ML20111A447
| ML20111A447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1985 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8503120506 | |
| Download: ML20111A447 (36) | |
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im f T H E C L E V E L A N D E L E C 1 R I C l L L U rs ! U A.T : W G C O M i2; A !! Y P.o. Box 5000 - CLEVELAND, oHlo 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINAT.NG BLOG. - 55 PUBLICSQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN March 8, 1985 VICE PRESIDENT PY-CEI/0IEW-0002L NUCLEA R f
Mr. Brian K. Grimes Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 s
Integrated Design Inspection 84-29
Dear Mr. Grimes:
i Enclosed is the additional information requested of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company at the conclusion of the closeout inspection conducted by your office on Februat y 27, 28, and March 1,1985. This closecut inspection resulted from the Integrated Design Inspection of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant contained in NRC Inspection Report 50-440/84-29, transmitted by Mr. DeYoung's letter of December 12, 1984.
At the closeout inspection exit meeting held on March 1, 1985, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company agreed to provide supplemented responses to a number of inspection items; draft copies of changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report for Perry Nuclear Power Plant as identified 5
in responses to inspection items; and a summary and status of actions on open inspection items, including expected completion dates for these actions.
The additional information requested is enclosed.
Our staff will provide any information you may require in addition to the enclosed, and we will continue to be available to work with you on a timely closeout of this inspection.
Very truly yours, U
Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:bmr Enclosure cc:
J. Silberg, Esq.
D. Keating J. Stefano D. Norkin J. Grobe J. Keppler 8503120506 850308 PDR ADOCK 05000440 0
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SupplementalResponse To-k Perry NucleaTPower Plant integrated Desian inspection The following list arovides a summary and status of actions on open and conditionally closec items. The list also serves as an index to the attached supporting documents.-
D2.1-3
- Attach'ed is a supplemental response (Page 4)' reflecting our agreement during the. reinspection to develop a water hammer test program. As stated in the supplemental response, this test program will be available April 1,1985.
D3.2-4, D3.3-8, & D3.5-2 General Electric Company (GE) has revised GE Plant Piping Design memo #123-8418 as discussed during the reinspection.
s D3.2-5 A supplemental response summarizing remaining activities is.
attached (Page 5). The remaining effort is scheduled to be completed by May 1,1985.
( in addition, the Inspection Team expressed concern regarding the Piping Design Specification defining itself asthe overriding document in cases where information from another source is not consistqnt. We have reviewed this issue and have made two programmatic changes which will provide additional direction as to the use of the Piping Design Specification. These changes are:
1.-Item 3:00 of the Piping Design Specification. entitled " Design Information" currently reads:
"This section delineates detailed information considered to be necessary and adequate for the analysis of the piping and piping support design in accordance with ASME Code Ill. The piping analysis shall be performed in accordance with this design 7
specification."
Thisitem has been expanded to include the following:
" Conflicts in information between the design specification and of the Project Engineer Piping and Project Mech lht to the att referenced vendor information shall be brouc anical Engineer for written resolution."
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2.The Perry Procedures Manual addresses piping design specifi-cation changes in Section 5:00 of Appendix N. The following paragraph has been added to this section:
" Changes to the Piping Design Specification are,the joint responsibility of the Project Mechanical Engineer and the Project Engineer Piping. Discrepancies noted between inter-facing documents and the design specification during execution of the design change shall be jointly resolved in writing between the respective project engineers" D3.3-6 A supplemental response addressing a revision'to Piping Department Standard DS-5 is attached (Page 6).
D4.2-2 We have completed a reanalysis'cf the Reactor Building seismic model following the approach discussed during the reinspection. The floor response spectra obtained from the reanalysis were compared to the design spectra. The design spectra are adequate. The results of this reanalysis have been provided for NRC review.
D5.4-1 A revised calculation will be completed by April 1,1985 D5.4-7 Attached (Page 7) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D5.6-1, D5.6-2, D5.6-4, & D5.6-5 Action as described in our response dated January 24,1985 is proceeding and will be completed by April 1,1985.
D5.7-1 Review of calculation R31-001 utilizing 442 volts as the degraded condition at the 480V bus was questioned by the inspection Team. Verification of the 442 volts is required in response to this item.
i The degraded coadition of 442 volts at the 480 volt bus will be confirmed upon the completion of the load flow calculations currently underway in response to item D5.14-1. These calculati6ns are scheduled to be completed by April 1,1985.
D5.7-3 Attached (Pages 8 thru 10) is the Class 1E Cable Voltage' Drop Evaluation Program.
Implementation of the program will be complete by April 15,1985.
D5.7-6 Attached (Page 11) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D5.9-1 Action discussed during the reinspection is proceeding and will be completed by April 1,1985.
D5.10-1 Attached (Vages 12 and 13) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion
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D5.10-3 Supplemental information is attached (Page 14).
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3-8-85 DS.10-4 Attached (Page 15) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
DS.10-5 Supplemental information is attached (Page 14).
D5.12-3 Attached (Page 16) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D'5.13 Attached (Page 17) is a supplemental response reflecting our-discussion during the reinsoection.
' D5.13-2 Attached (Page 18) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D5.14-1 Action as described in our response dated January 24,1985 is proceeding and will be completed by April 1,1985.
US.2-1 A revised calculation as discussed during the reinspection is being prepared and will be completed by April 1,1985.
D6.1-2 Attached (Page 19) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D6.1-9 Attached (Page 20) is a supplemental response reflecting our discussion during the reinspection.
D6.2-1 The addition'al concerns raised by the inspection Team are currently being reviewed. This review will be complete by March 15,1985.
D6.8-1 Supplemental information is attached (Page 14).
D6.8-2 Supplemental information is attached (Page 14).
FSAR CHANGES -
All FSAR changes identified in responses to IDI items have been incorporated into Amendments 15 and 17 to the FSAR dated December 31,1984 and March 6,1985, respectively, except for changes resulting from IDI items 2.3-1 and 3.2-5. These FSAR changes have been initiated and will be included in a future amendment.
Copies of the applicable changes for IDI items 2.3-1 and 3.2-5 are attached (Pages 21 to 35).
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D2.1-3 (Deficiency) Failure to Document Substantiation
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for Emeroency Service Water Pump Vacuum Breaker
- Check Valve Size-Summary of item This item states' that specific analyses were not performed to assure that the size of
. the Emergency Service Water pump discharge vacuum breaker check valves, and the pump start-up sequence subsequent to a pump trip, would not result in water hammer loads on the Emergency Service Water piping.
Response
- No specific water hammer analysis was deemed necessary for this system. The design input included the considerations for all critical operating characteristics of the system in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11. The engineering decision that water hammer was not a critical characteristic was based on the design of the system, including the relative sizes of the pump and vacuum breaker check valve, the addition of an in-line check valve to minimize system drainage, the speea of the pump, the minimal amount of air flow needed to drain the applichble portion of the piping system, the amount of time available in which, to drain the pump and restart the pump, and the demonstrated ability of similar systems at i
other operating plants to preclude water hammer. We do not believe that ANSI N45.2.11 -
required a calculation to confirm the type of engineering decision covered by this item.
Nonetheless,-in response to thisitem, the Perry Preoperational Test Program will be modified to require observation of the system performance with regard to water hammer.
A detailed Water Hammer Test Program, which includes the system operational transients and condiitions which could cause water hammer, will be issued by April 1,1985. This test program will provide additional assurance that the system design precludes the occurrence of water hammer. Because the original engineering decision is still considered appropriate, no design or hardware modifications are required.
Other systems (e.g., Feedwater, Residual Heat Removal, Control Rod Drive, Main Steam) have been designed, and calculation's have been performed as required, to account
,or potential water hammer effects. Accordingly, this item does not raise a~ systematic" f
issue.
For these reasons, no other action is deemed necessary to address this item.
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i 3-8-85 D3.2-5 (Deficiency) Interface Between Pipino and Equipment-Summary of item This item states two concerns with respect to interfaces between G/C-designed piping and safety related equipment. These concerns relate to possible seismic effects of flexible equipment on piping, and failure to include thermal effects in the loading combinations used to evaluate N555 equipment nozzles for emergency and faulted conditions.
Response
The first concern is that there was a' failure to include flexible equipment (equipment with a fundamental frequency less than 33 Hz) in the seismic analyses for piping. As stated -
in our response to item D3.1-2, G/C was aware of the potential effect of low equipment frequency prior to the IDI and had initiated a program to evaluate its effect on the attached piping. All equipment specified by G/C in the table referenced in this item had already been evaluated by this program an'd was determined to be acceptable. The equipmentidentified on the table as having been specified by GE was not evaluated.
As stated in the response to item D3.1-2, an evaluation of GE and HVAC equipment is being performed to determine those pieces of equipment which require flexible modelling.
No hardware modifications have been required for reanalyses using a flexible model which have been completed to date.
i A detailed plan to complete work on the remaining 16 pieces of equipment has been established. This work involves reanalysis of 12 pieces of equipment which will be modelled flexibly with sufficient attached pipinc to predict dynamic interaction effects.
The remaining 4 pieces are HVAC Plenums wh)ich will be flexibly modelled or will be y
stiffened to establish a natual frequency higher than 33 Hz. This work is scheduled to be completed by May 1,1985.
The second concern is that there was a failure to include thermal loading in emergency and faulted conditions for GE (N555) equipment. Although the ASME code does i
not require inclusion of thermal loading for the faulted condition, we agree that GE's criteria, which is more conservative, than the code, was not met. In response to this item, G/C has reviewed all GE equipment attached to G/C-analyzed piping. Excluding the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers, which are addressed in D3.1-3, there are a related pieces of GE equipment containing (22 nozzles with G/C-total of eleven safetyhed.
Nozzle loads have been recalculated Calculation P323) to analyzed piping.attac include thermal loading in the emergency and faulted, conditions. All but one of the nozzles have met the established interface load allowable. One nozzle on the RHR pump exceeds the allowable by 12%. GE is currently evaluating this condition. No hardware modifications are expected to be required based on GE's conservative method of 1
establishing faulted nozzle load allowables. Our evaluation is scheduled to be complete by l
March 15,1985.
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3-8-85 D3.3-6 (Deficiency) Shear Luo Qualification Summary of item This item questions.the design process followed for support 1P45-H515, including the assumption that loads are evenly distributed to the pipe lugs from the clamp, and the judgment to consider primary loads as primary plus secondary.
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Response
As stated in the IDI Report, the original calculation evaluating lug stresses,which was performed in July 1982, assumed a symmetrical arrangement of the four lugs to calculate load on the lugs. The symmetrical arrangement was in accordance with project instructions for pipe stress analysis.
As further noted in the IDI Reportduring installation of the support,a field change (ECN #14061-44F-3923-A)was required,which'resulted in rotation of the clamp. Although this rotation of the clamp changed the distribution of the loading,the designerjudged that the lugs were still adequate because the support load was substantially reduced.
'In April 1983, the pipe fabricator requested the substitution of a Western Clamp. The substitution was approved. As a result, the as-built support configuration was reviewed in May 1983, at which time the designer noted that the design load had decreased even further. Thus, the designer concluded that the support was adequate.
In. response to this item,'an additional calculation (pipe support Calculation 1P45-H515) has been prepared which evaluates one lug for the entire support load. This conservatively reflects the as-built configuration. The resulting stresses were determined to be within design allowables. In addition, a review will be performed by February 15,1985, to confirm that calculation of shear lug loads is sufficiently conservative in other cases where as-built configuration differs from design assumptions'.
The second issue concerns the treatment of primary loads as " primary plus secondary" loads in the shear lug calculation. By crossing out the secondary portion of the load table, the originator indicated that she recognizec that there were no secondary loads on this refers to the fact that the designer was conservatively applying a sup' port. The " secondary" factor of 1.5, which is required to be used only when conside local stress intensification secondary stresses. Since the loads resulting from this method of calculation exceeded design requirements, the designer decided to eliminate the unnecessary conservatism and to calculate stresses for a primary loading condition only. This calculati~on demonstrated that the design was acceptable. The use of the conservative approach in the initial calculation is the standard G/C approach, as indicated in the IDI Report.
Nontheless, in order to assure consistencyin future applications, Piping Department Standard DS-5 has been revised to clarify the didinction between primary and secondary stresses and the appropriate selection tables for each.
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3-8-85 DS.4-7 (Deficiency) Battery Room Temperature Summary ofitem This item states (1) that the alarm setpoint in the battery room will not detect a loss of-battery capacity because it does not have a low temperature setpoint, (2) that there is an inconsistency between the M23 (HVAC) System Description and Plant environmental table temperatures, and (3) that "the proposed Technical Specification appears to be in error because it was not specifically written for the Perry battery temperature cond.ition."
Response
On the first point, there is no need to have a low temperature alarm to assure batttery capacity because the battery room temperature will not fall below 72oF, as noted in Plant Environmental Conditions Table EC.S. The battery is sized for the minimum temperature (72cF) under any condition for this zone. The design and installation of the batteries is consistent with IEEE-484(1975) and Regulatory Guide 1.128 which do not require a low temperature alarm.- The Battery Room High Temperature alarm is paralleled with other MCC, switchgcar and miscellaneous area temperature alarms to provide a common high
" Room Temperature Alarm" annunciation point in the Control Room. This alarm indicates a ventilation system problem and is not intended to alarm a battery reduced capacity condition.
On the second point, there is no need to include a minimum temperature in the HVAC System Descripti@c There is no requirement that all environmental data in the FSAR Environmental Tables be duplicated in the System Description. In any case, as noted above, low temperatures will not occur in the battery room because loss of ventilation results in increased tempentures.
Regarding the final point,the proposed Technical Specification declaresthe battery inoperable when the average electrolyte temperature of ten cells is below 60oF. This temperature is consistent with the current carrying capability of the battery because of the margin presently in the battery. However, we agree that raising the temperature in the Technical Specification will allow full utilization of available _ margin in the battery.
Accordingly, we will assure that the minimum cell temperature in the final Technical Specification will be consistent with the corresponding temperature in the Environmental Tables. No additional analysis or hardware changes are required.
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- 8-85 D5.7-3
~ Class 1E Voltaae Drop Evaluation Procram 1.
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- The Voltage Drop Evaluation Program for Class 1E ci'rcuits is initiated in order to support c
cable sizing criteria followed during th# design of Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Additionally, the program will satisfy conditions of the Project Design Criteria, Article 2.7, Paragraph "h" and the program results will identify circuits the lengths of which adversely affect the -
voltage delivered to the connected equipment II.
SCOPE 1
-The program identifies proposed re~ views and calculations, outlines criteria for evaluating cable voltage drop in Class 1E low voltage power and control circuits and includes CEI inputs
., and concurrence.
- The program is comprised of the following phases:
4 A. Elementary DraWirig Review.
- 1. A review of various safety related elementary systems of high complexity will be don e to determine whether multiplication of loads or circuits' conductors cause excessive vo,ltage drop.,The review will be primarily performed for control circuits of equipment inside containment.
Calculation R31-001, Rev. 2 " Cable Length Calculations for 3% Voltage Drop",
- (Reference 5) and the Perry NPP Design Criteria, Chapter 2, Tables 2.7-2 & 2.7-3,.
(Reference 2) prov,ide criteria to be utilized in this review.
- 2. Voltage drop calculations will be performed for all circuits identified for detailed evaluation by results of the Elementary Drawing sample' review.
B. Voltage drop calculations will be performed for control circuits serving motor control center starters size 3 and larger. Control circuits of smaller starters will be evaluated during the Phase A and F.
C. Voltage drop calculations will be performed for control circuits of DC operated breakers in 480V and,4.16kV switchgears.-
D. Voltage drop calculations will be performed for control circuits of DC starters.
s E. Voltage drop calculations will be performed for power circuits serving equipment inside containment. A total length of inb~oard and outboard circuits will be utilized.
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' D5j-3(Cont'd.)
F.iVolt' ge drop calculations will be performed for circuits identified by a computer a
program No. E105 Long, Version 1,(Reference 4). Circuits evaluated in any of the
.pr.eceeding calculations, Phase A through E,will be excluded.
s The computer program No. E105 Long, Version 1 uses data resulting from calculation
? R31-001 Rev. 0. : Cable sizes sorted by bill of materials and their maximum circuit lengths 4
. based on conductor ampacities were used to select circuits, the length of which exceeds these maximum limits.
I 111.. PROGRAM CRITERIA
' A. Power circuits 480V,120V,125V DC.
- 1. A cable voltage drop calculation shall be performed for any equipment added to the PNPP Class 1E power distribution system or existing circuits which exceed 3% voltage drop at fullload;
- 2. The cable voltage drop shall be determined for both starting and normal running conditions. Values of inrush and full load current of connected equipment incluc ing ower factor, as applicable, shall be used.- The values shall be
. appropriate values of p's supplied documentation. For equipment for which no obtained from vendor accurate data is available, the missing information can be assumed based on values 4
l-of comparable equipment.
- 3. All voltage drop calculations for equipment in 4.16 kV and 480V power distribution system shall be based on degraded bus conditions. The calculated degraded voltage j..
of the bus from which the' component is supplied shall be used as the base for these calculations.
- 4.. The v'oltage drop in 4.16kV and 480V power circuits shall in no case result in an equipment terminal voltage less then rated. For steady state conditions - 10% of 460V, for MOV's; - 10% of rated for all other motors during normal running, and 75% of rated on starting.
- 5. The voltage drop in 120V AC and 125V DC power circuits should in no case result in the terminal voltage less than equipment minimum rating.
- 6. For DC powered equipment, a battery voltage consistentwith the equipment.
operation shall be selected. A value of 113V,(Reference 6) shall be used for equipment actuated during the first minute of the battery duty cycle. A final battery discharge voltage of 105V shall be used fo_r the remaining time.
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3-8-85 D5.7-3(Cont'd.)
- 1. The cable voltage drop analysis for control circuits shall include the inrush current of
. any connected devices, circuit total length accounting for cummulative effect of cable conductors, circuit resistance and the device minimum voltage rating.
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- 2. Volt:ge drop evaluation of 125V DC control circuits shall be based on a minimum battery voltage of 105V. Should the control circuit originate in secondary power
' distribution panel or cabinet, the minimum voltage level at the panel needs to be established. Subsequent voltage drop calculation will be based on such voltage
.value.
- 3. Voltage drop evaluation of 120V AC control circuits shall be based on 480V AC bus degraded conditions. The initial voltage for control circuits is 110V AC.
- 4. The cable voltage drop in no case shall result in a device terminaivoltage less than minimum rated.
- 5. When a control circuit is comprised of separate discrete circuits, the total length of the complete circuit (power source to device) shall be considered.
C. Instrumentation Circuits Because of low current levels, no cable voltage drop considerations are required for instrumentation circuits.
IV. DOCUMENTATION OF PROGRAM RESULTS:
A summary of circuits causing voltage reduction below connected equipment minimum operability rating will be submitted to CEI along with recommendations for corrective action.
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REFERENCES:
- . Industrial Power Systems Handbook, D. Beeman '
- 2. Perry Design Criteria Chapter 2
- 3. Dept.0421 Electrical Design Guides
- 4. Computer Program E105 Long, Revision 1
- 5. Calculation R31-001, Rev. 0-2
- 6. Calculation R42-13, Rev. -
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.t D5.7-6 (Deficiency) Cable Pullina Calculation Summary of item -
.This item states that Perry Project Organization _ personnel determine pulling tensions -
for cables in duct banks by extrapolation without a documented technical basis for the extrapolation. The item further states that the electrical contractor hand pulled cable in cable trays without perfo'rming tension calculations.
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Response
This item states that extrapolation of the values in the tables for cable pulling tensions is without technical basis. There was adequate technical basis for the extrapolation. Based on manufacturers' data, G/C developed tables of maximum allowable pulling tensions for use by the.' electrical contractor in installing cable. SP-33, the electrical construction-specificatica, incorporates these tables and requires'that the contractor determine the
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maximum allowable pulling tension based on the number and types of cable in the pull,
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and'the' bend radius of raceway or: conduit. Although the maximum allowable pulling tensions for most cables were determined by the contractor, maximum tensions for cables pulled through duct banks were determined by Project Organization personnel, approved Modifications (RCIM) g, and provided to the contractor on Raceway an g
by G/C site engineerin tensions from the SP-33 tables was necessary because the highest value shown is for a bend -
radius of 25 inches, while the bend radius of the duct banks is 48 inches. The extrapolations were documented on a sheet attached to each RCIM.
The technical basis for the
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extrapolation is that allowable pulling tension is directly related to the bend radius. This i
relationship is evident from the tables, and it was not considered necessary to document the basis for the extrapolation. As noted in.this item, these calculations resulted in a -
conservative limit on pulling tension. Further, in response.to this item, 29 RCIM forms developed by Project organization personnel to provide the contractor with pulling tensions'for safety-related cables in duct banks, have been reviewed. None have been found to specify a pulling tension higher than acceptable per the latest tables attached to SP-33. These 29 represent a majority of the safety related tensions developed by Project Organization.
4 With respect to hand-pulling of cable, we interpretthat the electrical contractor's procedure as allowing hand-pulling of cable in cable trays without calculating. pulling tensions. L. K. Comstock's Cable Pulling Procedure 4.3.3, Section 3.2.10, states in part that t
offsets and penetrations shall not require a tension limiting / measur
"(c) ables pulled in trays by hand, where a man is stationed a maximum of ever If tension is i
not required to be measured during hand-pulling, there is no reason to calculate a j.
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maximum allowable tension. A revision to SP-33 will be initiated to make the specification consistent with the procedure so that the contractor is not required to determine the pulling tension for hand-pulling cables as noted above.'
Based on the above, no further analysis or corrective action is required in response to this item.
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3-8-85 D5.10-1 (Deficiency) Electrical Separation Criteria Deficiencies
' Summary of item This item states that there are several errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the G/C
-inconsistencies in the G/C Project Electrical Design Criteria and construction criteria drawings with respect to electrical separation requirements.
Response
There are nine concerns noted in this item. Our responses to the specific concerns are as follows:
Concern 1 We agree that the reference to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1in criteria drawing D-214-005 is incorrect. The design was based on Revision 2, as stated in the FSAR.
The change does not affect the design because there are no differences between Revisions 1 and 2 with respect to separation criteria. The drawing will be revised by March 1,1985 to reference the correct revision.
Concern 2 We do not agree that this concern is an omission in the Project Design Criteria.
Although separation requirements for Class 1E to non-Class 1E conduit are not specifically addressed in the Project Design Criteria, the Project Design Criteria references IEEE Std. 384-1974, which contains the separation requirements. As noted in the IDI Report, criteria drawing D-214-004 shows the separation requirements. The separation requirements for Class 1E to non-Class 1E conduit are the same as for Class 1E to Class 1E conduit.
Concern 3 Paragraph 2.8.4(d) of the Pro ect Design Criteria was not meant to imply that separation could be less than one inc, as long as conduits are not in physical contact. This provision was intended to be a aplied in conjunction with Figure 2.5-1, Sheet 2, which shows the design objective of six inc, separation. Both the Project Design Criteria and criteria drawing D-214-004 are in compliance with IEEE Std. 384-1974.' Nonetheless,in response to this concern Figure 2.5-1, Sheet 2 will be revised to be consistent with the one-inch minimum separation shown in the construction criteria drawing. This corrective action will be completed by March 1,1985.
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D5.10-1 (Cont'd.)
Concern 4 There was no omission in the Project Design Criteria or in separation criteria t
. drawings D-214-004 and:D-214-005. Separation-requirements for Class 1E components within panels are not specifically addressed in these criteria-documents-because these i
documents are for the design.and construction of raceways. As noted in the IDI Report,
- construction specification SP-33 specifies the applicable; separation requirements.
Nonetheless a section has been added to the project design criteria to address separation of
- Class 1E componentswithin panels.
Concern 5' it is not necessary to show the Division 3 power tray identifetion symbol c the Division 4 instrumentation tray identification symbol in drawing D-214-005. The oc!y power tray in Division 3 is a random lay power and control tray. The symbol for this tray is i-shown on criteria drawing D-214-005. Division 4 does not contain any trays, including logic trays. Thus, there is no omission.
1 Concern 6
.This concern is related to Concern 3. Figure 2.5-1, Sheet 2, of the Project Design
' Criteria shows a minimum separation distance of six inches, while criteria drawing D-214-004 shows a minimum separation of one inch. Both the Project Design Criteria and drawing D-214-004 are consistent with IEEE Std. 384-1974, which requires a minimum separation of one inch. In response to this concern, Figure 2.5-1, Sheet 2, will berevised to' be consistent with the criteria drawing. This corrective action will be completed by March 1,1985.
4 Concerns 7,8,1and 9 i
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The one-inch minimum required separation distance between barriers and raceways is i
not shown on some details of barrier criteria drawing D-201-146, Sheet 1. The separation requirernents are set forth in IEEE Std. 384-1974, and there is no need to duplicate the detailed information on each drawing. Nonetheless, in response to this concern, all details
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of criteria drawing -D-201-146, Sheet 1, which do not show the minimum one-inch separation distance will be revised to include it. This corrective action will be completed by March 1,1985.
A general concern of the IDI item appears to be that design criteria documents are not I
always revised to reflect detail included in construction specifications or drawings. We do l
not agree that all details specified in construction specifications or drawings are required to 1^
be reflected in the project design criteria. The~ IDI Report observes that separation requirements.were correctly shown' in construction specification documents.
These
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specification documents are used in conjunction with criteria = drawings for the field 1
installation of equipment and raceways. This assures the field installation is in accordance j
with the design requirements.
in light of the above, no further analyses and-no hardware modifications are f
req'uired to address the concerns in this item.
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3-8-85 Supplementallnformation For issues D5.10-3, D5.10-5, D6.8-1, and D6.8-2
-The inspection Team expressed the following concerns regarding items 5.10-3 and 5.10-5.
- 2. 'Either expand the explanation in report DRF A00-794-6 or explain via separate letter, the
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arrangement of cable in contact with flexible conduit. It appeared from the picture in the report that the cable was tie wrapped to the conduit, however no written description was contained in the report.
- 3. Address area of thermal gain. Would a lesser current over a longer time frame be a harsher condition? Issuance of report DRF A42-53 would be sufficient to close this item.
Reports DRF A00-794-6 and A42-53 have been issued to CEI via PY-GEN /CEl-2328 dated March 5, 1985 thus closing items 1 and 3 above as well as IDI item D6.8-1.
The referenced letter and its attached reports noted that the cable adjacent to the flexible conduit was in contact with the conduit by use of tie wraps and/or metal straps thus closing item 2.
The referenced letter also addressed the fact that the test arrangement had wires in contact on both sides of a metal barrier. Therefore,the letter addressed the concerns raised in IDIitem D6.8-2.
For item 4, a communique from GE on February 27,1985 has supplied G/C with an advanced copy of 22A3728 Rev. 4 and notation that formalissue to both CEI and G/C is in process. A followup phone call with GE on March 7,1985 has confirmed this.
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' D5.10-4 (Deficiency) Electrical Separation Violations Within Local Control Panel 1 H51-P037 -
Summary ofitem-5 This item states that there were two separation deficiencieswithin alocalcontrol f
panel where flexib!e steel conduit (used as a separation barrier) containing non-Class 1E g
~. wiring has Class 1E wiring touching or less than 1-inch distance from the conduit, contrary p
to lEEE 5tandards 384 and P420.
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Response
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'The item eorrectly identifies two cases in a balance.of plant local control panel
'in which Class 1E wiring was less than one inch from conduit containing non-Class 11E
' wiring. - As stated in the item, the conduit was "used as a separation barrier" between safety and non-safety wiring. The item discusses separation requirements contained in IEEE Std. 384-1974. Atcording to the item, Section 5.1 of IEEE Std. 384 contains " guidance"
~
l-
. applicable to the two configurations identified.' However, Section 5.1 only relates to cables and raceways in general plant areas, and does not apply to internal panel configurations j
L such as those covered by this item..The portion of IEEE Std. 384-1974 applicable to internal panel wiring separation is Section 5.6.2 which states, among other things, that "(i)n the
~
l, event.... separation distances 'are not maintained, barriers shall be installed between redundant Class 1E equipment and wiring." The item recognizes that conduit was used as a barrier in this instance, and we believe the applicable provisions of IEEE Std. 384-1974 were l-satisfied in these cases.
The item correctly notes that G/C Electrical Department Project Design Criteria includes a reference to IEEE Standard P420. The inclusion of this reference was an inadvertent errer, since G/C has never intended to apply, and has not used,IEEE Standard P420 in the design of panels. For this reason,IEEE Standard P420 is not referenced in the j
FSAR. This explains why Specification SP-594 does not include a reference to IEEE Standard
'=
P420. The Project Design Criteria has been revised to eliminate the reference to IEEE Std.
[
P420.
f The item states that GE Design Specification 22A3728is "not applicable to the gal balance ~ of plant design effort," but then states that the specification "provides guidance i
with' respect to interpretation of separation criteria." The item states that the parts of the j
GE specification which require that analysis be' conducted when external wiring is less than s
one inch from the. barrier should be applied to G/C balance of plant panels. The item recognizes the inapplicability of the GE specification, and we do not agree that the specification constitutes " guidance" with respect to G/C balance of plant panels. The applicable portions of IEEE Std. 384-1974 discussed above do not require an analysis of the
- configuration covered by this item.
I Nontheless a letter has been' issued instructing the appropriate site personnelto separate the Division 1 and 2 cables a minimum of."1 inch from the flexible steel conduits containing the non Class 1E wiring.
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W 3-8-85 ~
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D5.1'2-3 (Deficiency) Fuse Sizino Criteria Inadeouate r
i Summary of item
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- A.
.This item states'that there is no analytical basis for the sizing of the motor operated valve fuses at Perry.
R@sponse -
.There.is adeguate' analytical basis for sizing the motor operated valve motor fuses.
The basis for selecting the fuse s,izing criteria is as follows. The criteria was established in 1975, shortly after the publication of NRC Branch Technical Position' EICSB-27, " Design Criteria for Thermal Overload Protection for Motors'on Motor Operated Valves." The fuse selection criteria was consistent with the Branch Technical Position, "to drive the valve to its i
proper position during an accident rather than be concerned with excess heating."' The Branch Technical Position requirement was established to prevent spurious operation of the' overload protective device. ' A commonly used design in valve motor protection is a thermal overload (for overload protection) and a molded-case circuit breaker (for short-circuit protection) in series. Because the Branch Technical Position required that thermal overloads be bypassed (i.e., not in the circuit) during an accidentithe molded-case circuit breaker would provide the only protection for the valve motor.
The selection of dual-element fuses to protect valve motorswas to improve on the protection philosophy established in the Branch Technical Position by'providing overload protection during an accident, still assuring' that the valve operation takes precedent over the valve protection. Thus, a fuse size higher than that used in normal commercial or industrial applications (i.e., NFPA 70) was selected.- This approach was clearly documented i"
in the SER and accepted by the NRC.
In addition, thisitem statesthatthe PNPP fusesizing criteriais such thatfusesare
" rated at 300% of motor full load current." This is not correct. As noted elsewhere in this item, the fuses are selected so that the " operating point is at least 300% of motor full load current durino the normal operatino time of the valve."
(emphasis added).
The 4
implementation of this criteria results in the selection of fuses rated no greater than 225%
of full load' current. Therefore, the conclusion in this item that the fuses are oversized and that the fuses may not provide adequate protection for the motors during normal plant operation is not accurate.
For these reasons, no further documentation of th election criteria is required.
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3-8-85 DS.13-1 (Deficiency) Seismic Equipment list Summary of item This item states that the Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) form and Seismic Qualification Summary Report for Emergency Service Water Pump A list the required floor response spectra for the Fuel Handling and Intermediate Building rather than for the Emergency Service. Water Pump House.
The item further states that the seismic qualification should be based on the pump vendor's seismic report rather than a floor response spectra.
R@sponse We agree, as stated in this item, that "(t)he correct reference should have been to the pump seismic report which provides the acceleration values that were actually used in the seismic analysis performed by the motor vendor." We further agree that the reference to the Fuel handling and Intermediate Building floor response spectra is only a documentation error, because the actual acceleration values supplied by the pump vendor were used to seismically qualify this motor.
In response to this item, we have verified thatthe seismic qualification for the three safety-related vertical pump motors used the correct response spectra.
In addition, references in the SQRT form for Emergency Service Water Pump motors 1P45C001 A, B and C have been corrected. The reference corrections in the Seismic Equipment List for these motors will be complete by March 1,1985. A sampling of other SQRT forms will be performed to confirm that these were isolated errors.
No hardware changes, other documentation changes, or further analysis are required in response to this item.
1 3-8-85 D5.13-2 (Deficiency) Vertical Motor Reauired Response Spectra Summary ofitem This item ' states that procurement specification SP-550 for Emergency Service Water Pumps 1P45-C001 A and B incorrectly instructs the vendor to provide seismic qualification based on floor response spectra, rather than the pump vendor's seismic analysis acceleration values.
Response
Although the specification referenced the floor response spectra,the qualification of the motors was based on the pump vendors' acceleration values. These numbers had been supplied to G/C from the pump vendor. Atthe time of procurement of these motors, Specification SP-550 included the latest information available, which was the floor response spectra. As noted above,when specific pump acceleration information became available,it was transmitted to the motor vendor.
Nonetheless, in response to thisitem, the three vertical pump motor combinations purchased'by Specification SP-550 have been reviewed. The review confirmed that the appropriate input provided by the pump vendor was used in each case. In addition, a f
memorandum will be written and placed in the SP-550 file indicating that future purchases of vertical motors must utilize pump vendor's acceleratien values rather than floor response spectra values.
~
3-8-85
- D6.1-2 (Deficiency) Safety-Relate'd instrument Loop Components Shown As Nonsafety-Related On Both Desian Documents and Desian Information Documents Summary of item -
-This item states that certain panel components on the Emergency Service Water
- System elementary wiring diagrams are indicated as safety-related, while the G/C instrument index and the GE device list classify these components as nonsafety-related or
- do not list them at all. This item further indicates that, due to the above situation, these
' device l have not been included in GE's Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) package for the Power Generation Control Complex (PGGG) panels.
l
Response
The PGCC panels fabricated under Specificat' ion SP-591 are known as Balance of Plant (BOP) panels._ These BOP panels were built by GE to a " design freeze" revision of the l
elementary diagrams and ship" ped to the Perry site for installation. Any changes to
~
elementary diagrams after the design freeze" revision were made with an Engineering 1-Change Notice (ECN), in accordance with the Perry Procedures Manual, Section 3.21 and Appendix N. The physical panel changes are made at the Perry site by the appropriate electrical contractor. The components listed in this IDI item were added to the panels prior to the IDI by ECNs 245L-033-01 and 245H-033-01 to upgrade certain instrument loops to safety-related as required by Regulatory Guide 1.97.
GE is responsible for c ualification of only the devicesthat they supplied in the "as-shipp'ed" configuration of tle BOP panels. Qualification of these GE devices is documented 4
4 in GE s PGCC SQRT Report.
I Components added by Engineering Change Notices to BOP panels are covered by the G/C Equipment Qualification Program. As part of the Equiament Qualification Program, components added by Engineering Change Notices are quali"ied by justifications, which are a
j filed as a supplement to the GE PGCC seismic qualification packages. Therefore, it is not necessary to provide the ECN justifications to the vendor of the as-shipped panels.
i in res onse to thisitem,the components designated on the G/Cinstrumentindex as "nonsafet " at the time of the IDI have been revised to "Div.-Safety". The Signal Resistor Units and DC Power Supplies, identified in tae IDI Report as "not listed," have not been i-included because they are not instruments. Such components need not be listed in the i
instrument index. It should be noted that the instrument index is issued for information not for design. -The index is periodically updated; however, the fact that it is not l
only, d immediately to incorporate references to design changes does not in our view revise constitute a violation of Perry Procedures Manual, Section 2:05.8, which simply states that i
j-instrument lists are to be developed.
1 Concerning the GE device list, although the component classification was not physicall changed on the list, the ECN numbers for the PGCC panels were posted on the controll copies of.the device lists located on-site, providing the required traceability. In addition, the GE device list will be updated and maintained via the Document Control Transfer Program.
i l
This item does not have any hardwareimpact. Further,we do notbelieve thatthis item requires reanalysis of the seismic qualification of the PGCC panels, since the.
qualification documentation correctly reflects the current design. No further action is required.
i 19
3-8-85 D6.1-9 (Deficiency) Logic Diac: rams Are Not Beinq Updated By The Engineering Change Notice Process Summary of item This item states that two Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) were written to elementary diagrams which did not indicate a corresponding change to the logicdiagrams.
RGsponse Logic diagrams which show how a system functionswere prepared asinputsto the initial preparation of elementary diagrams. Many ECNs written to modify elementary diagrams do not affect system functions. In sorne cases, ECNs written to modify elementary diagrams were issued to agree with the logic diagram. In these cases no change to the logic diagram was necessary. This was the case with ECN 10585-86-196, cited in this item. In a few cases, as in ECN 13137-86 219, Rev. B, also cited in this item, a change to the logic diagram should have been made.
The Perry Procedures Manual will be revised to require that all elementary diagrams be verified. This will assure that the elementary diagrams and ECNs to elementary diagrams will contain all design functions. Therefore, the logics do not need to be revised. The procedure revision will be made by February 15,1985. No hardware changes or analyses are called for by this item. A review of all safety-related elementary diagrams affected by ECNs written prior to February 25,1985 will be made, after incorporating those ECNs, to confirm agreement with logic diagrams or to correct functional design requirements prior to changing the status of the logicdiagrams to "information only".
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S 6.4 HABITABILITY SYSTEMS
../ ',9 Control ro'cm systems are designed in accordance with the design bases described in Section 6.4.1 so that habitability of the control room can be maintained under normal and accident conditions. The general guidance contained in General Design Criterion 19 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, and ths specific guidance contained in
- Regulatory Guide 1.78 is reflected throughout this section.
6.4.1 DESIGN BASES The design bases'for control room habitability systems are as follows:
a.
Control Room Envelope The control room envelope includes all areas located on elevation 654'-6"
....... Cf.the.contgol complex. Housed within this control room envelope are the
^
instrumentation and control panels required fer safe monitoring equipment, operation and shutdown of the plan,t. The control room envelope is provided
{
with fire protection equipment, adequate lighting, communications equipment and kitchen, sanitary,' administrative and storage facilities and spaces necessary for normal plant operation and required to maintain the plant in a safe condition following an accident. The con rol room envelo a th.ient3.n-S*
mb ibo m <i 7:rW 9
atomosphere is normally maintained at g K
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= c;'. t hs-L.id ity.
b.
Period of Habitability The control room envelope is equipped to sustain seven people for a period of seven days following an accident.
c.
Capacity
- J The normal occupancy level of. the control room.is six people.
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This system is:
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' Required to operate during normal, shutdown, loss of offsite power
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- periods and following a LOCA.
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-l Started manually from local panels with automatic start of redundant 2.
system components upon indication of low system air flow.
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Designed to maintain areas served by this system tet"er-M*?
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Designed to remove heat generated in the DC switchgear rooms, HPCS 4.-
8-switchgear rooms, reactor protection rooms, cable ' spreading areas and i
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aj HVAC equipment rooms.
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-5.
, Continuously monitored to indicate system operating status, outside
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air, return air, relief air damper persition, system malfunction, smoke
$n the supply and return air ducts.
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Provided with redundant and separated equipment, controls and power
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supplies so that a single active component failure will not prevent satisfactory system operation,
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Designed with system components located in an area notLaffected by 7.
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internally generated missiles. Pipe whip, jet impingement and flooding.
effects resulting from breaks in high or moderate energy piping are l
reviewed in Section 3.6 and are insufficient to cause a loss of system redundancy.
_Provided with outside air intake ducts and relief.ai~r ducts'with
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structural missile barriers to. prevent external missiles from entering
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the control complex.
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Provided with smoke, exhaust capabilities for the cable spreading, MCC i
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and switchgear rooms and the control complex chase.
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This system is:
[d Required to operate during normal plant operation -cd during plant V I.
shutdown periods.
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M to maintain offigep. laboratorL-s served by this system 3
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. Designed to remove heat = generated in the various offices, 3.
laboratories and shop areas.,9f the controlled access area and frem the miscellaneous equipment areas such as the nuclear closed cooling 7.
pu=p and heat exchanger rooms, emergency closed cooling pu=p and
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heat exchanger areas and from the HVAC equipment area.
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G,...............,,.4't". Monitored continuously to indicate system operating status, system 4
malfunction, smoke in the supply-return-exhaust ducts and high 1
temperature in the filter plenums.
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Designed to direct all exhaust flow from this system through a 5.
charcoal filter plenum to ensure that the release of radioactivity
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to the environment is below permissible discharge limits.
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9.4.1.1.4 Computer Rooms HVAC System
.1 Design bases for the computer rooms HVAC syitem are as follows:
s This System.is classified as Non-Safety Related and Non-Seismic Category.
a.
The requirements of NFPA 90A and Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 have also been considered in the system design and equipment procurement, t
The design bases listed for the HVAC system discussed in Section b.
9.4.1.1.1, items b2, b6, and b7 are applicable to this system.
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This-system is:
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y Required to operate during normal plant operation.
1.
Designedtomaintaintheco=puterrooms7ndthecaj"lesreadingS. p.$
2.
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Designed to remove heat generated by the computer rooms, adjacent 3.
cable spreading areas and control complex WAC equipment room.
Continuously monitored to indicate system operating status, system 4.
malfunction and high computer room temperature.
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J 9.4.1.2 System Descriotion 3
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. 9,4,1d.1.. m 'MCC, Switchgear",' an'd' M'is'cellaneous Electric. Equipment Areas d
WAC System u.} -.{e_
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-This system, shown on Figure 9.4-1, operates continuously 'during normal plant
,j operation, during plant shutdown, and following loss of offsite power or a y
I0CA to' provide cooling or heating. The areas served by this' system include
.4 MCC, switchgear, DC switchgear rooms, battery rooms,'HPCS switchgear rooms,
' {,. r reactor protection system rocas, remote panel shutdown rooms, cable spreading
'l The WAC system consists of two 100 percent areas, and WAC equipment rooms.
capacity supply plenums (M23-B001A, B) that house roughing filters and chilled m3. coot A &
water cooling' coils, two 100 percent capacity supply fans (Mes-Eso pf-B3, a te G) supply duct system with electric rehea(sn.senigns'o e nn.toon A'dhdt syste One t coils 4and a return hundred percent capacity includes removing the heat resulting from simultaneous operation of the equipment in these areas for Units 1 and 2.
The plenums and fans are located in the control complex at elevation 679'-6".
The duct The "A" equipment is in a separate room from the "B" equipment.
systems and controls are arranged so that a mixture of outside air and return
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Q, air from the WAC equipment room is directed through the cooling plenum and
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- Room air, from supplied to the various areas requiring cooling or heating.
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9.4.2
-SPENT TUEL POOL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEy o,1 The general fuel handling areas, fuel pool area, control rod drive pump areas and the fuel pool cooling' equipment rocas are ventilated by the fuel handling area supply system (THASS) and the fuel handling area exhaust system (FRAES).
9.4.2.1 Design Bases _
Design bases for the THASS and the THAES are as follows:
The THASS and THAES'are classified as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I.
a.
System design complies with the requirements of General Design Criteria 1
The guidance (GDC) 1, 2, 4, 5, 60 and 61 of 10 CTR 50, Appendix A.
a
.; _l 1.3, 1.13, 1.25, 1.26, 1.29, 1.47 and 1.52 provided by Regulatory Guides 1*
5.
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has been considered in the system design.
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The THASS and THAES are' not required for safe shutdown of the plant in l
b.
1 the event of a LOCA. However, these systems are required to operate to 7'
Therefore, sitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.
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f redundant components are provided to satisfy the single failure 4
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criterion.
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The THASS and THAES are initially started and subsequently operated a.
ul remote-manually frem the control room.
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e of the fuel The THASS and THAES are designed to maintain the temperat
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whandling areas, and any other areas they serve, bet. ween W
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personnel and equipment.
The THASS and THAES are designed so that air flow is directed from areas e.
i of potentially low radioactivity to areas of potentially high l'
radioactivity.
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Designed so that air flow is directed from areas of potentially low 4.
radioactivity to areas of higher radioactivity.
Designed to maintain flow rates of 3 to 6 air changes per hour for
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non-radioactive areas and 6 to 10 air changes per hour for
.potentially radioactive areas.
4 Designed to maintain constant supply and exhaust air flow despite 6.
filter pressure drop increase due to dirt accumulation.
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' Designed to direct the exhaust air of this system through a charcoal j
7.
filter plenum to ensure that the release of radioactivity to the a
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environment'is below permissible discharge limits.
Continuously monitored to indicate system status, system malfunction, 8.
q jgg fire or smoke hazard, and excess radiation in the discharge of this
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exhaust system.
.'i The ABSS outside air intake is provided with a structural missile barrier c.
to prevent external missiles from entering the auxiliary building.
n-d.
The A3ES discharge is directed to the. concrete unit vent.
The ASSS and A3ES supply and exhaust fans are physically separated frem e.
each other, and are located in equipment areas that would not be affected 1
by internally generated missiles, pipe whip, or jet impingement resulting from breaks in high and moderate energy piping.
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t 9.4.321.2 Steas Tunnel Cooling Syste=
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' Design bases.for the stem: tunnel cooling syste: (STCS) are as follows:
I a.
The STCS is' classified as non-safety related and nor.-seismic category.
The require =ents of NFPA 90A and Branch Technical Position APCS 3 9.$-1 s
have also been considered in the ' system design and equipment -procure =ent.
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b.
The STCS 'is:
1.
Not required to operate to. safely shut down the plant in the event-of a LCCA.-
7 9
. 2
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Started and stopped from panels local to the supply fans.
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Designed to maintain areas served by this system between 49aP-m*=' > h.~ -
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- Designed to relieve the cooling ventilation air to 'the A3ES charcoal 7 : L [g _
filter system and turbine building.
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- Continuously monitored to indicate system status and systes 4".
malfunction.
' The STCS supply fans are mounced above the inlet plenu= in an equipment c.
area thAt veuld not be af fected by internally generated missiles, pipe
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whip, or jet i=pinge:ent resulting from breaks in high and moderate energy piping.
9.4.3.1.3 Radvaste Building Supply and Exhaust Systems Design bases for the radvaste building supply syste= (RSSS) and radvaste
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building exhaust system (RSES) are as follows:
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- Bases listed in See: ion 9.4.3.1.1, excluding item b2, are also appilcable
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to the R3SS and R3E1.
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( /f,y 9.4.5.1-Desien Bases Emergency Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation System l
9.4.5.1.1 Design bases for the emergency service water pumphouse ventilation system I
(ESWS) are" as follows:
.s The The ESWS is classified as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I.
a.
design of this system complies with the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
The requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.26, 1.29, 1.47, f
1.53, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 90A and Branch Technical Position APCS 3 9.5-1 have also been considered in the system designs and equipment procurement.
o 1
b.
~ The ESWS is:.
_ _ f.....
Required to operate to safely shut down the plant during normal 1.
j.
conditions, and e=ergency or LOCA conditions.
q.
Started automatically when the emergency service water pumps 2.
The ESWS is remote-manually stopped from the control operate.
room.
b i
Designed to maintain areas served by this system beiween W 3.
- e D _,b. To.}A2. 3.ll-Q Designed to remove the heat generated by the emergency service water 4.
pumps and auxiliary pump room equipment.
Continuously monitored to indicate system operating status, system l.
5.
malfunction, high'and low space temperatures.
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(The ESWS air inlet and relief openings are provided with structural c.
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missile barriers to prevent external missiles from entering the pu=p These openings are also designed to be unaffected by snow, room.
freezing rain or sleet.
The ESWS fans are physically separated by a minimum of 20f t-9 inches d.
between fan center lines. They are located in an area not affected by internally generated missiles, pipe whip or jet impinge =ent resulting from breaks in high or moderate energy piping.
4 The ESWS is provided with multiple ventilation fans and multiple e.
operating exhaust louvers so that failure of a single active component will not prevent satisfactory system operation.
9 9.4.5.1.2 Emergency closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling System
~
Design bases for the emergency closed cooling pu=p area cooling system (ECPCS) are as follows:
1..
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6; ;
All requirements discussed in Section 9.4.5.1.1, item a, are applicable
'I a.
to the ECPCS.
b.
.The ECPCS is:
i Required to operate to safely shut down the plant during normal 1.
conditions and emergency or I,0CA conditions.
4 2.
Started automatically when the emergency closed cooling pu=ps The ECPCS can also be remote-manually started or stopped operate.
from the control room.
Designed to maintain areas served by this system between 402f-o 3.
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x The ECCSCS' air' handling units are:
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I They can
' Started automatically when the associated pump starts.
1.
also be manually started er stopped from local stations.
h
. -.. - e. - 7 Designed to maintain pump areas between W :
2.
E r -. L ro n a. 3. n-K. r Designed to remove heat generated by the Rh4 pumps, HPCS pumps, LPCS 3.
pumps, RCIC pumps, piping and auxiliary equipment.
Continuously monitored to indicate system operating status, system 4.
malfunction and high space temperature.
't The ECCSCS air handling units have no outside air or relief air openings f.
through the pump area walls.
'.4.'
The ECCSCS air handling units are housed in separate rooms, each comon 4
.e $
g.
Any single air handling unit could be affected
- ,;j - (. > 4 to its associated pu=p.
by pipe whip, jet impingement or flodding resulting from breaks in high j
[
However, nultiple air handling or moder' ate energy piping in a pump room.
O 3*
units would not be af fected by an incident in a single pump room.
A a.
T 9. 4. 5.1. 4 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System Design bases for the diesel generator building ventilation system (DGBVS) are as follows:
All requirements discussed in Section 9.4.5.1.1, ites a, are applicable
/
a.
to the DGBVS.
b.
The DGBVS is:
..c,.
k.
Required to operate whenever the diesel generators operate.
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s,T)12. 3. -1 Mainta 'n a +3 07 to-k500F ebient al tempe ure in he_dr 11 and g
f W 1 n q N, a.
-('a:.y incai 900F (o-1040F a=' ate t air ce aeratur in the entain ne eratingc5adQions.'i, ve cJ und gr=
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^=- 8 (8-25-82)
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f Details of the instrumentati~on and controls for this subsystem are c.
. g discussed in Section 7.3.1.
W Control of the purge isolation valves is discussed as follows:
Normal 4;eration of the purge isolation valve is manually initiated from a.
Normally, when the. containment vessel purge supply the control room.
subsystem and the purge exhaust subsystem are operating, the purge isolation, valves are open (except for the dryvell purge supply and exhaust valves, and the 42-inch isolation valves located ins,ide the containment' vessel).
It becomes electrically permissive to operate the purge' valves if a LOCA b.
signal has not isolated the containment vessel and drywell.
~ l 4 -
t c.
Instrumentation is provided for indication in the can' trol room (status lights) of the close or open position of the valves.
- 4$
The major items of instrumentation and controls are pneumatically driven d.
Each valve purge isolation valves, as indicated on Tigure 9.4-17.
includes limit switches and a 3vay solenoid valve sized for emergency i
rapid closing (4 seconds maximum). The air cylinder operators are air-open spring-closed mechanisms.
INTERMEDIATE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.7 9.4.7.1 Desien Bases
?
The ventilation system for the intermediate building is designed to:
ures in various operating of tFp Maintain the ambient temper A' ~
% A
).ll,A
- f a.
d
.; r -f '-' " du ing
- m irr -f
-=
intermediate building.:.:
normal plant opera
- ion and plant shutdown in order to provide suitable 4
environment for operating. personnel and equipment.
' A.'.
er ea, p.a 9.4-76
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Pressure switch in the com=en heat exchanger discharge line to alarm t) 2.-- in the control room'on loss of hot water flow. 1 3. Level gauge'on the expansion. tank. Le' vel switches on the expansion tank to annunciate on a local panel 4. when the water level either reaches a low level or high. level. A separate hi.gh/ low level switch opens the water make-up valve if low water _ level is sensed. The same switch activates a computer to provide computer printout and CRT indication when the makeup valve is opened. 4 Pneumatically driven three-way valve in the main hot water line to ? 5. .i. each heating coil bank which is controlled by a temperature y, controller in the discharge duct of the air handling (or supply .1 ~; ... ? I ~ lenum) unit. p ?) J. ~ Pressure relief valve on the expansion tank to relieve excess tank
- 1 6.
y-f ; [. a - -. %7 pressure when above 75 psig. d. Pressure regulator control, valve in the compressed air supply line i j. 7.
- 4).
to the expansion tank to automatically maintain system pressure. 91- '8. Pressure switch to alarm on a local panel on low expansion tank 5 2 pressure. 4[ 9.4.11 0FT-GAS CHARCOAL VAULT REFRIGERATION SYSTEM 9.4.11.1 - Design Bases The off-gas charcoal vault refrigeration system is designed to perform the following functions: y + /.'. ' paw v n
- j.
Maintain the vaults at a preselected temperature within the range ! a. 4.during normal plant operation to , g M h 3. F I -iO*T t; riPT (
- f......, m 7
(. 4 enhance the filtration efficiency of the of f-gas charcoal'adsorbers. '^ ^ Ps 7 ~'nen d og 3'J d 5 7 a a a d;j F.y Mi 9.4-103 -n J. ~34-J
q W: p*.27.; i :) da qm}' <,p {**j aj +- i g a lj JC Nj d TABLE 3.7-3 COMPARISON:0F CALCULATED SEISMIC LOADS TO DESIGN
- SEISMIC LOADS OF CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT, SSE CONDITION i
Design Seismic Calculated Results_ Natural Frequency -Seismic Loads _ Load E . Equipment- -0.35g (horiz.) 3.0g (horiz.) >33 Hz -l.:
- RCIC Pumpi 0.55g (vert. )
2.0g (vert. ) 'RCIC Turbine 16 Hz (horiz.). 2.25g (horiz.) 2.25g (horiz.) .+- N. 18 Hz'(vert.. ) '2.25g (vert. ) 2.25g:(vert. ) L2. [SLCTank(}' 58'.8 Hz 1.50g (horiz.) 1.50g (horiz.) O.14g (vert. ) O.14g (vert. ) e 1)- 18.13/I!.65 562 lb/in 26,600 lb/in Spent-l . Racks-{ue 3._ 2> 871'lb/in ~(Containment only) 4. De fective ' Fuel 18.13 2,826 lb/in 26,600 lb/in ~ Racks New Fuel Racks ( } 18.13 2,826-lb/in 26,600 lb/in 5. 6. Refueling Platform '12.15' 31,220 lbfin 31,680.lb/in (OBE) 2 2 38,490 lb/in-40,600 lb/in (SSE) -(Seismic Adequacy Determined by Test) ^~ 7.. Control Room 7anels t 2 8.' Fuel Prep Machine 17.0 5,860 lb/in 29,400.lb/in (SSE) 2 14 Hz (horiz.) 1.0g (horiz.) 1.0g (horiz.)' 4 39 Hz (vert; ) .0.4g (vert.-) 0.4g (vert. ) 9. .RHR Heat Exchanger (Seismic Adequacy Determined by Test) 10. ' Hydraulic Control Unit NOTES: I.. Beams and'cruciforms. 2. Beans only. i l and .3.'.. Seismic loads are less than the desi8n seismic loads when hor zonta vertical loads are. combined. Dynamic Loads.specified correspond to the.iowest dominant frequency. 4. analysis was performed using'a response spectrum. sy4)nn:37]3- .i - .}}