ML20106G099

Requests Rev to Draft Tech Specs to Provide Comprehensive Set of Action Statements for Filter Trains

ML20106G099
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/12/1985
From:	Jens W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NE-85-0277, NE-85-277, NUDOCS 8502140221
Download: ML20106G099 (17)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:r-L = Wtyne H. Jens - Vice President Nuclear Operatens. 6400 h Dixie Highway 3NN February 12, 1985 NE-85-0277 Director'of: Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:!Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief

Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D'.C.

20555

Reference:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 2) Letter dated January 11, 1985 from W. H. Jens to J. G. Keppler, " Post Fuel Load Preoperational Testing"

Subject:

_ Request for Revision to Draft Technical Specifications Detroit _ Edison requests a change to the draft Fermi 2 Technical Specifications.as indicated in' Attachment.l. Concerning the proposed change to specification 3.7.2, a-recent.componentL ailure highlighted the need for a more f comprehensive set of action statements.. The Standard Technical Specifications for the control room emergency filtration system are based on a design having independent subsystems. As~noted in_section 9.4.1 of the staff's SER for Fermi 2,_the Fermi 2. design has' redundant active components but a single recirculation filter train and. . single makeup' filter train. This design is-shown schematically-on FSAR. Figure 9.4-2. 'For a design having two independent _ subsystems the Standard 'lechnical Specifications ' require an inoperable -subsystem to. -be repaired within 7-days or the. unit must be shut down. 'To _ achieve'a comparable response for the Fermi 2. design, pro - posed action statement b.2 requires an inoperable redundant component to be repaired _in 7. days or the. unit must be. shut down..This statement recognizes that some components other_ than'the fans are also redundant. Proposed action b.l.re-quires the unit'to be shut.down within 12 hours with nonre-dundant portions of the system. inoperable. Proposed action -statement c.1: accomplishes the.same purpose for Operational- . Conditions-'4 and 5. . A

- t Mr. B. J.--Youngblood February 12, 1985 NE-85-0277 Page 2 TheLproposed change _to surveillance 4.7.2.b clarifies the v heater being referred to. The proposed change to surveil-lance 4.7.2.c.1 parallels the. wording of surveillances 4.7.2.f and 4.7.2.g. The.' proposed change to surveillance 4.7.2.e.1 was made nec-essary by the results of preoperational testing which indi-cated a pressure drop of 4.8 inches across the recirculation i filter train with clean filters. It also clarifies that the flow rate through the makeup filter train is 1800 cfm rather than 3,000. Surveillance 4.7.2.e.2 has been modified to reflect the fact that:the positive pressure in the control room is. achieved by air flow through the emergency makeup air filter train. In addition, surveillance 4.7.2.e.4 is clarified to indicate that each heater dissipates 12 kW. The proposed addition of footnote *** is consistent with a proposed deferral of preoperational testing of the Control ' Center HVAC System as requested in reference 2. Since no irradiated fuel will exist until this. condition is achieved, the function of the system is not needed. At the request of. Mr. Gary Staley of the Environmental and. Hydrologic Engineering Branch, Detroit Edison has agreed to modify npecification 3.7.3 as indicated in Attachment.l to includs,the location and elevation of.each survey point on .the shore barrier. Finally, a minor typographical error was.noted'on.page.. 3/4.6-34.. It is requested that these proposed changes be -reviewed-and incorporated on a schedule to support fuel load.

I hereby certify that'these proposed changesfreflect,thec

. plant, Final Safety Analysis. Report and-the staff's Safety. Evaluation Reports in.all' material. respects, rAttachment 2 consists of a revision to the' Final Safety J Analysis' Report'which will be incorporated'in a future s ? amendment. ;Itfraflects.a revised analysis-of the time. required to restore a negative pressure'in the secondary s ' This analysis containment'following a design-basis LOCA.- supports the technical = specification on; norma 1' secondary ' containment pressure as-discussed previously.with-iMr. John Lane of1the' Containment Systems Branch.. b r ME I Ic; (,.. i ~ [ i 'i _ _j.f;. lia.. d .;,i_.l_. m.

( Mr. B. J. Youngblood - February 12, 1985 NE-85-0277 Page 3 If you have any further questions please contact Mr. O. K. Earle at (313) 586-4211. Sincerel r i Attachments ikgg cc. Mr. P..M. Byron Mr. J. C. Lane Mr. M. D. Lynch Mr. R. L. Perch Mr. G. B. S taley Document Control Desk, USNRC Washington, D.C. 20555 s y f O f ? .? I b,. ~ 1 0 r } }

b I, WAYNE H. JENS, do hereby affirm that the foregoing statements are based on facts and circumstances which are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. WAYNE H.(/JENS ( Vice President Nuclear Operations On this day of 1985, before me personally appeared Wayne H. Jens, being first duly-sworn and. says that he executed the foregoing as his free act and deed. Notary'Public MARCIA BUCK Notary Public, Washtenaw County, Mt My Commission Expires Doc.28,19U bb M pw ~ u

6]LL.f / PLANT SYSTEMS 9 P'l' ~,i d e.t e '*q 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM y 'u a.t q .a g b[ W LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 The control room emergency filtration system shall be OPERABLE with the n system composed of: a. The emergency makeup air filter train. ,, b. The emergency recirculation air filter train. 1 c. Two recirculation fans. d. Two return and supply fans. e. A flowpath capable of: 1. Recirculating control room air. 2. Supplying emergency makeup air to the control room.** APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,"3,"4 N ind

• ACTION:

With the control room air temperature greater than 95'F but less than a. 105'F, restore the control room air temperature to less than or equal to 95'F within 12 hours or go to a 4 hour operating shift. b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 a'th := trt :1== =;r;=:y filt-d'= yst: rni=ul;tien f;n ;nd/;r =: =tur =d =;;1y .M M 4a hir.;p:r:510, rester th: ' = p;r bi; f;n(;) t: 0"E"O L:. i.i. Mb

ithin 7 deys er 5;

".a ;t 1;est ",0T 5",t'T00= ithin the neot-12 heses h .-m _si. 4 y 3= waA p . a

4. en,n cumnnou c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, 5 or *: 1. With ere :=tr:1 rees 2;;rgen;, iiiii.tien syst;: =:trculat4en fr =d/r ;n; return ;nd eopply f.n ineps.tle, re: tere-.tha. in:per:ble f=(:) t: 0.E""."L:.i to;.;ith' ' days ce in4 W ie and ri-tria epe etier Of th: :y:t= a'th OPER**LE f=: '- th: scircul;tien ;;;d; ;f ;;;reti=. With the control room emergency filtration system inoperable, ,2. suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and operations with a potential for i draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in d. Operational Condition 8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The control room emergency filtration system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: 4.7.2 At least once per 12 hours by verifying'that the control rc = air a. 4. temperature is less than or equal to 95 F.

• When irradiated fuel is being handled in the secondary containment.
  • Not-applicable in the chlorine mode of o$nt,rf od CPERATrogAL G eration.
• Nor seelossbit. pruo r To achoutu cem MTeR vvmnt fuei Los D.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-8

kW/ Oh

b. Gnsert) tozL - et tL. oLa Q.fL 6-1.

n.f6~ yk k & L. i a L a aorsauro-a A & o.,t iz h OaM. Eu COLD $ H UT D0 UJPJ M Ev - - - - _ - fM 2 4 %. p %me 3 M +toraust.e a m 7W ; ~ 3 ~d L p A % m p as JA, wM 1% A. b ai A .L.4 sor su ur po um tL. g i2. h M A coco SH uTDoulh) T.A.s. 2.4 & J.v. to.al. a ma.c.JLA~, i ~ % pm 3 GA c. i. Ak@%~M LAk & M -&Q w JA. % JA >.~h & + &w&t o peru s t e u 7A ev ' A mA h7%. A L d'&W, nLL 6 1 enw-w e I a. 4

n FIML Mmy; PL_ ANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating i fan operation from the control room, and establishing flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, and verifying that the s stem.ooerates for at least 10 hours with the hectas OPERABLE. c4eA enememy adevf' mieto.sr keo:ter A c. A east once per'18 m6nths or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by: 1. Verifying that the system satisfies the in place penetration testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.5.c, and oper & q 'Ybe' C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and-thewkd t. S /S4" "% a.J---P f w rate,4s 1800 cfm + 10% through the makeup filter and 3000 cfm i 10% through the recirculation filter. 2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory g analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0%; and 3. Verifying a system flow rate of 3000 cfm + 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with XNSI N510-1980. - d. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sa'ple obtained in accordance with Regulatory m Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0%. At least once per 18 months by: e. 1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the recirculation train i and across the ma adsorber banks 2kgeup train combined HEPA filters and charcoal,gb, C('S #) each less than;6 inches water gauge while r o atina ne stem at a flow rate of 00 cfm + 1Q%Jhrough U e f ebt f.9 fying Ye.r odn~ud170icfauEom-!:t son F %r i c 11ys#Ychhotherecir-makeof filtey I 2. .V that e system wil a w culation mode of operation on each of the below actuation test .g.y g

• signals and verifying that on any one of the below recirculation mode actuation test signals, the system automatically switches to the recirculation mode of operation, the isolation valves close within 5 seconds and the control room is maintained at a positive pressure of at least 0.125 inch water gauge relative l

to the outside atmosphere during system operation at a flow

rate less than or ' equal to 3000 cfm through the emergency ruiredt!= filter:

1900 l mAeop adr . FERMI ; UNIT 2-3/4'7-9

FINAul Dygggae PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) a) Control center inlet radiation monitor. b) Reactor Building ventilation exhaust radiation monitor c) Radwaste Building ventilation exhaust radiation monitor. d) Turbine Building ventilation exhaust radiation monitor, e) Fuel pool ventilation exhaust radiation monitor. f) Low reactor water level. g) High drywell pressure. 3. Verifying that on the chlorine mcde actuation signal, the system automatically switches to the chlorine mode of operation, the isolation valves close within 4 seconds, and a minimum of 1200 cfm emergency recirculation is established. each 4 m ene9&'y;det Mc 4. Verifying that+the+ makeup '"tr tab heaters dissipate 12.0 + 2.0 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. f. After each complete or partial. replacement of a train HEPA filter bank by verifying that the train HEPA filter bank satisfies the inplace penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the system at a flow rate of 1800 cfm + 10% for the makeup train and 3000 cfm i 10% for the recirculation train. g. After each complete or partial replacement of a train charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the train charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the inplace penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 1800 cfm + 10% for the makeup train and 3000 cfm 1 10% for the recirculation train. ~ FERMI --UNIT 2 3/4 7-10

Ml 1 PLANT SYSTEMS ( 3/4.7.3 SHORE BARRIER PROTECTION . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 The shore barrier shall be structurally sound and capable of limiting wave action as intended. The shore barrier skan be mainhhed such that the 'elevat.on oV each survey P in+ list A in T ble 3. 7.3-/ is not le ss than I.o f t 4 APPLICABILITY: At all times k*l*w the elevah.n list,) ,*n th e 7, ble, ne, 33 g l 3urvey (.see Ta.kle 3,7. 3-l) ACTION: g,; With the elevation of one or)more survey points different by more than 1 foot from the :: it'it elevatione, prepare and submit.to the Commission within 90 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report which includes the following information: a. Explanation of how the degradation occurred and if the shore ' barrier is continuing to degrade; b. A planned course to repair the damage and a schedule for accomplishing the repair; end- ~ Evaluationofandjustificationforcontinuedplantoperation;and c. ~

d. The cunewt de*koa c4 ed survey point skown, Tdle 3.7.3_,

? SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 -The shore barrier shall be determined to be structurally sound and -capable of limiting wave action.by visual inspection and instrument' survey: a. At least once;per 12 months. -b. Within 7_ days after.a severe storm in which the crest elevation of incident waves _at the shore line exceeds the top of the shore barrier (583'0"). 4 s FERMI - UNIT 2-3/4 7-11 o

p TABLE 9.7.9-1 SURVEY POINTS FOR SHORE BARRIER Survey-Location December.1984 Point North-South East-West. Control Elevation 1A N6807 ES945-580.05 1B -N6803 E5957 576.99' ~1C N6803 E5972 575.10 2A, N6824 E5947 581.63 2B N6825 E5959-

581.01 2C N6826 E5968 579.02 2D N6822 E5976 577.65 3A N6901 E5944 581.52 3B N6898 E5958 579.89~

3C N6905 E5972 577.08 4A N7020 E5949 580.92- -4B N7023 E5960 580.59l ~ 4C N7023 E5967 578.58 4D N7024 E5974 576.02 SA. N7119 .E5947 582.09 SB-N7122-E5957.' 581.45 SC N7120 E5964 -578.72 5D N7121 E5974 575.52: 6A .N7222 E5931 582.55 6B N7223 E5950 582.70 16C -N7215-E5958 581.22~ r - 6D N7228 E5966 2578.59-6E N7233: E5973 575.59 5 "i 7A N7328-E5946 582.22: s 7)B N7322 LES958-581.18 a 7C N7317' ~ E5966' 578.99 x 7D N7328' E5974-575.09- '8A~ N7422' lE5950 5 82.~ 16 ' 8B' LN7418 E5957 581.40 '8C H7429 E5963 -578.12 8D N7428- ' ES9 T4 : 576.53' c. 1 ~ + 4 7

TABLE 3.7.9-1 (Continued) SURVEY POINTS FOR SHORE BARRIER 9A N7529 E5948 583.04 9B N7531 E5961 582.10 .9C N7531 E5965 579.91 9D N7526 E5973 575.13 10A N7612 E5937 583.85 10B N7610 E5950 582.21 10C N7618 E5961 582.56 10D N7616 E5972 576.53 11A N7721 E5940 583.15 11B-N7721 E5956 582.08 11C N7718 E5963 579.82 11D N7722 E5971 576.43 12A N7814 E5949 581.66 12B N7809 E5955' 581.11-12C N7814 E5965 578.88 12D N7815 E5975 .577.81 1. Measuring reference points are enchored into the capstones using center notched self-drilling bolts. 2. See Figure B3/4.7.3-1 for location. sketch.

r [- t4.78.00 ) + ~h 'PT.it.AM'ED}l PT.12c THE PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN PT.it D AND SECTION l$ TO ILLUSTRATE PT.11 A 'P7110N\\ THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE NT700 SOFNE.Y PotNTS LISTED IN LPT. ut TABLE 3/4,7. 3 -I N b 5 - PT. IOC PT.10A \\ + K -PT. 10 D m e,oo ( FI " PT 9 8 I-PT. 90 f PT 9 M7500 cPT". $C. PT BA PT.' 8 D M 7400 PT.8 Bf AA AA ] g-PT 7.D m PT. 7A - N7300 f 0 L-PT.*1c a.e 5 5 '8 W G d W g-PT. G E PT. gas PT48 h l Y ,M7200 -)- bP T G r L PT.G C SECTION A-A P T. 5 8 p y, S c I .5 D M? LOO SCALE i'= 100'_ 7 PT.4 A 4o N7000 SCALE 2' 100'% g o O d

• ?

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• T PT. 2D NG800 44

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c. ~ TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) t' PRIMRY CONTAI MENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXDEM ' ISOLATION TIME [ VALVE FUNCTION AND NUNBER (Seconds) 8. Remote-Nanual Isolation Valves ') (Continued) I

28. Post Accident Sampling Isolation Valves (Continued)

NA c. Gaseous Sample Return Valves P34-F408 (V13-7369) P34-F410 (V13-7379)- - d. Pressurized Reactor Coolant Sample Suction Valves P34-F401A (V13-7360) R P34-F401B (V13-7361) " j* Liquid Sample Return Valves (b) -e. 8 2 P34-F407 (V13-7368) P34-F409 (V13-7378) l

29. Nitrocen Inertino Instrumentation Valve

{ T48-F451 (V4-2185) NA l

30. 4suupaat X Torus To Secondary containment Vacuum Breaker Isolation valves T23-F410 -(V21-2016)

NA h,.= T23-F409 (V21-2015) NA c. C.- Manual Isolation Valves ig I9) NA i 1. Drywell Condensate Supply Header. Inboard Isolation Valve P11-F126 (V8-3120) [7 l 2. Drywell Control. Air and N Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve (q) 2 y ' "3 T49-F007' (V4-2172) j

• ',,l 3.

N to Drywell Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve (q) g 2 l T49-F016 -(V8-4140) i

EF-2-FSAR z SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURIZATION DURING DESIGN-BASIS LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT 4 The standby gas treatment system (SGTS) is designed to maintain a ^ secondary containment pressure of -0.25 inch of water, thus ensur-ing that any airborne radioactive material in the secondary con-tainment is not released to the surrounding atmosphere without passing through the SGTS filters. In the event of a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBA-LOCA), loss of offsite power is E assumed; consequently, there is a delay period from the start of the event to the activation of the SGTS and the emergancy area Coolers. During t_he delay period, the secondary containment pressure in-creases l#hdye/d/2 Vin'cK 4E'w' t'ef,f because of heat generated by 4 a emergency equipment and other sources. Upon initiation of the SGTS and emergency area coolers, a short period of time is re-quired to reduce the secondary containment pressure to a negative pressure at or below -0.25 inch-of water. J The purpose. of this' calculation is to generate the secondary containment pressure response during a DBA-LOCA and to determine the period of time when the secondary containment pressure is ~ above. -0.25 inch of water. The method of analysis and the assumptions and results are described in the following paragraphs. 1 58 METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS The Leemputer. code HVAC (Reference :l) was used to generate. the secondary containment pressure response. v All-major assumption are given belows .l. No credit was taken for exfiltration from the secondary containment. + 1 2. Infiltration to the secondary containment'was i g included in the' pressure response analysis. .3.- No heat transfer was allowed to the outdoor 1 atmosphere. 4. Heat transfer to interior' secondary' containment 4 walls, ' floors, and ceilings was' included. 5. Heat transfer from the torus room to the secondary containment is based on flow through'the pressure- . relieving doors in 'the corner ' room basement walls. 6. Only ' one ' SGTS filter train is available with a minimum volumetric ~ flow rate of 3800 cfm. E.5.042-37 Amendment 58 - July 1984 w,, e -mn- .,.,g--., v-er. ,.---w--:.wvm ,- e n ne mw.-see.gg,w ..p-, - - -,,, e,, - 4-vwm E m.m ye ,r. --n ..+ m ,w

W2 EF-2-FSAR 7. Offsite power is lost at the start of the DBA-LOCA event. 8. The activation of the SGTS is delayed by 33 seconds, and the activation of the emergency area coolers is delayed by 38 seconds (see FSAR Table 8.3-5). 9. The residual heat removal (RHR) pump rooms and the co're spray and reactor co.re isolation cooling (RCIC) pump rooms in the reactor building subbasement are treated separately from the main secondary contain-ment. volume. These rooms have their own emergency coolers to handle emergency equipment and lighting heat loads. Because the heat loads and cooling are confined to partially enclosed volumes at the very bottom of the secondary containment, the area coolers will absorb the heat loads within the confines of the corner rooms. 10. The heat loads from the RHR, core spray, and RCIC pump rooms will not af fect the main secondary con-tainment volume before the initiation of the area coolers. The RHR pumps are activated 13 seconds after the start of the DBA-LOCA event (see FSAR Table 8.3-5). The emergency coolers are activated at 38 seconds. For the heat loads to affect the main 58 volume, the pumps, piping, and subsequently the corner room atmospheres must heat up. After the corner room atmospheres have heated up, the only mode of heat transfer to the main volume is by natural convection. Considering that natural convection is a rather slow process, no significant heat transfer to the main secondary containment volume from the corner rooms is expected during the 25 seconds from.the ' initiation of the RHR pumps to the initiation-of emergency cooling. 11. An outdoor temperature of -10*F was used in the analysis. M q* f) n ' d'd[8 f 5)tondo / ; co d o e b m /a.k te n or 9 ~ RESULTS - C,/2.$ /nf4G n gua e was a s SVm ecK, The secondary containment response due o a DBA-LOCA is shown in Figure-1. During:the first 33 seconds, the pressure increases to a slightly positive : value..With the ~ activation of - the SGTS at 33 seconds and the activation of the area coolers at 38 seconds, the pressure ' decreases to near atmospheric.

Q>

$6 At.w seconds, - pressure-relieving doors on the common wall be-tween.the-torus. room and the corner rooms open and allow heated torus room air to enter the rest of the secondary containment. This step: input of heat into the secondary containment appears as a sharp pressure-spike on Figure 1. E.5.042-38 Amendment.58 - July 1984 s

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