE WITH SUPPORT TO POORLY X MITTED INFO '. PIR 3-94-235 3326 1 No No No No No No No No Yes C* BOLTING NOT AS ASSUMED IN HVR/ACU COILS _ PIR 3-94-243 3326 1 No No No No es No Yes No No IOV TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ERROR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ERROR /PR PIR 3-95-005 3326 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B2
- DRAWING ERROR / LACK OF VERIFICATION DRAWING ERROR NOT CAUGHT DU PIR-3-88-04 3326 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No VALVE STEM ADAPTOR CAN DISENGAGE SELF POTENTIAL MOV FAILURE l QS-93-022 3326 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 INADEQUATE DIRECTION IN AWO QSD SURVEILLANCE VG-106 3326 1 Yes Yes No No REVISI No No No DESIG No Yes C1 APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV130 VALVES PDCR NOT ACCEPTED BY PORC DU l
VG-144 3326 1 Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes C8 , SWP DISCHARGE VALVE NOT IN TECH SPEC QUESTION ON BASIS FOR VALVES N l l I i - 46
} .rs .w> KL4 A P.tl p $ pyyqwy:s MS 2r:
ource Sys_ Group _QIg_ En Mad Einld Vand Other DE IS Ic.n.t Other.. BL EE ACE._ Dnslan .Qas ZAQI Deficency Notes VG-146 3326 1 Yes No No No AS-BUI No No No No Yes C2 DRAWING DISCREPANCY ON SERVICE WATER BACKWASH FE DRAWINGS CONFLICT WITH ONE AN ACR 04561 3327 3 No Yes No No NoNo No No Yes B1 - CONTROLLED DRAWING DOCUMENTATION INADEQUATE LOGIC DIAGRAM DOESNT SHOW HO ACR 08803 '3327 4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes DRAWING DISCREPANCY CORRECTED DRAWINGS PlR 3-86-184 3327 4 Yes No No No es No No No No HIGH DP W/O PUMP TRIP STICKING SWITCH PIR 3-86-223 3327 4 No No Yes No No No No No No ICREENWASH EXPANSION JOINT FAILURE EQUIPMENT GROUNDS PIR 3-92-330 3327 3 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes B2 ONE LINE DRAWING HAS WRONG INFO UPDATE WITH WRONG INFO l E94-004 3328 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3
]
MUSSEL FOULING; HYPOCHLORITE SYSTEM DESIGN ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.11 PlR 3-86-143 3328 No No No No PM No No No No Yes C11 CTMT BLDG ISOLATION SIGNALAL HIGH CHLORINE - DETECTOR FAILE I ACR 12231 3329 4 Yes No No No No No No No No l DESIGN INCORRECT RELATIVE TO INDICATING OF VALVE PO STATUS NOT CLEAR AT THIS TIME ACR 01162 3330A No No No Yes No No No No Yes EQ LEVEL SWITCHES NOT REPLACED ON TIME LONG VENDOR LEAD TIME FOR PAR 7 47
Q if f g f % % Q 9 & T yk'R t s " - . source Sy.n. farsup .QIs. Mo.d Eleid Vend Other DE IS Ical Other B.L EE ACR Nn Deslan Qps Zgz Deficenev Notes l ACR 04888 3330A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 CONTROLLER SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM CALC SETPOINTS SETPOING CONFIGURATION CONTR ACR 07187 3330A 1 Yes No No Yes No No No No No CCP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR DAMAGE -- POOR VENDOR DESIGN ACR 08425 3330A 1 Yes No No No MUST No No No No No CCP P! PING TEMPERATURES LIMIT EXCEEDED I UNREASONABLE DESIGN LIMITATIO PIR 3-91-170 3330A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes 83 l *B" HX INOP; MUSSEL FOULING - HIGH DP PIR 3-91-172 3330A 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 C" HX INOP: MUSSEL FOULING HIGH DP PlR 3-92-340 3330A 1 Yes No No No No No No VLV No Yes B11 RPOCW NSR PIPE HDR CRACK EXCESS Vf BRATION: THROTTLING V l PIR 3-94-287 3330A No No No No No No No No Yes C* l RUBBER PLUGS LEFT IN CCP HX FROM l ACR 04569 3330B 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes l VALVES INSTALLED IN REVERSE WRONG VALVE FOR SERVICE ALSO PIR 3-93-331 33308 4 Yes No No No No No No No No FAILED BUSHING TACK VELD: 3-CCS-D113 FOUND DURING PUMP REPAIR ACR 06594 3330C 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C5 LO LEVEL CONLS NO INSTALLED PER lEQ NO INPACT ON FUNCTION 48
l l l y,,.g:3m, u.. . .:,4p, , i _str.c.c Sys_ Group .QIg_ Mod Ehld V_cnd Other DE IS 1911 Other B l. E E ACR ' Mn Dnslan _Qas ZD.QI I Deficenev Notes l ACR 09466 3330C 4 Yes No Yes No MAINT No No No No No l WIRE LANDED ON INCORRECT TERMINAL PIR 3-94-232 3330C 4 Yes No No Yes No No No No No . CDS CHILLER KEEPS TRIPPING REQUIRED DESIGN CHANGE v ACR 00015 3331A 4 No Yes No No es No No No Yes C1 - AUX BOILER SYSTEM VLVS. MISPLACED REQ'D PROCEDURE CHANGES NOT I .M E94-004 3331A 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 .. 1 AUX STEAM RELIEF VLV IS UNDERSIZED ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.10 . l PIR 3-92-057 3331A 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 -, VX CONDENSATE NOT SAMPLED IAW BJ PERSONNEL ERROR l PIR 3-88-099 3331D Yes No Yes No No No No No No - STARTUP STRAINER NOT REMOVED ISOLATED ERROR PlR 3-94-226 3331D 47 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 HOTWATER HEATING VLVS WIRED AVICE B DCH IMPLEMENTION ACR 05291 3331E 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes AUX BOILER DESIGN DRAWNG DISCREPANCIES NU OWNGS VS VENDOR DWNGS 1 ACR 08437 3331F 4 Yes No No No No No No No No l BOLTING WITH INSUFFICIENT ENGAGEMENT USED ACR 00635 3332A 2 No No Yes No No No No No No C7 DESIGN CHANGE CANCELED - AWO LEFT OPEN RIE NOT INCLUDED IN AWO PACKAG , 49
, . g.sTs,.; esW 9/p. W t' -
.t gpupp.,.
source Sys. Group .QIg_ Mo.d Einld Y.end Other DE If Inst Other. BL EE AGE. Ms2 Design _Qas ZQRZ Deficenev Notes ACR 02630 3332A 2 Yes No No No ORIGl No No No No Yes ACTUATOR GREASE SHIPPING CAP NOT REMOVED
*ACR 09355 3332A 2 Yes No No No No No No No No 3 MINOR DRAWING ERROR NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT
. E94-004 3332A 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B da NON-SEISMIC INSTRUMENT AIR LINES ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2id
- E94-004 3332A 2 Yes No No No No No No Yes No AIR COMPRESSORE DESIGN DEFICIENCY 3332A ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.1
.:PIR 3-88-86 3332A Yes No No No No No No No No AS SUPPLY HEADER CRACK CORRECT BY MODIFICATION PIR 3-93-050 3332A 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes 83 INSTRUMENT AIR LEAK SUPPORT FAILURE PIR 3-92-181 3332C 4 No No Yes No No No No No No BJ NOT APPROVED IN 14 DAYS PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 02706 3333 4 No No No No No No No No Yes C1 GAS EOOS IV POOR CLOSED BEFORE AWO CLOSED INST. NOT CAL DUE TO AWO CLOSE l l ACR 06942 33358- 4 Yes No No No No No No No No C2 l CONTAINMENT SUMP PUMP P&lD DRAWING CONFUSED AS BUILT DRAWING ERROR ACR 05275 3335A Yes No No No No No No No Yes PRIMARY DRAINS TRANSFER PUMP RELAY INCORRECT USE OF RE VS. RC RELAY 50
l 4% %fhG } ,.gy.?~ > M W'M ? N8 N** source Sys._ Group Olg. MQd Eleid Yand Other DE IS Icit Other BL EE ACR No D1 sis.n ORE 10.0I l Deficency Notes ;
\
PIR 3-94-040 33358 No No No No es No No No No* l CONTAINMENT SUMP PP OPERATION NOT PER FSAR PROCEDURE CHANGE NOT CONSIS ACR 13225 3335B- 4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B1 l POWER SUPPLY TO "TEMPOFMRY" CONDENSOR SUMP PUM USE PERMANENT POWER SUPPLY V ACR 05496 3336A 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 1 1/2" PIPES THROUGH SW CUBICLE NOT FIRE RATED FIBERGLAS PlPE NOT 3 HR FIRE RAT i E94-004 3337 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B5 l WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR SETPOINTS IMPROPER- ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.3.2 E94-004 3340C 4 No No No No VLV LE No No No No No JMW AUTO FILL FEATURE INOP ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.8 l PlR 3-88-168 3341 Yes No Yes No No No No No No FIRE SEAL NOT IN PLACE PART OF RECONCILATION l PIR 3-88-171 3341 Yes No Yes No No No No No No FIRE BOUNDARY PENETRATION NOT SEALED CONSTRUCTION ISSUE PIR 3-89-018 3341 4 Yes No No No' No No No No Yes C11 PROPER FIRE SEAL NOT INSTALLED PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 13220 33410 4 No No No No es Yes No No No FIRE DAMP ER TESTING NOT DONE NOT TESTED UNTIL SAFETY EVALS I l ACR 08568 3341A 4 Yes No No No NoNo No No No AS BUILT ERROR FOUND IN EDG SUPPRESION DRAWING MINOR DRAWING ORIGINAL ERROR 51
.m:.,~,..1. + .%y;gy :
Jurce Syn. Group .Qtg_ Mad Elcid Y_end _Qthat DE IS Ieit Other B.L EE Q A_C.R. N2 Desion _Qas Z00Z Deficency Notes ACR 08615 3341A 4 Yes No No No No No No No No WIRING ON SEC. TAMPER SWITCH NOT PER DRAWING CLARIFIED WIRING UNKNOWN 2 3341A 4 Yes .No No No No No No No Yes B10 FIREWATER P&id ERROR a P&lD= CAPS; PLANT USES 2 VLVS. UNKNOWN 2 3341A 4 Yes -No No No No No No No Yes B10 FIREWATER P&lD ERROR -( AR 9504995 3341C 4 No Yes No No DOWN No No No No No SIMPLEX RESTORATION ON CPU REBOOT ISEG REPORT PIR 3-92-331 3341C 4 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C11 s ORK IN CO2 AREA W/O PERMIT CO2 PERMIT NOT PICKED UP PIR 3-86-196 3341D 4 No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes B11 FIRE ZONE PANEL WIRING ISSUES ALARMS DISABLED PROC DEFICIEN PIR 3-91-130 3341D 4 No No No No No No No UNK No No FAILED HEAT DETECTORS TURBINE BLDG VALVES CAUSE UNKNOWN PIR 3-94-266 3341D 4 No No Yes No No No No No No FIRE SEALS MISSING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION PlR 3-94-200 3342 3 No No No No No No No No Yes B5 FUSE INCORRECT IN RCP MOTOR CKT FUSE CONTROL ISSUE ACR 10519 3343 3 Yes No No No No No No No Yes FSAR PROTECTION SETTINGS NOT SAME AS FIELDL SETTING START UP ISSUE 52
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I l oource Sya. Group .QIg_ Mad Einld _V_cnd Other DE IS _T_est 01her_ BL Eg n Un Deslan .Qps y Deficency Notes ACR 10525 3343 3 Yes No No No NoNo No No Yes l CABLE TRAY FILL NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR DESCRIP START UP ISSUE PIR 3-87-075 3343 3 No No No No DRIFT No Yes Yes No No 4160V BUS TRIP SETPOINTS LTS LIMITS 30 DAY LER . l PlR 3-88-199 3343 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO VITAL BUS LOADS 30 DAY LER PIR 3-89-015 3343 1 No No No No No No No No Yes B3 l FAULT CURRENTS > DESIGN VALUES PERSONNEL SAFETY ISSUE PIR 3-89-032 3343 1 No No No No No No Yes No Yes B11 l DUAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN SURV. MISLEADING DATA SHEET VG-111 3343 1 Yes No Yes No SETPO es No No GENER No Yes C1 CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEME RELATES TO SCR VIA PDCRs AND F VG-112 3343 1 Yes Yes Yes No FILL C es No No DESIG No Yes C1 K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA RELATES TO DISCREPANCY BETWE VG-142 3343 1 Yes Yes Yes No. FILL C es No No DESIG No Yes C1 CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS SAME AS VG-112 ON FILL CRITERIA VG-149 3343 1 Yes Yes Yes No SETPO No No No DESIG No Yes C1 ELECTRICAL PROTECTION CRITERIA NERMS AND FIELD SETT RELATES TO DISCREPANCY BETWE l ACR 07203 3344B 1 Yes No No No No No No No No BREAKER LABLES AT ODDS WITH ONE-LINE DAGRAMS AS BUILT DRAWING LABEL PROBLE l I 53
vq. iW+%MitMME? *** -?t W wpm.c 1 ( l .ource Sys Group dig _ Mad Eleid Yend Other D_E IS Ien.1 Other BL E.E ACR !. Ng Deslan _Qas ZaQI Deficency Notes ACR 09322 3344B 4 Yes No Yes No No No No No No NON SAFETY WlRING ERROR DRAWING ACR 09334 3344B 4 No No No No No No No- No No DRAWING ERROR PER FIELD CONDITION CORRECTED DRAWING VG-107 3344B 1 Yes Yes Yes No RELAT es No No OPERA No Yes INTAKE STRUCTURE SUMP PUMP PLUGGED INTO VITAL REC SIMPLE QUESTION ON CONTROL O VG-54 3344B 1 No No No No No No No No No i SAME AS VG-107 I PIR 3-93-228 3345 4 No No No No UNK No No No No No 410NG SIZE FUSE INSTALLED CAUSE UNKNOWN PlR 3-86-189 3345A 4 No No No No es No No No No LOSS OF INVERTER 6 POWER SUPPLY ISSUE ACR 06948 3345C 1 No No No No RIE No No No No No C7 MEPL DOWNSGRADE INAPPROPRIATE DUE TO SEPARATIONS ISOLATED ERROR ACR 12347 3345C 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 DISCREPANCY BEW/EEN OPS CRIT DRAWING AND FIELD CO NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ACR 12846 3345C 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes STATION BATTERY QUALIFIED LIFE EXPIRED EQ SHOULD NOT BE ISSUE FOR " MILD" NA 12139 3345C 1 No No No No No No Yes No Yes NOV BATTERY TESTING DEFFECIENCY TEST NOT LAW DESIGN REQUIREME 54
hy:s , , , ' y:: : '. W ap! l 1 source Sy.g. Group Q[9. M2d Elsid Vand Other DE IS les! OthP_E. Bk EE ACE. M2 Design Op_s IQ_QZ Deficency Notes PIR 3-90-089 3345C 1 Yes No No No No No No No No BATTERY GROUND ON LIMIT SWITCH CHANGED HYPOCHLORITE INS. PT. VG-104 3345D 4 Yes No No No BASIS es No Yes CAPAC No No IS BATTERY 6 CREDITED IS PSA ': : RELATES TO SAFETY IMPORTANCE VG-118 3345D 4 Yes No No No es No No ELEC. No No BATTERY 6 SURVEILLANCE METHOD QUESTIONED QUESTION RE ADAQUACY OF TEST ACR 00110 3346A 4 No No No No CAL E No No No No No "A" CDG INTERCOOLER TEMP INDIC REVERSED SENSING ELEMENTS REVERSED - A ACR 00722 3346A 4 No No Yes No No No No No No lA WORK DONE ON AWO SHORT FORM USED WRONG AWO FOR QA WORK ACR 00724 3346A 1 No No No No No No No BP NO No Yes SP COULDN'T BE DONE DUE TO MOD E&DCR MOD PERFORMED; SP NOT l ACR 00891 3346A No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 I OPS CRIT DRAWINGS NOT REDLINED STORAGE P&lDS, REDLINED, REPLA l ACR 01760 3346A 1 Yes No No No No No Yes No No B3 l SEQUENCER TIMING DISCREPANCY MAY NOT RECOGNIZE LOP SIGNAL ACR 02392 3346A 1 No No Yes No No No No No Yes WRONG FUSES INSTALLED IN BREAKERS STOCK CODE ERROR IN PART NUMB ! ACR 03628 3346A 1 Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes 89 FSAR OB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE CONFLICTS ON 5 START PARAMETE
.e.
55 l i
l
.p,;if ts e c' '
dource Syi. Group Qts. Most Eleid Yand Other DE IS Inst Other SL EE g Rg Deslan Ops Zqg7 Deficency Notes I ACR 10778 3346A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No FSAR DESCRIPTION HAS NO TOLORENCE ON JACKET WATER CLARITY ISSUE - REVISE FSAR E94-004 3346A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No VOLTAGE REGULATOR POTENTIMETER OPERATION ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.3.5 l l l IPE-95-011 3346A 1 No No No No es No No No Yes C* DIESEL STARTING AIR STUCK OPEN RUST FSAR SYS NOT USED j i MP 3-92-333 3346A 1 No No No No No No No PROC No Yes C11 EOC REClEVER NOT CROSS TIED l l l PIR 3-87-016 3346A 1 No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS MAINTENANCE ISSUE i l F l PIR 3-87-035 3346A 1 No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS 30 DAY LER PIR 3-88-207 3346A 1 No No No No No No Yes No Yes B11 ! EDG SEQUENCER RELAY TESTING INADEQUATE TESTS I PIR 3-91-161 3346A 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 , HX FOULED WITH MUSSELS INOP ; i 1 i PlR 3-91-167 3346A 4 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B5 l
"A" EDG INOP: LOW RECEIVER PRESSURE AIR COMPRESSOR MECHANICAL FAI i
PIR 3-91-184 3346A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No : EDG INOP - MUSSEL FOULING 56
aurce Sy.s_ Grmta Org_ Mo.d field Y_end Other DE IS Tgit Other BL PE ACE. Hg Deslan Qas IQDI Defleenev Notes PlR 3-92-333 3346A 1 No No No No No No No PROC Yes No 011 EDG RECEIVER NOT CROSS-TIED PROCEDURE COMPLIANCE PlR 3-94-012 3346A 4 No No Yes No No No Yes . No No GAGES INSTALLED WRONG SINCE S/U S/U ISSUE ON INITIAL TESTING PIR 3-94-016 3346A 1 No No No No es No No No No* EDG STARTING AIR DEGREDATION AIR DRYER NOT USED CONSISTENT PlR 3-94-108 3346A 1 No No No No es No No ~ No No* EDG KEEP RUNNING WHEN STOP SIGNAL GIVEN DIESEL AIR DRYERS NOT USED FOR PlR 3-95-036 3346A 4 No No No No No No No CAWR No No AGES REVERSED ON INTER COOLER TEMPERATURE INCORRECT CORRECTIVE ACTION
- E9&OO4 3346B 1 Yes No No No No No No - No No DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.4.1 PlR 3-86-211 3346B 1 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B3 SEISMIC EVAL QUESTIONED SQRT AUDIT DISCOVERY PIR 3-94-124 3346B Yes No No Yes- No No No No No C EDG FO XFER PP DID NOT START LEVEL SWITCH PROBLEM ON GOING PROBLEM SINCE S/U SWI VG-151 3346B 1 Yes Yes No No SETPO No No No DESIG No No EDG SETPO!NTS QUESTIONS ON RECENT PROBLEMS l
ACR 01862 3346C 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes DRAWING ERROR OPS CRIT SBO D/G DWNG BREAKER ON OPS CRIT DRAWING B 7 57
l 1 wppysy y n, . 9- ~' 'M- .
'Q g &.1;g-l l
.ource Sys. Group QIg. Mad Eteld McRd Other DE IS Inst Other B_L EE ACE.
I MQ Deslan _Qgs ZQQZ l Deficency Notes AR 9500914 3346C 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B5 SBO D/G VECTRA ISSUE CLOSE-OUT ISEG REPORT SIP-MP3-P-9 3346C 2 No No No No No No No No Yes C6 SBO DG - MEAL UPDATE NOT TIMELY QSD SURVEILLANCE ACR 01867 3367A 1 No No No No WRON NoNo No No Yes INCORRECT FUSE IN FUSE PANEL FUSE CONTROL ISSUE, PERSONNEL ACR 03269 33678 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 l INCOMPLETE INCORP OF CHANGES ON OPS FORM PDCR NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED ACR 0186S 3367C 1 No No No No BJ CO No No No No Yes
/ORK RELEASED CONFLICTED WITH BJ IN USE BJ NOT SHOWN ON OPS CRIT DRAW 8
ACR 02856 3398 1 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C2 DCNS SIGNED OFF W/O MOV ENGINEER REVIEW SIGNED OFF THROUGH FLS, W/O MO ACR 03555 3401 2 No No No No DATA No No No No No IMPROPER DATA ENTRY INCORE SURV. OPS SP 36023 ACR 06610 3401 2 Yes No Yes No No No No No No SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR LEVEL NOT PER DRAWING WRONG POWER SUPPLY CONNECT ACR 12495 3401 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C3 SETPOINT CALCULATION INADEQUATE IN THAT TURNOVER M PIR 3-68-104 3401 No No No Yes No No No No No POTENTIAL LEAKS IN CABLE ASSEMBLIES VENDOR FIELD PROC. NA TO f.1P3 58
i,:-;M QWV&.u'~ - aource Sys_ Gragg QIg_ Mod Eleid Mand Other DE IS Init Other BL EE ACR Hn Deslan Ops IQQZ Deficency Hates PlR 3-94-250 3401 No No No Yes es No Yes No No C* RCS FLOW XMITTER, OIL FILL MON!TORIN7 ROSEMOUNT NEED PLUS AS WELL A PlR 3-89-061 3402 4 Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes 311 CTMT PENETRATION LEAKAGE DURING ILRT FITTING LEAK PlR 3-90-115 3403 No No No Yes No No No No No MCC 32C HAS GROUND - ISOLATED COMPONENT FAILURE ACR 06637 3404 2 No Yes No No No No No No No C9 FSAR DOES NOT CORRECTLY DESCRIBE REEL MONITOR FUN FSAR UPDATE IN ERROR ACR 08584 3404 2 No Yes No No No No No No No 3YSTEMS WOULD NOT FUCNTION AS DESIGNED ISOLATED ERROR F ACR 08609 3404 2 No No No No No No No I&C No Yes C1 SETPOINT NOT TIMELY UPDATED FTFP - DIDNT USE PROCESS ACR 12850 3404 2 No Yes No No No No No No Yes C1 OPTICAL ISOLATOR CREDITED BUT NOT INSTALLED E&DCR CREDITED DEVICE l PIR 3-88-003 3404 2 Yes No No Yes No No No No No RAD MONITOR COMPUTER PROGRAM ERROR 10CFR21 NOTIFICATION l l PIR 3-89-065 3404 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B11 RAD MONITOR MIS-LABELLED IMPACTED SIMULATOR 1 PlR 3-92-354 3404 2 No No No No No No No PERS No Yes C11 WRONG VARIABLE RECORDED FOR FLOW PERSONNEL ERROR l l 59
l 4 _a. l J urgg SyS_ Group Org- Mad Einld Yend Other DE IS T_ cal Other BL P2 m MQ D211gn Qpa Zgg2 Deficency Notes ACR 10862 3405 1 Yes No No No No No No No No DRAWING DISCREPANCIES l PIR 3-90-064 3405 1 No No No No No No No YES No No - TEST CIRCUIT FAILURE SLAVE RELAY TESTING FAULTY PUSH BUTTON l l ACR 01761 3406 1 No No No No SPEC No No No No Yes B5 SPDS SPEC AND PROCESS COMPUTER CODES SPDS SPEC WAS NOT UPDATED AS ! ACR 06941 3406 1 No No No No No No No No No C10 NCR FOR NON-CONF STUDS FAILED TO ADDRESS MODE 4 & NCR PROBLEM PlR 3-86-218 3406 1 Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes C11 tTD LOOP TIME RESPONSE NOT MET INADEQUATE REVIEWOFVEND INF i# PIR 3-88-212 3406 1 No No No No No Yes No No Yes B11 TS SURV MAY NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS ESFAS RESPONSE TIME TESTING ACR 08561 3407A 1 Yes No No No No No Yes No No FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. F ORIGINAL MISSED ASSUMPTION OR ACR 08562 3407A 1 No No No No No Yes No No No FSAR ERROR IN RESPONSE TIME TESTING - CONFLICT WITH CONFLlCT BETWEEN TS AND FSAR l ACR 08614 3407A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No SETPOINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE CORRECTED ORIGINAL CONNECTIO ACR 08623 3407A 1 Yes No No No No No No No No NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINT ORIGINAL a-60 1
I l I f l Jurce Sy1. G mint .QIg. Mad EleM Yend Olher DE IS 1911 Other BL EE AGIL Ng Deslan _Qpa ID_QI Defleeney Notes QS-93-103 3407A 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes AWOS NOT REVIEWED PROPERLY QSD SURVEILLANCE OS-93-103 3407A 1 No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes C1 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL INSTALLED QSD SURVEILLANCE PlR 3-92-030 3408 4 No No No No No No No POWR No Yes B1 LOSS OF ANNUNCIATOR POWER TO MB-2 DEFECTIVE INVERTER ACR 08411 3410B 2 No No No No No No No No Yes B1 NCR DISPOSITIONED WITHOUT GENERATION OF BJ TO ENSU NO IMPACT TRACKING ISSUE - PPP ACR 10515 3412 No No No No No No No No No PM AS-BUILT CONDITION NOT ACCURATELY REFLECTED IN SETPOINT ALSO NON-CONSERVATIV I# PIR 3-91-202 3413 4 No No No Yes No Yes No No No OPERABILITY OF SEISMIC MONITOR l PIR 3-94-210 3413 No No No No es No Yes No No B* I SIESMIC MONITOR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA REVISED INCORR ACR 09362 3414 4 Yes No No No No No No No No MINOR DRAWING ERROR NO FUNCTIONAL IMPACT PIR 3-88-135 3415 No No No No No No No PERS No Yes C11 WORKED ON WRONG ISOLATOR CABINET PERSONNEL ERROR PIR 3-88-098 3416 Yes No No Yes No No No No No POTENTIAL FOR COMMON MODE ECC FAILURE COMPUTER RESET ISSUE - MINOR P l 61 L______-________-_-_____---_----____
up_utG2 EYli. O_tQ.up 919. MQd Ehld Vand Q1bar DE IS Inst Other. BJ. P_P. AC.H. No Deslan QRs ZaQI Deficency Notes E94-004 3466 1 Yes No No No No No No No No SSPS LOGIC CARDS NOT AS A SWITCH ISEG REPORT: SECT 5.2.11 ACR 12854 3720A 4 No Yes No No No No No No Yes B1 1&C BUILDING INADEQUATE POWER SUPPLY NOT BUILT PER SP-EE-076 ACR 02281 37208 4 No No No No No No Yes No Yes EMERGENCY LIGHTING TEST CRITERIA DEFICIENCY DOCKETED TESTS MAY BE INADEQU ACR 08820 3720B 1 No No Yes No No No No MAINT No No BTP 9.5.1 LIGHTS NOT AIMED PROPERLY NOT ALLIGNED AFTER MAINTENANC ACR 08790 39008 1 Yes No No No No No No No No RAWING AS BUILT ERROR NO FUNCTIONAL INPACT (LABELING) ~ PlR 3-92-031 39008 4 Yes Yes Yes No No No No Mo Yes C11 CHARGING PUMP ATTACHMENT PLATES REMOVAL PERSONNEL ERROR P!R 3-89-082 3900C 2 No No No No No No No No No SPENT FUEL BLDG INTEGRITY VIOLATED PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 04880 3900E 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes B1 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH - MISSING FIRE SEAL IMPORTANCE OF BOUNDARY UNKN l 1 ACR 04883 3900E 2 No No No No UNKN No No No No Yes SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH - MISSING FIRE SEAL SEE ACR 04880 ACR 04884 3900E 2 Yes No No No No No No No Yes B2 FIRE SEAL DESIGN INADEQUATE SEE ACR 04880 62 l
- v. a y aurce siy_s_ Group QIg- Mad Eleid Vnnd DJher DE IS Init Other Bl. EE ACE.
Mg Deslan Qas ZaQI Deficency Notes F!R 3-92-191 3900E 2 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 RED TAGGED VLV REMOVED FROM SERVICE PERSONNEL ERROR ACR 00455 3900H 2 No No No No MEPL NoNo No No Yes C6 . INCORRECT MEPL EVAL FOR CAT 1 SEISMIC STRUCTURE FSAR SHOWS A SEISMIC CAT 1 - ME ACR 08408 39001 2 No No No No No No No No Yes C11 SOME PMMS ERRORS IN NUCLEAR INDICATOR COULD RESULT IN AWO ERRORS
~
VG-109 3900K 2 Yes No No No BASIS es No No OPERA No Yes SWP CUBICLE WATER TIGHT DOORS QUESTION ON BASIS FOR 1 OR 2 DO l VG-954 3900K 2 No Yes No No es No No NO PM No Yes C1 DCR SAYS PMs TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR INTAKE SUMP PU MISSED HANDOFF FROM PDCR TO I 1 VG-55 3900K 2 Yes No No No FSAR es No No LINEUP No No SWP CUBICLE VENTILATION SYSTEM DO WE OPERATE SYSTEM PER FSA VG-74 3900K 2 No Yes No No TEST No No Yes PDCR No Yes C1 INTAKE STRUCTURE SUMP PUMPS QUESTION AS TO IF PUMP TESTED P PIR 3-87-029 3900M 2 Yes No No No No Yes No No No MSV BUILDING HIGH EQ TEMPERATURE 30 DAY LER
- ACR 07373 3900N 4 Yes No No No No No No No No TIRE SEAL MISSING ORIG CONSTRUCTION MISS ACR 02001 3960H 2 No No Yes No No No No No Yes C1 CONTROL RM BOUNDARY BREECH DURING SIMPLEX UPGRA CABLE SPREADING ROOM FIRE BAR
.p 63
eqw ;;z 1
,ource Sys_ Glqua QIg. Mad Einld Yend Other DE IS T_csi Other. B1 EE &QB_
Ng Deslan _Qas ZQQZ Deficency Notes l ACR 09354 N/A Yes No No No No No No No Yes C2 DRAWING DISCREPANCIES FOUND ISOLATED ERRORS IN PDCR AND DC ACR 09763 N/A No No No No No No No No Yes C9 HISTORICAL CONCERN FOR FSAR DEFICIENCIES SIMILAR TO CONDITION OF CONCERN ONLY ACR 10517 N/A No No No No No No No MAINT. No No HOIST AND T BEAM LEFT OVER BORIC ACID TANK NO FUNCTINAL INPACT TEMPORARY ACR 12321 N/A Yes No No No No No No No No MINOR DRAWING TYPO ERRORS NO CONSEQUENCE ACR 12516 N/A No Yes No No No No No No Yes RM UV LCO NON-CONSERVATIVE MISMATCH BETWEEN TRM AND TS l !# VG-114 NA NA No Yes No No No No No No Yes C9 HOW DOES ACR PROCESS ENSURE FSAR UPDATE PROCESS QUESTION RELATING TO VG-114-28-7 NA NA No Yes No No No No No No Yes C6 MEPL STATUS RELATIVE TO DOWNGRADES CURIOSITY QUESTION RELATIVE TO VG-116 NA NA No Yes No Yes OlM U es No No OlM UP No Yes VENDOR MANUALS NOT ADAQUATELY TRACKED PROCESS ISSUE FOR BOB COX PIEC VG-132 NA NA No Yes No No REVIE es No No DESIG No Yes C1 DCP DOESN'T REQUIRE SAR AND NRC COMMITMENT REVIEW RELATES TO DCM AND EXTENT OF VG-134 NA NA No Yes No No CHEC es No No DESIG No Yes C1 l NEW DCM ELIMINATES NEED TO CHECK-OFF NEED OR LACK RELATES TO DCM CHECKLISTS 64 l l l
s r '. l Jurce Sya. Group .QIg. En Deslan Mod Eleid Vand Other DE TH .Teit Other flL P2 AGE. _Qpa 10QZ Deficency Notes ! VG-147 NA NA No No Yes No es No No MAINT No Yes SCAFFOLDING NEAR VITAL EQUIPMENT SCAFFOLDING CONTROLS ISSUE VG-148 NA NA Yes No Yes No CONT No No No No No I BEAM OVER EQUIPMENT STARTUP AND CONSTRUCTION FEA VG-160 NA NA Yes No No No No No No No Yes C11 1 SHOULD OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS HAVE 50.59 EVALUA NRC/NU STRUGGLING WITH THIS VG-41 NA NA Yes No Yes No FIELD No No No OUALIF No Yes ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTER SHIPPING PLUGS RELATES TO QUALIFICATION OF TR VG-84 NA NA No No No No DBDPs No No No Yes No { BDP DESCREPANCIES AND BASIS FOR CLOSURE BASIS FOR CLOSURE QUESTIONED I r 65
D& - -
.c r i _ Doc Defic ncy 9 ACR 02228 VIOLATED DCN REQUIREMENT RE: CABLE SUPPORT ACR 02635 PLANT CHANGE INITIATED VIA DCN VS PDCR ACR ACR 02854 02856 DCN'S NOT PROCESSED PROPERLY MQ g TeCNS SIGNED OFF W/O MOV ENGINEER REVIEW -
ACR 02858 DCN ON DWST DID NOT LIST DOING AS OPS CRIT OCL M Mf ACR 07493 iDCN NOT OPERATED PROPERLY FOR VENT LINE J 9 I Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, Nsan, y, m .. . documents - screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. . Page 1 l -
e of we M gg
- 6:urra Doo Defifrncy ACR 01173 RCP TO GASKETS .
ACR 06941 NCR FOR NON-CONF STUDS FAILED TO ADDRESS MODE 4 & 5 OPERABILITY ACR 08411 NCR DISPOSITIONED WITHOUT GENERATION OF BJ TO ENSURE FUTURE CONNECTOR ACR 12862 MOV THRUST CALC REVIEW INCREASED RSS TEMP AR 95047693 INCREASE IN UHS TEMPERATURE ~ NRB4 PIRS CLOSED OUT BEFORE NCRS ARE CLOSED ON SAME ISSUE QS-94-086 NCR NOT PROCESSED CORRECTLY Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. Page 1
of. wo Lk
.,our:n_ Doc l Deficency ACR 02001 CONTROL RM BOUNDARY BREECH DURING SIMPLEX UPGRADE ACR_02228 VIOLATED DCN REQUIREMENT RE: CABLE SUPPORT ACR 08452 INCORRECT CABLE NUMNBER SPECIFIED IN'BJ ACR 08612 CWP BEARING TEMPARUTURE ELEMENT CABLES LANDED INCORR1:CTLY -
ACR 10525 CABLE TRAY FILL NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR DESCRIPT::ON ACR 10787 CABLES NOT IN ACR 12502 CABLE DOESN'T MEET FLAME RETARDANCY REQUIREMENT OF FSAR PIR 3-86-167 INSTRUMENT CABLE INSULATION FAILURE PIR 3-86-195 BREACH OF SLCRS BOUNDARY PIR 3-88-057 CABLE SEPARATION CRITERIA VIOLATION PIR 3-88-104 POTENTIAL LEAKS IN CABLE ASSEMBLIES PIR 3-89-o69 SFP BRIDGE CRANE CABLE BREAlb VG-100 CONTROLOTRON CABLE FIRE RATING VG-142 CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS
.i Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
Page 1 '
,7; * ' '
N1 - Defi"r ncY Sourc7 Doo ACR 01173 RCP TO GASKETS PERABILITY ACR 06941 NCR FOR NON-CONF STUDS FAILED TO ADDRESS MODE 4 & 5 OFUTURE CONNECTOR ACR 08411 NCR DISPOSITIONED WITHOUT GENERATION OF BJ TO ENSURE ACR 12862 MOV THRUST CALC REVIEW INCREASED RSS TEMP ' AR 95047693 INCREASE IN UHS TEMPERATURE NRB4 PIRS CLOSED OUT BEFORE NCRS ARE CLOSED ON SAME ISSUE QS-94-086 NCR NOT PROCESSED CORRECTLY 3
't
.5 S
Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. Page 1 .
" ~" - -*- -m-r _._ __ ,,
g K. 6/ /96 AWD source Doc l Deficency ACR 00110 "A" CDG INTERCOOLER TEMP INDIC REVERSED , ACR 00635 DESIGN CHANGE CANCELED - AWO LEFT OPEN i ACR 00722 QA WORK DONE ON AWO SHORT FORM ACR 01201 USED WP7NG AWO FOR VE-2 INSPECTION , ACR 01540 DIFFIdLTY IDENTIFYING AWO PKG REQUIREMENTS ACR 02706 GAS EOOS IV POOR CLOSED BEFORE AWO CLOSED ACR 02868 FLANGE "A" SW TRAIN INSTALLED W/O BJ ACR 02990 SW PUMP VALVE WOULD NOT STROKE OPEN ACR 08408 SOME PMMS ERRORS IN NUCLEAR INDICATOR , PIR 3-86-239 INSUFFICIENT TAGGING - EQUIPMENT CYCLED PIR 3-88-211 AWO WORKED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-92-025 AWO CANCELLED, TAGS CLEARED: JOB STILL WORKING PIR 3-92-026 AWO ACCEPTED WITHOUT RETEST AND TAG CLEARANCE i PIR 3-92-036 ' AWOS WORKED WITHOUT OPS AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-92-343 AWO RELEASED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-93-243 A W O W O R K E R W I T H O U T A U T H O R I'Z A T I O N PIR 3-94-193 RCP #3 SEAL LEAKOFF INSTALLED IMPROPERLY W /)PC QS-93-022 CHANGE IN AWO WITHOUT PROPER REVIEWS 7 QS-93-023 WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QS-93-028 WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QS-93-034 WRONG AWO TYPE USED TO IMPLEMENT PDCR QS-93-103 AWOS NOT REVIEWED PROPERLY QS-93-130 AWO PKG CONTAINED WRONG PROCEDURE SIP-MP3-P-95-0:RWO DEFICIENCIES (VARIOUS) - SIP-MP3-P-95-0:RWO DEFICIENCIES (VARIOUS) Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, .QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P- 1
f h -
- k. N 6/. 196
# M \1 Source Doc I Deficency ACR 02856 DCNS SIGNED OFF W/O MOV ENGINEER REVIEW ACR 02858 DCN ON DWST DID NOT LIST DOING AS OPS CRIT ACR 03013 MOV MOTOR TERMINAL BLOCKS NOT EQ QUALIFIED ACR 05276 CAUTION TAGS NOT REMNED FROM HEATERS
/ ACR 08317 MOV OPERATOR INSTALLED BACKWORDS ACR 10325 WIRE IN MOV CIRCUIT NOT LANDED ACR 12862 MOV THRUST CALC REVIEW INCREASED RSS TEMP N95-11 MOV CONTROL MOD NOT VERIFIED NSABE11 USE OF PDCR VS DCN V4 p4dl gf I '/f NSABE13 GENERIC VS SPECIFIC PDCR USAGE PIR 3-86-229 CIRC PUMP TRIP LOW LUBE WATER PIR 3-88-097 BLANK FLANGE REMOVED WITHOUT BJ AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-159 BJ GERDVBD WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-213 BJ RE50VJLL WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-89 2 BJ'S RIG (OV_ ND WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION j PIR 3-91-114 MISSED LLRT AFTER MOV TORQUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT
- PIR 3-92-191 RED TAGGED VLV REMOVED FROM SERVICE PIR ?-9?- m tsu MEEtuve;D
- PIR 3-94-243 MOV TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ERROR '
PIR 3-94-244 MOV BOLTING DISCREPANCIES 4
\ PIR-3-88-048 VALVE STEM ADAPTOR CAN DISENGAGE SELF -
VG-106 APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV13o VALVES /
"C 1E? .".O OIA"!:r.'.CM TMPLETELY REftOVJO- FROM OWST -
~
i L 1 i 2 1 Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents ' screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. i 1 1
jj L 6 f ,/96 3T5 STIN (a Source Doc Deficency ACR 04886 SP TESTING INCONSISTENT W/IST PROG. ACR 08561_ FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. FUlICTIONS ACR 08567. ACR 13220 FSAR ERROR IN RESPONSE TIME TESTING'- CONFLICT WITH "ECH SPEC FIRE DAMP ER TESTING NOT DONE NA 12139 NOV BATTERY TESTING DEFFECIENCY PIR 3-88-209 INADEQUATE TESTING - PROC. DEFICIENCY PIR 3-94-024 FW ISOL MAY HAVE DEGRADED WITHOUT BEING DETECTED PIR 3-94-128 NOT TESTING PER FSAR QS-93-119 VOTES TESTING SURVEILLANCE I, t I _t P 1
.3 h 6f /96 5S%
Source Doc l Deficency ACR 00294 AFW CK VLV NOT IN IST PROGRAM ACR 00455 INCORRECT MEPL EVAL FOR CAT 1 SEISMIC STRUCTURE ACR 01148 FSAR DOESN'T REFLECT NEW SITE BLDGS' ACR 02167 FSAR CHANGE APPD W/O SAFETY EVALUATION ACR 02304 BJ VIOLATED REG GUIDE 1.143 ACR 03628 FSAR OB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE ACR 04559 FSAR COMMITMENT NOT MET ACR 04877 DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DRAWINGS & FSAR ACR 06637 FSAR DOES NOT CORRECTLY DESCRIBE REEL MONITOR FUNCTION ACR 07214 MINOR FSAR ERRORS NOT AFFECTING-FUNCTION ACR 07363 FSAR DOES NOT REFLECT MODIFICATION CHANGES ACR 08561 FSAR IN ERROR ON RESPONSE TIME TESTING TIME SPEC. FUlICTIONS ACR 08562 FSAR ERROR IN RESPONSE TIME TESTING - CONFLICT WITH r?ECH SPEC ACR 08830 BACKLOG RESULTS IN FSAR AND OTHER PROGRAMS NOT BEING TIMELY UPDATED ACR 08838 FSAR NOT PROPERLY. TRANSLATED INOT CHEMISTRY CABLE
- ACR 08843 FSAR & TECH SPEC FLOW RATE NOT IN AGREEMENT ACR 08903 FSAR DOES NOT AGREE WITH NETM ACR 08907 DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FSAR AND CALCULATION ACR 09321 FSAR AND P&ID OUT OF DATE PER LATEST TSCR
% ACR 09763 HISTORICAL CONCERN FOR FSAR DEFICIENCIES SIMILAR TO IIP 1 h r ACR 10384 ACR 10519 FSAR-SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION DISCREPENCY FSAR PROTECTION SETTINGS NOT SAME AS FIELDL SETTINGS n
- f. ACR 10525 CABLE TRAY FILL NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR DESCRIPT::ON
/f yi. ACR 10539 FSAR NOT UPDATED PER PDCR f ACR 10778 FSAR DESCRIPTION HAS NO TOLORENCE ON JACKET WATER TRWERATURE IPE-95-011 g pg & _
DIESEL STARTING AIR STUCK OPEN RUST NSAB22 DIFFERENT EDG START TIMES: FSAR VS TS PIR 3-94-016 EDG STARTING AIR DEGREDATION g44:[g g PIR 3-94-060 AFW PIPING NOT SUPPORTED FOR HIGH ENERGY VG-111 CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT VG-112 K AND L SAFETY TRAY FILL CRITERIA VG-114 HOW DOES ACR PROCESS ENSURE FSAR UPDATE VG-142 CABLE TRAYS LOADED BEYOND FSAR LIMITS VG-55 SWP CUBICLE VENTILATION SYSTEM Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. i P 1 -
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.jy K.
6/ /96 TAWA Source Doc ! Deficency NA 12139 NOV BATTERY TESTING DEFFECIENCY NSAB11 DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS NOT IAW DESIGN BASIS PIR 3-86-151 RAD MONITOR SETPOINT DATA BASE CHANGE ERROR PIR 3-92-057 AVX CONDENSATE NOT SAMPLED IAW BJ Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. Pt 1 c I
, [$3 K 6/ )96 Source Doc
- muev Deficency ]
ACR 00455 INCORRECT MEPL EVAL FOR CAT 1 SEISMIC STRUCTURE f ACR 01149 CTMT EQT HATCH COMPONENTS NOT SHOWN AS CAT I l - a^- ACR 06948 MEPL DOWNSGRADE INAPPROPRIATE DUE TO SEPARATIONS REQUIREMENT ! N95-09 MEPL DOWNGRADE PROCESS P PIR 3-88-228 NON QA PARTS IN QA SYSTEM PIR 3-95-028 INSTALLED NON QA SEAL QA LISTED APPLICATION VG-114-28-72 MEPL STATUS RELATIVE TO DOWNGRADES Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. T 1 _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - - _ . - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . - _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . - - _ __.___._-_-._____________._____________,-----w= e6m____._._______ -_ _ _ _
jf 1 6,. /96 SC A P FO'-b Bource Doc l Deficency ACR 08442 ' SCAFFOLDING INSTALLATION DOESNT MEET SPECIFICATIONS ACR 10585 ':CAFFOLDING HAS POTENTIAL PROBLEM N95-07 CAFFOLD INSTALLED IMPROPERLY je (c. PIR 3-93-244 BJ REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION M VG-147 SCAFFOLDING NEAR VITAL EQUIPMENT i Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P 1 _ ._ - - _ _ _ _ - _. - _ - - - - _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ~' ' - ~ ~
& K. 6/. ,96 NM '
Source Doc I Deficency ACR 00294 AFW CK VLV NOT IN IST PROGRAM ACR 03264 CK VLV BACKLEAKAGE OVERHEATS AFW LINE ACR 03265 LEAKING AFW CK VLVS ACR 10774 AFW FCV ISOLATION CAPABILITY DEFICIENCY ACR 10780 TTAFW VALVE SHEET TO TEST MDAFWP ACR 10790 E94-004 TT & MDAFW PUMP PRE-LUBE NOT PERFORMED OER VENDOR.REQUIREMENY AUX FEED PIPE SUPPORTS:HELB ISSUE PIR 3-86-136 AUX FEED FLOW CAL FAILURE PIR 3-88-105 VENDOR NOTICE ON SCC ON AFWsPUMPS PIR 3-94-060 AFW PIPING NOT SUPPORTED FOR HIGH ENERGY . PIR 3-94-206 AFW TT COULD NOT BE TESTED /INCONSISTFETS VG-127 MDAFWP PRE-LUBE a e^ - I Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-thir ' the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P 1 g
,j$' K. 6/-.,96 SBo Bource Doc l Deficency ACR 01862 DRAWING ERROR OPS CRIT SBO D/G DWNG AR 9500914 SBO D/G VECTRA ISSUE CLOSE-OUT SIP-MP3-P-95-0(#EBO DG - Mi@L UPDATE NOT TIMELY Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approxinutely one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
P- 1 r.
y' K. 6/. /96 i i: L%Ni.h-Bource Doc t Deficency
- ACR 02990 SW PUMP VALVE WOULD NOT STROKE OPEN ACR 06286 WIRES NOT LANDED ON NON RETURN VALVE ACR 08612 ACR 09466 CWP BEARING TEMPARUTURE ELIMENT CABLES LANDED INCORR]:CTLY WIRE LANDED ON INCORRECT TERMINAL ACR 10325 WIRE IN MOV CIRCUIT NOT LANDED ACR 10532 WIRE LANDED ON INCORRECT TERMINAL ACR 10545 SPARE WIRE NOT LANDED PER DRAWING Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986 Pr 1
- ,gy K.
6/. /96 W 9S,l - Source Doo Deficency ACR 07746 APPENDIX R (BTP 9.5.1) NOT UPDATED TO REFLECT PDCR. ACR 08820 BTP 9.5.1 LIGHTS NOT AIMED PROPERLY QA-95-4043 BJs NOT EVALUATED AGAINST BTP 9.5.1' COMPATIBILITY 4 1 i 'w' Query based on search of 644 line entdes. These entdes consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P 1 CI
K. 6/. ,96 i Source Doc j Deficency ACR 00831 AO FLOW IN C CCP HX SW LINE ACR 01849 3CCPXP1A OUTBOARD AIR DEFLECTOR LOOSE ' i ACR 03293 AIR DEFLECTOR. LOOSE:CCP MOTOR
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ACR 07187 CCP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR DAMAGE ' ACR 08425 CCP PIPING TEMPERATURES LIMIT EXCEEDED NRB9 SYSTEM NOT OPERATED AS INTENDED PIR 3-88-152 TUBE LEAK ON CCP: INCORRECT RELIEF VALVE PIR 3-92-168 MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX - PIR 3-93-057 MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX s PIR 3-93-060 CCP VALVE EXCEEDED STROKE S IME LIMITS PIR 3-94-287 RUBBER PLUGS LEFT IN CCP HX FROM. 4 VG-111 CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT VG-92 CCP SYSTEM WALKDOWN ITEMS VG-94 CCP SYSTEM TEMPERATURE ISSUES - 1 I 1 i t 3 Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
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6/. /96 b?A36%Lh K - Deficency Bource Doc I ACR 04195 TRM ISSUE ON AUX BLDG HEATER AVAILABLE ACR 05742 MSIV TEST SOLENOID 4A FAILED ON SURVEILLANCE TEST ACR 06945 SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE NOT CONSERVATIVE NCE FLOW TEXT ACR 10548 ORIGINAL CALCULATION ERROR IN CALC USED FOR SURVEILLh UIREMENY TT & MDAFW PUMP PRE-LUBE NOT PERFORMED OER VENDOR REQ;URVEILLANCE NOT BEING PERFO ACR 10790 ACR 10803 PROCEDURE CHANGE RESULTS IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION !M CALCULATION ACR 11321 FAILURE TO DERIVE PROPER SURVEILLANCE LIMITS BASED O NA 12529 SURVEILLANCE ALLOWED TO LAPSE NSAB16 SURVEILLANCE CLOCK TRIGGERS ARE INADEQUATE PIR 3-91-101 TECH SPEC FLOW SURVEILLANCE TEST tPORATE ENG PIR 3-94-234 IST SURVEILLANCE NOT CONSERVATIVE WITH SUPPORT TO col VG-118 BATTERY 6 SURVEILLANCE METHOD QUESTIONED VG-127 MDAFWP PRE-LUBE
\l 11 t
Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist i of 100 l percent third of of A screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1 the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. 1
i :q.s
' A 6/ /96 LME.L t N G, Source Doc I Deficency ACR 00871 BREAKED. MIS-LABELING ISSUE ACR 07743 PDCR FAILED TO SPECIFY MCC LABELING UPDATES 4
Y d 1 8 Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to Januay 1,1986. i F 1
I.h K_ 6/_./96 Source Doc NMIMCk Deficency -' ACR 00223 BJ ATTACHED TO OPS CRIT DRAWINGS & NOT INSTALLED ., ACR 00871 BREAKER MIS-LABELING ISSUE ACR 00891 OPS CRIT DRAWINGS NOT REDLINED ACR 01862 DRAWING ERROR OPS CRIT SBO D/G DWNG ACR 04507 ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC DRAWINGS INEFFECTIVELY CONTROTT.en ACR 04561 CONTROLLED DRAWING DOCUMENTATION INADEQUATE ACR 04877 DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN DRAWINGS & FSAR ACR 04887 OPS CRIT DRAWING DOESNT REFLECT AS BUILT STATUS ACR 05196 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES ACR 06604 DRAWING DISCREPANCY RES. AS-BUILT CONDITION FOR RC S" AMP ELEMENTS ACR 06942 CONTAINMENT SUMP PUMP P&ID DRAWING CONFUSED ACR 07203 BREAKER LABLES AT ODDS WITH ONE-LINE DAGRAMS ACR 08568 AS BUILT ERROR.FOUND IN EDG SUPPRESION DRAWING ACR 08790 DRAWING AS BUILT ERROR ACR 08803 DRAWING DISCREPANCY ACR 09334 DRAWING ERROR-PER FIELD CONDITION ACR 09354 DRAWING DISCREPANCIES FOUND ACR 09355 MINOR DRAWING ERROR ACR 09357 MINOR DRAWING ERROR ACR 09362 MINOR DRAWING ERROR A ACR 09377 MINOR DRAWING DISCREPANCIES ACR 10356 MINOR P&ID DRAWING PHYSICAL LOCATION DESCRIPTION DISCREPANCY ACR 10532 WIRE LANDED ON INCORRECT TERMINAL ACR 10862 DRAWING DISCREPANCIES ACR 10864 DRAWING DISCREPANCY ' ACR 12321 MINOR DRAWING TYPO ERRORS ACR 12347 DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OPS CRIT DRAWING AND FIELD CONDI" ION ACR 63630 DESIGN DRAWING DISCREPENCY PIR 3-92-330 ONE LINE DRAWING HAS WRONG INFO PIR 3-95-005 DRAWING ERROR / LACK OF VERIFICATION SIP-MP3-P-96-0]QPS NOT USING GRITS FOR DRAWING REVS VG-146 DRAWING DISCREPANCY ON SERVICE WATER BACKWASH FEATURl: Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and' License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P- 1 4
jjp K 6/. /96 PDeL Source Doc I Deficency ACR 00633 PROJECT CLOSE-OUT DEFICIENCIES ACR 03269 INCOMPLETE INCORP OF CHANGES ON OPS FORM ACR 07344 PDCR RELEASED TO OPS NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED ACR 07743 PDCR FAILED TO SPECIFY MCC LABELING UPDATES ACR 07746 APPENDIX R (BTP 9.5.1) NOT UPDATED TO REFLECT PDCR ACR 09354 DRAWING DISCREPANCIES FOUND ACR 11321 FAILURE TO DERIVE PROPER SURVEILLANCE LIMITS BASED OH CALCULATIONS NSAB10 PDCR SAFETY EVAL DOESN'T ADDRESS USQ NSABE11 USE OF PDCR VS DCN NSABE13 GENERIC VS SPECIFIC PDCR USAGE PIR 3-86-160 INTERMITTENT GROUND PIR 3-86-229 CIRC PUMP TRIP LOW LUBE WATER PIR 3-92-192 EQ CONDUIT SEAL INSTALLATION INVALID PIR 3-95-007 HOOK VENTS INSTALLED ON UNSPECIFIED LINES SIP-MP3-P-95-O(HDCR GENERATION FROM BJ'S NOT TIMELY VG-106 APPENDIX R ISSUE WITH SWP*MOV130 VALVES f(, VG-111 CCP PROTECTION SETPOINTS DIFFER FROM FSAR STATEMENT g, VG-154 PDCR SAYS PMs TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR INTAKE SUMP PUMP 'g VG-74 INTAKE STRUCTURE SUMP PUMPS E E 21 Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, bacic to January 1,1986. F -1 _____ _ , + - , , __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
- h. 6/ _ .,/ 9 6 6L Bource Doc j Deficency ACR 00223 BJ ATTACHED TO OPS CRIT DRAWINGS & NOT INSTALLED ACR 01174 BJ INSTALLED WITHOUT AWO ACR 01179 GENERATOR PHASE IMBALANCE RELAY REMOVAL ACR 01866 WORK RELEASED CONFLICTED WITH BJ IN USE ACR 02304 BJ VIOLATED REG GUIDE 1.143 ACR 08317 MOV OPERATOR INSTALLED BACKWORDS ACR 08411 NCR DISPOSITIONED WITHOUT GENERATION OF BJ TO ENSURE FUTURE CONNECTOR ACR 09477 BJ CLOSE-OUT DID NOT CHANGE OP ACR 10163 INCORRECT VERSION OF BJ ATTACHED TO OPERATIONS CONTROL DRAWINGS ACR 10782 BJ REQUIRES OPERATOR ACTION YET NO PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR THIS ACR 10795 BJ DEFEATED AUTO START FEATURES IES.1 SOME SYSTEM ENGINEER NOT AWARE OF STATUS OF BJS AND PDCRS IES.3-1 BJ'S INCOMPLETE MODS AND A FEW CONTROLLED EQUIP INSTALLATION PIR 3-86-147 MAIN GENERATOR OVER VOLTAGE PIR 3-88-013 BJ INSTALLED.WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-087 TEMPORARY PUMP INSTALLED WITHOUT PAPER PIR 3-88-097 BLANK FLANGE REMOVED WITHOUT BJ AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-159 BJ REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-213 BJ REMOVAL WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-88-89 2 BJ'S REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-92-181 BJ NOT APPROVED IN 14 DAYS PIR 3-93-217 FOREIGN OBJECT IN CORE SUPPORT PLATE PIR 3-93-244 BJ REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION PIR 3-94-070 BJ REVIEW NOT CONDUCTED QA-95-4043 BJs NOT EVALUATED AGAINST BTP 9.5.1 COMPATIBILITY
- SIP-MP3-P-95-0CHDCR GENERATION FROM BJ'S NOT TIMELY SIP-MP3-P-96-0$1lLT RESTORATION NOT PER PROCEDURE l SIP-MP3-P-96-02 HILT RESTORATION nOT PER PROCEDURE I
Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
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i f,-{3 i._ 6f .d/96 M SIV 7 Source Doc I Deficency ACR 01821 "A" MSIV FAILURE TO OPEN ACR 05742 MSIV TEST SOLENOID 4A FAILED ON SURVEILLANCE TEST ACR 06322 MSIV ZERO CLOSED POSITION INDICATION QUESTIONED AR 9500515 MSIV STROKE TIME PROBLEMS
- PIR 3-87-072 MSIV STROKE TIME EXCEEDS TS LIMITS PIR 3-94-010 MSIV PARTIAL STROKE TIME PIR 3-94-115 "C
- " MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PIR 3-94-157 "C" MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PIR 3-94-185 'C' MSIV FAILED CLOSED PIR 3-94-207 MSIV TS INADEQUATE TO SUPPURT MODE CHANGE PIR 3-94-282 'C' MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE PIR 3-94-284 MSIV PART STROKE FAILURE Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents _
screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of
, the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
T 1
.1 ,,18/96 Source Doc _
Deficency E94-004 MUSSEL FOULING; HYPOCHLORITE SYSTEM DESIGN PIR 3-91-161 HX FOULED WITH MUSSELS INOP PIR 3-91-162 HX FOULED WITH MUSSELS INOP PIR 3-91-170 "B" HX INOP: MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-91-171 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-91-172 "C" HX INOP: MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-91-184 EDG INOP - MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-92-168 MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX PIR 3-93-057 MUSSELS FOUND IN CCP HX ' Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. 1 . L
.1 .,18/96 R.c9 _
Source Doc l Deficency ACR 01173 RCP TO GASKETS ACR 06336 D RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKING , ACR 07266 RCP SEAL BOLT DEGREDATION I93 RCP STANDPIPE LEVEL CONTROLED BY CTMT ISOL N9507 SLCRS INOP ROOF PLUG REMOVED
- PIR 3-88-007 RCP OIL COLLECTION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION INADEQUATE
- PIR 3-88-094 RCP TURNING VANE BOLTS CRACKED
, PIR 3-93-240 MISSED RECEIPT; INSPECTION RCP MOTOR
- PIR 3-93-242 RCP INTENALS PAPERWORK MISSING
! PIR 3-94-137 RCP TVCS-SEABROOK INFO ] PIR 3-94-193 RCP #3 SEAL LEAKOFF INSTALLED IMPROPERLY PIR 3-94-200 FUSE INCORRECT IN RCP MOTOR CKT ! UNKNOWN 1 FAILED TO GET ANTI SIGNATURE ON AWD FOR RCP SEAL HOU!IING EOLT REPLACEMENT j UNKNOWN 1 FAILED TO GET SIGNATURE ON AWD FOR RCP SEAL HOUSING BOLT REPLACEMENT 1 i 4 I Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent ofACRs,.PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of . , the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. J ;
- j,
.r P 1 1
K1 w/18/96
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EQ Source Doc l Deficency ACR 01162 EQ LEVEL SWITCHES NOT REPLACED ON TIME ACR 03013 MOV MOTOR TERMINAL BLOCKS NOT EQ QUALIFIED ACR 07337 LOSS OF CENTRAL OF EQ MASTER LIST ACR 08903 FSAR DOES NOT AGREE WITH NETM ACR 12339 EQ 10 YEAR EQUIPMENT INSPECTION MISSED PIR 3-87-029 MSV BUILDING HIGH EQ TEMPERATURE PIR 3-87-054 LOCAL TE-77 CTMT EQ TEMP >TS LIMIT PIR 3-88-054 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EQ REQUIREMENTS _ , PIR 3-88-057- CABLE SEPARATION CRITERIA VIOLATION PIR 3-88-060 VARIOUS SWITCHES NOT EQ QUALIFIED PIR 3-88-061 INCOMPLETE -EQ QUAL PACKAGES . _ .
)
PIR 3-88-091 CONTAINMENT EQ TEMP HIGH FOLLOWING UNIT STARTUP PIR 3-88-129 CONTAINMENT' TEMP ABOVE EQ LIMIT - PIR 3-88-153 CONTAINMENT EQ TEMP PROFILE'WAS TOO CONSERVATIVE PIR 3-90-088 EQ TEMPS NOT' RECORDED ON ROUNDS PIR 3-92-171 WRONG MATERIAL FOR PORV GASKETS PIR 3-92-192 EQ CONDUIT SEAL INSTALLATION INVALID PIR 3-94-005 RCS RTD TEMP HIGHER THAN ASSUMED IN EQ LIFE t Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents a screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. 1
' .1 18/96 E.%
Deficency Source Doc i ACR 03628 FSAR OB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE ACR 05193 EDG ALARM SETPOINT NOT CHANGED ON TIME ACR 08568 AS BUILT ERROR FOUND IN EDG SUPPRESION DRAWING I93 PLANT ENGINEERS DID NOT PURSUE EQUIP PROBLEMS, QUEST"ONING ATTITUDE NSAB22 DIFFERENT EDG START TIMES: FSAR VS TS PIR 3-87-016 EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS PIR 3-87-035 EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS PIR 3-88-207 EDG SEQUENCER RELAY TESTING PIR 3-91-167 "A" EDG INOP: LOW RECEIVER PRESSURE PIR 3-91-184 EDG INOP - MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-92-179 "A" EDG EXPANSION JOINT FAILURE PIR 3-92-333 EDG RECEIVER NOT CROSS-TIED PIR 3-94-016 EDG STARTING AIR DEGREDATION PIR 3-94-108 EDG KEEP RUNNING WHEN STOP SIGNAL GIVEN PIR 3-94-124 C EDG FO XFER PP DID NOT START LEVEL SWITCH PROBLEM ' VG-151 EDG SETPOINTS Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, screened to be relevant to Design and Ocense basis issues from May 15,1996 back t the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. e1
. .d
al us18/96 S Lc 9_S _ Source Doc j Deficency ,, ACR 04880 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH - MISSING FIRE SEAL ACR 04883 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH - MISSING FIRE SEAL 192 ENGINEERING TIMELINESS, NOTES SLCRS' DEFICIENCY NOTED IN 1985 I93 SLCRS WORK AROUND ON FAN STARTS REDUCING AVAILABILITE OF FANS IMA2 EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS REQUIRE OPERATES. COMPENSATORY ACT::ON N9507 SLCRS INOP ROOF PLUG REMOVED PIR 3-86-155 SLCRS BACKDRAFT DAMPER FAILURE PIR 3-86-195 BREACH OF SLCRS BOUNDARY PIR 3-86-246 SLCRS FAILED SURVEILLANCE PIR 3-91-108 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACHED WITHOUT AWO PIR 3-91-158 "A" SLCRS FILTER FAILS FLOW. TEST PIR 3-91-166 BOTH SLCRS FILTERS OOS: FIRE DAMPER REPAIR PIR 3-92-052 SLCRS BOUNDARY BREACH Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. P 1
?.:
I .1 ,18/96 MFL.R.c.T C E Source Doc I Deficency ACR 03293 AIR DEFLECTOR LOOSE:CCP MOTOR ACR 01849 3CCPXP1A OUTBOARD AIR DEFLECTOR LOOSE ACR 071.87 CCP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR DAMAGE t Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent ofACRs, PIRs, NOVs, NSAB, QAS etc. documents screened to be relevant to Design and License basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approximately one-third of the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986. I 1 R : _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ - - - - ' ~ ' ~ " ' ' - ~ ~ - - ~
kJ. ,18/96 6% _ Source Doc ' Deficency ACR 03628 FSAR OB ISSUE; EDG STARTING AIR PRESSURE ACR 05193 EDG ALARM SETPOINT NOT CHANGED ON TIME ACR 08568 AS BUILT ERROR FOUND IN EDG SUPPRESION DRAWING 193 PLANT ENGINEERS DID NOT PURSUE EQUIP PROBLEMS, QUEST::ONING ATTITUDE NSAB22 DIFFERENT EDG START TIMES: FSAR VS TS PIR 3-87-016 EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS PIR 3-87-035 EDG START TIME > 10 SECONDS PIR 3-88-207 EDG SEQUENCER RELAY TESTING. PIR 3-91-167 "A" EDG INOP: LOW RECEIVER PRESSURE PIR 3-91-184 EDG INOP - MUSSEL FOULING PIR 3-92-179 "A" EDG EXPANSION JOINT FAILURE PIR 3-92-333 EDG RECEIVER NOT CROSS-TIED PIR 3-94-016 EDG STARTING AIR DEGREDATION PIR 3-94-108- EDG KEEP RUNNING WHEN STOP SIGNAL GIVEN PIR 3-94-124 C EDG FO XFER PP DID NOT START LEVEL SWITCH PROBLEM VG-151 EDG SETPOINTS Query based on search of 644 line entries. These entries consist of 100 percent of ACRs, P!Rs, NOVs, NS screened to be relevant to Design and license basis issues from May 15,1996 back to January 1,1994, and approxi the PIRs from Dec. 31,1993, back to January 1,1986.
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ATTACHMENT D UNIT SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS QU/.LIFICATION RECORD Employee (or contractor) Name: _\(m Mgofu SSN: Project Lead: Ggggg p f.7 % TASK o Conduct the Unit Specific Self-assessement in Accordance with the Unit Specific Attachment of the CMP PREREOUISITES (Attach resume if not an NU Emnfoyee)
- 1. Education: B.S. in engmeering or science; exceptions may be made based on extensive experience in Nuclear Operations /Enginceing (note 1). _ _r.
- 2. Experience (with B.S.): mmimum 5 years in nuclear industry Nuclear Operations /Enginecing.
TYPICAL PROJECT REQUIREhENTS (Individual qualifications based on task assis >ent) REFERENCE MATERIAL TO BE REVIEWED Degree of Review Review Completed Required (Note 2) g 2 N/A Initial 1
- Tratatag Overview and Introduction AntND Date PI-2 Unit Specific Self assessments X M g//g /q/,
' PI-I4 Configuration ManagementPlan Project Administration X M(hD
' d//i/QA X
- Instruction fa '
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ll#40 EJO/46 N:tes: C ~ (1) Education Pre-Requisite
'Ihe Project Lead shall provide the exception reasons when needed.
(2) Degree ofReview 1. Understand & Demonstrate (Project Lead or designee shall initial and date completion) 2. Read to have general understanding (Individual shall initial & date completion) N/A Item is available for individual information as situation permits. l 44, I S/16/96 L
UNIT SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS QUALIFICATION RECORD Employee (or contractor) Name: dAR< (AM nut V SSN: '
.-roject Lead: fgm hmw t IAS.K o .
Conduct the Unit Specific Self-assessement in Accordance with the Unit Specific Attachment of the CMP PREREOUISITES (Attach resume if not an NU Employee)
- 1. Education: B.S. in engineering or science; exceptions may be made based on extensive experience in Nuclear Operations /Enginecing (nogl).
- 2. Experience (with B.S.): mmimum 5 years in nuclear industry Nuclear Operations /Engineeing. i TYPICAL PROJECT REQUIREMENTS (Individual qualifications based on task assigc ent)
FERENCE MATERIAL TO BE REVIEWE{ Depse of Review Review Completed Required (Note 2) 1 2 N/A Initists Date Ining Overview and Introduction AzuND X Unit Specific Self assessments Ed H g//L/Q4, X Wi/O .T /' /-J/4 g
- .4 Confiauration Management Plan Project Ad ninistration X ~ ' ' '
i ruction A ^ n w .J VL= . Gzo 5//L /4t, i AA . L .im.A l - m z d E A Nb ' N
~
X M s/n/4/,
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g., Education Pre-Requisite The Project Lead shall provide the exception reasons when needed. (2) Degree of Review 1.
- 2. Understand & Demonstrate (Project Lead or designee shall initial and date completion)
Read to have general understanding (Individual shall initial & date completion) N/A Item is available for individual information as situation permits. l l a i , t 5/16/96 I
i I
. :;w&Wyn x :, . . .
ATTACHMENT E PERSONNELINTERVIEWED AS PART OF PI 2 PROCESS C. J. Ashton -- Current MP3 Mechanical Engineering Design Engineering Supervisor R. A. Andren -- Current MP3 Manager, Design Engineering , J. Harris -- Original Unit Engineering Manager D. McDaniel -- Former MP3 Unit Engineering Manager and Current Rx. Engr. Supervisor J. Ruttar -- Current MP3 Shin Manager _ S. Lawhead - Current MP3 Shin Manager M. B. Brown - Original MP3 I&C Supervisor and Current Millstone Oversight Dirsctor D. Deane -- Current MP3 Electrical Design Supervisor R. Standish - Current MP3 Mechanical / Civil Design Supervisor M. Dolishney -- Current MP3 I&C Supervisor D. Asay -- Current MP3 I&C Engineer - J. O'Brien -- Current MP3 Generation Test Supervisor L B. Roy -- Current MP3 Maintenance Manager S. Heard -- Former MP3 Procedure Writer D. C. Gerber - Former MP3 Mech / Civil Des. Sup. and Current Mgr., Tech. Support T. J. Mawson - Current MP3 NSSS Systems Supervisor
- G. Swider -- Current MP3 Service Water System Engineer R. DeConto -- Current MP3 Mechanical Design Engineer J. Petrosky - Current MP3 Mechanical Engineer P. Privizzini -- Current MP3 Electrical Maintenance Supervisor -
M. Hess -- Former MP3 Unit Engineering Supervisor and Current AFW System Engr. L. Loomis -- Current MP3 ISI Engineer R. Broullier - Current MP3 HVAC/ Support Systems System Engineer A. Silvia -- Current NUSCo Welding Engineering t i
( i ATTACHMENT E (Note that this form is marked up to depict average response score.) MP3 UNIT-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF CONFIGURATION STATUS, PER PROJECTINSTRUCTION 2 TO THE CMP PERSONNEL INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE Intewiewee's Name Date ofInterview Interviewer's Name(s) Interviewee's Current Position Intewiewee's Past Position (s) having relevance to PI 2 issues i NOTE The following questions are intended to tap the full knowledge gained over the full period of experience of the interviewee. Responses need to reflect past as well as current practice. If useful, provide two ratings with past practice first and current practice last. , I) On a scale of 1 to 5, (1 being " poor" or " low" and 5 being " excellent" or "high") how l would the Interviewee rate himself and/or MP3 relative to the following? I A. Familiarity with/use of FSAR I i l a) your understanding of why MP3 has a FS AR _3.73/4.36_(1986/1996 or year i of assignment to MP3)
- b) your frequency of use of the FSAR _2.71/3.24 l c) your knowledge of when to consult the FSAR _2.81/3.90 l B. FSAR Integrity 1
a) in terms of accuracy _3.79/3.79 l b) in terms of clarity _3.68/3.89 l c) in terms of completeness _3.74/3.68 C. Translation of FSAR into Departmental Procedures & Surveillances I i g a) quality of department procedures relative to FSAR-described l l assumptions _3.06/3.69 b) quality of surveillances relative to FSAR-described assumptions _3.07/3.79
aw D. Maintenance of FSAR a) familiarity with process changes resulting in need to revise FSAR _3.06/3.67 b) thoroughness, timeliness and consistency ofinterviewee's actions to correct FSAR upon discovery of errors _2.82/3.94 E. Impact of FSAR on Interviewee's Work Activity P a) awareness of FSAR impact on his work activity _3.15/3.75 b) awareness of his work activities impact on FSAR _3.16/3.89 F. Ability to establish the license basis for a particular system attribute a) Rate the ease with which establishing the license basis is accomplished _2.94/3.43 b) Rate yourself relative to your consistency in exploring the license basis prior to modifying the design or operating characteristics of plant systems _3.57/4.0 II. Answer the following questions as succinctly as reasonably possible. (Note that the answers to the following questions were essay type and of wide variation. The Team will retain a loose leaf binder of questionaires wherein responses can be reviewed by the appropriate parties upon request.) A. What documents do you believe form the license basis for MP37 B. What does the term, Design Basis mean to you? C. In the conduct of your work assignments, do you have the occasion to review portions of the unit's FSAR, and, if so, describe these? D. How do know what sections of the FSAR to read?
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l l E. What do you do when you find an FSAR problem? ( l F. Explain how you would establish the license basis prior to designing a l modification to the unit or change the manner in which a system is operated and/or i tested. ; 1
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l - G. Changes in Work Habits With Respect To use of or respect for the FSAR l a) Has anything occurred to change how you deal with the FSAR b) Describe that change and the reasons for it H. Do you know of areas potentially susceptible to the types of problems which ; have led to the current shutdowns of all three Millstone Units? i l l l , l \ i i w
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O., h(Audwra A<irtos Musv tcBwec,jeg gfg OTHER ISSUES FROM S0.54 FINTER VIEWS. S/8/96-S/15/96
- In the 1986-1990 time frame, both on and of site engineering groups perfonned cales. Here was no [
4e enmmon , index. Efforts by one group may have invalidated another's work, and neither may have been
- g. .i compared to FSAR assumptions. We need a method to verify old calc. input per FSAR assumptions, I Tw @cce, and to ensure there is only ONE index available for cales. . :
l
- Assess the impact of other cales, on radiological cales.
Initial tech spec reviews were fast paced. He link between TS changes and the FSAR may be tenuous. WEam fasc e It's difHeult to review the FSAR and see where a!! changes to a given system carry tghro g g
- Contractor groups brought on site are typically charged to perform a narrow scope of work, without cur looking at what else is impacted by their work. Hey do not typically look at FSAR impacts, and do not p
appreciate the impact of their work on our license bases. For example, PEG , a non-engineering group,
. brought in a contractor (NES) to do MEPL reviews. NES did as directed. However, in sleast one' area, MMM -
the letdown line, NES performed a MEPL evaluation downgrading this line based on linylted criteria. hd his violated the unit license basis, which credited this line for actions beyond those NES reviewed for. g U"f^ L r e here is no easy way to retrieve and understand licensing commitments, and how they were satisfieg bQ.d4 e Ensure the 50.54f review addresses FSAR section 3.6 figures and the stress data package-we may have lost control of revisions in this area. ~ 4 '
=
%'^9t.+vlS l Consider improving the clarity of the FSAR relative to tl(e effects of the LNP on electrical distribution a- {~M ;
systems and how the electrical distribution system operates.
- Diesel generator air start issue: what is really the design basis of the system, i.e.,5, starts from full pressure, or ?? Also, what constitutes a single failure for the diesel air start system?
e RHR Valve V-43 can inop both trains of RHR we credit operator action to preclude this-review. 4
=
FSAR Chapter 9 addrepes Radwaste and aux. systems, including ventilation, which should bepqm gg,,,,, g reviewed as part of thisf4t).54f effort, jg e High humidity issue for the Switchgear Room Ventilation system g,3w,j w g ' Electrical Specification #321 is being re-written again, but is not adequately used. g M e Review the TS surveillance program line by line,just like the FSAR is being reviewed. Establish a I42, gf master tracking index for surveillances, which matches each TS to an ops form number and acceptance criteria in TS. I D
= Formerly, licensed personnel reviewed changes to surveillance. Now we used non licensed people.
Have we dropped any TS required s or changed the intent of any surveillance inadvertently? e There should be an auto clock system on surveillances, so all are done on time.-qwhg , 14/L e Were narrow range containment pressure instruments and channels deleted in error in 1990-19917 - Fs % bu.w
*- In 1993, was the technical requirements review non conservative, so some requirements were deleted in y as error?
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We may have violated the FSAR about 1991, when we changed the heating system, for the charging pump area irrihe boric acid system. Power was supplied form four breakers via a bypassjumper-these g%
%L. breakers supplied emergency power for the fuel b!dg. ventilation system per the FSAR. Despite FSAR WA.
words, this change happened anyway. I believe the breakers were credited in accident analysis. MP-3 initially based its Ops, I&C and Maint. procedures based on draft Tech Specs. Later, these procedures were revised to reflect final TS. Could information have been lost in translation between gkky draft and final TS? e ~ The quality of annual FSAR updates may have suffered when most were grouped toward the April-June time frame, versus being spread out more over the year. Cg.Jg e All FSAR reviews initially had engineer-supervisor-manager reviews initially; they do not now get this level of review. das q e Initially, Jim Crockett and Carl Clement timtto see bases information when PDCEs were proposed by new engineers. nis action resulted in few QA audit findings. Over time, it wasn't pursued. g]g e ne drop offin Stone and Webster support after the unit went commercial was significant. Here was no contingent of experienced engineers, who grew up with MP-3 left on site (for economic issues) to resolve backlog. nere was a notedloss in continuity and design basis information due to this action. We may want to review the_open items work list when S&W list and test how well it was dispositioned. M80 7 I
- Review E&DCR logs irfthe time from le- 19RS-micf-1986.1)ue Av + c1Ir C.f@ Scott *McMWQ?U 6 to startup pace, there may be a b.T@Ef>{
vulnerability in major design changes in the E&DCR logs, which should be reviewed. nere was no firm design authority in place in the post commercial operation days. Here were lots of MP-Berlin telecons for doing work then. His may ba a veemht ped for FSAR integrity WRT design change process. 8, dou e n<d dr495- eyecq,,9 , Flg
- Review the process as we changed over from E&DCRs; DCRs; and DCNs for gaps and or Qp M%
vulnerabilities. gy The radwaste area may have systems credited for use in the FSAR which have been taken out of - M. We need to first update drawings by deleting such equipment from them, then update theb py" FSAR. We still lack the resources to do this, so it becomes a low priorityjob and gets pushed off. gp ke Add GL-89-10 to the DCR checklist h gg3 g
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Address abandoned systems canem!1vlVRJFSAR status - p + W % cer k t-- e Design Engineers need better training for the SPECIFIC systems they work with, somewhat like SEI trainmg, but not as detailed. - ' d gg h e Review the adequacy of system - -- and stress data packages. 7 e Commitments are still not tracked effectively. It's Ulflicult to find out T is open out there. G P4h-
= We need mole resour& Y cc vL C Q ces in programs like Appendix R and MEPL. Q3p i
l e Review the EDGF secuencer mndt perfumed by I&C late in startup-they may be at odds with the i e e W Look at ventilation systems vs. FS A't.
- ,j 4
o L Q,Q '_t 4_Atw. recA,,,,,h A.9 Review information on how S&W interfaced ,ith outside vendors on desien issues (EDG secuen&r; RSS; QSS). g g 4 , o We are overly conservative in doing simple mods., i.e., hinging grating requires a PDCR. ne process l
- hould be made less complex in less critical areas.
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- Re ACR process has too low a threshold, and significantly impacts SEs. Ohgc Welding gas piping (oxygen, acetylene) is largely still in place in containment post constmetion days. [-/m .e Does this impact FSAR assumptions?.
g
. Simplify the Work Control process. 6 buy O hg , cp
- Train Engineering on how to use the FSAR.
pd g Leave SEs in place long enough to learn their systems. Qdg
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Put more SEs in place. The work load is too heavy for sorne SEs. \hrd.e ; Design changes done under the unit organization may not be properly captured in drawing updates. ' Some examples include:: turbine b!dg. instrument cal shaiw installed withoutprawings; ana ugnting/ fire protection syrtem upT;rades'in the I&C shop. s%g / g d l4Sy S d GAN , a Non safety related drawings were not aTwif" s upaatea wacu equipment was changed out, Le., by Chemistry and I&C. nere was a laclq of attention to detail here. -- Here was a Level B ACR written for lighting and distribution panels and ops critical drawings, as hL researched by a task force. Ops is not confident in killing power to some of these loads. He issue is not looked at very well due largely to econornic impacts. yg Five years ago, management seemed to mandate the need for accuracy in work, like PDCRs. Now, thei - same feeling isn't there. M L I e
%e rad monitor logic changes fixed the paperwork issues, but are not consistent with the FSAR.
g = Westinghouse plans for Post Accident Monitoring are not compatible with a RG 1.97 graded approach. Backlog may contain issues waitiag to get u] yhc q e Our culture has changed negatively. One time, there was a good focus on meeting Tech Specs.' 9ev (M e We did not train personnel effectively in the licensing basis for the um rom Guer trT\ o We erred in cutting experienced SEs from the payroll post startup in 19[ d wb c Time has since not allowed new SEs to come up to speed. Rey respond to day to day fire &p h o Se area is understaffed. Unit engineering was understaffed from 1986-1993.
- e ,
Plant engineers did desinn chances. WITHOUT receiving any training in design and licensing basis during the whole backlog time frame. L c 4g6 rWW $ i l Long term use of Bypass Jumpers, coupled with engineer training issue g c I nni- 1tr !"/AC o _MWe are actually onerated vs. how they are desinned to onera!c6Sm . UYt(typically operate at loads much lower than their accident design loads, which impacts g their long ! term operation, i.e., HVQ equipment for the RSS cubicle. 3N , o Review issues like RSS and determine their generic root cause applicability to other MP-3 systems.. Vi o d.crwf L4Y\ Workload precludes SEs from taking time to get a thorough knowledge of the FSAR and design and licensing basis for their systems in many cases] g c u .. o he SE is supposed to be the focal point for system questions. However, some groups are allowed to s interpret TS or FSAR sections without working with the SE. Recommend the SE be used as the true _ hWO
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focal point to provide a standard interpretation of the FSAR, to avoid confusion. For example, was a FSAR Interpretation by Engineering that FSAR words " Start another SW pump" to rest cooling meant that no SW pump could be taken out of service for maintenance. NU be issue, at a cost of about $400,000. A quick call by the SE and licensing to the NRC indica interpretation went BEYOND system design bases, and precluded the need to spend e The lack of a central repository for historical cales, design information, etc. is e Backlog issues impact daily workloa e M{ possibility exists that such comniitments can beginadverten . researched actions. One engineer researched a series of valves proposed for deletion fro program (3-MSS-MOV-18A through D) via PRA and the FSAR. PRA indicated N these va credited in PRA analyses, and could be deleted without safety impact to the unit. A 1_ indicated these valves also were NOT credited in' ves the FSAR. A chanc addressed by what amounted to a " hidden" licensing co maintained in the ISTprogram, s, 1 e addressing FSAR impact. ' Ibis practice was based pn a PO correlation between the FSAR and department prbeedures and surveillances. *
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- v Descriptions documents are occasionally at odds with the FSAR. g Eva J
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j- ATTACHMENT F 3 Adverse Condition Report ACR# ansnjittal Sheet
/3 m Apprwed By: - _
j SORC#: fS-+6 Effeethe Date: // 9 # mmary ACRInformation
, MM/ L AcR -te hdacua 6duti % c% O-1 Alt (s)affected bythis ACR: D MP3 O MP2 gMP3 Q MPSite: O other:
Mg Famers __. Eeywords: -
"%3tjon Resointion:
'A ; <* Ikrn , W 11\ .
GCN A 47 G W,; fMr' M W ; ciy46 _ A A9t t_X 5 A ; O F M A mat LCR Significance Level: OA [BS D C D D
- oding Pamers Codes:
l l Ta!)ure Mode Code (s) Failure Cause Code (s) Euma: Performance / Programmade Cause Code (s) ' l l 1 _ O N!A C N/A C N/A iribution List O Pre Investigation Q Post-Closure Transmittal Transmittal Name Organization Leestion Code A/R Number
?1WW TUAWLN 70%7OA -
W- 4 ' (.fcA 9MtoG QA M inuusior)
- Ik< -S i n-ns1 ' 7- V b'$ 9 /.,
1 l O send finas results orinvesti atien t to NPRDS m MM M T sns4:styss Cooramator) Extension NYT - Date T44d l RP4 -5' _ Rev.1
.)
r dverse Condition Report ACRg estigator Assigurnent Sheet /.39A Approved By: d M: SORC # : 9946 Effective Date: //- 9 s 1.aad In'vestigator, you are required to completdyour determination of causal factors and development of the strective cetion plan, and have the required reviews completed in accordance with the following requirements. If you see questions about the assignment, contact the assigned Events Analysis Coordinator. sd causal facton determination process: t Cause Detennination in accordance with NGP 3.15. Previde results and reviews as speciSed on Form RP 4-7. . Q-Apparent causal factors determination. As appropriate,use NGP 3.15 as a reference. Document results and reviews on Form RP 4-7. O-Identify corrective actionstequired for this advene condition and document on RP 4-7, pages 3 and 4. (No causal factor determination requiits.)
- Required operating experience reviews:
Q-PIRs/ACRs - Review the PIRs or ACRs ideritified below for similar or related events. Continuation Sheet C l D-LERs - Review the LERs identified below for similar or related events. Centinuatien Sheet O O-PMMS Maintenance History - Search the PMMS. database for the affected systems, sinterures and components (SSCs) and related SSCs. Ihe search should go back five years. , NPRDS-Contact a Maintenance or I&C NPRDS coordinator and request a NPRDS search for similar I cr related components. C-INPO Information - Review the INPO and industry operatine experience information listed below: l Centinuatien sheet O l l Q-Other Centinuation Sheet O Required evaluations to suppen investigation. As lead investigator,you are required to initiate or coordinate (such as i in the case of operability and reportability determinations) these evaluations. l Q-Operability Evaluation - Lead individual: l @-Reponability Detenninstion - I. cad individual: n f4fw..uu l Q-PSSH(NGP2.01) 0-HPESEvaluation D-JCO(NGP2.29) 0-MRFF Q-Other: M,-None Is an LER or other written repon to the NRC required or potentially required? Q-No B. Yes *Iype of repon: Q-LER Q-Other: Required submission date: 0-0 h lead indMdual for repon preparation: E M e. Gtt m e m "Jbe f:llowing individuals / groups must review the causal factors and corrective action plan: l
- a. Management up to and including the following: .
O-Manager /Depanment Head: G-Director: /hf3 0-vice President
'Jtberindividuals or groups:
J-oAS O- ' 0- R-Nue
- c. Oversight review groups:
Q-PORC O-MP1 Q-MP2 0-MP3 O- O- 0-None w RP4-6
J l i i j . - . . _ .
._ . . _ . . . m. . \ . ! I j e . .
J P g g ,,,,,,. A verse Condition Report ACR* N2 013302
- s ersy tiation Form i, Approved By: / SORC :# 9S'N EEcetive Date: //- f- W 4
j Provide the foBeiwing laformation to the best of year ability. Provide soongh information so the issue can be anderstood by others who
; itst review it. Refer se instrucsions on the back of this form.
- psesfest A,'beur a esaden asuu Asw sa bunariare decr en prataqfre, de ese W.dsat wr4 r18* *pesermisrb, er someone souw ne seeed yan issue h nar ade
- :ar anmedimek, Norriypour superiser er A, sigfr superher h A, contorRoom hun.far,h.
4 } Adverse Condition Information Initiator completes blocks 1 - 10 Print all infonnation.. !2. hh,A lif. h nn R. 9,ma.o Unit / Department: M P 'A Extension: tL2.taf - -,4 j (Prmt)
- 2. Describe the adverse condition: (The back of this form lists the type of info;mation you should include) l hE. butms.,rr i
! Contination sheet O l 3. Personnel,quesdonnaires attached? B74o Oyes - By Whom? j 0: hen bems prepared? SNo O Yes
- 4 What initial actions were taken as a result of the advene condition? Provide reference to items such as AWO, TR, NCR, EWR, etc.
l MPS os beiny enswitaaned sLg4,l% fQ A g,$ sun,gg,,,,, ,y, j , Q Q p) ! hms l veke I anJ Wpkm ;blin fyar fu respeJrny-foc=*=6= & A/ 8ha' sis O
- j. enb seeh idhu.
! 5. What do you know or suspect was the cause of the adverse condition? i 55tE RC R. 'lC b~t Evtssif 26thrw yyy gmpy- @sm,,,yfj)g C=e=en shut O i l1 6. What doyou recommend as corrective action (s)? CornPut*ytato ser-speeshe_0$$'t.f7& ek se.cy MP3 d@ j Cont!nution sheet O
- 7. Date:r/7/w "rtme: /Lf &S 8. Unit (s) affected by ACR: O MP1 O MP2 (P MP3 O MP Site Q Othen
- 9. What structures, systems and components are affected? 10. Ismatettalbeingheld! BNo O Yes.What and where?
i GJse"To PMMS 6 AMMID if known.) k. dM P ! ACR Review Ensure ali certinent information is provided and initial actions are sufficient. j al. SupervisorReviewwithInitIstor: (Print Names & Dates)Cn4-c 8 h7de ae K/##4 "
- a. Is immediate ACR closure recommended? (No further investigation or corrective action required) Q Yes S$o
.b. System Engineer notified? RTNA QYes Name .
i c. How discovered At*#'7aa 1. Aseess'r* A:linsbe, oat =ar, N/2e/2 48 & #-fro , f M } / M e* I d. Should the ACR be reviewed by a Shift Supervisor? #4 , ! % Yes . Immediately take or provide to the affected Shift NO
- Terward to the Events Analysis Department 1
. Supervisor (s) (Malstone Budding 475,5th floor / FAX 5522)
J l# Initial Shift Supervisor Review (if ACR went to SS):
' Joes ACR have an actual or potential adve e safety,operabDity, d. Process using Form RP 4-3 j, seportabEityorplant operation?,g _ , ,,_
, Name of Shift Supervisor: E/MMF8d ///4/6#//W D No. Retain ACR in Control Room 1 '~y- r/[ Prim) miserbs.mi whw.t g;,.g., y.tt .shWtA roi , M.oriew, RPb1 _ -____._ _._ R a l_ __ _ _
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ACR No.13302
- 2. Description of Adverse Condition:
Recent findings relative to the license and design bases for MP3, and to the processes involved in maintenance of configuration of these bases, has called into question, the level ofconfidence as to the unit's compliance with these bases. Findings include, but are not limited to, the generic implications of ACR 7007-identified root causes and the degree to which MP3 has been affected, the NRC's recent inspection team findings and self-identified findings such as the QSS/RSS and AFW issues. 6 l l i e
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i Adverse Condition Report ! Shift Supervisor Review ACR # 13302 Form RP 4 3 Rev.1 Page 1 of1 l ~ i Enter ACRs 13302 g f Approved:D B Mmer Jr- SORC:21-dft Effective:H-2-11 I svide the f:llowing information to the best ofyour ability. Refer to instructions on the back of this form. If during your review i a consider additional information is required, request the initiator or other individual to provide it, or provide it yourself. Enture j requiredprompt or immediate reporting requirements are satisfiedprior to completing thisform. f Platt C:nditions: Mode: 5 Rx Power: 0% RCS Temp: 133'F RCS Pressure: 43 PSI l Are Initial corrective actions sufficient? E Yes O No-Descr;oe any additional actions taken or required:
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l Are any of the affected structures, systems or components (S3Cs) safety-related, or covered by Technical Specifications j (TS) er the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)? E Yes (Complete 3 A) O No =>(Go to Section 4) l A. List affected SSCs and applicable 'I3 / TRM Section(s): . l All systems listed in support of design basis will be addressed by separate ACRs as questions arise j Are these structures, systems or components OPERABLE 7 g Yes (Go to 4.) O No (Go to 3B) O Uncertain (Go to 3C) ! B. Which ones are not OPERABLE and why: b - I lC. Describe actions being taken to resolve uncertainty: i l Lead individual responsible to resolve: Ext. 1 - i j Is the ACR REPORTABLE 7 O Yes (Complete 4A & 4B only) O No E Uncertain (Complete 4A & 4C only) A. Report Catagory: D A (Prompt /immediate)--attach a copy of Nuclear Incident Report Form i O B (30-day LER) O C(PublicInterest) O FFD(Public Interest) O other: B. Whyisthe ACRREPORTABLE: l C. Desde actions being taken to resolve uncertainty: Separate ACRs for specific questions will address reportability concems for those items l Lead individual responsible to resolve: { Ext. .____ s { Is en immediate investigation or a Post-Trip / Transient Review (PTTR) required? j E No O Yes-Name ofInvestigation Team Leader:_____ Ext. _____ j PJrsonzelContacted: l j Duty Officer (all ACRs):R. Martin Date/ Time:125!ft ///o { Other(specify): Date/ Time: _____ j Other(specify): , _ / Daterrime: D SS "gnature and Print Nam ' " MI/#/IM///.f[ ' Date/ Time #// 8 //.I.D - ments- ! l 1 ?
- 5 1 Adverse Condition Report Management Review ACR # 13302 i Form RP 4 4 Rev.1 Page 1 of 1 l Enkr ACRs 13302 Approved: D B Miller Jr. SORC:21-d.fi Effective:11-9 95 h to instructions on the back of this fonn. If during your review you consider additional information is required, request the stor to provide it, provide it yourself or request assistance from other individuals.
lWas she ACR processed through the Shift Supervisor (SS) using a Form RP 4 37 (pdles(Complete 1A & IB only) . !O No(Complete 1C,1D & 1E only) The Daty Officer c9mpletes this box: Print Name: 8 - {. M A(2 Ti r4 ;., . . f;., i Ar Is the Operability Determination complete? O N/A [](Yes O No-Identify actions underway to resolve: . - . = - l B. Is the Reportability Deter,mination complete? O N/A O Yes []!(No-Identify actions underway to resolve: sA sws s.a s 4 m L +-a . The Events Analysis Coordinator completes this box:
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C. Should this ACR be reviewed by the SS7 O No O Yes-Take or provide ACR to the appropriate SS(S) .,[ D. Arc initial corrective actions sufficient? O Yes O No-Describe any additional actions taken or required: . . . - . E. Should the ACR be reviewed at a unit moming meeting? O No O Yes-Process this form at the moming meeriris E e ACR be closed following init.al review? O Yes(Complete 2A & 2B) gNo(Complete 2B only)
- 2 Basis: For O Belongs in mother problem reporting rystem:
Closure O Low signif.cance, cause is understood, corrective action complete or identified in AITTS, and no l generic implications. - r./n O Other reason (explain): , _ l B. What is the ACR Significance level? O ^ #B O C O D -l 2, What cdditional evaluations are required during the investigation? . v O PSSH (NGP 2.01) O HPES Evaluation O JCO (NGP 2.29) O MRFF O Other: .gSone. What cdditional reviews of the investigation results and corrective action plan are required? f.J 'r3;" M L - O PORC O MP1 O MP2 O MP3 O Other: Ib@fibss! W Assign:5eits B. Other Assignment:____ , ,,f 3 ;;;. .t A. LeadInvestigator: Comments-
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ATTACH 5ENT G 1 4/ 11 (
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\/ NORTHEASTUTILITIES ROOT CAUSEINVESTIGATION l _ . _ , -.
l MILLSTONE UNIT 2 1 EIGHTY SEVEN ACRS HAVE BEEN GENERATED OVER THE LAST YEAR FOR CONFIGURATION CONTROL ISSUES 1 ii 1 PREP BY: Lead Investigator, William A. Price / Date Evaluation Team Member, John P. Padden / Date REVIEWED BY: Supervisor, Steven W.Walnio / Date . CORRECTIVE , ACHONS CONCURRED WITH: Responsible Manager, Michael F. Ahern / Date i APPROVED BY: j Director, Raymond P.Necci / Date i i
_ __-__m _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ __ _ v9gqqpyw }
- 2 l EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
{ irsa Condition Report (ACR) No. 8761 was initiated by the Millstone Unit 2 Unit Director to
- 4tigate configuration control deficiencies ancMammaspaalGus11puomtheafandamentatuansammap j assotamatchsthemotantaplant passounatiam j Eghty-seven (87) ACRs generated within the last twelve (12) months relating to configuration
. controllssues are the result of a positive culture change. This resulted in lowering the Unit's } threshold forinitiating ACR's, use of tracking and trending tools; with a focus on corrective action i' to pr;v;nt a class of recurring issues. Not til configuration control discrepancies dentified by the ACR program. One Hundred Plus (100+) Edministrative typagasig _, s) have been generated (during the same ' i time p.silod) for administrative drawing update for configuration.centrol4iscrmides. We __ anticipIts that more configuration controllssues will be occurring after the completion of this report and feel strongly that @nexamfigmatiancantrelesson"4sioorsprincipalswaaknessiassanlaggd,
- ggithmussSSMistflautigst.
i i The following are deemed as . ..; root causes: ' I i The terminal event for this root cause evaluation is thatgt{lisDJ6YRI.GSMRECOROVO'NO'!* j ". The fundamental cause appears to be Inadequrte Administrative Controls. The contributing factors are: past modifications made to the plantwithout a design control process, improperinsta!!ation of design modifications and design
; m fications made without drawing update. In addition, numerous Field Change Notices (FCNs) i- lon-Conformance Reports (NCR) generated by Bechtel as part of their construction effort
. neverincluded in our design drawings upon construction tumover and plant start-up.
%I5fWgsmWntistandardsjandOversis.i i.ndardswerettoodcoe .Their primary focus was " day to l d2y" Em2rgent activities to keep the plants operating while elimination of long term backlog was l limited by budget consideration. This took away essential resources from activities such as j bicidog reduction, procedure updates, training and project closures. Insufficient planning and
- budget restraints influenced what work was done. History reflects that management's action, j when taken, was reactive, ineffective and only partially implemented.
1 'NgadioR _ L.v ' : MsigmsutHUfity8hastradacettistetmoteliminatedP efsconfiguratiomeontroidssaepimproperinstallation of design modifications has j d over the last several years due to improper work habits, inadequate woric procedures,
;lnsufficient resources, lack of communication, departmental guidelines, and training. This list of l concerns is further amplified and challenged when design modifications are implemented in a ihlghly re:ctive mode. Design Changes resulting from concems associated with long standing
- Plant Material Conditions and requiring an expedited response to address operability, affords little
{ tpportunity for sufficient planning or a thorough design review. 4 Regal 914resvigtmenfigurationcontrol willaroquitstatningund extensive, review.cf.past modifleuBons*andfieldwalkdowns. There is a need for continued use of tracking and trending tools with a focus on corrective action to prevent recurring issues Management sho . u ldof cu sno itask completion, scheduling compliance and performance of success criteria for processes and P! M-is 1 i
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 EVENT DESCRIPTION Within the last 12 months 87 Adverse Condition Reports have been generated of which most identify configuration control deficiencies between Millstone Unit 2 drawings / specifications of record and the actual plant configuration. This Root Cause ' Ev:httion shall evaluate the issues, determine if programmatic weakness exists and det:rmined if additional corrective actions are warranted. 1.2 SCOPE . As a rcsult of the events that were identified during the period of March 1995 through April ,1996 et Millstone Unit 2, a Root Cause Evaluation was established to investigate each ACR that was related to a configuration control issue. y l The RiviewTeam performed a root cause analysis using the guidance in NGP 3.15. " Root . l Cause Evaluation Program." The following methods were used during the investigation: !o Event and Causal Factor Chartino was the primary tool used during this investigation. l The method was used to identify the sequence of events and the causal factors contributing to those events. -
- arrier Anaivsis was used to help identify the barriers that could have prevented the l cvent from occurring if they were not overcome.
lo Chanae Anaivsis was used to a limited degree to assess what differences existed in the p!nnt, procedures and Engineering Organizational changes with respect to ownership l cnd responsibility. l
2.0 REFERENCES
C l o' Review of all applicable ACRs.
.o Rsview of ACR 7007 " Millstone Unit i FSAR Inaccuracies."
o Evant Review Team investigation, Millstone unit 2, " Service Water Strainer Backwash System Problems." o Mimo No. DE2-96-009, TO: R.P.Necci From: S.A.Sudigala, Titled: "Bi-Annual Report Assessing PDCR DCNs / Attachment #5 DCNs and Administrative DCNs for Millstone Unit 2." ie M mo No. DE2-95-1032, To: Unit 2 PORC, From: S.A.Sudigata, Titled: "PORC ! commitment 295-030, Identification of valves downstream of Root Valves." 3 i le Grits Adhoc report for all Code B Design Change Notices (DCNs)..
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7 n - 4 3.0 COMPILATION OF FACTS: e following ACRs are examples of the Configuration Controlissues that were reviewed sing the investigation. Not all are discussed below, but they are bound by the . conclusions and recommended corrective actions. MODIFICATIONS MADE WITHOUT DRAWING UPDATE improperWork Practices Lack of Attention to Detall ACR 2030 ISI drawings of record do not match tne mechanical and stress isometric of rscord
. up Ins rvice Service Inspection drawings were created in the early 80's using the Mechanical and Stress isometric drawings of record. They were placed in the NU nuclear records system in 1992 time frame. During the period between the creation and actual placement into the system there wsre modifications and programs such as Bulletin 79-14 which cause r vision to the Mechanical and Stress drawings. These changes did not get updated on the ISI drawings until recently. When the ISI drawings were placed in the Nuclear records system there was not any reconciliation from the time of creation to the time of submittal, causing the ISi drawings to be inaccurate. EWR 2-96-0003 was initiated and is currently working to correct this problem.
I 2516 Valve removed from Clean Liquid Rad Waste Bechtei field change notice (FCN) no. H-87 was implemented in the mid 70's to remove a vrlva from the system, but there was not an effort to update the drawings . This went undetected until the initiation of this ACR. A search in Nuclear Records is underway to , determine if there are any other field change notices that may have been implemented by l Bechtel which did not update the drawings. ACR 7424 Facility 1 and Facility 2 Separation for Hotwell Annunciator Cables Facility 1 annunciator wires are in contact with Facility 2 power / instrument cables in rack C181. Impicpor facility separation, poor work practice, original plant installation. Lack of Resources Priority on Emergent Work and " Fire Drills" ACR 510,1155,1517, 2215, 2217, 2241, 3083, 4154, 5572, 8032 and 7309 All of the above ACRs are related to the replacement of material in the plant for mechanical piping systems. Incorrect Bolt material, the wrong type of pipe and pipe flanges were replaced in the plant without regard to the Mechanical Piping Specification f* 'AE-668 red uirements. i After further reviewit was determined that the specification may been the cause of these events. The specification procedurally requires a revision c.fter the sixth Design Control Notice (DCN) is initiated. This specification went unchanged
an.ow+w - 5 bryond seventeen DCNs that appears to have caused difficulty in gaining an - t' 'rstanding of the current specification requirements. nCR 364 Fuse Label different than schematic drawing Wiring drawing was up to date, but the 125V distribution drawings have been in error since erigin:1 construction. Resources exhausted with priority on emergent work and fire drills. Low priority on reviewing drawings for correctness. IMPROPERINSTALLATION of DESIGN
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Lack of Attention to Detall- s-l ACR B490 Contsinment Sump Screen Replacement
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The sump screens were damaged and required replacement, new screen was ordered with s l the correct mesh size but was received with a larger size mesh opening. This effected the -r l FSAR and required replacement recently. This was a safety significant event and reported - per LER no. 93-008. ACR 399 Non-Category 1 lamps installed in Category 1 application Cat; gory 1 bulbs required per design were replaced with non-QA bulbs. This discrepancy v discovered during performance of position indication test per AWO M2 095-06234.
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MODlFICATIONS MADE WITHOUT A DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS Standards Were to Low ACR 3462 2-HD-44A/B Check Valve intemals were remove in 1977 by memorandum The ramoval of internals was technicallyjustified within the content of the memo, but the drawing of records were not up dated to detall this change. Interviews with personnel who work;d for Millstone 2 in this time period have indicated that it was not unusual to change the piant by such documents as memorandum. The memo was retrieved from the Mrint: nance departmental historical files. Further review of the historical files are required to det:rmine the need for proper drawing update. ! ACR 465 Appendix "R" spare RBCCW motor bearing temperature instrument is a ! thermocouple end should be an RTD. i The motor was purchased in 1986, and it was not known that the motor was supplied with i tbmocouples and not RTDs. The field leads were connected to TE-6269 and TE-6270 5 ae AWO lifted lead sheet. The control room was called to verify that the temperature
.. .e.ation was normal. The Control Room indicated that the temperature readings were filind low. All connections were double checked and then the RTDs were read with a DMM. Readings from the DMM indicated the sensor was most likely a thermocouple
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l ! j n m e3 5 Q a w 6 I
- Instsad of an RTD. AWOs were started to investigate the problem and confirm the initial l fi-'ings. It was found that the sensors were not RTDs but were thermocouples as sected.
~ 4.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: i Millstone 2 loss of design configuration control was due to a broad set of causes. Many , barriers were ineffective in preventing the loss. This is indicative of Management ; Standards being too low. ;
- improving standards at Millstone 2 over the last two years increased awareness of our loss
! cf dssign configuration. The implementation of the ACR prpeess and the Unit Directors i cupport to lower the threshold resulted in the new Unit Directors recognition of a trend and . j initiation of ACR 8761. - - 4 J l The number of Plant Design Change Reports (PDCR) and Pbnt Design Change i Evaluations (PDCE) were compared to (Attachment 7.2) Plant Generated Design Change i Notices (DCN-P) and Design Change Requests (DCR-P). PDCRs & PDCEs decreased in 1
- numbers from 1974 to 1995, but the amount of drawing requests increased. This appears ]
3 to indicate that between 1974 to 1990 drawing configuration updates may have been 1 1 omitted. i . ! During the review of adverse condition reports and code 8 DCNs it appears that drawing l l v " itts for NCRs which have a disposition of"use as is' and " repair" were rarely initiated. ! l ..umerous configuration control issues were left unresolved on the day MP2 went l ! commercial. This is due to the large number of Bechtel generated Field Change Notices i
- (FCNs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) that were never incorporated or tracked i j ogainst the design drawings. l l
l { Say:ral configuration discrepancy concems relating to the identification of valves j downstream of root valves on the Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P& ids) are continually l cddressed in ACRs. In November 1995 Design Engineering recommended to PORC that { the numbering and detailing of drawings for instrument valves would be addressed on a ! case by case basis. It appears that there is not any requirement to detail instrumentation ! valvss and the high cost associated with such an activity was the rational for Design ! Enginsering recommendation. t 4 5.0 RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
5.1 COMPLETED
! Management standards have been raised at Millstone 2 as indicated by the self , identification of this adverse trend. l The IS! drawings were updated. e I n - - - - , _.
r +;p 7 The containment sump screen was replaced. 5.2 SHORT TERM bORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Raised standards are needed in Design Engineering to prevent a lack of resources from resulting in procedure noncomp!!ance. Specification SP-ME-668 should be revised to include all open DCN's in
- eccordance with Procedures.
l Use of DCNs for drawing update without a parent document or 10CFR 50.59
- evaluation should cease except for purely administrative changes.
i l Walkdowns to verify that electrical Z1 thrgggh Z4 facility _ separation at MP2 meets ) { the requirements of IEEE-279-1971 and MP2 electrical separation criteria (Dwg
- 25203-33001) with specifb ettention to control panel wiring separation per SEC 3.0 1 control panels and devices. Facility Z5 ve'rification has been completed (ACR 504 '
l 1 and EWR 2-95-000f>6). I 5.3 LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 2 All of the adverse conditions identified in this report are logged and must be-corrected. The results of this evaluation should be shared with other units. l ! Improved training in design control should be implemented to avoid future
- undocumented modifications.
] A review of all previous Design Changes, Department records and Bechtel FCNs , cnd NCRs should be performed to identify any needed changes to the plant or i configuration documents. - ;
- System walkdowns should be performed paying particular attention to flow choke points where loss of design configuration control has been safety significant. !
i Trending of adverse conditions by the oversight function needs to improve. Staff augmentation to satisfy short term backlog following outages should be trained and readily available to incorporate information into design documents (i.e. drawings, procedures and specifications). Provide resources for the backlog of DCN Incorporation. Procedures' writers should Query the GRITS data basis for instances where specifications have more than 6 DCNs and process specification updates as ne'eded with final review, comments and sign-off by Engineering.
., Reassessment of the original recommendation that was made in 1993 by Design 2 Engineering which addressed verification of instrumentation valves down stream of the root valves. ,
l 1 1
e , s Update Production Maintenance Management System (PMMS) with more accurate and complete information. Develop one line drawings for 480V AC distribution and classify them as
- Operations Critical".
l Develop load summary sheets for 120V regulated AC instrument distribution panels l
' VR11 (FAC.1 and VR21 (FAC.2). )
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- 6.0 COMMENTS
!!t must be noted that standards do and should get higher over time. The past standards on . > rdesign configcitation control were too low to meet legal requirements for procedure- . _ _m, l compliance. However, concern for public and personal safety has been high and rising x l lover the entire twenty years of Unit Two's operation. Consequently, only two of the eighty .v.- ! nine ACRs hid any safety significance. In those cases the significance was low because r the condition ~was identified before the equipment was needed to perform its safety - ' function. i 7.0 ATTACHMENTS;, l r 7.1 Event and Causal Factor Chart :
. i 7.2 PDCR, PDCE, DCR-P, DCN-P and LER Graph ,
7.3 Listing of 87 ACR for Trending of Configuration issues 7.4 Bi- Annual Report Chart Assessing PDCR DCNs/ Attachment # 5 DCNs and Administrative DCNS for Millstone Unit 2, Dated Jan. 9,1996. ; 7.5 GRITS Adhoc report for Code 8 Administrative DCNs. '
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1 RT CRITERIA: ALL DCNS FOR tat 2T DN2 FOR DIS:"IPLINE E AS OF 05/29/96 . ..o........................................................................................................................., o.... APPROVE CIASE DISCIPLINE NtP8"*R . STATUS DATE DATE CATEGORY PDOt a DESOt! 5 UIC 072595 EDS SOLEN 0ID VALVE MODEL CHANGE A.95 UIC 080495 EOS PUSE *CD* 14 CAT 20N Cet DISTRI5DTION St9 MARY S.0964 95 UIC 080995 051396 EOS MA DIESEL GENERATOR DRAN330G UPDATES 5 1048 95 UIC 081495 081495 EOS ADD 8 TALL MOUNT PNL C100 C517 C518 TO OtTRL RM CDI 5-0852 95 UIC 081195 300 ADD LIMIT SWITOI CONTECTS TO SCHEM DWG FOR MOV 5 1945 95 UIC 082195 082195 EOS ANNUN CABLE ROUTING UPDATE AND TERM SOE 2D UPDATE 5 1103-95 C24 091495 091495 E00 2 95 046 TEST PLAN FOR EMERGENCY 3.TOMT L92 4 88 ) 8 2123 95 UIC t;91595 ' 092695 EOS 2 94 002 REPIAS M019R2EID VALVI ASSEMBLY FOR RM.8123A & B 5 1090 95 UIC 091595 091895 EDS REVISE 31ACK DIAGRAM F01 PR.SCIENEL ALERT SYSTEM 5 1124 95 U2C 091495 091895 EDS E12CTRICAL SEPARAT!Olt CETTERIA DRAWING UPDATE 3 1118 95 UIC 091495 091895 EDS ADD SECURITY DIST PNL D'.FA TO OPE DATABASE RECORD 81998 95 MC 091895 091895 EOS MS/R 1A & 13 FIRST STAf,E DRAINS NV-4541 DWG UPDATE 3 1026 95 UIC 091995 091995 EDS ESAS MODS CYCLE 12 . S *MDtAT2C DRANING 2NTERFACE s ; 5 1132 95 UIC 092195 208 ERDS SPECIFICAT20st (SP EE-341) UPDATE 5 0805 95 UIC 092195 092295 EOS INDINTIPT FUSE '3 FAN
- d CRT CII PNL D11 StreeAY SH ,
5 1143-95 UIC 092795 092795 E00 2NVY-FN2 2NVY-FN3 & 2NV/.A00212NVY.AOD22 CPF DWG i F M66 95 UIC 092995 100295 E00 2 95-059 NYDROCDI SEAL CIL TANK N2/IA LEVEL A1 ARM .h 3 10&2 95 UIC 200595 200695 EOS TEEDWATER & CONDDISATE 22 VEL SETTING DISCREPAECZESV -- -- 5 0893-95 UIC 101295 EDS - LC.227 FACILITY 2501AT2006 CIARIF3CATIOtt 3-1012 95 93C 101295 101395 EDS MOISTURE SEPERATOR/REMEATER 7707 & SCHEMATIC UPDAT, 3-1265 95 UIC 110195 E08 POST ACCIDENT NYDROGDI MINT!!CRING SYSTEM 5-1285-95 UIC 111695 050996 500 REP 1ACDEENT OF 1 RAVEL 235G SOLEEN DRIVE MOTOR MANDSW - 3 1237 95 CIA 112295 112295 EOS LIGHTING PANEL 1AAD VER2FICAT20st ~+ b1186 95 CIA 112795 112895 E08 COMPUTER ID POINTS UPDATE 1 1281 95 UIC 112095 112895 EOS CABLE DESCRIPTION REPORT S$1 ADDIT 300t ,_ 8 1252 95 UIC 112095 112795 EDS REP!ACIMENT OF TDEPATURE RECORDER TR 4510 - b1091 95 UIC 112895 EDS STACK SAMPLE FANS (MF41A & MF415) DRAWING UPDATES b1311 95 CIA 112995 112995 EOS 2 93 034 CST TRENOt StMP PIMP P&2D UPDATE ! bO215 95 UIC 120395 120495 EDS RCP SPEED SDtSING DRANING UPDATES b1315-95 CIA 113095 113095 E08 COMPUTER ID POINTS UPDATE ADDITIoltAL POINTS F1255 95 CIA 120095 120095 300 COMPUTER ID POINTS UPDATE 011996 E08 A/R 95049167-16 FUSE DoctPtDITATION f b1280-95 CIA 121395 bl* CS CIA 121395 121495 EOS COMPUTER ID POINTS UPDA23 { b1 45 CIA 122095 122095 EOS 2 95-066 CABLE DESCRIPT30lt REPCst? ADDIT 10sts 5 CIA 122195 122295 EOS COMPUIER 2D POINTS UPDATE ,
.-95 CIA 121395 122295 EDS EDG DWG. UPDATE 70 REF22CT 79045 TAG N05, 8 4288-95 CIA 122895 122995 EDS COMPUTER 2D POINTS UPDATE ;
4 t.1304 95 CIA 122895 122995 EDS COMPUTER 2D POINTS UPDATE - b1346-95 CIA 122195 021296 EDS 2 95 010 PDCR 210 95 TEST PIAN REQUIREMDIT CHANGE
$00013 96 UIC 010596 010596 EOS 2CND.PNLO3 DRAWING UPDATE i-0015 96 UIC 010996 Eos POST ACCIDDtf NYDROCDt MostITORING POWER 1 1214 95 UIC 011296 031896 EDS FUSE 2DDITIFICATIcet FOR 125V DC VITAL DIST PANEL D b1215-95 UIC 011296 D31896 208 FUSE IDDITIFICAT20st FCst 125V DC VITE DIST PANEL D i 1-0806 95 UIC 011296 031896 EDS FUSE 2DDIT3FICAT10It FOR 125V DC Y!TAL DIST PANEL D b1213 95 UIC 011296 031896 E00 PUSE IDDITIFICAT20st FOR 125V DC VITE DIST PANEL D BOO 10096 UIC 011596 011596 EOS ESAS IAGIC DRAWINC UPDATE 3 0050 96 UIC 011196 011796 EDS CABLE DESCRIPT20It REPORT 362 ADDIT 20st b1059-95 CIA 011996 011996 EOS RESOLVE PENDING APPROVAL CABLE CODES IN CABLE RACE *e.0069096 UIC 012696 012696 E08 CORRECT 20It TO MILL 8700tE CABLE SACptAY CODE C81 b0056 96 UIC 012996 013096 EDS RCP SPPEED SENSING P&2D UPDATE ;
f.0055-96 CIA 020996 021296 EDS REVISE DIDtGDECT DIESEL GENERATOR SCGIC DIAORAM e k0099 96 UIC 021496 052096 EDS RECORDER 2CESPIELC7RR M20t0 PROCESSOR CCetFIGURATION b0119-96 UIC 021596 052096 EDS CPF RADIAT1000 MC8t! TOR meMe REPIACDtDET WIRING [ h1218-95 UIC 021996 031896 tos FUSE 2DDITIFICATIOlt FOR 125V DC NONVITAL DISTRIBUT n [ f s i
, d ydr,WEk47@@* W
? CRITERIA: ALL DCMS FOR UNIT 51M2 FOR DISCIPLINE M AS'0F9 05/39/96 APPROVAL CLASE DISCIPI.INE asesER STATUS ImTE ImTE CA3008tY PDat 8 DESCRI
....................................................................................~...
CIA 051095 063095 MOS 2 94 072 RERocTE TanNG LINES 70 RELOC WSTE CAS SAMPLE SINK
. C1A 080295 080495 MOS NA RsM0 VAL Or DIESEL GENERATOR DWGS FROM ISI PROGRAM 1p71 95 CIA 080995 081095 MOS LINE SYMB014GY UPDATE.P.A.S.S.
0996 95 CIA 080795 081195 Mot 2 94 047 UPDATE SERVICE MATER CHANGES 1943 95 CIA -081095 081195 MOS 2 95*034 SERVICE WATER PhID UPDATE 0968 65 UIC 081595 100695 MOS 2 93 043 LOCAL STORAGE 01 $* FIRE ROSE CROSSTIE TU SERV NIX 3082 95 UIC 082295 082295 MOS VALVES 2-ND-1328 & 2-ND 112C ISO DWG UPDATE 2083 95-C14 082995 091995 MOS P&ID 25203-2',005 SH 3 UPDATE 1935 95 UIC 083095 121995 MOS P&ID UPDC FOR 26023 SR.1 SFP COOLING & CLEANUP 3053 95 UIC 083195 112195 MOS MA AUX Bf'A AREA DRAINS & NP DECON ROOM WASTE EFFLU 1113 95 CIA 090095 090095 M08 MEATER DRAINS LEVEL CONTROLS VALVE CORRECTIONS 1965 95 CIA 091195 091295 Mot NA P&ID DRAWING UPDATE 1984 95 U3C 091395 091395 MOS CONDDISER HISLABELING/EQUALISER LINE C3EANGE 1104 95 CIA 091495 091495 MOS 2 92-067 N022LE CHANGE 1999 95 mC 091595 091895 MOS MATERIAL UPGRADE FOR SqPPORT 1113 95 CIA 091995 092095 MOS REPMCE COIL DRAWINGS FOR X.181A & S. UPDATE 1122 95 UIC 092095 092195 MOS g DWG UPDATE FOR AERATED WASTE DEMIN. INLET 2 1/2 1133 95 CIA 092195 092295 MOS c@ r P&ID DRAWING UPDATE 1157 95 CIA 100395 100495 MDB CHANGE REDDCER ORIETAT20N ON DISCHARGE OF P.94A,B 9963 94 CIA 091495 092795 MOS _ P&ID UPDATE . CLEAN LIQUID SADWASTE SYSTEM 0022 95 CIA 092195 100295 MOS P&ID UPDATE . AUKILIARY SUILDING DRAINS 1169 95 UIC 101095 MOS 2 89-100 SE!SMIC MOONTING OF CO2 FIRE EETINGUISMERS 1193 95 CIA 101295 101895 MOS . P&ID 25203 26007 SH.1 & 2 UPDATE 1155 95 UIC 101095 101895 MOS DRAWING UPDATE FOR RSCCW SYSTEM 0114 94 CIA 092595 101895 MOS P&ID UPDATE-RSCCW SYSTEM 1206 95 SUP 101795 M08 CIRCUIT 30ARD T52C DESS2 CANT DRYER 0708 95 UIC 101895 101995 MOS REPLACEMENT OF FAN F.114A F.1143 F-114C 1184 35 UIC 101895 102395 MOS P&ID UPDATE FOR STATION AIR SYSTEM *JDD-28* ENCLOS 1210 95 C2A 102495 103095 M08 CHANGE LINE CONNECTION IACATION 1135 95 CIA 102195 102195 M08 P&ID UPDATE 26023 SH 2 26034 SH 3 1165 95 UIC 103195 103195 MOS REPMCDENT INSTRIMENT AIR CINT ISOMTION VALVE 2 1248 95 C3A 103095 110395 MOS - REMOVE DUPLICAT20N OF MITROGEN LINE ON SI SYSTEM P 123* M CIA 103095 110395 M08 CHANGE DDPLICATE STATION AIIt VALVE NUMBER SSI CIA 102495 103195 MOS P&ID UPDATE SCRIC ACID AND CHARGING SYSTEM CLO 102395 110695 MOS P&ID 25203 26000 SH 3 25203 26027 SH 2 UPDATE CIA 102495 110795 MOS P&ID UPDATE. REACTOR C00MNT SYSTEM an3 95 CIA 111695 111695 MOS NA CHANGE CHARGING PUMPS SEAL LUBE DRAIN VALVE FROM 0 1364 95 CLO 311795 112095 MOS CONDENSATE PUMPS P-2A,28 & 2C MOTOR WINDING RTD'S 1272 95 UIC 112095 112195 MOS 2.HV.450 VALVE NUMBER DUPLICATION 0209 94 CIA 112895 113095 MOS P&ID UPDATE SAMPLE SYSTEM 1312*95 UIC 113095 120095 M08 A B TURBINE INSTRUMENTS SWITCMED ON P&ID 1284 95 UIC 130595 120595 Mot P&ID 25203 26005 SH 1 UPDATE REMOVAL OF STRAINERS 1194 95 UIC 101695 120695 MOS P&ID 26026 SHEET UPDATE FOR VALVE 2.BW.139 1302 95 UIC 120695 120695 M08 P&ID UPDATE FOR 26026 SHEET 3 AUX STEAM & CONDENSA D618 95 CIA 120895 120095 MOS P&ID LEGEND UPDATE 1279 95 CIA 120795 120795 MDB CHANGE AUK. STEAM TRAP N:MBER(DUPLICATE OF MAIN ST, 1268 95 UIC '122195 122195 MOS NEW DWGS 70 SHOW F140R DRAIN LABELLING SYSTEM 1332 95 CIA 122195 021296 MOS 2 SW-247 PNFUMATIC POSITIONER CAUGE MODIF2 CATION 1325 95 UIC 122195 MOS DRAWING UPDATE 1327 95 CIA 121895 122895 Mot CORRECT INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER PANEL INSTRIMENTS 1278 95 UIC 122195 122195 MOS P&ID UPDATE FOR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 36011 SH 1 1258 95 UIC 122795 122795 MOS 3.GAN.353 2.LRA-160 VALVE DUPLICATION 1247 95 CIA 122995 122995 MOS ADDITION OF STA%R NNDING COOLING YALVES IN RECT 2 2034 96 UIC 011296 MOS 2 93 043 UPDATE P&ID 25503 26012 SH 2
3
~m.an amyge m *;fh !
? CRITERIAs ALL DCNS FOR UNIT DM2 PCR DISCIPLINE E AS OrgD5/29/96
.... ..........................................................4............................................................
APPROVAL C24SE DISCIPLINE 10MBER STATUS DATE DATE CATEGORY PDCR g DESCR1
.. . ...... ........ ...... .......... ........ .............................................. .. j UTC 021996 031896 E00 PUSE EDENTIFICATION FOR 125V DC NONVITAL DISTRIBUT
, UIC 022396 031896 EDS 9VSE TDDfTIFICATION FOR 125V DC NONVITAL DISTRIBUT 4 $.95 UIC 022396 031896 EOS PUSE IDDf73FICAT20N FOR 125V DC IIONVITAL DISTRIBUT 0828 95 UIC 022496 022896 EDS STATION RATTERY CELLS 201A D31 & 2013 DB2 1 0155 96 UIC 030196 EOS 2 96504A CEDS REED SWITCN POSITICH E.MTTR RSPTS RIP 1ACD1ENT l 0163+96 MC 030596 032296 tot DATA T1tAE INSTALIATION CHIM 1AB MICROPanevcenn CCSI 0191 96 UIC. 030996 EDS MA REPIACEMENT OF SOLDf01D VALVE 2.!JtR.103.LRS 0204 96-52C 031496 E00 2 95 066 OtP F22AC.BC & C508. C509 SPEC. 329 UPDATE 0207 96 UIC 032594 EDS ENC PotfER SUPPLY CAPACITOR REPIACEMDfT 0198 96 UIC 040196 508 EHC 30V/60HE REGUIATED POWER SUPPLY 0313 96 UIC 040296 EOS 2 93 034 CST SUMP PUMP 14 CATION 0190 95 UIC 040496 E00 REPIACEMENT OF PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS PT 6526 PT 55 0194 96 UIC 040496 .EOS REP!ACEMENT OF PRESSURE 11LANSMITTER PT.4300 0242 96 UIC 041096 041096 EOS ZDDTTIFY 70tfER TO NYDROGEN ANALYEER A & 3 CN IbOP 0304 96 UIC 041296 EOS 2 91*003 CONTROL ROOM HVAC RADIAT20N MONITOR MODIFICATION 0299 96 UIC 041096 041896 EDS E1 E2 BATTERY ROOM AIR TEMP MON!?ORING TE.8435A TE 0300 96 UIC 042496 042496 EOS 2 91003 CON 71tOL A00M NVAC RAD MONITOR CABLE CONNECTORS 0330 96 UIC 042696 042596 EDS MICELIANE003 DRAWING UPDATES --
0340 96 UIC 042996 E0d SPEC SP.EE.329 UPDATE & PPMS UPDAM E - 0322 96 U2C 042996 EDS SPEC SP.EE.329 UPDATE 0351 96 UIC 043096 051796 ECS RWST PIPE CHASE SUMP PUMP P126 REPLACEMDrT 0361 96 UIC 043096, 050196 EOS, TOTAL 14AD CALCU:ATION POR 125VDC DIS 7RIBUTION PAN 0393 96 U2C 051096 EOS REP 1ACD1ENT OF TRAVELING SCREDI DRIVE MOTOR MANDSW 0442 96 UIC 051796 051796 EDS RWST P2PE CNRSE SUMP PUMP P126 REP!ACEMENT 8444 96 UIC 051696 EDS RECORDER UR.5265 MICROPROCESSOR CONFIGURATION , i 0424 96 UIC 051796 052096 E08 RECORDER 2CESPN147RR MICR0 PROCESSOR RECONFIGURATIO ' 0446 96 UIC 052096 052096 EDS CPF RAD MONITOR RECORDER REPIACEMENT WIRING CIARIF 0445 96 UIC 052096 E08 RECORDER UR 5265 REPLRCEMENT l l l l l l a 1 l l I i
O,ITE3tIA: ALI, dot 3 FOR UNIT IM2 FOR DISCIPLINE H AS CF 05/29/96 APPROVAL CIASE DISCIPLINE lM8ER STATUS DATE DATE CATEGORY PDCR 8 , DESCRI 72C 011596 011696 MOS P&ID DRAWING UPDATE FOR M. S. CENERATOR 814WDOWN .
... VIC 011296 011296 MOS SG BIDWDOWN QUENCH TANK RELIEF VALVE PSV.4634 NUSC LC80 95 CIA 010996 011696 MOS IABEL 20tA.P1A AND 20tA.PIB CN P&ID DC22 96 UIC 011896 MOS REPIACDIENT OF YALVES 2.SW 1112.SW-113 6012 36 UIC 011896 012296 MOS ADD PI TO P.170 UPDATE WASTE NEUTRAL RADIATION MON 6046 96 MC 012596 012596 MOS FAN F.31A F 31B MOTOR SIZE UPDATE 1041 96 UIC 012596 Moe 2 95 068 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ADDITION CABLE VAULT FI40R 431 96*C10 012296 013096 MOS @60 98 UIC ADDITION OF PI NUMB 23tS 70 NTfnR.S X.196A X.1968 012996 MOS 2 95-054 RETIR2 MENT OF REAST & BAE P&ID 110 95 UIC 020296 MOS 073 96 UIC AS BUILDING OF SUCTION PIPING FROM DECASIFIER N-24 020296 Mot 2 95 068 ADDITION OF ASTM B 584 COPPER ALLOY UNS C83600 TO $$1 96 UIC 020$$6 MOS 2 95 064 SUPPLEMENT 70 DCN; 1196 95 & 1229 95 088 96 UIC 021396. 021596 MOS 221 95 UIC 2 95 064 BACKUP AIR ACCDMATOR FOR RBCCW VALVE 2 RB-23.1A 020996 MOS HEATER DRAINS PUMP SEAL COOLING TO X.204A X 204B 031 96 UIC 020996 C21396 MOS NA UPDATE OF CLAND SEAL C60 LING, X 204A & B 080 96 UIC 021396 MOS 115 96 CIA 021596 2 95 064 BACKUP AIR ACC"JCLATOR FOR RBCCW VALVES 2 RB.13.1B 021696 MOS UPDATE VALVES ON TRAVELING SCREENWASH P&ID 071 96 UIC 020896 020896 Mot P&ID UPDATE FOR 26012 26203 116 98 CIO 021496 C21696 MOS =-E s .
018 96 C 4 021396 UPDATE P&ID 26004 KHT'S 2 & 4 (RIT ACR NO. $151) 021496 MOS P&ID 25203 26008 SH 3 UPDATE 079 96 UIC 021696 021696 Mot P&ID UPDATE FOR 25213 26801 SH 7 894 96 UIC 022596 022796 MOS UPDATING ISCLATION VALVES FOR LG.7003/7012 18194 CIA C30496 030796 M08 CORAECTION OF LINE CIASS ON DRAIN LINE,CCA.11,HSC-186 95 CLO 030796 032196 M08 - 228 96 CLo 031396 2 96501D SUPPLEMDff TO DCN NO. DM2.S 0158 96 TIE.IN VALVES 031896 MOS UPDATE A0111ARY CHEMICAL FIED PANEL C.98A 122 96 CIA C31496 031896 MOS 195 96 UIC 031896 KDt0VING INDICATORS E14218 214222 MAIN STEAM SYS MOS 2 95-066 ADD PRESSURE SWITCHES PS9968A & PS99685 178 96 SUP 031896 041796 MOS 225 96 CLO 032096 2 96018A PIPE CIASS 'JCD' & P&ID FOR SERVISE WATER STRAINER 042596 Mot SERVICE WATER P&ID UPDATE 261 96 CLC 032296 032696 MOS NA CORRECT VALVE N31BER ON DEISEL CINERATOR LUBE CIL 242 96 ClO C32296 032696 MCI 2 95 064 SUPPLEMENT TO DCNS 1196 95 & 1229 S$ 187 96 UIC 032896 MOS UPDATING P&ID IIGEND 223 96 MC 033196 Moe 202 TC 040296 STEAM AIR EJECTOR EXXAUST FAN ASSEMBLIES FSSA F55B 050796 MOS DPANING UPDATE CONTAINMENT SAFETY INJECTION PIPING 2s 640596 042596 MOS 2 SW-12A,B,C & D VALVE ACIVAIUR DETAILS
.L0 040996 041996 MDB P&ID 25203 26022 SH. 5 UPDATE eus.96 SUP 041796 042396 MOS J1-95 CA SERVICE WATER PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT MOD 041896 042496 MOS ;05 96 UIC P&ID DRAWING UPDATE FOR STATION AIR.26009 00010 041896 MOS 27 96 UIC NUSCO NUMBERS REQUIRED ON DRAIN VALVES FOR LS.5393 042396 050396 MOS .58 95 M C SERVICE WATER PRESSURE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT MODIF 042596 MOS 58 96 UIC 042596 MOD. 70 DfD CAPS FOR 2 RB 76A sDtu 2 RB 76C M08 3596MC ADDITION OF PORTABLE DEMINERALIIERS TO WIT 1AYUP 042696 MOS 2 95 066 P&ID 25203 26027-00003 UPDATE 59 96 UIC 042996 051796 MOS 14 96 MC OFF-CAS EUMP PUMP P.126. DISCHARGE MODIFICATION 020996 MOS ISI DRAWING UPDATE 89 96 UIC 051596 MOS UPDATE FOR P&ID 25203-26005 SE1 #
10 96 MC 051496 MO8 2-95 053 PIPING SPECIFICATION
!5 96 MC 051696 MOS 2-95 068 ADDITION OF PIPING CONNECTION TO P&ID 25203-26009 W,'
I
ERITSR2A ALL DOfS FOR tdt 27 DH3 FOR DISCIPLINE AS Or 95/29/96 l ..............................................C.............................................................................. APPROVAL CLOSE DISCIPLINE DSER STATUS , DATE DATE CATEGORY PDCR 8 DESCR2 24 080495 080495 C08 MA DRAWING UPDATE FOR SERV 2CE WATER SUPPORTS
...s. DIC 020996 C08 REPIACEMENT RECORDER FOR CPF AREA RADIATION MONITO aC96 96 MC 021396 C08 TD(PORARY RIGGING FROM SUPPORT 401102 2185 96 UIC 040496 C08 INSTALLATION OF MISC COMPONENT SUPPORT STRUCTURES 3322 96 UIC 041196 CDS INSTALIATION CF MISC COMPONENTN SUPPORT STRUCTURES 1173 94 UIC 050396 COS ISI DRAWING UPDATE 1130 96.UIC 050396 C08 281 DRAWING UPDATE C.33 96 UTC 050396 C08 231 DRAWING UPDATE 1125 96 UIC 0$0396 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE 1144 96 UIC 050396 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE 1161 96 UIC 050396 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE i203 96 UIC 050396 C08 152 DRAWING UPDATE lC6096UIC 050396 CD8 ISI DRAWING UPDATE
!i150 96 UIC 050396 C00 181 DRAWING UPDATE
- l l '
1160 96 UIC 050396 CCS ISI DRAWING UPDATE C49 96 UIC 050396 C08 231 DRAWING UPDATE 1229 96 UIC 050396 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE , C31 96 UIC 050396 C03 ISI DRAWING UPDATE -% i 1237 96 UIC 050396 C08 !$2 DRAWING UPDATE C39 96 UIC 050396 C08 281 DRAWING UPDATE - i (13 96 UIC 050396 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE ) 224 96 UIC 050396 C08 IS! DRAWING UPDATE r-l 176 96 UIC 050396 CCS ISI DRAWING UPDATE - 188 96 UIC 050396 Col ISI DRAWING UPDATE l 183 96 UIC 050396 CCS ISI DRAWING UPDATE l 300 96 UIC 051396 C08 REPLACEMENT HOIST BLOCK FOR SPENT FUEL POOL PLATr0 l 268 96 UIC 051696 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE ) 411 96 UIC 051696 CCS RISER HANGER ELEVATION C'.1 1/2' ON LINE 2 1/2.HSD 404 96 U2C 050996 CCS REPLACEMENT OF P2PE SUPPORT COMPONEFTS FOR 3/4*.CC 425 96 U2C 052096 C08 ISI DRAWING UPDATE . i o i l l 4, I i i *% , 4
i 1 I l l t l NORTHEAST UTILITIES l I ROOT CAUSE INVESTIGATION REVISION 1 l MILLSTONE UNIT TIIREE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MP-3 CONFIGURATION AND CURRENT LICENSING BASIS ACR 13302 ! l i l l I l i i Lead Evaluator: / Mark # Whitney / [/Date' /j /Jfr TEAM MEMBERS: A -
~
/ Y ihl QDate l L'enneth L.'BurtiTn D te GeoIge'R. fitdian ;
I l t l l ! I
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE UNIT'S CONFIGURATION TO ITS CURRENT LICENSING BASIS EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
An assessment team was convened on April 29,1996 to review the design and license basis compliance of MP-3, as described in Configuration Management Program Instruction (PI) 2. The team was charged with determining whether or not the program specified in the MP3-specific Configuration Management Plan (CMP) is adequate; what, if any, expansion in resiew scope (" Slice of System") should occur; and what other areas should be resiewed as part of the CMP. This activity was completed on June 4,1996. A MP-3 PI-2 specific assessment was fonvarded to management on June 5,1996. That report covered documentation dating back about two and a half years. The documentation included PIRs (Plant Information Reports) and ACRs (Adverse Condition Reports); NSAB (Nuclear Safety Assessment Branch) and SNRB (Site Nuclear Review Board) meeting minutes; INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) evaluations; personnel inteniew inputs; QAS reports and assessments; and the recent NRC Inspection Team findings. It also addresses issues raised in ACR 7007, when categorizing the above information reviewed for MP-3. Revision I to the assessment was issued on June 21,1996, based on comments received while drafting the original issue of the report. The latest revision maintains the original review scope in an Access database. It adds Plant Incident Report (PIR) data from January 1,1986 through December 31,1993. The additional data indicated certain problems existed at startup, focusing mainly on Equipment Emironmental Qualification (EEQ); Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG); and Senice Water related mussel fouling and SLCRS events. These problems appear to have been largely corrected as the unit matured. The review conducted of earlier PIR data indicated continuing themes since startup of Automated Work Order (AWO) use and control issues; MOV problems; Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) issues; Plant Design Change Record (PDCR)- related issues; Bypass Jumper (BJ) use and control; Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) stroke problems; Supplemental Leak Control and Recovery System (SLCRS) issues: EDG issues; and electrical cable related issues. The Team also performed a causal factor evaluation on the " event" The event, which is defined as Loss of Confidence in the MP-3 Configuration and Current Licensing Basis, is essentially, a human performance failure event of large proportion. The Team concludes that: o The event unfolded over a long time frame, starting shortly after commercial operation in 1986 o The major non-unit-specific issues of ACR 7007 apply to MP 3, and o The primary causal factor for this event appears to be the unit's failure to treat the FSAR as a document with which verbatim compliance was required. No definite root cause could be found. Corrective actions fall into two distinct and separate categories, as follows: l
- 1) The re-establishment of confidence in the physical plant to ensure compliance with design and license l l basis commitments and conditions and, l l 2) The creation of changes in the areas of management expectations, oversight, culture, administrative processes and procedures, personnel training scope and effectiveness (including management development) and the implementation of an effective corrective action program. These are the same areas deemed to require improvement by the ACR 7007 ERT Report.
The ERT for this root cat se analysis has er.dorsed, with conditions, the corrective actions ongoing for item I above, via issuance of the MP3 Unit-Specific Assessment Report. Additionally, relative to l item 2 above, ongoing or planned Nucler,r Excellence Plan activities should prevent the recurrence of a similar condition. l l (Note that since there was no one discrete " event" to analyze, this causal analysis is by nature l not as objective as a distinct event-driven Root Cause analysis.) t
1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Event Description l On Jaruary 31, 1996, the three units at Millstone Station were placed on the NRC
" Watch List" At that time Millstone Unit Three (MP 3) was operating at 100% reactor
! power. On March 30,1996, MP-3 elected to shut down to address AFW system issues. The NRC issued NU a letter on April 4,1996, requesting that NU provide it additional information 7 days prior to restarting the unit. NU established a Configuration l Management Program (CMP) to ensure confidence that the unit was complying with its design and license bases in response to the NRC's 10CFR50.54(f) issue letter. j 1.2 Scope 1 This document provides an assessment of the causal factors leading up to why a Loss of , Confidence in the MP-3 Configuration and Current Licensing Basis has occurred. It I i addresses the implications of ACR 7007 findings on MP-3. It ensures the scope of PI-2 is appropriate and addresses key license and design basis issues, and is based on l l Revisions 0 and 01 of the MP-3 NUC PI-2 Assessment reports. ( A team was appointed to review and modify, as required, the scope of NU's PI-2, " Unit Specific Assessments". The team consisted of George Pitman (lead); Ken Burton and Mark Whitney, and was charged with the implementation of NUC PI-2 to ensure that the MP3-specific CMP scope adequately addresses MP-3 design and licensing basis compliance issues. PI-2 specifies that a review of data be conducted covering a period of l a minimum of two years. The Team initially reviewed reference data covering a period 1 l of approximately two and one half years, from January 1,1994, through mid May 1996. The subject data reviewed is shown in Section 2.0 of this report. The Team inteniewed 24 people, many still with the unit and with MP-3 experience predating unit stanup. I Inteniew findings confirmed many of the issues described in the Causal Factor chart attached to this report. Based on this resiew, the Team issued Rev. O of its findings in a repon dated June 4,1996. ' t i The Team then augmented the assessment scope with a review of PIRs from 1/1/1986 through 12/31/1993 to verify whether or not the themes noted in Rev. O of the report y' continued to recur, or if other themes would be identified. The Team concluded that, with the exception of some issues identified as related to initial unit startup and configuration control, the conclusions and recommendations of Reference 2.1 are still [ 1 valid with only minor scope additions.
2.0 REFERENCES
l l 2.1 MP-3 PI-2 ;MP-3 Specific Assessment: Report to MP-3 UPM and MQC on PI-2 Team i Findings, Rev. O, dated June 4,1996 2.2 Applicable Adverse Condition Reports (ACRs): 1/1/95-5/15/96 2.3 Applicable Plant lacident Reports (PIRs): 1/1/86-12/31/94 2.4 MP-3 NRB Meeting Minutes: January 1,1993-December 31,1993 2.5 Site Nuclear Review Board (SNRB)/NSAB Mtg. Minutes: January 1,1994-March,1996 2.6 Relevant QAS reports, QAS Surveillances, etc. 2.7 Relevant ISEG repons and evaluations 2.8 The last two INPO assessments for Millstone and corporate NU 2.9 NU internal self assessments 2.10 ACR 7007 Event Resiew Team Report, February 22,1996
l 3.0 PERSONNEL INVOLVED 3.1 MP-3 PI-2 Team Members: George Pitman (Lead) Ken Burton (HPES trained Team Member) Mark Whitney (HPES trained Team Member) 3.2 Personnel Interviewed for PI-2 Specific Assessment Report (Ref. 2.'l): D.F. Asay - Current MP3 I&C Engineer C. J. Ashton - Current MP3 Mechanical Engineering Design Engineering Supenisor R.A. Andren - Current MP3 Manager, Design Engineering R.L. Broullier - Current MP3 HVAC/ Support Systems System Engineer M.B. Brown - Original MP3 I&C Supenisor and Current Millstone Oversight Director D.E. Deane - Current MP3 Electrical Design Supenisor R.E. Deconto - Current MP3 Mechanical Design Engineer M.T. Dolishny - Current MP3 I&C Supenisor i D. C. Gerber - Former MP3 Mech / Civil Des. Sup. and Current Mgr., Tech. Support l J.S. Hanis - Original Unit Engineering Manager l S.V. Heard - Former MP3 Procedure Writer I M.D. Hess - Former MP3 Unit Engineering Supenisor and Current AFW System Engr. S.L. lawhead - Current MP3 Shift Manager L.E. Loomis - Current MP3 ISI Engineer T. J. Mawson - Current MP3 NSSS Systems Supervisor D. J. McDaniel - Former MP3 Unit Engineering Manager and Current Rx. Engr. Supv. J.C. O'Brien -- Current MP3 Generation Test Supenisor J.E. Petro:ky - Current MP3 Mechanical Engineer P.F. Privizzini - Current MP3 Electrical Maintenance Supenisor R.B. Roy - Current MP3 Maintenance Manager J.A. Ruttar - Current MP3 Shift Manager A.J. Sihia - Current NUSCo Welding Engineering R.W. Standish -- Current MP3 Mechanical / Civil Design Supenisor G.L. Swider - Current MP3 Senice Water System Engineer 4.0 COMPILATION OF FACTS AND INFORMATION 4.1 Sequence of Events
. Unit FSAR submitted to NRC October,1982
. NRC issues SER November,1985
- Unit Commercial Operation April,1986
- Service Water Mussel Fouling Shutdown July,1991
- Major SLCRS Outage: Design Basis not met October,1992
. INPO evaluation: MP-3 Noncompliance with the unit FSAR March,1995 e MP-1 receives 10CFR50.54(f) Letter December 13,1905 e All Millstone Units placed on NRC Watch List January 31,1996 e ACR 7007 written re: MP-1 February 22,1996
, e- MP-3 receives 10CFR50.54(f) letter March 7,1996 I e MP-3 shuts down due to AFW issues March 30,1996 l
- MP-3 to furnish additional infctmation to NRC prior to restart April 4,1996
! . MP-3 PI-2 Team stans assessing PI-2 scope April 30,1996
- Rev. O ofMP-3 PI-2 Team Report issued June 4,1996 e Rev. 01 of MP-3 PI-2 Team Report issued June 21,1996 i
I \ . .
1 4.2 Trends Identified in Data Review The information below was determined by a resiew of Section 2.0 documentation as presented by Reference 2.1. It was coded per ACR 7007 causal factors, as show in References 2.1 and 2.2. Causal factor coding, as described in Reference 2.1, Attachment B, was used to link a document to a particular program, component, document, procedural inadequacy or lack of procedural compliance issue. Some of the more prominent main issues are addressed below. Others can be found in the Reference 2.1 and/or 2.2 sheets entitled " Matrix Observations and Printout". 4.2.1 DCNs not processed properly, violated, etc. 4.2.2 NCRs not processed properly 4.2.3 AWO issues: Worked w/o authorization, contained wrong information, wrong type used, tagging issues 4.2.4 MOVs: DCN related issues; BJs; wiring, EEQ issues
4.2.5 Testing
Not done IAW IST pror. ram / procedure deficiencies; not performed or not done per FSAR requirements 4.2.6 FSAR issues: FSAR not kept current; operations and or testing not IAW FSAR; system descriptions inconsistent with FSAk; FSAR conflicts with Tech Specs 4.2.7 MEPL issues: Incorrect classifications, improper downgrades 4.2.8 AFW system issues: Pipe supports, caletJations, operability issues 4.2.9 Improperly Landed Leads: field and/or drawing, work practice errors 4.2.10 CCP system issues: Loose parts, mussel fouling, valve stroke time 4.2.11 Surveillance issues: Failed, late or calculation errors 4.2.12 Drawings: Errors; discrepancies; and BJs not on dwng. 4.2.13 PDCRs: Close out errors; discrepancies; incomplete / inadequate PDCRs 4.2.14 BJs: Removed without authorization; on dwng, not insta!!cd in field; compromise unit design features; not restored per proc.; proc. used with BJ missing / inadequate 4.2.15 MSIVs: Stroke times, failures to open ) 4.2.16 Mussel issues: Component fouling various critical Hxs J 1 4.2.17 RCP issues: Oil leakage; oil collection system problems; PDCR errors 4.2.18 _ SLCRS: Boundary breaches, failed surveillances, engineering deficiencies 4.2.19 EEQ: Incomplete packages; temperature limits exceeded; component qual. issues 4.2.20 EDG: Drawing issues; excessive start times; air receiver operation issues 4.2.21 Programmatic issues: Not implemented consistently; retests inadequate; seismic issues 4.2.22 Cable issues: Separation criteria violated; overloaded trays; breaks 4.3 Intersiewee Observations and Opinions A total of 24 people were inteniewed as part of Reference 2.I's process. Inteniewees spanned the experience time frame of early 1980's to present with the unit, to only 2 or 3 years' experience with the unit. A majority of the inteniewees were long term employees associated with the unit over a decade, who had risen from worker to supervisory ranks. The opinions they shared with the Team, summarized below and shown as Attachment I to this causal analysis, relate only to configuration and licensing basis issues. Other observations which inteniewees provided are shown in Reference 2.1, Attachment E. Overall, inteniewee observations largely validated findings obtained from documentation resiews in References 2.1 and 2.2 and were important to identifying the primary causal factor listed on page 1 of this analysis. Inteniewee comments centered around the following major themes:
- Inability to clearly track commitments made after unit startup
- Conflicting and/or overlapping roles and responsibilities for the corporate and site Engineering organizations, and inadequate actions to capture post startup issues and calculations in one central data base or repository
- Lack of clear management expectations on the role of maintaining and using the unit FSAR
l e Inadequate engineering resources provided to ensure the FSAR and field as built conditions matched e Lack of clear management expectations in operating systems in accordance with FSAR descriptions. This was evidenced by operator " work arounds" and discrepancies between operating procedures, Tech Specs, and the FSAR e Systems which had known problems; did not operate as designed; and which were not fixed post startup (SLCRS, AFW) e Contractors brought on site are given narrow direction for work, with little appreciation of their works' impacts on the FSAR and/or unit licensing and design basis i e Level of management scrutiny of FSAR reviews decreased over time, as reviews j deleted the use of the engineering supenisor and manager
- Destaffing the Stone and Webster engineering support contingent for economic reasons, contrary to keeping them for a period of post commercial operation. (The 1 Team notes, however, that a Stone and Webster contingent was assigned to augment the NUSCo Engineering MP3 staff to ensure continuity over the startup to early period of operation period.)
5.0 CONCLUSION
S The ERT's conclusions fall into two major areas, as follows: 5.1 There is a need to re-establish confidence in MP-3's configuration. The eleven areas identified in Reference 2.1, Section VII, require follow up actions. Detailed l1 recommendations are included with the Assessment and not reiterated here verbatim. A number of these areas are directly factored into the attached events and causal factor chart, and are summarized below: 5.1.1 Old or numerous DJs may compromise the unit license and design basis 5.1.2 PDCEs may not fully address design and documentation requirements 5.1.3 QA Calculations may not inity address " Worst Case" scenarios, and basis i calculation integrity may be compromised 5.1.4 FSAR Correlation to Operating Procedures 5.1.5 Original Plant Startup Punch List Items 5.1.6 Missed Commitments 5.1.7 A/E Interface with Major Supplier Packages 5.1.8 FSAR Familiarity and Use l 5.1.9 FSAR Changes Conducted Without a 10CFR50.59 Evaluation ! I 5.1.10 DCN Use Vulnerability 5.1.11 Potentialinconsistency between the FSAR's body and FSAR Volume 15 and 16, NU responses to the NRC's questions (Q&As) l 5.2 There is also a need to ensure that corrective actions for the following areas ! are effective and will prevent recurrence of a condition such as currently exists at MP3. This is essentially a direct endorsement of the applicability of ACR 7007 ERT findings to MP-3. l I
l 5.2.1 Management expectations 5.2.2 The prevailing culture, which permits diversity in the degree of commitment to maintaining regulatory compliance 5.2.3 Effective Oversight activities nhich will,in the early stages, detect the development ofless than acceptable performance must be put in place i 5.2.4 Personnel, including management, need to be more effectively trained in the area of regulatory compliance and the means for maintenance Cf same. I 5.2.5 Administrative processes and procedures essential to configuration ; management ' l 5.2.6 An effective corrective actions program 5.2.7 An adequately sized staff capable of presenting backlog growth all-the-wh"a conducting work activities in a manner that will ensure retention of design and license bases. 6.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The MP-3 Unit Director should implement the recommendations of Reference 2.1, Section VII, as well as Recommendation 11 in Section VII of this main report, MP-3 PI-2: MP-3 Specific Assessment: Report to MP-3 UPM and MQC on PI 2 Team Findings, Rev. 01, dated June 21,1996; and the applicable ACR 7007 recommendations described above. This includes, specifically: ; 6.1 Open BJs
- a. Review all open BJs for FSAR compatibility. Ensure they have a written safety evaluation
- b. Evaluate temporary mods. installed without a BJ for need of a BJ and FSAR compatibility 6.2 PDCEs may not fully address design and documentation requirements !
- a. Review 1983-1991 PDCEs as part of other design ongoing reviews 6.3 QA Calculations may not truly address " Worst Case" scenarios, and basis calculation integrity may be compromised
- a. Generate a master list of all calculations
- b. Ensure existing calculation assumptions do not negate each other 6.4 FSAR Correlation to Operating Procedures
- a. Review Group Il systems for FSAR to Operating Procedure compatibility
- b. Complete 10CFR50.59 evaluations for ALL systems operated differently from the FSAR-described mode of operation.
6.5 Original Plant Startup Punch List Items
- a. Credit planned Engineering Backlog review with ensuring that significant design mods put into placejust before and after unit startup are compatible with the FSAR.
i i 6.6 Missed Commitments
- a. Establish a means to ensure commitments are tracked and traceable 6.7 A/E Interface with Major Supplier Packages
- a. Ensure resiewers are alert to ensure major A/E and vendor interfaces were addressed and documented correctly 6.8 FSAR Familiarity and Use
- a. Ensure that the Training element identified in ACR 7007 regarding FSAR use and I' expectations is appropria'tely addressed 6.9 FSAR Changes Conducted Without a 10CFR50.59 Evaluation
- a. Ensure that ALL plant modifications conducted without a PDCR are reviewed to ensure that either a 10CFR50.59 evaluation exists, or a clear and acceptable rationale is in placejustifying the lack of need for such an evaluation 6.10 DCN Use Vulnerability
- a. Ensure that the unit Design organization reviews ALL Category 8 Administrative DCNs to ensure that drawings have not been changed to reflect field conditions, without first ensuring that the field condition is I AW the intended design.
- b. Stop using Category 8 DCNs for purposes other than " purely administrative changes" 6.11 Potential inconsistency: the FSAR's body and FSAR Volume 15 and 16 Q&As
- a. Train appropriate sections of the organization to use Volume 15 and 16 Questions and Answers as part of the MP-3 configuration management process t
- b. Evaluate the need for incorporating the results of Volume 15 and 16 Q&As into appropriate FSAR sections
- c. Review CMP reviews completed to date and ensure such reviews adequately address the results of Volume 15 and 16 Q&As. Revise such reviews if necessary.
6.12 ACR 7007 ERT Findings
- a. Ensure the generic elements of the NU CMP and the Nuclear Excellence Plan address the issues shown in Section 5.2.1 through 5.2.7 of this root cause analysis.
7.0
GENERAL COMMENT
S The unit specific assessment (Reference 2.1) provides additional informatica that should bc useful to returning the unit to conformance with its licensing basis. l1 , 8.0 ATTACHMENT l i Attachment I, Events and Causal Factor Chart l I
g, EVENTS & CAUSAL FACTOR CHART Friday, Juns 21,1996 B (See page 2) S!U Program
-> PhaseI,11,&
lilto FSAR Unit SW to DG NRC notices Unit FSAR VerifiedTest S/U Program / SLCRS submitted stating lity as J( fuelloaded
-> Commercial -> fouling -> performance -> determined
- describedin Program Operation Service Wtr slippin9-
_ A to NRC satisfied not to meet FSAR is 4/23/86 troubles 10/82 > acceptable & Tecincal design Juh N r@rements meets Standard Specifications Major Outage Review Plan SER issued 11/85 1M2 U3 told to A y INPO points U-1 receives h;;gsta U-1 Performs U-3 fumish NRC Inspection R tCause Shddown addit'el out -> 50.54F Letter > p acea
--> Analysis- ACR -> due to AFW -> information > Repod -
OR Millstone 12/13/95 Genenc Ust 7007 3/30/96 priorto Units not Generic implication of 1/30 2 restart 6 Implication of 4/4/96 ACR 7007 with FSAR ' culturel applies to resources, etc, MP3 to MP3 4/4/96 2/22/96 Page1
\
EVL..o & CAUSAL FACTOR CHART Friday, June 21,199t, PDCRs not closedin a Management did not hold , l Engineering timely manner after , organization accountable ,' Some FSAR (\ understaffed --> implementation. Makes toFSAR ' changes did not after SAJ FSAR descriptior@ , receive 50.59 Ir1 accurate ,
> (Issue 9)
Temporary Modifications ,'
, left in place since S/U ,', Did not train Plant due to lack of resources / ,'
, Engineers on
! priorities. , importance of FSAR _
, - PDCE concems (Issue 1)
V ' > (Issues 2 & 8) FSAR not considered Abandoned Systems
. - - - - - a formal requirement > not removed from Star' tup Testing accepted if which must be met. / FSAR if PDCR not
. Technical Specifications could ....__~ done (50.59 not be met-items added to backlog if not completely k\ ' completed) matching FSARIdesign t 3 I f Approach fix via operating Unit 3 starts up with large ; y procedures such as single backlog failure of SW to RSS Hx vs. (Issue 5) Systems not functioning design changes are bypassed / procedurally , g modified w/o 50.59 even Y ' though described in FSAR l ( B (Issue 4) (See page 1) Dotted lines used to indicate feedback. The result feeds back to strengthen the Page 2 perception behind the main causal factor. 1
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l ATTACHMENT 1A Attachment 2 I Job Priority (Sheet 1 of 1) ( DETERMINE Job Priority by selecting the category description that best matches the task or plant problem. CATEGORY PRIORIIY1 PRIORITY 2 PRIORITY 3 PRIORITY 4 Plant or Equipment Prevents operation at Equipmentproblem Improves unit Generalplant Reliability expected powerlevel thatjeopardizes performance, improvement and or requires continued operation availability, and equipment repairs immediate action to at expected power operability. Work which can be done avoid equipment level may be scheduled when time permits damage and completedin a timely manner Personnel Safety Si-inet safety Safety hazard which Personnelsafety ags h5ard requiring requires attention to improvements that 7 immediate action in avoid personnel are needed but do a y",}].
@t ddf$)%#h ,
order to avoid injury not present an
.. 3RE. KWH personnelinjury immediate hazard $%ggy%QL '
A2Es@EId=5A: Outage Work Immediate action Ajob on the critical May become Does not affect required to prevent path schedule criticalpath work criticalpath adversely affecting or or significantly schedule and may be impedingcritical affecting outage deferred tolater path schedule schedule outage without affecting reliability Regulatory Problem that results Jeopardizes Routine work n Ng em Reqcinment in failing to meet a compliance with required by Wikdp%f regulatory regulatory regulations Dr W4 A ( requirement requirements 2& n d;de b i Pnventive mt Overdue PM which Routine PM work Routine PM work Maintenance g% gam 74 t gI > Ld7.N, ,.has been determined stp by Operations or
;p y;> f , ' 'd Maintenance jdi d e W M fpT supervision to
$3 "M?L 98 require a higher
- W^Mk y@g priority sud % % d!k & M a Security Requires multiple Requires Security High priority CM, Routine CM, PM,or Requirement Security Guard Guard posting and PM, SV, or modification work posting and major excessive overtime modification work system failure is hours willbe or imminent or has expended unless or occurred addressed promptly Deterioration to a Conditionis situation where or or expected to postingis required, deteriorate within butis not expected Major part of There areinadequate 1 week to a point in the near future security system has personnelto where Security failed creating a compensate for Guard posting will degradation of additionalfailures be required securitywhich cannot beyond this event be compensated Level of Use vv g ,q gy lnfOrmation [% [U% [F% [% MdW
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