ML20113C723
| ML20113C723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1985 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| CON-#285-311, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-TM OL, NUDOCS 8504120008 | |
| Download: ML20113C723 (5) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 SHIELDS L. DALTROFF nacTaicPn c on March 29, 1985 Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 Inspection Report Nos. 50-352/05-02 50-353/85-01 Mr. Richard W. Starontecki, Director Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Dear Mr. Starostecki Your letter dated February 28, 1985, forwarded combined Inspection Report 50-352/85-02 and 50-353/85-01.
Appendix A addresses two items which do not appear to be in full compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements.
These items are restated below along with our response.
Finding A.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures be maintained to implement the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item I.C.6.
Administrative Procedure A-41, the procedure for the control of safety-related equipment, implements Item I.C. 6 of NUREG-0737 and requires that, prior to removal of safety-related equipment from. service for maintenance, permission to release L
the affected equipment'shall be granted by shift. supervision.
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contrary to the ' a bo've, on January 23, '198 5, safety-related equipment was removed from service without permission being I
granted by shift supervision in'that, during performance of maintenance activities controlled by Maintenance Request Form 8501192, the Loose Parts Monitoring system was rendered inoperable in that the alarms on all its modules were 8504120008 850329 gDR ADOCK 05000352 I O
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March 29,.:1985
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This[is :a Severity - LevAl IV -Violation (Supplement ~ I).
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eon January 23;;1985,sa maintenance request: form.was~ issued to;
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sperform; adjustments to the. Loose Parts. Monitoring ~. System.;
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'The scope of the work. authorized was not intended to render
_ "tlie v ays temJinoperative. ; Durin'g the. course of'the work the 6.
technicians defeated'theialarms' locally at the system-
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modules, rendering the systes inoperative.
Shift. supervision
{was. not' aware of' the changed ' status. -
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0nLJanuary 24', 1985, when operating: personnel werennotified
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of?the~ system status,;the Loose Parts' Monitoring System was 1,-
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.. logged"in the LCO' tracking. log as inoperable,'as was;
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appropriate with'the alarmsfat the. system'modulen defeated.
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.This ensured that the' correct status of ~ the system wan' apparentfto~ operators..
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' shift operating personnel were instructed by-the Operations,
,' Engineer-to~make equipment'" INOPERATIVE" during maintenance ~
'if<any' possibility existed that the* Work would. render the q
system' inoperative W The Operations Engineer also. requested
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. that :the MaintenanceiEng1neerl a'nd ' Technical Engineer rc-
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einphasizo to their personne'l' the lre'spohsibility to keep shif t t.
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' supervision? informed about changes to equipment' status which foccur'during; work.
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<operato'rs specifically re'garding.the Technical 4 Specifications has. been. implemented.. - This. consists of. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of training
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.on' Technical? Specifications'i!and;is expketed to enhance 7,
. Soperator; awareness"of Techn'ical Specification requirements as u-wellEas emphasise~the Importance of' evaluating equipment-operability / status'in' light'of Technical Specification
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' requirements.,As a part of the program,'all licensed
- operators _ have.been provided with a personal copy of the.
Technical Specifications'for'their use.
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Plant / personnel have also-developed and' implemented a tprocedure which assists control' room personnel in verifying
- thatl plant system-status;and parameters" indicated _in the
. control; room-are within Technical Specification' requirements.
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fMr~.'Richar'd W.[Starostecki
' March 29,-1985 Page-3 u
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- Management attention has been focused on the upgrading of all personne171n standards of plantioperationJand.has-resulted11n:
c a: plant-wide prograa.of improved " operational l Excellence".
This -has included meetings with all parsonneli by senior site management., Improved performance'in.the area of control of t
Technical-Specification related parameters and equipment'has-
- been notedsin recent weeks.=
FullLcomp1iance was achieved on January-24, 1985
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when the.
inoperable' status of the' Loose Parts. Monitoring System was N
- properly, logged, thus assuring Shift-Supervision awareness of "p,
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the system ~ status.
e Finding
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15. ~ 10.CFR :50.59 states that changes to procedures described ;in
.the safety -analysis report can be made without prior.
Commission approval provided these changes ~do:not involve an unreviewed safety question..
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. Final Safety Analysis Report' (FSAR) sections 2.2.3 and.6.4~
describe ~ the analyses used to demonstrate that.the control room.would remain habitable after accidents which' involve L.
releases of. radiation,1 chlorine or; toxic gas.'1These sections indicate.that'a' positive air pressure is assumed to exist'
.within 'the control room,to licit air les.kage into the contro11 room during the ' initial stages of the above described 1 accidents.
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FSAR :section 9.4.1.2.2 and' Figure 9.4-1 describe the
- procedures;for operation'of;the control room heating,.
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~ ventilating and. air conditioning -(HVAC) system such that a '
- positive. air pr'e,ssure t n'the control room would;.bei i 4 i
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- Contrary,to the.above, between about '9:30.a.m. and 11:30 L
,a.m., January 24, 1985',';the pr'ocedures,forLoperation of.the
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control room HVAC system'were changed, such that a positive air pressure was not being maintained, without prior
) Commission approval and.without an evaluation to' demonstrate
.that the effects of this change-on the control room habitability. analyses did not involve an unreviewed-safety.
question.
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LThis.is a -Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
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.Mr~.. Richard - W. ;Starostocki_
March 29,-1985-
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ion ; January 24,r 1985, withx Unit' 1 at :4 percent power, the' main
- t l control roomoventilation system'was operat'ed outside of its (design. basis forDa two hour period..
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i The contro1(room-_v_entilation_ system inlet and outlet
{ isolation ' valves had 1been. blocked"in1the closed position for y
h lmainten'anc'e... Theicontrol room' toilet'. room' exhaust.-fan was J
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v Tlef t :inf operationnwhich. caused. the ' control room atmosphere to -
~ 1 be negative =with respect to the turbine enclosure.... The -
' 'cor' trol room is ~normally. maintained.st a positive pressure' i
with respect.to the turbine; enclosure.
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When.thel significance.of thelabnormal: pressure condition:was y,
fdiscoverediat 11:30_a.m.lon January 24, 1985, the control;
'Jroom' ventilation ~ system was immediately placed in~the
'radiationLisolation'modeiof operation.
This isolated the t
toilet.' room exhaust fan 'and allowed.the pressuref differential'
[^"i to? return to.an< acceptable.value.
The radiation isolation <'
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-. mode supplies' filtered outside air _to pressurize the control room.
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7 S.hif t operators have been; advised to initiate a radiation
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.. Isolation, manually in the event ofva-low control room N" pres;sure condition. : A modification is being designed to r#
. actuate an alarm when an abnormal control room / turbine w
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.en' closure 7 differential: pressure condition exists.
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AddiIlonally,theblockingsequences'for:thecontirolroom
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-.ventilat'lon ; system have'- been reviewed and : are being revised.
- to-includeEthe toilet > room' exhaust' fan and isolation valves.
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Full compliance wasfachieved on, January 24,'1985 when the:
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! control. room ventilatioA system was restored to a mode of
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~ : operation (radiation ' indication) which falls within.the
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_ ; design basis.
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_'information~, please contact'us.
fShould;you'havecany questions,or require additional.
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~very truly yours, Origins signed by g
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S. L. DALTROFB '
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fcc'a' Dr.,T..E..Murley,,hdministrator, Region l', USNRC m
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- J..T. Wiggins, Resident Site Inspector r ; e. _'
-See Service List!
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cc:
Judge Helen F. Hoyt Judge Jerry Harbour Judge Richard F. Cole Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.
Mr. Frank R. Romano Mr. Robert L. Anthony Ms. Phyllis Zitner Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
Zori G. Ferkin, Esq.
Mr. Thomas Gerusky Director, Penna. Emergency Management Agency Angus Love, Esq.
David Wersan, Esq.
Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
Martha W. Bush, Esq.
Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel James Wiggins (3 Copies)
Docket & Service Section Timothy R. S. Campbell January 16, 1985
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