ML20108D429

Motions to Address False Statements in Applicant & Staff Responses to Aamodt 850115 Motion for Reopening of Hearing. Supporting Documentation & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20108D429
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/06/1985
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#185-920 SP, NUDOCS 8503080360
Download: ML20108D429 (72)

Text

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MQ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI($N Sbf BEFORE THE CO'1 MISSION W ~6 PS:20 hhhkC In the Matter of

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s METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.

D6 dst 50-289 9 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station. Unit 1) MOTIONS TO ADDRESS FALSE STATEMENTS IN RESPONSES TO AAMODT MOTION OF JANUARV 15. 1985 Table of Contents

gage, 1.0 Abstract 3

2.0 Background

3 3.0 Reply to Licensee and Staff Responses insofar as they are dishonest 5 3.1 There is no way that the Licensee and the Staff could believe that Gerusky " corrected" his May 3.1979 testimony in an October 1,1980 interview 6 3.2 The Licensee and Staff convenientiv overlooked the testimony of other BRP employees in the May 1979 deposition 9 3.3 The testimony of two TMI managers who confirm the BRP testimony was ignored in the Licensee Response and dismissed bv the Staff 10 3.4 The fact that the NRC investigations do not reflect the gamble conclusions is of no significance. 12 3.5 The fact that Gamble did not testify concerning the content of his reports is no reflection on the authenticity of the reports. 13 8503090360 850306 PDR ADOCK 05000289 g PDR 1sa2

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS. contd. 3.6 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, in excusing its deletions of the Aamodt Motion as clerical errors and attributing this explanation to the Aamodtt. 13 3.7 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it asserts that health effects were not an issue in the TM1 Restart Proceeding 15 3.8 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it asserts that health effects do not bear on any issue in the ' Restart Proceeding. 15 3.9 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it refers to the increased cancer mortality in three TMI areas ~ as alleged 17 4.0 Discussion 18 5.0 Motions 19 6.0 Conclusions 20 Exhibit. A - Deposition of Thomas Gerusky, lDilliam Dornsife and Margaret Reilly. May 3,19/9 Exhibit B - Report Provided by David Gamble as part of his testimony in the Remanded hearing Exhibit C - Memorandum, December 1,1981. Fortuna and Gamble advising Cummings of DOJ investigation of i\\,l; REG-0760 Exhibit D - Correspondence between Aamodt and tilagner concerning false statements in Staff response Exhibit E - Letters from Drs. Cochran, Molholt, Berger. Cobb Mayor Reed, and Senat.or Spector supporting Aamodt, heal'.n motion ,- s e

.. 1.0 Abstract The Aamodts find t. hat the Licensee and Staff responses to I their January 15 motion are totally dishonest. They believe that the nature and extent of these deceptions should be fully understood i prior to the Commission's decision on the motions. They are motioning ~ g for the' opportunity to reply to the Licensee and Staff responses and p[oviding the reoly at the same time.

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't \\ _The Licensee and Staff have asked the Commission to denv the Aamodt Motion for a reopening of a hearing to consider information i t concerning serious health problems in residents of the TNI area. . f. These parties were particularly critical of informat. ion prnuded by the Aamodts thatma former NRC investigatur concluded that TNi personnel had lied concerning offsite surveillance between h30 and 8:00.a.m. On March 28. 1979. After carefully considering ali evidence provided by the Licensee and Staff, the Aamodts found that these parties' objections were neither rational nor sincere. The Aamodts are asking the Commission to censure the St.aff 5L 4".+ , for its deliberately dishonest response and lack of appropriate' concern about health matters. They are also asking for an internal investi-gation of Staff policy and actions with regard to the Aamodt motions.

2.0 Background

On June 21. 1984, the Aamodts raised the matter of an excess cancer incidence and mortality in three elevated areas west of TMI where citizens conducted a ocor-to-door survey. Evidence of radiation-induced anomalies in flora in these same areas-were evaluated by a distinguisher* ' otantist. In addition examples of bizarre experiences J of. these' residents on the early days of the accident were provided.

4 A letter from a state representative indicated that these experiences were wide-spread in the TMI area and not induced by hysteria since they occurred prior to public concern about the accident. The Aamodts motioned for a full investigation and a stay of the Commission's decision on restart until the matter of health effects was resolved. They now questioned whether GPU had been honest concerning radiation monitoring and reports during the initial days of the accident. The Commission denied the Aamodt Motion on December 13. citing a review by the Centers for Disease Control which found the information in the Aamodt Motion " insignificant". On January 15, 1985, the Aamodts petitioned the Commission to reconsider its decision. They provided new information: (1) a verified excess cancer mortality incidence, more than seven times that expected for the post-accident years (1980-1984) for the three survey areas, (2) a critique which revealed the shallowness of the Centers for Disease Control review, (3) Pennsylvania Health Department data which showed a significant drop in neonatal hypo-thyroidism in Lancaster County from a ten-fold greater than expected incidence in 1979, (4) a review of a key official dose-assessment study which provided an example of the inadequacies present in all studies to date, and (5) a recently-disclosed report, written in 1980 by a former NRC investigator, which concluded that TMI-2 personnel had lied concerning offsite surveillance. Two parties filed responses: the Licensee on -January 25 and the Staff on February 4. i

-S-r 3.0 Repiv to I.icensee and Staff Responses in so far as they are dishonest The Aamodts are limiting their reply to those portions of the Licensee and Staff Responses which are clearly untrue. The Licensee responded on a single issue, asserting that the Gamble reports, a basis for the Aamodt motion for a hearing, was not credible information. The Licensee provided the October 1,1980 testimony of Thomas Gerusky (pp. 33-41) and claimed that somewhere in that transcript. Gecusky had " corrected" his May 3,1979 testimony on which Gamble had depended for his conclusion that TMI personnel had lied concerning offsite surveillance of a plume during the early hours of the accident. Nowhere in Licensee's reponse is a specific cite to the October 1,1980 transcript provided to show how and where Licensee believes Gerusky corrected his earlier testimony. This is a deplorable violation of NRC rules of practice in responding to a motion. .however Licensee could not provide a transcript citation because nowhere in the pages of the October 1980 deposition does Gerusky . correct his earlier testimony. - On the contrary, Gerusky confirms .his earler testimony in so far as he is able, eighteen months after the accident, to remember and insofar as he is able to resist the suggestions of the NRC Staff that he change his testimony to bring it in line with what was 911eged to be a PEMA log. There is no way that the Licensee could truly believe that Gerusky changed his testimony or that the evidence they presented showed that he did. ' Licensee's response is worth no more than the five sheets of paper on which it is printed. Licensee's response is evicence of a present improper attitude.

I < The' Staff responded superficially to nearly all aspects of the Aamodt motion. The responses were based on false statements, some of which were cunningly contrived. The Aamodts requested a retraction of two statements where were so blatantly factually false, that to ~ allow them to stand unchallenged was intolerable. See Section 3.6, pp.15 The Staff reiterated. Licensee's argument concerning the Gerusky testimony, and as with the Licensee, provided no transcript citations or quotations. See pp. 3-6. 3.1 There is no way that the Licensee and the Staff could believe that Geruskv " corrected" his May 3,1979 testimony in an October 1,1980 intervietg On May 3,1979. Gerusky testified as follows: In the meantime, I requested them to try to get their teams somehow to Goldsboro, and they said that the State Police helicopter was there and that they would get one of their teams up in the air and over Goldsboro, ide stayed on the phone with them. They found no radiation levels onsite or in Goldsboro that would indicate any kind of a leak,' So threrfore, we then notified the Civil Defense to hold tight. This was all before 8:00...

2 7 f I On October 1,1980, in the second of two interviews which Gerusky described as " briefings", Gerusky haltingly responded concerning the time TMI personnel first claimed offsite surveillance: No, it was af ter 7:30. Its a feeling and I really haven't tried to verify it one way or another to determine what these times were in the past year and a half, because ! didn't think it was important, but I have a feeling it happened sometime between 7:30 and 8:00. (pp. 59) i i don't know. I think in reconstructing it, or at least the telephone...the PEMA telephone duty log indicated it may have been an hour, which surorised me a little bit the first time I heard that, six months ago in another one of these j briefings. (pp. 41) Did Gerusky " correct" his testimony? Obviousiv, he did not. Did the Licensee and Staff believe that he corrected his testimony when tney provided their responses to the Aamodt motion? No; if they did they would have quoted the specific testimony or provided a suitable reference to the transcript of the October 1,1980 deposition. As stated above, neither party proeided a single shred of evidence. However, they claimed that there was evidence somewhere within the n nine pages of the deposition transcript. Their claims are provided below.

[ _g. The Licensee described Gerusky's testimony in the October 1.1980 deposition as follows: (pp. 3, 4) The NUREG-0760 investigators then reinterviewed Mr. Gerusky and explored this inconsistency. Mr. Gerusky told the investi-3ators that the Commonwealth had been informed of the Goldsboro dose rate prediction and of the onsite measurement before 8:00 a.m', but it was in fact an hour later that an actual measure-ment at Goldsboro was reported tothe Commonwealth -- a fact evidenced by the PEMA log... not surprisingly, therefore, the portion of the NUREG-0760 draft which relied on Mr. Gerusky's first interview was not included in the final report. See NUREG-0760 at 31-33. It is evident, therefore, that there is neither new nor significant information concerning the Goldsboro dose rata prediction. The statements which might have appeared at one time to provide a basis for the Aamodt's contention -- Mr. Gerusky's 1979 interview -- have long since been publicly clarified by Mr. Gerusky himself. The Staff's description of the alleged change in Gerusky's testimony in the October 1,1980 interview: (pp. 4) However. Mr. Gerusky, has acknowledged that his statement,' quoted in Attachment 4 to the Aamodt Motion, reflects an error in his recollection, and this error was corrected by Mr. Gerusky in an October 1,1980 interview by the NRC Staff, where Mr. Gerusky indicated that it was about 9:00 a.m. when the Goldsboro measurement was reported to the Commonwealth. See October 1,1980 transcript of NRC Staff Interview of Thomas Gerusky, exerpts of which are attached to Licensee's Response to Aamodt Motion dated January 25, 1985. The timing of of Licensee's report is evidenced by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 109 These amazing interpretations of the October 1,1980 Gerusky testimony are nothing more or less than dishonest. If the Licensee and Staff find that the PEMA log is better evidence' than Gerusky's testimony, they should say so, and provide that evidence. 4-- en-y

m. 3.2 The Licensee and Staff conveniently overlooked the testimony of other BRP employees in the May 1979 deposition The Licensee and Staff reponses made no mention of the testimony of two other BRP employees, William Dornsife, the a nuclear engineer, and Margaret Reilly, a health physicist, who also testified, along with Gerusky, on May 3,1979. The first 20 pages of this deposition are provided as Exhibit _A.

Following Gerusky's statement ("This was all before 8:00."), which referred to TMI personnel's claim that a survey in Goldsboro had discounted high predicted t eleases, Dornsife said, "The next notes we have is, about 8:30..." and went on to describe his preparations for briefing Lt. Gov. Scranton and a press conference. From this several conclusions can be drawn. First, the times assigned to various events were accurate in that the s BRP personnel referred to their notes made at the time. Second. There were no communications significant enough to report to the interviewers for the time period from 8:00 - 8:30 a.m. Third. Dornsife would not have been able to prepare for the activities described (briefing, press conference) without any confirmation j concerning of fsite surveillance. Iherefore, either TMI persoanel l reported offsite surveillance to BRP prior to 8:00 a.m. or i three BRP personnel collaborated to fabricate this assertion, t I i

_. - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3.3 The testimony of two TMI managers who confirm the BRP tosimony was ignored in the licensee Response and dismissed by the Staff Gary Miller, the TMl station manager, and Richard Dubiel, health physics manager, testifed between May 21-24, 1979, before the U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Interior and Insular Af fairs, that they did dispatch a team around 7:40 a.m.'on State Police heiitopter and that this team was in Goldsboro within five minutes. See Exhibit B. Gamble report, pp. 7-10. Miller stated: At approximately 0730 or a little before, I had received predictions of an offsite dose of 10 R at Goldsboro. This was was based on the Reactor Building dome monitor. which was still increasing and from our past experience with source calculation, we did feel these were really this high. but as a precaution, I dispatched a State Police holicopter with an offsite team along with an offisite team in a car and separatelv, to the West Shore (Goldsboro). Then Dubiel confirmed Miller's testimony: At some point around 7:30, Gary Miller asked me for the status of the offsite teams, and I gave him the informa-tion that we had two teams ready to 90 offsite both avail-able for transportation over to the West Shore. Gary directed me to make contact with the State Police and get a State Police helicopter to get one crew over there in a more timely fashion. He was concerned about the traffic--the early morning rush hour traffic trying to go up over the bridge in Harrisburg and then back down and and that it might take an hour or more to get over there. He requested that we send one team in a heli-copter and a second team in a car of driving over at a normal pace to back them up. I do not recall exactly who told me that they would get the State Police helicopter. I believe it was George Kunder, I do not remember exactly, but within minutes I had it confirmed to me that the Sta'.e Police had been notified, and helicopter would be on its way J

since they are stationed up at Harrisburg, Harrisburg International Airport. It would be here in a matter of minutes, and that security was notified that this helicopter was coming and would be landing somewhere in the Vicinity of the north parking lot, and that they were to allow it to land and make preparations to support its landing in getting our technician on board. ...the timing may be poor but I am estimating 7:40 we had a man in the helicopter and sometime by two to three maybe five minutes later the man was in Goldsboro. On September 20, 1979, before the NRC Special Inquiry Group, Miller confirmed his earlier testimony: ...! remember as soon as I had the projection, which was high, for Goldsboro and knowing the west---knowing the wind was l blowing to the west and knowing that it was seven or eight in the morning, that I know that I asked for a helicopter before seven thirty. ...they picked up one or two of our people and they were flown over there. And readings were back, and as I remember the readings were back before Dubiel had thought the plume had gotten there. In other words, we had gotten over there faster than the radiation would have at the wind speed, which was very slow. Miller's and Dubiel's testimonies confirm what Gerusky. Dornsife and Reilly testified. The Staff knows this, but the Staff dismissed these testmonies, in responding to the Aamodt Motion, as the Staff had done in its report, NUREG-0760, published in 1981. The Staff characterized the certain, detailed testimony of Miller and Dubiel, provided above, as reflecting "some natural inability to reconstruct the precise series of events based solely on the recollection of individuals." See Staff Response, pp. 5, Footnote 5. The Staff's conclusion is preposterous. It is even more preposterous that the BRP personnel would have suffered the same " natural inability" in precisely the same way about the same events.

.=. The Staff prefers the subsequent gross changes Miller and Dubiel made in their testimony. The Staff's participation in this change should be a matter of investigation, if it is not already. (The Staff's report, NUREG-0760 was referred to the Department of' Justice for investigation in March 1981.) Suddenly, the day af ter Miller's testimony before SIG, provided above, Dubiel began the apparently uncomfortable change in testimony: ...I don't recall a time. I believe it was an hour later... I thought one did (concerning the helicopter landing). I have been led to believe...we requested a helicopter. hJhich team got there first I don't know... (Exhibit B pp.10.11. ) 3.4 The fact that the NRC investigations do not reflect the Gamble conclusions is of no significance. The development and content of NUREG-0/60 has been an open question since 1981. Investigators questioned the appropriateness of NRC Staff non-investigators conducting depositions. OIA referred the matter to the Department of Justice in March 1981. Gamble, and another investigator Roger Fortuna, wrote in a memorandum of December 1.1981 (Exhibit C) that "the facts warranted prosecution for Willful misrepresentations, omissions, or Violation of NRC regulations." The Licensee Response (pp. 2) and the Staff Response (pp.3-4) imply that-the failure of NUREG-0760 to include the Gamble reports (" working draf ts") is evidence that cuts against the Aamodt Motion. The Licensee and Staff know better. L

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( 3.5 The fact that Gamble did not testify concerning the content of his reports is no reflection on the authenticity of the reports. ' Licensee stated in Footnote 1 on page 2 concerning the i use of the Gamble reports in the Remanded hearing: '~ ...This exhibit to David Gamble's testimony was not admitted for the truth of its contents, but only to .show that sections of NUREG-0760 had been drafted prior to the completion of interviews... The implication is that Gamble does not presentiv stand by the conclusions of his reports. First Gamble did not testify r l I concerning the contents because he was not permitted to de so. Second.-the fact that Gamble provided the reports as part of his testimony indicates that he would stand by his conclusions, under oath, if given the opportunity. 3.6 The Staf f is wrong, and deliberately so, in excusing its deletions of the Aamodt Motion as clerical errors and attributing this explanation to the Aamodts. The Staff is in triple jeopardy. The Staff provided a false explanation for criminal behavior, and then attributed the explanation . to the Aamodts. In its response, at page 6 the Staff stated: The Staff's intent to influence, according to the Aamodts, is shown by the fact that virtually every other page of the Aamodt June 21.-1984 Motion was not copied and sent to Dr. Caldwell. The deletions did not follow a pattern of virtually every other page missing. The following analysis shows that the Staf f's assertion is wrong: Order of Missing Page Identification in Original Third Page 2 Fifth Page 4 Sixth Figure 1 Ninth Page 6 Fourteenth-Page 9 Sixteenth Page 11 Twentieth Affidavit 2 Twenty-second . Affidavit 4 Twenty-sixth Affidavit 7 Twenth-eighth Affidavit 9 Thirtieth Thirty-first Thirty-second There are only three sequences of every other page deleted, with thirteen possible. In addition, parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth pages (Affidavit 1) were deleted. It was the lack of a pattern that caused the Aamodts to conclude that the deletions had been performed deliberately r

- - -_ ___ l In a February 12 letter to Staff cat'nsel, Mary E. Wagner, i the Aamodts asked the Staff to corrects its filing. The Staff has refused to do so. Marjorie Aamodt again requested a correction - by the Staff in a letter of $1 arch 5. This correspondence is j-provided as Exhibit D. 3.7 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it asserted that l I health effects were not an Nsue in the TMI Restart Proceeding in 1981, the Licensing Board permitted the litigation of the matter of an apparent increased incidence of neonatal hypothyroidism in 1979. The Board made findings on the matter in its second partial initial decision (December 14, 1981). The Aamodts took the matter to appeal in 1982. It is incomprehensible that the Staff was so poorly acquainted with the record of the hearing to respond: ... health effects of the TM1-2 accident were not an issue in the TMi-1 restart proceeding. (pp.11) 3.8 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it asserted that health effects do not bear on any issue in the Restart Proceeding. The Staff asserted that the excess cancer mortalilty rate in the TMI area "does not address any issue bearing on a TMI-1 restart decision (pp. 10). The Staff assumes that the cancers . could not have been caused by the TMI accident because the latency " cancer occurs after a long latent period.." (pp.11).

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ The Staff' cited the CDC review as its authority on latency period, which provided no adequate definition or reference of the latent period. -The Staff failed to address the Aamodt critique of this portion of the CDC review. ~ lt is provided as Attachment C; see pp. 3.) The Aamodt critique rebutted CDC's view on cancer latency as follows: ...CDC presents no basis for its assumption that a cancer resulting from exposure from the TMI-2 accident must

necessarily take at least one year to develop. Neither CDC nor anyone else knows precisely what the active agents may have been.

CDC presents no evidence that cancers cannot occur with - out a "long" latency period. Short latency perious are known to occur. Note the literature on organ transplants and the effect of -depressed immune systems. Could the role of a causative agent emitted from TMI have been to suppress the ' immune system? (p. 3) The latency period for cancers in humans is inferred .from epidemiological studies, thus providing an average period rather than a minimum. The only truly scientific data on minimum latency is with cells in the test tube, where the latency is six weeks. and in animals, where the latency is three months. (These studies, or an affidavit can be provided.) The Staff position did not allow, in addition, for.exaberation of existing disease by radiation from the TMI accident. The Staff failed to consider the other health effects of metallic. taste, erythema, diarrhea, nausea and vomiting, irritated and watery eyes, respiratory inflammation, disruption of menstral cycle, skin rashes and blisters, greying and loss of hair, sharp pains in -joints. and tingling or itchy skin experiences by hundreds of residents or

_ _. on the initial days of the 6ccident. (SeeAamodt Motion, January 15, 1985, (Health Study), Affidavits 1,2,4,5,6,7, Attachment 3.) The residents.largely experienced these symptoms prior to the time they knew about the TMI accident or realized a danger existed. These same kinds of symptoms were experienced by Hiroshima victims and are classical radiation-induced health effects. The NRC Staff has admitted this in various communications with residents. (See Id., (pages from Saxe book); Aamodt Motion, June 21. 1984 pp. 8; NRC letter, Dircks to Commissioner Ahearn, " Draft Letter to Ms. Brenda A. Witmer, June 14, 1983.) 3.9 The Staff is wrong, and deliberately so, when it refers to the increased cancer mortality in three TMI areas as " alleged" The Aamodt Motion (January 15, 1985) clearly stated its basis for asserting that the cancer mortality incidence had been verified.

pp. 4... Death certificates were obtained from the Pennsylvania Department of Health. The population for the areas surveyed was checked by use of the West Shore School District survey, conducted at the approximate time of the citizens' health survey, and tax maps, pp.4, Attachment 3 : Figure 2 presents the cancer mortality rate analysis. The estimated numbers of persons in all households (the population) for the areas surveyed was verified by the West Shore School District survey conducted about the same time and tax maps. The prior extimate of 457 persons was lowered to 433. Eighteen of the twenty cancer deaths reported were verified by death certificates obtained from the Pennsylvania Health Department. Two reported deaths were dfropped; one (cancer) occurred before the accident (1978), and the other was not attributed to cancer on the death certifu te.

..One cancer a

. death certificate was delayed because the place of death was a hospital and not the residence. A cancer death, not obtained in the survey (noone was at home), was discovered in the followup, and the death certificate was obtained Thus, twenty cancer deaths have been verified as occurring in the areas surveyed 5 during the post-TMI-2 accident period. Additional verification of the above is provided by a letter of January 14' 1985. Drs. John Cobb and Jonathan Berger to Marjorie Aamodt, provided as Attachment C. 4.0 Discussion When the Aamodts approached the Commission on August 15, 1984 concerning the elevated cancer incidence in three areas near IMI in the direction of early plumes, the general concensus among the Commissioners was that the cancer deaths should be verified. The presumption was that if, and when an excess of cancer deaths was verified, this would indicate the need for an NRC investigation. That verification occurred through the independent actions of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund at the request of the court. The NRC was provided with the information in the Aamodt Motion of January 15, 1985. It was expected that this information alone would have moved the Staff to support the Aamodt's request of an investigation and a reopening of a hearing. However, it did not. The Staff's response was literally ch'lling. This agency on which the public depended throughout the TMI cris!s and now, throughout the cleanup operations, professed no interest in l'ealth problems and wnuld not even acknowledge that the excess of cancer mortalities had been confirmed. The Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, the TMI-2 Cleanup Citizens Advisory Committee, Judge Sylvia Rambo. Dr. Thomas Cochran, Dr. Jan Beyea, Dr. Bruce Molholt. Drs. Berger and Cobb, Senator Arlen Spector and Mayor Stephen Reed (Harrisburg) have all expresssed interest in the Aamodt health study. Four letters from individuals among these named above are - enclosed as Exhibit E. The NRC Staff pretends to be disinterested and unimpressed. -The fact that the Staff would prefer to resort to false statements, deceptions and other criminal behavior rather than fact an investigation of the TMI health problems cannot indicate anything other than a distorted interest of the Staff or the intent to coverup. It is imperative that the Commission investigate the Staff policy and actions which resulted in the Staff's response to the verified increased cancer mortality rate in the TMI area. 5.0 Motions 5.1 The Aamodts motion for permission to reply to the Licensee and Staff responses to their January 15, 1985 Motion. 5.2 The Aamodts motion for the strik:ng of the false and misleading statements in the Staff's and Licensee's responses. 5.3 The Aamodts motion that the Staff be reprimanded for its attempt to obstruct justice in the Restart Proceeding. 5.4 The Aamodts motion that the Staff be reprimanded for its abbrogation of duty concernng health effects in TMI area residents. 5.5 The Aamodts motion the Commission to initiate an investigation by the Office of Internal Auditor of the policy which has directed the Staff's false response to the Aamodt Motion. J --g ,,es

, 6.0 Conclusions The Aamodts have asked the Commission for the opportunity to be heard, out of turn, to correct false and deceptive statements in the Licensee and Staff responses to the Aamodt January 15, 1985 Motion. At the same time, the Aamodts have provided their reply since the Commission decision is imminent. The Aamodts have shown that the Licensee and Staff have no. evidence that refutes the Gamble report that TMI-2 personnel lied to the Commonwealth Bureau of Radiation Protection concerning radiation surveillance. The Aamodts have also shown that the Staff has abbrogated its responsibility for public health in its utterly false response to the motion. (The Licensee made no response concerning health issues.) The Aamodts have asked the Commission to censure the Staff for its attempt to obstruct justice concerning the litigation of health issues and initiate an internal investigation of Staff policy. Respectfully submitted, l / }.~n L : a a -.l i Norman O. Aamodt ~ Marjurie M. Aamodt f c

EXHIBIT A Deposition of Thomas Gerusky. William Dornsife Margaret Reilly, May 3,1979

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I r - t t 41 t ' ,t 7: C5 :; tc.; t.' 3t t t "Th/: a Mile F s *.:' ?.' 01 a : Ma-r;: :/. Call h :k to tha c:r, trol r.;s U.,it 2." I : i t.':21y af tu t'.t I called I':;11a "ailly and wanted to --53 I g surs, to ::3 if t':rs via t./ ;h,3 n..-isrs a had directly to the c:-trol I to,1 U3 C.'a' t. Sh2 dfia't, tell..a ve had ar.y - I gue:s we did h;.a cre l to t'.a ( xtr:1 r: s. 4 8 i .'.it LY.: I b;t it.t 1;d off tha switchbesrd.... d g l 10 f.C - ' W... R.: So, I called t::k thr: ;h tha s <itehtesed and I gr.nss Pa;3 e f 3 u.at :f,::d c. d c:11ed Toa to tall him to get ser.2bedy to get in to take cvar t.ts office. 13 ~ If, UlttY: The first ;sr:on I called was Malloy. 15 16 D. ".P...i t M: Okty. Vall I called tack to tha plant ir :::iately af tar h.a. ;f rg up with F.2;gle, which'was about a minute later, and I got the swit:htesrd. Tha switchboard operator hsd difffeulty connecting me with the control i t ^ 19 She ceuld get the control room, but she couldn't get us tegether. rces. t 20 Se.finalli after a cogle of minutes I told her *dy don't you have thas j tt ~ s cal 1 me. back at sqr home." So I gave her the nueter and about a minute ~. i V gg latar sese,ene from tho' control reca called me back. I forget, I don't knew i t f 22 t j. '.. yhather he even told se his name. I guess it was the shift su;:ervisor, 24 wheaver was on, duty at the time. I 25 Things sounded very confused at the j .' z.. r

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. 2,. s.. ie. s 41 [FQ: Ex- *: 2 ".2, ftst fer a se::nd, Bill. You indicated t.'at they had t:':'. u a t *J : t t f 3 3 ti.f s vis sh:rtly af ter 7:0_0 in the_ror.i rg,_ that f t':y ?. ' ret _f:.13 ythf ra offsite.

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s. 15 P \\ L C'. "L'IF E: F.f c S t. Th y definitely had tens cut. they could not find anything i i 19 .[ { offsite. 20 I .F~:. a 21 F. i ESSIG: Chay, sorry. Go ahead. i i 2c t r ( 23 I s C-Fis1FE: Then I heard in the background, an announce.':ent- " evacuate the 7 l 24 f 21 br...ditng and auxiliary building." a c. L s 1j L r 3 (.. ...-..._.---~a-- e + ~ e 4 .1-3 ,,. A ' i, g. ,p ..s-..... .g 4-p ~.. 7,yj, rg,--...r :- -

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e , j f :' I i P / "1 ' - c.t. th?y b-1 no e % - 3 r dt 3 ..r t ' s ,[ 4: r.:;. :: C.t ha said to ce, "I have to go, I really have to p r,: = -l., y 4 C.T.fi d3 3. d '.iry u;::t. "I really have to go n:w; I'll e:11 y:u t :n' -- j ha h'.34 tg.. i i n 1.- 2'.".l9.223: ' This was ttout what tfee? t.. n Pl*J ifli Thfs was about... f a,.>.l - ~ y t REilLY: A q';1rter efter seven. 3 4. 18 ';.'; n'.;s':.. ' 1 T. 3 l- ~ 3-s' ~ p.Oi$tF6 Well, in that time frate, ouarter aftar--tvaat> after tear.ty aftar, I'd say. , iteut He hung up. 'So I figured, at that pfat I F u 13 l. puple ware i:caing into the offi I figured there was no rease, t 19 ce. J ':I - to try ~ and call his bact so I just took off and headed for the office. &d Ch no, I'm f scrry, I called into the office after the plant hung up en ca and I' told ..i.- . 2, -4'Nfy. S '.E'or.e of the. secretaries who was thars--I told her, the first persen 22 > f. * '. : ~ e ...,..., ' c. co::es in to get thes to. call back to the plant frt:adiataly. ,.,1 23 i.. And h :t .JJ briefly told har that there was a problem thare, but not to alar:: 7 24 t ' -i.

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V I' '.Y: It's in 152 :: < to t'1... .C.C~'.'.S I T E:It's in t!.e pr0cedures part. i 1., <e 4.e _0 '.t C5 01: 17 Tha ar..cx to tha Three Hile Island e ergency plan? i 12 I 0F."iTFE: Yaah. ) I L l 20 i 0 Mt.05:1: Then that inforration was or was not provided in that forcat? e i 21 l r 1 I y s i Cv....,....>.. c : .,3 v:y I ren11 the forest, it was not absolutely--sota:ne 23 I readir.; d:.in the whole If st--no. It was so what disjointed. ? 24 25 f ? e 5 l b. _ -.i t I. t 1

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Th3 fcr. it in t'.) plin, it's a f :ily of for.;;ts ac';117y, t'.s.t I are tucd on disign tasis accid:nts and en saticipated tr1nsicnts. Fe fr st-':?, a 1/.CA cr a 10:s of AC, or a 1c:s 'of Ic'ad, cc a f.; 1 c:d eja'.: n, thfr;.1 If h that, thfr.;s th t have a rec:;nt :d beginnin;, ard :.':/'re est:r.tially d:vsle;:d out of SAR infor stion, .s e. .b. **. 1'.C_ 't: Elli, tha tics y:u rt:af vcd ttst call did t.' y ;t e 3:u a le. gir.aric classification of the type of event that thcy th:'.;.t that they afght P. ave had? 13 k 20 i 00RNSIFE: I believe they told me it was a transient, and that ec pit-i ( 21 cations had occurred in addition to the norral transient. t 22 I i 2.1 OCHLt!ON: They did not aantion anything such as a stean eenerator t, f 24 s ruptural o '.t. ..s o 9 .+. ~ ~...,._,....,.:.......... . ;I

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i /...i,.. s.,,. 4,... 1 n. .3, l C. ;. e !. u ::. f;.) ta c f fsr fr:1 that ;: int. c. f. f."I 8.Y: C*- y. .'.t t :. t,. : ! c t I ;.1 ! r '.o t' : :flica - t 7: ' S, t' '. s. i G..:t'.y sas alt:-Q.:ra s..-f c.) tha ph:ra seith tha pir.;t. k: it as L, at:u.3 th:t f:fnt that th:y r:lled ev:r fr:: a sita to a c:.- ral. Ci ty. P:.'.. . ll a t'- ) r u t o f ;ur p apl a s.a4 cc :f t;[in. Fai.'ly :..-ty in this thing I c:ntact:d ths Ca;:rt:nt of Ajricultura 5:::u32 wa ab.sys p.rcef.e i that th ra is a g003 chir:2 of havic; a d:f ry pr:bla,ith a ra..::r 7::. 't. Ya var: d!sc;;;fr.t:1 vith this cr.e. Va ::f d.1' t r::11y...it c: ;ic.s to ss blew cy cind. Let's sas... wa got tha c:p cut--all tht ;;;d s.f f. .3 r - 4. GERUSKY: No, wait a minutes. Let's stop. I was the first e a in the sJ office after the call from Mar;3 ret. c 20 - And the secretary give ca the infor-mat'fon that Bill had called and that I was sup;: sed to call the Isla.-d + s is t right resy which is our nor=al procedure any ay. The first par::n into the l 22 office calls the Island, calls the reactor control reci. ~ ~ 23 i 24 t SC he I 9 i' [ [~ s S ~ 9 e ? S ... --. e.a .-a ~ ....e.~...- .JC/ * -' I J [ Y-I. *= i *;f 1

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) i t, ;, t. ..1. i ' ' ' q: You'ra svt.,':::1 to have tha plan at h:,93 with you. C 'FE: Ye th, wall, no ens evar g:va it to ::a. I think there.as per.t: ly L

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. ' *. ' ' t h ;. ..a t GE' MY: s Vall, I talicvs I was in the of fica about 7:25 and. tja t.'a call l' l 5::k to the c:ntral r:c,. 1.- Thcy told ca that it wss a site e. 3';an:y, that t th:ra was a ste:.s c:r.arator priesry to secondary leak and it was isolated; } 23 ~ e that th.72 was a ganaral...at'that point they want fres site to ger.3ral \\ I g.- .,....y. s.\\ t 23 2 e 0""iL O50'{: Tom, do you re.tr.ber who you were talking with? }; 5 :. \\ 1 ?, -{ k t es .,....,--.,..s...,..... 9 e e l I._ T1

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i f '.1 : : 1 c-c 11. . y y, th.-t tr.:y h:d failed fol. The d: a i :...; J Q R ;;r b:ur in tha r?'-tor building and th2y had 4 9 ,.c. ; ! t a t:

0;t ct;; king. They told re the wind was out of 30 ds;rees in i

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c'. t; Td'..d fwal; a high radiation area.. Ar.d in the c.'

.: : : :: ) s :2 $ ;ri'..g en a predictien of d:se offsite, based upon i. A e F t' : 1.) R ;;r F:,:e r:: din; :n the d: a :nitor. They precict2d 10 R/hr i t { .s c, r.';'e..3, r s s ;ra at 0:!dd:ro, based t; ;aMt 30 a m:nitor and a leak 1: 's rata of.2 of a par:cnt ;ar day in tha contair.: ant. s., t ..( l .i. '.t.." ".: n :t 10 R, s s t'.3t a ti:e d:;andant or was that a c:urse of 2:

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Fr:: tr:t, 't t-en, va nintair. d an c;an ifra to tha Unit 2 cer. trol ro::n, and a v:-! ty of l 15 p::;1 s:re en tha ph:.s tecluding--Sill was en ritnly I telf.:ve. l U Y:a..ra a on tha phone with them, and hara are v:ur c:,tc.s Bill. 13 19 i s 00:351FE Th3_ n?<t notas we hsve is, ateut. 8: 30, so eb:dy ca.a (:.n, I 6,w thtr.k it was llittr,ndorf, who is the Oc;uty Secreta y of Envircr. catal l 21 Protection, Tca's boss, came de n and said that they wanted sc.st:dy to go l 22 i over to the 1.t. G:vtrnor's of fice a.d t,rief him a.d to take ;srt in the 23 prcss confcrance. So I could voluntate str.:a I prebibly krew r.:re ctaut i 24 the plant status than anybody at that psint. So right before I left I 25 i i I 9 P I L (

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~ ; ) V:.e; th:ra :s 1 lb. pra:s.re in the rnet:r a ) t :;'.!r 7, - ), . < 3 :' ":;: )cic; that tha b;.;n.c:ncentr:tica fa tha si ./

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.l, --J t' y su ;3ct:J thare was a n2g2tive fe:C.:k frn l )! ' t> 1 st::...'ay to t ia p fcuy. They got so a secennry side wat back into 9. t'. : ; r f'.ry s.' .) 1 ;r:sitra was r:S :d in th6 pri sry. High pr:;i.re .. der. B:1 fc.!'t'. ! aad 0:y.cra using hf;h pressura inje:ti:a to ka:p th cara c:vered. 1 Ar.d tr:y r2y have had a butble in tha pricary; they i d:;r;:surized. TT.:n I wt cvar to brief the Lt. Givernor. 9o. I U C' .0 R't: 80 At this time did they discuss any releases or any possibility for ralcts.:s, at any tir.a in the future? 21 i n E.,' il.[{: I just ask:d for plant status. I guess after that we were in '23 c:r.: tint cc.~:nnication. I'm sure that was..... Hiller just briefed a on 24 t'.a ;1ar.t status-- bat had he;;:nad, what inttf ated the transient and what ..n. i i. t P r .e ' s'... y. 4 F ,, g t ( , ' *,,., [#

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! 13 :. ), I r-- Mr :na valta ::uth of t' 2 : t:.r-f '.a' ilJ. T.'. ) (.:ti; tts th:t th:y had frei th2 field rstf iting J i { ' if. m r..::**j (*. din 3 131 cc.- :-tr nic,s to the ord:r of 10 -3 t 3., t-C p a r , i ! i' y - ! ta vuf fy this t::w:a tafs was gatting into a r3thar 1: i . '. : / j f..".1 .!.a ;2th'ay hsz:rd, sithiugh not an acute pr.:bles. ) Th:y ' i us ' 2 v -ify their estfrita using our countfog e:;ui; ent, in that I 2 st;;'ily coing to pot. Arran;: :,ts f:r this .ra ,( .1..:17. 3 Dick C 0!al. And Hat Ed was g:ing to chc;;ar the a c.ctriC a to tha helipcet at Haly Spirit Hospital and we would sznd a .i.- Pt.

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I think I cust of spnt the greater ;3rt of 3/4 of ..a an h:ur trying to get through to whoever at the hospital was in authority ; r U to tell the.1, \\

Ci "there is a helicopter co.11ng with the sa pie--not to worry.'

"o.'!r. ally $ 2.straf;htened that out and we em the sample, and the cen-e l ..ntrati:n wa c':scrved in that was to the order of 10 -10 4 go,,, a t. t m' 2* w f"t!!!N: 2 What was the minte a detectable arount on the counting systei? i 20 ><e ( t i I r c i 5 i ..n... i .._oy. ?,-, 'OA---_xx-__-~__ _ - -. _. ~.

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EXHIBIT B Report Provided by David Gamble as part of his testimony in the Remanded hearing

• Second of two draft reports h...

t.xnic1t 7 i i g REPCETMILITY OF A PREDICTED QTISITE EXPOSl'RE RATE l At about 0740 on March 28, 973, the licensee atte=pted to report to NRC Region I the General Emerge =cT involving known major fuel damage. 1/ During telephone contacts wet.l. Region I personnel, which began at about 0750, the licensee did not c.etify Regico I of an offsite release cal-culation which predicted sigr.ificant exposure rates downwind toward Goldsboro.2/ The reportability of that prediction is the object of this investigation. Except for minor tire variar :e.4, matters bearing c the repertability of the offsite exposure rate p.ed:: tion have been described rather consist-ently by TMI-2 accident par de pants and investigators. A Predictien -10CC's R/hr in G::dsboro v Upon arriving at the plant = :ime to hear a Site E=ergency announced at 0655, Heward Crawford, a nue2er engineer, proceeded to the Unit 2 cot-0 ' :-.- h trol roo=y b r-.v eiva-1 he p:hered materials = = - - '+ predicting u%,.. A n 4 e c-f-%.m bT /- A f.c, th'N; r h rates a task he hac p:.rforme[during drills for two years. 3j Crawford recalls that his fi. sn calculation, completed soon after 0700, p - - sQ oJ.- k ~' h an exposure rate of D 3/br in Goldsboro. Neither the time,nor g th of this calculatr.mn has been substantiated by, records or the w&

.a recollection of others.c, "-

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. _ z4 ? T is prediction (10R/hr at the LPZ) appears to have been performed by j' Asc7/3 Crawfor2 A m a. 4 G %(he massive release of radioactiv,4 W %M

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5 - ; ' '". 0 <51 Both the time and reactor building atmosphere. rhi:b b;.% /cRA% pLWp.- W.s ymM msgnitude of Crawford's dome monitor (HP-R-214) reading (300 R/hr)g are uncertain. A= -;. c t, 0;- 2 0' " 'h a.d. $ L..ad-the-bas.ie N r The time shown on the calculation sheet, 0744,. f - e e; du m m - u r. mms

f wnen HF-R-214 was read or when the calculation was per-

"Nrb.s formed. -Ti;.;f i.g, Mr. Crawford's prediction cf 10 R/hr at the LPZ see=s to have occurred between 0713 and 0744. Crawford recalls discussing a 40 R/hr prediction with Richard Dubiel, Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry, and with James Seelinger, Unit 1 Superintendent.6,/1/ Dubiel and Seelinger recall <:zrt. discussions [ N -Oh ~ only concerning the 10R/hr prediction.8/9/ 0/11/ this distinction M 40 Rf A r d M RJ k. ( f is unimportaot*:thm-A~ r - M,@4 g m During tae 6/6/79 interview,7/ Crawford stated: L They both thought it appeared too high and they i:. mediately talked, you know, possible steam damage to the dome moniter...they wanted to get a very good feel to see if they wanted to believe that number.... kd' On 5/22/79, Dubiel ststed:EI g

...I don't think we ever had projections that were meaningful and I don't believe at that time we had any projections that indi cated anything of a serious nature, even based on the procedures. This statement appears to have been based on two factors - disbelief of, the doce monitor reading and knowledge of low pressure in the reactor c*s 9/11/7f. w building - as indicated in the following exenange gof \\ Q Do you recall doing an off-site dose calculation at approximately 7:10 on the morning of March 28th? Dutiel I did not do any off-site dose calculations. Q Do you recall verifying one? Dutiel I recall verifying one. I recall looking at several during the morning. L Q An specifically, do you recall one that was made by Mr. Crawford based en a reading of the dome monitor? Dutiel Yes, sir, I de. Q Do you remember verifying that one? Dubiel Yes, I do. b*

k Q Am I correct that Mr. Crawford's calculation was incorrect? Dubiel No, I think Mr. Crawford's calctilation was correct. 'Q Was . based on an incorrect reading of the monitor? Dubiel No, I don't believe so. Q What was the calculation of the off-site dose he came up with? Dubiel Approximately 10 R per hour gamma at a location which was the center of the town of Goldsboro, which is on the west shore of the Susquehanna. Q And your understanding is that, based upon the information that he had, he correctly calculated a projected dose of 10 R per hour? Dubiel Yes. Q. Can you explain how Mr. Crawford could have made an ac-curate calculation of 10 R per hour as the expected level in Goldsboro when in fact there were no detectable levels? Dubiel I think that the single biggest factor in that particular,

iter is that the doce monitor did not respond accurately. The projected levels are based on the dome acnitor read-ings, plus some very conservative assumptions. Since we are trying to do, in defining the procedure for dose projections, there are a lot of parameters which cannot be detereined, so that conservative assumptions are made. And, I feel, first of all, that the dome monitor over-responded significantly. I feel, secondly, that the building pressure of one or two pounds versus the conservative assumption of 55 pounds would add to it. fa.$E%sW DE 5/11/79, Gary Miller, TM1 Station Manager,Q testified before the U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Af fairs:15 Veaver: What did you think of that? The high reading on that dome monitor? Miller: I just did not think about it in terms of fuel damage. I knew that it meant there was a potential t: release things offsite. My only concern was to get readings. Cheney: Did you have any question about the values of those readings?

[ Mi'.l e r : I thought it was too high, but I did net need to be con-vinced that it was high enough to be concerned. I vas .M.e44% _;_;d.1; 40,000 or 50,000. I mean that was beyond what I had ever envisioned ever see.ng on the dome monitor, so. ycu can discuss whether there was shielding and moisture and whether it was beta radiatien, and all that sort of thing. But I did not need to be convinced. What I really wanted was somebody out there with a meter and an iodine kit saepling, and the vind direction. That is real nu=bers. That is really what someone is g:ing te get out there. So that was our concern. Onsite and Offsite Menitoring ( Mr. Miller's statement reflects a commen concern for getting radiation measure:ents onsite and offsite to supplemen theCrawfordpredictionC4). Upor. de:laration of a Site Emergency at 0655, efferts te organize and dispatch onsite and offsite monitoring teams began. B/13/ This see=s to have ccturred rather clumsily; nevertheless, in onsite tea: (Alpha) was ( instructed at about 0730 to measure the radiation level vest of the Unit 2 reac:er building. l'/15/ During th:t survey, the wind was westward and very light with minu:e-to-minute variations of ab:ut to to 30 degrees. This survey was appropriate, but tardy. At 0746, Alpha Team reported less than 1 m."./hr at Station GE-S wes of the Unit 2 reacter building. As discussed later, this measurement became the basis for discounting .c. C ewf:rd's pre' dict:en(s) of high exp: ure ra*es offsite. 1 l

At abou: 0800 and OS3C, respectively, Charlie and Bravo Teams were dis-pa:ched by vehicle to Geldsboro. At about 0830, Charlie Team reported. less than 1 mR/hr in Goldsboro. Bravo Team reported similarly at about 0940. Given that there had been no significant release from the reactor building, these surveys seem adequate from the expe,sure rate measurement standpoint. However, had a major release occurred, these surveys would have been too little, too late. TM1 ca:agement appears to have realized the need for a quick measurement i: Celdsbero to cenfir= or deny Crawford's prediction:(s). In statements fellowing the accident, Miller and Dubiel maintained that a State Police helice;;er had flow a survey.ea: to Geldsbere soon after the General Emergency was declared. To the U. S. House of Representatives, Cc=mittee on Interior and Insular I' % *. Affairs,^ Mill ~er stated:3y, OnM 2 % 19 19's o b[ " l _' ' :!.v. J At approximately 0730 or a little before, I had received predictions of an offsite dose of 10 R at Goldsborc. This was based on the Reactor Building do=e menitor, which was still increasing and from our past experience with this source calculation, we did feel these were really this high, but as a precaution, I dispatched a State Police helicopter with an offsite team along with an offsite team in a car a:d separately, to the West Shore (Goldsbcro). 0740 York Haven radistion monitor reading (0) - helicepter (approx.) at TMI - dispatched offsite teams in helic:pter and one

1 separately in car to West Shore (fro G. P. Miller and R. W. Dubiel recall of the incident). O'800 Offsite team in Helicopter at West Shore (Goldsboro) (approx.) 'O' reading - we actually were ahead of the plume - plus onsite team at our Vest site boundary '0' reading. f%b- + 9/u/7'79 2 the b.C Special Inquirv GrcuaMC,Millerstated:,g, A ~ Q In fact, you er someone called the State Police that morning for a helicopter and you got one very fast, didn't you? Miller There may be---subsequently I know there's some dispari-ties in my time versus the time the thing landed here or the time it's documented. I remember as soon as I had the projection, which was high, for Goldsber and knowing the west---knowing the wind was blowing to the west and knowing that it was seven or eight in the morr.ing, that I know that I asked for a helicopter before seven thirty. I k:;r'. cha' that was in my minVand knew. that I had the enmonitoroutove/ / ork jF r there an '/ l /~ I knew nad a guy on the Vesl. Shore. / 6at's something that had in the Unit 2 hear / practiced and tho/ Eves / / ingswhen/ ught about it. / / / / slow as it was/ we discussed the wind blowing west, g.

se Q Do you know whether the helicopter actually ca=e on the site and picked up somebody to go over the river? Miller To my knowledge it was verified to me that they picked up ~ one or two of our people and they were flown over there. And readings were back, and as I reme=ber the readings were back before Dubiel had thought the plume had gotten there. In other werds, ve had gotten over there faster than the radiation would have at the wind speed, which was very slow. 4las-On 4/24/79, Dubiel stated:g, 3 At some point around 7:30, Gary Miller asked me for the status of the offsite teams, and I gave him the infer =ation that we had two teams ready to go offsite beth available for transpertation over to the West Shore. Gary directed me to make contact with the State Police and get a State Police helicopter to get one crew over there in a more timely fashion. He was cencerned about the traffic--the early morning rush hour traffic trying to go u; over the bridge in Harrisburg and then back down and that it might take ac hour or more to get over there. 11e requested that se send one team in a heli-copter and a second team in a car of drivir.g over at a ncrm:1 pace to back them up. I do not recall exactly who told me that they would get the State Police helicopter. I believe it was George Kunder, I do not remember exactly, but within minutes I had it confirmed te

4 c.e that the State Police had been notified, and a helicopter would be on its way sin:e they are stationed up at Harrisburg, Harrisburg International Airport. It would be here in a matter of minutes, and that security was notified that this helicopter was coming and would be landing somewhere in the vicinity of the north parking lot, and that they were to allow it to land and make preparations to support its landing in getting our technician on board. ...the timing may be poor but I am estimating 7:40 we had a man in the helicopter and sometime by two to three maybe five minutes later the man was in Goldsboro. By 9/21/79, Dubiel's position regarding the helicopter survey had chacged Q Did you have any role in ordering a Pennsylvania State -- or requesting a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter to come to TMI and take a team to Goldsboro to verify what you thought and hoped was the fact, which is that it did not have a 10 R per hour reading there? Dubiel Yes, I was involved in the determination for the need of a helicopter. I did not make the specific request. Q Do you know who did? Dubiel George Kunder made the request via the site protection officer. It might have been a sergeant, someone in the security force. E 101-3

Q Did the helicopter arrive? Dubiel The helicopter came in. I don't recall a time. I believe it was an hour later. Q To your knowledge, did a team go in the helicopter to Goldsboro and take a measurement? Dubiel I thought one did. I have been led to believe -- when we determined the need for the helicopter, we simultaneously sent a team in a car to drive around. But recognizing the time it takes to get there, we requested a helicepter. Which team got there first I don't know. I know the helicopter was available, because I subsequently used it for other things. The fact seems to be that TMI manaEement, being concerned,about potential exposure rates in Goldsboro, did order a belicopter after declaring a General Emergency at 0724 'However, the helicopter did not arrive until 0835, by which time Charlie Team had reported in free Goldsboro and Bravo Team had left by truck for Goldsboro. The helicopter was not used to transport a survey team to Goldsboro. By 0830, when Charlie Team reported less than 1 mR/hr from Goldsboro, it was clear that a major offsite release from the reactor building had not occurred. But little comfort should have been derived from that knowledge while the reactor building contained an inventor of perhaps'300 million curies of noble gases and other radionuclides l W1

l Fepertability and Reperting The situation was intuitiv. ly reportable to NRC under 10 CTR 20.403, which requires icrnediate notification "...of any incident involving n byproduct... material...which raay have caused or threatens to cause... v release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table II...." pav X,t-i ? " 2E Mpf ~ Tid 2rM A 3 E-pd2/M. c.- 9 M 3 ere was no reason to beliese that the deme monitor (HP-R-21!.) increase was transient, (.he "iemediately reportable" concentration of L.:'n.n cM Xe-133 4 -.. ;!:.- 1.5E-3 yCi/c1 (i.e., 5000 x 3E-7 7i/ci). Oi.; C ., ar-t - Mw.' xe--eed- : XM 6 EA r econds-per ent-ie-me.t-er, ,.& SY kcA g,,

t :1 _ t 0744 C rawf o rd un d L.:. t i a-Ew.w y P. m im..

&M-4 ; R e v--.3,

j g 4~" d-L.J 2/' /73 to calculat9' a concentration of 0.33 Ci/mi at the I.P2, 220 tic. G W~Q'S L timesA "immediately reportable" concentration.q Ht'r i.g d.; u g.o - g E-w. h ee e A M. M p m 6 M b E ~ pue,.-t-he-sicir.u.r-eeecentTas-ion-tenediaely-reportalde-undtM CT?e W% I4 7c, y. Rw. 3 c% His-h r-t~~f~M A. ic R /,v,. 2{-6C9-flW ^ f -/dC wan-be,4ounWorrespond--to ar c:.7 -~ N~- L k 'i V"-F.-2 4.-reading-A niy.. n/h. Early in the accident, the licensee logically could have challenged tne Procedure 1670.4 calculation on the basis of low reactor bdildi:g pres-sure. But as the reaeter building radioactivity invento:y increased, as measured by HP-R-214, the licensee should have become fr:; t-- 4 less concerned about the conservatism of the calculation and mere con-cerned about the magnitude of the potential hazard. i no

Tele;tene contact between the Unit 2 control room and NRC Region I was established, af ter appropriate ef forts by the licensee, at about 0750.4/ Although e2 lier contacts had been made with the Region I answering ser-vice, this.vas the licensee's first good opportunity to report the acci-dent in accordance with 10 CFR 20.403. (c,7.7 & / h A %,t LP2. f However, the 0744 prediction of 10 R/hr was not reported, apparently 4 because the first ensite measurement at point GE-8 west of Unit 2 (1 mR/hr at 0746) had been used to calculate a new source term at 0750. Although this one onsite measurement did not prove that the release was ins:gnificant, the licensee could have concluded justifiQ that the .[ (9-c47 lpCU.~ rd f.fi----. -Z Ch %-v- ,.:. s release was not as bad as n ::_'.: S 5. .s,,s M t.ne situation j' e.K, ., 9.. v~, re=alced however, in t:at: (1) the incident still threatened to cause a ~ major release and (2) offsite field measurements had not been completed. tM;,.s -% $'QG'&..j Gf7 W b The licensee 4 reported Crawford's 10 R/hr prediction te the Bureau of d s ') Radiation Protection but not to NRC. The only identified NRC reference

3rc, I-N*,Nd to a high radiation level outside the plant var the fellowing telephone N..w

[ cenversation recorded $fter 10:00 a.m. on 3/2S/79 / x. f in the CC Operations p,3NN Center 7 SQ M0 T. / e. .$7 A $m[-Q l. . c. fts[.g VOICE: The indications are that low levels are being released, j.:M../] we vill find out. e

o..

&I h,' [Y/ k ) f VOICE: W.at is your CC? s u*4..T. '.%:.,3 u.-

• 1.'

'44 : V0;CE: There is no question that.here was - .h.~ - > '" Y.,. N 3 y .., k. e.'. O w. 2.:

L V0]CE: There vas? VOICE: --released when the incident first occurred. VOICE: Yeah, I beard somebody, I guess on the radio, I think it was from the Eureau, saying that there were 10 R per.hc.ur out the cooling te-er. VOICE: No. VOICE: k'as that emergency.scrvices? VOICE: I don't know who said that. VOICE: It was son.elicdy f rom the State of Per.nsgIvania being it.ter-viewed, that's shat. It is unlikely that the licensee inadvertently omitted the 10 R/br pre-diction eben describing the accident to Region I after 0750.

Clearly, from the Crawford and Dubiel statements, the iicensee% anted not to believe the dome monitor and Crawford's calculation.

The licensee not only failed to report the 10 R/br prediction to Regico I, but also, according to the following statecent of Thcr.as Gerusky, Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, countered the report to ERP with nonexistent Goldsboro survey results. s-

In the meantime, I requested them to try to get their teams somehow to Goldsboro, and they said that the State Police helicopter was there and that they would get one of their teams up in the air and over Goldsboro. We stayed on the phone with them. They found no radiation levels onsite or in Goldsboro that would indicate any kind of a leak. So therefore, we then notified the Civil Defense to hold tight. This was all before 8:00. The desire to disprove the 10 R/hr prediction, which could have triggered massive evacuations, is understood. Use of the first onsite, downwind measurement to partially achieve such disproof also is understood. The use of nonexistent offsite survey results to fur 6her disprove the pre-diction is not understood. Conclusion Nothing discovered in this investigation relieved the licensee of the requirement to report to NRC all pertinent facts concerning the accident. The 10 P/hr prediction seems not to have been adequately disproved by 0750, when telephone c'ontact was established with Region I. The decision not to report the 10 R/hr prediction was improper. By not reporting to Region I at about 0750 on 3/28/79 that the calculational method described in Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.4 had predicted a reportable re-lease of radioactive material, the licensee violated the reporting re-quirement of 10 CFR 20.403(a)(2).

s peferences ) 1. NUREG 0600 2. Ibid. 3. Crawford Interview IE 48, 5/3/79 4. NRC Special Inquiry Group, Volume II, Part 3 5. Ibid. 6. Crawford Interview IE 48, S/3/79 7. Crawford Interview IE 174, 6/6/79 8. Dubiel Interview IE 20, 4/24/79 9. Dubiel Interview IE 133, 5/22/79 10. Dubiel Deposition (SIG), 9/21/79 11. Seelinger Interview IE 77, 5/8/79 12. Oversight Hearings, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, May 9, 10, 11*, and 15. 1979, Serial No. 96-8, Part I

13. Egenrieder Interview IE 82, 5/8/79

14. Etbridge InterviewIE 89, 5/9/79

15. Burkholder Interview IE 99, 5/17/79 16.

Leach Interview IE 47, 5/3/79 17. Oversight Hearings, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, May 21 and 24, 1979, Serial No. 96-8, Part 11 18. Hiller Deposition (SIG), 9/20/79

19. Warren Interview IE 70, 5/7/79

20. Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Technical Staff Analysis Report on Alternative Event Sequences, Appendix E, Fission Product Inventory Within the Containment.

21. Gerusky Interview IE 46, 5/3/79 M

EXHIBIT C Memorandum, December 1,1981 Fortuna and Gamble advising Cummings of DOJ investigation of NUREG-0760 e I .. _.. - a

7. 8 E. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a , A $mNG TON. D. C. 20515 W i.,...../ December 1,1981 MEMORANDUM FOR: James J. Cumings, Director Office of Inspector and Audi r i FROM: Roger A. Fortuna, Assistant Dire

• r fo Ir24s' s

Office of Inspector and Auditor.' q%]. hT g 'llj David H. Gamble, Investigator i' o Office of Inspector and Auditor F#

SUBJECT:

QUESTION OF WITHHOLDING OF INFOPRATION DURING TMI ACCIDENT On March 5,1981, at the direction of the Commission, we met with representatives of the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), to present the results of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) report entitled " Investigation into Infomation Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Island" (NUREG-0760, dated January 1981, hereinafter referred to as the "IE Report"), for their consideration as to whether the facts warranted prosecution for willful misrepresentations, omissions. or violation of NRC regulations. At that time we also previded DOJ with ; draft of the report prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee c'n Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, entitled " Reporting of Infomation Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island" (97th Cong.. 1st Sess., Committee Print No. 3, dated March 1981, hereinafter referred to as the . HR Report"). We then advised DOJ that.we were providing them-with both reports because of an apparent difference in the conclusions reached therein regarding whether Met-Ed employees withheld information from the State and Federal Governments on the date of the accident at Three Mile Island. Nct having read the HR Report, we were unable to describe for DOJ what discrepancies existed between the two reports. At that time DOJ requested that the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) identify the portions of each report relating to the specific topics so that they could more easily analyze the discrepancies between them. Per your instructions we perfomed this task by reviewing the IE and HR reports without consulting the results of similar reviews (e.g., by ACRS) or other investigations (e.g., by Rogovin's Special Inquiry Group). In y A ..?o. # 9 o 5. Y g* n !, /.W/y'

p gg)d>4' 6 6* O f/ IMAGE EVALUATION //// ' f[kg,<4, f er Test 1AaGET car-3) rs 1.0 lf M 2 p lll HM u l'" He 1.8 1.25 ' I.4 1.6 4 150mm 6" 4 * b+ 4

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I f James J. Cummings. this revic i we have avoiced the temptation to characterize the contents of various, sections of these reports in favor of referring to specific page numbers in order to insure that DOJ reads the actual words of the reports within their own contexts. The following are the results of our review: I. Scope of the reports IE Report - pp.1-2, 33 par. 3, 35 par. 3, and 39 par. 5 HR Report - pp. 1-3 II. Identification of the primary individuals and organizations IE Report -

p. 33 par 4 HR Report - pp. 4-5 h

III. Availability and comprehension of infomation A. Open PORV/EMOV as cause of low pressure in the cooling system IE Report - pp.16-17 and 33 par. 5 HR Report - pp. 6-11 and 93 par. 2 B. Throttling of high pressure injection IE Report - pp. 13-14 HR Report - pp. 11-14 and 93-94 C. Temperature Data IE Report - pp.14-16 and 18-20 HR Report - pp. 14-33 and 94-95 D. Uncovering the core IE Report - pp. 14-16,18-20, and 34 par.1 HR Report - pp. 35-45 and 95-96 E. Uncertainty as to core cooling IE Report - pp.14-16 and 18-20 HR Report - pp. 45-54 and 95-96 F. Neutron detectors / count rate behavior IE Report - pp. 20-22 and 34 par. 1 HR Report - pp. 33-35

l r .M:: 3?d. r:.. ll I nf G. High radiation levels in containment /Goldsboro radiation dose lgl# rate projection w y/ IE Report - pp. 31-33 P HR Report _.p. 35 H. Hydrogen combustion / containment pressure spike IE Report - pp. 22-31 and 35 par. 1 (see also OIA Report, "IE Inspectors' Alleged Failure to Report Information re March 28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion at TMI-2," dated January 7,1981) HR Report - pp. 54-92 and 96-97 IV. Infomation received by the NRC j IE Report - pp. 35-39 HR Report - pp. 103-121 V. Infomation received by the State IE Report - pp. 39-45 HR Report - pp. 103-121 VI. NRC reporting requirements IE Report - pp. 45-52 HR Report - pp. 98-102 and 121 M

a EXHIBIT D Correspondence between Aamodt and Wagner concerning false statements in Staf f response N

200 North Church Street Parkesburg, Pennsylvania 19365 March 5,1985 Mary E. Wagner Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Ms. Wagner:

I am in receipt of your February 25 reply to my letter of February 12. You have attempted to provide explanation for two statements in the February 4 Staff filing which I found downright misleading. I do not find your response satisfactory. You claim that the Staff statement concerning the missing pages in the copy of our June 21 motion the NRC Staff sent to CDC was taken from our January 15 motion. You are wrong. How does your characteri-zation " virtually every other page of the Aamodt June 21, 1984 Motion was not copied and sent to Dr. Caldwell" originate in our statement at page 6: The intent of the Staff to influence CDC's critique is clearly revealed by the fact that the NRC removed eleven pages and altered an affidavit in the copy of the Aamodt motion sent to CDC. Even if, we had so asserted, why would the Staff be satisfied to adopt what is not the truth? Setting aside the alterations to an affidavit, the missing pages do not follow a pattern of every other page, or " virtually" every other page, or any other sequential pattern that we have been able to determine. We are attaching a page from our March 5 filing which provides an analysis that debunks the "every other page" (therefore, clerical error) excuse. Concerning the second statement to which we objected: You reply that you claimed that Gamble's references, not Gamble's reports, were "available for a number of years". That is true. However, it is misleading. You have attempted to switch the basis for our motion from the Gamble reports to the references of the report: As for the alleged " deception", the testimony of Mr. Gerusky and others, which form the basis for the Aamodt motion, have been part of the public records for years,7/ and this basis for reopening should be rejected on timeliness grounds. (Staff Response, pp. 9,10) } u

2 Since our basis was not the testimony of "Mr. Gerusky and others", but a specific conclusion of the Gamble report (available for I~ the first time late last year), you have a false argument based on irrelevant information (footnote 7). We stand corrected on a technicality, but you still owe us the retraction of your false -statement (above) which will automatically eliminate the objectionable footnote. Very truly yours, Marjorie M. Aamodt l I i L__.

0 Ercoq), UNITED STATES (.-E y.- < f i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U" E ',; J - &? -. l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 \\. February 25, 1985 Marjorie M. Aamodt 200 North Church Street Parkesburg, PA 19365 In the Matter of METROPOLITAN EDISON' COMPANY, ET AL. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) Docket ho. 50-289 (Destart Remand on Management)

Dear Mrs. Aamodt:

This is.in reply to your February 12, 1985 letter to me in which you claim that there are two errors in the January 15, 1985 NRC Staff Reply to Aamodt Motion for Reconsideration of Comission Order CLI-84-22 and Opening of a Hearing (Staff's Reply). First, you object to the following sentence from page 6 of Staff's Peply, which you claim is incorrect: The Staff's intent to influence, according to the Aamodts, is shcwn by the fact that virtually every other page of the Aamodt June 21, 1984 Motion was not copied and sent to Dr. Caldwell. Your complaint about this sentence, as described in your letter, is incomprehensible to me. The quoted sentence merely characterizes the claim in your January 15, 1985 motion for reconsideration that the Staff intentionally tried to deceive Dr. Caldwell of the Center for Disease Control by forwarding to him an incomplete copy of your June 21,.19Fa motion. I believe the quoted untence accurately characterizes your allegation against the Staff and, therefore, there is no reason to correct Staff's Reply as you request. Secondly, you claim that the Staff is wrong when it states in foot-note 7 on page 10 of Staff's Peply that the " Gamble draft reports" had beer.available in the NRC's public document room for a number of years. Footnote 7 does not state what you say it does. Footnote 7 reads as follows: 7/ Page 16 of Attachment 4, which page was not included in ~ the copy of the Aarrodts' Motion which was served upon q, the Staff, lists the references used in preparing this e draft section of NUREG-0760. The documents referenced have, to the best of Staff's knowledge, beer available in the NRC's Public Document Room for a number of years. . Footnote 7 does not state that the " Gamble draft reports" (Attachment 4) had been available in the NRC's public document room for a number of years. Rather, footnote 7 statas that the references (" documents referenced") listed en page 16 o' Attachment 4, to the best of Staff's knowledge, have been available in the NRC's public document room for a number of years. The Staff still believes this to be correct. Since you obviously misread footnote 7, and it is correct to the best of Staff's knowledge, there is no reason to correct Staff's Peply on this po i r.t. I hope this rectifies any misunderstandings you may have about the Staff's Reply. Sincerely, OQ

• d/g Mary E. Wagner Counse4 for NRC Staff cc

  TMI-1 service list L_

EXHIBIT E Letters from Drs. Cochran, Molholt, Berger, Cobb, Mayor Reed and Senator Spector supporting Aamodt health motion 9 L-

v'V Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc. 2 350 NEW YORK AVENUE. N.W. I SUITE 300 WAS HIN GTON, D.C. 20005 8 8 20s73-700 New Tork Ofice IVestem 0,* ice a t t E AST (S N D STREET 35 EE^mNv startt N z w v o n E, N.Y.10 8 68 S AN F R AN CISCO. C A LIF. 9 410 8 888 949-0049 4:54ndsh January 7, 1985 The Commissioners U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ~

Dear Commissioners:

I am a member of the NRC's Advisory Panel on the Cleanup of TMI-2. I have not had the opportunity to discuss the contents of this letter with others on the panel and therefore do not speak on their behalf. At the panel's last =eeting with you, we discussed briefly the Aamodt study -- the finding of an excess of cancers as a result of door-to-door interviews with residents of two areas about five miles from the TMI site. Since our discussion, I have received a copy of your Order CLI-84-22, in the matter of Metropolitan Edison Company (TMI Unit 1), Doc. No. 50-289-SP, in which a majority of the Cormnission concluded that "the Aamodts' informed survey is based entirely on recollections and opinions and has no scientific basis," and ilhat.this was " insufficient to raise serious questions about earlier studies." You should be advised that the TMI Public Health Fund Advisory Board, on which I also serve, has independently checked the Aamodt findings and confirmed the excess cancer mortality found in the Aamodt study areas. We have identified the death certificates of all but 'one of the people reported to have died of cancer and have independently checked the Aamodts' estimate of the total population in the study areas. We have not yet checked the reported incidence of cancer among living people in the study area. I would be happy to discuss our methodology with any one of you or your staff. On the basis of our own independent analysis, it would be wrong to conclude that the Aamodt results are groundless. Certainly there now is a scientific basis for concluding that there may be a large excess in cancer mortality in the scudy areas. .Vew England Ofice: 9 0 805 TON POST "O^D ' 5'D8' AY M A 0i7;6 6:; 23 o4 5 Public Lands Institute i;no n.Act sTatIT ornta, co. Soro6 3c3 3;;-9;4o s#, Rectcled Paper 6 p e g D e

i. The Commissioners Jan. 7, 1985 Page Two I do not know the statistical prcbability of finding such a high incidence of cancer in this small study population. I do not know the cause of the excess, although I doubt it is TMI-related. Nevertheless, since your conclusions regard *ng the Aamodt results are not valid today, I urge you to reexamine this issue. Even if the excess is not TMI-related, surely you recognize how important it is for the Commission to take the lead in ensuring that more careful epidemiological study is undertaken and an effort is made to determine the cause of the excess. Sincerely, CB Thomas B. Cochran cc: Mike Masnik, TMI Program Office for distribution to Advisory Panel members D 9 0 e O O + y

4M* pg [] 400 Cowpath Road

0...I. h I Hatfield, PA 19440 I

F;.... 17 Decemberi1984 T ....w Dr.GlynCai' dwell Centers for Disease Control .." '" '6 P 1 :51 1600 Clifton Road Atlanta, GA 30333 vii..- & 5.J : ,,.s Re: Review of Aamodt Study for NRC 90027):on Ah.506 Vit. 6h n

Dear Dr. Caldwell,

gnD DEC 2M984 Your name is mentioned in NRC correspondence concerning CDC's review of the Aamodt cancer mortality study near TMI. I write you concerning the negative review your agency has given the Aamodt study such that the NRC is quoted as calling it " based entirely on recollections and opinions and (has) no scientific basis." Having reviewed the Aamodt study and having some expertise in epidemiology, I am puzzled as to why CDC dismissed their preliminary findings so hastily. Although obviously in need of followup, the Aamodt study is credible in several important scientific manners: 1) All cancer deaths were reconfirmed after the survey was completed. 2) Dr. John Cobb has obtained 12 out of the 20 death certificates in question and has found that 12 out of 12 attributed to cancer indeed died of cancer as primary cause. 3) The population base was large enough that the SMR of 5 (4 expected, 20 found) is statistically signi-ficant at the 95% confidence level. A true independent review of the Aamodt study by CDC would entail an analysis of cancer mortality frequency since 1979 in a larger area than surveyed by the Aamodts. Obviously, CDC has this capability. It might be fruitful to examine cancer mortality rates for census tracts in the TMI area 1974-79 v. 1979-84. The surprising fivefold increased cancer mortality rates dis-covered by the Aamodts in their preliminary survey called into question NRC dose assessments from the TMI accident. Hence, it is circuitous to dismiss their preliminary findings on the basis that low radiation doses make such an increase in cancer mortalities untenable. The Aamodt study deserves careful followup and a truly independent review. I would appreciate it if the CDC would take this mandate seriously, as protectors and advisors to our public concerning their health. Yours sincerel, , /J((Ul ruce Molholt, Ph.D. James 0. Mason,M.D.,Ph.D./ / cc: Nunzio J. Palladino, Ph.D.

Jonathnn Berger, MRP, PhD 442 West Schoolhouse Lane Philadelphia, PA 19144 John C. Cobb, MD, MPH P.O. Box 1403 Corrales, NM 87048 January 14, 1985 .vrs. Marjorie Aamodt bnowhill Farm, R.D. 5 Box 428 Coatesville, PA 19320

Dear Mrs. Aamodt:

We would like to report to you the results of our follow-up of your study. These results are our interpretations and do not represent the view of the Public Health Fund. Your original study reported 20 cancer deaths in a population of approximately 450. This represents, if true, a significant excess over the normal expected number based on the rates for Pennsylvania as a whole or York County. We decided that we could verify your analysis through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Vital Statistics and local school surveys and county tax records. After filing an application for confidential records with the Commonwealth of Penn-sylvania State Health Data Center for 22 possible decedents, we found that 19 died of cancer, 2 of other causes and 1 remains as yet un-checked because the death certificate is not yet available. We checked the population number in the areas that you surveyed and found that the spring 1984 school census in the area substantiates your number although the evidence suggests that the population for the area may be somewhat smaller. It is our opinian that these data support a significant excess of cancers in your survey area. We have no opinion on the causes of these cancers. Sincerely, M /N WD tm / Jonathan Berger, MRP, PhD , -% u '. Es $ John C. Cobb Professor Emeritus Preventive Medicine and Biometrics University of Colorado School of Medicine JB/JCC:rjw

p/ D %'e f oeuera g y us e o. t !/ i\\ wW 'I Q !E '85 FEB 26 P319 OFFICE OF THE MAYO}mcgsr sasage h CITY GOVERN 51ENT CENTER HARRISBURG. PENNSYLVANIA 1 101-16 8 %TE Pilt N R. Rt I D \\10 0R February 22, 1985 gg g Mr. Nunzio J. Palladino, Chair Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States of America 7920 Norfolk Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Palladino:

Today's official confirmation from the operator of Three Mile Island that some meltdown of the core of TMI Unit 2 did, indeed, occur during the 1979 accident, is a very significant admission. It contradicts previous denials of such. During the D!I accident, a number of stack monitors, the maximum measuring capacity of which was 1000 REMS, were " stuck" at that level for a period of as much as eight hours. This =eans, si= ply, as we understand it, that emissions from the plant exceeded that significant emission level. Locally, the question of short and long term health effects from D!!'s accident and its operations before and since the accident have been vigorously debated. Since no conclusive data exists in the Nation to conclusively identify such effects, there is no local " comfort" from known data either. I believe that it is imperative that the U.S. Government determine the levels and types of contaminants that would have been and were emitted from TMI'during the 1979 accident, particularly in view of the fact a portion of the Unit 2 core actually melted under temperatures higher than what were ever previously proj ected to have occurred. I further believe that it should not be so easily dismissed that because of the emission of such contaminants into a semi-rural atmosphere that these contaminants posed no threat to public health and safety. NRC records have established, and enforcement action against the DII operator have revealed, that omission of information has occurred at D!I regarding data. The need for objective and independent data has therefore been established for quite some time.

c. -

-Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino February 22, 1985 Page Two It is critically important to the future of TMI and the future of . existing and future nuclear power development in the United States that the question of short and long term health effects from TMI be accurately examined. The admission of partial core melting considerably adds to the scope of what possibilities may exist, we are advised, and there should be no reopening of either Unit at TMI until these basic questions are answered. Underlying this. issue is the question of whether the NRC, established to both promote and regulate the nuclear power industry as a public agency, will-perform its longter= mandate of ensuring public health and safety while providing for a new form of energy for the Nation. We therefore believe no TMI Units should restart until health and safety issues are resolved, particularly in view of the latest damage confirmation. We are available to discuss this if you wish and appreciate your consideration of this request and view. Yourssincerely,! I r-A' i STEPHEN R. REED Mayor-SRR/ra 6 I i

< =.. n exu ,s.t c s a A0 C Aav APD40raa',and .t

• t aa.,5 as s a,a 3 Idnited Statcs.Scnatt was.=cro=. OC 205 to February 12, 1985 Chairman Nunzio'J. Palladino

.c 5 F 9 A 9 :54 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts o Commissioner James K. Asselstine %y Commissioner Fredrick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i, if h 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentic5nen: L FAC...........,,,,gna. New inforration has bem brought to my attenticn that reinforces my con-viction' that serious public safety and management integrity issue:3 have not been adequately addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Camtirsion, and that ccnsideration of restarting m1 Unit 1 at this time would be inappropriate. I am referring to the health study conducted by Nor:ran and Marjorie 'sa.edt and concerns about GPU managsunt that are raised by the Aamdt.%3 tion for Feccasidera-tion of Ccmnission Order CLI-84-22, filed with the NFC cn January 15, 1985. 'Ihese matters wre presented to my office by the Aanodts personally. 'Ihe health study concludes that there is a cancer death rate in three areas around the mI plant that is over seven times the norral expected rate. According to the Motion for Beccnsideration, this data has been verified by death certifi-cates provided by the Pennsylvania State Health Departrent and other sources of population data. I understand the Center for Disease Control has raised questions about the nethodology of the Aamodt study. While this response my indicate the need for further study with better nethodolcqy, I do not see how it can justify ccupletely ignoring the cancer risk issue. In addition, the Aanodt bbtion charges that licensee personnel lied #.en they told the Pennsylvania Bureau of Padiation Protection at the tire of the accident that surveillance teams had been dispatched and had verified that a significant release had not occurred. The Motion cites the testi:rny cf a for ur NFC investigator in support of this allegation. As I have stated in prior letters, it is extreely troubling that serious issues relevant to restart rerrain unresolved six years after the accident at 'IMI. Expeditious resolution of these tw] particular issues is essential before the Ccrmtission decides whether to authorize restart. Sincerely, Arlen Specter AS:ssa

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The document MOTIONS TO ADDRESS FALSE STATEMENTS IN RESPONSES TO AAMODT MOTION OF JANUARY 15, 1985 and a letter, dated March 5,1985 to the Commissioners were served on the Commissioners by my personal delivery cf these materials to the Commission office at 1717 H Street, NW. Washington, D. C. Counsel for the Licensee was served by hand-delivery to their offices. All other parties were served by deposit in U.. } Mail, first class delivery, on March 6,1985. ~N t, Marjorfe M. Aamodt SERVICE LIST Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Ellyn R. Idelss Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Washington, D. C. 20555 2001 S Street, N.W.#430 Washington, D. C. 20009 Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas v. Au, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20555 Office of Chief Counsel Department of Environmental James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Resources U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 505 Executive House Washington, D. C. 20555 P.O. Box 2357 Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner Harrisburg, PA 17120 y.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George F. Trowbridge, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20555 - Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Lando W. Zeck, Jrl., Commissioner Trowbridge 1800 M Street NW U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20555-Three Mile Island Alert Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 315 Maclay Street Washington, D. C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA Atomic Safety and Licensing Tom Devine, Esq. Appeal Board Government Accountability U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20036 j Docketing and Service Section (3) i Office of the Secretary l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 MaryE. Wagner, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Staff i i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, D. C. 20555 L}}