ML20100D741
| ML20100D741 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1984 |
| From: | Ferg D CYGNA ENERGY SERVICES |
| To: | Colbert W, Youngblood B DETROIT EDISON CO., Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 83021.058, NUDOCS 8412060038 | |
| Download: ML20100D741 (22) | |
Text
0
=
150 Nortn wacker onve, chicago, it soeos 83021.058 312 236-5701 November 30, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. B.J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No.1 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. William F. Colbert, General Supervisor Nuclear Safety and Plan Engineering (342 NOC)
-The Detroit Edison Company Enrico Fermi-2 Nuclear Operations Center 64 North Dixie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166
Subject:
Conference Call Questions on 11/26/84 Independent Design Verification Program Detroit Edison - Enricoi Fermi Unit 2 Docket #50-341
Reference:
Cygna Letter 83021.056 dated October 19, 1984 to Mr. B.J.
Youngblood of NRC and Mr. William F. Colbert of Detroit Edison
Dear Sirs:
On November 26, 1984, a telephone conference call occured between Messrs. John Gilray and M.D. Lynch of the NRC, Mr. 0.K. Earle of Detroit Edison and Mr.
D.A. Ferg of Cygna. The purpose of the telecon was to obtain clarifications in support of the on-going EC review of Cygna's Fermi-2 Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) Final Report. Specifically, questions asked by the NRC were a result of their review of the additional Section 8.0 material to the IDVP Final Report (transmitted by Reference 1).
Based on this call, Cygna agreed to document the points discussed and to revise Exhibit 8.2.2-1 and Section 8.2.1 by asssigning the valid design control observation to the root cause categories.
In addition, the
" SIGNIFICANCE" sections for Observations DC-01-08, DC-01-09 and 0C-01-10 in Exhibit 8.2.1-1 on page 8.2-9 have been revised to reflect that these findings were found by Cygna to have an insignificant impact on the design and safety of Fermi-2.
As stated on page 8.2-2 of Section 8.2.1, Cygna developed the root cause sum-maries using previous information and documentation gathered during the course of the IDVP review. This information and documentation was also used to resolve the various observations and findings and prepare the IDVP Final Report including the supplemental Section 7.0.
As such, none of the supple-mental information contained in Section 7.0 is affected by Cygna's response to the EC Enclosure Items contained in Exhibit 8.2.1-1.
To develop the root 8412060030 841130 PDR ADOCK 05000341 i
San Fra 4
.an Jose san Diego 00<
'Ns__
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation u
Attention: Mr. B.J. Youngblood, Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. William F. Colbert, General Supervisor The Detroit Edison Company October 19, 1984 Page 2 cause, significance and extent implications of the ninety-five (95) valid observations, Cygna conducted no additional review within Detroit Edison's organization or their engineering sub-contractors. Exhibit 8.2.1-1 does represent an expansion of the IDVP since a determination of the individual root cause was not explicitly part of the original review commitments. The NRC Enclosure 2 and 3 items did however, require Cygna to review new design documents and to perform additional calculations. These documents and calcu-lations are identified in the Cygna responses to the Enclosure 2 and 3 items in Sections 8.2.2.2 and 8.2.3.1 to 8.2.3.8, respectively.
Enclosed are the revised pages to Section 8.0 with an instruction sheet for inserting them into the IDVP Final Report for Fermi-2. Please contact me if you have any further questions or coments in this addition information.
Very truly yours, Y'
David A. Farg Project Manager DAF/lt Enclosures (40 copies for NRC)
(20 copies for DECO) cc:
M.D. Lynch (NRC, NRR-DOL) with Enclosure (2 copies)
J.G. Keppler (NRC IE, Region III) with Enclosure (2 copies) 0.K. Earle (DECO) with Enclosure (1 copy)
i ;;
~
y? y - t; E
4
(
h
(
. INSTRUCTION SHEET To insert the' enclosed printed material into CYGNA's Independent Design Verification Program Final Report on Detroit Edison's. Fermi-2 plan -(Docket
- 50-341),- perform the following--steps:
-.a). Remove _ pages 8.2-5 and 8.2-6 (Revision 0)
~b) Insert attached pages 8.2-5, 8.2-Sa, 8.2-6 and 8.2-6a (Revision 1)
-c) Remove pages 8.2-38 and 8.2-39.(Revision 0) d) ; Insert attached pages 8.2-38, 8.2-38a and 8.2-39 (Revision 1) e)' Remove page 8.2-9 (Revision 0)
- 'f) Insert attached.pages 8.2-9 and 8.2-9a (Revision 1) 5 4
i
- O h
e S
i A11'of the observations assigned to Category A except Observations PI-01-11 y
and PS-01-03 received an expanded review by Cygna. Section 7.3, Exhibit
' 3 identifies to what extent the 10VP review was expanded. Observations PI-01-11 and PS-01-03 concerned the analysis of annulus pressurization (A/P) loads as a design requirement for Fermi-2. Since A/P loads were not origi-nally considered by Cygna to be an actual design requirement on Fermi-2, the review was not expanded. Refer to Section 8.2.2 for further discussions con-cerning the A/P load issue. Observation EE-01-03 was by the nature of the observation expanded to review all safety-related loads which are sequenced on the diesel generator under accident conditions to ensure norte would reduce the diesel generator voltage below 85%.
All of the observations assigned to Category B except Observations DC-01-05,
{)
DC-01-12, DC-02-06, DC-02-07, DC-02-10, PS-01-04, PS-02-03 and ST-01-01 required an expanded review by Cygna. Again, Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 descri-bes the scope expansion conducted by Cygna to resolve these Category B obser-vations. To resolve Observation DC-01-05, all key design documents were reviewed by Cygna to ensure they had the proper QA level designation.
A review of the personnel who acted as. lead auditors since 1978 was performed to resolve Observation DC-01-12. Sargent & Lundy's internal audit program was reviewed in depth to determine that there was no design impact on Fermi-2 due to Observation DC-02-06. Observations DC-02-07 and DC-02-10 were resolved by requiring DECO to perform a complete as-built analysis for all flued-head anchor structures and Sargent & Lundy to review all Fermi-2 pipe stress Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-5 ant um
h reports and request the field to verify that as-built pipe supports are recon-ciled with the stress report results. Observation PS-01-04 concerned the com-parison of piping design loads for Operational Basis Earthquake (0BE) and Safe-Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ground motion accelerations. As such, the observation did not require an expanded review because it inherently covers the seismic characteristics of the entire Fermi-2 site. Observation PS-02-03 concerned a check to ensure seismic movements were within the working range of spring hangers. Again, since the seismic movements were small (< 1/10") in both the RHR Cooling and RHR Service Water Systems, no expansion in review scope was necessary since the two systems are representative of other plant
. systems. However, Cygna requested Detroit Edison to review the remaining spring hangers to verify adequacy. Finally,' Observation ST-01-01 involved the g
use of design summary sheets to incorporate the structural design criteria
.V into each structural calculation on the Fermi-2 project prior to 1981. Even though ST-01-01 was generic to all of S&L structural activities, it had no generic implications to the design process on Fermi-2 (refer to page 7.7-104 for further discussion).
.f Detroit Edison Company A'y 1 y } Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification lillikililllilllllilillliliFinal Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-Sa
(
Ut the twenty-six (26) observations assigned to Category C, eleven (11) required an expanded' review to determine to what extent, if any, each obser-i vation affected the Fermi-2 design. The scope expansions for Observations PI-01-03, PI-01-07, PI-01-08, PI-01-09, PI-03-05, PI-03-06, EQ-01-03, EQ-01-04, PS-00-04, ST-01-24 and ST-01-33 are described in Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3.
Cygna determined that it was standard practice for GE to use a default value for stress indices of 1.0 on small branch connections. Consequently Observation PI-01-06 required a generic resolution involving GE pipe stress analysis techniques. For Observation PI-03-02, Cygna review all flued-heads to verify the omitted containment pressure stresses were negligible. Since thermal movements are small for both the RHR Cooling and RHR Service Water
.]
elements and since both systems'were representative of other high temperature
(
Fermi-2 systems, an expanded review for Observation PS-00-02 was not justified.
In Observation PS-01-01, Cygna expanded the review until it was determined that GE had verified the shear lug design in the Class 1 pipe stress analyses. To resolve Observation DC-02-02, Cygna examined Sargent &
Lundy's method for specifying the use of computer programs on the Fermi-2 pro-ject and checked this method to ensure the correct and proper programs were utilized in the design process. Review results were able to also demonstrate that Sargent & Lundy's method for calculating allowable loads on embedment plate stud bolts was sufficiently conservative to resolve Observation O~
v Detroit Edison Company 4'y
, y } Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification IIllikililllllillibilillkill Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-6
r
<s' s
(_,)
ST-01-26. Observations ST-01-03, ST-01-05, ST-01-06, ST-01-09, ST-01-12,
'ST-01-13, ST-01-15, ST-01-16, and ST-01-19 are in the structural discipline and are unique only to the RHR Complex. ' Additional information associated with the resolution of Observations ST-01-03, ST-01-06, ST-01-09, ST-01-13, and ST-01-16 are provided in Cygna's responses to NRC. Enclosure 3 Questions (refer to Section 8.2.3)
.(J T-L O
Detroit Edison Company ek'(ejTf'jermi2IndependentDesignVerification F
Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-6a ll111$111111llll11 lifflill
a Observation /
Reference PFR No.
Description Page-DC-01-06 Root Cause: An incomplete review of the subject specification since the. revision did not.
7.7 have a P.E. certification. This was a random occurrence and appeared to be simply an over-sight on behalf of Detroit Edison Engineering.
Extent:
No generic implications DC-01-07 Root Cause:
Not applicable since observation was invalid.
7.7-32 0C-01-08 Root Cause: A lack of documented evidence that the Detroit Edison QA program with respect to 7.7-33 PFR-01 internal audits was being effectively implemented.
Significance: Without adequate assurance that the design control program was being effec-tively implemented, the quality and integrity of the Fermi-2 design could have been called into question. A comprehensive review indicated all elements of the design control program were evaluated during the course of the project.
Extent:
Generic implications for the entire plant to the extent the design process could have been.of questionable quality and a lax internal audit system might never have identified the extent of any weaknesses. The review results indicated the desigri process was not adver-sely affected.
DC-01-09 Root Cause: A lack of management attention and follow-up in reviewing audit results and 7.7-34 PFR-02 taking appropriate action to correct the deficiencies.
Significance: The Fermi-2 design could have been adversely or unnecessarily impacted without timely and proper corrective action on design control audit findings. Positive management actions have been taken to resolve all outstanding open audit findings and surveillance items.
Extent:
Generic implications for the entire plant to the extent the design process could have been of questionable quality due to a continued lack of corrective action on internal audit and surveillance findings. The review results indicated the design process was not aversely affected.
Detroit Edison Company
=-
Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification
[edtj 2 M Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-9 111111111111111111111H!H1111
{}
(])
(
Observation /
Reference PFR No.
Description Page DC-01-10 Root Cause: A lack of documented evidence that the Detroit Edison QA program with respect to 7.7-35 PFR-03 contractor and vendor audits was being effectively implemented. Also, an audit schedule of A/E's which appeared too infrequently for continuous monitoring of supplier QA program imple-mentation.
Significance: Basically, it is Detroit Edison's. responsibility to perform frequent audits of architect / engineers and engineering consultants. They should maintain adequate documentation ~
of checklists and audit findings to provide added assurances that design control programs are being effectively maintained and implemented. Subsequent review of engineering suppliers.
disclosed DECO performed the necessary audits to assure the effective implementation of their.
design control programs.
Extent:
Generic implications to the extent the design infomation and design control process from A/E organizations to Fermi-2 could have been of quec,tionable quality and an insuf-ficient, infrequent vendor audit system might not have identified a weakness. The review results indicated the design process was not adversely affected.
Detroit Edison Company
=____
N 3=I Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification O k IA Fiaal Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-9a 1111111111111111ll111111111111
EXHIBIT 8.2.1-2 c
ROOT CAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS jsb Category Observation Comments I
A DC-01-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-11 Annulus pressurization piping loads
'PI-02-02 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-04 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-00-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-01-03 Annulus pressuriazation support loads PS-03-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-03-02 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-02 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 EE-01-03 FSAR requirement on minimum motor starting voltage B
DC-01-05 QA level designations DC-01-08 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-01-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-01-10 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-01-12 Lead auditor qualifications DC-02-06 SRL internal audit files DC-02-07 Field design change requests DC-02-10 As-built field verification
' Q__
PI-01-12 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-02-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-01-04 Design specification revision required PS-02-03 Spring hanger seismic movements ST-01-01 S & L structural design criteria ST-01-30 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-31 Concrete voids and exposed rebar C
DC-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-02-02 Computer program user requirements PI-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-06 Branch connection stress PI-01-07 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-08 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-02 Flued-head load cases indices PI-03-05 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-06 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 EQ-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 EQ-01-04 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-00-02 RHR pipng thermal movements PS-00-04 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-01-01 Shear lugs for Class I piping V,o Detroit Edison Company 4 g i 7 ] Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-3C iiiiiiiiiiiiiiillil11llllIll
i EXHIBIT 8.2.1-2 (cont'd)
~.,.
(/
ROOT LAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS
-Category
' Observation-Comments C
PS-02-04 Use of OBE vs. DBE loads (cont'd).
ST-01 RHR Complex design soil loading ST-01-05 Cooling tower frame analysis model ST-01-06 Basement reinforcing steel placement ST-01-09 Foundation wall rebar placement ST-01-12 Missing foundation walls loads ST-01-13 Reinforcing steel in beams t
f f
I 'V
-f I
L)b f
Detroit Edison Company ermi 2 Independent Design Verification Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-38a gi;
,,,, 22momni
. EXHIBIT 8.2.1-2 (cont'd)
ROOT CAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS
- (j '
Category Observation Comments C-ST-01-15 Shear wall overturning moments (cont'd)
ST-01-16 Foundation wall design moments ST-01-19 Reservoir water effects ST-01-24 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-26 Stud allowable load calculations ST-01-33 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 D
PI-01-01 Long vs short radius elbows-PI-01-02 Orientation of restraints 5810 & G16 PI-01-10 Shear lug input load error PI-02-01 Branch intensification factors PI-02-04 Restraint G01 geometry PI-02-05 Long vs short radius elbows PI-02-06 Lubrite plates in stanchions PS-01-05 Weld size error PS-02-02 Penetration sleeve gaps PS-02-05 Hanger E11-2189-007 internal brace PS-02-06 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-10 Cooling tower slab load definition ST-01-28 Inconsistent section ST-01-32 Cantilevered slab loading i
EE-01-02 Conduit size drawing discrepency O
e oc-ot-os aissia9 et certificatioa DC-01-11 RHR Mechanical Design Document update DC-02-01 Seismic analysis report references DC-02-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-02-04~
S & L design review schedule DC-02-05 S & L pipe support design calculations DC-02-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-03-01 Responsible engineer's signature DC-03-02 Receipt acknowledgement of drawings DC-03-03 Seismic report comment resolution DC-03-04 Filing of dispositioned DCN's PI-01-04 Snubber st.ppporting frame stiffness PI-01-05 Incorrect valve body weights EQ-01-02 Valve axial cyclic stresses PS-02-01 Support E11-2184-G01 gap size ST-01-04 RHR Complex thermal gradients ST-01-07 Cooling tower thermal gradients ST-01-08 Cooling tower slab thermal gradients ST-01-14 Shear loads on deep beam walls ST-01-18 Bedrock pressure grouting ST-01-20 Cooling tower seismic loadings ST-01-21 Cooling tower slab seismic loadings ST-01-23 DBE vs. OBE seismic design spectra ST-01-29 Bedrock pressure grouting EE-01-01 Circuit breaker interrupting rating
[
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification 4'y~ir}
IIlllilllllilillllllilllifill final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-39
. ~
() -
All of the observations assigned to Category A except Observations PI-01-11 and PS-01-03 received an expanded review by Cygna.
Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 identifies to what extent the IDVP review was expanded. Observations j
PI-01-11 and PS-01-03 concerned the analysis of annulus pressurization (A/P) loads as a design requirement for Fermi-2. Since A/P loads were not origi-nally considered by Cygna to be an actual design requirement on Fermi-2, the review was not expanded. Refer to Section 8.2.2 for further discussions con-cerning the A/P load issue. Observation EE-01-03 was by the nature of the observation expanded to review all safety-related loads which are sequenced on the diesel generator under accident conditions to ensure none would reduce the diesel generator voltage below 85%.
All of the observations assigned to Category B except Observations DC-01-05, O
oC-ot-12. oC-o2-o6. oC-02-07, oC-02-10, eS-01-04, eS-02-03 aod ST-01-01 required an expanded review by Cygna. Again, Section 7.3,. Exhibit 7-3 descri-bes the scope expansion conducted by Cygna to resolve these Category B obser-vations. To resolve Observation DC-01-05, all key design documents were reviewed by Cygna to ensure they had the proper QA level designation.
A review of the personnel who acted as lead auditors since 1978 was performed to resolve Observation DC-01-12. Sargent & Lundy's internal audit program was reviewed in depth to determine that there was no design impact on Fermi-2 due to Observation DC-02-06. Observations DC-02-07 and DC-02-10 were resolved by requiring DECO to perform a complete as-built analysis for all flued-head anchor structures and Sargent & Lundy to review all Fermi-2 pipe stress O
MA Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification
. Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-5
I h,)
reports and request the field to verify that as-built pipe supports are recon-
'ciled with the stress report results. Observation PS-01-04 concerned the com-parison of piping design loads for Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) and Safe-Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ground motion accelerations. As such, the observation did not require an expanded review because it inherently covers the seismic characteristics of the entire Fermi-2 site. Observation PS-02-03 concerned a check to ensure seismic movements were within the working range of spring hangers. Again, since the seismic movements were small (< 1/10") in both the RW Cooling and RHR Service Water Systems, no expansion in review scope was necessary since the two systems are representative of other plant systems. However, Cygna requested Detroit Edison to review the remaining spring hangers to verify adequacy. Finally, Observation ST-01-01 involved the g
use of design summary sheets to incorporate the structural design criteria into each structural calculation on the Fermi-2 project prior to 1981. Even though ST-01-01 was generic to all of S&L structural activities, it had no generic. implications to the design process on Fermi-2 (refer to page 7.7-104 for further discussion).
O v
Detroit Edison Company 4
, Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification F1nal Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-Sa 1111llllllll1lll1111ll11111111
c Of.the twenty-six (26) observations assigned to Category C, eleven (11) required an expanded review to determine to what extent, if any, each obser-vation affected the Fermi-2 design. The scope expansions for Observations PI-01-03, PI-01-07, PI-01-08, PI-01-09, PI-03-05, PI-03-06, EQ-01-03, EQ-01-04, PS-00-04, ST-01-24 and ST-01-33 are described in Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3.
Cygna determined that it was standard practice for GE to use a default value for stress indices of 1.0 on small branch connections. Consequently Observation PI-01-06 required a generic resolution involving GE pipe stress analysis techniques. For Observation PI-03-02, Cygna review all flued-heads to verify the omitted containment pressure stresses were negligible. Since thermal movements are small for both the RHR Cooling and RHR Service Water C
elements and since both systems were representative of other high temperature Fermi-2 systems, an expanded review for Observation PS-00-02 was not justified.
In Observation PS-01-01, Cygna expanded the review until it was determined that GE had verified the shear lug design in the Class 1 pipe stress analyses. - To resolve Observation DC-02-02, Cygna examined Sargent &
Lundy's method for specifying the use of computer programs on the Fermi-2 pro-ject and checked this method to ensure the correct and proper programs were utilized in the design process. Review results were able to also demonstrate that Sargent & Lundy's method for calculating allowable loads on embedment plate stud bolts was sufficiently conservative to resolve Observation I
2 Detroit Edison Company g g i g Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-6
~
lilllllilimillllililllillil
(])
ST-01-26. Observations ST-01-03,-5T-01-05, 51-01-06, ST-01-09, ST-01-12, ST-01-13, ST-01-15, ST-01-16, and ST-01-19 are in the structural discipline and are unique only to the RHR Complex. Additional information associated with the resolution of Observations ST-01-03, ST-01-06, ST-01-09, ST-01-13, and ST-01-16 are provided in Cygna's responses to NRC Enclosure 3 Questions (refer to Section 8.2.3)
O Detroit Edison Company A{
Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-6a ll111111.........
- ll
~- -
~
- ^,.
j"'"'h d
J v
Obsarvation/
Reference PFR No.
Description Page DC-01 - Root Cause: An incomplete review of the subject specification since the revision did not
[7.7-31 have a P.E. certification. This was a random occurrence and appeared to be simply an over-sight on behalf of Detroit Edison Engineering.
Extent:
No generic implications
^
+
DC-01-07 Root Cause:
Not applicable since observation was invalid.
7.7-32.,
DC-01-08 Root Cause: A 1&ck of docucented evidence that.the Detroit Edison QA program with respect to 7.7-33.
PFR-01 internal audits was being effectively Splemented.
Significance: Without adequate assurance that the design control program was being effec-i tively implemented, the quality and integrity of the Fermi-2 design could have been called
'4 into question. A comprehensive review indicated all elements of the design control program were evaluated during the course of the project.
Extent:
Generic implications for the entire plant to the extent'the design process could have been of questionable qu.=lity and a lax internal audit system might never have identified the extent of any weaknesses. The review results indicated the design process was not adver-sely affected.
DC-01-09 Root Cause: A lack of management attention and follow-up in reviewing audit results and 7.7-34 PFR-02 taking appropriate action to correct the deficiencies.
Significance: The Fermi-2 design could have been adversely or unnecessarily impacted;without timely and proper corrective action on design control audit findings. Positive management actions have been taken to resolve all outstanding open audit findings and surveillance items.
r Extent:
Generic implications for the entire plant to the extent the design process could have been of questionable quality due to a continued lack of corrective action on internal audit and surveillance findings. The review results indicated the design process was not aversely affected.
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification yltjl M Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-9 111111111ll1111111111111111111
O O
C
~
~.,
Observation /
Reference PFR No.
Description-Page DC-01-10 Root Cause: A lack of documented evidence that the-Detroit Edison QA program with respect to 7.7-35 PFR-03 contractor and vendor audits was being effectively implemented.- Also, an audit schedule of A/E's which appeared too infrequently for continuous monitoring of. supplier QA program-imple-mentation.
~*
Significance:
Basically, it is Detroit Edison's responsibility to perform frequent audits of architect / engineers and engineering consultants. They should maintain adequate documentation of checklists and audit findings to provide added assurances that design control programs are being effectively maintained and implemented. Subsequent review of engineering suppliers disclosed DECO performed the necessary audits to assure the effective implementation of their design control programs.
Extent:
Generic._ implications to the extent the design information and design control piocess from A/E organizations to Fermi-2 could.have been of_ questionable quality and an insuf-ficient, infrequent vendor audit system might not have identified a. weakness. The review results indicated the design process was not adversely affected.
1 Detroit Edison Company m
---=
3=
Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification O N= k Ill r - >-
Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-9a 111111111111111lll1111ll111lll
,m EXHIBIT 8.2.1-2 ROOT CAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS f)
M./
Category -
-Observation Comments I
A DC-01-01
.See Section 7.3, Exhibit'7-3
_PI-01-11 Annulus pressurization' piping loads PI-02-02
-See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-04'
_See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-00-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-01-03.
Annulus pressuriazation support loads
-PS-03-01 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PS-03-02 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01 ']2 -
See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3
.EE-01-03 FSAR requirement on minimum motor-starting voltage
.B.
.DC-01-05 QA-level designations DC-01-08 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3
-0C-01-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-01-10 See Section 7.3, Exhibic 7-3
~
DC-01-12.
Lead auditor qualifications
.DC-02-06 SRL internal audit files DC-02-07
~ Field design change requests DC-02-10 As-built field verification i.
.PI-01-12 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 V(_
PI-02-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-01--
See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3
~PS-01-04 Design specification revision required
-PS-02-03 Spring hanger seismic movements ST-01-01 S & L structural design criteria
'See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-31 Concrete voids and exposed rebar.
C 0C-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-02-02 Computer program user requirements PI-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-06 Branch connection stress PI-01-07 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-08
-See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-01-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-02 Flued-head load cases indices
-PI-03-05 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 PI-03-06 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3
'EQ-01-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 EQ-01-04 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3
'PS-00-02 RHR pipng thermal movements PS-00-04 See Section 7. 3, E thibit 7-3 PS-01-01 Shear lugs r# 11a: s I piping g
,,..e y.
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification 4'y i[3 Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-38 llllliiiiiiiiilliti 11ll111!
=
. EXHIBIT.8.2.1-2. (cont'd) s e7 e
~. _,/
. R00T CAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS Category Observation.
Comments C
'PS-02-04 Use of 0BE vs. DBE loads (cont'd)
'ST-01-03 RHR Complex design soil loading ST-01-05 Cooling tower frame analysis model ST-01-06 Basement reinforcing steel' placement JST-01-09 Foundation wall rebar placement '
- ST-01-12 Missing foundation walls loads ST-01-13 Reinforcing steel in beams h
s i
v l
~ Detroit Edison Company eg'{ej{[gjFermi2IndependentDesignVerification Final Report TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-38a
- lillllllililllilllilllllillill
r
. EXHIBIT 8.2.1 (cont'd)
ROOT CAUSE CLASSIFICATIONS
-.yQ Category Observation Comments C
ST-01-15 Shear wall overturning moments e
(cont'd)
ST-01-16 Foundation wall design moments ST-01-19 Reservoir water effects ST-01-24 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-26 Stud allowable load calculations ST-01-33 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 D
PI-01-01.
Long vs short radius elbows PI-01-02 Orientation of restraints S810 & G16 PI-01-10 Shear lug input load error PI-02-01 Branch intensification factors PI-02-04 Restraint G01 geometry PI-02-05 Long vs-short radius elbows PI-02-06 Lubrite plates in stanchions PS-01-05 Weld size error PS-02-02 Penetration sleeve gaps PS-02-05 Hanger E11-2189-007 internal brace PS-02-06 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 ST-01-10 Cooling tower slab load definition ST-01-28 Inconsistent section ST-01-32 Cantilevered slab loading EE-01-02 Conduit size drawing discrepency
)
E DC-01-06 Missing PE certification
-DC-01-11 RHR Mechanical Design Document update DC-02-01 Seismic analysis report references DC-02-03 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-02-04 S & L design review schedule DC-02-05 S & L pipe support design calculations DC-02-09 See Section 7.3, Exhibit 7-3 DC-03-01 Responsible engineer's signature DC-03-02 Receipt acknowledgement of drawings DC-03-03 Seismic report comment resolution DC-03-04 Filing of dispositioned DCN's PI-01-04 Snubber suppporting frame stiffness PI-01-05 Incorrect valve body weights EQ-01-02 Valve axial cyclic stresses PS-02-01 Support E11-2184-G01 gap size ST-01-04 RHR Complex thermal gradients ST-01-07 Cooling tower thermal gradients ST-01-08 Cooling tower slab thermal gradients ST-01-14 Shear loads on deep beam walls ST-01-18 Bedrock pressure grouting ST-01-20 Cooling tower seismic loadings ST-01-21 Cooling tower slab seismic loadings ST-01-23 DSE vs. OBE seismic design spectra ST-01-29 Bedrock pressure grouting EE-01-01 Circuit breaker interrupting rating Detroit Edison Company T
Fermi 2 Independent Design Verification rN k I AI Final Report, TR-83021-1, Revision 1 8.2-39 L
. llllll11Illll1111111111!!11111
-