ML20105B356

Submits Rept Re Security Incident in Response to 10CFR73.71(c) Detailing Loss of Security Effectiveness, Responses Made & Efforts to Revise Sys & Procedures to Reduce Chance of Recurrence.Portions Deleted

ML20105B356
Person / Time
Site:	University of California - Irvine, 05000000
Issue date:	06/01/1982
From:	Rowland F CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, IRVINE, CA
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20105B359	List: ML20105B356
References
FOIA-84-284 IE-U-509, NUDOCS 8207260421
Download: ML20105B356 (4)

Text

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June 1, 1982 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Human Factors Safety Operator Licensing Branch Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed a report on a security incident submitted in response to Federal Regulations 10CFR 73.71(c) . The repcrt attempts to detail the occurrence of the loss of security eff ectiveness, the responses made, and our ef forts to revise systems and procedures to reduce the chance of a recurrence.

We are aware that this report is late by the criteria necessary for

report of moderate loss of effectiveness which has not been compensated for. As noted below, we f eel that there are miticatinc circumstances in this case which lead to uncertainty as to how much compensation is j required to fall into the non-reportable categcry.

We wish to point out the following important it ems :

l. All evidence shows that there have been no breaches of security, l

no unauthorized activities and no threat whatsoever of material diversion.

2.

elements do not necessarily meet the "self-protect:.ng criteria" as defined by NRC, they are all highly radioactive, and not handleable with saf ety or without detection by radiation monitoring eculpment.

3. The present authqrized security plan for the f acilitywas submitted in July, 1974, following recuests for chan in the clan from NRC in June, 1974. This clan does described under " surveillance" section. .

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.Q eC H U. S. Nuclcnr R gulotory Commiccion Pego 2 June 1, 1982

4. A revised security plan was submitted to NRC on April 27th, 1981.

Additional comments were submitted on June 30th, 1981 in response to a request from NRC dated June 19th, 1981. No response has been received from NRC since that date, with the exception of a brief telephone request from Carol Rossomondo regarding clarification of personnel qualifications for admittance to the facility. This latter was in May, 1982.

5. On the advice of Region V NRC personnel, and under the guideline that we were increasing the level of security we croceeded with installation of the hardware and aspects of the revised security plan, and these nave oeen s stantially completed for some time. We have not completed documentation of procedures, nor any formal retraining of personnel for the new plan, pending further revision.

6. In response to a perceived difficulty with the new plan, emphasized by this incident, we are proceding to make additional changes -

further increasing the level of security. These changes will necessitate minor revisions in the new security plan. These revisions are being prepared and will be submitted to NRC very shortly. These

hanges address the issue of system reliability, " compensation" for loss of system effectiveness, and improve the communication beyond the current level.

7. We believe our present system already exceeds the requirements f or a low strategic significance f acility as given in 73.67 (a).

8. The incident has identified the need for changes in some of our procedures in implementation of the new plan. Some of these are detailed in the attachment.

We submit this report in the belief that the major difficulties with operation of security at our facility, pointed out by this incident, have been identified and are being addressed so as to minimize the probability of a similar incident occurring.

At the time of submitting this report, security is back at the level existing prior to the incident.

I In our discussions, we have chosen to focus on improvements to be made.

The history of the incident is discussed only as it relates to identi-fication of problems with security operations, since no actual security breach occurred.

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I F. S. Rowland Reactor Administrator N hM G. E. Miller l Reactor Superviscr i RM/km .

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UCI TRIGA Nuclear Reactor Facility Security Incident Report. Period 4/1/82-6/1/82 Report Date 6/2/82 Description of event.

On approximat til 1st, problems devel wi t 4

1 spate point.

i ese pro ems resu ted in removal o the unit for service a few days' l

i later.

On the week-end of May 1st, the Reactor Supervisor became aware that the was not in operation, and began preliminary contact with t on Monday, May 3rd. By Thursday, May 6th, the supervisor had been made aware tha l

On Monday, May 10th, now that matters locally were in order, the Reactor

Supervisor called NRC to report the possible moderate loss of security effectiveness as a historical event.

! The was placed back in service sometime around May 25th and proper checks conducted as to comunications between the systems.

The security at the facility had, all this time, kept l complete track o a even s - entries, exits, movement, radiation e.larm i occurrences, etc. The system has to be manually reset following any untoward incident. No manual resets were needed in this period. All

fuel elements in inventory were still in place in the Thus no actual security breach had occurred or had been attemp e .

Discussion.

Problems had been occurring with the system for l'

a while, but all had been quickly re onvec aise a ams, etc). As far as facility staff is aware, no attemot was made to infom the facilit that the system was to be removed from service for repair, and no I

g were initiated prior to May 6th, i

Personnel at the facility enter and leave on a frequent, but random basis.

A complete record ess and realam and t i is recorded on a 1

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! ca or 7-6/1/82. t wouto oe possi se e" through

! this log and record every time period inat the facility was unoccupied.

l This exercise is clearly not worth it since no security breach occurred.

l Further Actions.,

The following actions have been taken or are being planned. A brief analysis of the reason for each action is also included here.

1. Installation of a nit has comenced.

This unit will, on t a siana ro j iine. he unit w111 als i

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. Incident Report,6/2/82

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Further actions (continued)

Since the was not described as part of our new plan, I a plan revi n is being prepared for submittal as soon as ossible to l cover this. It is our intent that both systems should remain in operation when possi e. In the event o al ure of n or the other, reporting

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capability would be maintained. would be initiated only if both units fail.

2. A procedure for more fr ki of l the comunications link is being prepared and will be imp emente as soon as possi e. he exact ,

frequency is still under discussion, but would not be less frequently than In the interim,M will be made.

3. A procedure for recycling of '

M output on a basis such that recorcs or at east can be researched has been established.

4. A recuest has been made for setting up discussions with the M ,

M with the aim of initiating personnel training sessions at which the full new plan will be implemented. Such procedures will include the need for adequate reporting of trouble with systems and for implementation of as soon as system difficulties are identified. We aim to carry out a complete review of all procedures relevant to the new plan. It will be helpful if we can finalize this plan and assume that new revisions will not be iminent, except at our initiative.

As noted, we are of the opinion that these actions will greatly reduce the chance of a recurrence of this situation. We hope to have all phases of these improvements implemented within 30 days.

G.E. Miller, Reactor Supervisor Department of Chemistry 1

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