ML20100D721
| ML20100D721 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1984 |
| From: | Gamble D THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#484-470 SP, NUDOCS 8412060032 | |
| Download: ML20100D721 (68) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,
. . . _ _ _ . _ ~ . _ . . , . . ... z_. . . _ . ..._ . ;>
?j70L
.t 3 . . _ _ . . MYED CO
.j.
. o.
.1 2*
, ., t .
'~
DOCKETED ussac. 4 . .w .-
^
1A. DEC -5 N1:11
~
OFFICE OF SECRETAR
- 000nEitNG 4 SEi<VICl, BRANCH B
v-
. l . F e C. f '
x MODIFIED PREFILED TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. GAMBLE L Submitted by Three Mile Island Alert December 4,'1984 so3
i
, .a iv I'am David H. Gamble, currently a Supervisory. Criminal Investigator _(Special Agent) with the Defense Criminal Investi-gative; Service. . Formerly I was.a Criminal Investigator with
-the Office of Inspector and Auditor ("OIA" ) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and participated in the investi-gation'into whether licensee Metropolitan Edison failed to report information about the accident which occurred at Three Mile Island ("THI") , Unit 2, on March 28,-1979. I am also an attorn'ey licensed to practice law before various federal and state courts. My educational and professional background is
' described .in my resume (Exhibit 1) and is included for the Lpurpose of assessing the weight to be given to my testimony.
I am not testifying as an official representative of the Department of Defense. This testimony modifies my testimony prefiled on November.1, 1984, to limit it to address those deficiencies in the NRC's investigation into information flow during the TMI accident whichithis Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ruled on November 29, 1984, were relevant to its consideration of the "DLeckamp Mail-
. gram" issue.
On MarchH21, 1981, Acting Commission Chairman John Ahearne requested that the Executive Director for Operations direct the Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("IE") to begin this investigation, which led to issuance of the NRC report entitled
" Investigation into Information Flow During the Accident at
.Three Mile Island" (NUREG-07 60) .
Chairman Ahearne instructed i
_ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ .. ._ . ._.._.....m.._. .4 9 ' c .* the Director-of-OIA to assign _a_ criminal investigator to'the
.IE investigation "to protect'the interests of'the U.S. Depart-ment 1of Justice.in any criminal matters that might arise dur-
'ing;the investigation." OIA Director' James Cummings assigned me:to the investigation full-time.
Victor Stello, Director of'the Office of Inspection and. Enforcement,. established guidelines for the investigation in an" April 1, 1980 memorandum to Norman C. Moseley, who was 7 assigned to head up the " Task Group" selected to conduct the investigation. See Exhibit 2. I have participated in four other investigations of the TMI accident and related events including: (1) the investigation of the accident which-led to the:IE report entitled, "Investi-gation_into the March 28,'1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and Enforcement," Report No. 50-320/79-10 4 (August 1979), NUREG-0600; (2) the invastigation into the accident con-ducted by the Rogovin~Special~ Inquiry Group; (3) the joint OIA-IE investigation into fal-sification of leak rate tests at TMI; (4) the OIA investigation which led to an OIA Report entitled, "IE Inspectors' I m . , .-. . .._.s . - . - . ~ - . . _ _ _ , _ - . _ _ _ . . - , . . . . . . _ . .. _ ~ _ . - , _ _ - .
- 1 p a m.;. q. v w - w .2 u n _ _ u n ;;. a . w 4 . _ ; A _ w a .-;_ m m .. . . - i m . _ O
^
s
'4' z...
~
3-
. Alleged. Failure to Report Information
- re March.28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion at TMI-2" (January 7, 19 81) .
On(AprilL 18,;1980,- less than three weeks after the begin-ning off the : investigation, Mr. Moseley directed' Task . Group mem-bers'.to draf t the three" major portions of the investigative report.. .This-was before they had completed any significant inves-
~
tigation. Mr. Moseley requested' the draf ts 1xs completed with-
~inLa' week. - See ' Exhibit 3.
'Two members.of the.! investigative team, Ronald C. Haynes, and, William L. Fisher, drafted those portions of the report s
for.which they were responsible prior to conducting any inter-views.- See Exhibits 4, 5, and 6.
'I.am' aware of this because copies of these drafts were pro-
,vided to me. Mr. Moseley assigned Terry Harpster the responsi-
'bility'to draft the third section concerning the containment pressure spike. Mr. Harpster did not provide me with a copy ofEthe draft.
It was my opinion that this direction was not in_ keeping with the direction-from Mr. Stello in his April 1, 1980 memo-
- randum.that the Task Group " initiate this task with an open
^ ~
' mind" Land'"every effort should be made to impress upon everyone contributing to this assignment that they should not be influ-enced in this task by the previously stated IE conclusions."
m.-,
f
;Moreover, ILfelt that writing ' sections-of the report based on a
prior NRC; interviews and,previously-gathered documents tended to. predetermine the conclusions the Task Group reached. The second criticism I had of the' investigation is that IE' Headquarters personnel assigned to the Task Group,.
- Mr. Moseley, Mr. Harpster and John W. Craig, drafted'the ques-tions to- be ' asked during the. interviews. Mr. Moseley.then-attempted to prohibit other interviewers from asking questions
. outside 'the list he h'ad pre-approved, even those flowing logi-cally from the witnesses' answers. This restriction on ques-
- tioning of witnesses impairedithe' Task Group's ability to draw
. useful.information from the witnesses and to develop fully the relevant subject areas of the investigation.
The Commission' Chairman had assigned me, as the OIA repre-sentative, a specific mission in this investigation which could not be accomplished within the stricture's Mr. - Moseley attempted to impose. OIA took the' position that I must be permitted to
- ask questions without regard to whether they appeared on the pre-approved list.
One can.see from a number of interviews in which I par-ticipated that of ten I was the only questioner who asked ques-tions beyond'the scope of the pre-approved agenda. For example, in'the September 3, 1980 interview of Brian Mehler I asked follow-up questions about the persons to whom information about the pressure spike was communicated. Similarly, in the x.r-
Lhyg Qf.;plu+- a . -
. ; ; dg h L2:a :. LL= 2 W hbri:J.I *a w ,t, y,.c - <
3 J.t n, m
-c5 -
,K' p g 1
[ September 4l11980fint'erview o"f. Joseph Chwastyk I asked.a follow-up question about-communication ofJinformation about the pres-
~
,- f 'sure spikelto' Gary Miller. Similarly, in NRC' interviews of LJohnIFlint{ Michael'Ross and Joseph Logan,:I asked' follow-up r '
(quebtionsinforder'to1.identifyotherpersonsto'whominforma-
~
4 tion.about critical E reactbr. parameters ^was. communicated. ~ These
- conditions; included the pressure spike, incore thermocouple 1 : temperature readings,=and core uncovery.
'The protocol'which Mr. Moseley imposed on other. team mem-c bers was that'only one person.at.a time could1ask questions from k I the pre-approved list..of questions-. If other interviewers on f . the t'eam wished to.ask additional questions, they were to' wait tuntil the end of the' interview to ask Mr. Moseley's permission
+
to pursue these' inquiries. Mr. Moseley would then pre-screen C . - :-additional questions by:other interviewers.and determine whether S. 'they could.ask them "on the record." 'In many. cases, this pro-
, tocol foreclosed questions in areas suggested by specific unex-
'pected'a'nswers of witnesses,.or those tailored to witnesses' particular demeanor or knowledge.
~
~ overall, it was my opinion that the restrictions on ques-l tioning of: individuals and the investigation'.s orientation to-Iward. predetermining the. conclusions of the investigation prior t
Eto conducting lany interviews cast doubt on the completeness
. .and accuracy-of the interviews which were conducted in the course of the investigation.
L
._ . - _ . . - - . - - - ~ . . . , - - - -:-- =-- - . u- =~ a: > a: - x--~~ - - -
l Exhibit 1 I y n;
. DAVID'H. GAMBLE
. P.O. Box 9290 '
'[ Alexandria, Virginia 22304-9998 EMPLOYMsNT HISTORY '
- 1982 to present criminal Investigator (Special'
-Agent) '
Contract Fraud Division
' Defense Criminal Investigative Service-19781to-1982 Criminal Investigator Office of Inspector _and Auditor-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975 to 1978 Personnel Security Specialist Division of Security U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EDUCATION Jurih . Doctor - (with Honor) University of Maryland School of Law s Bachelor of Arts Bucknell University HONORS 1982 Award for Superior Performance in directing the investigation into NRC's Region IV's investigation of the Hayward-Tyler Pump Company. '
'1984 Award for Special. Achievement in investigations leading to the prosecution of Defense procurement fraud cases.
(
. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS Member, Federal Law-Enforcement Officers Association
~ Member, > American Bar Association i
Licensed to practice law before various state and federal courts. i. F 4
m
- g: ,, ,:-
EXHIBIT-2. - c t
$.2RfCp
+ . _
'g UNITED STATES 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SSINS 3800 h WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
-t ;/ ~
..... APR 1- 1980
. 1 i
- MEMORANDUM FOR: Noman C. Moseley, Director.
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement , FROM: Victor Stello, Jr., Director
- Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
~ COMPLETION OF IE INVESTIGATION OF INFORMATION FLOW AT TMI DURING MARCH 1979 ACCIDENT t The_ Comission has directed IE to complete its investigation of the infomation flow from the licensee to NRC during the accident at Three Mile Island in . March 1979. You are assigned the lead responsibility for the task. The following guidelines are provided for direction:. , (1) The prompt completion of this task is to be considered your top priority assignment. If you believe it to be necessary, you 'should assign someone to act in your' stead as Division Director until this task is completed. { (2) The background of this task is as follows: _ , (a) At.the time enforcement action was taken on the IE investigation results, it was concluded that until completion of other on-going . investigations, final conclusions should be held in abeyance on the following three matters: [ _
- Reporting of a calculated exposure rate of 40 rem /hr p .at Goldsboro.
- Reporting of the high core exit temperatures.
l
- Reporting of the cor$tainment 'p ressure spike.
l
-(b) The Kemeny Comission and the NRC Special Inquiry investigations f have been completed.
p (c) ~In view of all the infomation now available, we must reach final conclusions on the matters left open; and make a recomendation on actions to be taken. l _ , , . . . . , _ , , , , , . _ _ _ , _ , , _ . _ . ___,._,_._m.._,_.__._a
A .. .c Norman C. Moseley - 2-(3)JAs a'minime,the task should include:
.(a) : Review of.the prior IE investigation into this particular matter.
(b) : Review of the NRC/TMI~Special Inquiry Group investigation into this particular matter. 1 (c) Review of the material available from the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Comittee on Interior and Insular Arrairs.
-(d) :To the maximum. extent practical, reliance should be placed on available interview transcripts and testimony. However, as necessary,
.you should conduct interviews of individuals whose testimony is needed to determine the proper extent or meaning of written material or'past testimony, or to complete the available evidence in matters not previously pursued or inadequately pursued on the basis of new considerations. If there is a need for deposing individuals under oath, the proper request for the power to do so should be made promptly.
(e) Other evidence, information or allegations that has come to light - since the completion of the prior IE investigation, and that relate to the determinations that are to be made should be considered'in your assignmeat. This includes any material from other investigations that may' reflect in a significant way on the tendencies of the principal participants to initiate or accede to practices intended to alter infomation or to restrict the required. flow of information for any . reason. , (f) ThreeiEpersonnelshouldbeselectedtoassistyouinthistaskon essentially a full-time basis. If additional resources are needed during the course of the task please inform me promptly. The task should be completed as soon as practicable, but in no event should L the date of the final report be later than June 6, 1980. (g) David Gamble, a representative from OIA, will actively participate as a working member of this task group. Marian Moe of OGC will be kept informed of the ongoing activities of the group. It is essential that we initiate this task with an open mind. The conclusions reached in the prior IE investigation are to be. set aside and every effort should-be made to impress upon everyone contributing to this assignment that they should not be influenced in this task by the previously stated IE conclusions. I i e
~
0
.,s m.- m .r--w
. m , ., .. : : ~ , ,:...~.n=-~~-u + -. w u .u ... , . - ~ . . ~ . ~ . - . - - ~ . - , - . - - , - - ~ - ~ ~ -
~
b' . ..
- er , . .
~.
g l$onnan C. Moseley The report of your task should briefly summarize the background that led to'your
-task; should clearly specify the purpose and scope of your efforts; should -1 describe how you conducted.the task' including the personnel involved in the task, l
- the information reviewed, new.information obtained, and how it was obtained; should describe the evaluations made.in sufficient detail to clearly define the bases for the conclusions reached; should list the conclusions reached, and finally, the actions recommended on the bases of those conclusions.
Please initiate work on this assignment immediately. I want to be informed of progress periodically (at least twice weekly). Inform me immediately of any matters that arise that may interfere with the prompt execution of this task. N N Victor Steld$ Jr. Director Office of Inspection
. and Enforcement cc: Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Kennedy
. Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford W.-J. Dircks R. DeYoung
~
L. Bickwit H. Shapar J. Murray -
- J. Cummings' D. Thompson M. Moe .
R. Fortuna D. Gamble l
'+ # F e *4
'f
sn. a . -.i. .:a a ~ w.: ---w=-~'"'='"~~'"~~'
' EXHIBIT 3
;* UNITED STATES y a. .c- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
;; rI wAswiwotow.o.c.20ssa f
h,' W / APR 181980 - MEMORANDUM FOR: IE TMI TASK GROUP - FROM: Norman C. Moseley, Dir., ROI, IE SU8 JECT: DRAFT REPORTS, TASK GROUP MEETING The initial draft reports for the three areas (40 R/hr calculated dose rate, high core exit temperatures and containment pressure spike) are due by April 25, 1980. These drafts should be available for HQ distribution to all Task Group participants on April 25, 1980. This will allow all members to
. review the draft reports prior to the meeting on April 28, 1980. This meeting is expected to last for two days (4/28-29/80).
The meeting will be held at 8:30 a.m. on April 28, 1980 in' room 550 of East West Towers (Hearing Room) and in the morning of April 29, 1980. The afternoon session of April 29 will be held in room 332A of East West Towers. If you have any questions about the draft reports or the meeting please call John Craig on 49-28019. -
/
',......cs. , 5 0 $ / f 5 N
,/Norman C. Moseley '
/
i- Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE
- cc: . V. Stello, IE .
,R. Haynes, RV W. Fisher, RIII T.'
J. Craig, Harpster,JI IE D. Gamble, DIA M.- Moe, 0GC R. Bachmann, ELD l
, _- _ - ....- -.-- - - - - - - - -a. < -
T* 5-p 4 5 vp u EXHIBIT 4 -
.,. *{
f -s :. Investigation of Information Flow During the Three Mile Island March 1979 Accident
?. ~ .
,A.- High Core Exit Temperatures . . ." . .
- 1. Introduction , , ,,. ,, .,. ._ ,
,4* ~: .~. .-:, *:** **
Purpose,%.f.':* .i."' #.?.5.h % : A-r
. a. - '
- - , . r L ' :'t;: t
. , - . . . . q _. .: . . . . - :-
. This investigation of the information flow of core exit temperature data during the course of the accident at TMI-2
'on March 28, 1979 was conducted to determine if the licensee .
. .T' c" ~+' ',
~ willfully withheld information from the NRC.about the sever- .
ity of_the accident? ' "
- b. Method of Investigation
' This investigation was conducted by reviewing and eval-uating information contained in the several documents listed
... in Appendix A. The best evidence availabic for many of the
~-
_ issues were those. contained in the transcripts of recorded
.. telephone conversations on March 28, 1979 and contemporaneous
; .. ' notes, data and logs. Transcripts and records of statements
. made by key licensee and NRC personnel in various forums and interviews, including'both sworn and unsworn testimony, were examined. The credibility ~and meaning of these state-ments were evaluated considering: the aforementioned best avcil-able evidence, what we now know to have been the plant status, the statements of.others, the questions eliciting the state-ment, and.the statements made by the individual at other times.
~
- i. c. Background -
t 4 On March 28, 1979 information was available at the Unit 2 control room during the ongoing accident which clearly in-dicated that fudl rods were severely damaged from overheat-ing. This'information ine1uded temperatures as high as 2650"F - 4' - as measured by'the incore ,thermocouples at the upper egd fitting o'f the fuel assemblies and temperatures of 800 F
,; , , in the reactor coolant system hot-leg piping.
Adequate cooling of the fuel elements in the reactor core is assured if the fuel rods are covered by water, i.e., " water is maintained in contact with the full length of the fuel rods. Overheating of the fuel rods may occur if the water flashes to steam such that all or part of the length I
' . 3. w _.
- m. . i v.
~ '
r . . .
'of the fuel rods is cooled only by steam. Damage from slight overheating may result in perforation of the ::ircalloy tubes enclosing the fuel pellets. These tubes comprise the pressure ,
boundary,of the fuel rods and contain the radioactive gaseous ,
,. fission products'which' collect in the free space outside of
'the fuel pellets.. Such gases are often referred to as." gap
' activity". 'It should also be noted that sudden depressuri- 9 zation of,the reactor coolant system immediately after high -
can also cause perforations of the fuel rods' . : .. .! 1;,. t . ~%
.M..] %.'# .
$[..,j' y' C. Power and release operation,'
the gap activity. This latter fuel rod failure 7 ;;
; .tif. U 3.t .
~
tjf.."' , "-mechanism is not unexpected by persons within the industry. H
.. . '; Greater extents 'of overheating may result in: an exothermic
- Al'-
, reaction of the.zircalloy' tubes with steam resulting in the c),I.3'4 g f.
.~. formation of free hydrogen gas, dissolving of the oxidized zircalloy , tube material by formation of 'an eutectic with ura-
- ..hy 9 .'/ '-
w.. ' '
~
nium oxide ' fuel pellets or, in worst case, melting of the ~ fuel pellets. Post accident analyses indicate that the over-heating during the TMI-2 accident stopped just short of fuel - pellet melting. ,
' ~ '
Measured temperatures in excess of 2000'F at the incore *
.~4 thermocouple location are well with.in the range of where
.'77
. 7.5: 'M the exotherm'ic zircalloy-stgam reaction occurs. Measured
>. <. f. .
hot-leg temperatures of 800 F. are siggificantly above the . . , -
.?. .. . .
critical . temperatures of steam .(705.4 F) and demonstrate steam ( " cooling of the fuel rods regardless of the pressure in the
~
f '- . . hot legs. (The saturation pressure corresponding to the coiticalstgamtemperature,is3206 psia. Steam at temperatures above 705.4 F cannot be liquified no matter how much pressure
, j,,
may be applied.) ,
, , f. . As is evident by inspection of the reactor coolant flow paths shown in Figures I and II of Appendix B, circulation ef subcoded water through the reactor coolant system, whether by forced or natural circulation, will result in the same temperatures being measured by the incore thermocouples and hot leg temperature detectors. For this reason, many pressur-ized water reactors, including Three Mile Island Unit 1, do not
. .. have the capability,to monitor temperatures at.the THI-2 .
. ~
, . incore thermoc'ouple location. Also included in Appendix B
.. ; : ', is a brief description of the incore thermocouples which
.e' .- -
J .7 ' ' was extracted .from Volume II of the NRC's Special Inquiry
(
T
~ .
Group report. ' Figure III Was included in Appendix B to show the location of the thermocouples as described in the extracted
. write-up. ' Figures II-28 and II-28 A & B show temperatures measured incore thermocouples during the course of the~ acci-dent. ~ Figures II-28 A & B are based on thermocouple data called into NRC-Headquarters offices after a reactor coolant pump was restarted at 7:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979.
6
i
* .c . j
~
Finally, during review of transcriptions of the recorded telephone conversa,tions, it was difficult to fix the time '
- precisely and to understand the relevance of certain-state-3 ments since the statements were often abbreviated and pro-vide only a glimpse of what was~or may have been occurring.
To assist in developing a fuller understanding of the state-ments,- the plot of system parameters -developed by NRC's Special . Inquiry Group was used. This plot .is also included in Appen- ,,".
-Y, . N 1 ,,," dix B and .shows instrument data and information on critical U. .-plant operatio'ns which were developed during post' accident - "'
investigations..-
' ~ '
. ,,it...p 2 . . . .: '. p -.; ;* V . .
2.. Information Reported on March 28, 1979-
- mS_^ -
, ,; 3 : ., . .
,, ,.7. .. ,
y,
,f
. . . , ., A Site Emergency.-was ~ declared by the ' shift supervisor ~ at
'+', '
iTMI-2 at.6:55 a.m. on March 28, 1979 based on~several process
and area radiation monitor instruments exceeding their high alarm set point. Shortly after this declaration, the Station Mana'ger, Gary Miller, declared a General Emergency based on the greater
'than 8 R/hr reading'on the containment dome monitor. Notifica-tion of. the 'NRC Region 1 office of these emergency. declarations was attempted by licensee personnel at 7: 04 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. -
These attempts reached the answering service and the' licensee was unable to contact NRC officials until the NRC Region I switchboard f.. opened at'7:45 a.m..' Recordings of telephone conversations between
' the NRC;and the licensee did not begin until about 9:15 a.m. How- -
ever,. there are earlier recordings of telephone conversations
.between the Director of the NRC Region I office ard the NRC Head- .
quarters Response Center. . Review of transcripts of these conver-sations show that by about 8:00 a.m. the Regi_on I office had been
' informed of high radiation levels in the containment, that fuel
. failures had apparently occurred and that there was a bubble in the reactor vessel. (Transcript 01-01017-CH2/20-FFC at 1-6). Based C . on this information the Region I. office activated its Incident Response Center and designated the accident as a Level I sever-4 ity incident, the most severe classification of NRC's emergency
- i plan.
NRC Manual Chapter 0502' define's a Level I incident as . that where there is ran actual or imminent serious i . . threat or hazard presented. This requires activation of the NRC' Incident Response Program. Section 20.403 ' 'n. '
,Part 20 Title 10 -of the Code of Federal Regulations e
o' . requires licens~ees to immediately notify the appro-priate NRC Regional of,fice -- Region I in this case - - - of incidents involving licensed material which may have caused or threatens to cause any one of four listed effects. The accident at TMI-2 r.et all of i these effects and warranted classification as a Level I severity incident.
,_ _e, w.. m ,,--e--=-,---<----"
w .w.~. ~ .
. . - -- -._ . ~ . . . . -...
- . b. . . ,.
7, - 3 ,
+- ,
_g_ , i . . . The transcript of a recorded telephone conversation starting at_- 9:26 a.m. between George .Kunder TMI-2 Superintendent of Techni-
~
cal Support, and the NRC Region I Response Center includes a dis-cussion wherein Kunder responded'to a request for the " scenario"
.., and-information on the status of the plant. (Kunder had been the plant since 4:50 a.m. and of the six senior people on Miller's emergency command team - Kunder, Rogers, Ross, Dubiel, Seelinger 3
.and Logan he was in the'best position to answer questi~ons).
. Kunder reported that the condensate polisher system valves closed Q. r .. . ,,. .t .1. / ".$? '
~due' ". .to' water.in the air lines causing the feedwater_ pumps to tripY.M .
on low pressure. This, in turn, caused a turbine trip and a reactor M.,- ~
~'* " -trip. . He 'also reported that the pressurizer level (water level) went up and the pressurizer went solid. He noted that the reactor l pressure had decreased and caused an activation of the high pressure b,p .
*e.- injection system. The bubble' in the pressurizer was " lost" by . .
4..-~ e < *' - supposedly " pushing through the' relief valves into the reactor . coolant drain tank" and .the rupture disc on the drain tank had - ruptured. He further reported that the pressure dgopped to 1000 ps.i and.that the temperature had stayed around 545 F which baffled the people-(apparently these were the reactor coolant pressure and temperature conditions which existed up to 5:45 a.m. when the re-
S'* actor coolant pumps "were shut'down).
M' . * " ~ ' they were experiencing steam bubbles vapor . Itiwas
' lockingal.so the reported coolant that M I .' . , - system such that they don't have good flow and that apparently ..
the vapor blocking effect was being fed by heat in the core. . Kunder went on to say that high pressure injection had been re-initi.ated to get coolant flow in but that they didn't get the de
- sired effect. (This high pressure injection was initiated at about
- 8:00 a.m.) Further, it Was repo'rted that they tried to start another (reactor) coolant pump but it didn't give any flow and .
' and w(s still apparently vapor locked (this pump operation attempt
' [. '
'" occurred at about 8:15 a.m.). Kunder went on to say "The prob- - .
,"*: . les is trying to get the pressure down low e'nough so we are sure
- the flow is going into the -- is going down -- in the reactor
- -. vessel annulus and up into the core. The vapor. lock apparently
! ' is preventing that from occurring -- and that is apparently what -
- led to failed fuel". , Continuing the conversation, Donald Haverkamp, NRC Region 'I Principal Reactor Inspector for TMI-2, confirmed
- that the licensee had said that high pressure injection had been L -
. secured and was informed that this occurred about five minutes .
?' '
'after its initiation because pr'essurizer level went up. Kunder M,,,.
".. f ; replied that this,was a normal operator response. Further on, -
.- 'a discussion of outside radiation readings takes place where -
f ,' the licensee reports that the State is involved and small amounts of iodine were detected downwind. At about 9:55 a.m. , Kunder reports the primary system pressure and temperature as follows:
"The pressure -- it is cycling around 2000 lbs.', the T up around 571 - indicated -- I don't think that our in8Ye.is atorsstill l
t
.~
e.,,+-.. -.,e+. --me*
m J
.? . .
t. are really giving us representative of indication of T how-ever, I am sure you will take that with a grain of sal!Y,because '
. we you know -I am sure; we don't have an equilibrium temper-
. _ature through'out the loops." (NRC Region I Tape 1) Subsequent investigation has shown that under conditions where the _ cold leg
-tempgrature (Tc) .is pegged at the bottom of the narrow range scale (520 F) and the hot _ leg temperature (T is pegged at the top ofthescale620F,the"Taverage"in$)1catorwillindicate570*F. '*
.. -' ....' ' . .f '-.G. ' ...?T.:_ddC /fG- : ' .. :" .. .
d '. . . ~ " . r .. : ". At 10:00 a.m.~ Kunder. updated the Region .I Incident Response '.. - Center and reported that inside the containment the radiation ~ ' levels were 10 R/hr at tiie operating floor by the incore area,
.. ~
100 mr/hr at the ~ access ~ hatch, the' dome monitor was 6000 R/hr
.. and Kunder questioned its accuracy, and that they had 140 micro-2.~ .
curies /cc beta gamma' primary coolant activity but that this sample' 3 .; _w as.obtained before the (radiation) levels had gone so high (this primary sample had been taken at about 6:40 a.m. and the level of 140 microcuries/cc is about 350 times normal levels). By'10:15 a.m. Kunder updated the reactor status as follows:
- - ~ . -
KUNDER: Talking to Mike Ross - he's looking at the indications, . his assessment is that he's surely certain got the core
!. . - .- covered and we 'are getting water you know - water into the core. The only thing the is that the Tg are
_ . 'J . , - still high and that's what bothers us -- the pressure.- ~ and getting control of it - and... - t: .
, HAVERKAMP:What is your pressure and temperature now?
,KUNDER: The pressure is still up around what I told you -- it's
~. ; holding there - okay? We got a bubble -in the pressur-
. izer -- the only thing now -- he thinks -- it looks .
(-y . . to him like se are getting some natural circulation cooling...okay? But he is still baffled by the "T" hot - we are really trying to, access th'at - "T" hot l , (?) right now are reading 571 F but, again, I am not ( , sure how real a number that is. 4-HAVERKAMP:571'F. - l ,. .' < KUNDER: Yeah.- i~'. . Shortly after'this"interi:hange Kunder says "I am g'oing to have to talk through a mask here." (NRC Region I, Tape 2). Post accident investigations have shown ghat the hgt leg temperatures at that. time were about 780 F and,730 F for the "B" and "A" hot legs; therefore, the report of 571 F is erroneous. The reason for the (?) in the transcript was checked and listening t k i l .
m -
. -. . . . ~ . ~ - . ~ - .a ..~..w~. . . .
- 6-
~
n ~ to the tape.we found that the words are-slightly garbled. sentence should read "But he is still baffled by the T hot -The we last
', are really trying to.assgss that -- T hot is'like - right now.
the T hot is reading 571 F but, again, I am not sure how real a
~
~ " .
' .- as "T" 571'F and it'is evi. dent that the temperature repo was average. **
.L ;.
'!. .c ~r Review of trans'cripts of the NRC Headquarters Incident ! 3::.7.pg;, i-. : d; ._ Response Center tapes show that the plant status .information was ."
.C ^
C
. ;-7,p ..jin this center were busy notifyingTheothers. discussed eople in m
~ ir NRC Opera -
.--' fe..' O tions Center Log shows heavy telephone usage beginning at 8:20 a.m . y Q $ ,. N ,;lE / ~and regional former directors.Director of Region IV, was given the
- j. ' .. f - Robert Engelken, Director of Region V was the'last of the regional directors to be contacted by Howard. -
,: At 10:15 a.m. Howard informed Engelken that TMI-2 cannot get the 1 reactor coolant pumps operating because they appear to be . vapor -
--M:.: locked, there was high radiation readings in the containment, there b:7 . Jy, - . readin was some activity in the reacto_r coolant and an offsite iodine Q :~.- g ',;tive (g. Engelken comments that'these are. indicative of defec-sic, damaged) fuel. .(Transcript Of-118-CH4/22-EG-2)
. a . . tk .
2: ~ "
-l m .._'. p .- .
1 v - There is no indication that Gafy Miller personally 'cor uni- ' ., .- ". , - M . cated by telephone that day with the NRC.' Miller did communicate !' 4 .'with NRC-personnel in the Unit 2 Control room after they entered the control room at about 11:00 a.m. Miller was functioning as
. the Emergency Director and primaH1y involved in executing the .
E station was in a~stable radiological condition. emergency plan and trying to assure the plant Miller was often on the tele . ! . -- E d.' ~ with Jack Herbine, Met Ed Vice President of Generation. phone Miller ' " ~k .; . also updated the Lt. Governor's office at about
"- ,at thd state's request. 9:00 - 9:30 a.m.
Evidently the request was prompted by the Governor's news conference which was scheduled for 10:00 a
^
s -Miller then called the Met Ed corporate office in Reading, Pennsyl-
? vania to relay what he had told the Lt. Governor.
J call ManagerJ was recorded and Miller s, poke with George Troffer, Met EdThe Readin of Generation Quality Assurance and Richard Klingaman,
. f ., i,6
. . :e T*"
- Met,Ed Manager of' Generation Engineering (Miller knew that Herbein
? ...- wwas in Philadelphia for naval reserve training since he had spoken ,
3 :y:'ers;:.:.: . yith Herbein
.b' .: :. . earlier).. .* This transcript begins with Miller saying ,
^' .
' ~ "Lt! ' Governor -- I had no,Q .. ,
~' choice but to talk to him." Miller 4
" tells Troffer he told the Lt. Governor's ' office that Unit-2 ex-
' parienced a turbine trip and reactor trip from very high power but (that wasse't a problem, reactor coolant had been released to the !-
. reactor building floor when a relief' valve lifted due to high pressure and that this gave an indication of radioactivity in the .
6 e e g i
.i Y_
- reactor building, that' the coolant release to the reactor building .
floor "was not' a break ,or a leak.or anything that was designed to release at.a high pressure". Further, Miller goes on to say, "In addition t$ this the plant obviously experienced a pressure u
~
and temperature change fairly fast. I didn't say this to them -- T I'm'just.saying it to the group. I was on the phone with a nuclear
~
engineer (Dornsife) over there so he .knows about fuel pi'ns. 'I -
.said yes we may have had some fuel pin leakage. I don't know: :.
Y ,~d 's .;,. . ' that.right now. That's'part of small ' term assessment on this -
- . .: thing and that's ' economic..- He asked if I had any melting on fuel.
3
- Ti . . I .said I don't have'any indication of melted fuel, but'I may have 1 ~ , 'f. . -
. had some fuel pin leakage which is not abnormal in the industry. .
.H .'. '. d .;, ' , . . 'I didn't say any at the present but I did say that we had reac
~
.-L .J G "
-tor coolant released in the building which was giving radioactiv - '
.'.. .. G.. E-
' ity on the monitor."' ~..9.. .-%.+ .
When we get that, I said our emergency plan mandates that ' when I see it in the. reactor building I assume it's getting out. Therefore, I go into the general emergency. I fully gear .up like I already got an emergency in the public. That means that I put people on stations, I closed the gates, I-'et the, State Police, g
~
. ' .#" '.. I make all the phone calls and I say s'ubsequent to doing everything .
'. ~
~
in the plant we have had confirmation very rapidly the number 1. .
-.4' (?) From the time the incident started we have had no release ~ to
[ the environment especially above background. We have had no in-dication of a millirem an hour that I know of. We know where the -C.-
. wind is moving -- it- is moving slowly to the west. We have-people ,
at the west site ' boundary. ' We had. a helicopter fly over. to Golds-
.f
. boro. We 'had the meters taken out at York Haven -- if I have
. .to go back I will. Never had any indication. We have been~in*
cummunications' with Molloy in .the State for most of the day. -
.~. -
.,7. ' We had no action level by th'e. plan for the public. .
~
9 __
.g .:.;.. , , ,
We do not expect any additional or any release. We are in ' the process of taking ths plant to a. cold shutdown to evaluate
* ' the situation and th .t evaluation is probably more economically
, damaging than anything else -- from the public standpoint."
.s ,_. * - .
. : 'i 2
,. . q-.V - -
s
* ' .:[ '
. . ..?l .Q.
"IL,'*
. f!!.~:'$l,% ' ^ ' .-Y* ;.< ,..' ,. .' ,. ' . - * ',' N'
; }".'
- N'il' ,
- . s u; ;*.
. . . v. ' .
o. e a 4 1
w,. . .. ., . c. ym rr m -c .. g.
.w .
a . L Apoendix A
. . ~
i.
- f. - List of' Documents Reviewed During Investigation .
... ..r . . .
.....~.
+
~ .
.n .. ,m.>. . ... ...:..... .. , ...._ .!:. ,,.. ..,,,.
.. . . . . .u. :.... :. .
. ee; -v.....vv..
- . :* .. --c.cj.:..-+,:m..wm. ;:a:q;,.wm.w . v > t.w. ~. -. . . . 9 . .; .: .
..: - - ...., . .. u. r.a .....e....s...,.
..s..... . .. ;.o.e, . . .. ..a..~.
. s. .
.. x. e.v .. .. . ..-
..J. .:..... ....::a: - * - *.;g y:
- ..,....
- 4+n.. . o: : .:,.-.s :w.n. ,_. ._. ~ . : - .:~. .. . . .
. . .. .,. . z . ... .
..;.,.s 4 ~,...us. ,.. > . ;. ,.. :,... .., . ...m
....s....
. _ . . , - , .o s.
..r.,.
. . .. i
..s..... .. . g.,.
... . , 3.
.y,.
. . ,..1 .
. . = ,. .. .
.. +.
- n. .-
.i. .
,.. .t. ; .: . . y. . . . . - .-
..c e.*....v. . . . . . . . . .
..,.,.,ss,,,,.,.<s...
. w.
,.. .su.. w.u. n . . e, (a.s.m . ; ..*.y.,
s..
,f .:.< %.* *
.* ; . .1f ~ . . *
., ,, **1 f. . g .
4,
- v. *
...W., ..
,. . . ' . . . ' ... ... . ., 7 .
e, s *
,.' ^
. . sq . .
. ,:.s. . . . -
.4*.. ..
. . g.n. . .,
. ..r.. . .
.a... . . .. ... . . . .
- n.~g ..
- s
, ..?
;......-s~s ..
. 1,. .'s o.., .
.A = ~ s . .
4 .
.&;. ..e. .
W. . ' . = . * . ,. * .. : f.,.'
..w
=~. . - . . =- . .* g .., .y u.,
yjs y.6,=.k. 6., y . * . , .
. ..e. * .
- s...... . - ,. .
. . . < . . . .. ,. .~,
* . , . ~ . ,q~...owg
.+. 4..* * . ,.... .e . . .
- a. .,.r ..A* ; .. ,/*, *". ,a **e*.-.
,: 4 .
.--.f***....
*;.,*M .L. .* * .- . . . .. * .
*' . .a.... .
.* . ...+. .,...g.*.. .. .
.*- v . ,. ,
4..~=. .
*; ..#-*. .t.. .
.. . .. .,. + .. ..
,.. ~ . . .
o .~,,t.;. . ") - 6.
. ., t ,
+ . * ,- .
~.,.
s.
. . t .,
, s: ?. *s .a *
. ,i . * . -
+
8 , . .s . p. .
. 2,
.3.. *t
.y es ..
. . - .. . . . . _ . ..... * ..e..* .. .
r.*.,., . ,, , .
. 8-. . . .,.g. .
.r . .-
.v.
.g -.- .
.* a,i*,
s
.y .. ., ... ,. . .
.* e *
.* r . . * .
*. =
+
,,.. t =.n,.., = ~. ,
. *P .
4 . 2 .. .
.6. # .. . ,
.9
. p. 4, . .
.... ....3 . ..,..
... w .:. .- ....* . . . . .
s:. -. ..i. -*. .:. . . :' . . .
. L.w :* . *s- : .
r . . f . ,' .J. .an *p.s. . y .
.s. .. . s.: . . .
~
. , .*'= , . , . . .
r . . r. e' . e. * . . .
fc. m,n -
. . _ _ _ . - ~ ~4 2 s.2 m _u. . .
.. m m ... n ,.._. u
.e e - ; f.n. 4 .-
- v.._
.- . . . . ~
. . .L.: n, 9, {
. m
)rs -
~ ~
Aooendix B
~
LTechnical ' Data Concerning-Core Outlet Temperatures - .
~ : i.. .
. ~ . , .. .
+ . .
. ,. a .. - ..
- .,.~,.... .
n . m ; ,..w..v.y. .
.m.. ..,.
.s..,.
,: ... ..,~.. . . .. .- . . ....
a:....
....,.g.
..,.:, .w . .x ....(
,,..: ... . . , . c. .. ... ..-,. .
, .. . .; .. s
.. . . >.w. . r .i a. . . n. . .w. . . .
..s.
. , _ , . .. . ..s.,.. . , , . . . . . , . .. . - . . . ..
.,x..v ; , ,. .. .... .: . ,.-
..<.r
.:,..........w.i. ....: .. .. .. .
p g.
. . c. . . ..
........ .. ;.. . ..g- .. . . ..
. .t .. .. . ..
c . n
.,....,..n..
....t. .
. . . . .. w
~...
. .. .. w , ..,..........
.....,.e......
. . m
- w. . . .. . . . . . , .
. . . . . . . ,, 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . .p7.,...;.,,,.........,.,...;,,......., ym , .. . .. ,. ::, . .e,......
..,m...
. . . .. . , .s . ... .. ..
..,s...
.....s.
. . , v. ..:. ,..
.. . z a . . ,. . . . .
..a.
. e. ..
a u...,...'.:.: s .c . c... .~.: +.
.. w : . .. :. ..
. :: . ..,... . . . ::.a. ,u. .- .
- o. . . . .. . .
..u.c . .,.....
.~.,.. : ..; ... . ... ,
p.. .. . . . . . . . . ,
.... >. ... . . . ;...y, . .: . . .:. .. . . . , ,. . . a. . . : ... ..
. r..... . . .
e.. . . s , ,, .. .
. .s. ,
w: .,
.n. , .
w.-c
.u . . ..... . . ,.r1 . . ., . . . . .
w.s . . ; . . , . .
~
. . . .. . c.,......
~ . ... ~ :, - ..
... - . . . .. .. .a...... .
.....,,.i*
=
. , , . . , . ., r.; . . .
es . e ..
. g. - _ .. ..
~.
,. ~. . .
, . .o . . ..
, . .+....;..w. . .
~ f ,.. .,. , . . . . . ~1.. . . .. .. .. -. c.t . . .:: ... - .,.:. . . . ..
. : . .. . ; . g . . .. . ,. .
m.
- a. .
. . . * *,l '5;..
.... c ..J ".* ,..e...
, ..... ... o.
*. ..t 1.Ji* . . .
.. . .., . : . , . , . .u : .
. e. .
6.... 9-
,. r
. T ., .
3 . . 2-1
_ _ _ _ . , . . . _ _ _ ._.._m .w .. . - . . f .... ,
..k .
,a
, Incore Thermocouples 1 ,
' ~ '
',h ,
' , A type K (Chromel-Alumel) ' sheathed '.hermocouple with a grounded bead
~
.was 1ocated in the top of. each of the 52 instrumentation tubes positioned in a specific spiral pattern ire the core. Each instrumentation tube was_ :.
, located in the center of'a , fuel: bundle and was permanently fastened into ..
c . _,,--4j the botton, support plate "for the* core... Each also contained seven self ., ;;-/
- l. ',F : .. . l
- powered : neutron detectors"(SPND7 spaced at about 13/4-foot intervals' ver ' ,,: , * - :."
. , . ,4 tically. and located between , neighboring grid spacers. : The instrumentation , . -
. was being'used in an experimenta1' study of power tilt and power shaping ' . ., '
f,J .in the core and'is not normally present. The incore thermocouples measured
- ~;.l.j ^' .wa,ter temperatures exiting the burdles, and the SPNDs measured the neutron -
f ' >. - - ' ' flux and. flux profile in the bundits. The physical elevation of the incore
* - 19 thermocouplei was in'a flow mixing cup contained in the lower part of the " '
. y upper end fitting of.the bundles and was 12 inches above the top of the fuel t
in the fuel rods of the bundles. _The data from both the thermocouples and the SPNDs could be requested'from the plant computer via either the alarm ,P-lg., , . printer.or the utility typer at operator option. Both were connected
, .4, , ' print out n the alarm printer when the set reading range limits, 700,to' F .
W ,'. , . and.2x10.6. amps, had been exceeded.' Data from selected SPNDs were also ~ *
".v . .'
,. ~ recorders located in the control room. '.
f .'.: .;;'*.C.b . available o.iCa::. on two; multiple
. .:. GY2;',*re. pointdiC: %. L. . ? .
6 T . . " ' Th' eincorg thermocouples~ beganoff going;y ' 1 4 scale..(indicating temperatures .*
- above :700 F) during the'later part of the' time'the alarm printer was una- '
. YT. vailable.'between 5:15:16 and 6:48:08 a.m. At the time of the earliest record [.-d V . of alarming of .the incore thermocouples, between 6:55 and 7:13 a.m. (2 h'ours - B- 55 minutes and 3 hours 13 minutes accident time), g9 of the 52 incore ther-i.. .- i.e., above 700 F. The records thereafter
,[. ~,. ' -aie mocouples incomplete were because recorded eith'er .some off scale, 'thermocouples were missed in an o > +.. ., ' sequence of. recording, or only a partial listing was requested, or they simply .
(q.],, -were not ' requested by the operators from either the alarm printer or the utility
.typer for,a considerable ' period 'of time. The data that are available have
", .been. reported elsewhere. A set of measurements of temperature was made ~ . ,
-at.the computer terminals.in the cable spreading room by usin0 a calibra-
- ..ted thermocoup1g' reader instrupnt and manually recorded. Temperatures 2.~ ~ ' 'as high as 2650 F were measured, as shown in Figure II-28. The trend
. , . ~; data on incor~e thermocouples jndicating temperatures greater than F 700,of si- the
.7 e
*., ther.at'th'. time of, recording or both befgre and'after the period show that
~
.m - 49 of the .52 thermocouples l read above;700 F in the period between 3 -hours
~
a inutes
~)[M J V13 -
36 minutes,,and
. b *. e 3 hours '21* ki.nutes, 33 betwee.n'3 hours 21 minutes and 3 h -
.8 betw'e'n e 4 -44.'b' ho'rsu 34 minutestween'3 and 4' hours hours 4744 minutes minutes. and'3 The' number hours above 700 47 minu
, decreased thereafte'r in reasonable order, 'but 11 w'ere still, up' scale at - .
00:43 a.m. the next day (March'29, 1979), 3 e at noon onMarchg9,1979,andIwasstillupscale'(greaterthan700were still 'up sca}F); 2 above 300 F at 10:22 a.m. on April .1,1979, more than 4 days after the start of-the~ accident. No evidence available at this time can determine whether the temperatures indicated were measured at the thermocouple bead in the
-.m -
. - . - . .- - - -~
i mixing cup of the upper end fitting or were those at newly formed junctions located in the " liquefied fuel" region of the core. Attempts to measure the resistances of the legs of the thermocouples could not resolve the question, nor. could other types of measurement made to determine the continuity of the thermocouple wires. ,. . s. _ .. Miller continues on to inform the Reading personnel that, no :. one has had an overdose or an overexposure, that plant radiation-
. - l,: , . :. ,
e.- 9.ME ..PJ" ' . , surveys that they may had have'used been performed up?some'and operator's the appropriate quarterly doses areastaking roped.off,;rJf. ' ". ;,' i . ~" ** -,T ~. coolant samples and that they had maintained a general emergency - f., . 1- because they had been testing the -
- e. .. , . gJ.te.. plant. . The transcript closes
.. with.
- . . Miller . s-
.. "". .1.
.' re. ., . .%..'aying,5 .~.. ... ~..
v .~ %..~. :. ... a ,..,. . -
- f. . '. l ason';we
.. . . . ~ . . . ...-
?.. .. .. "The avenotl
't .s;"; e[
' ' to be honest with'you we'pnd'you're right the George,plant. is because don't :. + '.'.
ve been testing 'We ~
* 'know where the hell the plant'was going. See the situation we're;2 '
' :^ -
in is a delicate one because we actually have plant integrit'y. ' If we had a leak we'd be all right -- as far as we'd have a lot . . ?,,. more economic consequences., 'We've been trying to figure out how 2 ..- to cool down in the most expeditous~ fashion without releasing ~O. ' p ,: . ' ' - and without damaging too much. ' That's taking a pretty .har'd asses'- s
. a.
- y . ;. ";- , ment. 'I'll work on .getting out of the emergency right now,"3 '
c '*-
- . ; j '.
..* . .i ."n.?. ;..v .-Q:::@).:. ..
S':7. : ._, . . . The foregoing collo.quy. shows that Hiller tried to " N;"-
. Q,N . ,. " . . , ' , , .
put the best face' on the situation when talking to the Lt. Gov- V.: *
. . ' - ,,. - ' ~
ernor.'s . office and that Miller ;did n'ot understand the true planf. . * [.,, . ., status during the discussion. Although Miller was somewhat more.** candid with the Med Ed people in Reading, .no mention was made of." -
' the high core exit temperature readings, notably the hot leg temp-- .
eratur:es which were~ then of concern in the control room. His 's;;-t -
. statements about having plant' integrity and'if we had a . leak we'd
,,- i q'..' -
be all right appears' to be alluding to the idea that-a steam bubble 2 1;
'. was trapped in the, system and inhibiting the cooldown.. As noted' q/ + :.". " '
previously, this waslthe message Kunder was simultaneous 1y'giving i the NRC Region I Incident Re~sponse" Center but Kunder was provid- . l ing more details. 'When asked about the information provided Met '
,Ed Reading office'per,sonnel, Mil.ler, replied:
' ~ '
. ..v. . 2
. "I talked to Reading, I 'think.'~early' in the morning. At least *
. . '.T 9 . 7' the engineering manager, and.I. don't believe that there was a.ny , ,' .
l-i * A .. '! . i imore they could advise.me on~ what to do. ' I was aware Jack (Herbein) ' '. .
~ center.' . . I .' .h*%M l'#;C : ' y , ..' C.M'was' didn't believe coming there was to theTsite[anyone in the orReading afleast officeto th'e observation.i -
morning that could have. understood. the plant conditions and spec-ified action better than the five senior people I had with me..."
. , (Miller, SIG Deposition, 10/29/79 at 41) -
e . ** -
m .- - o . The Lt. Governor's office was not solely dependent on the informa-tion provided by Miller for the Governor's 10:00 a.m. news con-farence. They had access to Thomas Gerusky, Director of the Pennsyl-vania Bureau of Radiation Protection and his associate Margaret
, Reilly. Both Gerusky and Reilly had been in contact with the plant .
T. . nearly continuously si.nce about 7:30 a.m. .Their contacts'were - mostly with Richard Dubiel,'THI-2 Supervisor of Radiation Protection _
- i. .
' . x.* - and. Chemistry, and the Met Ed person in charge of contrdlling the -
; ~ i .J..4.T u . ; onsite and offs'ite radiological surveys. Gerusky telephoned Bernard .
.F*'4MS .
~ ' Weiss at the'NRC'Headq'uarters Incident Response Center at about ** "Y
. ft.N$%. -). ' 10iOO a.m. and informed Weiss that: (1) there was radioactive f '.- .
JJ _% .S.T. 7'.'M,.% .3 . .',*. were '" moving [. material in the to Unit 1,l(2) ' air of it appeared thatthe' Unit.was the problem 2 control created roo 8 ~.$$F1 t
, by' gap l activity rather than melted fuel, (3) it appeared there!.. ~ [' ~76 . .RM .Y.5 .g.<.
- imay be fuel cladding problems based on the iodine activity in thq
'. . f. .p.py: ' ,* Ocoolant, (4) nd off-site radiation ~ levels had been detected using :-
.. . ' . portable equipment,' (5) it seemed'they had detected onsite read
.T
.- ings with a SAM-2 (radiation ~ detection instrument), (6) the Gov-
~ ' ernor would have a press conference at 10:00 a.m. and he (Gerusky) i . .' s - called the Lt. Governor's office to inform them that "we" were
, i' - {.GU .' . ' , detecting radioactivity, and (7) they (the State) were going to'.'.,
say that very' low levels of radioactive',m,aterials were'being re Y " ' "rg[4:($f? 4 4v/~ll.:. , . leased to thef environment.. Weiss challenged the release state- h
'4.p. 3,..;8 ment asking how they could be so definitive'but Gerusky maintained. ,- ,.
7dTM ~.'K .. his position. The . transcript of this discussion also includes *
. ; .: . :;9 the following comment by someone at the NRC Incident Response . x.,"- l . 5-}rjd.&- . Cente.r " yeah','I h'eard somebody,-I guess on the radio, I~think.'g
- - 4.,. . "'a.p it was from the' Bureau,' ,saying that there were 10R per hour out'. ' :- .
.- the cooling tower". The response to this, apparently from Gerusky, * 't'. s -
began "Unfortunately, the estimates were that if..." and then .,'
- j; .c ..: :.' .- . background noise 'from radi'o report drowned out the comment *
'W. W J. (Transcript 01-838-CH19/203D-SW at 8-12). This latter exchange 9;.'d.'f.""
. is noteworthy.'in that' Gerusky' and his . people were notified by , :: .
. Y:- :'. :c$ .
?", Met Ed personnel >at 7:35 a.m. of a 10 R/hr projected dose rate at -
. 9 T.:.. w Goldsboro. This was based 'on calculations using'the indicated
' radiation ' levels in the containment as the source term. Margaret-Reilly had told the State Civil Defense to prepare for evacuation
..../ -
of Goldsboro upon learning of,the projection; this alert was rescin- - ," B ':'.".' ' d . ded when onsite radiation surveys showed that 10 R/hr at Goldsboro .
- E l
.M.li . 9.4. hll,m.. '.' ' . ' .II,,Part . coul d. 3; not exist. :(Draf at.128-130). t, SIG
'.. :7. .:.. ' Report,
. c to the, Commissioners,'2;Volume...
W.1, , * ;, . '. '.L C- d G . . . *'.. .l..? g,- , .i, 4..F !.ippa. John rentfy.?LY.4,
~
.h .n."'
Davis, Acting ..y'%.of'Othe Director . . Offic.e of Ink b "g,.y pw. e . 1
'" .. ". :.'. C' ? ' ~~ '
'spection and' Enforcement was aware of most of the information " ~ . *
.. -that Weiss received from Gerusky. At about 10:30 a.'m. ,' Davis, - . ..
Lee Gossick, NRC's Executive Director of Operations, and Edson Case,
' Deputy Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, placed a confer-ence call to NRC Commissioners Bradford, Gilinsky and Kennedy y to update them on the accident. Davis reported that there was D &
I
e no measurable radiation offsite as of 9:50 a.m., that the dome reading was very high at 3-4,000 Rem /hr, that the containment
. , pressure was low but if it went up there could be some offsite activity in the control _ room. releases, and that there was an about the source of the radiation, Davis said that probably activity was coming from. gaps in the fuel and that some of the '
(Transcript ,02-213-CH. 6/24-LFR at 4-5 fuel pins .- popped ' L(5 f * : .% ,j . . . - Grier; informed Davi's.that;they had in)-indication of iodine .[. ' off-:
.M: m' sitt and that' the' sample was being flown to a hospital for ,C anal
' - ~.2 ysis.
b.i 'M '::TTi. .., .' . west,', southwest'of the ' site ahd that he'(Grier) '.'f..' ha
'. :n,' ,
' not to believs it"R (Transcript' 01-214-CH 6/24-LF at 7)' Davis .
%v.;. .3 '
' 'then . updated Commissioners Bradford,'Gilinsky 'and Kennedy .
' . . ' O. .
s-C ."Z' :W.i "11:30 a.'s. c of the' Fiodine' ' e'ading and 'said thaf it could
'-~ ~
r
*" ' ' 'be
' ". ^.
from the ~ containment.'. (Trans'cript 01-215-CH 6/24-LFR at 5-6)
~ At ab~out 2:00 j.'m. Commissioner Gilinsky and representativ'es' .'of
'. the the other Commissioners talked from.2000 to Case and Davis and
? :c.f*- ': that reactor pressure was reduced psi to 500 .
psi,- . t- 9e . :. . thatand the10radiation. levels in that the there containment werele'6000 vel R M.
. top
- 2 @.,' '. ~ , / of 500 mr/hr 'out' side the containment at the base' of the
. R/hr'at'the 'decklevel, was a radiation '.' '
M f;-;.V,3,,
'2.. ' f; ., ment and that this was " shine" (direct radiation reading), .. '
O i,. .
>. ..7, ,, 3 T .,1, . :.',f.,[
sample taken on the north side of the island read.- 3 . b- i.. micro..' ^ curies and, /cc,. that the ' sample was being' flown to a hospital if the for analysis," '
/ " ' ' . ' ' protective measu. reading were ' confirmed as ' iodine 131 then 'some'
, . ';~
stuffs but it was no,t an. evacuation level.res would be requiied 's'uch
~
{ '. ' s - J,*. -
*; ' . d.~ . :. 'the plant because of'a 7.mr/hr
' ~..
- ?
shine reading. por Under questioning . ( / , ..e .:.r.y ,:
,'C-sisteht with {the 10 R/hr radiati'by Commissioner Gilinsky',.*the
* ' tainmenE.' ' Additionally / it was pointed out that'there has beenon '
i venting of'the secondary system '(steam) to the atmosphere but ** .
. - that was now stopped but there may have been some radioactive material released that*Qay. !
, , , Ouring the conversation the. results
. .' ~
of
.1 x 10 the gdine sample check w,ere, received and showed a level of ..
M .:.%2 microcuries/dc.' . This was 'said to indicate that there ,. Q f:L &,.: f..fwas not an - iodine': release.'.(Transcript 01-220-CH 6/24-LFR
- at 410
9:Q' O ' .;j. M .: 4 .. b, wt:;. M M . 2 e,,.r .
? % w.? m:: ' . ' . '
" " . , ' ' ^ . . ' 'When'.the 'informat. Ion wa's? developing "about' appa. rent rele. J ?.
ases of M n ' radioactive material, at'te' ntion was 'also placed at the NRC Inci- . * ;- *'.
'i ~
dent Response Centers 4 bout the core exit temperatures.. A follow- - up ' discussion took place between Richard " Rick" Keimig, Region I after the Kunder-Haverkamp exchange about hot leg , (The transcript does not identify the speakers other than a state-ment " Yeah Rick, this is Mike".) During this discussion Wilber
,,_,,.,-*-ee * - " ~ ~ ' ' ~
e - 14 . questioned Keimig about how the core was being cooled and Keimig noted that-the. reactor. coolant pumps were not operating and that "they're having trouble cooling the core because there might be a vapor bound. (sic) They have no indication of primary system .
. temperature". 'When asked why, Keimig responded "no flow". .
(Transcript 01-01019-CH 2/20-GFC at 5-6) Subsequent follow-up
- - - ^- ,
conversations a few minutes later indicate their belief that the '
. ;* , h ' ' . . .
plant'had natural circulation flow. (Transcript 01-01019-CH 2/20-
.......a- GFC at 21) Regi'on I dispatched a team of NRC inspectors at 8:40..e,. .
'-7 y. Th. .!..c.*.Lh fik y 77a' m.' .to eTHI-2.[They arrHed', at' th' U
-lished their communications with the Region I. office shortly after e
'Q.
?.:~%"J4N'[$ .
.J.'.~.v, - . . . , . '.i,,',.10:00 a.m.*;.. James Higgin's',.a" 2 control room. Region I Reactor Inspector However they had M,p,-q.; y .d.1 ! '. to .- . nspector first'obtain.sent wer'e - and to th.e ~ don Unit. respiratory. protection masks before ent ..
N.k'4.@ $ 8 .9;... . fin'g' the controf room. .Thi.s delayed their entry during a period , E c." sh's /C.Je . : '
~when people at the Headquarters. Incident' Response Center were '
P.E '. ' P.~ eager for plant ' operations information. . At about 10:55 a.m. Higgins
- 1 - x. ' . . .
reported to the Region I Incident Response Center that there were ' T . probably bubbles in both hot legs and the only circulation they
?:: ..
had on the primary side was due to natura1' circulation and even. . 1% '.' ', .;,
. that "wasn't too great". (Region 'I, Tape 2) At about 11:30 a.m.,
- f. f 'Je q t..
' Region I updated the' plant operations information to the Headq"uarters "' ,.
s E M Q ..- ' Incident Res
. ,ponse '. Center. as. follows:7.ps.'.'I.? % ...
..~."-
- 2:L ?.:a. :.,s : ,. C.' ;,.'. ..:4 , q ;. g Q..u;..:.:. :. % ...l;*'.,. .
b'. y.,'.' ,. ::. W,.C',t.WC(-
. 'a re '
's...,".
p .n . '.t
. . .:~ < .'.VOICE: .: .
~
.' ."t:.<j
'Okay,i...yyou .:.: >.:. . .w' ready .u . unfor ,some:r . information? .* ' '
. .a w.-w*".W. ,4u. *c ..*.. .r 'N<.
Ye's'~* '* '
- g.;w. . ...
n . . . . .G : ..n . .n
. VOICE.- -
r - e , ~~ . .
... m.. ,;, u .. .<.;
;o .
.:.m, t'r. ,,0.
; %.t. ,7,. . .: .. .
. . . - . ~.
? ..{ ;
- " . VOICE:
- Yen...-C a-a'*'.:,.l..
w . C'Q:. m .. :" -
- '. .% p a ' - . '. ' : .
*Tl . . :.,1.. J. .:..
core " pressure is appioximately 2,000 psi.. ?
- .. c.. ?.,.,..u. ,. . RVOICE? . ..
.a.
. The.h.A
$ ., . .6.?G
. . i.. a: -
VOICE:o. .
~
It r%:. ....! 2.&;; - .n.. .o (. ; ..What?: ..r. G ' . vTwo . . thousand. .....,.. .r :;'wai.19 something before. . Okay.
.p
~ . . . . . .
j ;, . # r. -. j,. .
.. 'r VOICE: Te.mperature is 350 degrees.'. . ' . . .
. .. ~ .
VOICE: 350, it was 200 before. - -
~
- n.. . .
..,.;, s.- They'are maintaining at 2,000 psi by cycling the elec -
-VOICE:' -
n. . :W
..'. ..c.. .. .
- t. rom.atic ~.',c . '. ..
..c -
..i .) . ;; 1. * ;.Y .'" Ar relief. v.,.alv.e.
Wp . %.. . . s : ,. ,... .m.. k.n.:...:. . :. '. W.. .a. c.. .:', W 'r:..:.' .. ,,. .,. -
~ ., o
..:.. .; v.. . VOIC - .- '*. ~ .,'
.s.O.*:. Okay;x.w;,:.,: co ,1.f-'*.'p .:.*.'. ..M;7.QG - ' .K:9' G, M:4W .. ;.':. .:-
p c}N.W:.Q.W.Qw.E: iq',j'. . VOICE:' - (They note'that ',t.h'e' h6t leg tem'perature 1,s',around 620'. ,? ;,-} , . - degrees... , ,
- i. p. , ' .
VOICE: Then they saturate it. , VOICE: That figure I gave you, 350 degrees F - -
,~.
. . .m - , -
u .
= . r . 5.y e 2.= .
n a. .. q
+ . .,
s . 2
'y t _
;,i -
.w -
15
+
a f y . VOICE:- .Yes.
- i
%;, _ VOICE: J '
*v
- is uthe pressuriier temperature. The cold. leg tempera- i tura is something around 220 degrees.
D
.'(TranEcripE02-024-CH2/20-Swat
.s 9)- . . ' . .. .
. s. ,. .. .. . . .. -
~
(Ws nop know that' the hot leg 'teinperatures were then'in" excess
.;.- c' n.
' T4-tJ .yf;: 31 read from the3 narrow 'rarige temperature .This indicaindicatorof
~
, . C ?@?.
O 1.or*w'as pegged'high'at 620 F. . circulation flow"was 'not' takirigHindsight also shows that natugal J: @ '
$.~'[." ". place). .-
[,'.! . @..J . 's; hot' leg temp'eratureiT background discussions took place at t
.J.9 1
*2 Y R..'l".i?,'7- ,' .
~
' Headquarters" Incident Response Center about in which loop' (A'or B .
W-#.*M:P.T '
- loop). was th's Et log' temperat'ure nieasured and the desire to' find ? W .
. . ; . ' f~ ' .
. 7 ',out the core ele' ment temperature'(incore thermocouple reading
.- A discussion' th'en to'ok place between Harry Kister, Region I Ra- 1/ .
- digtfon Prgtection Section Chief, at the Region I Incident Response c
' -~ Ce.nter and Vilber at the Headquarters Incident Response Center. .,
R. - I' *; This concerned whether the licensee had looked at the thermocouples . 4. at the fuel assembly cutlet and whether or not the plant had such ". f* S. C "' Li ".'.'t' ' thermocouples. r Although'it is implied that Headquarters wants this'? '* / j.?I .. . .i. ' information,'it'.doesn't a' p' pear.'that. this'wais "un'derstood or commun :* 8jil ' Se ; . . /L ". icated at that time ti the site. (Transcript 01-025-CH 2/20-SW n"
'at 13-14)Section At abdut'.2:45 p.iii. . Donald Capihton, Region I Reacto'r Op ' .E.7..
}'f erations -
'*l. -
Senior Operations. Chief, informed Gerald Klingler, Headquarters - f [i; . 7 '. *.,,v ' . 2:15 p.m! Thess iere:
. Specialist,' of the reactor parameters as of *
- W '.
q .- . 500 reactor coolant pressure at approximately 230, psi,temperaturel,ne,agsaturation,coldlegtemperatureof, F and hot leg ata600 F.
#s4 ~
Caphton noted that they'still suspected
' 7 .. bubbles in thk loops which would affect the temperature readings. .
g.,.d,';4, ,(Transcript' Region 1; Tapa 7): Simultaneously Wilber obtained Unit - .,
".y
. ', 2 reactor parameters /from Gregory Hitz, TMI Shift Supervisor, .' ' 3
- who w4s in,the Unit 1 Control' Room. . .
. . e , v. .: S*
gj. ;. ., s . , < .: ';. .., ;\ t.( :-.f-
,, HITZt
. [. ,
< ' Unit 2 has a 550T' hot; 200 T , 450 pounds pressure and -
- . ? -
" .i,
- 4re going to go on decay heaE removal - via the BWST - i
. that'.s
. . y v.the .- p'ame plart. -
'. 4 -
;T.y.y+ .U ?.0;s WILBE6 ,[< . Going '.b . l*t.T.T. on tha' decay heat removal. via the BWST. ' -
%.:;.k'. ' . ; i. "
W* ' ' ' %
- 1 .
- At about 3:30 p.m.< Wilber asked ' ": . ' .
'.i* ,. .J.', EN", ! , f 7 gof/.450 pounds Wisiia'ry got apriessu're' question. .youHitz "We .. g" ?..'
." and a 550 degree temperat'ure there, ' :-
;y ,. uni that sould'be'superheat?" '(Transcript Region I, Tape 9) The .'
t b / transcript th'en has health physics data end contact was lost with J 'i Hitz'. ,- 4 Wilber then contacted Caphton at Region I and Charles,Gallina,
" ' Region I Investigation Specialist, who was at the Unit I control
{ j room and f, aid that before lunch "we" asked about the incore ther- , , , a , ,'moccupletand he didn't know if they ever got an answer back. '
.~ .
M 4 i ~ Y g '
. . . - . . . . , , xx. - a
-16)-
,z .
Caphton.then asked Gallina to get Hitz b'ack on the phone. (Tran-script then told Wilber that at one time
."T" hotRegion was pegged I, Tape high 10)atHitz*F 620 and "T"' cold at 220 F, and,that
- he (Hitz) questions the accuracy of the1"T" hot instruments.
~
~ Wilber then asked fer the ir ore temperatures and Hitz said "...That
' .~ ~ : ' . . [.. would be a better unde.rstar Jing of what you have in the core..."
(Transcript Re'gion I,1 Tape n) Victor Stello NRC Director of the
". "f ~ ','
. Nuclear Reactor. Regulation Division of Operating Reactors, took N.>. ..J .. ,'..the telephone f' rom Wilber shortly after 4:00 p.m. and.~ explained
$+h@pp$.-?*U'.'i $^ .tD.'IfitX;i'W$f.?li 5liWE*$ E55 '5;.$$$'-0?'-&
I! A: ^ ,-0 I.;W.:* I;Y; !$ \
.rm. s- w: : . ; sc.1:=m::c,m=ac '. :.:Ifofyou Vyou. Y.e.%m v: . ..' =. ~ ::-
n._.p.*5.?A..x o. :h"
.STEL w L0r;.y.'
. Let me ask a question really have 550 rue .you are getting super , .. ".'.
. . _ .. , -s. .
,. .:,.> , 33 v. .4,. . . . ....-.a
..w
.y degrees inithat hot leg. it,s .
- A ..-ry.. 9 ..
- r. .... .... . .he.at. - If 'you're gett. ing super-heat there's a chance the 9 F.T.wem .
. ., S;p" .y.. .. . :: s ...s.. . .
her - . The only way you are' going ,to.: ,~. . _W.h.,jW.WC2t.. pc.cy*-t:.w: . O.% .3 . .icore could be uncovered., q?. ;F9.E,. get rid of that p
.- ...;d ...." W .... ..-
water into that vessel and get. that~ core level back . - -
-<!.:.;i' '4 -- - '-
up. If you thought'about what problem you've'got, if -
.- ~ ; '
-indeed you've got 550 degrees in that hot leg at 450,,
'. ? F D$ l
- i. . pounds.. ai,y,:. .... . . J:l : . ... . " . , . .- .- ... -
b .+'. . x. -
.. .:HITZi N.:% M.:'$ v? ;.~ ?:R':.'i ::l';.?:-+ 3 ,' .h 6- u. . :. l- *
?gc '$:S ~ f.y",. "', ,.-T lined"'up ' and 175 ' inches indica {telf 'in 'the pressurize ~ would
%.M . I see1what you're saying, okay ..Th'ey do have the BWST ' . /
hWtf - r gM:. /s # .T:;f.f.7 r UM. .: / - 7- :g. -. mean
' ' ~
that the core wo'uld be covered. . They also got the~': core' flood tanks' floatin .-- J. - . '... --
. ..:a-S Q@:'-y}
. F ?5:'J.:; .< " ':v.q)-l.y ; h%-.e. T; ";. . -:. gi ,i.d .
on that.E-'* *
. . ,7 .
.f. .'D.T .. , STELLO: .":, But that doesn't necessarily'mean that you don't have?,, i
. .k. , . 'M.: . ," :.
m.
.. ; e a steam. bubble,in~ther.e?,.a. N. . , . . . :f /- . .: . 5. . - .-
....v - . .-
. ,- . >.si .. a.~ -
Okay. you're ' talking about a steam bubble' in the core?
,.e : HITZ: , ..
n ,; '
. y, ,6 .
; ;;jff".. . STELL6:o..* Yeah - if you have a steam bubble in the cor~e you go , .
.~. ,'? . A, ,. .
- ..~ , .
# 'the top part of the ~ core ~which could be uncovered super * :' . .s . N .-
- heating the stuff coming out of there and that's what's '
.; #.il.:,"3:. * : n -e.; :.
, , , ,. . giving you the reading. Have any of your people out -
': * ;?.
- l. - ?"
.. there talked to B&W about what kind of a problem that -
' ' . ' J. could look like? .
. . . . : .~ ; : . .- ~
.. . c.' '
HITZ: ' . I don'.t know if they have talked to'them over in Unit
. ..ce's.. , . :.W.
.; .> ;g,r:.e. . ,.. ;
,..L. . .. . . . . . . 2.,orinot
. . . : . . . r. ue I'.ll find outs
. m e . . ..
.~.t
. ~ . . . -
/
,%. ? . ; W..a .M 7:.+ "J, .4 : - : -
. : .- ~ 1 -
n:We have be.en. trying to get in touch with you, a's best ' :^ 9...i
. .f.
,$. . C. E,Ule".: ;.Q.. .. STELLO: , .
~T
. we.'/d.an unde'rstand it,' as..we talked to them..we see the . N . 'i'
~
;;C. .. e! , f.'.". g,. n.
same concern in the same. pr'oblem.- If that thermocouple . J.
' 7 "
. _ reading is. correct,'. and you 'do have supe.r-heat coming
- " ' through that core... - "
.f v .. .
4
..---.w-.--v-=ri--,,.wmi---.wm--.-m---nw .--.ww ww w w .,ce~..
--~
. = . .
HITZ:
. Let me k.alk to the guys in Unit 2 and see what...
'STELLO: We would appr'eciate that very much.
HITZ: All'right. . (Transcript Region I, Tape 11)'. - t Shortly thereafter,' Hitz responded: . ;..
.5
,; -;Gli.g. . .. : C: '. . gig @.W.~' . .
- fl3-; .9-f::V-*:: ~'::, . ' . ' ..
. * . . .?
% 'V ? . .c ."' .^.
.;.. =,. %
. ' : -; HITZ:
- ' .n First . . J of
- - all,;
I can't get-the
.'.; . .:,n;. .. incore temperature, okay?,.
~ ' , . , . . . . ..
_WILBERi ~ 'Yoil ~ca,nn,ot get' thein?Q ' ...-
~ '
.. . , . q,:
[. . . . HITZ: The...: : y print out question marks: . ' g:: f ,- ' ~
-a.;,- - <-
WILBER: . They print .out question marks? Okay, what's that mean? HITZ: That Okay,means or thethat lineeither the computer roint is messed up. you know wheie you sense it -
- .e -.- .
. s that line is, broken somcthing is messed up with that :. .
.O e -, -
- ' .h. '. - line,t They were printing earlier. You know, the com- ,
. . . ;; d. . .. -
- puter just won'.t put out h good number for them.- They #1- -
are trying all of them to see if we can get-any of them. .- ['
. . ;-l5 "- ~ - -;
-c x
- - ~
to print.. Okay.. That's' going to take some time, okay??. ' V .',
/ . . , : .' '
- Because you have to printout each one individually. - - -
..a.,..-.
The core flood tanks are floating on the core lika I . told you, okay? And the core flood tanks just slide e
~
.' into the vessel a little bit. Now that ties in directly into the core right on top of the
- core, okay? -
.. . ;, 1 -
*?~ -
WILBEll:$. Yes.'[.:.'
, ..y .-.
;f '. . .
HITZ:
- L~ , , - " One'T h'ot 'is 590; 'the other T hot is still'pe'gged high.'
All right? We feel that we got boiling in both the T hot legs. The pressurizer is 175 inches and they're - trying to increase the pressure to push the pressurizer p . back up intothe loops, okay? To cut the bubble off. L .. WILBER: . t -
;., c What was thht again.with'the bubble? - -
. .. y , c. , :. .
- i .'<' .
L. ,- i # J ,
. HITZ:' y.
. .Well, they're talking - yeah, they're trying to force
~
~
/ --
j
! water out of'the pressurizer back up into the hot legs, - -
~
~ ~
but you 'know the temperature indication we got 'in the -- -- hot legs - we feel - they tell me they think that they i ; '
.are boiling up there. ~
WILBER: Yes. . t
1B -
+ ... . .-
There's boiling in the hot legs. HITZ:
- ~
WILBER: Yes. - HITZ: ' They've got you know - they've ts1ked about boiling in the. core feel m they.,themselves over in there, andfrom theywhat tell me they are not boiling the core they've .
. .j; -
?? - seen with the core flood tanks. and what they
- you know - ' ~
, .; r.e. .
. . - ....s~.. the makeup system lined up - we. lost .
. u. .: , . , t s. ,.. the w'ay th. ey got. heaters too.. '..' . :. .. . ..:v-
. .Q. .7.;:a.C.7. .. .. .
r f. : . wC.-~7.
.n. . ,
.. . . .,.1
. ,. u. ....:.....
- . . . .: ".. some'.
. . ;. ;.: p res surizer . ,.
,, .s,,.;,. ... . .. .
- ~J . .
. .Qr
. . .L..,. ,,., . . -.
. WILBER: .. f.,I 'underst' . . . . . . .cod that happened quite a bit earlier.-
. .:: . . ; .. .. :;.g.: : . -
5".,.:. . . .-. . .:
-~ . - .
. .. ... l
..-g. ; ; ,,:i, . .c
;- HITZ: .
I'm ' going back and see if they got any of the incores - l to printout.' . :t f i.
- .:lu.?.. r,.. ....: . :...,
- .',: . A. a.-: &, . . 4:. .+p +; .: .i.: . n. ef t. .r 9 n.. .
.. . . ~
.j
. WILBER: - Hell.o.'~ . . .,
- . 1..,.
' HITZ: Yes. .
.. .~ .
~. .. - .
. .l "
Wy... .. .g.
.. WILBER: W' hat is the basis that you feel that it is not boiling 5
in the core?-
.7* -
~
.;<.e; . , .. . i r..< : . v:. . :?...9.-76:4
~
..,,. .. . V. .n. . r. . .
. . r. .v. .
- . . . . '.*.> ., M. ,-e.:
.. ?4- . . . .~ :t':'
. . . . ,,_. . . c . HITZ: - . What's the' basis for 'what?. . e
.); g.~ ;; '.u . - - .. . v" '
. .; . ..:;; ::t;:sh+;%# f. ? .
- ~
. . . WILBER: You feel it is not boiling'in the core?
2 .+:u.
. . . r a . .:: .,.. h. .. r:, .3.na .E. ~ . [ _-- .
HITZ: BecAuse the codflood' tanks are sitting right on top. Q. '. , .
,'. of the core - they feel that the pressure they are.seeing is correct. The core flood tanks did slide in at 600
.f-f,a'C ,
pounds - they've ~seen-a' decrease in the core flood tank '
..,...9..' .
pressure -- levels,;.okay? ..
.:..... .c . - . . . . .
- 7. - .
7.., . l- P. WILBER: All right. '- .-2l'. ' ' i... . , - . . :' . . . . , .. : .: - LV HITZ: - They slid into the pot, and the core flood tanks are now sitting there floating on top of the core. When the pressure , indicated pressure go to 600 pounds we seen a slight, decrease in core flood tank level, which means .
".i d. ' ..
~'-
, that the more flood tanks you know - the' core flood
- 2 f..
- ,e , . . . ..
,. - ' tanks are piessurized at 600 pounds, so when the pressure H .; M 9 . - in the system gets 1ower than 600 pounds, they just N.g,.;)/,e , ... , :./ '
, slide in,. and 'they actually seen the level decrease in '
. the core flood tanks.'. Can you excuse me a minute?
l 7 WILBUR: : Yeah. '
- l. (Transcript; Region I, Tape 11) '
, , . , .e.-.,,-4,.~ . , . - - - - - , ~ . , , , . - . , , ...,,,,,_-,,,.;-,,,,..m..,,,.w ,,_m,.,m%,,.,,,..m_.gm,,.,,-,,. .-,..,_,_m,,, ,.~_.,.n, , , _ , , ,
y. The concern at NRC-Headouarters Incident Response Center was whether the core was covered since superheated steam conditions existed in parts of the reactor' coolant system. Miller, on the other hand, said in a post-accident interview that during the morning he was not. totally convinced that the core was covered. After
. . the core flood tank maneuver however, he was convinced the core 4 was covered and that they were getting some heat removal. (Miller, ,
IE 158 at 22-23 on 5/7/79) Norman Moseley,'NRC Director of the '- Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactoi Operations ..- . :,' ,
.. -Y R ' ~
Inspection,'at the NRC Headquarters ' Incident Response Center was. 'i d ,"
~
,, .- '.C .not convinced as evidenced by the following colloquy with Higgins .
~
~
.. ,3 who was in the Unit-2 control room. Higgins had agreed that -
there pr.obably was superheat .in the hot leg: .
.l.~g _ . ... ._
_, .7.... , , They're not positiv'ely certain that there is not a bubble
~
.:, HIGGINS: -.
_.',<- the-6; however,'they feel confident that there isn't ~" because the flood core tanks are floating essentially on the vessel, and that any water when they firstd 'id the blowdown with the electromatic relief valve, t. were at 1000 pounds and they came down, they gui, . ., n
.- they came below 600 pounds or so, where the core flood
- Vx.4W ' .. .ca ;r ,,
tank valves would open and let water into the upper level f
.F -
' . . 3 -E~^
~
of the core, the core flood tanks went down a very small ',' -U. _ l . . ~. .' ' . amount and they' thought essentially the reactor vea.ol -
~ ?. 2. '
was already full and the core flood tanks are floating # ' on it'and maintaining it full. ,
". w W.:
, , ., . n:.;
, >.g . _
l- .
? : MOSELEY: I think it's a function .of pressure rather than that
,, , they necessarily have shown there is not a steam bubble.
HIGGINS: That's true. They're not 100% cer'tain.
~' .' '
Mo'seley continues a few ' minutes later,
'5
~
, MOSELEY: Well' ..have you pursued with them,' the question you and E
I talked about little earlier and that is how do we j , know tifat the core is not uncovered partially. L
. . HIGGINS: We have talked that o' ver, actually mostly' the discuss- .
L ion on that wcs, between the peopla on site here, the Unit
~
- . - '. ' Superintendent and with Bob Arnold who was the, I'm not #
- . , 6. ..'lf.[
~'.
sure of the exact title, with Met-Ed, I think.he's the - f ;4.T ?; - Y.' ? . . . Vice Preside'nt of Med-Ed, and they talked about it for ' 20 minutes over the phone and I listened to the whole discussion the final results of it was they felt fairly ! confident that the core was covered they saw ' indications when they were blowing down and the f.lood core tanks and the interactions there, although they could not really give assorance of 100% that the core was covered. l I l
,- *A , , - . .--L--. -w. .i,,..-,,,wew.. .----O.-..--% .m-- y-,,.--e.. , - - - - . _ - - -
, a.
m.1..._. . _ _ . _ . _ . -e. ;
. :._n.. .
4 20
.MOSELEY: That flood tank story is not convincing to me. <-
, (Transcript, Region I Tape 12) .
. ,. _ The transcript of the Headquarters end of the above Moseley-Higgins
~ ,
. discussion picked up background conversation about what the NRC Headquarters personnel were thinking: .,
' - * ~ '
e' ; BACKGROUND VOIC'E:' f. Does'.*.he licensee understand 580 degree from - -
'. ~. f . .
N... .-y@.N$kd. - E 7,3.q%. 4.$..G... b2
$. e .Q, .
.$.,.$g.M;u._.the i . . inaudible. '. :: '
hot...--
. .: d..!: - ./ ,
y, .
.. . .. y .,... .. . ;. . .
. e.
,. . w .
..-..s. . 15. 1. T. . ..JJ . ..
. BACKGROUND VOICE:. y'.I. t mean.s .t. hat 'is super heat, they concede that.
i : 5: . . h:s: ..'. - .
, . a e .- . - . :::~rr. ;.-c;v 4: .' =- Q -:,: . :, .
"MM;2.ZT.,.
' ~
. BACKGROUND. VOICE:: ,They'. agree to that? i. U: c- . .
- & -: :;4l.. .
- 57* M%& . .. :%?:r-%;. -2.. : :*.K i. ;._.~; . . .t , . *:
- p.
-. m-
. .-': D ) :. - -
ww- .~.., ..- . B AC.KG RO. .UND
. . . VOI CE: ..:
".~.Ye g-
- o- a h'.n.w :- rw 5 ..:. . .
BACKGROUND VOICE: Do they have any way to explain super heat f , . .
~
. without the core being uncovered?
. ~ ~ ., - . [, ..:.. .. .
- [*!.%.ey. . -* f*c . . .,
BACKGROUND. VOICE: *;?.Not to my satisfaction, .no. -
.,s , ' ., r =.1 .%.
- ge,pp_ g
'-s
;..,=, . , , , - = p y=,., * * *
. =* .
r: .s .
..: k -r: .. . . . ,
- ..:,..: . ..-,-. -BACKGROUND VOICE: Did yo_u ask?. . " - - - .
2 .;- @: .. .:.,... .
- c. . - -
Y
.: .. :n .: . .y: - - . ... . .:%d:-M:. -{. : .r* . - . . . .
_ .l . .
- -N
- E . :I 5 -
~
VOICE:- - (MOSELEY) Hav,e you' pursued ,with th'em this question. .. .' ', " -
. :- ... u ......
~
.s
,IT.?. .. ~~. i.f(" - ~ (Transcript OE082-CH 3/211PD 'at 16) .. ..
- .+ g. ". .
- <- ~
C. . . ' Stello testified .d-: ring a' post-iccident hearing:
- .; ... .' '"throhghout the day, the clear impression was created that there' O .7'.'.-; . .
'was significant damage being caused to the core. The principal .
7.~J . " " -. reason - I am giving you a personal feeling - I cannot remember . m 7"'- whether the group truly felt this way or not". Stello continued,
, -- ,0 i "The reason for believing you had significant damage was the fact -
that we had a clear; indication that there was~ superheated steam coming out of 'the reactor vessel. The only. way you can, .in fact,
,. ~ ~ get superheated steam out of the vessel is to have the core uncov- -
E.. -7 . - ered. And the core, ,just from recollection, was uncovered for sub- . ac time throughout the day,' which left me with .
-stantial the clear impressio th'at significant damage had occurred in the periods oft'n
, ? i. . Y . '. Z.l: -s f y' core". (Oversight Hearings, Udall Committee on May 9, 1979, Serial ; " $E.C . No'.i 96-8, Part I 'at 4) Immediately after expressing his concern to the licensee (Hitz), Stello informed his Deputy Director, Darrell i; Eisenhut, who later relieved him at the Headquarters Incident
. Response Center and who was then in contact with Donald Roy, Bab-cock & Wilcox's Manager of-Engineering at Lynchburg, Virginia.
+ g . . 1 ( m---.--.- . ,,,-. -.,- - - ,,.. ,,- ...---- .- ..-.- .- - , ,r- ~,-,,#
u EISENIiUT: The guy we're talking to is Don Roy. STELLO: Don Roy. That's him. EISENHUT: That's who we're talking to in Denton's office. j
~
' . i STELLO: Yeah.' , . .
l Q'r(';.
., EISENHUT: ' They~ don't 'se,e anys'upei he'at on' it, but we' re foilow- f .
- . - ing'up with a cou , ..,
r A t-y . This' question 'A '
' ~ ~
mark thing -- we'ple re"asking of more them questions. right now.. -
-L;; . . . . . . . ;
-. . . ./. ..
... . . , . . m.
.= . . . . .
. -:: The other thing'we're' doing is Case called over - -
.. ~ .. { ' .* - '*
.?:. . . _
~
.: _ . . .;g 4 . . , i:';.g*-L. , .
y . ;. ...-..;... .
.'~. .STELLO:
What do you mean~he 'doesn't see any super h' eat? '-
. _..g.p >:-
.: . EISENHUT:. He 'says he's got a little bit different numbers. The
'. numbers they've been getting from their man are a little bit different than ours, and they don't run into the .
same problems. They've gotten the pressure and every- ; i . . ~ "..: ,1 . '
' ~ " thing out of the pressurizer, where the temperature. is .
jus.t a little bit different. ..'
..T.".r.T*Lf F' -
ng.~~~.C .
. . . . .l c . . :2.> ~,:a.w: ? ;' .-
^h 1.'- -' Darrell', 'l'et me give you the cori ect numbers. '
~
p,::g.. 'v.':. , . STELLO:
-f - EISENHUT:.. Okay.-' l - * '
' . . lv - .'
' .- STELLO: The pressurizer'is at saturation. That's a true state-ment. It's about 457' degrees Fahrenheit.
EISENHUT:.457 degrees Fahrenheit. - [ *.' , 0 STELLO: The pressure in the primary system is 450 pounds. The hot leg temperature is 550 degrees Fahrenheit. At one prior time it was pegged all the way up to 620 Fahren-heit. There ain't no way you .can get those conditions
, without super heat. .
e ~. EISENHUT: Wait a minute now. The pressurizer was at saturation, 457 degreeis Fahrenheit? i.~' k
, . ..,
- g*
.STELLO: Right. . . .'::.
L .. ~
.n
.. . , . : 9 .
EISENHUT: Primary system pressure 450 pounds? ,
. . . - - - . .. - 1.- . ' :
STELLD: Yes. i i
,,._,.,..-..,..-w._.. _,,,,.,.._,.._...,.~..~,..,7- , . , - - - .
3._,,,, _~--o ,.m . . _, . - _ _ , . - . . . , -
e e. -- .. T . . .- EISENHUT: Hot' leg temperature 550 F? - STELLO:. Yes. . ._ j EISENHUT: Do you~ know what the cold leg is?
.~ . '. .
STELLO: '200, 220. ; -
.. .. J . EISENHUT: Yiu g'ot'it mari: That's it. They've got a' problem. JJ.
Fjg. ."
- 35-1},{(,' @r't:9 5.ni!63:f-'s.s ??Q2;.p7.~
-[
.-d .-
~
-STELLO: Well the cold leg temperature is nonsense because that's
' A.
. ?G3 Mf ? where all the' water is coming in.
_ .&.. . !. , Q.h..
~
>. . . . : ; .,. : ., ,.:.c
-: EISENHUT:.- . 2._._. ,
I k. ' . . . g:
- v. - '
now.... ;g^-n ' .:...-
,W. Y ! jp - ' .11t9 - f.. ;},b . p'.1g .f: [A ..NF 11'% ,
-fp Z . STELLO: You re abov,e saturation, and the only way that's possible
. .. --l . . .. .
is sith super heat.e EISENHUT: Okay. - .: u i? ~;. .- s w' i.1 . STELLO:
.p: , .* y . . .- .-.D.
..si. . ;-l
. c.-.That's : . ....
just a'y facti .- ? ;n. - .
'.&:v. . ., . .'.EISENHUT: :0kifV ' ? ? h*;4 --) 3':: .
1[.:.,5! 2..
. == ;- ': ^ _ .
si . - ~ . - ... . . 9'STELLO: P.3.i.. .:... .:5
.; - , Now y'ou go up and'give .them the right numbers.
~
.. . . . . : =
.r" .
- ?: "J.'-t .
. EISENHUT: I. certainly will. " .7-A -; -:l .: e . iy.. .u.. . - ,. f . ' - ~, _ . - -
C'
~. ..
'. (Transcript 01-226-CH 6/24-LFR at 2-4)
. .. . After* talking with Eisenhut, Stello informed Commissioner Gil-
~
. insky of his concern about the superheated steam conditions and
.. the need for the licensee to get more water into the core to cover the fdel. (Transcript 01-226-CH 6/24-LFR at 6-10)
~
When Samuel Bryan of the Headquarters Office of Inspection and Enforcement followed up on Wilber's request to Hitz for incore
. data, Hitz said he' hhd not yet checked. A decision ensued with Brian asking Hitz if they can inject water into the hot legs and -
Hitz ' described the piping. arrangement which did not provide for L.- - t f W, finjection into the hot legs. Brain explained "But were concerned f,Ui.:.. :; . that the core ds' protected" (transcribed RI Tape 11). Walter Baunack,. D'~. ..
- ~^
RI, Reactor Operations In~spector, 'came to the unit to control room
', .. to assist Higgins and told Kermig at RI that they still had a i.
' bubble in the primary loop, that the hot' legs temperatures were almost meaningless and you can't have any faith in them. ' (Transcript Region I, T 4:45. p.m. Higgins reported on the progress in stabilizing the re-actor coolant system, f n _ ^
~... ~
HIGGINS: They do have a few pressurizer heaters now which they , didn't have earlier, they still are very limited, they don't have al.1 the pressurizer he&ters, by any means, they have some small amount and a while ago while I was in the control room they did get the level back
~
in the pressurizer they said they had it for about 1/2 hour or an hour, they were feeding makeup water in and
. lost it again, and by this time, they may havi it back 'N ' - - _ , .; W -* .,. ...
for now but they are' working with ,the heaters that they .. . g; / Cit:M'...c* ~-
- had and with the,-electromatic to re-establish the level ;- " -l1
' :. . ?. .:c' :. .. - -
[- i. - . - .a. 'in. .the pressurizerslllike
',* :. :-W : ..: -they .: had:- done . initial,1y. . .#! ; ~ .. ~~;d.2.p .
Z y.? -
- i. '. .
~(Transcript Region I Tape.12)'(Post-accident' review of instrument. '.'
charts show that this pressurizer level response occurred around
?... ' ':-
- 3:30. p.m3 :::h ' -- :d a 3.n:sW& '. :::r. '.. . ,- .'.
s- ;=@'.$;:3. -;i'5 ?.93F. : :
@; .w.; .-' ? %.3j.f.T' ' ' [g&.=: , . H 20:n
. s. - m. -
At about 6:00 p.m. , Higgins 3otified Regio'n I of the licensee's % decision to rep'r essurize the plant; a change in coolant stritegy.
~
HIGGINSi Don Haverkamp ' . okay - change of. strategy here appar-4 - ently Med-Ed and GPU or somebody on site is talking . .
- -* y "Y . . with the pe'ople here' - I'm.not sure - I think it was -
F.T YtJT.- .- - Jack Herbein - I told you b'efore that they had concerns - . (. i'.
. V.:: . . - .
'about whether or not the core was covered right? , 'n,; - - :C-g _ _: . % . ' . e . ':
. di.. ., ,
,=.. . ;: :- ..:.h ,.
i .:.- - HAVERKAMP: Right. . .- u- - - -
- s. .p ' % l f .i. .; ?:;
. r, .
~
15 HIGGINS: Okay, apparently I'm not sure what the scenario was P- - . for making making that decision for. change - but what-
. ever that is - thep are changing now - and they are
~- --
; continuing the cooldown, with the "A" steam generator -
C. ~' they feel that they are getting seine cooldown - they have Th on the "A" loop of 548; T of 446; av.d they i-feel tHat they're seeing a definiEe cooldown on that [, , .
-loop that are steaming the "A" steam generator. What
, they're doing now.is that have increased their make-l up to about 480 gpm - they're only letting down about L-- ~
40 - so they are fi] ling the pressurizer back up - they l.- .. are' letting pressure increase - they might take pressure . l" . .A.. up to about 2000 pounds - but the pressurizer goes solid p.
.(.r'.'.3
'and they want to try.and make sure by doing that that . -
W- they have all. bubbles' collapsed in the vessel, the loops,
...i.[i". -
%f..-. T.) .. '.'~..' 'whatever.- and they'are continuing in the meanwhile - 6- '
'?
.f M doing the steaming on the "A" steam generator. 'The
. ' thing here is to collapse all the bubbles - to make . .
sure the core'is covered - to make suie they don't have any air bubbles or. vapor pockets in there. t I n
u.. '
, - 2A -
HAVERKAMP:0kay. - .. HIGGINS: And they're' fillins up right now - they're -up to about 900 pounds .right now - heading for about 2000 the level
, . . 1 .. of the pressurizer is up to about 340 and it's going l up also. , (Transcript Region I, Tape 14) '
..gt. :y
', Higgins kept th,e Incident Response Centers informed of the 5*
.'e._ .e '
.NID.'?.i{tET..N, progress on the repressurization strategy. in a three way conver 'T".'.4-!; ..s 3.C'J:-@.~iN f, of NRC's' Pei formance Appraisal Team, at Hea~dquarters. Higgins-
- d-Sd.$.N.* ' '. responded at about 6~
- 30 p.m. to'Haverkamp's question about the incore. '
2 thermocouple. temperatures d_'.. .- . . .
;.'.~:_' ' .-ot &?W.:- -U5:.E. i' = '
- yl .\ : . ?.5,l .?-i:.l ' .l
~~ '
*~l
.l.Jer.t;&,p-i:. HIGGINS:. ' Is this still Don Havercamp, they a're,still proceeding.. .. :
" ~
l C.'. p g.-i N' .' . ? ,' , along the same lines, the primary pressure is up to about '
. 6.,.". . ' .;. .
. ^^ ' 800 -'1800 psi, okay? This is an indication that they
< ;. . " ' may 'not be getting too much natural circulation on the j - Fe q c. "A", loop ~.- Th hot is 570, they were able to get a read-c _3 -W .
~
.2 ing off one of the incore thermocouples, a lot of them failed and thep can't get readings on them but. they '
' C.: 9 M' f . P5 * i'.f4hlyp,9*M'.dT . did get one which also read 57Q,.,which leads us to believe ?R.:.Qpl.[T.EE.( that that T hot varies and the' loop is accurate,. the . ?. ~%;."-N? - lr.?.'.: . ' ' primary-the reason we do not think they're getting too .
- , - n.9 . ";fic. ."
~
much natural circulation b'ecause the Delta T has the Tc -
. .E F " 'll S"'J is all the way down to 220 again, and we can't feasibly' W' . be losing that much in the steam generator. (Transcript T-(i-?ftAkf ' .7.i
. +.
-?l7 .
, Region I, Tap.e 15, Sid.e 1) ,
..'c Higgins also noted that B&W employees in the control room .
1,. .~.';: . . . were vanitoring hot leg temperatures in the control room by observing
. . ' " 'T T .
. extended ran~ge temperature in' s truments on the back panel in the
.V+.. x.. .
control room.. .
./- .h
' "~
t . .c ' HIGGINS: Right. In the --(inaudible)-- loop, they still have'
. a bubble on the B loop hot leg and they are still up
'. in the range of 650 to 700. . Okay? --(inaudible)-- On the control panel it only goes as high as 620. That is
-4 . . -
- pegged high it has been pegged high. Periodically they .
'i ' 179:#. '. -
go back ind take thermocouple readings on the back panel.
' k. .:
ic.'. t i M P .
,, The B and W' people ~ are doing that and they ha e got around f flu)&:;. .
,.i. .. 700 to.750.from the~ thermocouple readings. (Transcript 7.SJ,'.yf.7*
l .
01-085-CH 3/21-DLE at' 7)' ,. Around 7:00 p.m. Higgins engaged in the following dialog with . Whitt, * ' HIGGINS: They're getting an indication of the vaporlock.in the "B" loop but it appears the "A" loop has been cleared
~
. of its vaporlock except that they are not getting a tremendous amount of natural circulation by looking at the temperature difference. .
C4--- .- 4-,, ,,.e. , . + . . -, ~,.-..,,,, -.., , w m , , ,, _,,,,.,m ,,,g~. -,-.,,,,,.,,,,,,--,y,m,, .,,,,n,,--.....,-w,, ..,,m,.g,ww --m% .y, - , , , ,
_ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . ~ . . . z.~.m.. .
.v 25 -
WHITT: Yeah, if it was solid, you should be getting that, shouldn't you? .
. HIGGINS: I would think so,' yes. ,
WHITT: From experience with other plants indicates that they should. - "J
. ..~..~~ - .
~'
- . ~
. .. :. .:.. .a. g HIGGINS: They 'sh.ould.* ye. , "%.c^ -
J'
- -. . rw : , , ; . . ; ;;,.-w . rc!.n.'.1-9fj .s'.#' 9?= ;c& ..~:
y...: .,- .- : .~
- .... -.. ... v. .
- ' - ..: a M; fM..:.y'"
WHITT:" Okay, so'that' indicates that maybe they still' have some '
.- '"4 : ~ . . . .; i. - :. , . . . . . . . . . . . .
sort of b l ockage/.Y4. :1e- " . . . .- -
. . v. - : . . . . . . - . . .. .
. ... - .: y.- -
, _ ' . ;g :. - . z:. ..,:~.. - .. .c. w. u . .=5 1.,. g :. v .
. .. .c.. HIGGINS: .Maybe so, this 'is a little bit of a unique arrangement f.,/,'f1i-k.x -
'here .with a once through steam generator, so. there's y .g.r.: . c :$.
not a lot'of this B&W design a lot of other plant ex-
' . .. .%.["- . .perience like we have on Westinghouse.
~
WHITT: We got experience with B&W just for your information, . they did go on natural circulation and cooldown and.
- ~.~-
'v.~
--Q :-lV F - . -L..- --::.+. ~;* :exceed 9 - the .'cooldown
.- g ;: ... ; :-
rate. :'-
~~:-
S. M .h:.[. [ -/AtyJ .": - HIGGINS:E dkay). A r.Lf '5'.'".. ' ' "
- 2. 3 ":' '
, . . ..; . . ..- ; h t .- -- . . ' .- ":;i::t % .-
;: . , .L: -
=--
- ~
- M-1- . ,
-: ^ -
-f j. ? - WHITT: . But'it cop' led do' wn very .fasti i.
q .- . , . m- . t =. - : . ; -.- . 'HIGGINS:. Where do yo'u hypoth'esizing that the gases are coming 1 59.:-. .- - .
- from in the other loop.
. .e.
_ WHITT:l TJ1e hypothesis is that maybe it's non-condensable gases.-
~ ....
HIGGGINS: Xenon or Krypton or that type of nitrogen or whatever, l I guess. :i."
.- . [, WHITT: Right.. .
~
WHITT: It could be oxygen, xenon, hydrogen...
. .s
! 'WHITT: Oh,I guess what we're concerned about is are they look-
.:. ;. -c ;.
,ing into =actually what they can do. - :
u ..
; .f . ,, . -, . .
HIGGINS: 1 Okay, let me get to f. hem with that and I'm going to ' M. .; % , "-
. -l .have somebody else get the phone. There's nobody here right now, I'.ll'sent somebody in. ~ .
~
WHITT: Okay. (Transcript Region I, Tape 15, Side 2) To initiate an adequate amount of coolant flow through the core, the licensee decided to run a reactor coolant pump. At 7:50 p.m. the 1A reactor coolant pump was placed into continuous _t
p ., ,. . u . 4 _+4.. , operation. James Gagliardo, a Performance Appraisal Team Reactor Inspector, contacted Baunack from the NRC Headquarters Incident--
' Response Center to obtain the incore temperatures. At about 00 -
p.m. .Baunack responded from the gnit 2 control room; ".. F611(g:)
-. . _. ] J .
is the hi. hest one I. know, 254 ( F) is the lowest one, so they're - 3 just reading at random, I don't think they're of any value at all..."-
' <-c.L
- c ~ (Transcript Region I, Tape 17,~. Side 1)
. .r
- ~ : .,..'... ' William Raymond', Region I Re's~ct'or Inspector and former. B&W J. :..,.
! 95$@ P - i. '
~
' ~ ;' ^- -
- [5-[wp.;,,,y h#~fr-M ~~ March 29, Raymond ' reportd 7.';."l"stad-up
-control roor for the~engineer;" night ' shift; AttooE e
about o've'r NRC' commun the plant' status to Wilber at the. . . . - . f? k i_C ~ .
.HeadquarterIncidgntRes'pon'seCr.nteras: reactogpressure1036 psi,. '. , ..Yh_2 E/< - I.I.:."A",T inlet 287.'4 F (T- Hot g), "incoreHead-3.m;g.y:/.E;-
s s..u.e r l"" pressurizer temperature 549 F; thermoc
.e quarters, questioned this'inco t temperature-and.Wilber requested -
T.Uf.. " . ~ ' ' that Raymond it.ake a map of the incore temperatures; which he did
~
NJ. W L'*{ ; . and dix B. th'e reported temperatures are shown in Figure Il-27A of,Appen- - Raymond noted that the temperatures varied from 207 F , $ cTes.
. to 617,F and that "Just off-hand, I don't seem to believe those.
4 865:.l - ~- high numbers..." He later. s' aid,' "I'd say~- okay, with one cool-P.WN.W " - ' ant pump running', the . 4@%.If00.y( n%fgj._
*hot ~ spots..."
- utionl(Tra'nscript, through there' y sh'ould have a fairly. equ
.Idon't)knowofany!reasonwehavethese Region I Tape 21, Side 1) The next -
- 57542.." -
morning Raymond informed -Headquarters that fourteen thermocouples s 12 W ? ~ were. inoperable. Further ' ' "
.: M .':.%.~ " : .u. i'. .;.
- M t. t.'::s., / n.-.;2;GsV'- *- -
#f . RAYMOND: I just wanted to~pa'ss on to you'that'Med-Ed has been' J-- ~. apprised of our observations on the incore trend - what
;~ -
they are doing is starting to trend selected high ones
; . ~_ - l ~: , .
; versus pressure so they can correlate any sensible trend W-- ^
out of it - in addition to that, they may select some
.,."fff of the higher ones and try to get some readings out
.- '*?- -
of it - the point of all that will be either discredit
~ % $-
~
or qualify the indications that' we'are getting from them. Okay. -
-k . ' .-
All right ^ great. ,(Transcript, Region J, Tape 26.)
^
r .O. .: .~ic
-3.
. ~ What was not Reported on March 28, 1979 . -
*'n*4f..-*.%h., . 9
.-:. :. ~ .
* ?> 2 .. . s -
- 2CQi.:; ; :.~ .,a... - - Background ;...V'.: *, n.7":ra.h.
a.: c 2 :qw. , -
.- l-i ~~ *?.'- . '. During ~ he several post accident' investigations it was t
learned that several licensee persongel knew of incore temp-
.erature~ readings which exceeded 2000 F. The evidence is that.this specific. information was not reported to the NRC on March 28. Therefore, a question was raised on whether the information was willfully withheld from the NRC in an attempt by licensee personnel to cover up the seriousness
- of the accident.
~ . 1. 1-- - . .- -.- R .. . ;...... _ _..-.. __...-.----,.-_-___ _.. _ _. . _ _ . _ _ _ . . - . . - _ . , . _ - _ _ . _ _ -
4
-e T . . .. ,
Several relevant interviews and testimony were examined to obtain an understanding of why the readings were taken, who knew of the readings, who and what were people told about
.l ~~.'-
the readings, and what did people believe the readings to mean at the time. These interviews were conducted by the d e." '.' . several TMI-2 accident investigation groups and they are listed ' in Appendix A.' Several persons were interviewed on this . R-f '. subject and some were reinterviewed several times.
- Inter '
"p . ..".-' '
views were conducted at various times beginning two weeks ; hNNMINS,Y 7 after' the acEident'and continuing' ov M. -
' The. peak interview period was in May.- --
f-5$$y;g;.- ' ' .7. . :*Dw' Whenexamining.tilessinterviewsi .'
=-- ' . ' '
M ;- e . Wl.k--l5 . . WM"i5N.5?505$0.5V ~ t is soon appare av_ . dif Ec.1.U. ' . there are problems]uch as: conflicts in statements between .' ,, .' '..
?.57_Ws;.?'fsJ:.7--d. .. T. <- .. .1ndivid.uals;
. inconsistencies with what we now know, incon- ' '
-M '; e/4 ' m -
sistencies' within a given' interview, and inconsistent state- .~'
%.E l_. ' . .
_ ments by an individual during different interviews. This
;..,2 was not unexpected considering: the nature of some inte'rviews,
- L. m-i.e. , the taking of unsworn statements which were requested .
~
and given in the context of a technical investigation to - - [yW. . - determine what happened during the accident; the complexity : *
-:D.e ' '9:
T-i;.r 2.W.'.': and length of the accident and its effects, on the people 're , ' sponding to bring the situation under control; and the state- j,, ,4 - W.E #:1.-'. . ments were taken at a relatively long' time after thef accident. :#:'i E . A.' _;% To obtain a reasonable resolution of substantive conflicts'._ . -l.~
;t[ f-
~ ' and inconsistencies as to what was known, said and understood, '
E-7,J .: . -
.,these matters were evaluated in the light of what we now know _ '
6;i:s. . . and the weight of the evidence.
- ' ~
v-
. e. 'Incore Thermocourle Readinos i?c
.4 , ..
~
C M *; - Shortly after Station Manager Gary Miller arrived in the
. Unit 2 control room at 7:05 a.m., he was informed of the re-
~ actor coolant system hog leg temperature indications which .
were then exceeding 700 F.- Probably around 7:15 a.m. Miller requested Ivan Porter, ' Unit 2 Instrument Control Engineer,
- to obtain incore thermocouple readings from the plant com-N
, puter read-outsslocated in the ccntrol room. (This time . f_ . ..
estimate is reasonable because the rapidly rising radiation
- .. .<. -s if. '
levels in the containment caused Miller to declare a general' .
- t N4 "- D " '~
' 'emergen'cy at 7:24 a.m'. His attention for the next several EsW;':. I'N
,G,. minutes were devoted to.his duties as the Emergency Director.' . "f,9 T.@ g. : ' .' '-' ' Also, the pErsoils lat'er taking additional thermocouple read-ings as a result of the computer data obtained, recall being f' ' told to obtain the necessary instruments around 7:45 a.m. - therefore, it is believeri that Miller probably requested , the data before declaring the general emergency). .The apparent basis for Miller's request was to assist in evaluating the meaning of the hot leg temperatures. Porter's first attempt g
r .y - .a I
~ %',i -
25 - et, v . to obtain quantitative incore temperature data was unsuccess-ful. The computer printed out " question marks" indicating
~ that the valves w'ere out of the range of the computer pro-gram. ~ When informed of the. question mark outputs, Miller -
asked Porter.if there was any other way.to obtain the read-ings. . Porter acknowledged that he could take the readings at the computer input terminals located in a . cabinet in a
' ' ~ ' -
. room directly below the control room. Porter then proceeded..
5
.$'@L..V'lW to iso get~ nassistan'ce.
Beiinetti NuclearVDouglas MaintenanceWeaver., UnitGilbert;~ 2 Instrum
~ . - - -
fM...; 6 ,77 . M..Ne' Foreman; Robert :. . af, .. . ,
.-C . ;.g.s. .f.7
- Foreman, Thomas Wright,' Unit 2 Nuclear. Instrument Man, .and Y '
; .g. - '
"2 '- -
.Roy Yeager obtained the necessary . equipment and took the. - ~~ ~-. -
.T..~. 2 ' . .--ll' .,- readings. Two sets of. readings were taken. The first set O.~.t._-fd..cJ..'._. ; . . R;-of 4 or 5 readings were taken with.a instrument called a .
$..l.i..,;... .
. . 2 ; t i,.f'i. V 2' '- '.. .-.'. ., Fluke digital thermocouple' meter.
Thisinstrumentmeasures,.{
" millivolts and converts the valde to temperature equivalents S; ' ~
- . . :.. . and displays the temperature. In using this instrument the
'.. people disconnected the lead wires from the terminal blocks, '
" connected the wires to the instrument and after the reading
.S- was obtained, the lead wires were then removed and reconnected
. to the terminal blocks.
-?_ '. ' .h . Some 4 to 5 incore thermocouple readings 0'L.".
' i. .j.n .q.C were taken in this mann'er and althiiugh the recollections of the p %-.jd% - '
' people'involdedf, varied, theie was basic agreement than some' "
F;;p. .:A , .- ..
~
temperatures wereflow and at least one thermocouple indicatgd-5. . :-h . in excess of 2000 F (the testimong: ranges.from 2000 to 2500 F . . for the high reading and 0 to 700 F for the lowest readings). dir.- ~74' '- : According to Porter, he left when the instrument was being -
- f. . - -sh - set up and upon his' return he was informed of the temperatures.
7 . "i ' Porter then proceeded to the control room to inform Miller of
. the results. Miller recalls that he and Porter discussed
. 4;. ' -.
- the readings briefly and Porter did not believe the readings were reliable. Miller accepted Porters evaluation and t -
I~~ ~
' : t. ' -Miller and Porter say they devoted little or no further Attention to the temperatures.
.. ~
t 1 e. .
~
[, . * '
,'~
,- . ;.[ ,,.,
2 .-
~
~
.y '.; : .
s_ -'
;;. . .., . . . .* ,. y. ., ... - :.. . . - ~ .. .
,e * . l . l
- - , , - . , , - - - - , - - - . - _ . , ,-- -- -- . --- ,n-, . . - , , . - , , , - - - ,- ,.- - ,., n . - , - ,.-- -
; ; 2 .; _#.s_.-. . . .. c .. a ~ m - . . ._ w_, - -.~c~. a._ _ .-- a . a , . m . / ;-- w _..u . a~
., .x. ~
EXIIIBIT 5
- i- REPORTABILITY OF A PREDICTED OFFSITE EXPOSURE RATE
.. At about 0740 on March 28, 1979, the licensee attempted to report to NRC Region I the General Emergency invoiving known major fuel damage.. M During telephone contacts with Region I personnel, which began at about 0750, the licensee did not ratify Region I of an offsite release cal-culation which predicted significant exposure rates downwind toward Goldsboro. ! The reportability of that prediction is the object of this investigation.
- Except for minor time variances, matters bearing on the reportability of the offsite exposure rate prediction have been described rather consist ' -
~
ently by THI-2 accident participants and investigators.
~ . .
Prediction -10(407) R/hr in Goldsboro Upon arriving at the plant in time to hear a Site Emergency announced at -
'0655 'Howard Crawford, a nuclear engineer, proceeded to the Unit 2 con-
. - trol room. Upon arrival, he gathered materials to be used in predicting release rates, a task he had performed during drills for two years. N
-Crawford recalls that his first calculation, completed soon after 0700, showed an exposure rate of 40 R/hr in Goldsboro. Neither the time nor o
the result of this calculation has been substantiated by records or the recollection of others.N However, that early prediction, if it occurred, is not pertinent to this investigation, since a similar, documented 1 J e + v ----,,~++,~,,,e,--,,rw,,,,-,.,,, w w.m, --,,-,,r-v -,,n.e-,,-,,-,+-~_,,-w,,, ,,,,--~-,-w,., ,,e-neww_,-,,mmw,-n,,-o,,e,w ,,--a,.,,,~
. , -_-__ - - - ~ . ~. ._ +.... -.. ..-_...a...~. -.. w :. .. 1. _ .. =
.- c,. . :-
,.( -'
- j. *
~
prediction (10 R/hr at the-Low Population' Zone boundary) was performed before the licensee reached NRC Region I by telephone at about 0750. i ~ - This prediction (10R/hr at the LPZ) appears to have been performed by
~
. Crawford during or after the massive release of radioactivity to the reactor building atmosphere,-which began at 0713.Ek Both the time and magnitude of Crawford's dome monitor (HP-R-214) reaoing (300 R/hr) are uncertain. Accurate or not, the 300 X/hr reading formed the basis for
.the LPZ calculation. The time shown on the calculation sheet, 0744, could indicate when HP-R-214 was read or when the calculation was per-formed. Therefore, Mr. Crawford's prediction of 10 R/hr at the LPZ seems to have occurred between 0713 and 0744.
l -- Crawford recalls discussing a 40 R/hr prediction with Richard Dubiel, Superirisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry, and with James Seelinger, Unit 1 Superintendent.0III Dubiel and Seelinger recall such discussions, I only concerning the 10R/hr prediction.1/1/ 0/11/ Again, this distinction is unimportant. During the 6/6/79 interview,1/ Crawford stated: l They both thought it appeared too high and they immediately talked, you know, possible steam damage to the dome monitor...they wanted to get a very good feel to see if they wanted to believe that number.... l On 5/22/79, Dubiel stateJ:EI L
.. -._-~._.-..._.--o.,_--_..
-. .- . . ~ . . - - . . . . . ... . . . - . . .. = = w.:.:. : -. .=. x .: :: u_= , - ..u a -
i- *
.. r.
...I don't think we ever had projections that were meaningful and I don't believe at that time we 'had any projections that indi- l cated anything of a serious nature, even based on the procedures.
This statement appears.to have been based on two factors - disbelief of the dome monitor reading and knowledge of low pressure in the reactor building - as indicated in the following exchange.10/ Q Do you recall doing an off-site dose calculation at , approximately 7:10 on the morning of March 28th? 1 Dubiel I did not do any off-site dose calculations. Q Do you recall verifying one? Dubiel I recall verifying one. I recall looking at several during the morning. Q 'An specifically, do you recall one that was made by Mr. Crawford based on a reading of the dome monitor? l Dubiel Yes, sir, I do. L Q Do you remember verifying that one? t Dubiel Yes, I do.
. ..o._- ._ .__ . _. .. _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ ~ . . _ . _ . .
_ _ . . . . , m.___ _ _ _ _ . . m . . . . . m.--._.._.-- -
---- _ ._. z . . _.. .._.2. w./_ a . -- ~ .. .
Q Am I. correct that Mr. Crawford's calculation was incorrect?- l z.- . Dubiel, No, I think Mr. Crawford's calculation was correct.
-)
., Q Was it based on an incorre,ct' reading of the monitor?
t Dubiel -No,.I don't believe so. Q What was the calculation of the off-site dose he came up with? Dubiel 'Approximately 10 R per hour gamma at a location which was the center of the town of Goldsboro, which is on the west shore of the Susquehanna. . Q. And your understanding is that, based upon the information that he had, he correctly calculated a projected dose of 10 R per hour? y Dubiel s Yes.
- l.
- l Q Can you explain how Mr. Crawford could have made an ac-curata calculation of 10 R per hour as the expected level in Goldsboro when in fact.there were no detectable levels?
.s Dubiel I think that the single biggest factor in that particular r
4-
.W
- item is that the done' monitor did not respond accurately.
The projected levels are based on the dome monitor read- ~ ings, plus some very conservative assumptions. Since we-are'trying to do, in defining the procedure for dose
. projections, there are a lot of paramet'ers which cannot be determined, so that conservative assumptions are made.
. And, I feel, first of all, that the dome monitor over-responded significantly.
I feel, secondly, that the building pressure of one or two pounds versus the conservative assumption of 55 pounds would add to it.
.On 5/11/79, Gary Miller, TMI Station Manager, testified before the U. S.
. . House of Representatives, Committee on' Interior and Insular Affairs:1EI Weaver: What did you think of that? The high reading on that
-dome monitor?~
Miller: I just did not think about it in terms of fuel damage. I knew that it meant there was a potential to release things offsite. My only concern was to get readings. Cheney: Did you have any question about the values of those readings?
NM _. .. > - .~ . ,6 6^.* s L. i -- ---,~&~~s.- .s"----*n~-~A~~-~~-aA-+~~ J L-"- A ~~~- A Miller: I thought it was too high, but I did not need to be con- : l vinced that it was high enough to be concerned. It was l readong 40,000 or 50,000. I mean that was beyond what.I had ever envisioned ever seeing on the dome monitor, s'o
, you can discuss whether ther~e was shielding and moisture I ~
and whether it was beta radiation, and all that sort of 4 thing. But I did not need to be convinced. What I really wanted was somebody out there with a meter and an iodine kit sampling, and the wind direction. That is real numbers. That is really what.someone is going to get out there. e So that was our concern. Onsite and Offsite Monitorina Mr.' Miller's statement reflects a common concern for getting radiation . measurements onsite and offsite to supplement the Crawford prediction.
~
UpondeclarationofaSiIteEmergencyat0655,effortstoorganizeand dispatch onsite and offsite monitoring teams began. 8/13/ This seems to have occurred rather clumsily; nevertheless, an onsite team (Alpha) was instructed at about 0730 to measure the radiation level west of the Unit 2' reactor building. $$/AEI uring
- D that survey, the wind was westward and very light with minute-to-minute variations of about 10 to 30 degrees.
This survey was appropriate, but tardy. At 0746, Alpha Team reported less than 1 mR/hr at Station GE-8 west of the Unit 2 reactor building. As discussed later, this measurement became the basis for discounting Crewford's prediction (s) of high exposure rates offsite. 6-
.-.. .-,. ~ = . - ~ . .-._
.;. a. . - ..~ . a . .
. .=:. .
...- ... . . . ~ , . - . .
l
*~
At about 0800 and 0830, respectively, Charlie and Bravo Teams were dis- _ patched by vehicle to Goldsboro. 'At a' bout 0830, Charlie Team reported. 4 less than 1 mR/hr in Goldsboro. Bravo Team reported similarly at about
.0940. Given that there had been no significant release from the reactor
, building, these surveys seem Adequate from the exposure rate measurement standpoint. . However, had a major release oc' curred, these surveys would have been too little, too late.
TMI management appears to have realized the need for a quick measurement in Goldsboro to confirm or deny Crawford's predictions (s). In statements following the accident, Miller and Dubiel maintained that a State Police helicopter had flown a survey team to Goldsboro soon after the General Emergency was declared. To the U. S. House of Representatives., Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Miller stated:lll - l At approximately 0730 or a little before, I had received predictions of an offsite dose of 10 R at Goldsboro. This was based on the L Reactor Building done monitor, which was still increasing and from our past experience with this source calculation, we did feel these were really this high, but as a precaution, I dispatched a State Police helicopter with an offsite team along with an offsite team in a car and separately, to the West Shore (Goldsboro). I 0740 - York Haven radiation monitor reading (0) - helicopter (approx.) at TMI - dispatched offsite teams in helicopter and one _. . . ~ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ .___ _ _ _
c,. separately in' car to West Shore (from G. P. Miller and
^
; R.-W. Dubiel recall of the incident). -
' '0800 Offsite team in Helicopter at West Shore (Goldsboro)
, (approx.)- 'O' reading - we actually.we're ahead of the plume -
plus onsite team at our West site boundary '0' reading. To the-NRC Special Inquiry Group, Miller stated:b e Q In fact, you or'someone called the State Pol ~ ice that morning for a helicopter and you got one very fast, '. 'didn't you?
- Miller There may be---subsequently I know there'.s some dispari-ties in my time versus the time the thing landed here or the time it's documented. I remember'as soon as I had the projection, which was high, for Goldsboro and knowing the west---knowing the wind was blowing to the west and knowing that it was seven or eight in the morning, that I know that I asked for a helicopter before seven thirty.
I knew that that was in my mind and knew that I had the York Haven monitor out over there and I knew I had a guy on the West Shore. That's something that I had practiced and thought about it. Even in the Unit 2 hearings when we' discussed the wind blowing west, slow as it was. u .; . =:=. u.= .u.. = w . = -..... =..-.-. .=. - .-.- ., . : w r u .a..... . ::
~ -
~
. . . . w .
,( .Q Do you know whether the helicopter actually came on the
' site and picked up somebody to go over the river?
Miller To my knowledge it'was verified to me that they picked'up one or two of'our people and they were' flown over there. And readings were back, and'as I remember the readings were back before Dubiel had thought the plume had gotten there. In other words, we had gotten over there faster i than the radiation would have at the wind speed, which was very slow. On 4/24/79, Dubiel stated:N At-some point around 7:30, Gary Hiller asked me for the status of
. the offsite teams, and I gave him the information that we had two teams ready to go offsite both available for transportation over to the West Shore. Gary directed me to make contact with the State Police and get a State Police helicopter to get one crew over there in a more t'imely fashion. He was concerned about the traffic--the early morning rush hour traffic trying to go up over the bridge in Harrisburg and then back down and that it might take an hour or more to get over there. He requested that we send one team in a heli- ,
copter and a second team in a car of driving over at a normal pace to back them up. I do not recall exactly who told me that they would get the State Police helicopter. I believe it wa's George Kunder, I do-not remember exactly, but within minutes I had it confirmed to a
. - -.. . - -. - . ..... .,. -,......a . . . .. . ., 1 .
me that the State Police had been notified, and a helicopter would be on its way since they are stationed up at Harrisburg, Harrisburg
. . Interna,tional Airport. It would be here in a matter of minutes, and i'
that security was notified that this helicopter was coming and would be landing somewhere in the vicinity.of the north parking lot, and that they were to-allow it to land and make preparations to support
, its landing in ge.tting our technician on board.
- - ...the timing may be poor but I an estimating 7:40 we had a man in the helicopter and sometime by two to three maybe five minutes later the man was in Goldsboro.
By 9/21/79, Dubiel's position regarding the helicopter survey had changed.1SI Q Did you have any role in ordering a Pennsylvania Etate -- or requesting a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter to
. come to TMI and take a team to Goldsboro to verify what L you thought and hoped was the fact, which is that it did not have a 10 R per hour reading there?
t V Dubiel Yes, I was involved in the determination for the need of a helicopter. I did not make the specific request. Q Do you know who did? Dubiel George Kunder made the request via the site protection j officer. It might have been a sergeant, someone in the i security force. b.
- .j
-C Q Did the helicopter arrive?
-l
+ Dubiel .The helicopter came in. I don't recall a time. I believe 4 + it was an hour later. ' t Q To your knowledge, did a' team go in the helicopter to r Goldsboro and take a measurement? Dubiel I thought one did. I have been led to believe -- when we determined the need for the helicopter, we simultaneously sent a team in a car to drive around. But recognizing the time' it takes to get there, we requested a helicopter. Which team got there first I don't know. I know the I helicopter was available, because I subsequently used it for other things. l l The fact seems to be that TMI management, being concerned about potential exposure rates in Goldsboro, did order a helicopter after declaring.a l General Emergency at 0724.,11I However, the helicopter did not arrive l i: o until 0835, by which time Charlie Team had reported in from Goldsboro and Bravo Team had left by truck for Goldsboro. The helicopter was not used l- to transport a survey team to Goldsboro.
- By 0830, when Charlie Team reported less than 1 mR/hr from Goldsboro, it was clear that a major offsite release from the reactor building had not occurred. But little comfort should have been derived from that knowledge while the reactor building contained an inventory of perhaps 300 million i curies of noble gases and other radionuclides.29/
c Reportability and Reportina
'The situatio,n was intuitively reportable to NRC under 10 CFR 20.403, whien requires immediate notification "...of any incident involving
, byproduct... material. . .which may have cau' sed or threatens to cause. ..
release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table II...." Since there was no reason to believe that the dome monitor (HP-R-214) increase was transient, the "immediately reportable" concentration of Xe-133 would have been 1.5E-3 pCi/ml (i.e. , 5000 x *3E-7 7Ci/al). Using
' a source. term of 1325 Ci/sec and a X/Q of 2.5E-4 seconds per cubic meter, at about 0744 Crawford used Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.4, Rev. 3, dated'2/15/78 to calculate a co.ncentration~of 0.33 pCi/ml at the LPZ, 220-times this "immediately reportable" concentration. Using the same pro-cedure,.the minimum concentration immediately reportable under 10 CFR 20.403 (1.5E-3 pCi/al) can be found to correspond to an HP-R-214 reading i
i of only 1.4 R/hr. Early in the accident, the licensee logically could have challenged the l Procedure 1670.4 calculation on the basis of low re' actor building pres-sure. But as the reactor building radioactivity inventory increased, I as measured by HP-R-214, the licensee should have become progressively less concerned about the conservatism of the calculation and more con-I carned about the magnitude of the potential hazard.
. . _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . - . - _ . _ . . ~
- /
4 i Telephone contact between the Unit 2 control room and NRC Region I was established, after appropriate efforts by the licensee, at about 0750.b/
~
Although earlier contacts had been made with the Region I answering ser-vice, this was the-licensee's first good opportunity to report the acci- ~ dent in accordance with 10 CFR 20.403. However, the 0744 prediction of 10 R/hr was not reported, apparently because the first onsite measurement at point GE-8 west of Unit _2 (1 mR/hr at 0746) had been used to calculate a new source term at 0750. Although this one onsite measurement did not prove that the release was insignificant, the licensee could have concluded justifiably that the release was not as bad as talculated. The reportability of the situation remained, however, in that: (1) the incident still threatened to cause a
- major release and (2) offsite field measurements had not been completed.
The licensee reported Crawford's 10 R/hr prediction to the Bureau of Radiation Protection but not to NRC. The only identified NRC reference to a high radiation level outside the plant was the following telephone conversation recorded after 10:00 a.m. on 3/28/79, in the NRC Operations Center. - VOICE: The indications are that low levels are being released, we will find out. VOICE: What is your MDC7
. VOICE: There is no question that there was - ,
i j . : .1 ,
1 q . VOICE: There was?
. VOICE: ,
--released when the incident first occurred.
, . VOICE: Yeah, I heard somebody, I ,gue'ss on the' radio, I think it was from the Bureau, saying that there were 10 R per hour out the cooling tower. ,
t VOICE: No. VOICE: Was that emergency services? VOICE: I don't know who said that. 3 VOICE: It was somebody from the State of Pennsylvania being inter-e viewed, that's what.
- It is unlikely that the licensee inadvertently omitted the 10 R/hr pre-diction when describing the accident to Region I after 0750. Clearly, from the Crawford and Dubiel statements, the licensee wanted not to believe the dome monitor and Crawford's calculation.
i
' The licensee not only faiied to report the 10 R/hr prediction to Region i I, but also, according to the following statement of Thomas Gerusky, i s t
Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, countered the report to BRP with nonexistent Goldsboro survey results.21/ \ 14 -
- - -p A ---.--vny _, 9+rp ,-n+--,,9 y gp..-,y_.ww,gg m .g.9y,..mg ww.,, g.9, p9y,w.,,,,.yp999 99 , w,%ygwe-wey,wy,_,,ywww.g .-
,.,ggp.-7-.--y-wpyg, g.,e
~ ._ ._._ ._ q 2g..z:a..g. j a . .u ... ._ .. 2.;:._;g;(4 L;d _. ?, : .; . ,_. ~ ' .-
} ; _ _. e
~~ j a "
3, .; ;a r ~
,7 g 4g' . ,w ; -
.w *) tr-, s
, e ' '~- ',
g .
' l' In the m'eantime, I requested them to try to get th51r tetys somehow
, 'to*Goldsboro, and'th'ey'said that the State Police helicopter was '
. . .n a ,
there and that they would get one of their teams up in the air and s
.e ! over Goldsboro. Se stayed on the phone'with them. They found no' i
. ~ .
,, _ x radiation-levels onsite or in Goldsboro that would in'dicate any kind y
of a..lcak. So therefore, we then notified the Civil Defense to bold
, 4
. 1 0 y- '
tight: This was all before 8:00. -' 1, + e . . i s
, .q The desire.to disprove the 10 R/hr prediction, which.dould haN. triggered massive evacuations, is understood, se of the first ossite, downwind
~
measurement to part!. ally achieve such disproof als'o is understood. The useofnonexistentoffsitesurvhyresultstofurtherdisprovethepre-
~ diction is not understood.
. Conclusion - -
o Nothing discovered.in this investigation relieved the licensee of the l requirement to report to NRC all pertinent facts concerning the accident. The 10 R/hr prediction seems not to have been adequately disproved by l .0750, when~ telephone contact was established with Region I. The' decision not to report the 10 R/hr prediction was improper. Bhnotreportingto l Region I at about 0750 on 3/28/79 that the calculational method described in Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.4 had predicted a reportable re-l: lease of radioactive material", the licensee violated the reporting re- ,. quirement of 10 CFR 20.403(a)(2). - l 1-l - l l
- a. .. . . . .:. w. . ~,.-:-- '
a.. :..=.- . . , . - . . a. ~a. w . u - ~ ~ ~ L :: Li
+. . . . .
3 References 4
.I. NUREG 0600, ,
.. . 2. Ibid. -
- 3. Crawford Interview IE 48, 5/3/79 /*
- 4. NRC Special Inquiry Group, Volume II, Part 3
' 5. Ibid. >
t
- 6. Crawford Interview IE 48, 5/3/79
- 7. Crawford Interview IE 174,6/6/79
- 8. Dubiel Interview IE 20, 4/24/79
- 9. Dubiel Interview IE 133, 5/22/79' t
-10. Dubiel Deposition (SIG), 9/21/79
~11. Seelinger Interview IE 77,5/8/79
- 12. 0versight Hearings, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, May 9, 10, 11, and 15. 1979, Serial No. 96-8, Part I
- 13. Egenrieder Interview IE 82,5/8/79
_ 14. Ethridge InterviewIE 89, 5/9/79
- 15. Burkholder Interview IE 99,5/17/79 i
- 16. I,each Interview IE 47,5/3/79
- 17. Oversight Hearings, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, l May 21 and 24, 1979, Serial No. 96-8, Part II
- 18. Miller Deposition (SIG), 9/20/79
- 19. Warren Interview IE 70,5/7/79
- 20. Report of the President's Conunission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Technical Staff Analysis Report on Alternative Event Sequences,
~ Appendix E, Fission Product Inventory Within the Containment.
- 21. Gerusky Interview IE 46,5/3/79 i
. - - _ _ ~ ~ ~ - .
e _.u , , _
--..-~ -- -
[ * *p. *- .
, EXHIBIT 6L -
C *
/T '
'V
. .REPORTMILITY OF A PREDICTED a OFISITE EXPOSURE RATE .-
At about.0740 on March 28, 2973, the licensee attempted to report to NRC ~
- Region I the General Emerge:ncy involving known major. fuel damage.1/ ' ' '
During telephone contacts with Region I personnel, which began at about . 0750, the licensee did not motify Region I of an offsite release cal- - culation which predicted significant exposure rates downwind toward . 1 Goldsboro.2I The reportability of that prediction is. the object of this investigation. ' E'xcept for minor time variamces, matters bearing on the reportability of the offsite exposure rate p::ediction have been described rather consist - ' ently by TMI-2 accident partic pants and investigators. . R. Prediction '10C@'ft R/br in Go:dsboro w _ Upon arriving at the ~ plant b :ime to hear a Site Emergency announced at . 0655, Howard Crawford, a nut.lezr engineer, proceeded to the Unit 2 con-- Aa-Rz,~ : f trol roomy g;.. ;refvat h xw.p%ke gtthered.r-2 materials -t 'M - w.predictingu
' in
% %M -
menesee rates 4 a task he had performe[during drills for two years.,,, . Cr'awford recalls that :his ff_:s: calculation, completed soon after '0700, y -/@Q of-Ass da:' an exposure rate of sD I/hr in Goldsboro. Neither the time g n6r - Ye the su - a of this calcula'tirn has been substantiated
- by records .or he g g er s y 1 - =Aw- c, - . %42Eib K _ -
recollection of others.- --v. i.~.
"" ly pr:34etiondf-40-occurred, n- n
. _ _ :q v a N h -
- - /since a similar, documented
- W .:t p um.c. ;. v : ' - #'
N mm%w4+m m ,.stz ,, & n .5%f & W W,a. . W y._,.---.,,---,seunme- ' - + ' ^ " " * * ' * * ' ' ' * * * " " ' " ~ " "
A. ,/ predictio'n (10 R/hr at. the I,ow Population Zone boundary) was performed
~
before the: licensee reached NRC Region I by telephone at about 0750.72a_ m
~
$ f u ,.l.a. W w W /0 R / % jan'OYn wf4'fa &
==2.==
9 T is prediction g (10R/hr at the LPZ) *
- appears to have been performed by ' ,
Crawforn dt07/3 % T2e g h;1us,,f. :fte- he massi e @ release of radioactiv to the # reactor building atmosphere. 1 1t___ E1 Both the time
,m%leR/h.pmAWw&and s
magnitude of Crawford's dome' monitor (HP-R-214) reading (300 R/hr)g are uncertain. # = = -er ::t, tk-300 "./h; reedlus fu med the-basi % - n QW r= i ca . w r. The time shown on the calculation sheet, 0744,, f "_ s op I HP-R-214 was read or when the calculation was per- + formed. '"c.;r%n efer.g , Mr. Crawford's prediction' of 10 R/hr at the LPZ seems to have occurred between 0713 and 0744. Crawford, recalls discussing a 40 R/hr prediction with Richard Dubiel, Supervisor of Radiation Protection and 'hemistry, C and with James Seelinger,
~
Unit 1 Superintendent.N1! Dubiel and Seelinger recall ein discussions [ ~ only concerning'the 10R 8/9/10/11/ A'*- m e- x -- 1/0R/LM(CR/A /hr prediction.
% this N distinction gis unimportant h ,A 6.4. _ c - ] -
ec-During tete 6/6/79 interview,1I Crawford stated: They both thought it appe red too high and they immediately talked, you know, possible steam damage to the dome monitor...they wanted.to ' get a very good feel to see if they wanted to believe that number.... j On 5/22/79, Dubiel stated:9/
~ - - - - --
. _ __ . _ - s .. _._ . . _ _ -. . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _
~..-
. . . V .
I don't think we ever had projections that were meaningful and
~
I don't believe at that time we had any projections .that indi- . cated anything of a serious nature, even based on the' procedures. < ' This statement appears to have been based on two factors- disbelief of
~ '
the dome. monitor reading and knowledge of low pressure in the reactor
- oN *I buildius - as indicated in the followin/11/79'ew g exchangeg- tof -
Q Do you recall doing an off-site dose calculation.at' , approximately 7:10 on the morning of March 28th? '
- 3, .
Dubiel I did not do any off-site dose calculations. 4
.Q ' Do you recall verifying one?'
Dubiel I recall verifying'one. I recall looking at several during the morning. - g * [ Q Anspecifically,doyourecaklonethatwasmadeby Mr. Crawford based'on a rea. ding of the dome monitor? l l Dubiel Yes, sir, I do. Q Do you remember verifying that one? , l i l Dubiel Yes, I do. , l 1 3- -
,,<.y-- vy*+y g- ,.2r-+-*--,%.--w.m-.-w,w,-, ,,e w oe,m-, av.w.,- . . . + - , - . . , - . .
...- c. ' .
item is that the dome monitor did not respond accurately. ,
~
The projected levels are based on the dome monitor read- ' ings, plus some very conservative' assumptions. Since we
., are .trying-to do, in defining the procedure for dose-projections, there'are a lot of parameters which cannot be dete mined, so that conservative assumptions are made.
And, I feel, first of all, that the dome monitor over-responded significantly. I feel, secondly, that the building pressure of one or ~ two pounds versus the conservative assumption of 55 pounds would add to it.
. f S h tMr5/11/79,GaryMiller,TMIStationManager,Q testifie,d before the U.'S.
Nous,e of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:W Weaver: What did you think of that? The high reading oa that~ - dome monitor? . Miller: I just did not think about it in terms of fuel damage. I knew that it meanc there was a potential to release things offsite. My only concern was to get readings. Cheney: Did you have any question about the values of those readings? 5-
,+c ,-me,-w_w.. -.,e
. , m---,.,,..w... ,7-y-,-ce%-m-,-w,,,-_,-- .7.w,--er-----_y-.%nwr,,,-,ye.m -,y,--m.,-----,,,- w - , y w w-w ,wn - .-w.-+--,-,wy,
. 4 31
, Miller:- tI thought it-was too high, but I did not need to be con- ~
vinced t' hat'it was high enough to be concerned. ~It was 2 at;40,000 or 50,000. I mean that was beyond what-I.
. had ever' envisioned ever seeing on the dome monitor,.so.
. you can discuss whether there was shielding and moisture and whether it was beta radiation, and all that sort of thing.
4 , But I did not need to be convinced. What I really wan~ted . was somebo'dy out there with a meter.and an iodine kit i sampling, and the wind direction. That is real numbers. That is really what someone is -going to get out there. - 9 So that was our concern. Onsite and Offsite Monitoring # 9 Hr. Miller's statement reflects a common concern for getting radiation . measurementsonsiteandoffsitetosupplementtheCrawfordprediction66).- ( - Upon declaration of a Site Emergency at 0655, efforts to. organize and' -
. dispatch onsite and.offsite' monitoring teams began. 8_/p/ This seems to
- have occurred rather clumsily; nevertheless, an onsite team (Alpha) was in'structed at about 0730 to measure the radiation level west o'f the Unit i
2 reactor building. N IE I During that survey, the wind was westward and l 4 very light with minute-to-minute variations of about 10 to 30 degrees. This survey was appropriate, but tardy. At 0746, Alpha Team reported less than 1 mR/hr at Station GE-8 west of the Unit 2 reactor building. - As discussed later, this measurement became the basis for discounting
- a. .
Cr/wford's prediction (s) of high exposure rates offsite. 6-w - , ,- --w,.- - * . - =. g--....y--,, ----.+.,-----,---,r,w,..,..,.,, .
- . - - - - .- - . - . . = . a: = :==
.. ::c S
'n-
*- ~
, . At about 0800 and 0830, respectively, Charlie and Bravo Teams were dis pktched by vehicle to~Goldsboro. At about 0830, Charlie Team reporteA
,less than 1 mR/hr.in Goldsboro. Bravo Team reported similarly at about-5940. Giv'ne that there had been no.significant release from the reactor building, these surveys seem adeqsate-from the exposure rate measurement' standpoint. ~ However, had a inajor release _ occurred, these surveys. would a have been too little, too. late.
TMI management appears to have realized the need'for a quick measurement 3 s'y in Goldsboro to confirm or deny Crawford's predictions (s). 'In statements' following the accident, Miller and Dubiel maintained that a State Police
. helicopter had flown a survey team to Goldsboro soon after the General '
Emergency was declared.1 *
~
To the D. S. House -of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular V. , ( Affairs 1 er sta ed: b . W f ' j', ,
'At approximately 0730 or a little before, I had received predictions of'an offsite dose of 10'R at Goldsboro. This was based on the Reactor Building dome monitor, which wa's still increasing and from.
our past experience with this source calculation, we did feel these were really this high, but as a precaution, I dispatched a State Police helicopter with an offsite team along with an offsite team in a car and separately, to the West Shore (Goldsboro). 0740 - York Haven radiation monitor reading (0) - helicopter (approx.) at TMI - dispatched offsite teams in helicopter and one 1 .
- w .a . , ~ - - . _ , - - , . ~ . - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - ~~ ~~" "~~ ~
. 7. . .
M. '
~
separately in c'ra to West Shore (from G. P. Miller and . R. W. Dubiel recall of the incident). . 0800 .- Offsite team'in Helicopter at" West Shore (Goldsboro) ' , l
.(approx. ) 'O' reading - we actually were ahead'of the plume -
plus onsite team at our West site boundary '0'. reading. l
' $&b ow Wu/799 2 the NRC Special Inquiry Group , Miller stated:3g, Q In fact, you or someone called the State Police that f
morning for a helicopter and you got one very fast, didn't you? Miller There may be---subsequently I know there's some dispari , ties in my time versus the time the thing landed here or the time it's documented. I remember as soon as I had the projection, which w'as high, for Goldsboro and knowing
.the west---knowing the wind was blowing to the west and knowing that it was'seven or eight in the morning, that I know that I asked for a helicopter before s.even thirty. -
l Ik tha that was/in my mind'and knew that I had the V L ork / en monitor out ov:e there an I knew had a y on the Wes ore. at's someth g tha had r eticed
.!andtho/ ught about it. Even/ntheUn i 2 hea ngs w 1-
/ l ..'
/ /
.we discussed the wind blowing isest, slow as it was,.
l f
\
l- - - - . _ _ . _ . . .
_ , _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - . _ _ - .,. .. . __- . _ _ _. . _ m m .._ _ _ _ m _
': .- ,- .A ,
x ' Q Do you know whether the helicopter actually came on the site and picked up somebody to go over the river? . .
' Mille'r To my knowledge it was verified to me that they picked up one or two of our people and they were flown over there.
$, And readings were back,'nd as I remember the readings were back before Dubiel had thought the plume had gotten there. .In other.words, we had gotten over_there faster
.than the radiation would have at the wind speed, which was very slow.
~
W On 4/24/79, Dubiel3 stated:8j . At some peint around 7:30, Gary Hiller asked me for the status o'f -
, the offsite teams, and I gave him the information that we had two teams ready to go offsite both available for transportation over to the West Shore. Gary directed me to make contact with the State
[ Police and get a State Police helicopter to get one crew over there in a more timely fashion. He was concerned about the traffic--the early morning rush hour traffic trying'to go up over the bridge in l Harrisburg and then back down and that it might take an hour or more L l to get over there. He requested that we send one team in a heli-copter and a second tearr. in a car of driving over at a normal pace l to back them up. I do not recall exactly who told me that they - l would get the State Police helicopter. I believe it was George Kunder, I do not remember exactly, but within minutes I had it confirmed to
. . . - ~ . ..- v -- - = ~ - - - ~ - -- = - = - - -
Reportability and Reportina
^ 'i
.The situation was intuitively reportable to NRC under 10 CFR 20.403, !
which requires immediate notification "...of any incident involving. n byproduct... material...which maj have caused or threatens to cause... l release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if averaged
.over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table II...." pg )Gr.-t 73 DL , h V 6 M A 3E-K(#4/M .
Merewasnoreasontobelievethatthedomemonitor(HP-R-214) increasewastransient,(he"immediatelyreportable"concentrationof M 5f Xe-133g : ld b; i::: c &1.5E-3 pCi/ml (i.e., 5000 x 3E-7 7Ci/ml). ":i_; ' 4
.a. r- ta = ^61323 ei-fseo-end : %/^ cM 5Ed econds per tubic-meter;-
M:th;i0744 Crawford M:;d 2.d S ti:: j 7 g L.... , 7.x d-e 16&4Nevr-3, v g.
.d.;;d 2/25/?L-to calculateg a concentration of 0.33 Ct
~
- +
.gfe,.
alW_ at the I.PL22(Mr M times h "immediately. reportable" concentration.q l kin; ;Le 4 I
%<@ cL1A b.; M~Eey
.e%A
--& re t-he-minimurr-concentrat-ion--immedistely reportable-unds 10 OIR kW I470, 1r5 y,,Gi, Re~
4 u n-be#-fo 'is-h e-t WP-R_114-reading- /05
. 3 cQun orrespond-tefnMA Anly 1., 2/lis.
Early in the accident, the licensee logically could have challenged the Procedure 1670.4 calculation on the basis of low reactor building pres-sure.- But as the <eactor building radioactivity inventory increased, as measured by HP-R-214, the licensee should have become p n;r-- ' 1,- less concerned about the conservatism of the calculation and more con-cerned about the magnitude of the potential hazard.
-.-- , q
; , 'y , u-l Telephone contact between the' Unit 2 control room and NRC Region I was.
.~ established, af ter appropriate efforts by the licensee, at abo ~ut 0750.'I l Although earlier contacts had been made with the Region I answering ser-vice, this.was the-licensee's first good opportunity to report the acci.- .
dent in accordance with 10 CFR 20.403.
- ob.yp &%.JDpse LP2.
However,the0744predictionof10(R/hrwasnotreported,apparen g
.because the first_onsite measurement at point GE-8 west of Unit 2 (1 mR/hr at 0746) had been used to calculate a new source term at 0750. -
Although this one onsite measurement did not prove th'at the release was insignificant, the licensee co ld have_ concluded justif b1 that the s' release was not f2 as bad asfWt:0 & M,u L ge :1:el:t:L TL .y WW.s '>"' ,v! -he situation
, remained however, in that: (1) the incident still threatened to cause a .
~
>s. ,g major release ~ and (2) offsite field measurements had not been completed.
a y *
$ff. ' ,,- yksdj.
The 11censee4 reported Crawford's 10 R/hr prediction to the Bureau of-
.]A v.
o Radiation Protection but not to NRC. The only identified NRC reference g ,, , - to a high radiation level outside the plant was the following telephone conversation recorde after 10:00 a.m. on 3/2 in the NRC Operations
, . Centerg
*, k x' VOICE: The indications are that low levels are being released, l
"M# 4 we will find out.
. ' :Q R s J. .) Q
~
h % p-VOICE: What is your HDC7 NJ ! S
-, s MM ,
i i
. VOICE: There is no question that there was -
3h'5
- i,. d . ..
l l (k < ,; ,
. .; . ... -A .
..c -
* ,s -
4 ..,_..,J, '
~
.In the meantime, I requested them to try to get their teams somehow 4 to Goldsboro, and they said that the State Police helicopter was
_[. there and that they would get one of their teams up in the air and i-
- j. over Goldsboro. We stayed on the phone with them. They found no, I .
J radiation levels onsite or in Goldsboro that would indicate any kind of a' leak. So therefore, we then notified the Civil Defense to hold i tight. This was all before 8:00. N
- . . The desire to disprove the 10 R/hr prediction, which could have triggered l' .
. siassive evacuations, is understood. Use of the first onsite, downwind measurement to partially achieve such disproof also is understood, e use of nonexistent offsite survey results to further disprove the pre-diction is not understood.
4 Conclusion 5 Nothint[ discovered in this investigation relieved the licensee of the requirement to report to NRC all pertinent facts concerning the accident.
'1 The 10 R/hr prediction seems not to have been adequately disproved by ,
.l 0750, when telephone contact was established with Region I. The decision
'I not to report the 10 R/hr prediction was improper. By not reporting to
; Region I at about 0750 on 3/28/79 that the calculational method described in Radiation Emergency Procedure 1670.4 had predicted a reportable re-lease of radioactive material, the licensee violated the reporting re-quirement of 10 CFR 20.403(a)(2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart - Management Phase) Station, Unit No. 1) ) I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Testimony of David H. Gamble has been served this 4th day of December, 1984, by mailing a copy, first class postage prepaid to the following: SERVICE LIST
- Administrative Judge Thomas Au, Esq.
Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Office of Chief Counsel Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Department of Environmental U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resources Washington, D.C. 20555 505 Executive House P.O. Box 2357
- Administrative Judge Harrisburg, PA 17120 Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic Safety i Licensing Board John A. Levin, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
- Administrative Judge P.O. Box 3265 Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Harrisburg, PA 17120 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W. Docketing and Service Section (3) Washington, D.C. 20036 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Henry D. Hukill Washington, D.C. 20555 Vice President GPU Nuclear Corporation Attwie Safety & Licensing Board P.O. Box 480 Panel Middletown, PA 17057 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt R.D. 5 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Coatesville, PA 19320 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Louise Bradford Washington, D.C. 20555 TMI ALERT 1011 Green Street
- Jack T.. Goldberg, Esq. Harrisburg, PA 17102 Office of the Executive Legal Director Joanne Doroshow, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Christic Institute Washington, D.C. 20555 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002
- -2 .
l Michael F. McBride,'Esq. Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq. . LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae William S. Jordan, III, Esq. 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.- Harmon,' Weiss & Jordan Suite 1100 2001 S Street, Northwest
- Washington, D.C. 20036 Suite 430
, Washington, D.C. 20009 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Hunton & Williams
. 707-East, Main Street TMI-PIRC Legal Fund Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 1037 Maclay Harrisburg, Penn. 17 03 4 A N Lyhn Bernabei
- Hand Delivered i
l 4 r e ei 1 m. - . w..r .w--,-, - - . ..,,-,,,...s - , . ~~.,,,-,...-.....-,-,e---,,--.rm-,,,------- --E..e .}}