ML20101Q755
| ML20101Q755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1984 |
| From: | Liden E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20101Q757 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8501080268 | |
| Download: ML20101Q755 (2) | |
Text
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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P O. Box 236 Hancocks Bndge New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department December 19, 1984 Regional Ad7inistrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention:
Mr. Richard W.
Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs Gentlemen:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION IE BULLETIN 84-03 REFUELING CAVITY WATER SEAL SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 The attached Safety Evaluation Revision addresses the concerns transmitted in your letter, dated December 12, 1984.
The revision also incorporates the quanitative test results performed since the original issue of the Safety Evaluation.
Although the Safety Evaluation has been revised the conclusions remain the same.
There are a number of substantial differences between the inflatable seal design used at Connecticut Yankee's Haddam Neck and that used at the Salem.
The differences include seal surface coriditions, size of gap-to-seal dimensions, seal material, seating procedures and placement of brackets on top of the seal.
Because of these numerous differences, it is concluded that the probability of seal failure at the Salem Station is significantly lower than at Haddam Neck and a gross seal failure is considered highly unlikely to occur.
This conclusion has been reinforced through rigorous testing of the seal.
8501080268 841219
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PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
PDR The Energy People e g 3s mwsun.
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- Mr.
R. W.
Starostecki 12/19/84 Although_ precautions have been taken to assure the reliability of the refueling cavity water seal at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, the. consequences of a seal failure have i
been evaluated.
There are adequate moans of detecting a seal failure and subsequently preventing fuel failure through existing signals, procedures and Technical Specifications.
Implementation of the recommended " Integrated Procedure" that addresses'the loss of Refueling Cavity Water level will further increase the safety margin.
Should you have any questions concerning the above, please contact us.
Very truly yours, E.
A.
Liden Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation Attachment (all)
C
.Mr.
Donald C.
Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. James Linville Senior Resident Inspector l
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